December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Key-Escrow
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a question. There seems to be a lot of excitement over the key escrow stuff da gubermint is trying to install. Couldn't one burn off maybe 10 ** 200 keys and say, hey gubermint dude, these are like, gonna be my keys. Wouldn't this place them into a brute force search if they wanted to play with your info? Doing this will likely add to the tax burden for all dem disk drives needed to store them numbers. :( If ya can't do that, then they must be gonna sell key space like da radio spectrm - which means some number is gonna mean something to someone somewhere - yum yum say the hackers and the crackers. I'm thinking there will be a way no matter what happens....

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Re: The Petaflops Boondoggle Computer (was PET_ard)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:00 AM 9/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >(Hoist by their own petards indeed! Don't tell our Russian what petard means.) Uh, wasn't that the name of the bald captain on Star Trek Next Generation? You know, "Jean-Luc Petard"? >> The word is petaflops, computer jargon for 1000 >> trillion computations per second. Think of it as a >> year's labor for a powerful workstation compressed >> into 30 seconds. Think of it, also, as 1000 times the >> speed of the current computing benchmark, a trillion >> operations a second -- teraflops -- which is on the >... > >I doubt this will be ever be built, at least not as a government-funded >"G-job" "one-off" machine. It would, as the full article state, necessitate >a kind of "Apollo program" for supercomputers. Check out an article in about the September issue of Scientific American, 1966, on the subject of the Illiac IV, which was one of the first attempts at a multiprocessor machine. Originally it was conceived as a 256-processor unit, at 4 million (floating point?) operations per second per processor which would have been 1 giga ops per second, but it was eventually built as a 64-processor unit and turned on in about 1972 or so. The succeeding factor-of-1000 improvement appears (if the item above is accurate) to have taken 24 years to accomplish, so it's hard to imagine that the next factor of 1000 will arrive appreciably sooner than year 2020. >The reasons for the collapse of the market are well-known: the end of >communism has lessened certain needs, the cut-backs in defense spending, >"the attack of the killer micros" (arrays of cheap micros give better >bang-for-the-buck), and, related to the themes of this list, NSA's >code-breaking just ain't what it used to be. Oddly enough, however, we're getting somewhat of an echo of the "big single processor" phenomenon with the micros. We all know that in supercomputers, multiprocessors won out over single processors, and mainframes were just about defeated by microcomputers. Yet a look at Intel's pricing for Pentiums shows that they sell a 120-MHz chip for about $135, while they sell a 200-megahertz version for around $550 or so. Arithmetic suggests that a person would be far better off with a 4-120-MHz-processor Pentium (cumulative clock rate 480 MHz) than a single, 200-megahertz version. (admittedly, peripheral logic costs will adjust this a little.) Of course, this would also leave Intel flat on its ass attempting to compete with AMD, Cyrix, etc, because a somewhat higher speed per cpu is just about the only advantage they have. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: [AP] Afghanistan
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:10 AM 9/29/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >Afghanis publicly hanged their former president, Najibullah [no last name]. >Other countries should follow their example. > >--- > >Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM >Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps > > And this would accomplish???? And this has what to do with cryptography?? Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess that depends on your definition of liberty. The Mormons originally moved there to have a place to practice their religion, and have freedom from persecution. I suppose one could extend that to wanting a place to have the freedom to have a set of rules consistant with their beliefs. Should that include freedom from interferance from folks such as yourself who want to change their rules, even though you're not presently effected? Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: cypherpunks cc: From: tcmay @ got.net ("Timothy C. May") @ smtp Date: 09/28/96 10:35:42 PM Subject: Utah as a Religious Police State Hey, Attila, let me know where you folks live...I may want to move there! At 2:56 AM +0000 9/29/96, attila wrote: > the population base is changing with an influx of non-Mormons > in town, so R rated are showing up at the theatres and video > rentals in town. Just so long as my DSS dish still works in Utah--hey, I'll invite all the jack Mormons over for tomorrow night's showing of "Inside Janine," on the "Playboy Channel." (The "Playboy Channel" is kind of tame by video rental standards, but more crotch shots than we used to see a couple of years ago.) > the police visible prescence is effective --a force of 50+ for > a population base < 25,000, plus the county sherrif cars and the > state police. Curfew is 10pm weekdays for minors --and they > enforce it, big time. midnight Fri/Sat. They enforce the "curfew" big time? Looks like some Mormon pigs need to be zapped. (My kids don't cotton to no cop telling them when they can be out in public and when they can't. Any cop who tries to stop my kids from being out has earned severe retaliation. Any councilmember or state legislator who voted for such a curfew needs to be hog-tied, covered with tar, then torched.) I guess this is why I wouldn't last very long in Mormon Country. A fascist encampment, it sounds like. (I have no problem with Mormons, or Catholics, or Muslims, or Satanists keeping _their own_ children indoors after 7, or 5, or whatever their Holy Hour or Curfew Hour is, but no fucking religious nuts are going to tell _me_ when _my_ children must be indoors. I determine where my children may be, and I don't need the State's permission for them to be out. I would think anyone with an iota of libertarian sentiment would understand this.) > ...idle hands are the devil's workshop. you want good solid > kids, you start from the gate and keep 'em busy: home, neighbors, > school, church, etc. Do Utah's cops also enforce this law, too? > they do not date until they are 16 --in groups. boys and > girls --the same rules. With the Utah State Police enforcing this "dating curfew"? (I may sound harsh here, but "curfew" means one and only one thing to me: somebody restricting my freedom of those of my children to be a public place. Should one of my children be picked up by cops for doing nothing illegal, save for being "out past curfew," I'd consider violent response to be justified. It sounds to me--not that I ever thought otherwise--that Utah is not a land that favors liberty.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Internet 'terrorism' newsclips [CYPHER, but news]
by Donald Weightman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From today's PARADE magazine, that valuable source for insight into the popular heart and mind, "explaining" why "we" haven't been able to catch Iranian terrorists: >Thanks to the highly sophisticated surveillance capabilities, American >intelligence agencies have intercepted enough telephone messages from Iran, >ordering acts of terrorism, that Iran's terrorist network stopped using the >phone. Reportedly this has caused them to start using codes on the Internet >that are "practically" impossible to track and isolate. >"Just when we thought we had outsmarted them, they caught on and started >using codes on the Internet", an expert in international terrorrism tells >us. "There's so much crazy srewball stuff on the Internet that it's >practically impossible to track down and isolate the terrorists. No >government can analyze those millions and millions of messages." And from another piece of hard-hitting quote-the-official-source journalism in PARADE, "A New Worry: Terrorism in Cyberspace" >The danger of computer-based "cyper" attacks is second only to that posed by >nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, says CIA's Director, John >Deutch. He expects the threat to grow as we rush to connect the world on the >Internet. <SNIP> >There were more than 250,000 attacks on Department of Defense computers last >year, and 65% were successful. Little is known about who launched them, why, or >what they found. In a recent test, Defense Department "red teams" admit to >intentionally hacking into 18,200 systems, with only 5% of the attacks >detected; only 27% of those attacks were reported. Wonder if the timing of these stories has anything to do with the end of term legislative push on wiretapping. Don Weightman dweightman(a)radix.net

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I received this message, with "cypherpunks(a)sybase.com" as well as "tcmay(a)sybase.com" (???) cc:ed, so I assume this message was intended for the Cypherpunks list, with some sybase domain name weirdness, or reflector, going on.) At 12:30 PM -0400 9/29/96, Ryan Russell/SYBASE wrote: >I guess that depends on your definition of liberty. The Mormons >originally moved there to have a place to practice their religion, >and have freedom from persecution. I suppose one could extend that >to wanting a place to have the freedom to have a set of rules consistant >with their beliefs. Should that include freedom from interferance from >folks such as yourself who want to change their rules, even though >you're not presently effected? Well, if Utah can rig a way to _secede_ from the Union, your arguments would make more sense. But so long as they are part of these United States, their religious beliefs about when children should be at home cannot supersede basic liberties. (There are some thorny issues about whether _minors_ have full civil rights. But I certainly know that _my_ civil rights are being affected when my children are not allowed on the streets after some hour. If my child is out, this is my problem. I neither want cops to stop-and-detain my children, nor do I want my tax monies to be used to control the behavior of other people's children. Providing no crimes are being committed, curfews for the sake of controlling the behavior of children are no more just than would be a bunch of related behavior control laws, e.g., a ban on comic books, a mandate that all children join after-school youth leagues, etc.) As for "changing their rules," you're missing the point. There are presumably many in Utah who believe as I do (maybe even some Mormons). Those who are living in Utah, as renters, owners, whatever, should not be bound by unconstitutional rules, no matter how many Mormon Elders favor them. Unless the Mormons own _all_ of the property (and maybe not even then, as renters have civil rights), they cannot impose their own notions of morality on the rest of the population, except in compelling cases (e.g., involving the well-known actual _crimes_). I don't mean to pick on Mormons, as other communities have also attempted to impose curfews and other restricitions on the children of others. My ire was raised by Attila's enthusiastic support for laws which no freedom-loving person should be enthusiastic about. Again, I have no problem with Attila restricting his own children's movements, or joining with other parents to control the behavior of their _own_ children, via religious camps, religious schools, youth leagues, etc. He can even make his own kids wear funny uniforms, funny religious hats, whatever. But, for example, tellling _me_ when _my_ children may be out on public streets (doing nothing illegal, neither robbing nor spray-painting nor committing any other real crimes) is unacceptable. I urge Attila (and others) to rethink enthusiastic support for curfews. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Internet 'terrorism' newsclips [CYPHER, but news]
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>There were more than 250,000 attacks on Department of Defense computers last >>year, and 65% were successful. Little is known about who launched them, >why, or >>what they found. In a recent test, Defense Department "red teams" admit to >>intentionally hacking into 18,200 systems, with only 5% of the attacks >>detected; only 27% of those attacks were reported. > >Wonder if the timing of these stories has anything to do with the end of >term legislative push on wiretapping. Quite possibly. The message from this article is clear. Step up investigation and prosecution of illegal government Net activities :-) -- Steve

