December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:27 14/08/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >* the role of physical vs. cyberspace data havens ... >3. Vince seems to be a in a somewhat precarious position, awaiting renewal >of a one-year work permit. I'm sure this has come up before, but what would prevent a server being located on a buoy or something at sea outside territorial limits (or when satellites become cheaper, on a satellite itself) offering such services? Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

1 0

Re: RANT re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brad Dolan asks: > > 1. Good jobs of the future are knowledge jobs which require little > > capital investment. At 06:24 PM 8/13/96 -0700, Checkered Daemon wrote: > a) Knowledge jobs require tremendous capital investment, as in degrees, > training, continual updating of skills, etc. But they do not require much capital investment by the boss. That is to say the key corporate assets are increasingly owned by the employees, At some point one would expect this to lead to a change in business structure, but I see no signs of this happening. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

2 1

re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 08:33 13/08/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >> > Demand for Indian programmers is less than supply not because capital >> > has somehow failed to flow to India, but because an engineer in India >> > is not free to produce the value that engineers elsewhere are free >> > to produce. I've worked with companies that bring Indian contract programmers to Silicon Valley and also contract for work back home in Bangalore. Sure, part of the lower price paid for programmers in India vs. importing the same people here is probably because the government is annoying. Why is it worth paying nearly-American-scale wages to have them do the work here rather than 1/5 as much back home? Part of it is because it's harder to interact with people halfway around the world, even using email and faxes, so the jobs that succeed well in that environment are big jobs with well-defined inputs and outputs. For work that needs real interaction between the customer and the worker, it helps to have the worker nearby, so it's worth paying them to come here. For work that needs interaction between workers and machines, especially brand-new-not-yet-working machines on high-speed networks that aren't easy or cheap to drag across the Pacific and then connect to India, you need bodies on site. Even for standard equipment you can buy more of, it's still more productive to work here where you have lots of it and can get spare parts at Fry's than to ship some of it to India and have people use it there. Also, of course, the folks who are good enough to ship halfway around the world to do a job for you are usually the best they've got; they'd get more than the average programmer back in Bangalore as well. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

1 0

Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:15 AM 8/15/96 +0600, you wrote: >At 10:27 14/08/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >>* the role of physical vs. cyberspace data havens >... >>3. Vince seems to be a in a somewhat precarious position, awaiting renewal >>of a one-year work permit. > >I'm sure this has come up before, but what would prevent a server >being located on a buoy or something at sea outside territorial >limits (or when satellites become cheaper, on a satellite itself) >offering such services? Piracy. Some pirates may have black Jolly Roger flags on their ships, but most have flags that say "Coast Guard" or "Navy" or "Harbor Police", and think they're protecting their National Security or something. Satellite launching is generally somewhat government-controlled, though you could get a remailer into space if you didn't tell the government too much about it until it was launched. The US apparently has restrictions on crypto capabilities of satellites launched from the US, according to something I read on the net once. But I suppose you could launch a programmable satellite, and then reprogram it by radio.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

1 0

Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:27 AM 8/14/96 -0700, Tim wrote: >* the role of physical vs. cyberspace data havens ..... > so I tended to view data havens as not being tied to physical communities > where the local potentates could revoke work permits, visas, > travel permits, business licenses, etc. Agreed. At least for now, banking havens are a different kind of market than data havens - people want to be able to demonstrate that activities are being run from Non-Taxing states, though there's a parallel need for private data communications to hide any connections back to a potentially more greedy state, and perhaps to move money back home as well. Data havens, on the other hand, may need public ports in tolerant locations, but most of their business really needs to be encrypted any way; the visible parts such as web pages are only a small part of the game. I suspect that, rather than having fixed physical locations, they probably need to operate on a Temporary Autonomous Zone basis, moving elsewhere when a jurisdiction becomes unfriendly but mostly trying to avoid too much notice. >What the form of these "cyberspace data havens" might take is unclear. >Several pieces of technology are missing, just as they were missing four >years ago when one of the early list members contacted me to tell me how >easy it would be to set up a data haven with computers. (It wasn't easy >then, and it ain't easy now. The pieces that are missing are the >reifications of protocols we talk about a lot....mere encryption and >authentication are only the starting points, and look at how hard it's been >just to get _them_ deployed.) Reification is one thing; developing business models and markets is another, and making the activities visible so potential users can _find_ data havens is a third. There are some activities that operate as temporary data havens today - child pornography, warez, police Red Squad and blackmail files on citizens kept illegally on home machines outside the public's control, and other unsavory groups that limit the people who know about them. Public data havens are a bit different. Finding a reason to Just Do It means you either need a real threat model or you end up becoming Yet Another Spam Server like many of the remailers have been. Some things we need to implement Data Havens - 1 - digicash or equivalent - it's coming, but it's not widely used, and if you can't pay anonymously it's tough to pay for data havening anonymously. 2 - practical temporary registration of connections - is hacking a DNS server enough? Or do we need IRC meetmes? Not sure. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

1 0

Re: Fw: Re: Free Pronto Secure Offer
by geoff＠commtouch.co.il 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: unicorn(a)schloss.li, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Aug 15 10:53:53 1996 On 14 Aug unicorn wrote: > "Do all the work I should be doing or have done in the first place > discover the critical flaws in my new-keen-o-ka-jive-o crypto system > and I will give you a free copy of a critically flawed crypto system > (a $99.00 value) ABSOLUTELY FREE. Wait, don't order yet. Included > you also get to> actually whitewash my fence and then mow my lawn. > All at NO COST to you." Unicorn, please try to take a minute to think before hitting that send key. You infer that a product is critically flawed without even trying it ? There are quite a few members of this list who are using Pronto Secure and will testify to the contrary. See http://www.commtouch.com/testers.htm for a list of people who take the trouble to try out a product before venturing an opinion. Agreed that feedback from external testers is a good deal for developers. It is also not a bad deal for evaluators, they get a free copy of a product which in the case of Pronto Secure many find useful (as witnessed by x-mailer headers on c'punk traffic). Testers also get an opportunity to contribute neat feature ideas which helps propagate secure messaging to the masses. Unicorn, you are invited to whitewash my fence :) - --------------------------------------------------------------- Geoff Klein, Pronto Secure Product Manager; www.commtouch.com My PGP public Key 1814AD45 can be obtained by sending a message to geoff(a)commtouch.co.il with "Get PGP Key" as the subject. - ---------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMhLXlELv5OMYFK1FAQHoCQP/Tg13glNoTAq4OdHJ5tay+x67kpAg3eIn JwMG/spaV/R5z9iec2wE3BQNWbta2lGF2hZUwkyRNUPX/01024024rg4wp3dIrUQ gk5vl9hG7kbTIOzLKgyEKvQs8yBs+9A3KfE3HY47vm78qMVF0QE11PECMWubnfg6 be7yL9/U64M= =923l -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 3

Last word: auto video surveillance report[long]
by The Prisoner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this is pushing it as far as crypto-relevance. I won't bring up the subject again. But this was too much to not pass along - there are some interesting insights into the mindset at work, and if I had to justify the cryptorelevance it would be by promoting the value of knowing the mind of Brother ... both Little and Big. For those not familiar with Calif. bureaucratese: "HOV" is "High Occupancy Vehicle" and an "HOV Lane" is a carpool lane. Edited doc. follows (from http://www.bts.gov/smart/cat/274.html) Use of Videotape in HOV Lane Surveillance and Enforcement: Final Report USE OF VIDEOTAPE IN HOV LANE SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT FINAL REPORT By John W. Billheimer Ken Kaylor Charles Shade Submitted to State of California Department of Transportation under Contract 55 G710 D232 March 1990 SYSTAN,INC. in ATD,INC. 343 Second Street Association 6431 Independence Avenue P.O. Box U with Woodland Hills, CA 91367 Los Altos, CA 94023 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report covers a six-month study designed to explore the use of vidoetape in HOV lane surveillance and enforcement. The study is an extension of an earlier investigation of the effects of different enforcement strategies and engineering designs on violation rates on California's mainline HOV lanes. The report has been prepared in the Los Altos, California offices of SYSTAN, Inc. under Contract No. 55 G71 0 with the California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS). The project was jointly sponsored by the California Highway Patrol (CHP). Mr. Philip Jang, Chief of the HOV Systems Branch of CALTRANS Division of Traffic Operations served as project administrator, while Scott McGowen of CALTRANS acted as the project's technical monitor. ... SYSTAN wishes to thank all those who provided information and insights on the enforcement and operation of California's mainline HOV lanes, and acknowledges full responsibility for the analysis, interpretation, and presentation of the data they provided. ... 1.1.1 Background ... It has been suggested that using video equipment to assist in HOV lane enforcement could reduce the requirements for patrol officers, increase citation rates, and minimize freeway disruption. The current investigation has been designed to extend past studies of HOV lane enforcement by testing both the feasibility and accuracy of the use of video equipment in HOV lane surveillance. 1.1.2 Objective The objective of the current study has been to demonstrate and test the use of video equipment in determining vehicle occupancy, documenting violator identity, and aiding enforcement of HOV lanes. ... Field tests showed that it is technologically possible to record several accurate views of vehicles traveling in mainline HOV lanes. Specifications and costs of the equipment needed for videotape surveillance are summarized below. Cameras. Best results are obtained with high speed color cameras capable of achieving exposure times of 1/1000 of a second. A 14:1 zoom lens is needed to focus on oncoming vehicles at distances of approximately 1200 feet. Cameras placed at eye-level on the freeway itself should be small and unobtrusive. Auxiliary Equipment. Two monitors with split screen capability are required in the control van. One monitor provides an on-line review capability, while the other provides a permanent record of all camera views. A special effects generator should be used to make the exact time and location a permanent part of the videotape record. Polarizing filters help to solve problems with glare from shiny cars and windshields, although they reduce the light-gathering capability of the cameras. Infra-red cameras and light sources can be used to document license plates after dark by videotaping the rear license plates of departing cars. However, it does not appear feasible to videotape oncoming vehicles under conditions of darkness or low visibility. Results are not clear and the infra-red light source can distract oncoming drivers. ... 1.3.3 Potential Applications Although it is technologically possible to record a series of accurate views of vehicles traveling in mainline HOV lanes, no combination of recorded views currently provides enough information to support prosecution for occupancy violators. Even so, videotape surveillance of HOV lanes can provide useful information for a variety of other purposes. These include: 1. Support for on-line enforcement. In cases where there are no refuge areas adjacent to mainline HOV lanes, videotape surveillance provides a means of alerting officers stationed downstream from the cameras to the presence of oncoming violators. 2. Support for remote ticketing . Although videotape by itself does not appear to be accurate enough to provide a basis for citations, the combination of videotape and an observing officer could conceivably provide the accuracy needed for a system of mailed warnings and citations. If a system of mailed warnings or citations can be installed, the officer would not have to pursue violators, and a videotape record of driver, occupancy, and license plate would be available for court hearings. Such a system would be more cost-effective than the current system of freeway pursuit and roadside citing, and will reduce the congestion caused by rubbernecking. 3. Performance Monitoring. There are several applications in which videotape surveillance appears to provide a marked improvement over current practice. These include: (a) Freeway monitoring to document vehicle type and occupancy over time; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ... The cost of videotaping HOV lane activity is more than double the cost of monitoring operations manually. However, videotape provides more accurate records, a consistent data base, and a permanent, verifiable record of traffic activity. It also provides information on the vehicle mix, traffic speed, and the license plates of carpoolers and suspected violators. 1.3.4 Public Reaction In a state in which radar cannot legally be used to enforce speed laws on state freeways, videotape surveillance of HOV lanes has significant legislative and public relations implications. These implications are beyond the scope of the current study. However, two pieces of information related to the current study may shed some light on the potential reactions of the public and the media to the possibility of videotape surveillance. .... Press Coverage. The field tests undertaken during the current study attracted the attention of the Los Angeles media and resulted in a limited amount of press coverage. Articles in the Los Angeles Times and Ontario Daily Report/Progress Bulletin were both balanced and informative. To the extent that these stories can be viewed as an indication of press and public reaction to the use of videotape in HOV lane enforcement, there was no suggestion that CALTRANS and the CHP would be exposed to a massive public outcry if videotape proves to be technologically and legally feasible as an enforcement tool. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the articles themselves made potential HOV lane violators in the Los Angeles area more cautious. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ... Video cameras operating in conjunction with officer observation may provide sufficient accuracy to support mail-out citations for HOV lane occupancy violations. An officer stationed downstream from the video cameras is in a position to verify the occupancy of vehicles which appear suspect to observers monitoring camera output. ... Moreover, the presence of an observing officer may remove some of the "Big Brother is watching" stigma from the use of videotape.

