December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Privacy] Airline background checks...
by aaron＠herringn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Under plans to overhaul the airline security system, making a plane reservation would trigger an instant profile of a passenger's background, including past travels and possible criminal history information. [...] Government should pay The committee, made up of 23 industry, government and public interest groups, suggested the federal government, not the airline industry, pay for the increased security measures. It estimated the proposals would cost $9.9 billion over the next 10 years. "It's not an airline or airport problem. It's a national security problem," Lally said. "Airports and airlines are surrogate targets. The real targets are the policies and government of the United States." [...] http://www.cnn.com/US/9612/13/airline/index.html

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THE CRYPTOCRACY'S PLAN TO PSYCHOCIVILIZE YOU
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.nwlink.com:88/~dbader/

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Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

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Wired Integrity
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The latest issue of Wired has a nice article about Sameer Parekh and C2Net. What is troubling is that it is written by Sandy Sandfort who works at C2Net. There is no indication of this in the vicinity of the Wired article. The Little Green Man

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From Houghton-Mifflin MIS regarding the ongoing self-mailbombing
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A lesson in stupidity. - -rich [Forwards from impeccable intermediate sources snipped; if you REALLY need to confirm, mail me.] - ------- Forwarded Message OK. I used to work in the MIS department of Houghton Mifflin, and still am good friends with the upper MIS people. In fact I had dinner with them last night. Although the promotion is/was real, PLEASE DON'T SEND THEM ANY MORE EMAIL. The mail gateway is throttling with the incoming mail - we had a long talk last night over how to aleviate this problem. They've gotten alittle over 100k messages in 1 week. The mail server is currently a SPARC 5 w/ 64MB RAM and a gigabyte of swap, and is so hosed that they're switching in an Ultra2 tonight to try to handle the load. The lesson here is: don't do a marketing ploy without first consulting your Tech people. Apparently, the whole thing was cooked up by one of the departments, who neglected to tell MIS. Also, for those of you who might possibly work in industry in the future and are looking for a way to gather email addresses or do some kind of promotion like this, USE WEB HITS. The average email coming in to HMCo is about 4kb, requires disk space, and requires a vfork() of sendmail to deliver. A typical Http hit runs less than 100bytes, is served by a threaded httpd server, and requires very little disk access. Anyway, this is just a note to please spare my friends at HMCo. The kids are going to get all the donations promised, and my friends have enough headaches. Thanks! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMrHJDJNcNyVVy0jxAQH98wH/RA2dc5bLz3KbX0JoyVha5+XoppMSgNtB 8MvVemU5iOeBRrJTENo1bj6OYx8b7ie8E95OUsBy9Kx0RpFfpOmBSA== =QdmN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Would you send money to Gary Rasmussen ?
by jimg＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, I've sent Gary Rasmussen (RagyR, Classical Crypto Books) money and received books. He's prompt and honest, in my experience, and even offered to refund my money on the latest edition of Kahn's "The Codebreakers" when I pointed out that there's very little new info in it (16 pages), and it's not integrated with the text, nor does it include the copious footnotes that make the original so valuable. I met him at the most recent American Cryptogram Association meeting, and he was efficient and personable there as well. In fact, I just sent him another $69.95 today for the Handbook of Applied Cryptography -- the ACA member price. His price breaks are usually much deeper for ACA members; evidently the margin is lower for modern low-volume professional texts like this than for the classical ones I usually buy. Jim Gillogly jim(a)acm.org > From: peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk (Peter M Allan) > > > (And is there anyone I'd know who'd suggest I send you money ?!)

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Re: In Defense of Anecdotal Evidence
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hats off to Rob Carlson for a great article! At 9:54 AM 12/13/1996, Rob Carlson wrote: >On Thu, 12 Dec 1996 14:12:23 -0800, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: >>Statistics are a useful tool, but they have their problems. Their >>accuracy is often in doubt. Most scientific data comes with an >>error analysis so you can tell what the figure means. For some >>reason statisticians never do this so we cannot tell whether their >>numbers are accurate to within 0.1%, 1.0%, 10%, or even worse. >> >>There are many other problems. For instance, users of statistics >>assume they have a random sample, even in cases where that is far >>from clear > >[ List of other problems deleted ] > >Of course, anecdotal evidence also suffers from all of these >problems. And in greater magnitude. This is true since it is a >special case of statistical evidence. With a non-random sample set of >one and no controls for observer bias. Excellent point. On the other hand, if everybody operates correctly based on their own (non-random) experience in general the right outcomes will occur. This is rational if the tertiary statistical evidence is unreliable. What you are implicitly assuming is that the studies one reads were done honestly and competently. Yet, the chain of evidence is rather weak. Typically, we don't even know the people who did the study. Given the many contradictory results obtained by social statisticians, we have substantial evidence that there is something wrong with their methods or their application. Another way to judge the experts is through selected in depth studies of their work. I have not found the results to be encouraging. >>The advantage of anecdotal evidence (in the sense we have been using >>it) is that the person who is telling you the anecdote was there and >>saw it. You can cross-examine them and get a full understanding of >>the evidence provided. > >The reporting of evidence involves different issues. If you want to >believe that women are actually cut in two or that politicians are >telling the truth anytime their lips are moving, thats one thing. If >you want to tell me its true because you personally observed it, >thats quite another. > >Given the failures of humans as observational tools, your story is >unverifiable by me. Perhaps through effective cross examination I >can prove you wrong, but I can never prove you right with such a >technique. That will require other evidence outside the control of >the observer ( statistical is just one available ). Occasionally we may teach somebody else about something they observed and change their mind. This is not the same thing as proof, but it is worthwhile. In other cases, we may have beliefs about the integrity of our observer. We may believe that they will not intentionally lie. That means we can separate out their interpretations from the exact details they can recall. Even if our correct interpretation is not accepted by the observer, that does not imply that we can learn nothing of interest. >This doesn't make studies or statistical evidence true. Just more >reliable than anecdotal evidence. I should make clear that I have not ruled out statistical evidence as a tool. We have to be aware of its limitations. >Humans who will lie about their observations will also produce flawed >studies. Again the former (anecdotal) is unverifiable, but I can >check the latter (statistical) independently. Actually, it is cheaper and easier to develop an understanding of the reliability of anecdotal evidence. Often we may have known the observer for some time and be able to form theories about their character and ability to accurately interpret what they have seen. We can ask them what they saw on different occasions and see if we get about the same story back. We can think about whether the person has intentionally lied in the past and, if so, under what circumstances. We can ask ourselves what motivation the person might have to lie. Is there any benefit to giving a particular story? >Relying on anecdotal evidence makes you susceptible to the magicians >of the world. The honest ones use mirrors and their need is to >entertain you enough to get your money. The rest use anecdotal >evidence and emotional arguments (verbal misdirection?). Their needs >are left as a test of the reader's naivete. What needs are satisfied by the white cloaked priests of social science? Which of their needs are satisfied by their work? Very few of these people are independent. They are often paid by people whose interest in the truth is in question. That means that the temptation to fudge (and humans find ways to rationalize such actions) is very powerful. The people preparing the statistical studies are often interested in the fame associated with career advancement. None of this is conducive to the search for truth. >Evidence that can be verified independently by many observers >increases the reliability. Experiments and polls can be done by me >thus eliminating your bias. Independent verification can also check >for errors and check the parameters under which the evidence is true. >Studies are done with certain assumptions and controls. The evidence >loses its reliability when removed from this context. I have serious doubts about these methods. I am not a statistician, so there is a possibility that I am simply ignorant. However, I would expect that if these methods of determining the accuracy of the statistics were effective, that it would be possible to provide some sort of error analysis. When we get a figure for the GDP we know that it is highly unlikely to be exactly correct. What is the probability that it is low by 10%? I fail to see how the figure can even be useful without this information. In the case of a complex study involving the measure of biases to adjust the final conclusions, it would be most useful to discuss the probability that the bias was not measured correctly. This must surely affect our final results, especially when many biases and other measurements are combined. Red Rackham