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Chinese Censorship
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> _________________________________________________________________ > Cisco-Job Fair > _________________________________________________________________ > CHINA RELAXES CONTROLS ON INTERNET ACCOUNTS > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 Reuter Information Service > SHANGHAI (Sep 25, 1996 08:48 a.m. EDT) - China has removed limits on > the country's number of Internet accounts following the recent > installation of safety controls on the computer network, a senior > Shanghai telecommunications official said on Wednesday. Safety controls... nice euphemism, similar to "key recovery". > "Some time ago, our security arrangements were incomplete and there > was a problem with pornographic and politically unacceptable > material," said Zhang Weihua, vice-president of the Shanghai Post and > Telecommunications Administration. [...] > Zhang said access to sites on the Internet containing pornographic or > politically unacceptable material had been restricted, adding, "This > material is restricted all over the world." > He declined to give details of the security controls placed on the > servers, saying he was only responsible for the technical side of the > service. > But Zhang did say he was unaware of any restrictions on access to > major international news sites through China's Internet servers. > Foreign reports have suggested that China has cut off access to such > news sites. Analysts say that China is concerned over development of > public computer networks and their use by people opposed to communist > rule or communist policies. [...] > Zhang said for "security" reasons there was a need to control > information and discussion on the Internet and related bulletin board > services. > "But surveys done on the usage and interests of people in China with > Internet access indicate that virtually all the material they wanted > to look at is domestic," he said. Due to language differences, I would guess. > China's key Internet Service Provider (ISP) selling access accounts is > Chinanet, controlled by the Post and Telecommunications Bureau. > Zhang said the bureau took measures earlier this year to control > unauthorised activities of other access providers, including > Shanghai's Fudan University, in order to handle the security issue. > China currently has access points to the Internet in Beijing and > Shanghai. It has no plans to add more, Zhang said. > He said his department was being assisted in building its computer > network by several American-Chinese originally from mainland China who > spent time working with the U.S. space agency NASA. I see.... (grimace) > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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Does any body know anything about this?
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is this just more snakeoil or is this real? <<<<<<<< FORWARDED MESSAGE >>>>>>>> From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 09:05:28 +0100 Subject: Seminar in Cryptology and Computer Security *** *** *** *** *** University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory EXTRA SEMINAR SPEAKER: Matt Blaze AT&T Research DATE: Monday 23rd September 1996 at 11.30 am PLACE: Room TP4, Computer Laboratory TITLE: SYMMETRIC-KEY CIPHERS BASED ON HARD PROBLEMS A useful principle in cipher design is to reduce or at least relate closely the cryptanalysis of the cipher to some long-studied problem that is believed to be difficult. Most public-key ciphers follow this principle fairly closely (e.g., RSA is at least similar to factoring). Modern symmetric-key ciphers, on the other hand, can rarely be reduced in this way and so are frequently designed specifically to resist the various known cryptanalytic attacks. In this informal talk, we examine a simple cipher primitive, based on Feistel networks, for which recovery of its internal state given its inputs and outputs is NP-complete. We outline simple and efficient block- and stream- cipher constructions based on this primitive. * * * The regular Michaelmas term seminar series will resume on the 8th October with a series of talks on Tuesday afternoons at 4.15 PM in room TP4, Computer Laboratory, Pembroke Street, Cambridge. A list of speakers will be circulated shortly. * * *

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earthlink's image
by Allen Robinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 28 Sep 96 at 16:09, Back Draft wrote: > Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 16:09:20 -0800 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: backdraft(a)earthlink.net (Back Draft) > desubscribe > <sigh> Please do not assume that all earthlink users are alike. I've just mailed instructions on how to unsubscribe to "Back Draft." AR #%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#% "In the end, more than they wanted freedom, they wanted security. When the Athenians finally wanted not to give to society but for society to give to them, when the freedom they wished for was freedom from responsibility, then Athens ceased to be free." - Edward Gibbon ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Allen Robinson.........................sebago(a)earthlink.net PGP public key FE4A0A75 fingerprint 170FBC1F7609B76F 967F1CC8FCA7A41F

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newsgoup gateways
by Lurker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was wondering if anyone could point me to some servers that will allow me to post to newsgoupes. I have seen some aroud that use the format: newsgroup@domain and forward the mail to the chosen newsgroup. Thanks