1 0

RE: Fun with M$
by Andy Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 August 1996 06:16, Bill Stewart[SMTP:stewarts@ix.netcom.com] wrote: > >Microsoft has chosen what Sun should have: leave the security to the user, > >don't take it away from everyone. Java has been severely crippled by the > > User? What user? The poor unsuspecting fool who hits the web page? > The kind friendly person who writes web pages that turn off Win95? > Executing signed code from web pages is semi-ok, if the default is to > trust no one and make the user explicitly grant permission to code authors. > Executing anything that comes down the wire is foolish, and writing > software to do so is rabidly negligent. The default (at least on beta-2 of ie) is to not trust anyone unless you explicity say so. If the user then decides to execute "k3wl kontro1" from phreak.net then that's their problem. Does anyone know what the legal implications of signed code are? That is, if Company A signs their Active X control and it's later found to corrupt users data, does the signature (which is supposed to make the user trust the control as safe), open up the company to litigation for damages?

1 0

Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Aug 15 12:42:40 1996 > I'm sure this has come up before, but what would prevent a server > being located on a buoy or something at sea outside territorial > limits (or when satellites become cheaper, on a satellite itself) > offering such services? Space: How often does your system crash? (Imagine sending a shuttle up there to troubleshoot the server) Sea: If your server swims in the ocean I could think of several drawbacks: - - per satellite only: costs - - must be very robust (salt water, shocks) - - must be powered by battery (Hey Jeff, have you ordered the 2000 Alkaline batteries yet, I think it's about time to change them on the server) - - everybody can go and get it (after all, no jurisdiction also means no protection - I believe that everybody can claim stuff floating in international waters, he just has to get it). But I like the idea anyway. But then again, why don't you just buy an island and get the country to grant you jurisdictional power over it? (sounds a lot cheaper than a satellite) - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMhL/IxFhy5sz+bTpAQE7zggAuCJo0i0X49nmLWtlQ2ZgKcapn80F0z8T +LJ/5SIjcbfvAZOZHKJVRwjh2GmQjaro4AskgBY4UHg2BTumUlsOiLwXM6hvoCx+ mdd2znkiiWfFarD067Vvur7KTSD87XZWMXR9I/8f1ONzWRdASE/kLQ/azCEgne1P GO/u0T0kKWWORSVgLc638U9raxJTPmn0Q6vEwvgVU4ARFGAEIPsFN3p8TfbIBAQ5 SqQbzNShqYzHrLgSDiarH2OyHA6o3hghwK1jUs2zHe2bAxvdjzMc3BaodWOi1tlT DJSq79cTrYItzCK+nn0INtaIeOQy2XwPFEA+1FglIScyxtiPcV0AYQ== =Xwjf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Santford wrote: >Bart Croughs wrote: >> If you don't know the answer, there's nothing to be ashamed of. It is just this sort of unnecessary condescending snottiness that create the clear impression that Bart is an asshole. Perhaps he is a fine chap and this is just his style, but I find it very offensive an counter-productive in this discussion. S a n d y< To prove that I'm behaving badly you quote me out of context. My statement 'If you don't know the answer, there's nothing to be ashamed of', was immediately followed by the statement 'I don't know the answer either'. In this context, my statement wasn't that snotty. After all, I made clear that in this respect I wasn't any better than you. So I think you are overreacting a bit. Second, I didn't complain about the tone of your previous posts when you talked about me 'fretting' about the dropping wages of American workers, or when you wrote 'yada, yada, yada' in response to one of my posts. I don't even complain when you call me an asshole (except that maybe next time you start calling names you could be a bit more imaginative...) It's not that important. I guess I just get subconsciously a little irritated, and that's the reason I'm maybe a little less polite when I answer your posts than you would like me to be. So if you want me to behave nicer when I answer your posts, the best way to achieve this would be to start behaving nicer yourself. Bart Croughs

1 0

Re: Fw: Re: Free Pronto Secure Offer
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: geoff(a)commtouch.co.il, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Aug 15 07:45:59 1996 Nicely Put !! I. for one, love it... warts ( for now ) and all ! To: unicorn(a)schloss.li, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu Aug 15 10:53:53 1996 On 14 Aug unicorn wrote: > "Do all the work I should be doing or have done in the first place > discover the critical flaws in my new-keen-o-ka-jive-o crypto system > and I will give you a free copy of a critically flawed crypto system > (a $99.00 value) ABSOLUTELY FREE. Wait, don't order yet. Included > you also get to> actually whitewash my fence and then mow my lawn. > All at NO COST to you." Unicorn, please try to take a minute to think before hitting that send key. You infer that a product is critically flawed without even trying it ? There are quite a few members of this list who are using Pronto Secure and will testify to the contrary. See http://www.commtouch.com/testers.htm for a list of people who take the trouble to try out a product before venturing an opinion. Agreed that feedback from external testers is a good deal for developers. It is also not a bad deal for evaluators, they get a free copy of a product which in the case of Pronto Secure many find useful (as witnessed by x-mailer headers on c'punk traffic). Testers also get an opportunity to contribute neat feature ideas which helps propagate secure messaging to the masses. Unicorn, you are invited to whitewash my fence :) - --------------------------------------------------------------- Geoff Klein, Pronto Secure Product Manager; www.commtouch.com My PGP public Key 1814AD45 can be obtained by sending a message to geoff(a)commtouch.co.il with "Get PGP Key" as the subject. - ---------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCXAwUBMhMN+eJ+JZd/Y4yVAQFQ1wQKA4D7OyVKQDyM93653ffUgG3iRUtMkYc6 ozcSRGz1RHlH2HdUWPuM7M9YGvF8hhcccPwWUA1G1NuJypeEsCwKKHuaEiTIpRVk ZRAb1nA2AP/dLZ2NQTBxDr7JQMZ4zfSfX376Ejk7Ep1oR2XAr/fFP/QYHzpHsvme FYPEzNtejjDQSg== =/O/z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:39 PM 8/15/96, Bart Croughs wrote: > > If the situation is so clear, why can't you give the proof I'm asking for? > Several people have given explanations of why your question is both too simplistic and too tied to subjective definitions of "good for the economy." You ignore these points and keep repeating your protectionist mantra. You seem to have a one-track mind, suggesting you are probaby a rabid Objectivist. OK, so I will give you an Objectivist proof: A is A. Not-A is not Not-Not-A. A is real, Not-A is not real. Reality is good, non-reality is not good. Man exists in reality. Therefore Man is good. Existence is not optional. Non-existence is nothingness. Nothingness is darkness. The opposite of darkness is light. Fire produces light, therefore fire is good. Fire is the embodiment of good. Smoking is the embodiment of fire. Therefore, smoking is good. Non-smoking is bad.... What was the question again? --Tim May (P.S. Since Bart seems to have only one thing on his mind, and since our list members seem unable to persuade him about anything, I suspect this list is not the list for Bart. May he find the list he seeks.) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: GOP security
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Authorities in Chicago, where the Democrats will meet the last >week of August, are taking similar precautions. Metal detectors, >bomb-sniffing dogs and surveillance cameras will be in force, >along with thousands of police. Coast Guard cutters will patrol >Lake Michigan. Chicago police are sealing an eight-block area >around the United Center sports arena, the main convention site, >to all unauthorized cars, trucks and pedestrians. As the 20th >century nears an end, wary, pervasive security is as much a part >of the convention scene as Old Glory and silly hats. San Diego has >been preparing convention security for more than a year. Then a >bomber on the other side of the country suddenly made everyone >wonder if the next big public event could be free of mayhem and >terror. Taxicabs will have unrestricted access of course and are therefore the vector of choice. I heard an interesting ahem, "rumor" related to security through obscurity- only 2/5 of a major armored car companys trucks are actually armored/bullet resistant glass, the other three are just look-alikes...... saving money.....tsk,tsk. Brian "Zazen? Well it beats sitting around on your ass all day doing nothing."