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Appropriate Topics for Cypherpunks
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:54 AM 12/13/1996, Rob Carlson wrote: >To make this on topic, how does this apply to cryptography and >crypto-politics? This issue is a foundation of our discussions here. >Shall we accept anecdotal evidence such as the "If you only knew what >we knew" arguments? What is more reliable: IPG's claims that their >product is an OTP because they say it is or Bruce Schneier's book >that can be used to point out the fallacy's in their claims? I'm sure Rob Carlson already realizes this, but just in case let's be very clear that a discussion of the value of anecdotal evidence is so on topic to this list that it isn't funny. We are talking about trust models. The reason that the Net is a fundamental threat to the established social order is that it will probably result in a worldwide change in trust models. For one thing, we are now learning just how venal and corrupt the world leadership really is. At the same time, cross-border relationships and trust are flourishing. The rise of anonymous identities raises the question of how we can "trust" somebody we have never met. This immediately leads to the question of why we trust other people we haven't met, such as the President, or scientists, or whomever. It turns out our reasons for "trusting" these people are not as solid as some of us once believed. The attempts to crush strong cryptography - especially if it implies anonymity with strong authentication - is an attempt to undermine the trust developing between disparate groups of people. And, in a sense, that is what politics has always been about: the subversion of trust between groups of people so they can be played off each other for the benefit of the few. Back to what is appropriate to this list: What the cypherpunks is suffering right now is not an excess of well written articles that are off topic. I suggest that anybody who feels very strongly that they are not seeing articles of the appropriate content follow Rob Carlson's example and show the rest of us how it is done. Red Rackham