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British Censorship
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The actions they claim they will do will, of course, lead to no results whatsoever in many cases... as it should be. The hotline in question sounds like a number as opposed to an email address... pity, we could just bounce all spam to it and ask them to deal with it. > _________________________________________________________________ > Cisco-Job Fair > _________________________________________________________________ > BRITISH GOVERNMENT SETS UP NET PORN FILTER > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 Reuter Information Service > LONDON (Sep 23, 1996 3:48 p.m. EDT) - The British government Monday > set up a watchdog to try to get pornography off the Internet. > Safety-Net, which is being financed by the industry, will have a > hotline to which callers can report suspected illegal material and > will contact police if necessary. Being financed by the industry = if you're going through a British ISP, you're paying for it whether you like it or not. > It will publish a "legality indicator" or rating for each public > access area on the Internet known as a Usenet news group. The rating > will indicate whether the group normally contains illegal or > pornographic material and what kind. > Internet users can contact the hotline to complain about material > received from anyone via an automatic telephone, mail, e-mail or > facsimile. > Safety-Net operators will try to see where the material came from, > contact the authors and ask them to remove it. They can ask the > relevant service provider to take action and pass details to the > British Police National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). > "We at the Home Office (interior ministry) made it clear to the > Internet providers some time ago that action was needed to deal with > obscene material on the Internet," Home Office Minister Tom Sackville > said. [...] > Science and technology minister Ian Taylor said Safety-Net would act > as a warning system to alert the public. > "As this is an international network, we have to do something to try > to eliminate illegal use of it -- the abuse of the Internet by a few > perverts," he told BBC radio. As this is an international network, this is completely impossible. > "Government and the Internet industry have been working hard to come > up with proposals that can offer real protection to net users while > preserving free speech and recgonizing the value of the net for work, > education and leisure," Taylor added in a statement. Usual government doubletalk.... preserving free speech means no such actions. [...] > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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Cancelbots in the news
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> _________________________________________________________________ > Centura > _________________________________________________________________ > HATE HACKERS: KILLING DIALOGUE ON THE INTERNET > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 San Francisco Examiner Note the usual misuse of the term "hacker." > (Sep 28, 1996 02:18 a.m. EDT) -- One or more hackers using racist and > other hate terms have erased tens of thousands of messages used by a > wide variety of political discussion groups on the Internet, exposing > new concerns about the security of the worldwide computer system. > At least one Internet customer -- in Oklahoma -- has been blamed for > some of the more than 30,000 killed messages and has been cut off by > his service provider. > "Obviously, the individual responsible is no longer around here," said > William Brunton, president of Internet Connection of Tulsa, one of > several service providers of Usenet news groups that were victimized > during the weekend. "You can be assured it's not going to happen again > from here." The author really doesn't understand USENET, does he (or she)? Evidently, one of the persons posting the cancels was doing so out of this company. > He said he had turned information over to federal authorities and > could not comment further. > In Washington, D.C., an FBI spokesman declined to confirm whether the > matter was being investigated although it was unclear what, if any, > laws may have been violated. > The messages were deleted from system discussion sites used by gays, > Jewish groups, Muslims, feminists and other politically oriented > groups. > The perpetrator or perpetrators used so-called "cancelbot" software > programs labeled with such phrases as "fagcancel" and "kikecancel." > Besides Brunton's small Oklahoma firm, Internet service providers > whose discussion groups were victimized included industry giants > Netcom Inc. of San Jose, and UU Net Technologies of Falls Church, Va. > Officials of those firms were not available for comment. And operating out of these? Or is it simply that the groups in question are carried by these firms? > While some believed such attacks pose a serious threat to the sanctity > of the Internet -- which is virtually unregulated save for a generally > adhered-to protocol known as "netiquette" -- others were less alarmed. Usual mixup between USENET and the Internet, of course. > "There actually are no laws against that sort of thing," said Jonah > Seiger, policy analyst for the Center for Democracy and Technology in > Washington, D.C. "Obviously, it's sort of annoying." > He said a cancelbot, or a forged cancel message, is "a malicious > vehicle and not good netiquette." [...] > Two years ago, when some immigration lawyers "spammed the net" -- > electronically plastering news groups throughout the Internet with a > single message, an advertisement telling how to get a green card -- > "it was the first time someone figured out you could cancel those > messages," Seiger said. > Since then, phony cancelbots have appeared with some frequency. In one > of the better-known cases, the Church of Scientology used cancelbots > to erase messages from news groups used by some of its members with > whom the church was engaged in a legal battle. > The security of the Internet has also been brought into question > recently after hackers altered home pages operated by the CIA and the > Justice Department. [...] > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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[SPAM] More fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What has Timmy been smoking? ]From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Sun Sep 29 19:03:40 1996 ]Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) ] via UUCP; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:14:06 EDT ] for dlv ]Received: from disperse.demon.co.uk by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; ] id AA25790 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:03:40 -0400 ]Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-2.mail.demon.net id ac16129; ] 29 Sep 96 15:59 BST ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net ] id aa09441; 29 Sep 96 15:54 BST ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP ] id AA843903697 ; Sat, 28 Sep 96 09:41:37 +0000 ]Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> ]From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk ]To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> ]Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 09:21:37 +0000 ]Mime-Version: 1.0 ]Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII ]Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT ]Subject: Re: Possible subs attack???? ]Priority: normal ]X-Pm-Encryptor: JN-PGP-P, 4 ]X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) ]Message-Id: <844008901.9441.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> ] ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ] ] ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> writes: ] ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May lies again, as usual. ] ]Fuck you, ] ]I am not Tim May, Check out the return path if you don`t believe me, ]if you still don`t here`s my PGP public key signed by the EFF, they ]don`t sign keys here and there without checking ID`s... ] ]Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID ]pub 1024/5BBFAEB1 1996/07/30 Paul Bradley <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> ] ]- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ]Version: 2.6.3ia ] ]mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 ]6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 ]sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR ]tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy ]NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP ]Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b ]j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k ]C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ ]9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 ]En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 ]YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp ]put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW ]LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi ]mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= ]=CMZA ]- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ] ] ] ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- ]Version: 2.6.3ia ]Charset: cp850 ] ]iQCVAwUBMkzuH75OPIRbv66xAQHSmQQAqw0F/lIsCcQwOpiSQDx4hMqOVVUVXbyR ]3RMWY20ECE0TpAtJ6hkAiqphsWUSBqiFj2kGHMh+jHSHXIMPF+m1qtwVbgutJC7B ]8VYWj0VP+bGu5dEUisLrVHDNj5ucEIDyK2GnqObiCiKARFUbOuZnMQOp9TDJqibh ]2Wqa5+h8R7g= ]=/M2U ]-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ] ] Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security ] Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk ] Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org ] Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ ] Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 ] "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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European Censorship Proposals
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> _________________________________________________________________ > Centura > _________________________________________________________________ > EURO-COMMISSION TO TACKLE PORN ON INTERNET > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 Reuter Information Service > BRUSSELS (Sep 24, 1996 08:06 a.m. EDT) - The European Commission, > faced with calls to clamp down on use of the Internet to transmit > pornography following a Belgian paedophilia scandal, will take a first > step in October towards seeing how it can be done. > But Culture Commissioner Marcelino Oreja, who intends to unveil a > discussion paper on new media services on October 9, says that the > process will be a lengthy one in consultation with all concerned and > that at the end of the day a world solution could be needed. [...] > "We have to find mechanisms to see first how we can find the author > who includes this pornography in the Internet and second how we can > encrypt the content of these messages," he said. > The call for a European-wide solution to pornography and paedophilia > on the Internet is expected to be a central theme for EU justice > ministers in Dublin on Thursday and Friday when they discuss ways of > fighting the child sex trade. > EU culture ministers could also discuss it at their own meeting in the > Irish town of Galway on Wednesday. > The discovery of four murdered girls in Belgium and a child murder, > prostitution and pornography ring has focused the world's attention on > the child sex trade and fuelled calls for a clamp down on the > Internet, which at the moment is little policed and where anonymity is > assured. > Oreja said among the options raised in the discussion paper were the > possibility of encrypting access so that only those who pay could see > the material, or including a special computer chip -- commonly known > as a V-chip -- to screen against pornographic content. The obvious solution to this is someone in an unregulated country getting a couple chips or programs for the de-encryption, then making the images/text/whatever freely available. The major hurdles for this are A. digital watermarking to see which chip(s) are used then block their ability to be used (a reason to get more than one chip/program so as to compare to filter out the watermarking - some techniques for watermarking will survive this, but most won't) and B. copyright laws in the countries which do not enforce such provisions. [...] > Oreja, aware that Internet servers can simply move to a neighbouring > country to get round any restrictions agreed at European level, said > problems with satellite television had shown that national and > European regulations were not enough. > "We know that national regulation is not enough, that European > regulation is not enough...We may need to have a world regulation of > these matters, but let's go step by step. We do not have a European > regulation," he said. If they seriously think this will happen, they need to take another look at the international situation. > The idea of a professional code of ethics in which the media would > regulate themselves is acknowledgment that European regulation of the > Internet could face opposition on freedom of information grounds. > "I think everything can not be said. I think that violence can have > its limits, I think that pornography can have its limits. I am in > favour of that, but it can be that the sector itself prepares a code > of ethics," he said. That's funny, if I were in favor of any censorship it would be of government propaganda such as this.... they seem to be calling for violence on a rather frequent basis. > He said such a code could help get round wide differences between EU > member countries, who have widely differing laws on what can be > considered pornography and eroticism. > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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Re: The Petaflops Boondoggle Computer (was PET_ard)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:16 PM 9/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 11:50 AM -0800 9/29/96, jim bell wrote: >>At 10:00 AM 9/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >>>(Hoist by their own petards indeed! Don't tell our Russian what petard >>>means.) >> >>Uh, wasn't that the name of the bald captain on Star Trek Next Generation? >>You know, "Jean-Luc Petard"? > >Picard. I forgot the smiley B^) >> The succeeding >>factor-of-1000 improvement appears (if the item above is accurate) to have >>taken 24 years to accomplish, so it's hard to imagine that the next factor >>of 1000 will arrive appreciably sooner than year 2020. > >I agree. (Actually, it was a factor of 4000 since it was only 64 processors, but who's counting?) Anyway, this reminds me: What was Moore's law? Performance doubling every 18 months as I recall? How does this stack up? Well, 24 years is 16 times 18 months, so the increase in performance should have been 2**16, or 64K. Off by a factor of 16, which is fairly close, as exponential expansions go. If I were inclined to make the numbers fit the theory, I would argue that the design for the Illiac IV was probably based on SSI IC technology that was defined in 1966 or so, which would provide the extra 6 years (four doubling periods) which account for the "error." One of the advantages of modern CAD technology is that chips can go from foundry to a working computer far faster. A few months ago, there was an item about how IBM had demonstrated its ability to produce 0.08 um silicon chips, with a gate delay (don't recall how loaded this was...) of about 24 picoseconds. Such a process could probably be used to produce a single chip that can do about 1 giga operations per second, assuming it was pipelined adequately. But even that's "only" a teraflop with 1000 such chips...It makes me wonder what kind of a rabbit they're gonna pull out of the hat to produce a petaflop. >By the way, I knew some of the folks who worked on parts of the >Illiac-IV, which was still limping along as late as the late 70s (maybe >later). I think it was turned off in about 1982 or 1983. I did a web-search on its history a few months ago. >>Yet a look at Intel's pricing for Pentiums shows that they sell a 120-MHz >>chip for about $135, while they sell a 200-megahertz version for around $550 >>or so. Arithmetic suggests that a person would be far better off with a >>4-120-MHz-processor Pentium (cumulative clock rate 480 MHz) than a single, >>200-megahertz version. (admittedly, peripheral logic costs will adjust this >>a little.) Of course, this would also leave Intel flat on its ass >>attempting to compete with AMD, Cyrix, etc, because a somewhat higher speed >>per cpu is just about the only advantage they have. > >Intel is having no problem at all competing with AMD and Cyrix! Both of >them are struggling---AMD just announced a layoff, and Cyrix is facing >financial troubles. Neither are able to make competitive parts, for reasons >I won't go into here, and neither are making the money they'll need to >compete in the future with Intel. (Intel has half a dozen billion-dollar >wafer fabs, running with extraordinarily high yields--so my sources tell me >:-})--and the more money they make, the more factories they build, the more >they learn about how to make 0.35 and 0.25 micron chips, etc.) True, but the world would be FAR better off if the architecture for the commonly-used PC could be extended to allow multiple processors. Yes, I'm aware of the inefficiency issues associated with multiple processors, but I think the dramatic cost reductions associated with the use of larger numbers of cheaper CPU's would much more than compensate for them. As I see it, there are inefficiencies associated with both making a single CPU do multiple tasks, as well as making multiple CPU's do a single task. The former is one of the reasons that PC's have pretty much mopped the floor with mainframes, because the PC's were not "unfairly" hobbled with having to implement complicated time-sharing software. The latter is the classic problem which kept prople from going to massively parallel machines from scalars. However, I don't think that most of the problems a typical PC accomplishes are those "hard to divide" problems that resist parallel implementation. Rather, a multiprocessor PC would assign larger tasks (programs) to individual CPU's and not try to break up a program. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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More on European Censorship
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> _________________________________________________________________ > webslingerZ > _________________________________________________________________ > EU TO ACT AGAINST INTERNET CHILD EXPLOITATION > __________________________________________________________________________ > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 Reuter Information Service > BRUSSELS (Sep 29, 1996 00:12 a.m. EDT) - European Union > telecommunications ministers, reacting to a child-sex scandal in > Belgium, pledged Friday to consider ways to keep illegal material that > could harm children off the Internet. > Belgian Telecommunications Minister Elio Di Rupo announced that his > government planned to implement new measures requiring Internet access > providers to monitor and report material featuring sexual abuse or > exploitation of children. > He asked his colleagues to join forces with him. > "Today a big legal vacuum exists, for legislation is falling behind > technological evolution," he said, according to a speaking note that > was distributed to reporters. > "There is a big risk that it will create an enormous market of > children fed on by criminals." Market? Wider distribution of such pictures will lead to _decreased_ production, for the simple reason that the producers won't be able to go to courts for stopping copyright violations, so they can't make any money. > The ministers agreed to expand a working party that has already been > set up to look at the question of illegal material on the Internet and > asked it to come up with concrete proposals before they meet again in > November. > The group will include representatives of the 15 EU telecoms > ministries and of companies that provide access to online services or > prepare the content, a statement adopted by the ministers said. [...] > But some of the telecoms ministers, including those from Britain and > Sweden, warned that the EU could not wander into censorship and had to > focus on fighting truly illegal material. > British Science and Technology Minister Ian Taylor advocated a > self-regulatory system that was announced in his country earlier this > week. > Two British trade associations announced that an independent body, the > Safety Net Foundation, would be established to rate material carried > on the Internet and to set up a "hotline" service to receive > complaints about illegal material. > They said Internet service providers would also adopt policies for > removing illegal material and reducing the scope for subscribers to > act with untraceable anonymity. I suspect that any anonymous remailers operating in Britain may want to look out for ISP interruptions... > Swedish Communications Minister Ines Uusmann told reporters that EU > countries needed to exchange ideas and to speak with one voice in > tackling a global problem. [...] > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmm...never heard that one before. Care to produce a reference? (Or am I supposed to be ignoring this guy when he makes ridiculous claims?) Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: cypherpunks cc: From: dlv @ bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) @ smtp Date: 09/29/96 05:54:09 PM Subject: Re: Utah as a Religious Police State Ryan Russell/SYBASE writes: > I guess that depends on your definition of liberty. The Mormons > originally moved there to have a place to practice their religion, > and have freedom from persecution. I suppose one could extend that > to wanting a place to have the freedom to have a set of rules consistant > with their beliefs. Should that include freedom from interferance from > folks such as yourself who want to change their rules, even though > you're not presently effected? It's worth noting that one of Utah mormons favorite pastimes was to ambush the settlers heading for California, kill them all, and take their property. However the mormons were dealt with much less severely than the local Indians who tried the same tricks. Pity. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, my mail gateway sometimes does rude things to the mail headers...Just ignore it :) Anyway, you mave have a clear cut line between who gets to control kids, but I think it may not be so clear as you make it out to be. Why should you be able to say what times you kids have to come in? Why should you be able to limit their civil liberties? Because you are the parent? Why should that be any better reason than because they're the government? Is it your God-given right as a parent? (Don't answer that, I don't even want to start on religion with this crowd..) Conversly, if you think a parent has the right, why shouldn't a group of parents (who agree) be able to set some rules? Why not a town? These were originally nearly all-Mormon areas...Why shouldn't they be allowed their rules just because a non-Mormon chooses to move in? One might argue "if you don't like the rules, don't live there." I suppose you aren't familiar with the rules for participating in church activities, or attending BYU. The rules are generally very simple, live by the Mormon standards, or don't participate. So, that means that students at BYU can't smoke, drink, etc... So is the line between "public" and "private"? i.e. if BYU were an even partially publically funded school, they shouldn't be allowed to have any but the lowest-common-denominator rules? That sounds overly arbitrary to me, and doesn't appeal to the spark on libertarian I have :) Seriously, since laws are all based on a publically held set of morals, why shouldn't some places be able to have a higher set of standards than others. I think that's part of the arguement for state's rights. After all, we allow a lower than normal set of standards (Nevada.) Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: cypherpunks cc: cypherpunks From: tcmay @ got.net ("Timothy C. May") @ smtp Date: 09/29/96 01:17:46 PM Subject: Re: Utah as a Religious Police State (I received this message, with "cypherpunks(a)sybase.com" as well as "tcmay(a)sybase.com" (???) cc:ed, so I assume this message was intended for the Cypherpunks list, with some sybase domain name weirdness, or reflector, going on.) At 12:30 PM -0400 9/29/96, Ryan Russell/SYBASE wrote: >I guess that depends on your definition of liberty. The Mormons >originally moved there to have a place to practice their religion, >and have freedom from persecution. I suppose one could extend that >to wanting a place to have the freedom to have a set of rules consistant >with their beliefs. Should that include freedom from interferance from >folks such as yourself who want to change their rules, even though >you're not presently effected? Well, if Utah can rig a way to _secede_ from the Union, your arguments would make more sense. But so long as they are part of these United States, their religious beliefs about when children should be at home cannot supersede basic liberties. (There are some thorny issues about whether _minors_ have full civil rights. But I certainly know that _my_ civil rights are being affected when my children are not allowed on the streets after some hour. If my child is out, this is my problem. I neither want cops to stop-and-detain my children, nor do I want my tax monies to be used to control the behavior of other people's children. Providing no crimes are being committed, curfews for the sake of controlling the behavior of children are no more just than would be a bunch of related behavior control laws, e.g., a ban on comic books, a mandate that all children join after-school youth leagues, etc.) As for "changing their rules," you're missing the point. There are presumably many in Utah who believe as I do (maybe even some Mormons). Those who are living in Utah, as renters, owners, whatever, should not be bound by unconstitutional rules, no matter how many Mormon Elders favor them. Unless the Mormons own _all_ of the property (and maybe not even then, as renters have civil rights), they cannot impose their own notions of morality on the rest of the population, except in compelling cases (e.g., involving the well-known actual _crimes_). I don't mean to pick on Mormons, as other communities have also attempted to impose curfews and other restricitions on the children of others. My ire was raised by Attila's enthusiastic support for laws which no freedom-loving person should be enthusiastic about. Again, I have no problem with Attila restricting his own children's movements, or joining with other parents to control the behavior of their _own_ children, via religious camps, religious schools, youth leagues, etc. He can even make his own kids wear funny uniforms, funny religious hats, whatever. But, for example, tellling _me_ when _my_ children may be out on public streets (doing nothing illegal, neither robbing nor spray-painting nor committing any other real crimes) is unacceptable. I urge Attila (and others) to rethink enthusiastic support for curfews. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: GPS [MARGINAL, at best]
by P. J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was an article in _Scientific American_ February 1996 about GPS. I couldn't find the magazine, but they had this squib on the www.sciam.com website: The Global Positioning System Thomas A. Herring Two dozen satellites hovering thousands of miles up can locate your position on the earth's surface to within a few centimeters. Originally constructed for military applications, this network of space beacons today finds civilian applications--such as landing airplanes in fog--that demand accuracy beyond what its designers had thought would be technically possible. According to the website, there was also a letter in the June 1996 issue responding to Herrings article. Here it is: MILITARY ADVANTAGE I was pleased when I first saw your February article "The Global Positioning System," by Thomas A. Herring. As developers and operators of GPS, we in the Department of Defense and our partners in industry are justifiably proud of the technology. GPS represents the best of American scientific and technical ingenuity as well as being an excellent example of cooperation between the military and civilian sectors. But after reading the entire article, I was disappointed by its unbalanced discussion of the national security aspects of GPS. Yes, the Defense Department does operate GPS with unpopular security features. But these features were not designed to inconvenience the peaceful users of the system, as Herring implies. Rather they were designed to provide U.S. and allied forces with a crucial military edge. Furthermore, the Defense Department is well aware that the security aspects of GPS are an additional burden for many users. And while we believe such measures are still needed at this time to help preserve our military advantage, we have set a goal of discontinuing regular use of the feature known as Selective Availability, the component that degrades GPS accuracy, within a decade. Both time and resources are needed to replace the advantages Selective Availability provides. In light of the revolutionary contributions of GPS to both military and commercial enterprise, Herring could have portrayed the technology in a more evenhanded manner. PAUL G. KAMINSKI Under Secretary Department of Defense -- end of quoted material -- The article, as I recall, was about ways in which civilian users have found, or are finding, ways around the built-in inaccuarcy of the GPS. I don't recall whether crypto was mentioned in the article. My recollection of it was that they had been diddling with the timers or the clock signal or something, as opposed to encrypting anything. But then again it has been a while, and my memory of it isn't too clear. I seem to remember another crypto scheme discussed here at length about GPS, based on a paper by Dr. Dorothy [?] Denning, which involved having the intended recipient's coordinates - which were somehow involved in the encryption. The coordinates are in 3-D. Spheres centered on three of the GPS satellites intersect within a very small space. -- public service announcement: ------------------------------------------------------------- To remove yourself from the cypherpunks mailing list send to: majordomo(a)toad.com a message that contains the text: unsubscribe cypherpunks in the body of the message, not the subject line. --------------------------------------------------------------