1 0

Re: Schlafly on crypto
by Marc J. Wohler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:47 PM 8/14/96 -0700, SANDY SANDFORT wrote: >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > in this battle, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." I appreciate Sandy's enlightened and consistent position. And I will stand with anyone who supports free speech and privacy. Forgive my week character however, if I am forced to hold my nose while I stand with her on this issue. She is the type of free speach advocate who supports the freedom of those who agree with *her*. She is no friend of *mine*

1 0

Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger wrote: >No one claimed that you can't increase productivity and income on average under some circumstances by increased capital investment. What was being made fun of was the simplistic misunderstanding of what the underlying mechanisms are. Prices, including the price of labor, are set purely by the marketplace.Under some circumstances, incomes will be determined by investment levels made by employers. Under others, they will not. The important feature is the market principle, not the capital investment. The point of my "green pylons" posting was to note that it is the market direction of the investment and not the investment that is important.< If you mean to say that in a society where the government directs the 'investments' (confiscates the wealth of its citizens and spends it for its own purposes), wages could be lower than in a society where there is less capital accumulated but where private parties direct the investments, then you are right. But Austrian economists like Murray Rothbard, Hans Hermann Hoppe, etc. don't consider government expenditures to be *investments* of capital; they consider all government expenditures to be *consumption*. As an Austrian, you should know this. To quote Murray Rothbard about resource-using expenditures by the government ('Power and market', p. 173, 2nd ed.): "all of this expenditure must be considered *consumption*. Investment occurs where producers' goods are bought by entrepreneurs, not at all for their own use or satisfaction, but merely to reshape and resell them to others - ultimately to the consumers. But government redirects the resources of society to its ends, chosen by it and backed by the use of force. Hence, these purchases must be considered consumption expenditures, whatever their intention or physical result. They are a particular wasteful form of 'consumption', however, since they are generally *not* regarded as consumption expenditures by government officials" Etc. By the way, Jean-Baptiste Say, the French economist, already had the same view a long time ago. >Impediments to trade create wastes of capital just as surely as burning cash in the marketplace does. If you were really an Austrian, and not a confused person, you would know that all the Austrians and Chicago School people are for completely free trade, something you don't seem to get in your expositions on capital flows. Perry< You're setting up a straw man again. As I said several times before, I *am* for completely free trade. Even if the investment of American capital in foreign countries would lead to a lower standard of living for workers in the US, I still would support completely free trade, simply because I support the non-aggression principle. But, as I also said before, I don't believe that investment of American capital abroad would lead to a lower standard of living for American workers (it would lead to relatively lower wages, but I think the advantages of investing abroad would compensate for this). I just don't know how to *prove* this belief. I like to have proof for my beliefs, if only to be able to rebut socialist arguments. That's why I asked my question: how can you prove that the investment of American capital abroad would not hurt workers in the US? Bart Croughs

1 0

Schlafly helped defeat ERA, supported Goldwater--where do I sign up?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:53 PM 8/15/96, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Take a look at the Boston Coalition for Freedom of Expression's list of >enemies of free expression. Excerpt follows. >Linkname: Phyllis Schlafly, Eagle Forum >Filename: http://www.eff.org/pub/Groups/BCFE/bcfenatl.html#Schlafly > > Phyllis Schlafly .... > "Leading the pro-family movement to victories since 1972." Basic > membership includes a subscription to The Phyllis Schlafly Report and > costs $15.00. Mrs. Schlafly, whose husband Fred used to head the World > Anti-Communist League, is the person considered most responsible for > the defeat of the ERA. Her book A Choice Not an Echo, published in ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > 1964 to support the presidential aspirations of Barry Goldwater, is ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > one of the seminal texts of contemporary American conservative > politics. So, she helped defeat the ERA and supported Goldwater. Sounds pretty good to me. From this excerpt, I'd call her a friend of liberty. (Yes, I'm serious. Some of you find it hard to tell when I'm being completely serious and when I'm being facetious, so I thought I'd clarify this.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

[NOISE] Re: Stopped Clock. Was: Schlafly on Crypto
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>Subject: Clinton Is Trying to be Big Brother -- Phyllis Schlafly Column 8/8/96 >>It makes me ill to agree with Schlafly on any issue, but >>'Even a stopped clock....... >>Unrepentant Liberial > >It does seem really odd, doesn't it? But look at it this way: The only >reason the knuckle-dragging conservatives are able to take the moral >high-ground on this and other net-freedom issues is because the OTHER >"unrependant liberals" have inexplicably abandoned the correct side of the >argument. The fact that the conservatives are right may seem odd, but the >behavior of the liberals is truly astonishing. Liberals? What Liberals? Clinton's certainly no liberal; he's just a big-spending statist who likes to buy votes from poor, middle-class, and yuppie voters rather than buying them from defense contractors, not that he's above that. The only thing about him that's more liberal than George Bush, whose Clipper chips and miscellaneous wars Clinton inherited, is that Clinton smiles when he's lying instead of sneering like Bush. (If Clinton had said things like "Of course I tried to avoid the draft and smoked dope, I'm no fool" and had dropped the draft and the Drug War instead of supporting both after he was President, I might have a better opinion of him....) However, if Phyllis Schlafly understands that the tools she needs to protect her speech are the same that people she disapproves of can use to protect their speech, and is willing to make that trade, she's starting to inhale, and good for her! # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Reassign Authority!

2 1

Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by William Knowles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 15 Aug 1996, Arun Mehta wrote: > I'm sure this has come up before, but what would prevent a server > being located on a buoy or something at sea outside territorial > limits (or when satellites become cheaper, on a satellite itself) > offering such services? Something that I thought would make an excellent data haven would be older offshore oil platforms, Their size would allow extended living periods, electrcity and communications are in place, They are generally built outside of the territorial waters of most countries to avoid any damage to the shorelines if oil spilled (possibility for becoming its own country?) and with the hoops that Shell Oil went through to please Greenpeace with its last oil platform. You have to wonder how cheap these could sell for just to get them off the oil companies hands? Comments or suggestions? William Knowles erehwon(a)c2.org -- William Knowles <erehwon(a)c2.org> PGP mail welcome & prefered / KeyID 1024/2C34BCF9 PGP Fingerprint 55 0C 78 3C C9 C4 44 DE 5A 3C B4 60 9C 00 FB BD Finger for public key -- Vote for Harry Browne in November -- http://www.HarryBrowne96.org

5 7

remailers/kiddie porn
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Internet Child Porn An Issue At Stockholm Congress STOCKHOLM - Distribution of child pornography on the Internet seems destined to top the issues at the world's first conference against sexual exploitation of children opening later this month in Stockholm. Activists are trying to devise ways of keeping pedophiles from peddling such material on the global computer network, which is already used as a billboard to advertise prostitution and sex tourism and to exchange adult pornography. But not everyone agrees that regulating the Internet or its 20 million users worldwide is the right move. Some advocates say the Internet represents free speech. Others argue that the distribution of child pornography on the Internet is not that widespread. Still, many see it as a problem. "The Internet is like heaven for the pedophile," said Toby Tyler, a United States police officer who lectures at the FBI Academy on child abuse. "As far as our ability to restrict the distribution of child pornography and stop the sexual exploitation of children on the Internet...it's not something that can be done." Campaigners are concerned that unless urgent action is taken to stamp out the Internet's distribution of child porn, whether it features real children or just computer generated images, it could spark greater demand for child pornography. "Neglecting to prohibit computer generated images could well re-establish the commercial trade -- filling bookstores with computer images, de-sensitizing society and fueling demand for such material," said campaigner Margaret Healy from Bangkok-based End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT). Tyler said the Internet has ended the days when pedophiles had to make costly cross-border runs to buy child pornography in countries where laws were laxer and penalties lighter. Now they can obtain and distribute films and photos from their own homes on the Internet with little risk of capture. Tyler said the existence of anonymous re-mailers -- computer systems which accept material transmitted over computer lines and send it out again after coding its original address -- concealed the source of pornography on the Internet. "Before on-line sex material was available, you'd to find someone to sell it to you, trade with you, or produce it yourself. The net provides a very high level of safety." Short of denying people access to the network, he added, there was little to be done. Even convicted pedophiles with access to computers in prisons can get the material. However computer experts agree the existence of just one re-mailing system in a country with more lax laws is enough for the global distribution of child pornography on the Internet. Tyler said the most widely used re-mailing system currently operates from Finland, through which about 99 percent of all child pornography with untraceable address codes passes. But Johan Helsingius, who runs a re-mailing system from Helsinki, said he did not think child pornography was a problem on the Internet or that any of the 10,000 messages which pass through his server daily contained child pornography. "To a large extent the net is self-regulating. As soon as you do something that offends enough people, measures will be taken by those who are involved with the net," he said. ECPAT's Healy said in a report prepared for the five-day Stockholm conference that opens on August 27 that the regulation of child pornography on computers presents special challenges and called on governments to fund better training. "The establishment of an international research organization with...specialists in the areas of investigation, law enforcement, behavioral science, prosecution, law and computer technology could be an invaluable resource for the global community," Healy said. Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved

1 0

Re: [NOISE] "X-Ray Gun" for imperceptible searches (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 14 Aug 1996 22:24:39 -0400 (EDT) > From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> > Subject: Re: [NOISE] "X-Ray Gun" for imperceptible searches > > Correct. No warrant is required to observe that which is freely collected > after eminating from the residence of another and observed off his > property. > > Same concept applies to the "sniff" test and ariel views into greenhouses. Pitty somebody doesn't bring a suite against the FCC under this logic. It would particularly impact radar detectors, cell phones, and other types of scanners. Jim Choate

3 3

Re: Stealth Buildings Was Re: "X-Ray Gun" for imperceptible searches
by Alan Horowitz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I repeat. Generations of sweating engineers have discovered and confirmed that there is not an easy, "Silver Bullet" cure of the canonical problem of shielding electromagnetic energy from reaching someone who knows how to interpret it. Bill, you are welcome to look at a layer of tin foil and give a sigh of relief that you've shielded your gun or your crypto diskette or your private body parts feom someone who knows what they're doing. Go ahead, chant a mantra too, if it makes you feel better.

