December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

In-Line Skating Safety and Courtesy
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message: You have to do something about your products users. Some sort of responsible behaviour training. Here is a rant I made some months ago to a bicycle specific mailing list. (btw, my hand is still in pain) I am now convinced that there must be something about either cycling specific shoes, clipless pedal cleats, or perhaps the little mirror I have on my helmet that attracts users of inline skates so strongly that they crash into me. I used to think that it was a property of the bicycle, until last night. I went for an evening ride, and stopped to listen to some bagpipe players practicing in a local park last night. My bike was 10 feet away, leaning against a tree. I was standing off the path, on a place where the paving had been widened to accommodate a manhole. A skater was skating backwards, and ran into me, knocking me over. I jammed several fingers landing (officially hyperextention of a long list of Latin words). My hand is now in a brace, and since I already have chronic tendinitis, it may well be the better part of a year before it returns to its normal level of pain. I have no idea who the skater is, he picked himself up, and sprinted off, before I had a chance to get up myself, let alone time to offer my speculations on his parentage, and level of intelligence. (I suppose he was displaying some intelligence, for if I knew who he was, I would bring a charge of battery against him, in addition to a civil action that would include the maker of the skates. Not knowing who it was, or what brand of skates he wore makes such actions much more difficult.) I had to ride the remaining three miles home with my left (small favor, at least I can still write) arm on my lap. What particularly gets me about the clown last night, is that he was being spectacturaly irresponsible. This is a fairly popular park, and this was a busy time for a weekday. He shouldn't have been skating at speed on the path, let alone not facing the direction of travel. While I would have preferred that he instead have hit a brick wall, I at least had comparable mass to him, and still have reasonable bone strength, even if my tendons are in poor shape. Had he hit one of the parks frailer users, the result could have included a broken hip, or worse. (it is popular with seniors, who often take their evening constutional 4 abreast across the path.) I don't ride thru it normally (I'm not gonna take out someones grandmother), and in fact had walked my bike to listen to the pipers. When I have complained about problem interactions with skaters before, it was suggested that part of the problem was that I was using the bike path, as they aren't safe for bicyles any more. Well on Sunday, I came up behind two skaters on the road, in single file, climbing a hill. I made the usual "passing left" cry, and started to pass. The second skater was headphone equipped, and thus apparently didn't hear me. He started to pass the lead skater as my front wheel pulled alongside. His skate struck my wheel, luckily at ground level. That is when he became aware of my presence. We both managed to remain upright, and I swerved further out into the traffic lane (I had checked for oncoming cars before starting to pass. The skater didn't). Again, no apology was offered by the skater, I suggested that wearing headphones weren't a good idea on the street, he made an obscene reply. At this point, I am very tempted to switch from my current long wheelbase, fairly low bottom bracket recumbent bike, to a short wheelbase recumbent with a high bottom bracket (a design that places the pedals and chainwheels at the very front of the bike about 25 to 30 inches off the ground), and equip it with an extra "chainring", a 14" carbide tipped one from that well known bike parts maker Black & Decker. The electric bell that I have mounted inside the bar is clearly inaudible, even at times to those that aren't blocking out the world. I have heard speculation on a "lower pitch" air horn that operates off a water bottle filled with compressed air. (the message they convey is _LARGE TRUCK_ not bicycle). (of course that wouldn't have helped with the incident that prompted me to dictate this rant. Some of your users have clearly taken too many falls without a helmet. Others just don't have a clue about rules of the road. I repeatedly have problems with skaters that make sudden U turns without looking, nor was this the first time I have had a problem with a skater skating in the direction they did not face. (I was riding, they were oncoming, I was able to evade by putting my bike into the drainage ditch beside the path). SECOND Message: I just read your "asphalt bites" safety tips. NOT ONCE DOES IT MENTION OTHER VEHICLES AND RULES OF THE ROAD. It talks about saving the riders skin, but not that of the other users of the space they inflict themselves on. No mention is made about operating at night, etc. You don't suggest a mirror, and the "quiz" that tells people to ditch the headphones isn't mentioned on the page. This is truly irresponsible, and I hope some jury suitably penalizes you for your stupid actions. Since I wish to retain my anonymity, please send the reply to cypherpunks(a)toad.com, and I will see it. No, I don't want an apology, I want notice that the web page, and product packaging has been updated, stressing that inline skaters need to learn to a: share, b: be aware of other traffic (don't U turn into the path of another user, look before making any sudden change of direction or lane) c: don't come to a sudden stop in the middle of a mixed use "bike" path because a friend was coming the other direction, and you stopped to chat, d: operate "predictably" so if nothing else the other users can take steps to avoid you. e: ditch the tunes, f: have at least one set of eyes facing the direction you are travelling (yes, you can ride backwards, but you have to have someone spotting for you for the whole time) g: stay out of the lane that is for oncoming traffic -- if the path is narrow (like most rail trails) this means ride in single file. REPLY FROM ROLLERBLADE INC. Dear Mr. Random Nerd: Thank you for your e-mail message concerning in-line skating safety and more specifically, the "rules of the road". Public trails are used for many types of sporting activities (walking, biking, skating etc.). What the issue becomes is that all of us must learn to be courteous to other types of users, much like on public roadways which are utilized by cars, trucks, and motorcycles where everyone must adhere to a common set of rules. Regarding your issue with Rollerblade Inc., we feel that your anger towards us is misdirected. A good analogy to help me illustrate the issue for you would be this: if a person walking down the road throws a McDonalds wrapper on the ground, is McDonalds littering? It is up to us all to be skating (and biking) ambassadors who educate those who are beginners about the "rules of the road (trails)". Just as there are problems with uncourteous skaters, there are also uncourteous bikers out there who choose not to follow these rules. Rollerblade recognized early on the importance of safety education in creating this sport. We helped to create and, along with numerous other in-line skate manufacturers, heavily support an industry wide organization called the IISA (International In-Line Skating Association). The IISA has several programs like the Instructor Certification Program, and the National Skate Patrol that are aimed at educating skaters. National Skate Patrol members are much like National Ski Patrol members with obvious differences based on the specific activity. Members skate local parks and trails to be of assistance to skaters and to educate beginning skaters about safety and "the rules". The IISA also publishes "Rules of the Road" which gives tips to skaters about how to legally, and courteously skate. The IISA also helps to promote our "Asphalt Bites" Campaign which details the importance of always wearing protective gear while in-line skating. In addition to the efforts above, all your comments listed in points "a" through "g" are covered in the "Rules of the Road" on page 4 of our Owners Handbook that comes with each pair of Rollerblade skates. I have listed them below for your reference... 1. Always wear protective gear: helmet, wrist guards, knee & elbow pads 2. Take a lesson or learn in-line skating basics, such as controlling speed, turning, braking, stopping before you skate 3. Stay alert. Always skate under control. 4. Stay away from water, oil, debris, sand and uneven or broken pavement 5. Avoid areas with heavy traffic 6. Observe all traffic regulations 7. Skate on the right of the path. When you pass a walker, biker or another skater, move to the left. 8. Never allow yourself to be towed by a motorized vehicle or bicycle. 9. Avoid wearing headphones or anything that makes it hard to hear 10. Never wear anything that blocks your vision, and never skate at night or any time it is hard to see. I hope you come to find that we are as concerned as you about people enjoying public places and the outdoors. In most states, skates and bikes are wheeled vehicles that are subject to the same rules as motorists. Educating people to use public places takes an effort on everyones part. If you would like us to send a copy of our owners manual or any other safety information, please email us with your address. Thanks again...Skate (bike) the World!!! Webtech5 Rollerblade Consumer Service

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Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just got off the phone with the NSA. "There are so many places in the NSA that deal with cryptology we haven't been able to find the document yet. We'll call you back once we locate it and let you know if it can be released or not. We've been getting phone calls about the document. Did you read about it on the Internet?" -Declan >--- begin forwarded text > > >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 16:50:18 -0700 >From: Somebody >Subject: NSA Report >To: rah(a)shipwright.com > > I don't recall seeing this report mentioned in any e$pam items, and > thought you might be interested. Thanks for all your work on the e$ > lists. > ><Somebody's .sig> > >______________________________ Forward Header >__________________________________ >Subject: 21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >Author: "Ledig; Robert" <LEDIGRO(a)ffhsj.com> at internet >Date: 10/17/96 2:51 PM > > > >21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >October 17, 1996 > >National Security Agency Report Raises >Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money > > > A recent report prepared by the Cryptology Division of the National >Security Agency's Office of Information Security Research and Technology >discusses the potential for security failures in certain electronic cash >systems and their likely consequences. While demonstrating concern over the >attributes of non-traceable electronic money, the report points out methods >that may be used to minimize security breaches and losses, including >limiting the number of coins that can be affected by a single compromise, >requiring traceability for large transactions or large numbers of >transactions in a given period, and the creation of a mechanism to restore >traceability under certain circumstances. The report contains an excellent >summary of basic electronic money cryptographic tools, electronic cash >protocols, authentication and signature techniques and related security >issues. > > > >Copyright 1996. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. > All rights reserved. >21st Century Banking Alert is a trademark and servicemark > of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. > > > >--- end forwarded text > > > >----------------- >Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) >e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson >The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How about this idea for improving the remailer network: Every remailer is marked as either IN or OUT, not both. An IN remailer accepts mail from anybody but remails only to other remailers (IN or OUT). An OUT remailer never remails to another remailer, only to final recipient addresses. If an IN remailer finds itself as the last one in the chain then it picks an OUT remailer at random to send the message through. This way there would never be any abuse complaints on IN remailers because they are invisible. When an OUT remailer is taken out nobody gets hurt because OUT remailers will never be used in reply blocks. Matts

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RE: "Countless third world deaths"--who cares?
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hard Media <zaid(a)hardnet.co.uk> wrote: >Citibank is a major player in the third world debt crisis. [Thomas Bass interviewing Citibank's Walter Wriston] > goes on to ask if "Walter" has made any "bad loans" ie to >dictators and other nasty sorts >...jeez sorry but there's naivity and there's stupidity "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >Money was lent for economic development projects...some worked, >some didn't. Lenders of money don't "cause" deaths. People are >responsible for their own actions, mostly. If their governments are >corrupt, they need to replace those governments. In Re: Stopping the buying of candidates "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote >Our political system is already in thrall to various special interests; > [...] So be it. Let the highest bidder buy the government he can. In RE: wired wankers Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> wrote: >These are very serious folks [Wriston et al.]. [...] > Don't get in their way unless you have an angel on your side. >An angel with a bag of cash, actually. In Re: Timmy May is a jerk "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >I guess I'm not much of a joiner. I never donated to the United Way "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >If this sounds harsh, so be it. >Cypherpunks is not about redistributing wealth. Ahh, but you don't really believe this. Your vision of cypherpunks is all about redistributing wealth. Just not in the sense you speak of. There is naivete and then there is complicity. James "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >People are responsible for their own actions, mostly.

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New On WWW.Infowar.Com Vol I #3
by Betty G. O'Hearn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New On WWW.Infowar.Com Take a look. Pass it on. We thank our sponsors: National Computer Security Association Open Source Solutions New Dimensions International - Security Training Secure Computing Corporation HOMECOM Communications There is a lot included in this newsletter including the RELEASE DATE of Winn Schwartau's new book., "Information Warfare Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age." _____________________________________________________________ On www.infowar.com: What's New **December 2, 1996** deadline and call for papers for the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy In Russia, they don't have Ghost Busters!! They say they've figured out how to crack DES and other crypto services. You have to read this important announcement. DoctrineLINK - the most comprehensive online guide to military doctrine currently available. PKZip Trogan Horse.... Distribute to your security personnel. Beware of the Answering Machine Scam!!! Read about the The Internet II Project which has begun. HOW THE CIA COMBATS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HUMINT STILL MOST IMPORTANT WHEN THWARTING TERRORISTS Deputy Attorney General speaks on computer terrorism SPA vs. Site with Hack links? Private Big Brother? Memorandum on 'Arab Intranet' to be signed next week. Phone Scams on the Rise $100 Return Phone Calls? E-Mail Bomber Prosecuted ************************************************************* Great News! You Asked Us For It! It is ON THE WAY!!! ************************************************************* Archives of C4I Inforwar.com has received permission to mirror the entire archive of the list C-4I. For those of you not familiar with this communication, C4I-Pro is an unofficial list run in a DoD school environment in the interest of an academic exchange of information and ideas as a means for advancement of C4I related issues. These archives will add value in your searches. ************************************************************* Announcing a new list: Infowar(a)infowar.com Many of you have signed up for this discussion group thru the web site. This list is about to be launched with in the next 10 days. If you have not signed up, go over to http://www.infowar.com and add your name and info! ************************************************************* Announcing Winn Schwartau's New Book - "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" BY WINN SCHWARTAU Thunder's Mouth Press, New York. 212.780.0380 ISBN: 1-56025-132-8 Released Date: October 30, 1996. WINN Schwartau's second book on IW, "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" is a *must* have, inclusive update on the subject. You will want this book in your library of Information Warfare AND INFORMATION SECURITY genre. ABOUT 1/3 of this book is taken from the original work on the subject, "Information Warfare - Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway". ( ISBN: 1-56025-080-1) 1994. Schwartau has added substantial material that brings us current in the EVOLUTION of the field of IW. In addition over thirty contributions from an international collection of authors with excellent and CONTROVERSIAL pieces relevant to the field. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TRUE STORY OF PGP AND PHIL ZIMMERMANN FINALLY COMES TO LIGHT. A GREATLY EXPANDED SECTION ON DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS CLEARS UP MANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. A HIGHLY CONTROVERRSIAL PIECE IS ON HOW TO USE THE INTERNET AS AN ASSASSINATION TOOL. THE CONTRIBUTIONS SPAN FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN TO ANARCHIST. THE DISTINGUISHED Dr. John Alger, National Defense University authored the introduction, and validates Schwartau as one of the major players who brought Information Warfare into focus as "one that affected the primarily the economic infrastructure of the nation. ...And his taxonomy of Class 1, 2 and 3 information warfare is a meaninful organization of ideas upon which a serious study of the concept of information warfare - particularly where concern with economic infrastructure is concerned. Winn Schwartau's second edition of "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" examines IW in its broadest context." This book is a must for all teaching facilities on the subject of IW. Professor, Dr. Dorothy Denning is an example of distinguished academia from Georgetown University. States Denning. " I'll be using it in COSC 511: Information Warfare: Terrorism, Crime, and National Security". Among the contributing authors are LCdr. Robert J. Garigue, Martin Libicki, Daniel and Julie Ryan, Charles Swett, Carlo Kopp, Peter Radatti, Capt. Roger D. Thrasher, Matthew G. Devost, Simon Davies, Dr. Phillipe Baumard and a score of others representing a global view on the subject. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: THUNDER'S MOUTH PRESS 212.780.0380 YOUR LOCAL BOOKSTORE OR ORDER FROM THE NCSA AT 717.258.1816 **************************************************************** DIRECT REQUESTS to: list(a)infowar.com with one-line in the BODY, NOT in the subject line. Subscribe news_from_wschwatau TO JOIN GROUP Unsubscribe news_from_wschwartau TO LEAVE GROUP **************************************************************** http://www.Infowar.Com Managed by Winn Schwartau winn(a)infowar.com Interpact, Inc. 11511 Pine St. Seminole, FL 33772 813-393-6600 Voice 813-393-6361 FAX Comments, Content, Sponsor Opportunties Betty O'Hearn Assistant to Mr.Winn Schwartau betty(a)infowar.com 813-367-7277 Voice 813-363-7277 FAX