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[SPAM] More "fuckhead" fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

berserk Timmy May has gone . Has he been eating speed? bananas >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >Message-Id: <199609300138.AA08482(a)crl12.crl.com> >Subject: Re: [SPAM] More fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 18:38:05 -0700 (PDT) >In-Reply-To: <FFi2uD82w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 29, 96 07:14:50 pm >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Content-Length: 3442 > >> >> What has Timmy been smoking? >> >> ]From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Sun Sep 29 19:03:40 1996 >> ]Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) >> ] via UUCP; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:14:06 EDT >> ] for dlv >> ]Received: from disperse.demon.co.uk by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; >> ] id AA25790 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:03:40 -0400 >> ]Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-2.mail.demon.net id ac16129; >> ] 29 Sep 96 15:59 BST >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net >> ] id aa09441; 29 Sep 96 15:54 BST >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP >> ] id AA843903697 ; Sat, 28 Sep 96 09:41:37 +0000 >> ]Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> ]From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >> ]To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >> ]Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 09:21:37 +0000 >> ]Mime-Version: 1.0 >> ]Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> ]Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT >> ]Subject: Re: Possible subs attack???? >> ]Priority: normal >> ]X-Pm-Encryptor: JN-PGP-P, 4 >> ]X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) >> ]Message-Id: <844008901.9441.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> ] >> ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> ] >> ] >> ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> writes: >> ] >> ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May lies again, as usual. >> ] >> ]Fuck you, >> ] >> ]I am not Tim May, Check out the return path if you don`t believe me, >> ]if you still don`t here`s my PGP public key signed by the EFF, they >> ]don`t sign keys here and there without checking ID`s... >> ] >> ]Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID >> ]pub 1024/5BBFAEB1 1996/07/30 Paul Bradley <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> ] >> ]- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >> ]Version: 2.6.3ia >> ] >> ]mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 >> ]6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 >> ]sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR >> ]tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy >> ]NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP >> ]Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b >> ]j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k >> ]C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ >> ]9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 >> ]En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 >> ]YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp >> ]put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW >> ]LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi >> ]mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= >> ]=CMZA >> ]- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >> ] >> ] >> ] >> ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> ]Version: 2.6.3ia >> ]Charset: cp850 >> ] >> ]iQCVAwUBMkzuH75OPIRbv66xAQHSmQQAqw0F/lIsCcQwOpiSQDx4hMqOVVUVXbyR >> ]3RMWY20ECE0TpAtJ6hkAiqphsWUSBqiFj2kGHMh+jHSHXIMPF+m1qtwVbgutJC7B >> ]8VYWj0VP+bGu5dEUisLrVHDNj5ucEIDyK2GnqObiCiKARFUbOuZnMQOp9TDJqibh >> ]2Wqa5+h8R7g= >> ]=/M2U >> ]-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> ] >> ] Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security >> ] Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >> ] Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org >> ] Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ >> ] Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 >> ] "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" >> >Fuckhead.

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RE: Does any body know anything about this?
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Snakeoil? Matt Blaze? Where _you_ been, cowboy? ---------- From: John Anonymous MacDonald[SMTP:nobody@cypherpunks.ca] Sent: Sunday, September 29, 1996 2:38 PM To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Does any body know anything about this? Is this just more snakeoil or is this real? <<<<<<<< FORWARDED MESSAGE >>>>>>>> From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 09:05:28 +0100 Subject: Seminar in Cryptology and Computer Security *** *** *** *** *** University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory EXTRA SEMINAR SPEAKER: Matt Blaze AT&T Research DATE: Monday 23rd September 1996 at 11.30 am PLACE: Room TP4, Computer Laboratory TITLE: SYMMETRIC-KEY CIPHERS BASED ON HARD PROBLEMS A useful principle in cipher design is to reduce or at least relate closely the cryptanalysis of the cipher to some long-studied problem that is believed to be difficult. Most public-key ciphers follow this principle fairly closely (e.g., RSA is at least similar to factoring). Modern symmetric-key ciphers, on the other hand, can rarely be reduced in this way and so are frequently designed specifically to resist the various known cryptanalytic attacks. In this informal talk, we examine a simple cipher primitive, based on Feistel networks, for which recovery of its internal state given its inputs and outputs is NP-complete. We outline simple and efficient block- and stream- cipher constructions based on this primitive. * * * The regular Michaelmas term seminar series will resume on the 8th October with a series of talks on Tuesday afternoons at 4.15 PM in room TP4, Computer Laboratory, Pembroke Street, Cambridge. A list of speakers will be circulated shortly. * * *