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NSA/UKUSA Echelon: Exposing the Global Surveillance System
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't know the truth of this, but I'm sure it will make interesting reading. -- John Forwarded-By: Dale Amon as Operator <root(a)starbase1.gpl.net> Forwarded-By: Steven Carlson <steve(a)isys.hu> This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). ** Topic: #59 Exposing Global Surveillance System ** ** Written 10:30 AM Dec 3, 1996 by caq in cdp:covertaction ** EXPOSING THE GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM by Nicky Hager ------ The article as it apears in hard copy in the magazine also includes the following sidebars: --"NSA'S BUSINESS PLAN: GLOBAL ACCESS" by Duncan Campbell --GREENPEACE WARRIOR: WHY NO WARNING? and --NZ's PM Kept in the Dark by Nicky Hager ********Hager's book "secret Power" is available from CAQ for $33.******* ----------- IN THE LATE 1980S, IN A DECISION IT PROBABLY REGRETS, THE US PROMPTED NEW ZEALAND TO JOIN A NEW AND HIGHLY SECRET GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. HAGER'S INVESTIGATION INTO IT AND HIS DISCOVERY OF THE ECHELON DICTIONARY HAS REVEALED ONE OF THE WORLD'S BIGGEST, MOST CLOSELY HELD INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS. THE SYSTEM ALLOWS SPY AGENCIES TO MONITOR MOST OF THE WORLD'S TELEPHONE, E-MAIL, AND TELEX COMMUNICATIONS. For 40 years, New Zealand's largest intelligence agency, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) the nation's equivalent of the US National Security Agency (NSA) had been helping its Western allies to spy on countries throughout the Pacific region, without the knowledge of the New Zealand public or many of its highest elected officials. What the NSA did not know is that by the late 1980s, various intelligence staff had decided these activities had been too secret for too long, and were providing me with interviews and documents exposing New Zealand's intelligence activities. Eventually, more than 50 people who work or have worked in intelligence and related fields agreed to be interviewed. The activities they described made it possible to document, from the South Pacific, some alliance-wide systems and projects which have been kept secret elsewhere. Of these, by far the most important is ECHELON. Designed and coordinated by NSA, the ECHELON system is used to intercept ordinary e-mail, fax, telex, and telephone communications carried over the world's telecommunications networks. Unlike many of the electronic spy systems developed during the Cold War, ECHELON is designed primarily for non-military targets: governments, organizations, businesses, and individuals in virtually every country. It potentially affects every person communicating between (and sometimes within) countries anywhere in the world. It is, of course, not a new idea that intelligence organizations tap into e-mail and other public telecommunications networks. What was new in the material leaked by the New Zealand intelligence staff was precise information on where the spying is done, how the system works, its capabilities and shortcomings, and many details such as the codenames. The ECHELON system is not designed to eavesdrop on a particular individual's e-mail or fax link. Rather, the system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and using computers to identify and extract messages of interest from the mass of unwanted ones. A chain of secret interception facilities has been established around the world to tap into all the major components of the international telecommunications networks. Some monitor communications satellites, others land-based communications networks, and others radio communications. ECHELON links together all these facilities, providing the US and its allies with the ability to intercept a large proportion of the communications on the planet. The computers at each station in the ECHELON network automatically search through the millions of messages intercepted for ones containing pre-programmed keywords. Keywords include all the names, localities, subjects, and so on that might be mentioned. Every word of every message intercepted at each station gets automatically searched whether or not a specific telephone number or e-mail address is on the list. The thousands of simultaneous messages are read in "real time" as they pour into the station, hour after hour, day after day, as the computer finds intelligence needles in telecommunications haystacks. SOMEONE IS LISTENING The computers in stations around the globe are known, within the network, as the ECHELON Dictionaries. Computers that can automatically search through traffic for keywords have existed since at least the 1970s, but the ECHELON system was designed by NSA to interconnect all these computers and allow the stations to function as components of an integrated whole. The NSA and GCSB are bound together under the five-nation UKUSA signals intelligence agreement. The other three partners all with equally obscure names are the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Britain, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in Canada, and the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) in Australia. The alliance, which grew from cooperative efforts during World War II to intercept radio transmissions, was formalized into the UKUSA agreement in 1948 and aimed primarily against the USSR. The five UKUSA agencies are today the largest intelligence organizations in their respective countries. With much of the world's business occurring by fax, e-mail, and phone, spying on these communications receives the bulk of intelligence resources. For decades before the introduction of the ECHELON system, the UKUSA allies did intelligence collection operations for each other, but each agency usually processed and analyzed the intercept from its own stations. Under ECHELON, a particular station's Dictionary computer contains not only its parent agency's chosen keywords, but also has lists entered in for other agencies. In New Zealand's satellite interception station at Waihopai (in the South Island), for example, the computer has separate search lists for the NSA, GCHQ, DSD, and CSE in addition to its own. Whenever the Dictionary encounters a message containing one of the agencies' keywords, it automatically picks it and sends it directly to the headquarters of the agency concerned. No one in New Zealand screens, or even sees, the intelligence collected by the New Zealand station for the foreign agencies. Thus, the stations of the junior UKUSA allies function for the NSA no differently than if they were overtly NSA-run bases located on their soil. The first component of the ECHELON network are stations specifically targeted on the international telecommunications satellites (Intelsats) used by the telephone companies of most countries. A ring of Intelsats is positioned around the world, stationary above the equator, each serving as a relay station for tens of thousands of simultaneous phone calls, fax, and e-mail. Five UKUSA stations have been established to intercept the communications carried by the Intelsats. The British GCHQ station is located at the top of high cliffs above the sea at Morwenstow in Cornwall. Satellite dishes beside sprawling operations buildings point toward Intelsats above the Atlantic, Europe, and, inclined almost to the horizon, the Indian Ocean. An NSA station at Sugar Grove, located 250 kilometers southwest of Washington, DC, in the mountains of West Virginia, covers Atlantic Intelsats transmitting down toward North and South America. Another NSA station is in Washington State, 200 kilometers southwest of Seattle, inside the Army's Yakima Firing Center. Its satellite dishes point out toward the Pacific Intelsats and to the east. *1 The job of intercepting Pacific Intelsat communications that cannot be intercepted at Yakima went to New Zealand and Australia. Their South Pacific location helps to ensure global interception. New Zealand provides the station at Waihopai and Australia supplies the Geraldton station in West Australia (which targets both Pacific and Indian Ocean Intelsats). *2 Each of the five stations' Dictionary computers has a codename to distinguish it from others in the network. The Yakima station, for instance, located in desert country between the Saddle Mountains and Rattlesnake Hills, has the COWBOY Dictionary, while the Waihopai station has the FLINTLOCK Dictionary. These codenames are recorded at the beginning of every intercepted message, before it is transmitted around the ECHELON network, allowing analysts to recognize at which station the interception occurred. New Zealand intelligence staff has been closely involved with the NSA's Yakima station since 1981, when NSA pushed the GCSB to contribute to a project targeting Japanese embassy communications. Since then, all five UKUSA agencies have been responsible for monitoring diplomatic cables from all Japanese posts within the same segments of the globe they are assigned for general UKUSA monitoring.3 Until New Zealand's integration into ECHELON with the opening of the Waihopai station in 1989, its share of the Japanese communications was intercepted at Yakima and sent unprocessed to the GCSB headquarters in Wellington for decryption, translation, and writing into UKUSA-format intelligence reports (the NSA provides the codebreaking programs). "COMMUNICATION" THROUGH SATELLITES The next component of the ECHELON system intercepts a range of satellite communications not carried by Intelsat.In addition to the UKUSA stations targeting Intelsat satellites, there are another five or more stations homing in on Russian and other regional communications satellites. These stations are Menwith Hill in northern England; Shoal Bay, outside Darwin in northern Australia (which targets Indonesian satellites); Leitrim, just south of Ottawa in Canada (which appears to intercept Latin American satellites); Bad Aibling in Germany; and Misawa in northern Japan. A group of facilities that tap directly into land-based telecommunications systems is the final element of the ECHELON system. Besides satellite and radio, the other main method of transmitting large quantities of public, business, and government communications is a combination of water cables under the oceans and microwave networks over land. Heavy cables, laid across seabeds between countries, account for much of the world's international communications. After they come out of the water and join land-based microwave networks they are very vulnerable to interception. The microwave networks are made up of chains of microwave towers relaying messages from hilltop to hilltop (always in line of sight) across the countryside. These networks shunt large quantities of communications across a country. Interception of them gives access to international undersea communications (once they surface) and to international communication trunk lines across continents. They are also an obvious target for large-scale interception of domestic communications. Because the facilities required to intercept radio and satellite communications use large aerials and dishes that are difficult to hide for too long, that network is reasonably well documented. But all that is required to intercept land-based communication networks is a building situated along the microwave route or a hidden cable running underground from the legitimate network into some anonymous building, possibly far removed. Although it sounds technically very difficult, microwave interception from space by United States spy satellites also occurs.4 The worldwide network of facilities to intercept these communications is largely undocumented, and because New Zealand's GCSB does not participate in this type of interception, my inside sources could not help either. NO ONE IS SAFE FROM A MICROWAVE A 1994 expos of the Canadian UKUSA agency, Spyworld, co-authored by one of its former staff, Mike Frost, gave the first insights into how a lot of foreign microwave interception is done (see p. 18). It described UKUSA "embassy collection" operations, where sophisticated receivers and processors are secretly transported to their countries' overseas embassies in diplomatic bags and used to monitor various communications in foreign capitals. *5 Since most countries' microwave networks converge on the capital city, embassy buildings can be an ideal site. Protected by diplomatic privilege, they allow interception in the heart of the target country. *6 The Canadian embassy collection was requested by the NSA to fill gaps in the American and British embassy collection operations, which were still occurring in many capitals around the world when Frost left the CSE in 1990. Separate sources in Australia have revealed that the DSD also engages in embassy collection. *7 On the territory of UKUSA nations, the interception of land-based telecommunications appears to be done at special secret intelligence facilities. The US, UK, and Canada are geographically well placed to intercept the large amounts of the world's communications that cross their territories. The only public reference to the Dictionary system anywhere in the world was in relation to one of these facilities, run by the GCHQ in central London. In 1991, a former British GCHQ official spoke anonymously to Granada Television's World in Action about the agency's abuses of power. He told the program about an anonymous red brick building at 8 Palmer Street where GCHQ secretly intercepts every telex which passes into, out of, or through London, feeding them into powerful computers with a program known as "Dictionary." The operation, he explained, is staffed by carefully vetted British Telecom people: "It's nothing to do with national security. It's because it's not legal to take every single telex. And they take everything: the embassies, all the business deals, even the birthday greetings, they take everything. They feed it into the Dictionary." *8 What the documentary did not reveal is that Dictionary is not just a British system; it is UKUSA-wide. Similarly, British researcher Duncan Campbell has described how the US Menwith Hill station in Britain taps directly into the British Telecom microwave network, which has actually been designed with several major microwave links converging on an isolated tower connected underground into the station.9 The NSA Menwith Hill station, with 22 satellite terminals and more than 4.9 acres of buildings, is undoubtedly the largest and most powerful in the UKUSA network. Located in northern England, several thousand kilometers from the Persian Gulf, it was awarded the NSA's "Station of the Year" prize for 1991 after its role in the Gulf War. Menwith Hill assists in the interception of microwave communications in another way as well, by serving as a ground station for US electronic spy satellites. These intercept microwave trunk lines and short range communications such as military radios and walkie talkies. Other ground stations where the satellites' information is fed into the global network are Pine Gap, run by the CIA near Alice Springs in central Australia and the Bad Aibling station in Germany. *10 Among them, the various stations and operations making up the ECHELON network tap into all the main components of the world's telecommunications networks. All of them, including a separate network of stations that intercepts long distance radio communications, have their own Dictionary computers connected into ECHELON. In the early 1990s, opponents of the Menwith Hill station obtained large quantities of internal documents from the facility. Among the papers was a reference to an NSA computer system called Platform. The integration of all the UKUSA station computers into ECHELON probably occurred with the introduction of this system in the early 1980s. James Bamford wrote at that time about a new worldwide NSA computer network codenamed Platform "which will tie together 52 separate computer systems used throughout the world. Focal point, or `host environment,' for the massive network will be the NSA headquarters at Fort Meade. Among those included in Platform will be the British SIGINT organization, GCHQ." *11 LOOKING IN THE DICTIONARY The Dictionary computers are connected via highly encrypted UKUSA communications that link back to computer data bases in the five agency headquarters. This is where all the intercepted messages selected by the Dictionaries end up. Each morning the specially "indoctrinated" signals intelligence analysts in Washington, Ottawa,Cheltenham, Canberra, and Wellington log on at their computer terminals and enter the Dictionary system. After keying in their security passwords, they reach a directory that lists the different categories of intercept available in the data bases, each with a four-digit code. For instance, 1911 might be Japanese diplomatic cables from Latin America (handled by the Canadian CSE), 3848 might be political communications from and about Nigeria, and 8182 might be any messages about distribution of encryption technology. They select their subject category, get a "search result" showing how many messages have been caught in the ECHELON net on that subject, and then the day's work begins. Analysts scroll through screen after screen of intercepted faxes, e-mail messages, etc. and, whenever a message appears worth reporting on, they select it from the rest to work on. If it is not in English, it is translated and then written into the standard format of intelligence reports produced anywhere within the UKUSA network either in entirety as a "report," or as a summary or "gist." INFORMATION CONTROL A highly organized system has been developed to control what is being searched for by each station and who can have access to it. This is at the heart of ECHELON operations and works as follows. The individual station's Dictionary computers do not simply have a long list of keywords to search for. And they do not send all the information into some huge database that participating agencies can dip into as they wish. It is much more controlled. The search lists are organized into the same categories, referred to by the four digit numbers. Each agency decides its own categories according to its responsibilities for producing intelligence for the network. For GCSB, this means South Pacific governments, Japanese diplomatic, Russian Antarctic activities, and so on. The agency then works out about 10 to 50 keywords for selection in each category. The keywords include such things as names of people, ships, organizations, country names, and subject names. They also include the known telex and fax numbers and Internet addresses of any individuals, businesses, organizations, and government offices that are targets. These are generally written as part of the message text and so are easily recognized by the Dictionary computers. The agencies also specify combinations of keywords to help sift out communications of interest. For example, they might search for diplomatic cables containing both the words "Santiago" and "aid," or cables containing the word "Santiago" but not "consul" (to avoid the masses of routine consular communications). It is these sets of words and numbers (and combinations), under a particular category, that get placed in the Dictionary computers. (Staff in the five agencies called Dictionary Managers enter and update the keyword search lists for each agency.) The whole system, devised by the NSA, has been adopted completely by the other agencies. The Dictionary computers search through all the incoming messages and, whenever they encounter one with any of the agencies' keywords, they select it. At the same time, the computer automatically notes technical details such as the time and place of interception on the piece of intercept so that analysts reading it, in whichever agency it is going to, know where it came from, and what it is. Finally, the computer writes the four-digit code (for the category with the keywords in that message) at the bottom of the message's text. This is important. It means that when all the intercepted messages end up together in the database at one of the agency headquarters, the messages on a particular subject can be located again. Later, when the analyst using the Dictionary system selects the four- digit code for the category he or she wants, the computer simply searches through all the messages in the database for the ones which have been tagged with that number. This system is very effective for controlling which agencies can get what from the global network because each agency only gets the intelligence out of the ECHELON system from its own numbers. It does not have any access to the raw intelligence coming out of the system to the other agencies. For example, although most of the GCSB's intelligence production is primarily to serve the UKUSA alliance, New Zealand does not have access to the whole ECHELON network. The access it does have is strictly controlled. A New Zealand intelligence officer explained: "The agencies can all apply for numbers on each other's Dictionaries. The hardest to deal with are the Americans. ... [There are] more hoops to jump through, unless it is in their interest, in which case they'll do it for you." There is only one agency which, by virtue of its size and role within the alliance, will have access to the full potential of the ECHELON system the agency that set it up. What is the system used for? Anyone listening to official "discussion" of intelligence could be forgiven for thinking that, since the end of the Cold War, the key targets of the massive UKUSA intelligence machine are terrorism, weapons proliferation, and economic intelligence. The idea that economic intelligence has become very important, in particular, has been carefully cultivated by intelligence agencies intent on preserving their post-Cold War budgets. It has become an article of faith in much discussion of intelligence. However, I have found no evidence that these are now the primary concerns of organizations such as NSA. QUICKER INTELLIGENCE,SAME MISSION A different story emerges after examining very detailed information I have been given about the intelligence New Zealand collects for the UKUSA allies and detailed descriptions of what is in the yards-deep intelligence reports New Zealand receives from its four allies each week. There is quite a lot of intelligence collected about potential terrorists, and there is quite a lot of economic intelligence, notably intensive monitoring of all the countries participating in GATT negotiations. But by far, the main priorities of the intelligence alliance continue to be political and military intelligence to assist the larger allies to pursue their interests around the world. Anyone and anything the particular governments are concerned about can become a target. With capabilities so secret and so powerful, almost anything goes. For example, in June 1992, a group of current "highly placed intelligence operatives" from the British GCHQ spoke to the London Observer: "We feel we can no longer remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross malpractice and negligence within the establishment in which we operate." They gave as examples GCHQ interception of three charitable organizations, including Amnesty International and Christian Aid. As the Observer reported: "At any time GCHQ is able to home in on their communications for a routine target request," the GCHQ source said. In the case of phone taps the procedure is known as Mantis. With telexes it is called Mayfly. By keying in a code relating to Third World aid, the source was able to demonstrate telex "fixes" on the three organizations. "It is then possible to key in a trigger word which enables us to home in on the telex communications whenever that word appears," he said. "And we can read a pre-determined number of characters either side of the keyword."12 Without actually naming it, this was a fairly precise description of how the ECHELON Dictionary system works. Again, what was not revealed in the publicity was that this is a UKUSA-wide system. The design of ECHELON means that the interception of these organizations could have occurred anywhere in the network, at any station where the GCHQ had requested that the four-digit code covering Third World aid be placed. Note that these GCHQ officers mentioned that the system was being used for telephone calls. In New Zealand, ECHELON is used only to intercept written communications: fax, e-mail, and telex. The reason, according to intelligence staff, is that the agency does not have the staff to analyze large quantities of telephone conversations. Mike Frost's expos of Canadian "embassy collection" operations described the NSA computers they used, called Oratory, that can "listen" to telephone calls and recognize when keywords are spoken. Just as we can recognize words spoken in all the different tones and accents we encounter, so too, according to Frost, can these computers. Telephone calls containing keywords are automatically extracted from the masses of other calls and recorded digitally on magnetic tapes for analysts back at agency headquarters. However, high volume voice recognition computers will be technically difficult to perfect, and my New Zealand-based sources could not confirm that this capability exists. But, if or when it is perfected, the implications would be immense. It would mean that the UKUSA agencies could use machines to search through all the international telephone calls in the world, in the same way that they do written messages. If this equipment exists for use in embassy collection, it will presumably be used in all the stations throughout the ECHELON network. It is yet to be confirmed how extensively telephone communications are being targeted by the ECHELON stations for the other agencies. The easiest pickings for the ECHELON system are the individuals, organizations,and governments that do not use encryption. In New Zealand's area, for example, it has proved especially useful against already vulnerable South Pacific nations which do not use any coding, even for government communications (all these communications of New Zealand's neighbors are supplied, unscreened, to its UKUSA allies). As a result of the revelations in my book, there is currently a project under way in the Pacific to promote and supply publicly available encryption software to vulnerable organizations such as democracy movements in countries with repressive governments. This is one practical way of curbing illegitimate uses of the ECHELON capabilities. One final comment. All the newspapers, commentators, and "well placed sources" told the public that New Zealand was cut off from US intelligence in the mid-1980s. That was entirely untrue. The intelligence supply to New Zealand did not stop, and instead, the decade since has been a period of increased integration of New Zealand into the US system. Virtually everything the equipment, manuals, ways of operating, jargon, codes, and so on, used in the GCSB continues to be imported entirely from the larger allies (in practice, usually the NSA). As with the Australian and Canadian agencies, most of the priorities continue to come from the US, too. The main thing that protects these agencies from change is their secrecy. On the day my book arrived in the book shops, without prior publicity, there was an all-day meeting of the intelligence bureaucrats in the prime minister's department trying to decide if they could prevent it from being distributed. They eventually concluded, sensibly, that the political costs were too high. It is understandable that they were so agitated. Throughout my research, I have faced official denials or governments refusing to comment on publicity about intelligence activities. Given the pervasive atmosphere of secrecy and stonewalling, it is always hard for the public to judge what is fact, what is speculation, and what is paranoia. Thus, in uncovering New Zealand's role in the NSA-led alliance, my aim was to provide so much detail about the operations the technical systems, the daily work of individual staff members, and even the rooms in which they work inside intelligence facilities that readers could feel confident that they were getting close to the truth. I hope the information leaked by intelligence staff in New Zealand about UKUSA and its systems such as ECHELON will help lead to change. n CAQ SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION CAQ (CovertAction Quarterly) has won numerous awards for investigative journalism. In 1996, it won 4 of "Project Censored" top 25 awards for investigative reporting. CAQ is read around the world by investigative reporters, activists, scholars, intelligence buffs, news junkies, and anyone who wants to know the news and analysis behind the soundbites and headlines. Recommended by Noam Chomsky; targeted by the CIA. Each article in the 64-page magazine, which is in its 19th year of publication, is extensively footnoted and accompanied by photographs and graphics. For a single issue, send $6. A one year subscription: US $22; Canada/Mexico $27; Latin America/Europe $33; Other areas $35. A two year US subscription is $38 Please send check or money order in $US to: CAQ 1500 Massachusetts Ave. #732 Washington, DC 20005, USA Mail, phone or fax Mastercard or Visa with address info and expiration date Phone: 202-331-9763 Fax: 202-331-9751 E-mail: caq(a)igc.org CHECK OUT OUR WEB SITES: http://mediafilter.org/caq http://www.worldmedia.com/caq ** End of text from cdp:covertaction ** *************************************************************************** This material came from PeaceNet, a non-profit progressive networking service. For more information, send a message to peacenet-info(a)igc.apc.org ***************************************************************************