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge, Senator. Look at your account balance > >tomorrow. Never forget the National Association of Manufacturers was > >there for you" (Obviously a completely random selection 8-) > While I have worked through essentially none of the details, if the system > can be implemented well enough, all this kind of information will be blinded > into oblivion. Donations won't be tallied individually, and news of their > arrival will be disguised, possibly by limiting the size that is credited to > the candidate per day and thus in effect splitting up a donation to make it > "arrive" over a period of a week or two. Only overall totals will be > reported, possibly rounded to only two significant figures, and even then > possibly only on a weekly basis. Politicians need money to pay bills. If you are cutting off all prediction of money appearing (which is impossible unless you get rid of all special interests) no campaign can ever have the ability to plan. This is a major part of all campaigns. Resistance to this will be high (not that this wasnt expected.) > >> The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still > >> free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off > >> is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what > >> the problem is, isn't it? > > > >See above for why the connection is not. > > Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not > help develop one that will? Why don't you run for office. I did. Reality, after all, is far better than theory. > But "vote delivery" can't be proven, or even demonstrated with a strong > degree of assurance. Every candidate ever endorsed by the Firefighters Union in my town have been absolutely elected. Looking at the firefighters voting records and matching with their addresses shows a distinct pattern of voting in almost every election. They have sufficient numbers to win every time. > What I consider wrong is that government affects way too large a fraction of > our lives, without apparent Constitutional justification. If the government > at all levels were only, say, 1/10th of its current size, there would be > much less motivation for corruption. Power currupts. Not size of governement. I agree we need to shrink our gov't a whole lot. I believe whole heartedly in the Constitution. I advocate the entire Bill of Rights. I also support meaningful campaign finance reform. But ya know what? I lost. Change doesn't depend on changing finance laws. Much as in nature, these people will always find a way around it. It depends on helping people empower themselves. Making them know their vote DOES count. People who want real reform should fight actively for it. > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com Matt ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

American Banker, 10/24/96 Gonzalez pushing consumer safeguards for electronic banking Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez called Wednesday for aggressive congressional action to protect consumers in the emerging world of electronic banking. Releasing a blueprint for legislative action, the Texas Democrat urged Congress to: *Adopt public policy standards relating to privacy, disclosure, access, equity, and financial reliability for electronic banking products and services. *Hold oversight hearings to assess how well the industry is serving the consumer in these five areas. *Enact laws if the industry's performance falls below minimum congressional standards. *Define financial transactions to include the exchange of financial information as well as cash. *Consider revising current consumer protection laws. "Many of the federal consumer protection laws are nearly 30 years old, and they were not designed to deal with the effects of these new technologies," said Rep. Gonzalez, the House Banking Committee's ranking minority member. The report, "Connecting Consumers: Consumer Issues and Emerging Financial Technology," recommends subjecting banks and nonbanks to the same laws and regulations in this area. Republican committee members and banking regulators have been reluctant to issue rules that might hinder the development of new electronic banking products. [I.e., more regulation of electronic commernce. -DV] --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:32 AM 10/24/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: >> While I have worked through essentially none of the details, if the system >> can be implemented well enough, all this kind of information will be blinded >> into oblivion. Donations won't be tallied individually, and news of their >> arrival will be disguised, possibly by limiting the size that is credited to >> the candidate per day and thus in effect splitting up a donation to make it >> "arrive" over a period of a week or two. Only overall totals will be >> reported, possibly rounded to only two significant figures, and even then >> possibly only on a weekly basis. > >Politicians need money to pay bills. If you are cutting off all >prediction of money appearing (which is impossible unless you get rid >of all special interests) no campaign can ever have the ability to >plan. No, I didn't say I was "cutting off all prediction of money appearing." But it would be a long shot from having particular donor's names associated with particular dollar figures. And, the system would simply have to adjust. Campaigns would have to adjust their spending to match the current realities, and donors would have to recognize that they're going to have to donate a bit earlier to accomodate the delay. >This is a major part of all campaigns. Resistance to this >will be high (not that this wasnt expected.) > >> >> The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still >> >> free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off >> >> is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what >> >> the problem is, isn't it? >> > >> >See above for why the connection is not. >> >> Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not >> help develop one that will? > >Why don't you run for office. I did. Reality, after all, is far >better than theory. I'd prefer doing something far more...uh...permanent than to merely REPLACE officeholders. >> But "vote delivery" can't be proven, or even demonstrated with a strong >> degree of assurance. > >Every candidate ever endorsed by the Firefighters Union in my town >have been absolutely elected. Looking at the firefighters voting >records and matching with their addresses shows a distinct pattern of >voting in almost every election. "Firefighter's voting records"? I _thought_ we had a secret ballot in this country. Maybe you're from some town that I don't know about! Besides, what you're saying can be considered a bit of self-fulfilling prophecy. Some cities ALWAYS vote one way, or another. Over time, public employees simply adjust their politics to match their wallets, etc. Remember, these are PUBLIC employees after all, which really just means the employeees of the thugs who get into office. It does not serve their interests to go against the winning candidate. If, one year, the party normally out of office appears to be winning, the Firefighters will simply adjust their politics accordingly. Simple. > They have sufficient numbers to win every time. Whichever candidate wins, "has sufficient numbers to win." Tell me something else I don't know. >> What I consider wrong is that government affects way too large a fraction of >> our lives, without apparent Constitutional justification. If the government >> at all levels were only, say, 1/10th of its current size, there would be >> much less motivation for corruption. > >Power currupts. Not size of governement. Size of government is evidence of the size of the corruption. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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to whoever runs the "best of security list"
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've noticed that frequently when I send a message to cypherpunks, someone forwards the message to some list called, I think, "best-of-security". I have no idea who runs this list or who is forwarding my messages to it, but the list appears to be badly misconfigured. Every time one of my messages gets forwarded, I get literally two or three dozen bounce messages from undeliverable recipients on that list. My guess is that the best- of-security list software incorrectly identifies the original message author, instead of the list owner, as the originator of messages, and so errors are sent to the wrong place. So to whoever is running the best-of-security list: please either fix your list software or stop forwarding my messages to it. Thanks -matt

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"So Says I", 10/24 ISIG Meeting
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 13:58:24 -0400 (EDT) X-Sender: mcooley(a)tiac.net Mime-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: mcooley(a)nethorizons.com (Marianne Cooley) Subject: "So Says I", 10/24 ISIG Meeting fyi >Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 15:45:27 -0400 (EDT) >X-Sender: mcooley(a)tiac.net >To: isig(a)bcs.org >From: mcooley(a)nethorizons.com (Marianne Cooley) >Subject: "So Says I", 10/24 ISIG Meeting >Sender: owner-isig(a)bcs.org >Precedence: bulk >Reply-To: isig(a)bcs.org > >Join us for a great evening at MIT, Building 6, Room 120 for the latest ISIG >meeting. Here's the scoop on the main presentation which starts at 7 pm: > >"So Says I**": Financial cryptography, microintemediation and the power of >reputation in a ubiquitous geodesic economy. < Actually, "I" is "Joe Nebuchannezar" ;-), RAH> >(That really means there's a whole lotta' shakin' goin' on in the area of >electronic money!) > > >** "I" is Bob Hettinga, the founder of the Digital Commerce Society of >Boston, and resident man with opinions on most aspects of e$$ > > >Obviously, the net is going to give us the ability for anyone, anywhere, to >buy anything. No matter where the buyer or seller is, or, for that matter, >where the thing being sold is. > >However, financial cryptography, the technology which underlies digital >commerce, will have much more profound implications than merely the >simplification of sales and distribution. It permits us to make anonymous >*cash* transactions for everything from a billion-dollar foriegn exchange >trade to possibly even switching internet packets themselves. > >If this promise is kept, it could change the fundamentals of our entire >society. It forces profit and loss responsibility further and further down >into organizations until they break up into smaller competing operating >units. It makes book-entry transactions like checks or credit cards >obsolete, and replaces them with strange stuff like digital cash and >personal digital bearer bonds. It creates cash-settled auction markets for >practically anything. People joke about routers and switches which save up >enough from their traffic-tolls to buy copies of themselves. About >micromoney as processor food. > >On a macroeconomic scale, all of government's revenue sources are >book-entry taxes, like those on sales, income, and capital gains. "What >happens when taxes become a tip?", some people have asked. That is, if >government can't trace transactions anymore, because of the very way those >transactions executed, how will government be funded? > >Disintermediation is a common buzzword in the financial markets. It is >usually meant to describe what mutual fund companies have done to banks. >What happens when mutual funds become microintermediated? > >In this talk, we'll look at all of this, and what the world might look like >if Moore's Law and strong cryptography do manage to create a geodesic >economy. > >>From 6:30-7pm, we had expected to have a demonstration of Black Diamond's >web video software, but we haven't quite solved the technical details...(it >is active X, and we can't get that on a UNIX machine yet ;) ) I am still >expecting that one of their representatives will be joining us. We will >also have the usual Q&A during that time. > >If you don't know where Building 6 Room 120 is, the simplest way to describe >it follows: > >Go to the main entrance of MIT on Mass Ave and walk up the steps into the >domed building. Go straight ahead into the long hall ("the infinite >corridor".) Keep walking until you reach the sign that says Building 6,to >the right. Turn down the hall to the right until you reach room 120 on your >right. > > >Looking forward to seeing you all! > >Cheers, >Marianne >********************************************************************* > > Marianne Cooley Internet Special Interest Group > NetHorizons Unlimited Coming Soon! A *new* Boston Group > mcooley(a)nethorizons.com > 617.433.0825 > >Join "Life at Internet Speed" on www.boston.com Wednesdays from 1-2pm! >For a chat topic reminder, send an email to chat-reminder(a)nethorizons.com > with your full name and email address in the body of the message. >********************************************************************** > > > > ********************************************************************* Marianne Cooley Internet Special Interest Group NetHorizons Unlimited Coming Soon! A *new* Boston Group mcooley(a)nethorizons.com 617.433.0825 Join "Life at Internet Speed" on www.boston.com Wednesdays from 1-2pm! For a chat topic reminder, send an email to chat-reminder(a)nethorizons.com with your full name and email address in the body of the message. ********************************************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Rollerblade Inc. Message
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today I responded to a rant per request of a cypherpunks(a)toad.com member. I now have been informed that the above news group is not a general use news group. I apologize for any extraneous, non-cryptographic related material that would have been forwarded to all of you earlier today. To illustrate my point, this situation would be similar to someone calling and leaving a message to return the call but deliberately listing the incorrect phone number. I have received numerous replies from many of you and have responded to as many as possible explaining the situation as best I can. Being a webtech for a high e-mail volume company like Rollerblade, topics in cryptography are becoming very important to me. You can bet that I will be visiting your Cypherpunks sites frequently to keep up with the latest trends in cryptographic technologies. Please excuse my oversight of sending an e-mail reply to an unknown news group, this situation has definitely opened my eyes to another important NETicate rule. Thanks for your understanding. Skate the World!!! Webtech5 Rollerblade Consumer Service

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Yet-another Czar
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Up until now, when remailers have gone down it has not been in a circumstance in which escrow would help much. Generally they are taken down voluntarily or at the request of someone in authority (the owner of the computer they are running on, in many cases!). In these situations there would not be a problem in transferring the key to someone else. There have been a couple of times, particularly early in a given remailer's life, where people have clumsily deleted their remailer's key and had to create a new one. In such a circumstance a secure backup capability would be useful. But you don't really need the kinds of recovery that Matt's idea provides. Conceivably a remailer operator could be dragged off in chains, but it doesn't seem like a very probable scenario. Even then more traditional secret sharing based distributed backups would seem like a better fit than "net escrow". The main distinguishing feature of the latter is that society as a whole can choose to release a key without the owner's approval, but not any lesser group. Hal