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Tools for Rendering Censorship Firewalls Ineffective
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been trying to categorize the web censorship techniques available to governments, such as Singapore and China's Firewall Curtains, Germany's ISP Threats, etc. The objective is to make information widely and conveniently available to subjects of the censoring country by building tools that will provide multiple paths to data that are easy to find and hard to block because they're too pervasive. I'm assuming that email is difficult to block, in-country public websites are blockable (through business licenses, lawsuits, rubber-hoses, or confiscation), in-country private websites are difficult to block but not very relevant, authors can afford and post to foreign web sites without effective blocking, and that the real "threat" to the government is foreign websites making banned information conveniently available to its subjects. I'm also assuming that the government can use humans to discover a moderate quantity of banned info, but that blocking will mostly be done by bots rather than human readers. In particular, I'm ignoring the approach of in-country hidden websites, since it's too vulnerable in some countries, and focussing on the web rather than email because it's mass-market and easier to use, and email is harder to stop, especially given crypto and remailers. Notation: "Attack" is the Censors trying to stop data; "defend" and "evade" are the Good Guys trying to not get censored. The obvious techniques I can see include 1) Filter on IP address (e.g. German attack on XS4ALL) 2) Filter on DNS Name 3) Filter on Patterns in URL 4) Filter on Patterns in PUT/GET Requests 5) Filter on Patterns in Response. 6) Traffic Analysis on reading patterns Defenses - The most important defenses to these attacks depend on ubiquity and volume - they can block one or two of anything, they might be able to block a thousand, and it's not possible to block millions of things everywhere. So building bridges between systems and increasing multiplicity is a win. 1) It's easy to evade the crude version of this attack - use rolling IP addresses, and use DNS to publish the new ones. For the German model, where the government has to tell the ISPs who to block, this wins. They can counter by blocking your whole IP network, not just a single machine, which you can counter by hopping IP networks as well as hosts, though that's more trouble (and blocking routes is probably easier than blocking hosts, since you do it at the routers, and harder to get people to turn back on.) They can also enforce boycotts on the ISP, as they did with XS4ALL - blocking most of the traffic to a site can affect its other traffic enough to be economically annoying. The attackers can counter by also tracking the address with a bot - if you change addresses hourly, they can change blocking addresses hourly, which may workable for somewhere high-tech like Singapore or very focussed like China, but isn't very effective for somewhere porous like Germany that has a system of laws that move at the speed of bureaucracy. A very effective defense against this method is to deploy relay servers, either anonymizers or simple non-anonymizing cgi scripts that take URLs like http://foo.bar.com/cgi-bin/relay.pl/http://banned.site.org/ and fetch and return the real URL (perhaps modifying any URLs in it to connect through the relay.) This works if there are lots of easy-to-find relay servers. An obvious approach would be to package the relay program with Apache or other popular web server, so anybody who didn't bother turning it off would have a relay named "relay.pl"; the attackers can't realistically block everybody who's got one. Another effective defense is to use web servers that gateway to AFS (Andrew File System) or other distributed file systems. This lets /stanford.edu/censored-mirrors/banned.html be accessible from any site supporting AFS, such as http://www.cmu.edu/afs/stanford.edu/censored-mirrors/banned.html This has the great advantage that AFS sites are usually at major universities, which are important enough that lots of people would complain if you blocked them. This works better if there's an easy way to insert things into the AFS tree - volunteers are fine, but if there are servers that can automatically import material it becomes easier, either by copying or by various kinds of indirection. (On the other hand, if you allow automated import, attackers can turn your site into the Child Pornography NarcoTerrorist Bomb Info Mart and ban you...) Do the major web crawlers index AFS? Or do the sites use robots.txt to prevent multiple crawls, e.g. by only allowing searching on the local file systems and not on the remote ones? 2) Filtering on DNS names is an attack that proxy servers can use - the HTTP spec [RFC1945] says that requests to proxies need to send an Absolute URI (method://machine[:port][abs_path]) rather than just the absolute path (/etc.), so the proxy servers can filter on DNS names, defeating the rolling-IP-address defense. Doesn't stop relays. Non-proxy attacks don't have access to this method. However, governments that use full-scale firewalls and not just http proxies can also restrict what DNS queries the National DNS Servers will pass. How to defend against it for non-proxy attackers? One way is to make it easy to find the IP address of a server with banned material - web indexers can find everything, so putting the IP form of the URL in a file that the popular indexers, along with useful keywords, is one way to make sure you get found. Another would be to deploy DNS servers widely (done:-) and maybe form-based interfaces for users that will run Dig or whatever. 3) Filtering on patterns in URLs - as with DNS filters, a proxy server run by an attacker can block access based on patterns in the URL, such as relay.pl. This makes it tougher to use relays as a defense, because they either need to have different names on different machines (harder for users to find and for administrators to implement without having to pay attention), or else to not need a name (either modify the protocols or at least the servers so that http://foo.bar.com/http://banned.site.org/stuff.html gets handled properly.) The latter is doable, but probably requires more administrator support? Pattern matching on URLs can make it easier to attack AFS - you don't need to kill the whole AFS tree, just the banned parts. Pattern matching on URLs already starts to have heavy volume issues - can a proxy server take the extra time to search an ever-larger banned list on every web hit? Having used overloaded proxy servers at work (:-), I'd expect the population to start acting like disgruntled postal workers if the mandatory national firewall is underpowered. On the other hand, I suppose a government could partially solve scale problems by requiring a license fee for use of the proxy server; a few bucks per user could pay for increasing numbers of servers as well as tracking who's reading what. 4) Filter on Patterns in PUT/GET Requests As a defense against blocking URLs by patterns, defenders can send requests as message-body in PUT/GET requests; this is also useful for submitting banned material to cooperative sites. Attackers can filter on this material, though they can't easily filter out SSL or S-HTTP requests by content, depending on how much the protocols pass material end-to-end rather than link-by-link where the proxy can see it. 5) Filter on Patterns in Responses. Similarly, attackers could just grep for banned material in HTTP responses, though SSL/S-HTTP both interfere with this. Defenders can also structure banned writing in ways that don't trigger patterns easily (e.g. don't refer to Lee Kwan Yew, just refer to That Bum or Mr. Big, etc.) Filtering on picture content is obviously difficult, so including text in graphics can help prevent attacks. In general, I'd expect filtering attacks to be extremely susceptible to volume. On the other hand, attackers don't have to filter in real-time; they could scan material as a background activity, and go arrest the people who have received contraband after the fact, or just block their National Firewall Passports if they're reading too much. In general, this attack is probably more useful for overall study of what their subjects are reading than for real-time. 6) Traffic Analysis - who's reading what? Where? Who's reading a lot of contraband? What's popular foreign material? Which of the attackers' subjects are possible fellow travellers, based on what they're reading? This kind of material is useful for marketing as well as for identifying malcontents - businesses aren't always pro-privacy either, though they want their own secrets kept secret. Many of the attacks above can work as after-the-fact analysis more effectively than they can as real-time blocking, and volume is less of a problem for crunching a sample of firewall logs than for active blocking; this may be the hardest attack to counter, though it's repression rather than censorship. If you can't police everybody, you can at least encourage the policeman in everybody's head. +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ What other kinds of attacks are there? What other defenses? What kinds of holes are there in these defenses? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Re: Public Schools
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 29 Sep 96 07:55:34 +0000, attila wrote: > "That's our advantage at Microsoft; > we set the standards and we can change them." > --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft > (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial) > > and, if this is not the gawd-awful truth, I must have just got > off the bus... typical, typical MS arrogance. > a toast! a toast to their early demise! Now there'd be an almost acceptable use of AP! I bet Team OS/2 alone would contribute enough to paste billg. Not to mention what IBM or Sun or Apple or Lotus or Borland or [company that got screwed] would do. <g> # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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The ever-vigilant John Anon
by P. J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 14:38:01 -0700 >From: John Anonymous MacDonald <nobody(a)cypherpunks.ca> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Does any body know anything about this? > >Is this just more snakeoil or is this real? This is quite real, and was posted on the CCC list a while ago. It turns out the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences (Cambridge, UK) has been having a regular series of seminars on crypto and papers from a distinguished group of presenters. Several of the agenda notices, etc., have been posted here from time to time, hidden in the usual spew. Look for the proceedings to be published by Springer Verlag. Do a web search on 'Information Hiding' or 'Turbo Codes' or just go look at: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/ihws.html Snake oil, indeed. > ><<<<<<<< FORWARDED MESSAGE >>>>>>>> >From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> >Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 09:05:28 +0100 >Subject: Seminar in Cryptology and Computer Security > > *** *** *** *** ***