3 2

Press Release: Apple's CyberDog Web Bowser
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** PRESS RELEASE *** APPLE COMPUTER UNLEASHES CYBERDOG WEB BOWSER August 15, CUPERTINO. It may be the dog days of summer to some, but to Apple, it's the season CyberDog (tm), its new Web bowser, goes into heat. "CyberDog (tm) is the new dog in town," says Gil Ameliorate, the new leader of the pack at Apple. "CyberDog (tm) should convince our skeptics that Apple is not going to the dogs, except on our own terms. We have always been committed to dogs, as demonstrated by our many Apple and Claris products named after dogs, including Retriever, Pointer, Finder, and Setter." The CyberDog (tm) Bowser (tm) differs from conventional Web browsers by offering several important features built in the Apple mode. Using the OpenDog (tm) object-oriented parts system, Apple is delivering CyberDog with WOOF, the Web OpenDog Object Filer. According to one developer who's used OpenDog and WOOF, "I especially like the way it gets rid of DO loops and replaces them with object-oriented DogDoo loops. It's really bitchin!" The CyberDog (tm) Bowser (tm) offers several additional features, including a security shell called DogPound (tm), a new speech synthesis system called OpenDogBark (tm) and an improvement over Netscape's "cookies," which Apple calls MilkBones (tm). "We lift our legs and piss on Netscape and Microsoft," said Mr. Ameliorate. "We are marking our territory with this release of CyberDog. For those who are dog tired of Netscape and are suffering the lassietude of conventional Web browsers, our new bowser will be the paws that refreshes." Spokesdogs at Apple also confirm that Apple plans to directly compete with Microsoft with an operating system product based on AMD's "K9" chip. The product, known as "WinDog '97," will appear before Copeland, now delayed to 1999. "We think WinDog '97 will chase that other dog out of town." Microsoft could not be reached for comment, but a Netscape spokesman said "Netscape is the cat's meow. That Dog won't hunt. They're barking up the wrong B-tree." Those interested in taking CyberDog out for a walk, or just sniffing its butt, can find further information at: http://www.banana.com/~farce/OpenDogDoo/ CyberDog, OpenDog, Bowser, WOOF, DogPound, OpenDogBark, MilkBones, and WinDog '97 are copyrighted terms of Apple Computer, a member of the NASDOG stock exchange. (Credit to my friend Paul Engel for coming up with the "bowser" pun which inspired me to write this. He also was the first to comment while back that AMD's "K6" clone chip ought to be called the "K9." The rest are mine. I still use Macintoshes, so take this in the spirit of good fun. I do think, though, that "CyberDog" is a really stupid name for a product.)

2 1

Commercial Bundling
by Asgaard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A few days ago Eallensmith forwarded an article, which has lots of references to economic scientific sources, by Andrew Odlyzko, AT&T: 'The bumpy road of electronic commerce'. I didn't know that there is a whole theory of why and when and how bundling of products work in commerce (but I should have guessed). Soon after this article, published August 9, arguing why bundling and subscriptions will take the lead over intelligent agent shopping and personalized micro-retrievement on the net, came the following announcement (quoting Edupage) from MS: >Microsoft has struck deals that will allow it to bundle the Wall Street >Journal's Interactive Addition and ESPN Sports Zone into its new version >3.0 of Internet Explorer browser software ... A networked computer with a bundled MS operating sytem, and a browser already pointing to streamlined information. What more do we need? This really fits in with Odluzko's predictions, and there is more to come. According to Odluzko, bundling is not an evil but actually does good for everyone, mostly (as does different prizes for different customers). And most of us seem to prefer flat rates to pay-per-access. He doesn't mention anything about the coming black market (of crypto-anarchistic flavor), but then it isn't the subject of his essay. Asgaard

1 0

Re: Fw: Re: Free Pronto Secure Offer
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: unicorn(a)schloss.li, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, geoff(a)commtouch.co.il Date: Thu Aug 15 13:52:27 1996 > On Wed, 14 Aug 1996, Lou Zirko wrote: > > PGP. If I remember, your platform in Linux > > Incorrect. Sorry about that, I stand corrected. > > > and you should not be so quick > > to criticize what you may have not seen. > > I saw his promotional tactic, and that's what I criticized. This `promotional tactic` was in response to a prior list message asking about the offer. Because of this, I think criticizm was unwarrented. But enough about this. > > > Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 > > Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org > > "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye > > -- > I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist > unicorn(a)schloss.li > > > Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMhNx/stPRTNbb5z9AQEKdgf/QS/LXvn4IQek4VMbeGaoGd1W+nnJd8Sa UbxoPp2vog6nwI8mwLQTZtVrhCHSaalW2ykufksrFccDPzCH/nNYkljay4ugVgoe G31SATr5DS9WSbSmgLa6Ssb+hyYJVQhBhWRVEkd06vBAqxoc6hmlVZKF2YzzBDBA jZ5hKxWAdRb4dJ72NuzLk09UC5IOKFCd3/a1rcE6ocUTu7w0djIceE+d0+65wLzj O93F2BndoxLT60RQ/vUTqyoXjnvpdABfyE6r7oAvfOfNjwz6+/V1oyVcFKBUTzDA 17K701IFUYjKzTD7I5JfNVwi69sfwRq0KuQgh/iZNERTJwFt/hQkPQ== =Ht0y -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger wrote: >From: Bart Croughs You haven't answered this question yet. I don't claim that the U.S. is worse off when US capital moves abroad. I only ask: how can you proof that the US isn't worse off when US capital moves abroad?< Simple. Keeping capital from flowing wherever it likes leads to a non-pareto optimal state. Care to dispute that? Perry - - - - - - - - - For those who don't know what the Pareto optimum is: it's an allocation of resources such that no one can be made better off without someone else being made worse off. So what you say is that you can't keep capital from flowing wherever it likes without someone being made worse off. Of course I do not dispute this; obviously, the US investors will be worse off when you forbid them to invest where they want to invest. But this is not a proof that the rest of the US citizens will not be worse off when American investors decide to invest abroad. And that is the proof I'm asking for. Bart Croughs

1 0

Re: Schlafly helped defeat ERA, supported Goldwater--where do I sign up?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:48 AM 8/15/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 1:53 PM 8/15/96, Declan McCullagh wrote: >>Take a look at the Boston Coalition for Freedom of Expression's list of >>enemies of free expression. Excerpt follows. >>Linkname: Phyllis Schlafly, Eagle Forum >>Filename: http://www.eff.org/pub/Groups/BCFE/bcfenatl.html#Schlafly >> >> Phyllis Schlafly >.... >> "Leading the pro-family movement to victories since 1972." Basic >> membership includes a subscription to The Phyllis Schlafly Report and >> costs $15.00. Mrs. Schlafly, whose husband Fred used to head the World >> Anti-Communist League, is the person considered most responsible for >> the defeat of the ERA. Her book A Choice Not an Echo, published in > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >> 1964 to support the presidential aspirations of Barry Goldwater, is > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >> one of the seminal texts of contemporary American conservative >> politics. > >So, she helped defeat the ERA and supported Goldwater. Sounds pretty good >to me. From this excerpt, I'd call her a friend of liberty. I think it's interesting that one of the most effective methods the Democrats used to defeat Goldwater was the fear that he would get us into war (Girl and daisy ad, for example) and when Johnson was elected he promptly got us into the Vietnam war. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: Stopped Clock. Was: Schlafly on Crypto
by Stephen Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Speaking as someone who seldom agrees with Phyllis Schlafly...and not meaning to be overly ignorant or paranoid or disrespectful, but is there any link between her column and Roger Schlafly, as in: Schlafly v. Public Key Partners & RSA Data Security, Case C-94-20512 SW PVT or is it mere coincidence. Reminds me of the Doonesbury cartoon of conspiracy theorists, circa O.J. case: "Wait a minute, Hertz has an office in Dallas." "Coincidence?" "I don't think so." Stephen

1 0

Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Blanc Weber wrote: >Are you the one putting up the objections? Are you the one who does not want to see the proof which you are asking for? I would think that after having read Mises, Hayek, et al, the economic cause&effect principles which they outlined would make the resulting situation pretty clear. .. Blanc< If the situation is so clear, why can't you give the proof I'm asking for? Bart Croughs