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is my last reply. I guess I forgot your overarching theory. Reality, nah. (snip) > No, I didn't say I was "cutting off all prediction of money appearing." > But it would be a long shot from having particular donor's names associated > with particular dollar figures. And, the system would simply have to (snip) It's not a long shot. When Bob the Big Bad Lobbyist comes into the Senator's office and leads him to believe a donation will be made and magically a sizeable one does, it can be reasonable infered from whence it came. In the real world, politicians have access to the names and addresses of people who regularly donate to political campaigns. Trust me, the probability of others, i.e. regular working people, donating to campaigns is zero to none. There is a finite pool of political campaign money out there. > >> Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not > >> help develop one that will? > > > >Why don't you run for office. I did. Reality, after all, is far > >better than theory. > > I'd prefer doing something far more...uh...permanent than to merely REPLACE > officeholders. My fault. I forget whom I was replying to. Of course my reply above was in response to your question about developing a "working" system. Have fun in your politicianless world (with no physical infrastructure, information infrastructure, national defense, etc.) I would much rather leave it to the market. There is, of course, no corruption there. (WINK) > >Every candidate ever endorsed by the Firefighters Union in my town > >have been absolutely elected. Looking at the firefighters voting > >records and matching with their addresses shows a distinct pattern of > >voting in almost every election. > > "Firefighter's voting records"? I _thought_ we had a secret ballot in this > country. Maybe you're from some town that I don't know about! I, unlike some people, live in the real world. It is trivial for political groups to put together listings of public employee addresses, their VOTING records (meaning whether they voted or not, check with your city hall...hmmm...go figure, they keep track of that) and public expressions of support (i.e. lawn signs, letters to the editor, rally attendance). Compile this info and you have a pretty good handle on who voted for whom (Yes I know it cant show absolutely that someone voted a certain way, but most of campaigning is simple probability. I dont have the time to explain this in detail, look it up if you are really interested). > Besides, what you're saying can be considered a bit of self-fulfilling > prophecy. Some cities ALWAYS vote one way, or another. Over time, public > employees simply adjust their politics to match their wallets, etc. > Remember, these are PUBLIC employees after all, which really just means the > employeees of the thugs who get into office. It does not serve their > interests to go against the winning candidate. If, one year, the party > normally out of office appears to be winning, the Firefighters will simply > adjust their politics accordingly. Simple. What you are not getting is that, in this case, the public employees are the edge that causes the win. We have had some close races, the winning margin is clearly less than the number of voting public employees. You don't need to control all the votes. Only the sure number that you can "deliver", the need for which can be discerned fairly easily (using those nasty historical voting records). > > > They have sufficient numbers to win every time. > > Whichever candidate wins, "has sufficient numbers to win." Tell me > something else I don't know. > This came from a discussion of vote delivery. X has a block Y that will vote for Z (the endorsed candidate) every time. If victory margin is less than Y, X's delivery controls the race. > >Power currupts. Not size of governement. > > Size of government is evidence of the size of the corruption. > Unproven. Apparently you don't believe that some monarchies, which can be extremely small governments, have been some of the most corrupt in history. As I stated above, power corrupts. It is an easy way out of arguments for libertarians and most republicans to say that big government is the root of all evil. Quite simply put, it is people that are the arbiters of their free will. People are the root. > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com Matt ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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Re: Chinese Gold Bar Mystery
by Olaf Kielhorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 23 Oct 1996 12:28:35 -0400, John Young wrote: >http://www.iacr.org/~iacr/china/china.html > > >Cryptograms on Gold bars from China > > [snip] rest deleted this message seems to return like the four season at least 3 times a year It get's more and more boring each time. Every beginning of an idea corresponds to an imperceptible lesion of the mind.

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Re: Finally -- A crypto question from me...HD encryption
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Are there any good programs out there that can encrypt my HD?? Since > > there probably are, please mention some and where I can get them. Also, > > no one mention PGP. > > Yes, the KOH disk encryption system. It is a small little thing that > encrypts the FAT (I believe) That would be totally useless, you don`t need the FAT to recover the data. Do a web search for a program called SFS, that will encrypt the whole HD. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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LAWSUIT DROPPED; SPA STILL DEMANDS MONITORING
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Release October 24, 1996 Contact: Sameer Parekh 510-986-8770 LAWSUIT DROPPED; SPA STILL DEMANDS MONITORING Oakland, CA - In an ongoing attempt to force Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to monitor their customers' web pages, the Software Publisher's Association (SPA), acting on behalf of three member software companies, dropped a lawsuit against Community ConneXion, Inc., dba C2Net, but reserved the right to bring the suit again if C2Net failed to adopt a policy of monitoring their users' web pages for copyright infringement. The three plaintiffs, Adobe Systems, Inc., Claris Corporation, and Traveling Software, Inc., seemed surprised to find that they had filed the lawsuit, and sought to distance themselves from the action. For instance, Adobe's PR department maintained that Adobe has definitely not filed any such lawsuiT. (Contact Carol Sacks -- (408) 536-4033) C2Net, a small, Oakland-based ISP and software company, has always forbidden illegal activity on its servers. This includes copyright infringement and contributory copyright infringement. "We're very aware of the problems that software companies face from piracy; most of our revenue comes from software and we have our own problems with people pirating our software," said C2Net President Sameer Parekh. "I just don't think that bullying hard-working ISPs into embracing a highly questionable set of policies does anything constructive about the problem of piracy." The Software Publishers Association wants ISPs to sign a 'Code of Conduct' which would force ISPs to actively monitor users. Under current case law, this greatly increases the ISP's liability, in addition to being extremely expensive, time-consuming, and distasteful to users. "The telephone company isn't required to monitor all their users to make sure they're not saying illegal things," said Parekh. "How can we be expected to do that for our customers' use of the Internet?" Of the over twenty ISPs contacted by the SPA, many caved in and signed the 'Code of Conduct', fearing a lawsuit from the SPA more than the future expense and liability problems that result from ongoing monitoring. A coalition of ISPs and other concerned parties, the ISP Defense Coalition, has formed to oppose these bullying tactics by the SPA. "The SPA thought they could bully small ISPs, but they didn't realize we had principles and couldn't be cowed," said Parekh. Mike Godwin, Staff Counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation said, "My personal view is that the Software Publishers Association has forgotten that it is the legislature, not the courts, that is the primary avenue for seeking changes in copyright policy. What we see here is a perversion of the notion that the courts should be used to seek justice -- SPA seems to have picked defendants in the hope that they'd be too weak to resist. I find that decision morally objectionable. Speaking as a lawyer, I have to say that this is the kind of tactic that justifiably confirms in people's minds whatever low opinions they may have of lawyers." The suit alleged that C2Net users were providing tools to get around copy protection in the plaintiffs' software, and were providing pointers to other sites that actually contained pirated software. The SPA provided no examples, and did not allege any direct copyright infringement on C2Net machines. "Despite our best efforts to get specific information," said Parekh, "the SPA did not provide us with any specifics about our customers engaging in infringing activity. We suspect that they had no evidence of infringement, but acted merely on vague reports of questionable conduct on the part of a few users." C2Net provides high-security encryption solutions for the Internet worldwide. More information about C2Net's products are available at https://stronghold.c2.net/. Information about the forming coalition may be found at https://www.c2.net/ispdc/.