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Re: The Petaflops Boondoggle Computer (was PET_ard)
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 29 Sep 1996 12:16:27 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Symmetric multiprocessing is available, but it's often much less hassle to >have a single CPU running at 200 MHz than to try games with multiple >processors (which means more PCB real estate, more sockets, more of other >things). As far as SMP goes, it's actually not all that expensive. People in the linux-smp list have reported differences of as little as $50 for a uniprocessor vs. dual pentium system. Of course, every so often we'll get a message about a $30,000 system that can handle up to <drool>64 Pentium Pros</drool>! # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Tools for Rendering Censorship Firewalls Ineffective
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been trying to categorize the web censorship techniques available to governments, such as Singapore and China's Firewall Curtains, Germany's ISP Threats, etc. The objective is to make information widely and conveniently available to subjects of the censoring country by building tools that will provide multiple paths to data that are easy to find and hard to block because they're too pervasive. I'm assuming that email is difficult to block, in-country public websites are blockable (through business licenses, lawsuits, rubber-hoses, or confiscation), in-country private websites are difficult to block but not very relevant, authors can afford and post to foreign web sites without effective blocking, and that the real "threat" to the government is foreign websites making banned information conveniently available to its subjects. I'm also assuming that the government can use humans to discover a moderate quantity of banned info, but that blocking will mostly be done by bots rather than human readers. In particular, I'm ignoring the approach of in-country hidden websites, since it's too vulnerable in some countries, and focussing on the web rather than email because it's mass-market and easier to use, and email is harder to stop, especially given crypto and remailers. Notation: "Attack" is the Censors trying to stop data; "defend" and "evade" are the Good Guys trying to not get censored. The obvious techniques I can see include 1) Filter on IP address (e.g. German attack on XS4ALL) 2) Filter on DNS Name 3) Filter on Patterns in URL 4) Filter on Patterns in PUT/GET Requests 5) Filter on Patterns in Response. 6) Traffic Analysis on reading patterns Defenses - The most important defenses to these attacks depend on ubiquity and volume - they can block one or two of anything, they might be able to block a thousand, and it's not possible to block millions of things everywhere. So building bridges between systems and increasing multiplicity is a win. 1) It's easy to evade the crude version of this attack - use rolling IP addresses, and use DNS to publish the new ones. For the German model, where the government has to tell the ISPs who to block, this wins. They can counter by blocking your whole IP network, not just a single machine, which you can counter by hopping IP networks as well as hosts, though that's more trouble (and blocking routes is probably easier than blocking hosts, since you do it at the routers, and harder to get people to turn back on.) They can also enforce boycotts on the ISP, as they did with XS4ALL - blocking most of the traffic to a site can affect its other traffic enough to be economically annoying. The attackers can counter by also tracking the address with a bot - if you change addresses hourly, they can change blocking addresses hourly, which may workable for somewhere high-tech like Singapore or very focussed like China, but isn't very effective for somewhere porous like Germany that has a system of laws that move at the speed of bureaucracy. A very effective defense against this method is to deploy relay servers, either anonymizers or simple non-anonymizing cgi scripts that take URLs like http://foo.bar.com/cgi-bin/relay.pl/http://banned.site.org/ and fetch and return the real URL (perhaps modifying any URLs in it to connect through the relay.) This works if there are lots of easy-to-find relay servers. An obvious approach would be to package the relay program with Apache or other popular web server, so anybody who didn't bother turning it off would have a relay named "relay.pl"; the attackers can't realistically block everybody who's got one. Another effective defense is to use web servers that gateway to AFS (Andrew File System) or other distributed file systems. This lets /stanford.edu/censored-mirrors/banned.html be accessible from any site supporting AFS, such as http://www.cmu.edu/afs/stanford.edu/censored-mirrors/banned.html This has the great advantage that AFS sites are usually at major universities, which are important enough that lots of people would complain if you blocked them. This works better if there's an easy way to insert things into the AFS tree - volunteers are fine, but if there are servers that can automatically import material it becomes easier, either by copying or by various kinds of indirection. (On the other hand, if you allow automated import, attackers can turn your site into the Child Pornography NarcoTerrorist Bomb Info Mart and ban you...) Do the major web crawlers index AFS? Or do the sites use robots.txt to prevent multiple crawls, e.g. by only allowing searching on the local file systems and not on the remote ones? 2) Filtering on DNS names is an attack that proxy servers can use - the HTTP spec [RFC1945] says that requests to proxies need to send an Absolute URI (method://machine[:port][abs_path]) rather than just the absolute path (/etc.), so the proxy servers can filter on DNS names, defeating the rolling-IP-address defense. Doesn't stop relays. Non-proxy attacks don't have access to this method. However, governments that use full-scale firewalls and not just http proxies can also restrict what DNS queries the National DNS Servers will pass. How to defend against it for non-proxy attackers? One way is to make it easy to find the IP address of a server with banned material - web indexers can find everything, so putting the IP form of the URL in a file that the popular indexers, along with useful keywords, is one way to make sure you get found. Another would be to deploy DNS servers widely (done:-) and maybe form-based interfaces for users that will run Dig or whatever. 3) Filtering on patterns in URLs - as with DNS filters, a proxy server run by an attacker can block access based on patterns in the URL, such as relay.pl. This makes it tougher to use relays as a defense, because they either need to have different names on different machines (harder for users to find and for administrators to implement without having to pay attention), or else to not need a name (either modify the protocols or at least the servers so that http://foo.bar.com/http://banned.site.org/stuff.html gets handled properly.) The latter is doable, but probably requires more administrator support? Pattern matching on URLs can make it easier to attack AFS - you don't need to kill the whole AFS tree, just the banned parts. Pattern matching on URLs already starts to have heavy volume issues - can a proxy server take the extra time to search an ever-larger banned list on every web hit? Having used overloaded proxy servers at work (:-), I'd expect the population to start acting like disgruntled postal workers if the mandatory national firewall is underpowered. On the other hand, I suppose a government could partially solve scale problems by requiring a license fee for use of the proxy server; a few bucks per user could pay for increasing numbers of servers as well as tracking who's reading what. 4) Filter on Patterns in PUT/GET Requests As a defense against blocking URLs by patterns, defenders can send requests as message-body in PUT/GET requests; this is also useful for submitting banned material to cooperative sites. Attackers can filter on this material, though they can't easily filter out SSL or S-HTTP requests by content, depending on how much the protocols pass material end-to-end rather than link-by-link where the proxy can see it. 5) Filter on Patterns in Responses. Similarly, attackers could just grep for banned material in HTTP responses, though SSL/S-HTTP both interfere with this. Defenders can also structure banned writing in ways that don't trigger patterns easily (e.g. don't refer to Lee Kwan Yew, just refer to That Bum or Mr. Big, etc.) Filtering on picture content is obviously difficult, so including text in graphics can help prevent attacks. In general, I'd expect filtering attacks to be extremely susceptible to volume. On the other hand, attackers don't have to filter in real-time; they could scan material as a background activity, and go arrest the people who have received contraband after the fact, or just block their National Firewall Passports if they're reading too much. In general, this attack is probably more useful for overall study of what their subjects are reading than for real-time. 6) Traffic Analysis - who's reading what? Where? Who's reading a lot of contraband? What's popular foreign material? Which of the attackers' subjects are possible fellow travellers, based on what they're reading? This kind of material is useful for marketing as well as for identifying malcontents - businesses aren't always pro-privacy either, though they want their own secrets kept secret. Many of the attacks above can work as after-the-fact analysis more effectively than they can as real-time blocking, and volume is less of a problem for crunching a sample of firewall logs than for active blocking; this may be the hardest attack to counter, though it's repression rather than censorship. If you can't police everybody, you can at least encourage the policeman in everybody's head. +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ What other kinds of attacks are there? What other defenses? What kinds of holes are there in these defenses? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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PRNG discussions
by scottb＠aca.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I was wondering if anyone has kept an archive of old disscusions on PRNG's. I am playing around with a few ideas, and don't want to re-invent the wheel. Does anyone know of any FTP sites containg this sort of thing?? /sb

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Re: [RANT] Re: Workers, Public Schools, Tradesmen, and Justice
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 29 Sep 1996 13:26:08 -0400 (EDT), Rabid Wombat wrote: >> The old way was that your HS provided what the mythical average person needed >> to go about life. College was for the more "complex" careers. >Perhaps "high school" should end at age 16, with two years of publicly >funded "junior college" or "technical school" available to those who >select one or the other, and qualify. This would bring an adult-level >decision earlier in life, and students would need to start thinking about >which path to chose at about 14. Perhaps this would allow reality to set >in at an earlier age. A high school diploma has become meaningless anyway >- it is viewed as a "right." How about a real simple rule: if you don't pass a standardized test (Call it the SATs w/800 of 1600 minimum) you repeat the grade - no maximum age! Might end some of those "easy A" classes I took. >This wouldn't leave anyone condemned to a life of menial labor for a >decision made at age 16 - there are plenty of successful people who have >obtained a G.E.D. later in life, and then gone on to college. It would, >however, give some measure of responsibility to the near-adult. Yeah. I'd still say that you'd want to make it pretty easy to switch over - I've known a few people who were massively flip-flopping. Also, some kids may have hard times (parents divorce, etc) that might screw up their judgement for awhile. . . >fiance did drop out of high school at age 16 and started college, with her >parent's blessing. All her high school guidence counselor could come up >with was "But she'll miss her prom"! <g> That seemed to be the general focus last year... "We may be idiots but we have school spirit!" In CA, isn't there the option of taking CHSPE (sp?) that is like a GED but instead of sending the "I don't want this" message is more like "I don't want to waste my time"? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: [CRYPTO] Does any body know anything about this?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:38 PM 9/29/96 -0700, some nobody wrote: >Is this just more snakeoil or is this real? Neither Matt Blaze nor Ross Anderson are particularly on the pro-snake-oil side.... Sounds like an interesting talk and I'd enjoy being there for a variety of reasons, including being able to time-travel back to Last Monday :-) One difference between snake oil salesmen and mathematical cryptographers is that the latter talk about what they're doing, why it's as strong as it is, and how it relates back to other known hard problems or attack techniques. If this is sufficiently hard, cool. Most of the symmetric-key attacks these days are based on being sufficiently messy to be hard to attack, and on resisting known attacks, but there's no particular way to prove how hard they are - you can just show that they're messier than any currently known techniques can untangle. On the other hand, the experience with most public-key techniques is that it's hard to adapt NP-hard problems to crypto in ways that don't introduce special forms that can fall apart when handled right - the knapsack problem was a good example. Factoring and discrete-log still appear to be hard problems, but it would be nice to have other known-hard public-key systems. It would also be nice to have private-key systems that use NP-hard problems in strong ways, especially if it doesn't make them appallingly slow :-) >TITLE: SYMMETRIC-KEY CIPHERS BASED ON HARD PROBLEMS >A useful principle in cipher design is to reduce or at least relate >closely the cryptanalysis of the cipher to some long-studied problem >that is believed to be difficult. Most public-key ciphers follow this >principle fairly closely (e.g., RSA is at least similar to factoring). >Modern symmetric-key ciphers, on the other hand, can rarely be reduced >in this way and so are frequently designed specifically to resist the >various known cryptanalytic attacks. In this informal talk, we examine >a simple cipher primitive, based on Feistel networks, for which recovery >of its internal state given its inputs and outputs is NP-complete. We >outline simple and efficient block- and stream- cipher constructions >based on this primitive. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Re: Cryptography..
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:03 AM 9/29/96 -0700, Erp <erp(a)digiforest.com> wrote: >What is the maximum encryption allowed to be created. With export >restrictions in mind, and without export restrictiosn in mind... >Thanks... By WORLD and US standards please... The laws of nature don't appear to provide any maximum strength, assuming you run out of atoms to store your data before you run out of capacity for your computer, and _you'll_ be out of cash long before that :-) For mathematically strong algorithms, you can make the work a cracker has to do be exponentially larger than the amount of work you have to do to decrypt, so you win. Different governments have different rules, and many have no rules. Bert-Jaap Koops has a summary that (last time I looked) was at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/CRI/projects/bjk/lawsurvy.htm about different governments' crypto use and export rules. For the US, you can export cryptography software if you get permission, and you can usually get permission if you're using up to 40-bit symmetric-key keys and 512-bit public keys, or if you're writing software that's strictly for banking. You usually can't get permission for stronger crypto than that, unless you're a registered international arms dealer and are only selling your crypto gear to Friends Of The Pentagon. There aren't any restrictions on the strength of crypto you can use for messages you're exporting, only on software you export. And there are somewhat bizarre interpretations of "export", including telling foreigners inside US borders if they're not US subjects. Domestically, there are no restrictions on crypto you can write and use inside the US, subject of course to the bizarre interpretations of "domestically" that accompany "export". # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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GCHQ releases Venona files (from UK Telegraph)
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, A couple of articles from the UK Daily Telegraph may be of interest. The earlier one "Codebreakers come clean" is about the upcoming congference on cold war intelligence & mentions the continued release of the NSA's Venona files (see http://www.nsa.gov:8080/docs/venona/venona.html) The article is at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et/access?ac=116192744309&pg=//96/9/29/wspy29.ht… The second is about the GCHQ (UK equivalent of NSA) releasing its own Venona files in response to the NSA release. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et/access?ac=116192744309&pg=//96/9/30/ngch30.ht… These are being released into the public records office, but there is no indication that they will appear on the net for the time being. Sherry

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A periodic alert regarding Tim May
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May styles his facial hair to look more like pubic hair.