1 0

Win NT - Internet Security Alert (fwd)
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not approving this for comp.os.ms-windows.announce, but I figure it's on-topic here (what isn't?). I was intrigued by their "proprietary procedures to recover Windows NT installation with a lost administrator's password." (The procedure I'd suggest: boot from a DOS or Linux floppy with an NTFS driver. Back up all the application and data files you want saved. Reformat the drive, install NT, and restore the saved files.) By the way, did you hear the one about the Microsoft tech support recommendation to put the perl.exe interpreter into a world-executable directory? www.bugnet.com -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 15 Aug 1996 19:50:47 GMT From: MWC(a)news.ee.net, "Inc. NT Security team" <NTSecurity(a)box.omna.com> To: comp-os-ms-windows-announce(a)uunet.uu.net Newsgroups: comp.os.ms-windows.announce, comp.os.ms-windows.misc, comp.os.ms-windows.networking.misc, comp.os.ms-windows.networking.tcp-ip Subject: Win NT - Internet Security Alert *** Win NT / Internet Security Alert *** Our survey has shown that more than 50% of NT based Web Sites do not pay proper attention to Internet security aspects. These sites are extremely vulnerable, others are vulnerable to some extent. We were surprised to find that this relaxed approach to Windows NT / Internet security does not depend on a size of a company, etc. MWC (http:\\www.omna.com\Yes\MWC\) provides unique recovery and security services for Windows NT based networks connected to the Internet. We can help you to make your network truly secure. Our services include: *** Simulated Intrusion Attack Service *** The purpose of the SIMULATED INTRUSION ATTACK Service is to find potential security holes in a Client's Windows NT 3.5x, 4.0 Operating Systems Computer and / or Intranet / Internet Windows NT-based network. For more information please visit: http://www.omna.com/yes/mwc/security.htm *** NT Security Software *** ScanNT . v.1.1 is Windows NT password cracker. More information is available at: http://www.omna.com/yes/AndyBaron/pk.htm *** Password Recovery Service *** Guaranteed Administrator's password recovery service for Windows NT 3.5x, 4.0. MWC, Inc. uses proprietary procedures to recover Windows NT installation with a lost administrator's password. More information about this service is available at: http://www.omna.com/yes/mwc/prs-index.htm *** NT Network Examination *** MWC offers Network Examination Services for Windows NT based Internet connected Networks to help you answer the following questions: 7 Is your Internet Server Vulnerable? 7 Is your Production Server Vulnerable? 7 Is your Network Vulnerable? *** Partial List of Satisfied Customers*** is published at: http://www.omna.com/yes/mwc/cust-security.htm For more information please contact Andy Pozo, Director of Sales AndyPozo(a)box.omna.com , Tel 614-263-0662 Fax 614-263-0663 MWC NT Security Team.

1 0

RE: Stopped Clock. Was: Schlafly on Crypto
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

relation: mother-son >---------- >From: Stephen Cobb[SMTP:stephen@iu.net] >Sent: Thursday, 15 August, 1996 1:16 PM >To: jim bell >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: Stopped Clock. Was: Schlafly on Crypto > >Speaking as someone who seldom agrees with Phyllis Schlafly...and not >meaning to be overly ignorant or paranoid or disrespectful, but is there any >link between her column and Roger Schlafly, as in: > >Schlafly v. Public Key Partners & RSA Data Security, Case C-94-20512 SW PVT > >or is it mere coincidence. > >Reminds me of the Doonesbury cartoon of conspiracy theorists, circa O.J. >case: "Wait a minute, Hertz has an office in Dallas." >"Coincidence?" >"I don't think so." > >Stephen > >

1 0

Re: Can someone validate this code?
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This looks like something that was anonymously posted to the Internet about a year ago. It is widely believed to be a hoax; if nothing else, the key schedule is horrible. David Wagner broke the algorithm based on the key schedule alone. This is what I wrote about S-1 last time around.... Bruce ----------------------------seperator--------------------------------- I was in Europe while S-1 was posted, so I missed most of the discussion. Better late than never.... Over the last year, I have spent considerable effort collecting SKIPJACK information. I have gone through the published literature, the rumors, and a large stack of documents received by EPIC through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits. At Crypto last week I gave a Rump Session talk entitled "Reverse Engineering SKIPJACK from Open Sources." I prepared the slides before I left for Europe. Here is what I said: What the government told us: Single-key block cipher. Can be used in ECB, CBC, CFB, or OFB. 64-bit block size. 80-bit key size. What the review committee told us: 32 rounds. No weak keys (like DES has). No key complementation property (like DES has). What the hardware specifications tell us: The latency of the Mykotronx chip has 64 clock cycles. This means two clock cycles per round. Assorted rumors (excuse me if I don't reveal sources): SKIPJACK does not have rounds in the same sense that DES does: i.e., half of the text block is not encrypted in each round. SKIPJACK has half the total S-box data as DES. SKIPJACK has a 48-bit internal structure analogous to a 32-bit internal structure in DES. The masks for the Clipper/Capstone chip are unclassified and the chips can be produced in an unclassified foundry. Part of the programming in the secure vault includes installing part of the SKIPJACK algorithm. The part of the algorithm installed in the secure vault are the "S-tables", suggesting that perhaps unprogrammed Clipper chips can be programmed to implement other 80-bit key, 32 round ciphers. Trying to puzzle out the meaning of the third rumor, Matt Blaze and I invented something called an Unbalanced Feistel Network. These are Feistel networks where the source and target blocks are of different size. For example, in each round 48 bits might be used as an input into the F function, and produce 16 output bits to be XORed with the remainder of the bits. We called this a 48:16 UFN, and we proposed a design at last year's Algorithms Workshop in Leuven. Our design was broken, but I am still examining the structure. A 48:16 UFN satisfies the first and third rumor above, and I think it as good a guess as any regarding SKIPJACK. A few months ago, I found some additional information in the form of documents released under FOIA. One document was a Mykotronx design review for "Project Capstone" dated 10 December 1991. The design review was unclassified. Among the details about the modular multipliers and the SHA code was the following page about SKIPJACK: ECB Processing Rate 2 clocks per G-Box operation x 1 G-box per shift x 32 shifts per ECB encryption ______________________________ 64 clocks per ECB 64 clocks per ECB / 64 bits out per ECB = 1 clock per bit Yields 40 Mbit encryption using a 40 MHz clock. The only other thing I found was a SECRET memo. The organization name (either from or to) is blacked out. The date is 25 August 1992. The subject is "SKIPJACK Revision." Paragraph 2 is blacked out, but paragraph 1 reads: 1. (U) The enclosed Informal Technical Report revises the F-table in SKIPJACK 3. No other aspect of the algorithm is changed. That's it. Rounds are called "shifts," which seems to indicate that they are not "rounds" in the DES sense. A shift consists of a "G-box" operation, which includes not only what we call the F- F-function but the XOR as well. And there is something called an F-table, which could be a table of constants or perhaps a table of functions. In any case, it is something that can be revised without changing the rest of the algorithm. Now let's look at S-1. The most probable explanation is that it is a hoax. But it is a very good hoax: The hoaxer knew enough about algorithm design to make a cipher that was not obviously lousy, while at the same time not unduly complicated. The hoaxer knew enough to make a design that included three novel ideas not seen anywhere else: S-boxes that are created according to no known criteria, a G-table that chooses a rotation of S-boxes to use in a given round, and a bizarre key schedule. The hoaxer knew enough about how algorithms are used in the military to make a spookish interface. I am particularly interested in the "zeroize" function, the separation of the key creation and key loading functions, and the key masking. Blaze said that the interface was similar to the Fortezza interface, but not the same. The hoaxer knew about Blaze's and my MacGuffin paper and that we thought SKIPJACK was a 48:16 UFN. We made no secret about this, and our paper is on Blaze's web page. The hoaxer knew to use the term F-table. I haven't shown many people what I found in EPIC's documents, so the hoaxer either had to look through them himself or get them by some other means (maybe an independent FOIA request). It's not a perfect hoax, though. The classification markings look odd: NSA algorithms are SECRET, not TOP SECRET, and the codeword restriction sentence is strange. The key schedule is hopelessly flawed (David Wagner posted an attack to sci.crypt). The coding style is amateurish, like it was translated from one language to another. (Maybe this is clever on the hoaxer's part.) And there's even a typo in the code. And maybe the hardware latency is wrong. Clearly the design facilitates parallelization. You can precompute all possible F- table outputs in previous shifts, and then use the G-table result to select between them; I am not sure you can get a shift down to two clock cycles. I don't have the hardware background, and would appreciate comments from others. And why are there not bitwise permutations? If SKIPJACK is designed for hardware, it makes sense to put them in. They're free, after all. Anyway, it's a real good hoax. Blaze estimated that he could have done it, but it would have taken him a month of effort. I agree with his assessment: one man-month. It's a lot of time to spend on a hoax, especially one where the hoaxer doesn't get any credit. So, maybe it's SKIPJACK. It has a 64-bit block size and an 80- bit key size. It's a 48:16 UFN with 32 rounds (or shifts, or whatever). And it has an F-table. This is really interesting, because the structure really is an S-box. Everyone knows it's an S-box, and it makes no sense for a hoaxer to call it something else. But in S-1 it's called an F-table. (I think this is very significant, but others find it less convincing.) And the F-table has been revised at least once. In the code it says that the F-table entries "differ in the S-2 version." The code is dated 1 February 1989 and 31 July 1991, and I have a memo dated 25 August 1992 that says the F-table has been revised in "SKIPJACK 3." Pretty convincing, I think. (Of course this means that we can't confirm anything by testing the hardware, since the F-table entries are different.) Maybe there are no bit permutations because they make analysis harder, and perhaps they don't add all that much. Maybe the algorithm was designed for both hardware and software, or maybe it was designed for specialized cryptographic hardware with several parallel microprocessors and some cryptographic primitives. If it is real, we have a lot to learn about S-box design. The S- boxes are not even balanced. Maybe they are created just so to avoid some bizarre attack we can only dream about, but I kind of doubt it. But the key schedule is just plain wrong. So, here's a theory. Let's assume the code is real. (Not that it's SKIPJACK, but that it's a real algorithm from some military or some corporation.) Clearly the code is not designed to test the cryptographic algorithm, but to simulate some kind of hardware interface: it's called a "software chip simulator." If I were the NSA and I designed an algorithm whose security rested on some tables of constants, I might replace them with phony constants before giving them to another organization to test. I might call the phony version S-1 and the real version S-2. Maybe the code was originally written in FORTRAN, and then translated into C. (NSA doesn't use ADA.) NSA algorithms are classified SECRET, put perhaps algorithms in development are classified TOP SECRET. (We know cryptanalytic techniques can be TOP SECRET, so perhaps commented code falls under that category as well.) And maybe the code originally didn't have an 80-bit key schedule. Maybe it had a longer key schedule. The poster then modified this key schedule to make it look more like SKIPJACK. (This might also explain the bug in the code, which might not be a bug if it still had the original key schedule.) Which leaves us precisely nowhere. The most likely explanation is that it is a hoax, but I am hard-pressed to imagine a hoaxer with the requisite combination of skills, resources, and attitude. I also don't believe that it is SKIPJACK. It might be a preliminary design for SKIPJACK, but if both the key schedule and F-table entries are wrong, we really haven't learned anything. If we suddenly discovered that unbalanced S-boxes are far superior to balanced ones, then all best are off. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, 2nd EDITION is * Counterpane Systems available. For info on a 15% * schneier(a)counterpane.com discount offer, send me e-mail. * * For Blowfish C code, see ftp.ox.ac.uk:/pub/crypto/misc/blowfish.c.gz **************************************************************************