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Work on reputations
by Alexander Chislenko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could somebody please forward me references to existing reputations-based systems, and discussions of them? I read cyphernomicon and some texts on and off the Net, but I assume there should be a lot more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Alexander Chislenko <sasha1(a)netcom.com> www.lucifer.com/~sasha/home.html Firefly Network, Inc.: <alexc(a)firefly.net> www.ffly.com 617-234-5452 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York Times: Monday, October 21, 1996 Israelis Cite New Risk To Electronic Data Security By JOHN MARKOFF Two of Israel's leading computer scientists say they have found a way to more easily decode and then counterfeit the electronic cash ``smart cards'' that are now widely used in Europe and are being tested in the United States. The researchers have begun circulating the draft of a paper that points out higher security risks than those discovered last month by scientists at Bell Communications Research. The Bell researchers had reported that it might be possible to counterfeit many types of the ``smart cards'' that are being tested by banks and credit-card companies, including Visa and Mastercard. The two Israeli scientists, Adi Shamir, a professor at the applied mathematics department at the Weizmann Institute, and Eli Biham, a member of the faculty of the computer-science department at the Technion, reported that in addition to the so-called public key coding systems that were found vulnerable by the Bellcore team, private key data coding systems such as the American Data Encryption Standard, or DES, can be successfully attacked if a computer processor can be made to produce an error. The two Israelis made a draft of their research available via the Internet on Thursday. In their paper the two wrote, ``We can extract the full DES key from a sealed tamperproof DES encrypter'' by analyzing fewer than 200 encoded messages. Both public key and private key data-scrambling methods are based on the difficulty involved in factoring large numbers. A public key system permits two parties who have never met to exchange secret information. A private key system requires that a secret key be exchanged beforehand. Data-coding experts said that the new Israeli method might be a more practical system than the previously announced Bellcore method, because unlike public keys, which are frequently used only once per message, a private secret key may be used repeatedly to scramble electronic transactions. ``This seems a lot closer to something that might actually be used,'' said Matt Blaze, a computer researcher at AT&T Laboratories. Smart cards have been promoted as tamperproof, which is why computer scientists at Bellcore, one of the United States' leading information-technology laboratories, sounded the alarm last month, saying that a savvy criminal might be able to tweak a smart-card chip to make a counterfeit copy of the monetary value on a legitimate card. Executives at smart-card companies said at the time that the attack was theoretical and that it would be impossible to make a smart card generate an error without actually destroying the card. However, Biham responded that he believed such hardware attacks were possible. The cards are generally damaged by means of heat or radiation, which causes the computer chip in the card to generate an error, which the Israeli scientists used to obtain the code key and copy the card. ``I have ample evidence that hardware faults can be generated without too much difficulty,'' he said in an electronic-mail message. ``As a consultant to some high-tech companies, I had numerous opportunities to witness successful attacks by commercial pirates on pay-TV systems based on smart cards. ``I know for a fact that some of these attacks were based on intentional clock and power-supply glitches, which can often cause the execution of incorrect instructions by the smart card.'' Other researchers said that the class of attacks demonstrated by the Bellcore team and the Israelis had been known by some members of the tightly knit community of cryptographers for several years, but the results had not been published. ``Some of the smart-card manufacturers are well aware of this flaw,'' said Paul Kocher, an independent Silicon Valley data-security consultant. ``But it doesn't mean that they have fixed it.'' American Banker: Monday, October 21, 1996 Bank Regulations Are No Obstacle to E-Money Ventures BY THOMAS P. VARTANIAN Banks and holding companies have three strategic alternatives for delivering new electronic products and services to customers: They can develop them through internal expansion; acquire, whole or in part, companies that provide them; or enter into joint ventures, networks, alliances, and partnerships. Experts seem to believe the third approach provides banks with the optimal array of business opportunities. But successful technology ventures require a blend of business skills, savvy instincts, and an understanding of the legal pitfalls. Venture partners must be compatible in strategic goals, competitive vigor, geography, cultural affinity, and social constitution. As the trend toward technology-driven ventures develops, so must regulators correspondingly expand their views of what constitutes permissible banking activities. As they do, and as Internet commerce and electronic money transform the nature of banking relationships and money, banks and bank holding companies should constantly evaluate how investments in subsidiary corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, and limited-liability companies may facilitate their strategies to remain technologically competitive. In January 1996, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency explained its current position regarding the ways in which the operating subsidiaries of national banks may co-venture with nonregulated entities in the development and delivery of new technological products and services. In that decision, the OCC approved the contribution of a merchant credit card business by a group of affiliated national banks to a technology company, in exchange for a collective 40% equity interest in that company. Other initial shareholders in the transaction included a venture capital fund, a telecommunications company, and management of the company. The newly formed operating subsidiary planned to complete a public offering and further reduce the banks' ownership interests subsequent to this initial transaction. Similarly, the OCC approved in March a national bank operating subsidiary's participation in a joint venture that was 50% owned by 31 depository institutions, including four national banks. The venture was to provide automated teller machine and point of sale services to depository institutions in the northwest United States and western Canadian provinces. It also would operate a transaction switch, transmit information to other networks pursuant to gateway agreements, provide ATM and POS-related services to owners and members, and furnish net settlement information. These authorizations reflected a flexible approach to two critical factors: the list of activities that national banks may legally engage in; and the manner in which they can be so engaged. With respect to the latter point, the OCC will make exceptions to its traditional requirement that national banks control at least 80% of their operating subsidiaries and permit minority investments in subsidiaries if certain conditions regarding the activities and independence of the subsidiary are met. The OCC seems to recognize such subsidiaries will be a necessary vehicle for national banks to remain competitive in technologically driven markets. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is similarly accommodating. On May 21, it authorized Cardinal Bancshares to acquire Five Paces Software Inc. through a wholly owned thrift subsidiary, Security First Network Bank, and thereby engage nationwide in data processing activities relating to financial services over the Internet. The Fed noted that all of Five Paces' data processing and transmission activities "are provided in connection with transactions in accounts maintained by a financial institution. " The agency had previously determined that "the development, production, and sale of software that allows a customer to conduct banking transactions using personal computers (is permissible because it) is closely related to banking." On Feb. 6, the Fed approved the acquisition by Royal Bank of Canada of 20% of the voting shares of Meca Software LLC. The Fed relied on Section 225.25(b)(7) of Regulation Y, which permits bank holding companies to provide data processing and data transmission services, facilities (including software), data bases, or access to such services, facilities or data bases by any technological means, so long as the data to be processed or furnished are "financial, banking or economic in nature." Interestingly , the central bank disregarded the fact that Meca conducted nonfinancial activities. It concluded that those software products -- including games, computer security programs, a medical reference library, and a program providing basic legal forms -- did not have dedicated employees or resources, produced only 7% of the company's revenues and would not be upgraded, enhanced or promoted. Therefore, they would not preclude approval. Similar limitations on nonfinancial data processing and transmission services facilitated the Fed's approval of a de novo subsidiary of Compagnie Financiere de Paribas on Feb. 26 to produce integrated billing software programs for digital mobile telephone networks. It remains to be seen how the Federal Reserve or the OCC will respond to requests to engage in technological activities that are not directly financial, banking, or economic in nature. However, the agencies seem to be signalling a willingness to be expansion-minded. The Fed issued an order July 1 allowing four banks in Ohio and Pennsylvania through their ATM affiliate, Electronic Payment Services Inc., to provide data processing and other services relating to the distribution of tickets, gift certificates, prepaid telephone cards, and other documents. Proposals regarding joint ventures in electronic money, smart card systems, and PC hard-drive currencies are pending. The regulators are becoming attuned to new types of regulatory issues and concerns. For example, in its Cardinal Bancshares order, the Fed said it expects acquisitions such as Five Paces to "enhance consumer convenience by expanding the availability of electronic banking services and by making those services available in new ways." But it warned that defects in security policies or procedures would be considered unsafe and unsound banking practices because of the risks associated with the provision of services over the Internet. Not since Jesse James was practicing his entrepreneurial skills has bank security become such a regulatory concern. Since no human can exist in cyberspace, and identification and verification of parties over the Internet may be subject to manipulation, the Fed is clearly telling banks to take prudent steps and utilize state-of-the-art cryptography to discourage and prevent computer break-ins, counterfeiting, theft of accounts and identities, systemic attacks and informational warfare. A fair enough admonition -- one that many banks can satisfy only by working with partners and unaffiliated entities. But entrepreneurial business venturers do not mix easily with regulation. While a bank's joint-venture partner may be a high-quality technology company, it may not be accustomed to the kind of regulatory examination, intervention, and enforcement that banks know. This issue must be resolved at the inception of a joint venture to avoid subsequent disputes. Given the way current laws work, nonbanks may want to join with a bank holding company affiliate rather than a bank subsidiary to avoid the liability that can attach to an "institution-affiliated party," such as a subsidiary of an insured bank. Traditional concepts of due diligence will also have to be substantially augmented and modified to adequately evaluate businesses in cyberspace. No longer will physical reviews of corporate documents and officer interviews suffice. Bank acquirers and co-venturers will have to thoroughly consider the extent to which electronic breaches, theft, counterfeiting and manipulation of systems have occurred or can occur. Given the ever-increasing technological capacity available to cyberspace pirates, security protocols will have to efficiently accommodate new generations of technological upgrades. Off-line, unaccountable smart cards may have to be upgraded by the originator or issuer through virus- like transmissions spread card-to-card and card-to-terminal. Similarly, the encrypted identifying marks of electronic money may need to be regularly reformatted in order to limit the amounts that can be counterfeited or duplicated. In the intellectual property area, an acquired or co-ventured technology business may only be worth what it costs if the products and services and their underlying software and programs are adequately protected or protectable under copyright, trademark, and patent laws. Given the dizzying rate at which such filings are occurring in electronic banking and commerce, it is equally critical to determine that any technology, products, or services being acquired do not violate pending or issued licenses in any jurisdiction in the world. The Internet is a worldwide marketing mechanism, and users will have to consider the laws and customs of a multitude of jurisdictions -- even those where they may never have done business or intended to do business. In any joint venture, affiliation, or alliance, the contracting parties must determine who "owns" the customer. But in the world of cyberspace, where traditional identities and boundaries no longer apply, ownership and access issues will be even more important, particularly when a venture is unwound or dissolved. Banks have traditionally sought to share information between and among affiliates for marketing purposes. Where the affiliate is not a controlled subsidiary, however, such sharing may be problematic and even illegal under state privacy laws. As electronic commerce and smart card products begin to be introduced and gain acceptance, certain brands will naturally become more prominent and recognized. Unlike the branding issues that are important to companies in the consumer products area, these electronic products will have to fight for market share among consumers who put a premium on confidence and trust. Banks will have to find ways to continue to accommodate the financial as well as emotional elements of the relationship that exists between an individual and his or her money. Brands and logos that evoke confidence and trust will be extremely valuable, and should be treated accordingly in the business ventures that develop. Technology co-ventures must have workable and verifiable policies and procedures concerning disaster recovery. How an organization deals with traditional crashes, power losses, and breaches will indicate its capability in this area. No financial institution that relies on public trust and confidence can tolerate the loss of business information or customer data, particularly if it keeps customers from their money, electronic or otherwise, for some period of time. Odds are that many banks will not be able - or prefer not - to "go it alone." The landscape is already filled with dozens of alliances and joint ventures, and the business is still in its infancy. At the same time, banks should not be too quick to dilute or share their long-standing consumer trust and confidence. They have as much to give as they do to gain in technology joint ventures, and they should negotiate accordingly. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Washington Post: Monday, October 21, 1996 CyberCash: Change Is Good, They Bet By David S. Hilzenrath Somewhere in cyberspace, shrouded in anonymity, someone surfed to the World Wide Web site for Virtual Vegas last Friday and saw casino betting tips for sale for 50 cents. With a few clicks of a computer mouse, using software called a "wallet," the surfer ordered the tip sheet. Almost instantaneously, the gambling advice crossed the Web to the buyer's computer, and payment traveled to the Web site in a new form of electronic money known as CyberCoin. When Virtual Vegas settles its accounts, the encrypted CyberCoin payment will be converted into a 42-cent deposit in the business's bank account. Its bank and the buyer's bank will share a fee of 2 cents, and CyberCash Inc., the Reston company that issued the electronic money, will cut itself in for 6 cents. Mere pennies -- but multiply the transaction by a zillion here and a zillion there and someday the company could be making real money. One of the Internet's hottest and most speculative stocks, CyberCash has emerged as the early front-runner in a race to handle the pocket change of electronic commerce, many merchants and analysts say. In the process, CyberCash could help transform the way people do business on the Internet, making it easier to buy and sell inexpensive items such as individual news articles, pictures, video-game plays, computer software, recipes, jukebox selections -- or odds on the third race at Belmont. "When the Internet comes into its own, and it will come into its own, then CyberCash and its competitors will have provided a key mechanism for going from worldwide chaos to worldwide commerce," said Ira Morrow, a financial services analyst for the Gartner Group. It's big talk about a tiny company that in the first six months of this year had only $ 37,705 in revenue and has yet to show a profit. Moreover, the company is one of many betting on an explosion of on-line commerce that more than a few savvy observers say may never come. "Are people really going to want to do real commercial transactions on the Internet? A lot of us involved in this aren't sure," said Sholom Rosen, vice president of emerging technologies at Citibank and point man for the bank's experiment in Internet currency. "There's more smoke out there than there is fire right now . . . more hype than there is reality in the marketplace." Until about two weeks ago, some analysts considered CyberCash's prospects to be tenuous at best. Then Netscape Communications Corp. agreed to package the CyberCash wallet with its Netscape Navigator software, by far the most widely used "browser" for surfing the Web. Suddenly, CyberCash appeared more plausible. "CyberCash, with the Netscape deal, has emerged with some kind of a leadership position . . . some clear viability," said Kris Tuttle of SoundView Financial Group, a technology research firm. CyberCash introduced a system for secure on-line credit card payments in 1995, but by its own account it will be just one of many players following a standard approach in that arena. It is also developing a system for on-line check payments. But it is CyberCoin, which debuted on Sept. 30, that holds the key to CyberCash's fortunes -- and the greatest potential to shake things up in cyberspace. With CyberCoin, the company is trying to facilitate purchases of 25 cents to $ 10, transactions typically too small to be made by credit card. The system could allow Internet merchants to charge for things they have been giving away, or to charge nominal tolls for visiting Web sites. It could allow virtual vendors to charge "by the sip" instead of by the bottle, as some industry analysts say -- for example, to eliminate costly subscription fees for on-line publications when the reader only wants a single story. "It seems to be the answer everybody's been looking for to make small-amount purchases on the Internet," said Ned Barnett, marketing director of HealthWorld Online Inc., which plans to use CyberCoin to sell chapters of books and brief audio recordings about nutrition and health on the Internet. The folks at Virtual Vegas agree, but their own receipts should temper such enthusiasm. As of Friday, Virtual Vegas, based in Venice, Calif., had rung up just 48 CyberCoin transactions for a grand total of $ 40.05 in sales. Only a dozen merchants are currently equipped to accept CyberCoin payments. Another 33, including the Los Angeles Times, have signed up to use the system. Netscape won't begin distributing the wallet software to consumers until next year; in the meantime, it can be downloaded for free from CyberCash's Web site, www.cybercash.com. But to CyberCash co-founder and chief executive William N. Melton, it's a fairly good bet. And Melton has a history of good bets. In a prior life, he created VeriFone Inc., building it into the world's largest provider of credit-card terminals, which retailers use to verify transactions. He serves on the boards of America Online Inc. of Dulles, the world's largest on-line service, and Transaction Network Services of Reston, which manages a network that connects retailers and credit card processors. Melton, 54, grew up on a farm in Nebraska, where he and his brother and mother tended to the cows and pigs and chickens. His father, a Methodist minister, died when he was 7. As a boy, he dreamed of being a truck driver, he said, because the trucks that rumbled through Nebraska represented freedom. At West Mar College in LeMars, Iowa, he majored in psychology before going to Honolulu for graduate work in Chinese language and philosophy. He spent five years in Asia, traveling to Taiwan, Vietnam and Japan, and returned to Hawaii fluent in Mandarin. In 1993, practicing venture capital with his own money, Melton watched the growth of the Internet and saw its "revolutionary and transformative power," he said. He envisioned a need for a kind of VeriFone for the global computer network, an automated on-line payment system. "Most of the banking world at that time was not paying attention to this new [Internet] phenomenon, and most of the people in the Internet were not paying attention to payments. And so there seemed to be a gap that needed to be filled," he said. Melton also perceived a gap in his knowledge of the Internet, and sought out Daniel C. Lynch, now chairman of the CyberCash board, to fill it. Lynch, 55, one of the Internet's pioneers, had already made a fortune of his own by creating and selling Interop Co., which ran Internet trade shows. Lynch also served on the board of UUNet Technologies, the Internet services company recently bought by MFS Communications. Early in his career, as a computer programmer for the U.S. Air Force, Lynch wrote software for missile-tracking radars. But in the early 1970s he decided that was "a boring game" because "the offense has it all over the defense," he recalled. Now, Lynch relaxes by working on his own vineyard in Napa Valley. Melton and Lynch found each other through their mutual interest in bionomics, the philosophy espoused by author Michael Rothschild in a 1990 book by that title. Bionomics views the economy as organic and evolutionary, like a rain forest, and doubts the power of governments or other institutions to direct it. The two entrepreneurs became sponsors and directors of Rothschild's Bionomics Institute. Rothschild describes Melton and Lynch in contrasting terms. "Bill is a man of few words. To me he's sagelike, just very wise," Rothschild said. Lynch "is both a mathematical wizard, a hyper hyper techie guy, the super-geek, if you will . . . and the ultimate party animal." They met for breakfast one morning in October 1993, and Melton told Lynch about his ideas. By the time Rothschild arrived, late for the meeting, the two were planning a business. Initially, they financed the venture themselves. "We're two guys that could write checks for millions of dollars, and if we lost, we lost," Lynch said. "We were going to shake the world up." As the company developed, they watched the share prices of publicly traded Internet upstarts, such as Netscape, rise to stratospheric heights. By last winter, it was their turn to play. CyberCash issued stock on Feb. 15, raising $ 44 million from the public and $ 15 million from Japanese investor Softbank in a private deal. Initially priced at $ 17, the stock has since traded between $ 24.75 and $ 63.50 and closed at $ 33 Friday. Melton's $ 4.7 million investment in the company is now worth $ 75.5 million on paper, and Lynch has turned $ 2 million into $ 25.6 million. What made the offering all the more remarkable was not only that CyberCash was losing millions of dollars at the time, but that it had yet to take in a penny of revenue. "That was a bit of a rush, wasn't it?" Lynch said. Today, CyberCash has about 190 employees and offices in Redwood City, Calif., and Bangalore, India, where labor costs for programmers are much lower than in this country. The CyberCash strategy is to distribute its system to the masses through alliances with banks, credit card-processing firms, makers of Internet software for businesses and consumers -- such as Netscape, Oracle Corp. and Sun Microsystems Inc. -- and service providers such as CompuServe. CyberCash decided early on that it was better off cooperating with banks rather than competing with them. "We knew that the Internet was going to so challenge all of . . . life's assumptions that we were not interested in asking consumers to also leave the safe haven of their current banking relationships," Melton said. The company wants banks to put their names on the CyberCash wallet and offer it to their customers. So far, it has forged relationships with dozens of financial companies, including First Union Corp. and First Data Corp., the nation's largest credit card processor. To accept CyberCoin payments, merchants must use a bank allied with the company, but consumers can establish CyberCash wallets using any bank or credit card company. The consumer begins by in effect buying CyberCoin currency -- up to $ 20 at a time. This is done by transferring funds from a credit card or checking account to a bank account controlled by CyberCash. Encoded digital currency is placed on the storage disks of the us er's computer, and is transmitted over the network when purchases are made. Merchants then redeem the digital currency for the conventional kind via electronic networks run by CyberCash and the banking system. In this closed loop, the digital money can be spent on ly once before being cashed in. That distinguishes CyberCoin from other forms of electronic money that can circulate endlessly and anonymously like traditional cash or "bearer instruments" issued by governments. It also reduces the danger that CyberCoin would be counterfeited or used for money-laundering, major concerns of law enforcement authorities who are closely studying the emerging electronic money systems. When consumers shop with CyberCoin, they do so under a veil of cryptographic confidentiality. They hold electronic "keys" that can unlock the code. With a subpoena, the government could compel users to surrender the keys, which would make it possible to trace their purchases. But unless the user surrendered the key, the most CyberCash could do to assist law enforcement would be to stop encrypting transactions for that person. That's CyberCash's attempt to balance the government's police interests with the consumer's privacy interests. "There are no easy answers in this area," said Raymond Kelly, the Treasury Department's undersecretary for enforcement. "We think electronic money is good for the country and the world. But there [are] still many outstanding issues" for policymakers to consider, Kelly said. The final pillar of CyberCash's strategy is to rely on software, which can be easily transmitted over the network, rather than hardware add-ons to a computer. Some alternative approaches would employ devices such as stored value cards -- plastic cards embedded with computer chips. Those systems -- roughly akin to Metro farecards -- would also require users to attach card readers to their computers. Some analysts predict that smart cards eventually could dominate the market, but CyberCash believes that software solutions will spread faster. The CyberCash wallet could be adapted to work with smart cards, but at a reduced level of profitability, Melton said. For all its progress, CyberCash has also missed opportunities, one former executive said. It failed to forge a relationship with America Online's 6.2 million-member service. "Shame on me for that," Melton said of his unsuccessful run at AOL, but he added that as a member of its board he was unwilling to push AOL too hard. CyberCash has yet to build an alliance with Microsoft Corp. For a long time it didn't even try, because Melton thought it should wait until it had more to show for itself. Former marketing vice president Magdalena Yesil questioned that judgment. "Putting your head in the sand doesn't get you away from trouble," she said. "It actually allows the trouble to get bigger." Perhaps most seriously, the company has yet to recruit many merchants to accept CyberCash payments. "As a consumer, what do I do with this thing?" Yesil asked rhetorically. "It's like somebody giving me Turkish liras in California." CyberCash's closest competitor, an Amsterdam company called DigiCash, requires consumers to open accounts at designated banks, and it has enlisted only Mark Twain Bank in the United States. Other competitors may soon appear, though. Citibank is working on its Electronic Monetary System. Melton's old company, VeriFone, is readying on-line card readers. And Digital Equipment Corp. promises it will launch a service called Millicent, with much lower transaction charges than CyberCoin's. Before long, these companies may count their fees not in pennies, but in fractions of pennies. Then, zillions of transactions won't ensure profitability. It will take bazillions to get there. FEWER MIDDLEMEN, BIGGER MARGIN The chief executive of Virtual Vegas sees products such as CyberCoin as nothing short of "revolutionary," and he says the proof is the cards -- blackjack cards, to be precise. The Virtual Vegas Turbo Blackjack computer game sells in stores for $ 29.95. But with CyberCoin, Virtual Vegas is selling it on the Web for $ 2.95, a tenth of the price. And CEO David Herschman says he could make more money doing it. Each $ 29.95 CD-ROM version of the game yields a profit of about $ 4.50 after deducting the retailers' and distributors' share of the price; production, packaging and shipping costs; sales commissions; and unpaid accounts. By contrast, each $ 2.95 copy of the game paid for with CyberCoin and delivered over the Web costs Virtual Vegas about 26 cents, yielding a $ 2.69 profit. At the Web price, Virtual Vegas could sell many more copies, Herschman said. "The profit margin is huge," he said. "We make it once and . . . we could sell that from here to eternity." HOW A CYBERCOIN TRANSACTION WORKS 1. CyberCash Inc.'s electronic wallet software is downloaded from its Web site at http://www.cybercash.com to a user's computer. The user fills the wallet with money by transferring funds from a checking account or credit card to a bank account controlled by CyberCash. The actual money stays in the account until after a purchase has been completed. To fill the wallet from a checking account, users must mail in a voided check. CyberCash then loads the wallet with digitally encrypted symbols representing the allotted money in the bank. 2. To buy something, the consumer clicks the PAY button on a participating merchant's Web site. The code for the money is verified by CyberCash. The electronic product -- such as an on-line document or news article -- is transferred to the user's computer. The code for the money is transferred from the user's wallet to the merchant's electronic "cash register." The user's wallet logs all transactions. 3. When the merchant empties the cash register of its coded payments, CyberCash transfers the actual money to the merchant's bank account from the account where it was holding the consumer's funds. CyberCash deducts a transaction fee from the merchant's payment. The fee is split among CyberCash, the consumer's bank and the merchant's bank. 4. The user can return unspent funds to a checking account, but not to a credit card. American Banker, 10/23/96 Phone alliance may rival banks in electronic cash A smart card alliance of five telephone companies could raise competitive obstacles to banks that desire to control electronic cash transactions. US West Communications, GTE, Bell Canada, PTT Telecom Netherlands, and Telekom Malaysia announced formation of the Global Chipcard Alliance at the CardEx 96 conference this month in the Netherlands. Additional members are welcome. Oracle Corp., the data base software giant, plans to join, said US West. The alliance wants to create an open standard to allow any smart telephone card to operate in any pay telephone network. Some partners' cards are already interoperable -- for example, GTE cards work in telephones installed by US West and vice versa -- and alliance members may have the power to affect technology in the banking and payments field. Though phone card standards are its initial target, the alliance could view electronic purses and other chip card applications as viable opportunities. The major bank credit card associations have produced a smart card standard called EMV, for Europay, MasterCard, and Visa. It is designed to assure that merchants' terminals accept all compatible cards. The chip card group could incorporate EMV into its operating standard. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:40 PM 10/24/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: >This is my last reply. I guess I forgot your overarching theory. >Reality, nah. "My last reply"? Sorta the rhetorical equivalent of "I think I heard my mommy calling," huh? >(snip) >> No, I didn't say I was "cutting off all prediction of money appearing." >> But it would be a long shot from having particular donor's names associated >> with particular dollar figures. And, the system would simply have to >(snip) > >It's not a long shot. When Bob the Big Bad Lobbyist comes into the >Senator's office and leads him to believe a donation will be made and >magically a sizeable one does, it can be reasonable infered from >whence it came. Except that "sizeable" donations won't appear. If you don't understand this, you haven't been reading the descriptions of how the system would work. Individual donations won't be identified either by name of amount; they'll be accumulated and only approximately reported. > In the real world, politicians have access to the >names and addresses of people who regularly donate to political >campaigns. I wonder how many people will still be donating if they can't get their name associated with the donation... > Trust me, the probability of others, i.e. regular working >people, donating to campaigns is zero to none. There is a finite >pool of political campaign money out there. And it'll be even less when this system is adopted. >> I'd prefer doing something far more...uh...permanent than to merely REPLACE >> officeholders. > >My fault. I forget whom I was replying to. Of course my reply above >was in response to your question about developing a "working" system. >Have fun in your politicianless world (with no physical >infrastructure, information infrastructure, national defense, etc.) Who needs "national defense"? As for "information infrastructure, are you under the illusion that private industry couldn't do it? Hell, it DOES it! The Internet is essentially fully privatized, NOW. And "physical infrastructure"? Sure they'll be physical infrastructure. It'll just be _privately_ owned. >I would much rather leave it to the market. There is, of course, no >corruption there. (WINK) The difference between private and public corruption is that in private corruption, individuals presumably have the right to fight that corruption where it impacts on their rights and assets. In PUBLIC corruption, the taxpayer is rarely given the opportunity to fight the loss of his assets. > >> >Every candidate ever endorsed by the Firefighters Union in my town >> >have been absolutely elected. Looking at the firefighters voting >> >records and matching with their addresses shows a distinct pattern of >> >voting in almost every election. >> >> "Firefighter's voting records"? I _thought_ we had a secret ballot in this >> country. Maybe you're from some town that I don't know about! > >I, unlike some people, live in the real world. It is trivial for >political groups to put together listings of public employee >addresses, their VOTING records (meaning whether they voted or not, >check with your city hall...hmmm...go figure, they keep track of >that) and public expressions of support (i.e. lawn signs, letters to >the editor, rally attendance). Compile this info and you have a >pretty good handle on who voted for whom (Yes I know it cant show >absolutely that someone voted a certain way, but most of campaigning >is simple probability. I dont have the time to explain this in >detail, look it up if you are really interested). It appears that you've convinced yourself that ESP exists and works. Given that, it isn't surprising that you would believe that donations to candidates can't be "blinded" sufficiently to help dramatically reduce political quid pro quo. >> Besides, what you're saying can be considered a bit of self-fulfilling >> prophecy. Some cities ALWAYS vote one way, or another. Over time, public >> employees simply adjust their politics to match their wallets, etc. >> Remember, these are PUBLIC employees after all, which really just means the >> employeees of the thugs who get into office. It does not serve their >> interests to go against the winning candidate. If, one year, the party >> normally out of office appears to be winning, the Firefighters will simply >> adjust their politics accordingly. Simple. > >What you are not getting is that, in this case, the public employees >are the edge that causes the win. How do you know this? > We have had some close races, the >winning margin is clearly less than the number of voting public >employees. The winning margin is ALSO clearly less than the number of many different identifiable groups. You seem to be making assumptions in support of your theory. > You don't need to control all the votes. Only the sure >number that you can "deliver", the need for which can be discerned >fairly easily (using those nasty historical voting records). ESP again, I see... >> > They have sufficient numbers to win every time. >> >> Whichever candidate wins, "has sufficient numbers to win." Tell me >> something else I don't know. >> > >This came from a discussion of vote delivery. X has a block Y that >will vote for Z (the endorsed candidate) every time. If victory >margin is less than Y, X's delivery controls the race. Except that plenty of voting blocks exist. And there's plenty of unknowns that you can't figure out with any certainty: How certain are you that "Block Y" ALL voted for Z? How do you know some other group didn't? Etc. >> >Power currupts. Not size of governement. >> >> Size of government is evidence of the size of the corruption. >> > >Unproven. Apparently you don't believe that some monarchies, which >can be extremely small governments, have been some of the most >corrupt in history. As I stated above, power corrupts. It is an >easy way out of arguments for libertarians and most republicans to >say that big government is the root of all evil. It's pretty close, even if not entirely the "root of all evil." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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[JIM RAY] Does anyone have the complaint number for Florida Barr Assocoation?
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to complaint to the FLoria Bar Association about Jim Ray sending complaints to postmaster(a)bwalk.dm.com (quoted before). Can someone please post their contact address? The lying motherfucker's resume follows. <html> <head> <title></title> </head> <body> <h2 align=center> JAMES M. RAY </h2> <pre> JAMES M. RAY 1150 Madruga Ave. #A-101 Coral Gables, FL 33146 (305) 666-1029 http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray e-mail liberty(a)gate.net EDUCATION: UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW Juris Doctor - May 1995 Coral Gables, Florida * Society of Bar & Gavel, LAW SCHOOL NEWSPAPER OPINIONS EDITOR UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA Bachelor of Science, Psychology - May 1986 Gainesville, Florida EXPERIENCE: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Sept. 1994 to May 1995 Southern District of Florida * legal Intern For US District Judge William M. Hoeveler Attended trials and hearings. Wrote memoranda and orders. Conducted Lexis, Westlaw, and library research on a range of civil and criminal law issues including: possible fines in a corporate contempt of Court proceeding, 2255 prisoner claims, insurance, drug-smuggling and failed Savings & Loan cases. Organized and updated library. DADE COUNTY GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM Jan. 1994 to Aug. 1994 Miami, Florida * Volunteer Summer Intern, GAL Spoke for children in family Court hearings. Conducted interviews and investigations. Wrote reports, memoranda for attorneys, and performance agreement contracts. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI Oct. 1993 to Aug. 1994 Miami, Florida * research Assistant For Law Professor Susan Stefan Conducted legal and CD-ROM database research for articles and speeches. Assisted in preparation of an ADA lawsuit. PEKNY INDUSTRIES, INC. 1987 to 1990 St. Petersburg, Florida * Small Business Partner, Vice-president & Director of Marketing Supervised and performed research at the United States Patent & Trademark Office. Consistently the top anchor seller at boat shows. Analyzed and satisfied customer needs. FLORIDA STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Election 1992 Dade County, Florida * Libertarian Party Candidate for District 113 Ran successful local and statewide ballot access petition drives. Participated in panel discussions and debates. Held TV and newspaper interviews. Organized a lean, clean campaign. CHARLOTTE COUNTY ORANGE GROVE 1978 to Present Punta Gorda, Florida * Farmer (part time) Transported and sold citrus and exotic fruit. ACTIVITIES: PADI Advanced Open Water SCUBA Diver. Competent sailor, fisherman and power boater. Florida State House Messenger. Volunteer high-school teacher. Recording for the Blind law book reader. Hurricane Andrew volunteer. Internet Guide. Amateur HTML Programming. PGP encryption teaching for e-mail confidentiality and authentication. </pre> <hr> <p align=center> <center> Return to Jim's Home Page </p> </body> </html>