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Re: [Privacy] Airline background checks...
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Under plans to overhaul the airline security system, >making a plane reservation would trigger an instant profile of a >passenger's background, including past travels and possible criminal >history information. > >[...] > >Government should pay > [snip] >"It's not an airline or airport problem. It's a national security problem," >Lally said. "Airports and airlines are surrogate targets. The real targets >are the policies and government of the United States." > For those of you not aware of airport procedures, the real terrorism threats are not only from ground personnel but those impersonating LEOs (Law Enforcement Officers). Fake badges are easy to come by and by filling in a form anyone can get on board an airline with their firearm. No procedures are currently in place to allow airline or airport security personnel to easily and positively identify bogus LEOs.

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Re: In Defense of Anecdotal Evidence
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:54 AM 12/13/1996, Rob Carlson wrote: >This doesn't make studies or statistical evidence true. Just more >reliable than anecdotal evidence. Humans who will lie about their >observations will also produce flawed studies. Again the former >(anecdotal) is unverifiable, but I can check the latter (statistical) >independently. One other point I forgot to make: It is expensive to verify a long statistical study. Not only does it require extensive knowledge of statistics, but you may actually need to reproduce much of the work. The only people who can afford to pay for such verification work may not be the same people that I would trust. Anecdotal evidence is inexpensive to collect. In many circumstances the cost benefit analysis favors it. Red Rackham

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Re: Social Security Fraud
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:15 AM 12/13/1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: >>What laws would an employee violate? What are the chances of >>conviction? What are the likely penalties if convicted? > > ...upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $1,000, or >imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both." Ouch! >.. . shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be >fined under title 18 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or >both." Yikes! Thanks to Catfish Friend for the fine research work. So how often are people prosecuted under these laws? That is, if you pay your taxes and don't steal from people, but do give your employer the wrong SS number, what are the odds that you will be prosecuted? If prosecuted, are the odds high that you will receive jail time? Assume a good lawyer, spotless criminal record, and a favored racial class. Red Rackham