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crypto cd
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Sep 30 07:21:49 1996 Still looking for material... especially: sci.crypt archives (10.1994 until now... Mark Riordan???) sci.crypt.research archives (all) other releavant news groups has anybody anybody got anything? remo - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html iQEVAwUBMk9Y7hFhy5sz+bTpAQHz3wf/VD175Mf8ShQ0drqvwH4m5Yf7N9iE0ZeG V5Nv80Um3ofnhZvFscgijgPf54+25a8ogWJcEB3k+SEROvkeQkA49QmEYPIlotYi 2U6+xb5bgjQ5NvRMe09o+3cBSd7y3HabWpNPBtCX4cLxKWm3DOw+xOa+CWf8Kmuu nuaFaJhKG1RYkr/3QNPFlDSbh7PPi1Rg7go0LdVMkQUzMgWizkAOJJlg0cl5ZdVE ZV6JdiQD6o9JBWKEOX1Y4mqxQ9tRRDagfADa3S8wPOpT3WxWKVgKgbjLtvUsXrgZ miokoDGNSs2Cxlw+wk9kxKAbRrsCfoEAAPygvCHEDp0WGxA445iRZA== =NT66 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Looking for Codebreaker's by David Kahn
by Hendrik Reh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Im looking for Codebreakers by David Kahn !! Can anybody give me a hint where i can get this book thanx -- ,,,, Gruss, /'^'\ Hendrik ( o o ) -oOOO--(_)--OOOo------------------------------------------------ Hendrik Reh, Tel. : +49 0681 48362 .oooO WWW: http://fsinfo.cs.uni-sb.de/~garetjax/ ( ) Oooo. eMail: hereh(a)stud.uni-sb.de ---\ (----( )------------------------------------------------- \_) ) / (_/

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Re: What about making re-mailers automatically chain?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Would it be a good idea to have a re-mailer "randomly" decide whether to >send the mail to the destination or to another re-mailer. No. The remailer user should be presumed to know what s/he wants. Some remailer users may want to optimize for speed and certainty of delivery and therefore use a short chain; other users may want to optimize for more difficult traceability, and consequently choose a long chain. Remailers shouldn't try to rewrite the user's (perhaps) deliberate balancing of these factors. Also, users may choose to use or not use certain remailers based upon their policies, the reputation of the operators, the legal rules affecting the operators, and so forth. These choices should also be left to the user and not overridden by third parties. > If all >re-mailers performed this way, not even the sender would know the path. I don't see why this is useful. As things work now, only the sender knows the path, assuming chaining and nesting encryption. How does taking away the sender's knowledge add security? Adding hops to the chain requires that remailers keep track of other remailers; a robust way of doing this would require that they also keep track of reliability, because deciding to add a downed (or unreliable) remailer to a chain would be harmful. To prevent an active and hostile eavesdropper from adding itself as a remailer eligible to receive extra hops (and then dropping or logging the traffic), this remailer status information should be provided by a trusted source in a secure manner. All of this (adding remailer status tracking based on frequent updates of digitally signed information from a trusted third party) can be done, but it's a pain in the ass to code, and it doesn't add anything that users can't get for themselves. (Users who want long difficult-to-trace chains can already generate them. They can also let software generate random chains at the source.) It also may degrade performance for users who value speed and reliability over untraceability. So I suggest that it's not very useful. The best way to implement this would be to modify remailers to use "Anon-To: random" or "Random-To: xxx(a)yyy.zzz" header commands, such that users who desired the random hop behavior could get it, but users who didn't want it wouldn't get it unexpectedly. (Isn't some remailer doing this already? I've lost track.) -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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Re: Making Remailers Widespread [REMAILERS]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:37 AM 9/29/96 EDT, you wrote: >How about: maintain a list of trusted blocking-list sites (comparable to the >list of remailers used for chaining) and when it comes the time to update the >local copy of the blocking list, ask a random one on the list; if it's down, >ask another random one on the list. There may even be more than one list. :-) Getting more complex, but it might be workable. >> sender-blocking list ... >With most ISP's it's trivial to forge one's From: header in SMTP. >Switching to another dime-a-dozen throwaway account is also trivial. >Just admit that you can't block senders, and don't pretend that you >can - false pretenses destroy one's credibility. You obviously can't source-block a determined spammer, but you can slow down some spam attacks, especially if they're one individual using his/her regular account. It's no panacaea, but it helps. Also, if you source-block based on patterns anywhere in the header, you can catch less capable email forgers. >I think I see a way to accomplish this without too much trouble. >When an e-mail is directed at u@c4.c3.c2...c1, the code that checks >for blocking will search for the following records in the blocking list: >u@c4.c3.c2...c1 (exact match) >*@c4.c3.c2...c1 (replace user by *) >u@*.c3.c2...c1 (replace leftmost .-separated piece of domain by *) >*@*.c3.c2...c1 (both) >and repeat until there are only 2 components left in the domain name. That'd work. It's clunky, but there's no avoiding clunkiness for this sort of thing, and it does preserve privacy. >Now, the question is, who would be allowed to add records containing >'*' to the blocking list using the cookie protocol? I suggest that it be >one of the contacts listed in Internic's database. postmaster@domain is (ostensibly) guaranteed to exist. The Internic database is an interesting alternative, but for this I suspect postmaster is good enough. There's also the problem that for many domains, where smallcompany.com is virtual on an ISP, the Internic database will generally list someone at the ISP, who probably has no interest in the issue, rather than someone responsible for making decisions about smallcompany.com >Thus a blocking record for cypherpunks(a)toad.com could be added by >anyone listed in toad.com's Internic entry. There's no need for any >Remailer Cabal [tinc] to maintain blocking lists. For destination blocking, I agree that users should be able to block their own stuff as automagically as possible. For source blocking, most of the need is for spams and abusers that have been tracked down (or identify themselves in their postings), and that takes human thought. In particular, spammers are unlikely to block themselves from the remailers (:-), but forgers may try to block legitimate users. >One other suggestion: instead of storing one bit of information (the >address is on the list or not), why not have several flag bits. >E.g., the blocking list could contain records similar to: >hash - e.g. 160-bit SHA >flags - e.g. reserve 32 bits Interesting. I suspect the state of the art would be to collect the bits with a disclaimer that there isn't any code to interpret them :-), but it does let you build a blocking database that's usable as capabilities grow. Any suggestions for flags besides block/allow one-way, block/allow two-way, and max-size? I'm thinking of doing a remailer that instead of sending you a message, it sends you a retrieval cookie and lets you send it back to collect the message; blocking that would be another flag. The other kind of blocking that needs adding is blocking by words in message bodies - the spammer that caused me to shut down my remailer and not bring it back up was posting hate messages with somebody else's name and email signed at the bottom. It only took one or two to generate a flood of flames to the victim, and my current remailer couldn't block any followups. Also, since the spammer wasn't generating the flames himself, his spam slipped under the remailer's spam counter, just as hipcrime's did. This sort of blocking also lets you block things like the hipcrime spam and MAKE MONEY FAST. But it's a much more sensitive problem - anybody who can add things to the body-checking list can start doing real censorship, and it's probably best to leave that to individual operators to block, or at least to turn on by hand rather than default. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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the key of DES
by yjkim＠ssrnet.snu.ac.kr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, all ! With given a unknown DES system with 64 bits plaintext p, ciphertext c, can there be MORE THAN ONE keys ? If so, How is the probability (big or small)? Sincerely, - Yoonejong =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Yoonjeong Kim Email: yjkim(a)ssrnet.snu.ac.kr Department of Computer Engineering Phone: +82-2-875-7726 (office) Seoul National University +82-2-872-9801 (home) Seoul 151-742 Korea Fax: +82-2-875-7726 =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

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(Firewalls) Where is that Snake Oil FAQ again?
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may of course, just be a troll. ----- Forwarded message from Anonymous ----- >From firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM Sun Sep 29 21:27:09 1996 Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 02:37:26 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <199609300037.CAA20690(a)basement.replay.com> Subject: New Release - Software OTP Encryption. Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII To: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited XComm: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting XComm: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse(a)replay.com> Sender: firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM Precedence: bulk I apologize for this intrusion into your affairs. Please forgive but we do have important information that will be of interest to Internet users. Would you like to secure your hard disk files against compromise by Internet Interlopers? Would you like to communicate over Internet in absolute privacy? We can provide you with the tools necessary to do those two things in an absolute sense. Briefly, we have developed the first software sourced OTP, which is provably as good as any hardware sourced OTP that can possibly be be generated. Most experts thought that this could not be done, but we have done it, and can prove it. Our prices are: - $95.00 for a complete dual user system, the full package for two users, but your communications are limited to that single user - - $95.00 for a complete Elita unlimited usage system - that is you can protect your internal files, and communicate with anyone else that has an Elita system, or more comprehensive Ultima system below. - $195.00 for a complete Ultima Internet/intranets system, this allows user to protect their own files - communicate with anyone that has an Ultima, or an Elita, system - to form hierarchal work groups that provide the same protection - and to customize their system variables to achieve the maximum entropy. We are also going to open up the whole company for outside participation - it is going to a completely open Internet Distributive Company, we believe the first one of its kind. Anyone is welcome to participate in the venture. All marketing is to be done on an lucrative MLM basis, program development will be done on a royalty/commission on adjusted gross income basis. Everyone that participates will share in the rewards. System testing will also be handle in a similar manner, and system engineering will be handled on a fee for services and participation basis. If you can perform, you can win big, really big. If you just try to perform, you will still win. This is an important opportunity for you, take advantage of it at this most opportune time, To order, call us at 817-691- 1081, or write to us at 2629 Plaza Parkway, Suite B-20, Wichita Falls, Texas, or order through Internet or e-mail us at: ipgsales(a)netprivacy.com. For more details, visit our web site at: http://www.netprivacy.com Our apologies again, but we believe it to be important. Appreciatively, Don Wood, IPG "None can be so true to your secret as yourself." - Sa'Di ----- End of forwarded message from Anonymous ----- -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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An ITAR moment
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm currently sitting in a computer lab at the ICM in Warsaw, at a workshop on caching in the web. I wanted to log back home to check my email, so I asked if they had telnet or something. "Actually, we're disabling rlogin and telnet on our machines - can you use ssh?". Simon --- Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. And after all | Email address remains unchanged You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet.........