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Re: slander again
by Benjamin Grosman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sirs, Have either of you read my post to the coderpunks list concerning professionalism? I feel that it might be slightly applicable here. Surely this has gone on long enough, and in enough of a public manner, that enough people are sick of it. Yours Sincerely, Benjamin Grosman

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Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
by field＠nyc.pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The 18 June 1996 report, "How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash", was written by Laurie Law, Susan Sabett, and Jerry Solinas of the Office of Information Security Research and Technology, Cryptology Division, NSA. It is 30 pages, as follows: INTRODUCTION Section 1. What is Electronic Cash? 1.1 Electronic Payment 1.2 Security of Electronic Payments 1.3 Electronic Cash 1.4 Multiple Spending Section 2. A Cryptographic Description 2.1 Public-Key Cryptographic Tools (One-Way Functions, Key Pairs, Signature and Identification, Secure Hashing) 2.2 A Simplified Electronic Cash Protocol 2.3 Untraceable Electronic Payments 2.4 A Basic Electronic Cash Protocol Section 3. Proposed Off-Line Implementations 3.1 Including Identifying Information (Cut and Choose, Zero-Knowledge Proofs) 3.2 Authentication and Signature Techniques (RSA Signatures, Blind RSA Signatures, The Schnorr Algorithms, Schnorr identification, Schnorr Signature, Blind Schnorr Signature, Chaum-Pederson Signature, Implementations of the Schnorr Protocols) 3.3 Summary of Proposed Implementations (Chaum-Fiat-Naor, Brands, Ferguson) Section 4. Optional Features of Off-Line Cash 4.1 Transferability 4.2 Divisibility Section 5. Security Issues 5.1 Multiple Spending Prevention 5.2 Wallet Observers 5.3 Security Failures (Types of failures, Consequences of a failure) 5.4 Restoring Traceability CONCLUSION REFERENCES - Richard Field On Oct 24, 1996 09:52:25, 'declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh)' wrote: >Just got off the phone with the NSA. > >"There are so many places in the NSA that deal with cryptology >we haven't been able to find the document yet. We'll call you >back once we locate it and let you know if it can be released >or not. We've been getting phone calls about the document. Did >you read about it on the Internet?" > >-Declan >>______________________________ Forward Header >>21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >>October 17, 1996 >> >>National Security Agency Report Raises >>Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money >> >> >> A recent report prepared by the Cryptology Division of the National >>Security Agency's Office of Information Security Research and Technology >>discusses the potential for security failures in certain electronic cash >>systems and their likely consequences. While demonstrating concern over the >>attributes of non-traceable electronic money, the report points out methods >>that may be used to minimize security breaches and losses, including >>limiting the number of coins that can be affected by a single compromise, >>requiring traceability for large transactions or large numbers of >>transactions in a given period, and the creation of a mechanism to restore >>traceability under certain circumstances. The report contains an excellent >>summary of basic electronic money cryptographic tools, electronic cash >>protocols, authentication and signature techniques and related security >>issues.