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Is This for Real?
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can you trust anecdotal evidence? Are the statisticians lying, are the marketeers just keeping you entranced; do covert agencies send electromagnet currents through your body, are blatant, secret plots against your privacy in place? Stay tuned for the latest update from . . . P s y c h o P u n k s ! * Yikes - now we need a discussion on teleology & epistemology. .. Blanc * (just kidding. It's Friday afternoon)

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Re: Is This for Real?
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:35 PM 12/13/1996, Blanc Weber wrote: >Can you trust anecdotal evidence? > > Are the statisticians lying, > are the marketeers just keeping you entranced; > do covert agencies send > electromagnet currents through your body, > are blatant, secret plots against your privacy > in place? > >Stay tuned for the latest update from . . . > > P s y c h o P u n k s ! * > > >Yikes - now we need a discussion on teleology & epistemology. > > .. >Blanc >* (just kidding. It's Friday afternoon) It's not the Cypherpunks that are crazy - it's the world! ;-) Perhaps an example will be persuasive. Richard Feynman had some interesting things to say about the history of measured charge of the electron. If you look at a graph of the "official" value over time you will find that it drifts downwards to the correct value, or at any rate the value which is universally accepted today. If the charge on the electron has been constant this century - and that seems safe - you would have expected the results of each successive study to be scattered around the actual value. Instead, they start out a little below Milliken's original value and steadily move downward. The most likely explanation is that the experimenters did not want to seem too far out in their results and fudged them. (This is Feynman's explanation.) The charge of the electron is verifiable "hard" science to a degree the social sciences cannot even dream of approaching, and yet we find that the "professionals" were fudging their results. Not just one or two, but a whole flock of them working independently. The charge of the electron is hard for people to get worked up over. It has no political relevance. There is no real reason to boost its value. The social sciences, however, are political in the extreme. Aside from issues of anticipated future earnings (or even employment), many social scientists have strong political beliefs which motivate their work. Given that their studies are often not reproduced - one study can take many years to complete - and that they contradict each other when they are reproduced, I do not feel unlimited confidence in their conclusions. Red Rackham

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Re: Social Security Fraud
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me the government wouldn't like it because someone else (the real owner of the SS#) would be getting the $$$. It is also fraud because this is how the government keeps track of your workplace. Giving a wrong ss# would lead the government to believe that person with that ss# is working two jobs and only paying the taxes in april for one job.

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Re: Wired Integrity
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:35 PM 12/13/1996, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >> What is troubling is that it is written by Sandy Sandfort who >> works at C2Net.... > >...At the time I wrote and submitted the article I neither worked >for Sameer... Thank you for the clear explanation. Just so you know, I did not doubt your integrity for an instant. Wired should have appended a short paragraph explaining the possible conflict of interest. The Little Green Man

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RE: Is This for Real?
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: nobody(a)huge.cajones.com/aka Red Rackham It's not the Cypherpunks that are crazy - it's the world! ;-) ........................................................ That's right, Red. <g> Actually, I'm not in need of persuasion regarding the subject of evidence (anecdotal or otherwise). I'm aware of human nature and the frailties of intellect/psychology which can affect the results. It's easy to trust another's word when one does not have much knowledge of what can go wrong or doesn't know "how to know", or how to distinguish between fact & fancy. It's also easy to ignore evidence even when it is blatantly apparent, so that no amount of persuasion will convince a person to give up a mistaken conclusion. There are vested interests at work in the things people do, and it is sometimes shocking to realize that these have been at play when one wasn't expecting it, as in your example from Richard Feynman. That is why it is very important to always note whose interest is being served in any sort of persuasive bit of news from any source. A good question to keep in mind is "what are they trying to accomplish". .. Blanc > >

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CPU_two
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-13-96 "A hardware device may offer a solution to software virus problems" Calluna, a Scottish disc drive company, has developed a hardware product which it believes offers computers complete protection against viruses. It consists of a microprocessor on a small circuit board which is placed between the PC's hard disc drive and its system board, and which functions independently of the PC's own CPU as a second CPU. The microprocessor can be programmed to monitor all traffic being routed to the PC's hard disc drive. If it detects virus-like activity or any other illegal activity it alerts the user and allows the option of blocking access to the hard disc drive. The second CPU could also be allocated partitioned sections of the computer's hard drive to store all material downloaded from the Internet. Or the device could be used as a firewall to prevent unauthorised access to the PC's hard drive. [Might this have crypto use?] ----- CPU_two

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Magic Numbers in MD5
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am curious where some of the magic numbers in MD5 originated. First, we have the four chaining variables, A, B, C, and D which are initialized with apparently random numbers. Are they as random as they look, or are they carefully chosen? Second, we have the t_i values. Schneier's first edition says this: "In step i, t_i is the integer part of 4294967296xabs(sin(i)), when i is in radians. (Note that 4294967296 is 2^32.)" Does abs(sin()) have some properties that are especially conducive to strengthening MD5 or is it just a function to generate mildly random numbers? If the latter, wouldn't the algorithm be stronger if it was used with completely random numbers? Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: ITARs effects
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:06 AM 12/13/96 -0500, Adam Shostack wrote: >This implies that putting something up for FTP == export. Holy >shit. Sure. What did you expect? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/justforfun/prime.htm

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Re: [Privacy] Airline background checks...
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:53 AM 12/13/96 -0800, aaron(a)herringn.com wrote: > >WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Under plans to overhaul the airline security system, >making a plane reservation would trigger an instant profile of a >passenger's background, including past travels and possible criminal >history information. > >[...] > >Government should pay Just in case that somebody isn't clear as to what "government should pay" means. It means you and I through out taxes. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/justforfun/prime.htm

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Re: Race and IQ
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:30 PM 12/13/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >(For the curious, I am persuaded that there are minimal differences >in "intelligence" between the several or many races, but that >cultural and sociological factors strongly affect upbringing, >learning, interest in doing well in school, ability on standardized >tests, success in business matters, and so on.) The question is certainly interesting scientifically. Some Africans exhibit skills which are not found elsewhere. For example, in some African societies, I am told, there are people who can do things like play a drum with the left hand to 13 beats a measure and do something like 17 beats a measure with the right hand. Those who aren't amazed by this should try doing three beats on the left hand with two on the right. Call me when you master it. ;-) If you lived in a society where this skill was considered an important component of social success, most of us would appear to be retarded. (Consider, for example, the ancient Chinese civilization. Appointment into the imperial bureaucracy occured only after the applicants passed elaborate tests regarding their knowledge and interpretation of poetry. That was the entire qualification.) It has been claimed that African societies have never been "civilized" in the sense of developing large bureaucracies and cities. When many people make this claim there is an implication that the more with it peoples did this. But is that so reasonable? Read reports of life in European cities in the 18th century, before running water and before sewage systems. Give me the country any day! Many of the readers of this list are anarchistically inclined. When we hear that African societies have tended to be anarchistic, we should applaud their wisdom and insight. Perhaps these people could teach the rest of us a few things. (And maybe teach Hilary Clinton a few things. Is there a history of welfare states in Africa, or did they practice voluntary anarchistic communal charity on the level of villages?) It is not out of the question that once the human genome is decoded and its relationship with human intelligence understood that we will find that Africans beat out everyone else. (Incidentally, I question the claim that African societies never developed cities and bureacracies. The Egyptians are the most prominent example. Mathematically adept and literate they prospered for a couple thousand years. A better run than the Romans managed! We tend to think of Egyptians as being sort of like Europeans. I believe this is because Europeans invented Egyptology. Excuse me for pointing out the obvious, but Egypt is in Africa. What is more, if you study Egyptian statuary, you will find many examples of distinctly African looking royalty. Also, I know that cities like Timbuktoo were centers of Muslim learning and were large enough to have streets and houses. We may know little about them because Europeans were not allowed to visit, and also for racist reasons.) Scientific questions aside, it isn't clear why the racial link to intelligence matters. What are we going to do differently if it turns out that, on average, for genetic reasons, Albanians are less quick on the uptake than other people? The link between intelligence and success is not at all clear. We generally consider mathematicians and computer programmers to be smart, but in terms of total life competence, large numbers of these people live less than ideally. There are many instances in which I prefer to hire somebody who is less intelligent, but better equipped to play on the team, better organized, or just less of a primadonna. The eugenicists propose murder. This doesn't make any sense at all. We all have friends who are both smarter and dumber than ourselves, yet we don't plot their murder. Intelligence is just an excuse for what these people really want to do. If God came down and told us that there was no genetic basis for intelligence, next week there would be some other reason for the same policy. On the flip side are those who want to help the unfortunate with the time and labor of others. A racial link to intelligence will not increase my sympathy for such schemes. The upshot is: If you respect the rights of others, it doesn't matter. Now for some entertainment. Oliver Wendell Holmes, when he was a judge in Virginia, ordered the forcible sterilization of several young women. The state would wait until they became ill and then when they were admitted to a hospital, they were sterilized under the guise of giving them some other operation. Holmes claimed that the grandmothers of the women were imbeciles, their mothers were imbeciles, and that they were imbeciles. His great line was "Three generations of imbeciles are enough!" Curiously, it turns out that the word "imbecile" was a euphemism for "illegitimate". Know your doctor! Red Rackham

