December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Brock Meeks on NSA domestic codebreaking, from Muckraker
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is Brock's unedited Muckraker that's up at HotWired today (http://www.muckraker.com) Forwarded with permission. --Declan ********** Crypto Mission Creep By Brock N. Meeks (brock(a)well.com) The Justice Department has, for the first time, publicly acknowledged using the code-breaking technologies of the National Security Agency, to help with domestic cases, a situation that strains legal boundaries of the agency. Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick admitted in July, during an open hearing of the Senate's Governmental Affairs permanent subcommittee on investigations, that the Justice Department: "Where, for example, we are having trouble decrypting information in a computer, and the expertise lies at the NSA, we have asked for technical assistance under our control." That revelation should have been a bombshell. But like an Olympic diver, the revelation made hardly a ripple. By law the NSA is allowed to spy on foreign communications without warrant or congressional oversight. Indeed, it is one of the most secretive agencies of the U.S. government, whose existence wasn't even publicly acknowledged until the mid-1960s. However, it is forbidden to get involved in domestic affairs. During the hearing Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) asked Gorelick if the President had the "the constitutional authority to override statutes where the basic security of the country is at stake?" He then laid out a scenario: "Let's say a whole part of the country is, in effect, freezing to death in the middle of the winter [because a power grid has been destroyed] and you believe it's domestic source, but you can't trace it, because the FBI doesn't have the capability. What do you do?" Gorelick replied that: "Well, one thing you could do -- let me say this, one thing you could do is you could detail resources from the intelligence community to the law enforcement community. That is, if it's under -- if it's -- if you're talking about a technological capability, we have done that." And then she mentioned that the NSA had been called on to help crack some encrypted data. But no one caught the significance of Gorelick's' statements. Instead, the press focused on another proposal she outlined, the creation of what amounts to a "Manhattan Project" to help thwart the threat of information warfare. "What we need, then, is the equivalent of the 'Manhattan Project' for infrastructure protection, a cooperative venture between the government and private sector to put our best minds together to come up with workable solutions to one of our most difficult challenges,'' Gorelick told Congress. Just a day earlier, President Clinton had signed an executive order creating a blue-ribbon panel, made up of several agencies, including the Justice Department, the CIA, the Pentagon and the NSA and representatives of the private sector. Though the press missed the news that day; the intelligence agency shivered. When I began investigating Gorelick's statement, all I got were muffled grumbling. I called an NSA official at home for comments. "Oh shit," he said, and then silence. "Can you elaborate a bit on that statement?" I asked, trying to stifle a chuckle. "I think my comment says it all," he said and abruptly hung up the phone. Plumbing several sources within the FBI drew little more insight. One source did acknowledge that the Bureau had used the NSA to crack some encrypted data "in a handful of instances," but he declined to elaborate. Was the Justice Department acting illegally by pulling the NSA into domestic work? Gorelick was asked by Sen. Nunn if the FBI had the legal authority to call on the NSA to do code-breaking work. "We have authority right now to ask for assistance where we think that there might be a threat to the national security," she replied. But her answer was "soft." She continued: "If we know for certain that there is a -- that this is a non-national security criminal threat, the authority is much more questionable." Questionable, yes, but averted? No. If Gorelick's answers seem coy, maybe it's because her public statements are at odds with one another. A month or so before her congressional bombshell, she revealed the plans for the information age"Manhattan Project" in a speech. In a story for Upside magazine <http://www.upside.com/online/columns/cybersense/9607.html#one>, by old-line investigative reporter Lew Koch, where he broke the story, Gorelick whines in her speech about law enforcement going through "all that effort" to obtain warrants to search for evidence only to find a child pornography had computer files "encrypted with DES" that don't have a key held in escrow. "Dead end for us," Gorelick says. "Is this really the type of constraint we want? Unfortunately, this is not an imaginary scenario. The problem is real." All the while, Gorelick knew, as she would later admit to Congress, that the FBI had, in fact, called the NSA to help break codes. An intelligence industry insider said the NSA involvement is legal. "What makes it legal probably is that when [the NSA] does that work they're really subject to all the constraints that law enforcement is subject to." This source went on to explain that if the FBI used any evidence obtained from the NSA's code-breaking work to make it's case in court, the defense attorney could, under oath, ask the NSA to "explain fully" how it managed to crack the codes. "If I were advising NSA today I would say, there is a substantial risk that [a defense attorney] is going to make [the NSA] describe their methods," he said. "Which means it's very difficult for the NSA to do its best stuff in criminal cases because of that risk." Some 20 years ago, Sen. Frank Church, then chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, warned of getting the NSA involved in domestic affairs, after investigating the agency for illegal acts. He said the "potential to violate the privacy of Americans is unmatched by any other intelligence agency." If the resources of the NSA were ever used domestically, "no American would have any privacy left . . . There would be no place to hide," he said. "We must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that we never cross over that abyss. That is an abyss from which there is no return," he said. And yet, the Clinton Administration has already laid the groundwork for such "mission creep" to take place, with the forming of this "Manhattan Project." But if the Justice Department can tap the NSA at will -- a position of questionable legality that hasn't been fully aired in public debate -- why play such hardball on the key escrow encryption issue? Simple answer: Key escrow is an easier route. As my intelligence community source pointed out, bringing the NSA into the mix causes problems when a case goes to court. Better to have them work in the background, unseen and without oversight, the Administration feels. With key escrow in place, there are few legal issues to hurdle. In the meantime, the Justice Department has started the NSA down the road to crypto mission creep. It could be a road of no return. Meeks out...