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PIS_son
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-17-96, BuWi: "Apple, IBM, JavaSoft, Motorola, Netscape, Nortel, Novell, RSA, and Silicon Graphics Announce PICA Crypto-Alliance" The PICA specification will also be designed to make the task of developing differing domestic and exportable security requirements much easier. [GAK alliance 2.] PrNe: "World Wide Web Casinos, Inc. Brings Gambling to the Internet at www.netpirates.com" "Placing bets cannot be illegal because, despite their origination, bets will technically be placed on the computers at our off-shore spy-based casino site." BuWi: "Cylink Partners with U.S.P.S to Build National Citizen Tracking System to Include Postmarking and Authentication for Legal/Medical Records, Tax Filings" PhIn: "Unsuspecting Internet Users' 'Cookie' Files Concern Privacy Advocates" But look at cookie users another way: You're the hydrant and they're the dogs, marking you for future reference. ----- http://jya.com/pisson.txt (24 kb for 4) ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming/pisson.txt PIS_son

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Merc: PacBell predicts imminent death of the net; film at 11
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Full text freely available at http://www.sjmercury.com/business/dial1023.htm (they do one or two net-related stories "free" per day) Pac Bell says Net use may collapse phone system ISPs rebut dire, 'trumped-up' prediction Published: Oct. 24, 1996 BY HOWARD BRYANT Mercury News Staff Writer As many as one of every six telephone calls in Silicon Valley now doesn't go through on the first try because Internet denizens are tying up the lines, Pacific Bell reported Wednesday. Under normal circumstances, less than 1 percent of calls go uncompleted, the company said. The situation is so dire that California's entire phone system is in danger of breakdown, a company executive said, with Silicon Valley especially on red alert. [...] But rather than being a sign of imminent collapse, critics called Pac Bell's startling statistic a trumped-up charge designed to scare the public and pressure federal regulators into ending a price break Internet service providers enjoy when tying into Pac Bell's network. ''The Internet is a baby and Pac Bell has been in this game since Alexander Graham Bell's bar mitzvah. Now they're saying that in the last three weeks, we broke the phone system? Come on,'' said the head of a service provider who asked not to be named for fear of reprisal by Pac Bell. [...] At the heart of the issue is a pricing conflict between Pac Bell and the ISPs. In 1983, the Federal Communications Commission gave companies that offered Internet services, and other ''enhanced service providers,'' an exemption from the per-minute fees that other companies, such as long-distance telephone companies, pay to use Pac Bell's network. [...] Wiping out the subsidy would force Internet companies to find new, more efficient ways of pricing that better reflect actual usage, Parker said. In all likelihood, Net service prices would increase for consumers. [...] ''This is clearly a ruse,'' said Dick Severy, director of public policy for MCI. ''They've added 691,000 access lines this year. Business lines are up. It's curious.''

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Fw: Area Code 809 Carribean Phone Scam
by Michael T. Babcock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)hks.net Date: Fri Oct 25 11:13:26 1996 >> Just a heads-up about a current scam concerning numbers with "809" area >> codes.... spread the word! >> >> BE CAREFUL! This is a fraudulent message received the other day. >> >> "Subject: Unpaid Account >> >> I am writing to give you a final 24 hours to settle your outstanding >> account. If I have not received the settlement in full, I will commence >> legal proceedings without further delay. If you would like to discuss this >> matter to avoid court action, call Mike Murray at Global Communications on >> 1-809-496-2700" >> >> >> Subject: More Phone Scams >> >> The scam works basically like this: >> >> You get home and notice that the message light is blinking on your answering >> machine. You listen to the message, which has several wrinkles, but the >> best one is the caller asks you to call a number beginning with Area Code >> 809 to receive information about a family member who has been ill. (They >> may also tell you someone has been arrested, died, you have won a wonderful >> prize, etc.) >> >> In any event, concerned or curious, you make the call. >> >> Sometimes the phone is answered by someone who claims to speak broken >> English. (The idea is to keep you on the line to build up charges.) Or, >> sometimes you will just get a long recorded message. The bottom line is, >> when your phone bill comes, you see this incredible charge, oftentimes more >> than $100.00! >> >> Crooks are using the 809 numbers as "pay-per-calls" and to get around the US >> Regulations and 900 number blocking. Every time you call the number, they >> get a greatly inflated rebate from the foreign phone company. Since 809 >> numbers are in the Caribbean, they aren't bound by the US 900# regulations >> that require them to warn you of the charge and the rate involved, and also >> a time period during which you may terminate the call without being charged. >> >> The newest twist to this scam is to page people using the 809 numbers. With >> the new area code changes, people unknowingly are returning these calls. >> When the bill comes, there are HUGE charges for the calls. >> >> My suggestion is that no matter how you get the message, if you are asked to >> call a number with an 809 area code that you don't recognize, DON'T RETURN >> THE CALL! It is bad enough that the criminal is invading your privacy, >> don't let them invade your wallet as well! >> >> Scams of this type are extremely hard to prosecute and since you did >> actually make the call, neither your local phone company or your long >> distance carrier will want to get involved. They'll tell you that they are >> simply providing the billing for the foreign company. You end up trying to >> deal (over the phone) with a foreign phone company that feels they have done >> no wrong. It can turn into a real nightmare! >> >> Please fwd this message to friends and let people be aware of it! Message courtesy Michael T. Babcock http://www.cyberbeach.net/~mbabcock Send a message with subj. SEND PUBLIC KEY for PGP KEY. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQC1AwUBMnDZIdtTCwP6TF2xAQHNFwUAgV+gvgGng69r8wbzCUqr3ckbjimKoByb 5YovMm0vAnS7Ub/gC/ECYT4A9HI971xi3J8pzbiR0fRMJhPYjJw+XCNQ0glN9EQU wXONFDA4CmdUQaaKtzt2cx5HropnG90+ljBDE8f1xh/wEsqKpaBGwwRDefPlAKnl xw4oj28RTlsJqLULKelBFSRBOrvDMk5/anpgPDnpmPqVJ2UcKoJHSw== =eag2 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMnDY8CoZzwIn1bdtAQEInQF+NOLgpfiHX0Z3qvuo5rtSh/lR4V1GKxYx G3dP1QaWt9qhBpWVcjMEntsKdUlQkYHc =Mo7x -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 01:40 PM 10/24/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: > >This is my last reply. I guess I forgot your overarching theory. > >Reality, nah. > > "My last reply"? Sorta the rhetorical equivalent of "I think I heard my > mommy calling," huh? Yes Jim, your sparkling wit and incredibly convincing argument has made me run for cover. Remind everyone what your "solution" is again. In case everyone hasn't already *PLONK*ed you. ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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Re: [DES] Random vs Linear Keysearch.
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Reid wrote: > > There are methods of protecting against some forms of sabotage: > > The running XOR of the round 15 output will always ensure that the > > keyspace has been searched, but requires duplicated work to check, > > and the half-match method should work well on large blocks; if the > > half-matches are distributed evenly, there should be a few in each > > 31 bit chunk. > Let's consider a worst-case, but entirely possible, scenario: > The NSA doesn't like what we're doing. They want DES to be seen as strong, > so they try to disrupt the effort. > The NSA presumably has a large DES cracking machine. They use this to > determine the key, then send a message to the servers saying that they've > searched that space and not found the key. So, because everyone thinks the > space has already been unsuccessfully searched, that space is avoided and > the key is never found. > This not only works for the NSA, but for any organization who can afford > to brute-force DES and find the key before we do. > Certainly any organization with a DES cracker wants DES to be considered > secure. That way, people will continue to use DES and the cracking machine > will still be of use. Speaking of the NSA, someone there once said "never underestimate what your enemy is willing to do to crack your code" (quote approx.), and you can extrapolate from that "never underestimate the power of disinformation".

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Re: (null)
by Murray Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 24 Oct 1996 10:51:00 +1000, Butler, Anthony wrote: >22/10/96 > >WASHINGTON - US First lady Hillary Rodham Clinton unveiled a new >Superman comic book for Bosnian children during an East Room ceremony >Monday. The comic book, written in three languages, shows the >mythical American hero flying down to save two little boys in Bosnia- ^^^^^^^^ Ahem, that would be Canadian hero.

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When did Mondex ever claim to be anonymous?
by David J. Phillips 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been researching the ways in which new payment systems incorporate anonymity, traceability, or identification, and the ways in which those properties are presented by various people to various people. Recently I've been looking particularly at Mondex. I remember receiving the impression several years ago, when I first heard of Mondex, that it was purporting to be anonymous, or at least private. Now, however, I'm beginning a systematic analysis of their press releases and of press accounts, and I find very few references to privacy. One reference is in their web page FAQ, which says that Mondex transactions are "private, just like cash". Simon Davies, in his complaint to the British Trading Standards authorities, also cites this FAQ, claiming that it used to read "anonymous, just like cash". Davies also refers to an anonymity claim in the Mondex Media Pack. But I've found very little else that suggests that Mondex ever hyped privacy. Can anyone give me an idea of how I got the idea that Mondex was making privacy one of its selling points? David Phillips Visiting Instructor, Department of Communication Studies, University of Michigan Doctoral Candidate, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania

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Re: [DES] Random vs Linear Keysearch.
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Trei wrote: > > Before I start, let me say that the software I'm writing will search a > 'chunk' of keyspace linearly. The chunk will be somewhere around > 31 bits long, which is what I think that my index low-end system > (486, 33 MHz) could check overnight. I do intend to make the > code interruptable, so that it can suspend and restart work on a > given chunk. It's just that no result will be forthcoming until the chunk > is finished (unless it finds the key). BTW, while it's *extremely* > cpu intensive, it's not intensive in memory, disk, or communications > usage. I still maintain (and I'm working on some proposals --- it just takes more time than I have to form them well) that there are strategies for partitioning the keyspace that are likely to be more efficient, given how likely it is that the key is constructed/derived/etc., using certain common techniques. Now, if there is **NO** information as to how the key is constructed/derived, then all the assumptions about a perfectly distributed keyspace result in the conclusions we are all familiar with. But you know the adage --- smarter, not harder, and all that. There WILL (almost always) be knowledge of the key generation techniques. It is unlikely that geiger counters are in use by the banks. **IFF** there is a-priori knowledge of the key gen techniques, then it should be used if possible. Now, I happen to be working on ONE SPECIFIC and common generation technique, and there is some reason to believe that when it is used there is a more efficient approach to partitioning. There are a lot of caveats here ... and don't overgeneralize what I'm after - I'm only espousing these ideas to stimulate other thought along the same line. Regardez.