1 0

RE: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Bart Croughs > > If the situation is so clear, why can't you give the proof I'm asking for? ................................................ Well, first of all, I never intended to provide one. I don't know why you are asking for proof. I don't know why anyone should be moved to give one to you. .. Blanc > > >

1 0

Installing IE 3.0 Final under NT 4.0b2 [Was Re:NT remailer]
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: rednax(a)asiapac.net, sryan(a)reading.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Aug 16 13:05:38 1996 You can try the following. I will be attempting it myself tonight. I also understand that the 128-bit version is available again. Good luck! Lou Zirko - ----Forwarded---- From: "Scott Johnson" <sjohnson(a)iscdist.com> Subject: Re: Beware V3 of Internet Explorer Newsgroups: comp.os.ms-windows.nt.pre-release,comp.os.ms-windows.nt.misc References: <1996Aug13.085057.6086(a)news.ntrs.com> Organization: ISC Distributors, Inc. Message-ID: <01bb88d4$f88dd6b0$c8c1a0cc@sjohnson> X-Newsreader: Microsoft Internet News 4.70.1155 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit NNTP-Posting-Host: sjohnsonnt Date: 13 Aug 96 17:09:07 GMT Lines: 34 Path: news.c2.org!news.zeitgeist.net!cygnus.com!news.sgi.com!enews.sgi.com!su-new s-f eed4.bbnplanet.com!news.theglobal.net! Xref: news.c2.org comp.os.ms-windows.nt.pre-release:10225 comp.os.ms-windows.nt.misc:137713 There is a way to get the production release to run on the beta II of NT. It requires a little work but it does run fine. It seems the only problem is in the install. If you follow these steps you can use the install from the beta if IE 3.0 Beta II on the production cab file and it will install. 1. Run the self extracting cab file for the beta II of IE. This should produce a temporary dir in the temp dir on drive c. You will have to find it as it is named something different each time. 2. When you run this the first question will be do you want to cont. Answer yes. When it asks for you to agree to the lic. look for the temp dir. Make a copy of it somewhere and disagree. 3. Run the Prod code. Agree to the lic. and wait for the prompt for optional Internet components. Find the temp dir for this install and make a copy of it. 4. Run msie.exe from yorur new dir in step 4. This will make a new temp dir. Find it and make a copy. 5. In the dir made in step 4 you will find a CAB file and a IE.inf file. These need to be copied to the dir made in step 2. REN the ie.inf to ohrome.inf and run the infinst.exe file. This should install the production code on your beta II of NT Good Luck. Steve Bonine <spb(a)ntrs.com> wrote in article <1996Aug13.085057.6086(a)news.ntrs.com>... > The just-released version of Internet Explorer for NT informs you that it > requires build 1381 or higher to run. It imparts this bit of trivia AFTER it > has blown away the IE that you had installed. Beta 2 is build 1314; 1381 must > be the one that they have shipped to VARs. > > Brilliant move. Release a product to the general public which runs on an OS > that you have NOT released to the general public. > Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMhS4fctPRTNbb5z9AQF55wf8DIt7XF/DxxEJrppB4wmbqp2dz4zv8An2 2pJVieQ7CpYESozJCZFuHZjIxg29okjqQhPCIM4Q/4OHkcuRmZ8jFI+FCnO+0NZr 2jp2CI3AAWJ6cZBifwMrNCTBxySo5ZVLGxUQwZKyfcDHDWvZpoMTWEJXoI+tVSc/ FC0yRdQbwqaIrO4K+4k98nycS4CdMSTPhAU6bmC4KWFwX5h54JVV7D033FkAUklV Esknfo2zE7byq10UZqMqYCs6/5u8PlIPtqkhxo/slQFT8wr461RVO/OuJBJyiavi B1q3wrgIkTF9dXS1zHpJO4JwqI0TLtgLpEGas8T9HRdBkI6ojKaXxA== =tvhI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Burden of proof
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-08-15 17:35:20 EDT, you write: > This relates to something I have been wondering about: If one could > get one's company to pay one in electronic cash, what is to stop one > from piling the coins in a Datahaven somewhere (assuming one existed > that would be usable for these purposes) and say to the IRS: Money? > What money? Can you find any of my money? I, uhh... lost it! Yeah, > that's it!! But then how do you spend it? What if instructions are given to the banking system to not deal with such and such bank (or datahaven)? How are you going to get it out and spend them deniros?

2 1

RAD_ius
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

8-14-96. NW: "Proposed IETF standard to ease a variety of remote access concerns ." The scheme, called Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS), provides a centralized and secure method for authenticating remote dial-in users, authorizing appropriate enterprise resources and gathering accounting details. RADIUS also provides a way to integrate the security administration of dial-in users with that of the resident enterprise population. ----- http://jya.com/radius.txt (5 kb) RAD_ius

1 0

(NOISE) Re: Free Pronto Secure Offer
by geoff＠commtouch.co.il 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: unicorn(a)schloss.li, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Aug 16 02:41:34 1996 Unicorn, > No, I was merely pointing out that if the review revealed that it > had problems (one assumed that the intent of peer review is to reveal > such problems in the first place, but perhaps you just like giving > software away?) then the offered reward was valueless. Peer review seems to have voted that their risk paid off. > A lot of people use DES on this list too I'll wager. and... > I "tried out" your promotional scheme when I read your message, and > it was that scheme which my opinion targeted. You misinterpreted my reply to a list member's enquiry about whether our offer of Pronto Secure in exchange for feedback was still available. > This is a subjective question. Yes. > Cypherpunks is always getting the cash poor developer who thinks he > very clever because he has to pay testers no money if he offers his > new product free to the person who discovers a flaw, or writes a > review. Unicorn, you are again letting your fingers move faster than your brain. On what do you base your evaluation of our liquidity ? (not that it is relevant). Most Cypherpunks are technically savvy and crypto aware people, they provide a perfect community for evaluating and debugging a security enabling product. I would strongly recommend this route to any developer of serious security enhancing software. My sincere thanks to all c'punks who have and continue to provide incredibly valuable input into Pronto Secure. > From your home page, I would guess that you request that reviewers > allow you to make their comments public. That's called an > endorsement, and, by the way, people are usually paid for them. > Sometimes in the millions. Think Michael Jordan is getting a deal > when you use his name to promote your product and then give him a > $99.00 piece of software (which is effectively worth the amount of > time it takes to write a few kiss ass paragraphs on the software, not > $99.00)? Unicorn, you are again making groundless assumptions. I suggest that you do some fence painting before you enlighten us with your opinions about our "kiss ass paragraphs" of code. Unless Michael Jordon is reading Schneier on the sly, his endorsement of Pronto secure is not worth 99c. > Alturisim is a pipe dream. Depends what you are putting in your pipe :) I venture that most c'punks would agree that moving strong e-mail security into mainstream is a good thing. This is not going to happen without people making money from it. >> Unicorn, you are invited to whitewash my fence :) > Do I have to review pronto secure first? Yes. Geoff. - --------------------------------------------------------------- Geoff Klein, Pronto Secure Product Manager; www.commtouch.com My PGP public Key 1814AD45 can be obtained by sending a message to geoff(a)commtouch.co.il with "Get PGP Key" as the subject. - ---------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMhO1s0Lv5OMYFK1FAQG5WAP/XoLteaVpdhnLpj/pk/1aPiWX7Nx/h1cc 5Sf0mgOWv3Q9MASWHV2lKrgqF9jc15ZaymfJZDq1duGttrPj6SJqX/nwOTcYi006 Hh3qh+LnXWnBd7QA/mZL5Fn4SLAOBno/uspqwMbM+6DCw39MpCY2NG0jQ2Qi8vMH n1IG+PYYTAs= =5HnW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Floating DataHaven
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

William Knowles <erehwon(a)c2.org> > > Something that I thought would make an excellent data haven would > be older offshore oil platforms, > [...] > You have to wonder how cheap these could sell > for just to get them off the oil companies hands? A floating DataHaven is probably the way to get the ultimate in freedom. There is someone on Anguilla that bought a used floating oil platform for $1 million. It is big enough for 200 people to live on. It is not here, so I have not seen it. There is someone else here who says that there are some really old ones that you can get just for hauling them away. Some countries will not let owners just sink them. You can get Internet via radio links for reasonable prices. And via satellite for almost affordable prices. When Bill Gates 900 satellites get up there it should be very affordable. -- Vince ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Vincent Cate vince(a)offshore.com.ai http://www.offshore.com.ai/vince/ Offshore Information Services http://www.offshore.com.ai/