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RE: Goodbye
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: James A. Donald The glory days are long past, and cannot be revived by forming a new mailing list. ....................................................................... I've never thought of the cypherpunks as being of the mind to "abandon" the "worthless" masses to their own devices. Rather, I thought of them as being of the mind to associate among those who thought like themselves about privacy, who shared the values of self-reliance, who supported the ideals of individual liberty, and who were open to including on the list anyone who wanted to better understand the subjects which are discussed there. But that quote above reminds me of the patent office's statement, often recounted, of how everything which could be invented had already been invented, and there couldn't possibly be any more new ideas introduced. It all depends, as usual, on the individuals involved - on the quality they bring to the subject, to the list, to the enterprise. Interesting question: what do elite sophisticates *do*, once they've reached their pinnacle? .. Blanc >

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Attention Random Nerd!!!
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Don't worry. We haven't forgot about you. You can expect a detailed response to your inquiry on Tuesday. Thanks for your patience. Webtech5 Rollerblade Consumer Service

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Re: [IMPORTANT] Firewalls
by amnesia＠chardos.connix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C[reep] May has been fired from Intel for stealing office supplies.

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Re: IP: - Biham/Shamir Differential Fault Analysis of DES, etc
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note that this attack requires physical access to the DES chip, to stress it so it will fail. It works great against "tamper-proof" devices such as smart cards. It doesn't work against encryption happening at any distance from the attacker (e.g. across the network). It doesn't work against stored information like PGP-encrypted email messages either. However, it might be possible to use the attack by beaming disruptive energies (heat, electrons, microwaves, etc) at a computer which is doing a lot of encryption, while simultaneously monitoring that computer's activity across a network. John

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Your editorial in the 10/14 PCWeek
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Geoff -- I never did finish that article for you about the Apple crypto alliance, but here's something you moght like. I will be out this weekend. If you have any questions, email; I will respond Sunday night. [ PS. This may appear in the 10/21 PC Week. ] On the other hand, it may be too esoteric for TidBITS.... ------------- Mr Gibson -- I'm afraid that I must disagree with your editorial in the October 14th issue of PC Week titled "Encryption Law Change: Good News" <http://www.pcweek.com/opinion/1014/14edit.html>. This is not a good change, but rather another attempt by the government to get it's "key escrow" (now renamed 'key recovery') agenda added to commercial software products. Let's start with the facts. A) This is not a change in the law. There is no law regarding export of encryption software. Congress has never passed any such law. These are State Department regulations, and presidential decrees. These regulations, which have the force of law to you and me, were never debated or voted upon by our elected representatives. They can be changed tomorrow the same way. In fact, they can be changed and the public need not even be notified. B) The Clinton administration agreed to allow the export of unescrowed encryption that used 56 bit keys for six months (with up to three six month renewals) on the following conditions: 1) That the companies shipping the software agree (in principle) to incorporate 'key recovery' features in their software. 2) That the companies shipping the software make status reports to the government every 6 months as to their progress towards a key recovery scheme. If they are making satisfactory progress, their export license will be renewed for another six months. 3) That after two years, they discontinue selling their 56 bit software, and only sell the 'key recovery' software. Condition #1 is what the Clinton Administration has been fighting for since 1993 when it first announced the Clipper chip, the ability to recover the plaintext of any encrypted communication. Condition #2 puts these companies at the mercy of a government panel which will decide, every six months, whether or not an internal project is proceeding 'satisfactorily'. If not, the company will be unable to sell its' encryption products abroad. This is a _big_ stick that the government can use to influence companies' actions. Condition #3 requires the companies to obsolete their products in two years, because they will no longer be able to sell the "unescrowed" software abroad, and because one of the goals of "key recovery" is that it will not interoperate with software that does not support "key recovery". B) Your editorial states: >Previous administrations have turned a deaf ear to industry pleas, as >had the Clinton administration for three and a half years. Until now, >the White House has toed the line drawn by law enforcement officials, >which equated powerful encryption technology with munitions. Now, the >administration has, under high-tech standard-bearer Vice President Al >Gore, done a complete about-face. > Even if this was, as you wrote, a "complete about face", and there were no other conditions (such as key recovery) involved, it would still be inadequate. A paper written this year by a group of noted cryptologists titled "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security" recommends that the minimum key length for security today was at least 75 bits, and for data that needs to be secured for the next twenty years, at least 90 bit keys should be used. The entire paper is availiable at <ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.txt> (ASCII) and <ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.ps> (PostScript). It is fascinating reading. You also wrote: >The administration plan also calls for private companies to surrender >encryption keys should court orders demand them. > This is incomplete and misleading. The original Clipper press release, (availiable at <http://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper/white_house_statement_4_93.txt> ) states: >Q: Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on > a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation > encrypted using the device. What would they have to do to > decipher the message? > >A: They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a > court order, to do the wiretap in the first place. They > would then present documentation of this authorization to > the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and > obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug > smugglers. The key is split into two parts, which are > stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key > escrow system. > Please note the word "normally". The Clinton Administration, even though repeatedly asked, has never explained what consitutes an abnormal case, and what they would consider authorization in that case. This was not a typo. This Q&A was part of an official White House press release. C) What exactly is "key recovery"? How does it work? No one knows. The White House press release doesn't say. The idea is that the 11 vendor coalition will work out the methodology, and the White House will "approve" it. This is, in my mind, one of the slickest moves in the whole situation. The administration has taken a problem that they have been unable to solve to the satisfaction of the computer industry (access to all encrypted communications), and suddenly, it's not the administration's problem any more! It's the computer industry's problem! >From an article in a recent ComputerWorld: (<http://www.computerworld.com/search/AT-html/9610/961014SL42crypto.html>) >And speaking of failures to communicate, take IBM, which recently teamed >with 10 companies to develop technology for a "key-recovery" system >intended to satisfy the new export criteria. > >Through some mysterious process, the scheme will allow the government to >get encryption keys when it needs them, without having to hold them "in >escrow" the Clipper approach. > >Why "mysterious? IBM's press release announcing the initiative was four >pages of self-congratulatory drivel with almost no information about >what the companies would develop or how it would work. > >Reminded of the secret Clipper algorithm, I sought details from IBM. I >asked a spokeswoman why the company hadn't just put out a nice, snappy >white paper explaining its new approach to key recovery. > >"We spent three months trying to do that, quite literally," the >spokeswoman said. "It's pretty confusing stuff, and whenever we get it >on paper, we aren't happy with it." > > Observers believe that if the 56-bit experiment proves successful, >relaxation of the restriction that still covers 128-bit key software >will follow. This could take place two years hence. > Who are these "observers"? They don't seem very observant to me. The government has stated that the export of unescrowed 56 bit encryption software is a temporary measure, and will be prohibited again (at the very latest) on Jan 1, 1999. At that time, the only (medium or) strong encryption software that will be allowed to be exported will be that which supports "key recovery". In conclusion, this is not a "refreshing change of direction" for the Clinton administration. This was "more of the same", albeit better disguised. The 11 companies who signed up for this coalition are receiving very little (56 bit export for at most two years), in exchange for giving up control of their encryption technologies to the government forever. -------------- -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." --Justice Robert Jackson, _American Communication Association v Douds_, 343 U.S. 306, 325 [1952] [via ed.nelson(a)SYSLINK.MCS.COM]