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:58 PM 1/1/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: >> >This is my last reply. I guess I forgot your overarching theory. >> >Reality, nah. >> >> "My last reply"? Sorta the rhetorical equivalent of "I think I heard my >> mommy calling," huh? > >I wanted to take this crypto-irrelevant discussion off the list. If you think the applications for the use of cryptographic blinding techniques is "crypto-irrelevant" then you're even more clueless than I'd previously surmised. See Chaum's article of August 1992 if you doubt this. >> >It's not a long shot. When Bob the Big Bad Lobbyist comes into the >> >Senator's office and leads him to believe a donation will be made and >> >magically a sizeable one does, it can be reasonable infered from >> >whence it came. >> >> Except that "sizeable" donations won't appear. If you don't understand >> this, you haven't been reading the descriptions of how the system would >> work. Individual donations won't be identified either by name of amount; >> they'll be accumulated and only approximately reported. > >They will have to eventually appear. The money will eventually be spendable. But information as to the number and timing and size of the donations will be disguised using blinding techniques. Re-read my comments. >In reality vendors have to get >paid real money. Not approximations of money. It would be like >getting a new job and your boss telling you that he would pay you >some money at randomly occuring times. That would be a fun way to >budget. Nobody said politics had to be easy. They'll adjust to the new reality; they always do. >My point is, Jim, that your idea is unworkable in reality. Since you obviously don't understand it, and you also don't understand cryptographic blinding, why should anybody pay attention to your opinion? > In theory it would be nice to have complete anonymity. In reality it won't >work. Always overstating your case, I see. For the application I described, it isn't necessary to have "complete anonymity." What's needed is a healthy dose of fog and uncertainty, making sure that the candidates can't trust any claim that a donor has made a donation of any particular size. > Take, for example, the current attempt at finance reform. X >cant give Y over $500 per State Assembly race. What if X holds a >fundraiser for Y and invites their entire executive board. What if X >is at a legislative conference and suggests that all the participants >give Y at least $500. Do you plan on outlawing X's Freedom of >Speech? Since today's campaign contribution limits seem to be inherently a violation of freedom of speech, why not embrace my solution, which doesn't do this? > A self-proclaimed Constitutionalist like yourself should >hold individual freedom in a paramount position. "Constitutionalist"? Hell no! I subscribe to the idea inherent in the joke, "The Constitution may be bad government, but it's better than what we have now." I think there's no doubt that a government based scrupulously on the US Constitution would be a vast improvement. However, we've never had such a thing. >> > In the real world, politicians have access to the >> >names and addresses of people who regularly donate to political >> >campaigns. >> >> I wonder how many people will still be donating if they can't get their name >> associated with the donation... >> > >My point has always been that they will. Even if you totally blind >the donation, inuendo backed up with any modicum of external proof >will do. Such "proof" will be easily faked, BTW, which is part of the reason this system will work so well. I could go to some candidate and claim that I'd made a $10,000 contribution to his campaign. Let's say I'd show him a (forged) cancelled check. What could he do about it? Would he risk pissing off a valuable contributor? > The minutes of the executive board meeting, the cancelled >check, whatever. Even in a technically sound system, human inginuity >will prevail. Which is exactly why the faking process will be so easily accomplished. >All lobbies will continue to give. And, obviously, they'll claim they gave far more than the really did. This is okay, it'll destroy the credibility of anyone who claims to have made a contribution. > They seek access and control. >Politicians know the interests with the wherewithall to fund a >campaign. They know Right-to-life wont fund a pro-choice candidate. >Labor Unions will seek out pro-labor candidates and business will >find business friendly candidates. You can make it completely >anonymous with NO POSSIBLE WAY to know. It would make NO difference. Sure about that? Let me provide some contrary evidence. Every once in a while, you'll see on the TV networks a report about corporate (and labor, BTW) campaign giving, and they will occasionally point out that a given corporation (or PAC, etc.) gives money BOTH to the Republicans and the Democrats. They have no reason to do this, except that they think they will get some benefit in the future from the "access" that contribution produces. This is particularly true, since the identities of all contributors are currently public knowledge. If an organization expected no direct return benefit from making contributions (for example, if the donations were adequately blinded), it would make them ONLY to the side they considered would best help them, and not the opponents. If they thought it necessary, they would lie about making a contribution to the other candidate. >> And it'll be even less when this system is adopted. > >No it wont. If the good Senator supports business with his votes, >business has to support them with their money. It is in THEIR best >interest. I don't think there's necessarily anything wrong with this AS LONG AS the system makes it difficult or impossible to identifiably reward contributors. >> >My fault. I forget whom I was replying to. Of course my reply above >> >was in response to your question about developing a "working" system. >> >Have fun in your politicianless world (with no physical >> >infrastructure, information infrastructure, national defense, etc.) >> >> Who needs "national defense"? As for "information infrastructure, are you >> under the illusion that private industry couldn't do it? Hell, it DOES it! >> The Internet is essentially fully privatized, NOW. > >Fully privitized? Jim, I have been on the net since the late 80's. >I know how it started and what it looks like today. If you know as >little about the internet as you do about politics maybe you do not >know what the first budget item in any company is to go in tough >times. There is little public interest in private industry. I stand by my original statement. True, the origins of the Internet were primarily government-sponsored and financed, but by now the vast majority of the traffic goes through privatized connections (Sprint, MCI, AT+T), and most of the users access the web through private (not government owned or controlled) ISP's: Compuserve, AOL, Prodigy, and hundreds if not thousands of "Mom+Pop" ISP's around the country. I should also point out that given the fact that the Internet is at least doubling and probably tripling in size (packets and/or users) every year, if you go back to the last year that the backbone was government-financed) you'll probably discover that the Internet was far less than 1/10th of its current size. >Let me ask you this. Do you enjoy the net of today (AOL, Spam, >XXX-rated transfers bogging down traffic) Why should I mind the particular characteristics ("XXX-rated transfers") of the traffic jams? What are you, some kind of Born-again christian or something? And while I don't like the spam, either, I am under no illusion that this would be particularly avoidable, and certainly not EASILY or perfectly avoidable. Spam is, at most, a minor inconvenience most of the time. > to the net of yesterday >(100's of newsgroups not thousands, voluntary acceptance of >nettiquette, etc). Dont get me wrong I was glad to see the AUP go. >But your absolute statements are maddening. > >> And "physical infrastructure"? Sure they'll be physical infrastructure. >> It'll just be _privately_ owned. >> > >If it were feasible it would happen today. Business groups (the ones >I have had VERY personal contact with, subsets of NAM) are frustrated >with Legislature's refusal to act in the best public interest. If it >were feasible they would own their own transportation system. It is >not! It sounds like you're making a contradition. Previously, you suggested that a privatized system wouldn't work, but at the end of the last paragraph you seem to be saying that the blame falls on "the legislature"'s doing something wrong. See the problem with that position? Please get your story straight. >> The difference between private and public corruption is that in private >> corruption, individuals presumably have the right to fight that corruption >> where it impacts on their rights and assets. In PUBLIC corruption, the >> taxpayer is rarely given the opportunity to fight the loss of his assets. > >Where did you get that law degree? (BTW, mine comes from the >University of Wisconsin- Madison). Ask the victims of the S&L >fiasco, the latest NASDAQ controversy, anyone making claims against a >company in some types of bankruptcy, etc., etc. If you want I can >extend that list for you. The main victims of the "S&L fiasco" were the taxpayers who had to pay hundreds of billions of dollars in claims due to the government simultaneously maintaining the S&L insurance but chancing the laws to allow the fraud that trashed that industry. In other words, the problems were CAUSED BY GOVERNMENT. And like I suggested, no the average taxpayer didn't have any ability to fight this rape of his wallet: He didn't find out about it until it was mostly all over. And if you object to being rooked in a company's bankruptcy, complain to the government who makes itself a preferred creditor in almost all circumstances. >Take for another example the recent corruption at Pabst. Pabst >mismanaged the company and then took away RETIREEs benefits >(including death benefits. No recourse. Perfectly legal. >Inherently unfair. If it's "perfectly legal" yet "inherently unfair," it sounds like much of the blame lies with the legislature, since it is the legislature that is responsible for the laws. Huh? > >If it were done in a public context, heads would roll. " the >taxpayer is rarely given the opportunity to fight the loss of his >assets." What? Are you suggesting there are no layers of >bureaucracy? Not enough process? Funny you sound like a democrat. In the example _you_ mentioned, the S&L bailout, no "heads rolled." Was any government employee punished at all? I don't recall it! >> It appears that you've convinced yourself that ESP exists and works. Given >> that, it isn't surprising that you would believe that donations to >> candidates can't be "blinded" sufficiently to help dramatically reduce >> political quid pro quo. > >Jim, since you like the ad hominim, you are naive. I understand >cryptographic blinding. The world is not a computer. And as I >stated above, even if you could, it wouldnt stop the flow of money. The goal is not, specifically, to "stop the flow of money." The goal is to ensure that candidates know as little as possible about where the money comes from. >> >What you are not getting is that, in this case, the public employees >> >are the edge that causes the win. >> >> How do you know this? >> > >Try looking at election results. You still haven't proven your case. > Jesus Jim, if you are going to take >controversial stands at least understand how the system works in >reality. Get a copy of campaigns&elections. Look in the back. >Remember we are in an information society. People collect political >information. It is for sale. I am suprised that is new to you. You are coming to conclusions without support. As I said before, you've convinced yourself that you KNOW that a particular election went a particular way precisely because of "public employees." Sigh! > > >> > We have had some close races, the >> >winning margin is clearly less than the number of voting public >> >employees. >> >> The winning margin is ALSO clearly less than the number of many different >> identifiable groups. You seem to be making assumptions in support of your >> theory. > >Actually, in my small city, with under 2000 active voters, it is >fairly easy to discern the number one identifiable group. I DONT >deal in theory. I deal in reality, you should try it. While your >theories are enticing they are TOTALLY without the ability to be >realized. You STILL aren't supporting your claims! >> >This came from a discussion of vote delivery. X has a block Y that >> >will vote for Z (the endorsed candidate) every time. If victory >> >margin is less than Y, X's delivery controls the race. >> >> Except that plenty of voting blocks exist. And there's plenty of unknowns >> that you can't figure out with any certainty: How certain are you that >> "Block Y" ALL voted for Z? How do you know some other group didn't? Etc. > >Politics deals with probability not certainty. If you had ANY real >world experience you would know that. Budgets are all dependant upon >reasonable probabilities. Its really not that hard to grasp. How much longer do you intend to waste my time? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Practice Codes
by c62op27＠ibx.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What is a good source of "practice" ciphertext on the Web? Victor F.

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KRAP in HotWired (article on William Reinsch)
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You might want to read an article by Brock Meeks in HotWired on William Reinsch, who is charged with overseeing the new Key Recovery Access Policy. http://www.muckraker.com/muckraker/96/43/index4a.html Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Copyright violations
by Thomas C. Allard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not sure if "webmaster(a)americanbanker.com" is the correct place to report this, but I'm sure you can forward this to whomever is in charge of enforcing your copyright. One of your subscribers, dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis), has been redistributing articles from American Banker to a cyptography mailing list (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) Attached is just one of the many articles he has sent. Many users on the cypherpunks list have asked him to stop or at least tell us if he has permission to redistribute. He has done neither. To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: [NEWS] From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Date: Fri, 25 Oct 96 08:38:24 EDT Comments: Dole/Kemp '96! Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y. Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com American Banker, 10/24/96 Gonzalez pushing consumer safeguards for electronic banking Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez called Wednesday for aggressive congressional action to protect consumers in the emerging world of electronic banking. Releasing a blueprint for legislative action, the Texas Democrat urged Congress to: *Adopt public policy standards relating to privacy, disclosure, access, equity, and financial reliability for electronic banking products and services. *Hold oversight hearings to assess how well the industry is serving the consumer in these five areas. *Enact laws if the industry's performance falls below minimum congressional standards. *Define financial transactions to include the exchange of financial information as well as cash. *Consider revising current consumer protection laws. "Many of the federal consumer protection laws are nearly 30 years old, and they were not designed to deal with the effects of these new technologies," said Rep. Gonzalez, the House Banking Committee's ranking minority member. The report, "Connecting Consumers: Consumer Issues and Emerging Financial Technology," recommends subjecting banks and nonbanks to the same laws and regulations in this area. Republican committee members and banking regulators have been reluctant to issue rules that might hinder the development of new electronic banking products. [I.e., more regulation of electronic commernce. -DV] --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me. pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6 DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D

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USAF Speech Subterfuge (fwd)
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded Message: Date: 25 Oct 1996 10:48:12 To: Recipients of conference <fastnet(a)igc.apc.org> From: james(a)bovik.org (James Salsman) Subject: speech subterfuge I have some indirect evidence that patent-related activities of the U.S. Air Force may have intentionally obscured the mathematical definition of "cepstrum" from the mid-1970s, with literally tremendous implecations for the computer speech processing industry (perhaps billions of dollars in real economic damage by now), and also harming current war reduction projects such as automatic language translation systems. The correct definition was published in 1963 by Cooley and Tukey (who also coined the term "bit".) For those who care, the Cooley-Tukey cepstrum is: FFT( ln( | FFT( sample .* window ) | ) ) And for speech processing, the definition is: FFT( ln( melScale( | FFT( sample .* window ) | ) ) ) (The "melody scale" atenuates frequencies atenuated by the human ear. N.B.: Both the resulting cepstral magnitude and phase are significant, e.g., the result is a vector of complex numbers. Furthermore, only the first few elements of the cepstral vector are necessary for the formant envelope, while the exitation (i.e., the harmonics) are encoded as a peak towards the end of the vector.) The error has been to use the inverse Fourier transform instead of the second (outside) FFT, which seems to be why researchers have been experimenting with the (slightly) better Discrete Cosine Transform, from video signal processing. Sincerely, :James Salsman ----- End Forward

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[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

American Banker: Wednesday, October 23, 1996 Citi Tech Chief Fears Massive Fraud on the Net By JENNIFER KINGSON BLOOM Few bankers know as much about data security as Colin Crook - and few are as wary about the Internet. "I personally do not do financial transactions on the Internet," said Mr. Crook, Citicorp's senior technology officer. At a telecommunications seminar in New York last week, Mr. Crook was generally optimistic about the commercial potential of the Internet and its World Wide Web, which he billed as both "a threat and a promise." He is unsure when Citicorp will deem the Web secure enough for financial transactions. Today's banks on the Web are conducting exercises in "risk management," Mr. Crook said. "The notion of electronic commerce is quickly losing its narrow focus as an electronic payment system," he said. "It is now viewed in a much broader context of electronic customer contact, multimedia, interactivity, advertising, and enterprise restructuring." At the seminar, sponsored by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers of Piscataway, N.J., Mr. Crook underscored his concern that the Internet offers wrongdoers the opportunity to "perpetrate fraud on a massive scale." While a waiter holding a customer's credit card in a restaurant has only a limited time to pirate the number, Mr. Crook said, the "nonlinear" nature of the Internet makes time less of a constraint. Thousands of credit card numbers could be pilfered in an instant, he said, and precious corporate brand names could be sullied. "One disgruntled customer will have the ability to do enormous damage in cyberspace," Mr. Crook said. In one example of "electronic grafitti," Mr. Crook pointed to the infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency's Web site. "Hackers transformed it to the 'central agency for stupidity,'" he said. "And that was just a crass example." Warnings aside, Mr. Crook expressed confidence that Internet commerce would grow rapidly. He cited estimates that $20 million in sales took place on-line in 1994, and $500 million in 1995. By 2000, he said, varying researchers project $5 billion to $30 billion of transactions will be conducted electronically, with 150 million to 200 million people using the Web. "In technology, we tend to overestimate the short term and underestimate the long term," said Mr. Crook. "It's not clear to me that the case for electronic cash is very good" in the short term, he said. "Plain old money is very effective." Citicorp has spent years developing a hardware-based electronic cash scheme known as the Electronic Money System. Sholom Rosen, the system's chief architect, recently received another of several patents on the system. Mr. Crook said digital cash technologies like Electronic Money System -- as well as those of Digicash Inc. and Mondex -- were not ripe for widespread use, despite the liberal attitudes of regulators. "You would think this would be an amazing source of trauma" for the regulators, he said. In the near term, Mr. Crook said the Secure Electronic Transactions standard approved by Visa and MasterCard held promise for safe credit card payments on the Internet. And the development of E-check by the Financial Services Technology Consortium (of which Citibank is a founding member) might be the vehicle to project a check-like instrument into the on-line world. Digital money, he said, "really holds the promise of a radical transformation in the long term." Trained as an engineer at the City of Liverpool's College of Technology in England, Mr. Crook has been at Citicorp since 1990. He previously worked at Motorola Corp., British Telecom, and Data General USA. In 1981, he became the youngest person ever elected to the United Kingdom's Royal Academy of Engineers. "When you get into cyberspace, you can't trust anything," he said. "How do you establish relationships with customers in cyberspace?" Maintaining the interest of "the MTV generation" will be another challenge, he said. "We're going to be dealing with a bunch of customers who get bored very easily." --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fundamentally, you won't stop the buying of candidates unless elected politicians have nothing to sell. Technology won't fix that :-) What technology _can_ do is make sure that bribes/contributions can be delivered quietly and untraceably, and that the contributors can let the contributee know who gave the money and what sort of favors they're interested in. It can also simplify private coordination of soft money - letting contributors know what newspapers to put privately-funded ads in, generating astroturf letters to editors, announcing press releases from "Citizens for Better Health Care", "independent political polling" to find what issues the public thinks are important or could be manipulated into caring about by a good campaign, "marketing focus groups" by various front groups that can be leaked to the campaign, etc. Then of course there's leaking rumors about the opponents' Nasty Habits, complete with nicely-morphed pictures, providing lucrative speaking opportunities for TV "journalists", producing slick pre-produced video-bytes for the TV stations, etc. You might get politicians to agree not to accept direct contributions in return for giving them our tax money to spend, but that won't stop the "advance auction of future services" - it'll just raise the stakes. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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The Electric Library
by Hh Production-Mail system -- none 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Welcome to Electric Library! You are seconds away from using your free trial subscription to the Web's easiest, most comprehensive research service. The User Name and Password you requested are listed below. Just follow these simple steps: 1. Open your Web browser to the Electric Library site: http://www.elibrary.com 2. Enter your question in the text box next to the "Go" button. 3. Review your result list, and click on the title of the document you wish to view. 4. Enter your User Name and Password in the appropriate boxes under "I'm already a member". Your User Name is: cypherpunks Your Password is: cypherpunks 5. Click the "Continue" button. You may want to print out this e-mail as a record of your User Name and Password. If you have any questions about using Electric Library, please select "Help" from Electric Library menu bar, or e-mail elibrary(a)infonautics.com. If this message was received in error, please inform us. Thank you for trying Electric Library!