6 6

Re: Burden of proof
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:25 PM 8/15/96, Scottauge(a)aol.com wrote: >In a message dated 96-08-15 17:35:20 EDT, you write: > >> This relates to something I have been wondering about: If one could >> get one's company to pay one in electronic cash, what is to stop one >> from piling the coins in a Datahaven somewhere (assuming one existed >> that would be usable for these purposes) and say to the IRS: Money? >> What money? Can you find any of my money? I, uhh... lost it! Yeah, >> that's it!! > >But then how do you spend it? What if instructions are given to the banking >system to not deal with such and such bank (or datahaven)? How are you going >to get it out and spend them deniros? This is practically the least of the concerns. Assuming one could, say, be paid reliably and without True Name attached, in a country like Anguilla (to use a current example), it would be simple enough to fly to Anguilla for a vacation, pick up the money, and return to the U.S. I've never had my bags searched on an incoming flight, and even if one is fearful of this, there are multiple ways to get the cash back. This is not an ideal, pure crypto anarchist solution, but it certainly shows that getting the payments made to an offshore account is much more than half the battle. (I hear that some consultants to offshore companies are already doing something like this--they consult for some large fee, e.g., $200K, and then arrange to be paid out over a period of many years on a contingency basis. This reduces taxes, at least on this payment, considerably. And they can, while in Macao, or Singapore, etc., transfer money around the world to various locales they may visit in the future....) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Burden of proof
by mike＠fionn.lbl.gov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Aug 15, 7:25pm, Scottauge(a)aol.com wrote: > system to not deal with such and such bank (or datahaven)? How are you going > to get it out and spend them deniros? Make 'em an offer they can't refuse ?^)

1 0

Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:55 PM 8/15/96, William Knowles wrote: >On Thu, 15 Aug 1996, Arun Mehta wrote: > >> I'm sure this has come up before, but what would prevent a server >> being located on a buoy or something at sea outside territorial >> limits (or when satellites become cheaper, on a satellite itself) >> offering such services? > >Something that I thought would make an excellent data haven would >be older offshore oil platforms, Their size would allow extended >living periods, electrcity and communications are in place, They >are generally built outside of the territorial waters of most >countries to avoid any damage to the shorelines if oil spilled >(possibility for becoming its own country?) and with the hoops >that Shell Oil went through to please Greenpeace with its last >oil platform. You have to wonder how cheap these could sell >for just to get them off the oil companies hands? > >Comments or suggestions? As with offshore buoys, how long do you think such an entity would last? You mentioned Greepeace...don't forget that the French intelligence apparatus sunks a Greenpeace ship in a New Zealand harbor. Don't forget the way the U.S. mined Managua's harbor. And so on. Think of how any of these schemes are vulnerable to a cheap torpedo, "anonymously mailed" from several miles away. Oil rigs, buoys, pirate ships....these are all examples of hopelessly insecure systems. I could say more, but what's the point? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The only ideal I can think of would be the fictional "Port Watson". What is you had a system that spanned countries, using the internet as a linking device. It would be the same service. But when you specified the kind of data you wanted to post, the system would route it to the appropriate server in a country where it wasn't illegal. ---------- > From: Vincent Cate <vince(a)offshore.com.ai> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Anguilla - A DataHaven? > Date: Wednesday, August 14, 1996 5:40 AM > > > Tim: > > Rather, there is an "archetype," if you will, of what a "remailer" is, what > > a "data haven" is, what a "tax shelter" is, etc. While we cannot reasonably > > expect a remailer to exactly match the archetype, we can point out obvious > > deficiencies. > > 1) Anguilla has secrecy laws. Professional relationships are confidential. > There are strong secrecy laws. I have not given out taxbomber's > name, nor will I as I could face legal action if I did. > > 2) Anguilla has no sales or income taxes. A business does not need to > report anything about income, sales, etc, to the government (or anyone > else). If a guy wants to sell his data and keep 100% of the profits > instead of 50% or 60%, then Anguilla would be a haven for him. > > 3) We don't have the same laws as other countries, so there are things > that can be done here. For example, we can export encryption > software. Also, we will have bingo.com in Anguilla. > > There are deficiencies from a cypherpunk or Libertarian point of view. And > these are interesting. And exactly what I want to do is changing. As I > said, Anguilla is not the datahaven of cypherpunks wet dreams. I am sure > there are no datahavens that match the cypherpunk concept of an ideal > datahaven, yet. > > But I think the term DataHaven applies as well to Anguilla as any other > place I know of. > > Tim, we would all be very happy if you were to locate a country that could > be the site of the ideal datahaven, and finance a couple cypherpunks to > setup there. It would be a big help to our cause. Could you do this? > > In the mean time, people may have to exist in cyberspace (like > www.taxbomber.com) without having a totally secure physical location. > This is not the end of the world, or really even that painful. If done > right you could be down for only an hour - just long enough for > nameservers to change. Taxbomber is now setup to do it very fast next > time, if the need ever comes. Tim, I think you have even advocated this > approach, not stressing the physical location, just the cyberspace > location. No? > > -- Vince > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Vincent Cate vince(a)offshore.com.ai http://www.offshore.com.ai/vince/ > Offshore Information Services http://www.offshore.com.ai/

1 0

Re: [NOISE] Geek Apartments and Etherpunks
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:55 AM 8/14/96 -0400, Rabid Wombat <wombat(a)mcfeely.bsfs.org> wrote: >Most manufacturers offer SNMP-manageable hubs, but these don't offer >MAC-layer security. That usually costs a lot extra. The MAC-layer feature >is not widely used. AT&T was about the first vendor with that feature. Aside from solving a _lot_ of potential security problems, it was very convenient for finding out what device really _was_ connected to what hub port - the hub recorded the most recent MAC address received on each port, and you could compare that to ARP tables and untangle lots of problems. Not as fancy as a Sniffer, but let you do things that a Sniffer on ThinWire couldn't. (Of course, since it wasn't NSA-rated, the fact that it actually did solve security problems didn't give us extra slack on government jobs that needed it. ) A multi-port bridge gives you similar security capability, but generally costs more because it needs buffering and much more intelligence; the AT&T SmartHub was a lot simpler and (in its day) cheaper. It was about twice the cost of a regular hub, half the excess from cool features and half because it was from AT&T :-) It was less reliable than the regular hub, because it needed a fan to handle the extra heat from the processor board, and was also more awkward to mount. And the SNMP implementation was rather buggy, though it did have a convenient PC SNMP manager that knew how to use SNMP-over-MAC and the special features of the hub. Cool device. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Reassign Authority!

1 0

Re: Stealth Buildings Was Re: "X-Ray Gun" for imperceptible searches
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:01 AM 8/16/96, Alan Horowitz wrote: >I repeat. Generations of sweating engineers have discovered and confirmed >that there is not an easy, "Silver Bullet" cure of the canonical problem >of shielding electromagnetic energy from reaching someone who knows how >to interpret it. > >Bill, you are welcome to look at a layer of tin foil and give a sigh of >relief that you've shielded your gun or your crypto diskette or your >private body parts feom someone who knows what they're doing. Go ahead, >chant a mantra too, if it makes you feel better.+- I've stayed out of this "tin foil" debate, but some basic physics is being missed, or misused. The invocation of TEMPEST and leakage of RF does not say much of anything about _imaging_. If a gun, for example, were _radiating_ RF energy of some particular sort, then it might indeed be true that tin foil/gold lame shielding would not stop _all_ of the emitted radiation, and that sensitive enough detectors might detect the characteristic signal 60 or 90 dB down. Maybe. But a gun is not a radiator, it is at most a _reflector_ of RF energy. Thus, the TEMPEST invocation is misleading. The signal would perhaps be down by 100-130 dB or more, as the "leakage" must first get around the shielding, be reflected, and then get back around the shielding. And what this does to "imaging" almost needs no explanation. What leaks around the periphery or through holes in a shielded container will provide essentially zero spatial information about the configuration of sources and reflectors inside the shielded container. (I spent much of 1972-73 working inside a Faraday cage on ultra-low-noise superconducting Josephson junctions. Believe me, what signals leaked in, or leaked out (by symmetry analysis) could not have been used to deduce the configuration of sources and reflectors inside the room.) I should say I'm skeptical that millimeter detectors will be widely deployed anytime soon. For detecting concealed weapons, "metal detectors" in specific locations are both cheaper and have fewer constitutional and "false positive" problems. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

Scientology *really* tries to crack PGP...AGAIN?!?
by modemac＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: alt.religion.scientology,alt.security.pgp From: grady(a)netcom.com (Grady Ward) Subject: Criminal cult begins PGP crack attempt Message-ID: <gradyDw7Cnt.I6A(a)netcom.com> The Special Master has informed me that Madame Kobrin has asked her to retain a PC expert to attempt to "crack" a series of pgp-encrypted multi-megabyte files that were seized along with more than a compressed gigabyte of other material from my safety deposit box. Ironically, they phoned to ask for assistance in supplying them with a prototype "crack" program that they could use in iterating and permuting possibilities. I did supply them a good core pgpcrack source that can search several tens of thousands of possible key phrases a seconds; I also suggested that they should at least be using a P6-200 workstation or better to make the search more efficient. The undercurrent is that this fresh hysterical attempt to "get" something on me coupled with the daily settlement pleas reflects the hopelessness of the litigation position of the criminal cult. It looks like the criminal cult has cast the die to ensure that the RTC vs Ward case is fought out to the bitter end. Which I modestly predict will be a devastating, humiliating defeat for them from a pauper pro per. I have given them a final settlement offer that they can leave or take. Actually they have a window of opportunity now to drop the suit since my counterclaims have been dismissed (although Jusge Whyte invited me to re-file a new counterclaim motion on more legally sufficiant basis). I think Keith and I have found a successful counter-strategy to the cult's system of litigation harassment. Meanwhile, I could use some help from veteran a.r.s'ers. I need any copy you have of the Cease and Desist letter that you may have received last year from Eliot Abelson quondam criminal cult attorney and Eugene Martin Ingram spokespiece. Physical mail: Grady Ward 3449 Martha Ct. Arcata, CA 95521-4884 JP's BMPs or fax-images to: grady(a)northcoast.com Thanks. Grady Ward Ps. I really do need all of your help and good wishes after all. Thanks for all of you keeping the net a safe place to insult kook kults. -- Reverend Modemac (modemac(a)netcom.com) First Online Church of "Bob" "There is no black and white." PGP Key Fingerprint: 47 90 41 70 B4 5B 06 90 7B 38 4E 11 8A ED 80 DF URL: http://www.tiac.net/users/modemac/ (FINGER modemac(a)netcom.com for a FREE SubGenius Pamphlet!)