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Re: Blinded Identities [was Re: exporting signatures only/CAPI]
by whgiii＠amaranth.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In <Pine.SUN.3.94.961015211026.16787C-100000@polaris>, on 10/15/96 at 09:20 PM, Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> said: >On Mon, 14 Oct 1996, William H. Geiger III wrote: >> In <Pine.SUN.3.94.961014035114.28315K-100000@polaris>, on 10/14/96 at 04:01 AM, >> Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> said: >> >Banking is as much about confidence as any business can be. Anonymous or not, the >> >presence of funds which >> >infringe on regulations in one area or another are frightening to normal banking >> >customers. >> >> BULL!!!! >> >> There are only two things the banking customers care about: >> >> 1. Will my money be there in the morning? >> >> 2. What is my rate of return? >Both of these are affected by large scandals at banks. scandals=unwarranted media hype. True scandals of interest to the investment & banking community are along the lines of fraud, theft, embezzlement, poor or risky investment. Items that directly relate to 1 & 2. The S&L debacle in the US during the 80's is a good example. The rest is just crap to either: A: Sell more newspapers, and/or B: Increase government power. >In the case of the first example, runs on banks are hardly unheard of in relation to >major and even somewhat minor revelations about the source of deposit funds where >that source is criminal. (Again, I cite Union Bank of Switzerland which saw a three >day run of almost $200 million after >disclosures about UBS accounts which were used for kidnapping randsom. >DeBeers was one depositor which explicitly attributed their account >closures to the news). >The rate of return is directly affected by costs to the bank. Legal costs (even in >Switzerland) of defending against government and private party discovery and >compelled disclosure are severe. Need I even discuss the cost to the "legitimate" >BCCI account holder? What about the cost to Switzerland's banking industry due to the fact that they nolonger uphold their investors anonyminity?? Their industry has lost Billions due to their cow-towing to US and other governments snooping into investors accounts. What "cost" does that have to the account holders of their banks?? >And if customers are unconcerned about elements ther than #1 and #2, >why are such pains taken to invest in offshore institutions where the >costs (in sweat alone) can be higher? Because it is justified by avoiding government interference in their financial activities which in the long run increases their rate of return well above the added cost of doing so. >> The rest of it is a bunch of Govenment & Media hype & bull shit!! >The above incidents are easily found with a quick trip to the library. <sigh> Why so I can re-read the unwarranted media & government attacks on banking institutions because, god forbid, they actually took someone's money without running them over the coals first. Dam those nasty banks all to hell, they don't report every transaction of their investors to every government that may be interested. >The bottom line is that until anonyminity is not seen as some kind of >invariably criminal act with respect to banking, legitimate and >illegitimate money will be as like charged particles. No the bottom line is money is money. Their is no such thing as "legitimate" or "illegitimate" money. Banks should not be forced to play policemen, their job is processing money. Next time, get a CLUE. >Next time, stick to web consulting. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Who died an made you god of the banking industry?? Last time I looked Walter Wriston was still alive and well. :) (Incase you are too clueless to know who that is I am sure a trip to your local library should help.) -- ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting WebExplorer & Java Enhanced!!! Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of PGPMR2 - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice Look for MR/2 Tips & Rexx Scripts Get Work Place Shell for Windows!! PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info ----------------------------------------------------------- *MR/2 ICE: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers!