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RE: !! Point 'n Crypt -- Win95 Privacy for Everyone !!
by Walt Armour 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is no arguing that 40 bits is strong security. I agree with that. But we (Soundcode, and anyone else in the business of crypto) have to also look at things from the standpoint of market share and market size. Exportability directly affects market size and weighs in fairly heavily. (Which is why ITAR (oops, Commerce) restrictions bite). Which is why the current offering is 40 bits. As for security, the current release of PnC is primarily targetting privacy, not security. They are two very similar but different approaches. 40 bits is sufficient to encrypt files and keep them away from friends, family and coworkers (unless you work at the NSA). The point of Point 'n Crypt is to attempt to make encryption technology easily useable and widespread. If anything you have is of such a nature that 40 bits isn't enough protection then by all means don't use PnC (at least not this version :). As for your final point, I agree, some people are stupid. But part of the purpose of being a cypherpunk (and SoundCode) is to educate those that can be educated. Sometimes education just has to take pretty small steps... later, walt ---------- From: Matthew Ghio[SMTP:ghio@myriad.alias.net] Sent: Friday, December 13, 1996 4:49 PM To: walt(a)blarg.net Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: !! Point 'n Crypt -- Win95 Privacy for Everyone !! walt(a)blarg.net (Walt Armour) wrote: > Point 'n Crypt uses 40-bit DES-CBC (exportable), salted SHA passphrases, > and conforms to PKCS #5 and PKCS #7. 40bit encryption isn't much security at all. If you've got something important enough to encrypt, then it's important enough to find a proper encryption program. Why would anyone buy this shit? (That's a rhetorical question, of course; the answer is because some people are stupid...)

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[No joke] The Feds may legally gas us
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, Did you know that the Feds may legally test chemical and biological weapons on the civilian population as long as they give 30 days advance notice to the local bigwigs (so they can get themselves and their families out of the danger zone)? This is not a joke. It is in the United States Code. >Return-Path: <ca-firearms-errors(a)lists.best.com> >From: JT McBride <James.McBride(a)GDEsystems.COM> >Subject: Under color of Law >Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1996 05:34:55 -0800 >BestServHost: lists.best.com >Sender: ca-firearms-errors(a)lists.best.com >Errors-To: ca-firearms-errors(a)lists.best.com >To: ca-firearms(a)lists.best.com > > >I just heard about this on Art Bell's program, but this is United States >Code, Title 50, section 1520. Under the NBC program, our government has >the 'legal' right to gas us. This ought to be all the proof we need that >what is "lawful" isn't necessarily. > >If we can be gassed, why can't we be disarmed? > >There are rights that transcend "law". I'd say LIFE is one, and the need >for self-defense against tyranny should be clear. > >>From the Cornell Law Library: > [Credits and Conditions] [Structure] [Your Comments] > > * UNITED STATES CODE > o TITLE 50 - WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE > + CHAPTER 32 - CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >§ 1520. Use of human subjects for testing of chemical or biological agents >by Department of Defense; accounting to Congressional committees with >respect to experiments and studies; notification of local civilian officials > > * (a) Not later than thirty days after final approval within the > Department of Defense of plans for any experiment or study to be > conducted by the Department of Defense, whether directly or under > contract, involving the use of human subjects for the testing of > chemical or biological agents, the Secretary of Defense shall supply > the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of > Representatives with a full accounting of such plans for such > experiment or study, and such experiment or study may then be conducted > only after the expiration of the thirty-day period beginning on the > date such accounting is received by such committees. > * (b) > o (1) The Secretary of Defense may not conduct any test or > experiment involving the use of any chemical or biological agent > on civilian populations unless local civilian officials in the > area in which the test or experiment is to be conducted are > notified in advance of such test or experiment, and such test or > experiment may then be conducted only after the expiration of the > thirty-day period beginning on the date of such notification. > o (2) Paragraph (1) shall apply to tests and experiments conducted > by Department of Defense personnel and tests and experiments > conducted on behalf of the Department of Defense by contractors. > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > [Previous Section] [Next Section] > > [Overview] > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >This HTML is automatically generated. A product of the Legal Information >Institute >shelden > > >Jim >The "Assault Weapons" ban is drive-by legislation. The target: Crime; >the victimized innocent bystander: the lawfully armed Citizen. > ~*~*~ Tyranny Insurance by Colt's Manufacturing Cos. ~*~*~ > > -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/justforfun/prime.htm

5 7

Re: Race and IQ
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"ichudov(a)algebra.com" 14-DEC-1996 02:25:51.19 >From: TCMay: >> (For the curious, I am persuaded that there are minimal differences in >> "intelligence" between the several or many races, but that cultural and >> sociological factors strongly affect upbringing, learning, interest in >> doing well in school, ability on standardized tests, success in business >> matters, and so on.) It would appear that many of these factors that you mention are correlated together, based on that performance on IQ (and even more background-dependent standardized tests such as the SAT) is highly correlated with academic and business success. >A good point. I personally think that whatever we find -- whether there >are genetic differences or not -- is not terribly important since one >can make the most money by judging individual people by their merit. Agreed on both counts. The differences (whatever origin they have) detected by standardized tests between group averages are vastly outweighed by individual differences. >It is an interesting academic question, but for a businessman (absent >anti-discrimination laws) it is not very relevant. Quite. Unfortunately, the anti-discrimination laws make it hard to make use of all available data. I am not contending that businessmen should only use IQ tests... but that in almost all cases they are important as one data point that is not very expensive to gather. (For cases in which the free market is not operative (e.g., governments and monopolies), they have the additional advantage of not seeing the color of the person's skin or other information on which, for instance, an interviewer may be biased. The free market can take care of keeping businesses making rational decisions; non-market organizations are another matter.) -Allen

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new homepage
by Psionic Damage 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out This homepage, it's definitely under construction. www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------- Zer0 Faith Inc. H/P/A/V/C UNDER-WORLD www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 MEMBERZ: GATEMASTER, VIRIZZ, KRASH, EVIL TWIN, KORRUPT, PHONEHAZORD, PSIONIC DAMAGE, ORPHEUS (the pirate), MANTICORE, ERADICATOR, PSYCHODROME, BIONIC SMURF, SONIK, §ILVER KAT, kOBRA, & KRYPTIK! EMAIL:zerofaith@nlights.net (headquarterz) hakker1(a)hotmail.com (Delious's Haus!) hackerz(a)juno.com (The Gatemaster'z palace) zerofaith(a)geocities.com (delivery/help/requests/suggestions)