1 0

Garage door openers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:34 PM 8/15/96, Douglas R. Floyd wrote: >That is known for cars. I double checked, and found some car alarms able >to do this. However, I have not found any house garage door openers able >to pull this off. Most still use the old blurt code method. > Sure, most garage door opener codes are easy to break....but how many thieves who do this know to enter the _second_ correct sequence within 45 seconds, the one that stops the poison gas from filling the garage? Steganographic entry codes have their uses. --Tim May (P.S. There were six (6) names copied on this post, besides CP. Can't we edit the cc: lines? I try to, so why don't you all?) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Anguilla...etc.
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess the point I was trying to make all along is this; Is a data haven going to be a security through obscurity operation? This is what the Swiss have with secret bank accounts, etc. Or will it be an operation where the operator of the system lets whatever on, and hopes he won't get prosecuted. In Island in the Net, the haven were physical. The authorities got to them eventually. Vince's system is restricted by physical laws. There will always be a finite array of information he can present without putting the whole operation on the line. Is he still a data haven then? I believe so. But through creative diplomacy he could balance the powers that bind him. How well he or anyone else does this is the key to the range of information presented. ---------- > From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Anguilla...etc. > Date: Tuesday, August 13, 1996 9:07 PM > > At 2:21 AM 8/14/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: > > While Tim may be right that nobility is lost when backing down to the > >authorities, the fact is that this game has little to do with noble > >purposes. Check that, obvious noble purposes. While most on this list > >would agree that free flow of information is noble we have all seen that > >this is otherwise with people in power. As I stated in my last post, the > >Swiss have maintained thier "haven" for many years by playing both sides. > >In accomodating everyone they avoid harassment. > > This way the Swiss maintain a good system and live to fight another day. > > Let me be clear that I am not talking about "noble motives." In the sense > of somone sacrificing himself for the good of the herd, blah blah. > > Rather, there is an "archetype," if you will, of what a "remailer" is, what > a "data haven" is, what a "tax shelter" is, etc. While we cannot reasonably > expect a remailer to exactly match the archetype, we can point out obvious > deficiencies. > > For "data havens," we have very few examples, compared to operational > remailers. We have the fictional form in Bruce Sterling's "Islands in the > Net," some of whose plot twists have some parallels to the current Anguilla > situation. Another is the form described in Ross Anderson's "Eternity > Service." > > What might we expect of a true data haven? I've tried to describe several > of the attributes in my earlier posts, mainly by asking questions about > specific examples (bomb-building instructions, "Kill the monarchy" screeds, > etc.). > > Interestingly, with several of these examples, Vince has said that he is > not interested in having this kind of material on his site. His invitation > for Multi-Level Marketers to avoid U.S. and other laws by locating on his > service has now been withdrawn, from his latest comments. (To the person > who sent me mail explaining that MLM schemes are not illegal in the U.S., > indeed, some are legal and some are not. I said as much. And for those > which are legal in the U.S. or France or wherever, they would hardly have > any need to use Vince's service, would they? I surmised from his invitation > that he was encouraging MLM/pyramid scheme operators to avoid their > parochial fraud laws and use the services in Anguilla.) > > I plan to do more looking at just who is left, who is using Offshore > Information and what kinds of services they are offering. Not to harass > Vince, of course, but to better look at the envelope of what is considered > OK and what is not. > > If i find that all the "juicy" stuff is gone and all that is left is > booking sailing cruises around the Carribbean, I'll hardly call it a "data > haven." Which is not to say it's not still a useful and profitable business > for Vince, just that it has no Cypherpunk relevance. > > --Tim May > > Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > >

1 0

Re: Imprisoned Capital
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell wrote: >There is no straightforward link between amount of capital invested and >productivity or wages. If there were, some steel plants in the Soviet Union >would have had the best paid and most productive workers on earth. It's not a coincidence that you mention the Soviet Union. As I said in a previous post, Austrian economists like Murray Rothbard, Hans Hermann Hoppe, etc. don't consider government expenditures to be *investments* of capital; they consider all government expenditures to be *consumption*. >Additionally, countries which prevent capital outflows don't receive capital >inflows and thus become poorer. >DCF This is a good point when you talk about governments that will prevent *all* capital from flowing out. But a government could prevent the outflow of capital of it's own citizens, and still allow capital of foreigners to leave the country. As long as foreign capital isn't imprisoned, foreign capital could be attracted. Bart Croughs

1 0

BlackNet as a Distributed, Untraceable, Robust Data Haven
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:05 AM 8/16/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: >The only ideal I can think of would be the fictional "Port Watson". What >is you had a system that spanned countries, using the internet as a linking >device. It would be the same service. But when you specified the kind of >data you wanted to post, the system would route it to the appropriate >server in a country where it wasn't illegal. > I have to speak up here and say that there is an actual working exemplar of a distributed, untraceable data haven. While it lacks a robust _payment_ mechanism, that is also untraceable, so does the "Visit Port Watson" example (which has never actually existed). The simple structure I built in 1993 for "BlackNet" actually works. It has been discussed in many places, and will be the subject of a couple of sections in Peter Ludlow's new book, "High Noon on the Electronic Frontier" (http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/mitp/recent-books/comp/ludph.html) Features of relevance to any discussion of data havens: * messages are posted to message pools, including any of the 18,000+ Usenet groups copied automatically in sites around the world. * the initial messages are in plaintext, of course, as how else could readers determine which are of interest to them? "Anyone have details of the medical condition of Chirac?" might be an example. * a public key is posted along with the plaintext, thus allowing a reader to respond _privately_ by encrypting his message to the public key and posting it (through a chain of remailers and eventually to a mail-to-News gateway, for example). * this establishes two-way communication, in a "black pipe" that is visible to all, but opaque to all but the parties. * if some jurisdictions attempts to cut off a particular newsgroup, e.g., "alt.anonymous.messages," then the traffic can be shifted to other newsgroups, e.g., "talk.politics.singapore." * posting can be as untraceable as a chain of remailers linked to a mail-to-News gateway can be. * thus, two agents can establish a communications channel between themselves without knowing the identity or location or jurisdiction of each other. (There are some subtle issues of man-in-the-middle attacks, as with these sorts of protocols for establishing communication between parties who have not met; webs of trust, again. For the several cases of communications using BlackNet I was personally involved with, mostly in '93, this did not ever become a problem any of us were aware of.) * as I mentioned, BlackNet lacks a robust, untraceable payment system. Alice and Bob may be able to connect up with each other, by exchanging reciprocally encrypted messages in a public place, but transferring money is problematic. (I don't know just how well the Mark Twain/Digicash stuff really works at this time....someone motivated to actually transfer money would be a better judge, along with the several cryptographers on this list who've looked at it more recently and in more depth than I have.) The important thing to note is that BlackNet, and similar systems, do not depend on any particular jurisdiction or site to host the communications. The anarchic, distributed Usenet is used. (And there is no reason why mailing lists, a la Miron Cuperman's message pool list of a few years back, or the Web itself could not be used. Using a Web site does potentially open the owner of the URL site to charges of conspiracy, though the fact that the messages are encrypted (after the early plaintext.) There are certainly things yet to be done, but it's important that the example of BlackNet be mentioned. Solve the payment problem (for real, not the semi-GAKked version of Digicash that Chaum now appears to be promoting) and there's no need for "physical" data havens in Anguilla, Burma, St. Barts, Lichtenstein, or wherever. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

Re: Jurisdictionless Distributed Data Havens
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:52 AM 8/15/96 -0500, "Douglas R. Floyd" <dfloyd(a)io.com> wrote: >As of now, I am looking for someone who can help me implement a redundant >controller system, so when the DH is contacted, even if the first one if >smashed, the "RAID" stays operable. One approach is "Just Don't Do It" - let the user (or user interface program) handle the RAID work. You can get fancy and use Shamir Secret Sharing, or non-fancy and use N+1 sparing RAID, or medium fancy and use {<even-bits>,<odd-bits>,<evens xor odds>}, depending on how private and how reliable you want to be. Having just the even bits of decently-encrypted cyphertext makes cracking tough.... Some issues to think about - - Access patterns - who do you want to be able to retrieve the data? --- only the owner? --- people who the owner shares a secret with? --- Everybody? --- Everybody who knows where the pieces are? --- One retrieval? Many retrievals? - How do you want the data delivered? Anon remailer? HTTP? POP3? - Threats - who don't you want to be able to read the data? --- who don't you want to be able to delete the data? --- who don't you want to find out who retrieved the data? - Payment - who pays? Writers? Readers? Cops with warrants? Account holders or one-shot users? Digicash only? How much? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

1 0

Physical Havens
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's take a look at the successful havens of history. 1. Hashishim( Old man of the mountains)-The Aga Khan survived thousands of years of harassment by the surrounding powers by placing a few well choosen daggers. 2. The monastic system- These whole setup was an excellent model. The monks were burrowed away in those places for centuries. The church built them like fortresses to withstand the heathens, both mentally and physically. The original "data warehouse". 3. The pirate havens- Places like the carribbean(originally), then Madagasgar(last). Pirate havens did business for everyone. 4. The silk routes- The trading centers of the old silk road sprang up overnight then vanished. Original anonymous trade. All of these physical havens eventually fell to the persistance of the major powers of the day. Or were co-opted by others who absorbed the critical black market features of these systems. ??????????????????????????????????????? Greg Kucharo sophi(a)best.com "Eppur si moeve" -Galileo ???????????????????????????????????????

1 0