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NYT on DFA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, October 19, 1996, p. 37. 2 Israelis Outline New Risk To Electronic Data Security Hints That 'Smart Cards' Aren't So Smart By John Markoff San Francisco, Oct. 18 -- Two of Israel's leading computer scientists say they have found a way to more easily decode and then counterfeit the electronic cash "smart cards" that are now widely used in Europe and are being tested in the United States. The researchers have begun circulating the draft of a paper that points out higher security risks than those discovered last month by scientists at Bell Communications Research. The Bell communications researchers had reported that it might be possible to counterfeit many types of the "smart cards" that are being tested by banks and credit card companies, including Visa and Mastercard. The two Israeli scientists, Adi Shamir, a professor at the applied mathematics department at the Weizmann Institute, and Eli Biham, a member of the faculty of the computer science department at the Technion, reported that in addition to the so-called public key coding systems that were found vulnerable by the Bellcore team, private key data coding systems such as the American Data Encryption Standard, or DES, can be successfully attacked if a computer processor can be made to produce an error. The two Israeli's made a draft of their research available via the Internet on Thursday. In their paper the two wrote, "We can extract the full DES key from a sealed tamperproof DES encryptor" by analyzing fewer than 200 encoded messages. Both public key and private key data scrambling methods are based on the difficulty involved in factoring large numbers. A public key system permits two parties who have never met to exchange secret information. A private key system requires that a secret key be exchanged beforehand. Data coding experts said that the new Israeli method might be a more practical system than the previously announced Bellcore method, because unlike public keys, which are frequently used only once per message, a private secret key may be used repeatedly to scramble electronic transactions. "This seems a lot closer to something that might actually be used," said Matt Blaze, a computer researcher at AT&T Laboratories. Smart cards have been promoted as tamper proof, which is why computer scientists at Bellcore, one of the nation's leading information-technology laboratories, sounded the alarm last month, saying that a savvy criminal might be able to tweak a smart-card chip to make a counterfeit copy of the monetary value on a legitimate card. Executives at smart card companies said at the time that the attack was theoretical and that it would be impossible to make a smart card generate an error without actually destroying the card. However, Mr. Biham responded that he believed such hardware attacks were possible. The cards are generally damaged using heat or radiation, which causes the computer chip in the card to generate an error, which the Israeli scientists used to obtain the code key and copy the card. "I have ample evidence that hardware faults can be generated without too much difficulty," he said in an electronic mail message. "As a consultant to some high-tech companies, I had numerous opportunities to witness successful attacks by commercial pirates on pay-TV systems based on smart cards. I know for a fact that some of these attacks were based on intentional clock and power supply glitches, which can often cause the execution of incorrect instructions by the smart card." Other researchers said that the class of attacks demonstrated by the Bellcore team and the Israelis had been known by some members of the tightly knit community of cryptographers for several years, but the results had not been published. "Some of the smart card manufacturers are well aware of this flaw," said Paul Kocher, an independent Silicon Valley data security consultant. "But it doesn't mean that they have fixed it." [End]

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Mondex
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May must have been sharing needles with a rabid hedgehog.

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looking for old cpunk material
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hi, does anyone have that old cypherpunk enquirer that was a brilliant satire using the Carroll Alice in Wonderland framework? also, I wonder if anyone has a digitized image of the cpunk founders Hughes, TCM, Gilmore pictured in that old NYT article. (or alternately the same from that old issue of wired) please send either if you have them.. thanks;

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[PGP] Re: FYI - Biham/Shamir Differential Fault Analysis of DES, etc.
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In .cypherpunks, Matt Blaze <mab(a)research.att.com> writes: ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ <--- AT&T/NSA HQ >Subject: A new attack on DES > > >Research announcement: A new cryptanalytic attack on DES > > As usual, Blaze/AT&T uses cypherpunks to spread FUD from it's NSA masters. This time, however, he's stolen the work of others and twisted it to suit the corporate goals. Bet his next message is a commercial from AT&T for the clipper chip, which, they will ass-u-re us, fixes this socalled <<attack>>. Someone should sue Blaze and AT&T. Blaze, who is a wellknown homosexual Jew, probably can expect a nice bonus in next weeks blood money check for thinking of this latest little stunt, so I'm sure he can afford the legal fees. Just a cost of doing biz, right? Shame on him! p.S. I know this post sounds angry but this kind of shit just pisses me off so much.