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RRE: The InterNIC: a case study in bad database management
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've dropped a note to Jonathan Kamens pointing out that InterNIC is a monopoly, and therefore has no real reason to keep up any databases that don't directly generate money. -Allen From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 14-DEC-1996 02:53:56.61 =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1996 16:44:21 -0800 (PST) From: risks(a)csl.sri.com Subject: RISKS DIGEST 18.67 RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Friday 13 December 1996 Volume 18 : Issue 67 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 12 Dec 1996 17:07:04 -0500 From: "Jonathan I. Kamens" <jik(a)cam.ov.com> Subject: The InterNIC: a case study in bad database management (This message was also sent to comp.protocols.dns.ops .) The InterNIC (http://www.internic.net) is responsible for Internet domain name service for all top-level domains, as well as for second-level domains underneath all the old ARPA domains except MIL (EDU, GOV, NET, ORG, COM). Until a few years ago, domain registration services were provided by the InterNIC for free. That changed when they convinced the NSF that its grant money wasn't enough to cover their costs, so (amid much hubbub on the Net) they started charging $50 per year for any second-level domain registration, with the first two years (i.e., $100) payable in advance. According to <http://rs.internic.net/nic-support/nicnews/stats.html>, the InterNIC registered 638,788 new domains between August 1993 and September 1996. If I'm doing my math right, at $100 per domain, that's almost $64 million, or over $20 million per year. I would think that with that much money, they'd be able to provide competent service to their customers. Unfortunately, my experience has been that they're simply not doing an acceptable job. Some examples: ***** * Their automated systems do not function properly. They've introduced a PGP-based system for authentication of domain contacts. In other words, they allow domain contacts to register their PGP public keys in the InterNIC public-key database, and then requests which come from those contacts will only be accepted as authentic if they are signed with the corresponding provide key. Unfortunately, this system does not always work. Recently, I submitted a series of twelve database modification requests to the InterNIC in a single day. All of them were correctly signed with my PGP key. Of the twelve requests, three were returned to me in messages beginning, "We are not able to verify the PGP signed message that you sent us." To make matters worse, for one of those three failed requests, I received a message claiming the the modifications I'd requested had been completed, two days *before* I received the message informing me that they were unable to verify my PGP signature. I have asked the InterNIC multiple times why their system randomly fails to verify valid PGP signatures. They have not responded to my inquiries. Interestingly enough, another poster to comp.protocols.dns.ops claimed that when he asked an InterNIC on the telephone about their PGP authentication system, he was told that it is not currently working. That would seem to indicate that the InterNIC is aware that there are problems with it, and yet they continue to advertise it on their Web site without any indication that it might not work for any given request. * There are some data in the database which are impossible to update using the templates they provide. One of the types of data stored in the InterNIC database is hosts; in particular, hosts which act as domain-name servers for domains registered with the InterNIC have records in the database. Host records include an organization name and address associated with the host. And yet, the template for updating host records (available at <ftp://rs.internic.net/templates/host-template.txt>) does not have fields in it for updating that information! I believe that there are a couple of other record types in the database which have this same problem. This organization/address data has been described to me by an InterNIC employee as an "old hold-over;" it seems that new host records do not have organization and address data, but old ones do. Nevertheless, one would think that when switching to a new format for host records, the InterNIC would have either removed the obsolete data from the old records or established a procedure for updating it. Instead, the only way to update this information electronically is to send a plain-text message to hostmaster(a)internic.net explaining what you're trying to do, and then hope that whoever reads your message will be competent enough to understand what you're asking for and do the update by hand. Which brings me to my next point... * When asked how to do something that is not handled automatically by their templates, their staff give incorrect answers (or simply ignore the query) more often than they give correct answers. Of the twelve requests mentioned above, six of them were handled improperly by the InterNIC staff members who processed them. Iwn several cases, I received a response instructing me to use a particular template to make the changes I had requested, when in fact those changes had nothing whatsoever to do with the template they told me to use. I finally had to escalate my requests by sending "out-of-band" E-mail to an InterNIC employee who has resolved problems of this sort for me in the past, and she was able to "bounce" my requests to a high enough level that they actually got processed. Incidentally, the InterNIC introduced one or more typographical errors into the data I sent them when processing six of my twelve requests (i.e., when they were done processing my requests, six of the twelve records I asked them to modify had one or more typographical errors in them). I suppose that sending incorrect answers is better than how things were a few months ago -- then, if you sent a request that the person who read your message did not know how to answer, he/she simply ignored it and sent no response whatsoever. * There are some data in their database which are impossible to update using their current procedures. Imagine this scenario... Joe Admin at Foo, Inc. is responsible for system administration, including DNS administration. He therefore has a contact record in the InterNIC database indicating that he works for Foo, Inc., and he is listed as a contact for various domain, network, and host records, in the InterNIC database. Now, he leaves the company and takes a new job, with no further contact with Foo, Inc. He doesn't bother to update his contact record in the InterNIC database before he leaves. Foo, Inc. would rather not let records remain in the InterNIC database claiming that Joe works for them when in fact he does not. Therefore, they want to contact the InterNIC and tell them, "Look, the information in Joe Admin's contact record which says that he for us is incorrect. You can confirm this by attempting to send E-mail to the address in the record, or by calling the phone number in the record and asking to speak to him. The person who answers will confirm that he no longer works there. Please either delete the contact record completely or remove the information in it which associates Joe Admin with Foo, Inc." Sounds reasonable, right? Well, unfortunately, the InterNIC has *no procedures whatsoever* for allowing a company to remove contact information which incorrectly lists them. I attempted to do just what I described, i.e., to get the InterNIC to remove the contact record for a former employee of OpenVision who no longer works here, and who I cannot contact to ask him to update his own record (and considering that it's not hurting him in any way, I don't see that he'd have any incentive to update it even if I could ask him to). After several rounds of E-mail with the InterNIC, they called me on the telephone to discuss what I was trying to do. Once on the phone with them, I was "bounced up" through several layers of InterNIC staff, until I was finally able to speak to a woman who was perfectly willing to admit that yes, the scenario I described was a somewhat common one, and yes, it was perfectly reasonable for a company not to want the InterNIC database to associate non-employees with the company, but no, there's no way for anyone but the owner of a contact handle to update it. "Perhaps we need to establish a procedure for that, and I'll be glad to discuss that for you with our customer service manager, but we don't have one right now," she said, and she did not offer to make an exception and handle my particular request manually without the blessing of a "procedure". Presumably, this means that I could edit my own contact handle to indicate that I work for any company that I want, and that company would have no way to get the InterNIC to remove the fraudulent information. Similarly, presumably, that means that (to be a little morbid for a moment), if someone listed in the InterNIC database dies, there's no way for anyone else to get the InterNIC to remove the deceased's record from the database. When I pressed the woman about this, she said to me, "If you're a network administrator at this company, you presumably have control over the mail server" (an assumption which is not always true, and indeed isn't true in this case; although I can ask the people who administer the mail server to make changes and hope that they'll listen, I don't have the ability to make the changes directly). "Well," she continued," if you send us a mail message which claims to be from the former employee, asking for his record to be deleted, we'll process it." "Let me get this straight," I responded. "You're telling me that I should forge E-mail to your system in order to delete this record." She confirmed that interpretation. I said, "Surely you see the absurdity of that." She responded, "Well, obviously, ideally we wouldn't want anyone forging requests to our system, but in this case, that's the only way for you to delete the record." "What if the former employee had associated a PGP key with his contact record before he left the company." "Well, in that case, you'd need his private PGP key in order to delete the record." "But surely you know that's impossible -- the whole point of PGP is that only the owner a private key has access to it. Even if I had access to the file in which it was stored, I wouldn't know the correct password to unlock it." "Well, in that case, there would be no way for you to delete the record." ***** There are a number of countries with strict laws about the collection of private information in computerized databases. Database maintainers are required to seek permission from all individuals who have data about them stored in the database, to guarantee the security of the database, and to establish working procedures for keeping the data in the databases up-to-date. The United States has few such laws (there are laws about specific types of databases, such as credit and medical records, but no laws about databases in general). Until I started dealing with the InterNIC, I didn't see much point to them. Well, I've changed my mind. the InterNIC proves rather clearly that left to their own devices, companies will not maintain databases in a responsible manner. Incidentally, nowhere on the InterNIC's WWW site can I find the address or telephone number of the governmental office which oversees their grant and handles complaints about their services. Several months ago, I sent them E-mail asking for them so that I could file a complaint, to be considered the next time their grant comes up for renewal. Like many of my other messages to them, that request was ignored. Jonathan Kamens | OpenVision Technologies, Inc. | jik(a)cam.ov.com ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 18.67 ************************

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Radikal: raid in the netherlands
by tank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PRESS-DECLARATION 14-12-96 After the German authorities tried to force their censorship on people's thoughts and writings worldwide on the Internet, Germany now tries to prosecute a person who lives in the Netherlands for the making of the left-wing newspaper Radikal. In the morning of the 11th of December there was a houseraid in the village of Vaals (The Netherlands). In the raid ten local police-officers, a high officer from the Maastricht-court, two LKA (Landes Kriminal Ambt) German officers and two BKA (Bundes Kriminal Ambt) German officers took place. The 16 German and Dutch officers forced themselves into the house with the help of a lock specialist. The only person at home during the raid only noticed it after some time when the room next to her was already being searched. The german and dutch police refuged to explain the reason for this raid. German autorities refered to the dutch ones for explanations and the other way around. It was only after insisting that they explained the search warrant came from the german authorities in Karlsruhe. During the two hour raid two personal computers, floppy-discs, foto's, a pamflet and some Radikal stickers were seized. During this whole operation it was not clear against who or what this action was aimed and why this house was searched. It only became clear after the raid when another person came home from his work and phoned his mother in Aachen (Germany). At his mothers house there was also a house raid going on, nothing was taken there. At this house-raid six LKA officers took part and in a paper they declaired to have reasons for this raid because of evidence found in the raid in Vaals. "During the raid at the suspect's house evidence was found (...) that show the suspect (...) is using the house of his mother as well". This evidence consisted of his mother's car papers. The declaration paper alsow showed the purpose of the raid: " The search for Radikal publications, subscribers lists and financial information". The suspect is being charged with the making and distributing of the left wing newspaper Radikal. A newspaper that is forbidden only in Germany . The supposed involvement with a political magazine, forbidden in Germany, apparently is enough for the Dutch authorities to work for the German juridical apparatus. This means that the German idea of law and order concerning magazines leads to the joint persecution of a Spanish citizen living in the Netherlands. Although the magazine is entirely legal in the Netherlands. The dimension of the German-Dutch cooperation within the framework of the new "European Security Policy" is shown here in a very clear way. It shows that an attempt is made to completely redefine the persecution, across all borders, of politically unwanted people. Solidaritygroup Political Prisoners P/o box 3762 1001 AN Amsterdam The Nertherlands <tank(a)xs4all.nl>