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Secure Ware (HannaH)
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking for any critical information on a security product named "HannaH" from a company called Secure Ware. If there is none and the product is worthwhile, then, great. But I need to know if it is smoke and mirrors from an independant source. Thanks in Advance. Matt

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Re: Anonymous Auth Certificates [was: Re: Blinded Identities]
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I don't see how authorization certificates solve this problem. How >would you determine if someone was qualified to receive an authorization >certificate? And what would you do to make them stop using the service >if they abuse it, and to stop them from getting new authorization >certificates? > >Thanks, >Hal I guess I was mistaken about how rigorous identification checking was performed at various CAs. Verisign used to advertise three levels of CA checking, although I can only find two on their Web site at this time. The lowest, Class 1, is simply tied to your email address and is inadequate for my purposes. Class 2 Digital IDs provide identity assurance by requiring third-party confirmation of your name, mailing address, and other personal information. Although by no means bullet-proof dependence on Class 2 might be a workable alternative to a substantial, up-front, money escrow (as suggested) which I believe would make my service unworkable. -- Steve

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CyberPromo out of service, near bankruptcy
by Will rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I rarely post re: anything but crypto policy, but what the heck - Cyber Promotions is down. It may never get up. Details at out site. http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/961024x.html Cheers Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Inter@ctive Week -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.9 iQEVAgUBMnEl7kcByjT5n+LZAQFTyQgAzTJTT8SImOATbr59hq9qX+yPYePfLU5i nLZtXXf9zjC2aK13s/JwJsoLVc8Y47acEjrFQsi/hF2b+c+ifP3e6wgHp3f5Ully 241uu6iu4Ywu2lEeIOU/azwDqQ3zXxzOJXfjyU/emqRtJpp2+R714y4mvQQF/5Bs lGyzUp7dldEDltJgizBW6+l3MIoLU3+ELV0wv6GI+2JxMqpgniqZmBAsxPYFkC2Y AHSyosexhRbCxIiO0QaJ52+Y+7HNxX5ktBC4P1i6Hj4K9BTfAUdy0OImAOE+gbZp Wk2tonBX2XcpAoAbJG1RUc25UU0Miyt/uRk6P+dujxedNZfaQU4CIA== =i8dT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: http://www.clintongore96.com/ is hacked.
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: jmr(a)shopmiami.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 25 16:35:55 1996 > I am not certain how long this will stay up, so those with mirrors who > are > inclined should visit soon. As of 1630 CST it was still there. Should that cease to be, it's now mirrored at: http://www.prairienet.org/bureau42/clinton.html Share and enjoy. dave - ----- David E. Smith, P O Box 324, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 dsmith(a)prairienet.org http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith send mail with subject of "send pgp-key" for my PGP public key "Better living through chemicals" - unattributed -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMnEyyzVTwUKWHSsJAQHhrAf9EassLGw5U+zR4Yj7z71adDNAcaZR/Z9w Xe4EKIl4V4JtAjb/dmdtjDkzsyCNFhUc1n0r8MYGpumDxRRkYSBZObkQNc7vGOji zmxYBrG6dOC0Dp8YxEqx9oXdGpOnDMDj2PD4Stq4BEDY8QHQlD4s/JbZVovU4KXF E76NnO3yIOd7VXskzi2AL2oLmiNc04/hKqQAIWA8akHfVnbAJceMxg77271db1RE 6TIbJcVpKE6EqbM107TH5x0vUvvUU134dJzOwZUq5yeV7H//s2krm1FN/GrLPC8z /9G3e/mlVT+ZitIf8UeEvsQP6XGkPC8zeQMs4aqaRXjkK7RCjOlefQ== =rxac -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I apologize to the list for this last post by Murder, Inc. My last piece of mail was sent privately to Mr. Bell. He apparently thinks it proper to quote private mail in public. Whatever. > >I wanted to take this crypto-irrelevant discussion off the list. > > If you think the applications for the use of cryptographic blinding > techniques is "crypto-irrelevant" then you're even more clueless than I'd > previously surmised. See Chaum's article of August 1992 if you doubt this. What exactly are your credentials. Your reputation, of course, precedes you. Given that I should have stopped this idiocy a long time ago. > The money will eventually be spendable. But information as to the number > and timing and size of the donations will be disguised using blinding > techniques. Re-read my comments. Explain, please, how you would budget in this situation. Oh, I forgot, when the world realizes that Jim is right, everyone will learn to live their lives like Jim. > Nobody said politics had to be easy. They'll adjust to the new reality; > they always do. see above. > >My point is, Jim, that your idea is unworkable in reality. > > Since you obviously don't understand it, and you also don't understand > cryptographic blinding, why should anybody pay attention to your opinion? Hmmm. How long have you been on the list? What is it I don't understand, specifically. And in private e-mail. > > In theory it would be nice to have complete anonymity. In reality it won't > >work. > > Always overstating your case, I see. For the application I described, it > isn't necessary to have "complete anonymity." What's needed is a healthy > dose of fog and uncertainty, making sure that the candidates can't trust any > claim that a donor has made a donation of any particular size. Explain to me how many campaigns you have run. Explain to me at least a paper you have written (I dont particularly care if you do or dont have a degree, my opinions are based upon your ability to assert and defend a thesis). How many people support your ideas? The revolt must be stealth. Yeah, that's it. > Since today's campaign contribution limits seem to be inherently a violation > of freedom of speech, why not embrace my solution, which doesn't do this? You are right, they do. In your world, there must be only two solutions. Jim's way or the current way. Or better yet, just spout off. > "Constitutionalist"? Hell no! I subscribe to the idea inherent in the > joke, "The Constitution may be bad government, but it's better than what we > have now." I think there's no doubt that a government based scrupulously on > the US Constitution would be a vast improvement. However, we've never had > such a thing. What is your alternative, Jim. Oh yeah, kill all the politicians. Look to the archives folks. **PLONK** > Such "proof" will be easily faked, BTW, which is part of the reason this > system will work so well. I could go to some candidate and claim that I'd > made a $10,000 contribution to his campaign. Jim, how many politicians do you have regular contact with. There were CongressCritters at my wedding, but you know what? If I told them I just made $10,000 donation to their campaign they would not believe me. You know what else? You couldn't get close. Every office on the hill knows of the resident nuts. Its the essence of a killfile, nuts are handed off to the intern. The players are known. I don't particularly care if you believe me. Again what is your experience? > Let's say I'd show him a > (forged) cancelled check. What could he do about it? Would he risk pissing > off a valuable contributor? If he has already raised 100's of thousands of dollars before, he would have no need to deal with you at all. Especially since, I assume from your prior statements that you would get rid of contribution limits. > Sure about that? Let me provide some contrary evidence. Every once in a > while, you'll see on the TV networks a report about corporate (and labor, > BTW) campaign giving, and they will occasionally point out that a given > corporation (or PAC, etc.) gives money BOTH to the Republicans and the > Democrats. They have no reason to do this, except that they think they will > get some benefit in the future from the "access" that contribution produces. Corporate donations? Look it up. Yep, they do. And after you blind the donations, the access will continue to be bought. Politicians can use laws of probability to figure out who has, will and will in the future donate. They can also eliminate a whole bunch of folks. > not the opponents. If they thought it necessary, they would lie about > making a contribution to the other candidate. How many lobbyists do you know Jim? > >Let me ask you this. Do you enjoy the net of today (AOL, Spam, > >XXX-rated transfers bogging down traffic) > > Why should I mind the particular characteristics ("XXX-rated transfers") of > the traffic jams? What are you, some kind of Born-again christian or > something? And while I don't like the spam, either, I am under no illusion Did you protest the COS crap? Well shit Jim, I dont care about the content. Nevermind. > It sounds like you're making a contradition. Previously, you suggested that > a privatized system wouldn't work, but at the end of the last paragraph you > seem to be saying that the blame falls on "the legislature"'s doing > something wrong. Hmm. Blame and workability. What is the connection. Maybe we can all take up a collection so that Jim can go to logic class. > And if you object to being rooked in a company's bankruptcy, complain to the > government who makes itself a preferred creditor in almost all circumstances. I thought we couldnt complain to the Governement? Jeez. Jim, your confusing me. God I must be dumb. Or maybe you are really writing in a style that can easily be decrypted to mean something else. Yeah, Jim, that's it. > If it's "perfectly legal" yet "inherently unfair," it sounds like much of > the blame lies with the legislature, since it is the legislature that is > responsible for the laws. Huh? Blame, workability, its like trying to teach a student with no brain. > >Try looking at election results. > > You still haven't proven your case. How many times do I have to explain probability to you? Jesus, look it up. > You are coming to conclusions without support. As I said before, you've > convinced yourself that you KNOW that a particular election went a > particular way precisely because of "public employees." Sigh! See above. Oh yeah, uh, Jim, you can use that nifty scroll button, > >Actually, in my small city, with under 2000 active voters, it is > >fairly easy to discern the number one identifiable group. I DONT > >deal in theory. I deal in reality, you should try it. While your > >theories are enticing they are TOTALLY without the ability to be > >realized. > > You STILL aren't supporting your claims! Probability. Anyone want to send him a Statistics Textbook? > >Politics deals with probability not certainty. If you had ANY real > >world experience you would know that. Budgets are all dependant upon > >reasonable probabilities. Its really not that hard to grasp. > > How much longer do you intend to waste my time? Oh, Im sorry. You must be planning on taking over the world. Oh yeah, I heard all of your friends jumping to your support. All of the political ties you made with all of your experience are jumping to your aid. I hear only one solitary sound. ***PLONK*** > > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > > ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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Re: http://www.clintongore96.com/ ...
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: dsmith(a)prairienet.org, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, jimg(a)mentat.com Date: Fri Oct 25 18:02:44 1996 I was mistaken, and I now think it's a spoof, not a hack, but regardless it's a good anti-Clinton site, although still the best IMO is: http://www.realchange.org/index.htm Real People For Real Change, a non-affiliated, independent political action committee with nothing nice to say about *anyone*. ^^^^^^^ [I played a small part in convincing them to say bad things about Browne(!) on the theory that bad press is better than no press at all.] Following notes on a Browne-campaign staff -- National Party staff conflict-of-interest, the Real Changers say: "This being the Libertarians, other people argued that the other campaigns should have hired them, too!" To know us is to love us, especially if you are the highest bidder. JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMnE5DW1lp8bpvW01AQFo3AP+KwFdFegX73+2NIyy8l1CseTMb7bH03JN L1r3/waMvrwI3NDUyVoOpHT4o5rQomnQwzbprb8L1yOaM2hv/y2MM6zs5HTtdwpG z6y/Ku9JxWGE4xAw7g2MyYbtBhppNrJxBmwI48ruZk2OPy7tpGqCXWzmVv5QkZ+U Rd9mXSIIeOk= =llKb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: slander and call for lawyers. :)
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 25 20:29:30 1996 [I sent a version of this note privately to Ray, Sandy, and Unicorn, and now I've decided to send it publicly to the list. Hi Dmitri, you've finally done it.] Uni wrote: > If you don't watch it I'll have a pair of my staff represent him free of > charge. I hereby transfer my pledge of a shipment of guava pastries (that was me) from Sandy's meeting to Black Unicorn's lawyers if he chooses to go ahead with this, since the "let's Meet Dmitri" meeting seems to be off anyway. ;) JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMnFbcm1lp8bpvW01AQEaaAQAj8xsx5RZv56xKKEZhuthlvf9gNZANE+L f82rFV7FRj3BBJyo2phbiYlU8+dXMKIEHv2w5lhqzS2PB9hgwVcap+iOVcd0EqB6 KDOx+ez86gjYqv+Q7bcxxI+cB7iXq/01R+1JUeSTSFnrw6+Vnts8e02DHaTnGxMz qPKFUupyYd4= =u3SP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to RF for this pointer for getting the NSA report. We'll get a copy next week and put it on our Web page: http://www.ffhsj.com/bancmail/21starch/961017.htm 21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 October 17, 1996 National Security Agency Report Raises Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money [Snip report summary] If you would like a copy of the report, please contact us at: 21stCen(a)ffhsj.com or (202) 639-7200. Thomas P. Vartanian Robert H. Ledig David L. Ansell Washington, D.C. Visit the 21st Century Banking Alert Page on the World Wide Web at http://www.ffhsj.com/bancmail/bancpage.htm

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17 Dec '03

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17 Dec '03

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