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Q.E.D. reply to petty MESSger
by IPG Sales 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: perry(a)piermont.com Subject: Q.E.D. reply to petty MESSger > > IPG Sales writes: > > Some of you have sardonically written to say "Nihil Est > > Demonstrandum," N.E.D. because an OTP must be derived from a > > hardware source, that is, it must be a pure random sequence > > of limitless entropy. Accordingly, they unbashfully assert > > that an OTP generated by a computer program is not possible. > > > > How do they know that? Does the Bible tell them so, or the > > Koran, or do they get it from the Torah? Why not cite the > > source of their certainty instead of advancing an unsupported > > proposition. > > See Claude Shannon's papers on information theory. [Available as: C.E. > Shannon, Collected Papers: Claude Elmwood Shannon, N.J.A. Sloane and > A.D. Wyner, eds., New York: IEEE Press, 1993.] > > Shannon invented information theory in 1948 and 1949. Part of his > papers discuss the information theory of cryptosystems. He > mathematically proved that only a O.T.P. using non-reused physically > random numbers could provide what he termed "perfect secrecy". I > accept mathematical proofs above the Koran or the Bible. (The Torah is > a subset of the Bible.) As in so many other cases, you are so F.O.S. that it is unbelievable. Your eminence pontificating about it does make it true. Furthermore, Shannon certainly did not prove that physically random numbers are required to provide what he termed "perfect security." I believe that closer reading and interpretation will reveal that what he was saying was that any mathematical series other than truly random numbers can theoretically be reconstructed by some means, including brute force, should that be required. Obviously that is true. I do not disagree with the fact that brute force can be used to attack the algorithm that I have advanced. It you try all of the possible OTPs, PRNG encryptor streams, against the ciphertext, then only a limited few and maybe only one meaningful plain text can be obtained. There is absolutely no dispute about that. Accordingly, Shannon is quite correct in saying that it is not "perfect." It is not perfect in a mathematical sense, and in that limited sense only, you are correct. However to try all possibilities, is mathematically impossible - thus the algorithm must be attacked analytically - as EVEN you, or anyone else, will be able to clearly see, if you examine the algorithm, it cannot be attacked analytically. My algorithm most certainly does NOT produce a theoretical pure Random Number Stream, accordingly it is a PRNG, but it most certainly does produce an OTP that meets each and every requirement of such, other than some theoretical definition that you seek to impose on it by your dogmatic words. You do not have to take my word for it, the FULL ALGORITHM, which has never before been published, is set out on our web site. There is no mathematical proof that my PRNG streams are not an OTP - because they are OTPs. There are 156.8816 megabytes of raw encryptor stream data at our site. They constitute 10 OTPs, all using the same key, only the message numbers vary.but with different message numbers only. > > I do not mean to be rude, > > You are anyway. > You are so vane, so crass, so dogmatic, so blinded by your opinions, that you obviously look at yourself in the mirror wheneever given the opportunity. You do niot know what the hell you are constantly pontificating about. talking aboutand including the one under discussion herein. Why not show everyone your prowess by telling us what the key and the As, Bs, and Cs, are they were used to generate the 156.8816 megabytes referred to above. Of course, you cannot, so you bray like an ass to cover up your crypto impotence. > > but excuse me, what > > scientific proof can they offer for that immovable avowal? > > See above. See above > > > There is no scientific proof whatsoever, none at all, > > See above. See above > > > except > > for the words and their steadfast, and maybe self serving, > > postulate. > > See avove. See above and below > > > Accordingly, obviously it is they, not us, who are > > the ones that have "Nihil Est Demonstrandum," in this matter. > > See above. See above > > > There is not one scintilla of sustainable evidence to support > > such a doctrine. > > See above. See above and below. > > > While the vast majority of people knowledgeable about > > cryptography have not heretofore believed that it is possible > > for software to produce an OTP, > > It is not possible. It is absolutely possible, Q.E.D. > > The information content, or entropy, of the key stream is necessarily > no larger than its keyspace. That is, if you have a software > pseudo-random number generator using an N bit seed, the entropy of the > keyspace is necessarily never greater than N. This is mathematically > certain -- no amount of prayer on your part can change that. > > > that does not make it a > > scientific fact, More of your meaningless B.S. - Obviously you wrote your reply before you read my entire message. > > Sorry, its even better -- a MATHEMATICAL fact. > You saying it, like a lot of other supercilious crap that oozes out of you brain as "write bites," does not make it so. All kinds of crap is running loose up there, you need to get it under control someway. It is absolutely not perfect in the Shannon sense, but it does not have to be theoretically perfect to fulfill the requirement of being an OTP. You definition of an OTP, or a OTP as you mistakenly refer to it, is an extraneous mathematical definition that people have mistakenly extrapolated from Shannon. > > In support of their position, some have pointed out that John > > von Neumann, to paraphrase, stated that ARITHMETIC cannot > > produce random numbers, > > von Neumann meant any deterministic algorithm, actually. > There you go again, pulling things out of you crazy hat, head, running off at the brain again, stating a falsehood and hoping that people will overlook it. I assume that you held a seance with von Neumann and he told you that from the great beyond, since that is clearly not what he said. A careful reading of von Neumann does not reveal that he said one thing and meant another. He used the word ARITHMETIC, if he meant something else he world have said so. Furthermore, he was referring random numbers, and to repeat emphatically, my algorithm is a PRNG, but it also happens to be an OTP, as we can prove. Q.E.D. > > We stipulate the obvious fact that the encryptor stream > > generated by EUREKA is a PRNG stream, though we do consider > > it gross denigration to castigate it as ONLY a PRNG stream. > > If it is a PRNG, you do not have a One Time Pad, period. What you have > is a stream cipher. > It is a stream cipher, but it is also an OTP, just as a hardware sourced RNG is a stream cipher that is also an OTP. > > Furthermore, past examination has shown you have a POOR stream cipher. > Did you see the movie, Dumb and Dumber - you are obviously getting dumber and dumber and dumber - would I have come back to you 5 months later with the same thing - you are obviously brain dead - as I have stated on numerous occasions, the previous proffer was only a part of the overall algorithm, to solicit help from some of the cypherpunks, which I did get. The so called breaking with "Known Plain Text," was an absolute farce, it would have applied to only one message where it could be applied, if at all - it did not apply to the whole system, each OTP was, and is completely different - but that is beside the point, we did make some changes to negate other possible attacks, but those were modest changes. Any one that looks at the algorithm, which obviously, as a self proclaimed crypto Diety, you have not deign to do, can determine that it is in now way what you have looked at before. > > It is a PRNG issue that also happens to be an extremely well > > behaved OTP sequence, with limited but ample entropy, as well. > > If the entropy is limited, you do not have a One Time Pad, period, end > of discussion, its over. > I am sorry God! I did not understand that was one of PETTY MESSger's Commandments. You say that Shannon, or you, or someone can prove that mathematically, so let's see someone do it. 156.8816 megabytes of raw encryptor stream output should be enough to work with - if you need more, I can provide same. I agree that theoretically it can be broken by brute force but that is patently impossible as you can quickly discern if you examine the algorithm and try it, instead of salivating your mouth off with baseless blabber. Obviously, my algorithm does not produce a pure random stream. I agree with Shannon that it is not "perfect," but it most certainly is perfect enough to meet any and all practical requirements, now and forever. > > It meets each and every criteria rationally established for an > > OTP in all reasonable aspects. > > Set by WHOM? By you? Your criteria bear no resemblance to those > accepted in general. Are you one of those people who sells someone a > loaf of bread and says "this is an automobile, by every criterion I > have set for automobiles"? > There you go again, strutting about and spreading your pretentious turkey droppings, manure, all over the place. As you know, I headed the OTP group at NSA, and while there I conceived and implemented, under the direction of Abraham Sinkov, Dottie Bloome, Leon O'mera and William J. Cherry, LONE STAR, the Library of ONe time pad Encryption Statistical Analysis Routines. I was responsible for the generation and computer analysis of OTPs at NSA. I have worked on thousands of OTPs, both in the generation of, and comprehensive analysis of same, including looking for repetitive usage of the same OTP, including direct as well as nth degree derivatives, over the last 40 years, at NSA and at Mauchly-Wood. I make no claim that I am the world's greatest OTP authority, or even an authority on them like you obviously THINK you are, but I think that I have more than a little knowledge about the subject of OTPs. That brings up something that utterly fascinates me. Which is your frequent oblique writings about VERONA, or is it VENONA, or maybe it is VERONICA, or maybe even VERONIKA - anyway you know what I mean. Would you be so kind as to enlighten me, us, about that subject - I would like to finally find out what really happened from an authoritative source. How were we able to break some of those messages. Please help me, us, out with details instead of blabber. For those who have not seen my resume', it together with dozens and dozens of references, many of whom are well known, and some of whom you may know, is posted on our web site, but obviously that does not prove anything, except to provide a point of reference. The point is that we have disclosed the complete algorithm, for the first time at the web site, so let's see someone provide us with the key or the ABCs. Our server is downloading an enormous number of the algorithms/data/statistical tests, over 1,000 so far, so we assume someone is testing it and evaluating it. And for you to claim that my contention is analogous to comparing bread to an automobile, clearly demonstrates how PETTY of a MESSinger, you are. You cannot do anything, so you babble in mindless hyperbole. > > Think about that simple supposition for a moment. What do we > > mean by an OTP? > > Something different from what everyone else means, so it makes no > difference. Obviously something different from what YOU, and most others, mistakenly think it means. It is not some esoteric, theoretical mathematical meaning that has no relation to our real world. It is a tool to encrypt and decrypt messages with, it is not a mathematical formula. If you say that a random number sequence is not generated, I agree. If however, you go on and add that, "thus by definition it is not an OTP," then that is patently and absolutely a false statement, though subscribed to by most of the cryptography community. You are a mix-master stirring up cryptography and IT, and you simply cannot homogenize them into a fully blended mix. I assert that an OTP is a tool used for encryption which by definition, can never be used again, and which consists of a sequence of bits which can not be derived by any POSSIBLE, not theoretical but POSSIBLE, means. Granted, our stream could theoretically be derived by trying all of the possible 10^34322 keys/table values, but that is theory, it is absolutely clear that there is no way to try all the possibilities, or even the first 800 bits of an encryptor stream. Any relatively informed mathematician can quickly discern that there is no analytical attack that can be made against the stream, it is that simple, as readers/evaluators will find. If the only method of cracking the system is by brute force, and that is impossible, then it is absolutely an OTP for encryption and decryption purposes, which is its purpose - it is not something to define in IT writings. Our algorithm is absolutely not perfect in the theoretical sense but it is PERFECT as far as the ability to determine the underlying plain text is concern. > > > Not only that, but you can prove it to yourself, Q.E.D. We > > maintain that it is discernible to any knowledgeable person > > who probes the algorithm, that the only analytical tack that > > can be mounted against EUREKA is brute force and that is > > patently impossible.. One of your Cpunk colleagues says he > > uses Triple DES, 168 bits, and he does not believe that it > > can be brute forced - I agree, 3-DES, 10^50+ possibilities, > > cannot be brute forced now, or in the foreseeable future - > > then what about the EUREKA's 10^34322 possibilities, > > 10^34271+ greater than 3-DES? No way, not now, not ever. > > Furthermore, EUREKA is an order, or more, magnitude faster > > than triple DES, easier to use, much more secure, etal. > > I believe that we have already established that your cipher is easy to > crack, so your claims that it is hard to crack really don't matter. > > Perry > Don't yopu wish PETTY MESSger. Did your mother put lambs blood on your door when brains were passed out? Obviously, you are a victim of severe brain passover. To think that I would post the same partial algorithm that I heretofore posted is so crass as not to deserve comment. It does however, define your abstruse, enigmatic thinking that somehow facts can be ignored, that you can use smoke, mirrors, semantics and words to block out the truth. To repeat, we have made some a changes, and for the first time disclosed, detailed, the FULL ALGORITHM at great length at our web site. The reason that you do not want to argue that is obviously because you are absolutely impotent in that regard and you are unable to dispute facts, so you blindly conjure up some witches brew of words and think that people will never know the difference. To paraphrase John Dean, the truth will always come out and your ass braying will never stop that truth. Don Wood,