1 0

radikal: raid in the netherlands
by tank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PRESS-DECLARATION 14-12-96 After the German authorities tried to force their censorship on people's thoughts and writings worldwide on the Internet, Germany now tries to prosecute a person who lives in the Netherlands for the making of the left-wing newspaper Radikal. In the morning of the 11th of December there was a houseraid in the village of Vaals (The Netherlands). In the raid ten local police-officers, a high officer from the Maastricht-court, two LKA (Landes Kriminal Ambt) German officers and two BKA (Bundes Kriminal Ambt) German officers took place. The 16 German and Dutch officers forced themselves into the house with the help of a lock specialist. The only person at home during the raid only noticed it after some time when the room next to her was already being searched. The german and dutch police refuged to explain the reason for this raid. German autorities refered to the dutch ones for explanations and the other way around. It was only after insisting that they explained the search warrant came from the german authorities in Karlsruhe. During the two hour raid two personal computers, floppy-discs, foto's, a pamflet and some Radikal stickers were seized. During this whole operation it was not clear against who or what this action was aimed and why this house was searched. It only became clear after the raid when another person came home from his work and phoned his mother in Aachen (Germany). At his mothers house there was also a house raid going on, nothing was taken there. At this house-raid six LKA officers took part and in a paper they declaired to have reasons for this raid because of evidence found in the raid in Vaals. "During the raid at the suspect's house evidence was found (...) that show the suspect (...) is using the house of his mother as well". This evidence consisted of his mother's car papers. The declaration paper alsow showed the purpose of the raid: " The search for Radikal publications, subscribers lists and financial information". The suspect is being charged with the making and distributing of the left wing newspaper Radikal. A newspaper that is forbidden only in Germany . The supposed involvement with a political magazine, forbidden in Germany, apparently is enough for the Dutch authorities to work for the German juridical apparatus. This means that the German idea of law and order concerning magazines leads to the joint persecution of a Spanish citizen living in the Netherlands. Although the magazine is entirely legal in the Netherlands. The dimension of the German-Dutch cooperation within the framework of the new "European Security Policy" is shown here in a very clear way. It shows that an attempt is made to completely redefine the persecution, across all borders, of politically unwanted people. Solidaritygroup Political Prisoners P/o box 3762 1001 AN Amsterdam The Nertherlands <tank(a)xs4all.nl>

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Re: Redlining
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 09:32 AM 12/12/96 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: >> >(Those who don't believe me should get "Love Supreme" by John Coltrane >> >and listen to it carefully about 20 times. There are layers and Just for the record, I didn't say this. I believe it was Red. The thread has become so convoluted that I am only sure it wasnt me. ;-) Matt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMrLSibpijqL8wiT1AQHEoQP/f+G82ePBn6dlm7jgiaYZTalSm2xMAYEd S/wExEh86p0knbt4+fMmREQGR7PXyNJPyDknqSEkmyTh38QfwBwsuF20zEiUM4I2 gXR8e2zeuW1kB1L51PacusxSoAqR7FqIb2euwTlZ+K3GnZVpFPZmdZn03GaTGsvC yVfTehKEE2w= =QcKO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Re: Firewalls
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The only `culture' Timothy May possesses is that cultivated from his foreskin scrapings. )_( [@ @] Timothy May |/ \| \O/

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Re: ITARs effects
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack wrote: >Peter D. Junger wrote: >| That has always been the position of the Department of Defense Trade >| Controls with respect to the ITAR, the only difference is that now >| it is going to be in writing. > >My understanding is that they choose not to continue >prosecuting Phil for putting the code up for FTP. Thus, this is >a change. Or did Phil not put the code up for FTP? --------- What was never certain in Phil's case, I believe, is how the code got out of the US. Whether it was deliberately sent outside the US by someone, or just made available on a US site which was accessible from outside the US. The TIA lawyer who wrote me about TR453 indicated that there has been legal dispute about whether mere placement of ITAR-regulated code on a US site, accessible from outside the US, means that the code has been exported by the person placing it there (as I did with the CAVE code on an AOL server in Virginia), or whether the export is done by an accessor who is usually not be subject to US law. The new regs intend to close that loophole, as Peter Junger states, and as the TIA lawyer also indicated, that is, to codify the illegality of putting such code on a site accessible from "outside" the US, or by a "non-US person" inside the US. Heretofore, regulation has been by jaw-boning (as the TIA lawyer jaw-boned me about copyright villation of the uncopyrighted TR453). This is the point about two definitions of geography in conflict -- physical and electronic -- and how state-oriented law is attempting to assert control of the cyber-dissolving national borders. Similar to the struggle over electronic dissolution of intellectual property. As a speaker noted in a recent Congressional crypto hearing: government- aggressive law of cyberspace aims to define a nation's borders well beyond physical territory. As similarly argued against allowing "non-US persons" to study regulated crypto in Professor Junger's class. As others have noted here, other loopholes of by electronic reality are being closed by the new regs, even if First Amendment transgression follows. But I'm not sure that the lawyers are not condemned to trail the leading edge of technology, as ever -- in crypto-munitions as in First Amendment and intellectual property betrayals, misrepresentations and rear guard actions. Reading the new crypto export regs and comparing them to earlier incarnations is instructive. Observe those insertions of bits and bytes of contortinate intellectual labor -- never quite able to get the legilation to fit all the looming permutations of technology -- unable, that is, to stitch the wounds of the stumbling, flailing superpower, unsure where the foe is located who is mortally undermining faith in the physical prowess of the keepers of the privileges. Those vaunted inside secrets of nuclear-munitioned cops don't sell so well these days when the donut-dippers cannot be sure how to distinguish insiders from outsiders, and whose really in control of the armaments keys of keys. Whole lot of shifting of alliances going on, from State to Commerce, or so I read in the quagmire regs.

1 0

NYC Area Cypherpunks meeting
by Marc J. Wohler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The NewYork City area Cypherpunks will meet on the UpperWest Side of Manhattan. Date: Thursday 12/19/96 Time: 7:30 PM Place: The Club. Park Royal Hotel, 23 West 73rd Street. Between Columbus & Amsterdam Avenue. Subway stops: 72nd & Broadway #1 #9 #2 #3 (express stop) 72nd & Central Park West A or D trains Refreshments: BYOB & snacks. We can order out for dinner. All our welcome but please email me your intention to attend (if you have not already done so.) Marc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMqsDk2eikzgqLB7pAQHxFgP9FbdXYo4qiubH9zBFW+CdQb5LZVxKAhWB EwfV+2EquVT94dokYMN9P0n26ZIozJejpXf44QLLgNPvWHqHB8Wult/U7zyVeVid 1YVRftVFnxPlBjkabH5yGR8efP7L2i5Ynh5X8I0jFy9G8Wfilxsg8QT8r+eYtDWB g/b4Wpr0/0w= =CIyV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Re: ITARs effects (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Forwarded message: > Date: Sat, 14 Dec 1996 18:02:49 -0800 > From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: ITARs effects > > I certainly can't speak for Phil, but according to everything I have heard, > and according to several articles that have been written about the events > surrounding the release of PGP 1.0, Phil most definitely DID NOT place the > PGP 1.0 software on any kind of ftp site. > > (I believe that at that time, circa 1991, Phil did not even have any kind > of ISP or university Internet access which would have even made this > possible for him. In fact, I believe it was not until around 1993 that he > had a stable e-mail account.) I believe the first site to carry PGP 1.0 was Adelante BBS in Colorado where Phil was living at the time. I was a user of that site when 1.0 was put online and made publicaly available. I still have the Amiga disk those files were d/l'ed on. Somebody should ask Phil if he put v1.0 on any sites prior to Adelante. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com Best wishes and happy holidays to you all.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

1 0

Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

2 1