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Re: The Petaflops Boondoggle Computer (was PET_ard)
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Sun, 29 Sep 1996 12:16:27 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > > >Symmetric multiprocessing is available, but it's often much less hassle to > >have a single CPU running at 200 MHz than to try games with multiple > >processors (which means more PCB real estate, more sockets, more of other > >things). > > As far as SMP goes, it's actually not all that expensive. People in the > linux-smp list have reported differences of as little as $50 for a > uniprocessor vs. dual pentium system. Of course, every so often we'll get a > message about a $30,000 system that can handle up to <drool>64 Pentium > Pros</drool>! Check out http://www.ssd.intel.com/tflop.html, where Intel is building a 9000 Pentium Pro (200 MHz) machine for Sandia. Yes, it runs Unix, and they've already delivered the first 64 processor node. When finished, it will have 600Gbyte RAM, 200Tbyte disk, and run at about 1.8 Tflops, and cover about 1600 square feet. Price? 46 M$, or about $5k/processor. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 29 Sep 96 at 17:36, Ryan Russell/SYBASE wrote: > Hmm...never heard that one before. Care to produce > a reference? > > (Or am I supposed to be ignoring this guy when he > makes ridiculous claims?) > > Ryan I suspect that Dmitri is referring to the Mountain Meadows Massacre. It's not a pretty story and is one of the low points of Mormon history. The late historian Juanita Brooks wrote about the masscre, and about the leader, John D. Lee, in a couple of books. > ---------- Previous Message ---------- > To: cypherpunks > cc: > From: dlv @ bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) @ smtp > Date: 09/29/96 05:54:09 PM > Subject: Re: Utah as a Religious Police State > > Ryan Russell/SYBASE writes: > > I guess that depends on your definition of liberty. The Mormons > > originally moved there to have a place to practice their religion, > > and have freedom from persecution. I suppose one could extend that > > to wanting a place to have the freedom to have a set of rules consistant > > with their beliefs. Should that include freedom from interferance from > > folks such as yourself who want to change their rules, even though > > you're not presently effected? > > It's worth noting that one of Utah mormons favorite pastimes was to ambush > the settlers heading for California, kill them all, and take their property. > However the mormons were dealt with much less severely than the local Indians > who tried the same tricks. Pity. ===end vulis rant=== Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 30 Sep 96 at 0:55, Moroni wrote: > I never cease to be surprised by the interest that gentiles show in > working mormon communities while totally neglecting their own failing > areas. <rant on> I never cease to be surprised by Mormon apologists who refuse to look in the mirror at problems in so-called "working Mormon communities." I moved to Utah 2 years ago from Texas. Even though I am nominally Mormon (I haven't been to Church in years), it was still a huge culture shock to me. I think the thing that bugs me the most is the way the political system is dominated by a 500 lb. elephant known as the LDS Church. We Utahns sit in a room with this elephant that eats and s**ts and yet we don't talk about the fact that it's there. This is Utah for you...Utah where during the first legislative session I was here (1995) the legislature spent 42 out of 45 days talking about whether they were going to have tightened ethics laws. Where during the last legislative session (1996) the legislature spent 42 of 45 days discussing what to do about the fact that a few kids in one of the Salt Lake high schools wanted to have a gay/lesbian/straight club. NO MATTER that the schools are horribly overcrowded and that in some elementary grades 40-plus students per classroom is the norm. NO MATTER that teachers are horribly underpaid in a state with California-style costs. NO MATTER that despite a $100 million surplus the governor and the legislature can't see clear to get rid of the sales tax on *food*. NO MATTER that if anything terribly controversial (or even not so controversial) comes up, someone in the legislature feels like they have to sound out the Church to make sure that they don't cross Gordon B. Hinckley or Boyd K. Packer and endanger their Church membership. In the meantime, our legislators (with Church approval, these are Church "callings") run down to the prison at Point of the Mountain to "counsel" convicted child abusers and then pass laws to get rid of minimum mandatory sentencing. The roads are falling apart here, the schools are overcrowded. Gang violence is prevalent up and down the Wasatch Front. I heard about a gang-related murder in Layton last weekend. Up until a month ago, when the mayor of Salt Lake City closed the place and forced them out, there was a well-known open-air drug supermarket going on in Pioneer Park. Legislative leaders think that they're above the Open Meetings law. And liquor laws still are pretty backwards. (Gee, just last week places that sell beer actually got permission to put signs that say "BEER" instead of "BEE?" on their premises.) Thing is, Utah is generally a wonderful place to live. As I said, I used to live in Texas. It's great to live in a place where the economy is booming and there are jobs available. The crime rate is pretty low for an urban community (but there are sore spots, as I indicated above). The scenery is downright spectacular. And Salt Lake City proper is a pretty cool place. But I don't believe that Utah is immune to the problems that beset other cities. One thing that would help is for Utah opinion-makers to admit that not everyone who lives in this "pretty, great state" is a devout Mormon and/or a Republican. Not everyone shares the same values as the dominant religion, and they shouldn't have to. I apologise to the cypherpunks mailing list for this rant, but not everyone in Utah agrees with the view expressed by Moroni above. Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: What about making re-mailers automatically chain?
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:30 09/29/96 -0800, you wrote: >At 4:14 AM -0500 9/29/96, David E. Smith wrote: > >>I dunno about that one. Even if the message itself is encrypted, >>every remailer has to have the address of the final recipient for >>your plan to work. And if you have cleartext for that message >... > >Actually, as I read the original proposal, it was to only _insert_ >additional links. Thus, imagine the following remailer chain, with Alice >sending to Zeke through a chain, represented in parentheses (like LISP): > That's what I was going for. The re-mailer would only add links if the recip that it sees is another mailer. If it doesn't recognize the destination as a remailer, it must assume that it's the last link and should send the mail. If that doesn't happen Dave's right. Multiple mailers would know the final dest. The question I was heading for on this is: Does this add anything useful? Removing knowledge of the path from the sender is a plus. This prevents anyone, even the sender, from being able to give up any useful info even if under court order. Adding "random" traffic is helpful 'cause many people (including myself) use pre-fab anon scripts and therefore use the same anon paths all the time (I should stop that). This opens those messages up to some analysis and the possibility of the sender being revealed. Granted, these are not major items. The real question is: Is this worth implementing? As gbroiles(a)netbox.com said: >All of this (adding remailer status tracking based on frequent updates of >digitally signed information from a trusted third party) can be done, but >it's a pain in the ass to code... G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at http://www.pb.net/~wizard | | and on a plethora of key servers around the world. | | Key ID = 0E818EC1 | | Fingerprint = A6 7B 67 D7 E9 96 37 7D E7 16 BD 5E F4 5A B2 E4 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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ADJ_ust
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9-30-96. NYP: "National Security Experts Plan for Wars Whose Targets and Weapons Are All Digital." Is the threat real, or is this just another way to win scarce funds? Military and intelligence officials believe that enemy nations, terrorists and criminal groups either already have the capability to mount information warfare strikes or soon will. Criminals are quickly progressing beyond the vandalism and petty theft associated with teen-aged hackers and into robbery and extortion schemes ranging up to millions of dollars, corporate executives and private investigators say. Others reply that the worst threats mentioned are mostly speculation. "Information warfare is a risk to our nation's economy and defense," said Martin Libicki, a senior fellow at the National Defense University. "But I believe we will find ways to cope with these attacks, adjust and shake them off, just as we do to natural disasters like hurricanes." ----- http://jya.com/adjust.txt (14 kb) ADJ_ust

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Re: [AP] Afghanistan
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:57 PM 9/29/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >"Wayne H. Allen" <whallen(a)capitalnet.com> writes: > >> At 04:10 AM 9/29/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >> >Afghanis publicly hanged their former president, Najibullah [no last name]. >> >Other countries should follow their example. >> > >> >> And this would accomplish???? And this has what to do with cryptography?? > >Nothing, of course - neither do Timmy May's stupid rants, lies, and personal >attacks. > >By the way, your abuse of your native language suggests that you're probably >a product of U.S. public education. > > And you would be far off base once again. Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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Re: GCHQ releases Venona files (from UK Telegraph)
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone in the UK cares to get the GCHQ Venona releases, we'll be pleased to scan them for distribution. Or put them on our Web site. Our fax: 212-799-4003 (US) Vox: 212-873-8700 Or if someone else scans them and needs a Web site, ftp them to: ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming

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Another briefing in Atlanta on the NRC crypto report,...
by CRYPTO 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Another briefing in Atlanta on the NRC crypto report, October 21, 1996 Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society A Public Briefing in Atlanta, Georgia Monday, October 21, 1996, 1:30-3:30 pm There will be a public briefing in Atlanta, Georgia by the National Research Council on this report. The briefing will be held at the Manufacturing Research Center on the campus of the Georgia Institute of Technology on Monday October 21, from 1:30 to 3:30. Dr. Herbert Lin, director of the NRC study will conduct the briefing. Questions from the audience will be entertained. For further information, please contact Dr. Myron L. Cramer (404) 894-7292, <myron.cramer(a)gtri.gatech.edu> at the Georgia Tech Research Institute. The event is open to the press and the public. Directions: From I-75/85 exit on Tenth Street and head West. Turn left on Hemphill Street and follow it to where it ends on Ferst Street. The Manufacturing Research Center is the modern building in front of you. Parking is limited; use public transportation or allow yourself extra time. If you have suggestions about other places that the committee should offer a public briefing, please send e-mail to crypto(a)nas.edu.

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Re: Internet plug pulled on Colombia's guerrillas
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 27 Sep 1996 14:33:42 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which >>has periodically paralyzed half the country with road blocks, >>found its route to the information superhighway barred. >> >>The Communist insurgents, who rose up in arms in 1964, >>embraced new technology last year in their fight to overthrow the >>government by launching a home page on the Internet. > >I couldn't resist smiling when I read this. Not that I want their access >cut; quite the opposite. But it is REALLY reassuring to see the authorities >behave in exactly the fashion you expect them to! Attempting to cut off >dissenting political voices IRL is de rigeur; now, this shows that they >believe "threat" to the government posed by allowing others to voice >contrary opinions on the 'net is real. It's particularly funny when you consider that the main justification for suppression is that insurgents (or rebels or freedom fighters or ...) kill people. Something along the lines of "We don't suppress unpopular views; we're just protecting our citizens". Now, it seems to me that that having a web page is a decidely non-lethal thing. <g> OTOH, it's probably more effective at getting the outside world to find out what's happening. Draw your own conclusions. # Chris Adams <cadams(a)acucobol.com> # <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash ksub latent cut ek mix reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 30 Sep 96 6:45:05 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ************ 14:56 100.00% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *****++**+** 33:36 99.96% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ++-+-++++-- 1:11:40 99.94% winsock winsock(a)c2.org --------..-+ 6:56:13 99.81% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #*+#*# -#*** 12:53 99.79% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ----.------ 7:25:48 99.62% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ************ 5:03 99.40% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net #--*##*#### 13:56 99.17% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----------+ 3:47:17 98.46% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - - +- - + 1:27:49 95.92% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --++++ +++ 1:56:13 92.08% replay remailer(a)replay.com **+****** * 4:11 91.92% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu + ++*++ .-* 2:49:27 91.01% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++++-++--+ 1:53:37 81.18% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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