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[DES] Digital signatures
by amnesia＠chardos.connix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[rook] May steals condiments from fast food restaurants.

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Japanese Export Restrictions
by Scott J. Schryvers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: is there no end to AP & Creative Wiretap Arguments?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:52 AM 10/18/96 -0400, Hallam-Baker wrote: >Steve Schear wrote: > >> How about as a means of coercing war criminals ethnic purgers, as those in >> Bosnia/Serbia, to turn themselves in to proper tribunals for judging. >> Having AP bettors wager $100,000s on your untimely retirement, unless you >> turn yourself in, could induce one to consider conventional justice. > >On the other hand it would provide said war criminals with a convenient >mechanism for carrying out their crimes. Actually, no. AP "stacks the deck" dramatically against those few who engage in war crimes. People from all sides of a dispute who object to them can donate, and anybody considering participating in war crimes has to keep this absolutely secret. >It does not work for Bell and his appologists to wave their hands and >say "trust me it will be better". There is absolutely no reason to >believe that AP markets would be used by anyone but psychopaths. >No mechanism is proposed which restricts the purposes to which the AP >markets can be put. They would inevitably be used by the KKK and >neo-NAZI groups for hate-crimes. How long do you think that such groups would last with AP functional? Consider all those bleeding-hearts who are going to be voting for Clinton this year. I expect that many of them would gladly donate money to see organizations like the KKK dead. How effective will these hate-organizations be if they're running for their lives? >> All human rights are Naturally derived as are the 'Laws of the Jungle'. >> Governments instituted among men should derive their rights from the >> soverignty of its citizens. Unfortunately, many countries choose to ignore >> this. AP should serve an occassionally competitive system to keep the >> 'duly consistuted' system on its toes lest those in authority reap the law >> of the jungle. > >Rights do not exist outside a legal framework that supports them. Many if not most philosophers disagree. My _opinion_ of my rights exists, and for the vast majority of the people that's quite enough to remind them to steer clear. >Arguments >from natural law have been discredited for 300+ years. Such arguments >merely reify the prejudices of one society into axiomatic rights without >the bother of having to justify them. There is no logical basis to >prefer the "rights" of th US constitution over the "rights" recognised >by the Islamic Jihad. Since "they live there" and "we live here" there doesn't have to be any contradiction in this. >If you read the US declaration of Independence it is very clear that its >authors rejected natural law arguments. The rights that they hold to be >"self evident" are extreemly abstract principles which could be >justified within almost any ethical system. The removal of the word >"God" was deliberate and reflects a concious rejection of the natural >law argument. AP is not dependant on any sort of "natural law" argument. It doesn't really matter where you got the opinion of your rights that you have. "Natural law," or "gift of God," or anything else. Most of the time things will work out just fine. True, if you start believing that you have a right to a dozen free doughnuts per day from the shop down the street, and the owner of that shop disagrees, there may be a dispute. However, I suggest that disputes of this kind will be rare and short-lived, for reasons which should be obvious: You may have wanted a dozen doughnuts, but you'll end up with a dozen holes! >AP is self-contradictory. It claims to uphold "rights" by infringing >them massively and disproportionately and in such a way that no rights >would remain. It's odd that you would say this. Most societies operate today against crime by putting people in jails, which would (absent a crime to justify this) be a violation of THEIR rights. As for whether this is "disproportionate"... Let's see, a person can easily get a few years in jail for doing a bank robbery where he gets a thousand dollars or so. Yet, there were a number of bankers in the 1980's in the US who got no greater sentences for stealing tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. You find the "proportionality" in this and send me a note. My solution is to allow the victims of a crime to purchase the punishment of the criminal, which I claim will be a fair fairer solution, and one that will accomplish far more deterrence than the status quo. >It is impossible to justify AP except in extreeme >authoritarian terms that could be used to justify any system of >government. > Phill Some of us seem to disagree. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Car Rental: Refusal to take Check Cards
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Curious about this policy I went out to rent a few cars this week with a new check card from a local D.C. bank. Here were my results: Avis: Refused Hertz: Refused initally, but accepted after coaxing Thrifty: Refused National: Refused Alamo: Refused, got quite impolite after coaxing Enterprise: Accepted, but only because the teller barely spoke english Dollar: Closed The policy seems to be well entrenched. A few calls and some phone jockying finally produced an explanation from Richard Vine, Assistant to Edward L. McCarty the President and General Manager of Enterprise Rent-A-Car. According to him: When the customer rents a car and uses a normal credit card, the Rent-a-Car company "reserves" the funds which are essentially "In limbo." By requesting an authorization from e.g., Visa for a certain amount, that amount is deducted from the credit line of the customer. The customer cannot spend it away and it is essentially "reserved" for the rental car company. The rental car company, should they be forced to try and collect funds, essentially has an option on the funds (a security interest in the credit of the consumer?) Check cards suffer from a few defects from the view of car rental companies. 1. The customer can stop payment on a charge. Although I pointed out that a customer can likewise stop payment on a credit charge, it appears that while the credit card issuers must adhere to a standard requirement for dispute resolution (between merchant and issuing bank) check cards often have no standard dispute resolution system or no system at all. This leaves the recourse to negotiations between rental car company and consumer. This often results in collection procedures. (Read, expensive) 2. The customer can spend down the account entirely before the payment is posted. This cannot be done with credit cards as a portion of the credit line is "authorized but not processed." Essentially the rental car companies are concerned that they may never be paid. It seems check cards have been the subject of much abuse in this field. Check cards do not provide for instant clearing as far as I can tell. I think check cards simply give the account number to the merchant's machine and then a "check" is printed out on the spot and signed by the customer. As far as I can tell, the transaction still requires processing, even if it is a bit more automated. One would assume that on the spot clearing methods (digital cash) would solve this problem. Just TRY, however, to rent a car with real cash. I pointed out "Many check cards don't necessarily look like check cards, how are you dealing with that?" Answer: "We're working on it." Cash is dead. (The good news is that I had 2 rental cars to play with for the day. Haven't yet decided if I should take the $200 out of my checking card account before the transactions post). -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li

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Re: is there no end to Murder Politics & Creative Wiretap Arguments?
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: hallam(a)ai.mit.edu >To: jimbell(a)pacifier.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Cc: hallam(a)ai.mit.edu >Subject: Re: is there no end to Murder Politics & Creative Wiretap Arguments? >Date: Sat, 19 Oct 96 14:14:18 -0400 >X-Mts: smtp >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk >X-UIDL: 4c7d7a4a67ee32ebe0b7420122e108b7 > > >>Actually, no. AP "stacks the deck" dramatically against those few who >>engage in war crimes. People from all sides of a dispute who object to them >>can donate, and anybody considering participating in war crimes has to keep >>this absolutely secret. > >You hve absolutely no idea of what is happening in Bosnia. There >is widespread support in each of the communities for genocide >policies. Yadda yadda. Phill, would you consider not cc'ing C-punks on your missives to Jim Bell? You seem to be getting quite excited, and the next thing you know, those on the list will be faced with a series of anonymous posts suggesting that Jim has crumbs in his beard, or some other unnatural act. Dave

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Re: is there no end to Murder Politics & Creative Wiretap Arguments?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:14 PM 10/19/96 -0400, hallam(a)ai.mit.edu wrote: > >>Actually, no. AP "stacks the deck" dramatically against those few who >>engage in war crimes. People from all sides of a dispute who object to them >>can donate, and anybody considering participating in war crimes has to keep >>this absolutely secret. > >You hve absolutely no idea of what is happening in Bosnia. There >is widespread support in each of the communities for genocide >policies. After 4 years of killing? I wouldn't be surprised, although what you say sounds like an exaggeration. But that's four years of NON-AP conditions. Don't blame AP for problems caused by NON-AP practice. >You do not demonstrate any reason why people would be more interested >in murdering politicians than other people. Actually, I think I did, although I'll spell it out in more detail since it's so easy. If looked at on a "per-dollar-stolen" basis, an individual would have no more reason to kill a given politician than a criminal. However, since politicians are typically responsible for thousands of times more theft than common criminal, this will result in a vastly greater motivation. For example, in the US, 535 Federal legislators preside over $1 trillion in thefts, or about $2 billion per legislator. If only 1/1000 of that money were spent to eliminate the problem, that would be $2 million per-legislator bounty, which should be far more than enough. >You assume that contract murderers do not have political or social >agendas of their own. A member of the KKK is much more likely to >become a contract killer than a liberal. That doesn't bother me at all. It is the contribution system which will decide who the likely targets will be, not the killers themselves. If anything, an ex-KKK person would have far less desire to lynch a random black, for example, if instead he can make thousands of dollars killing genuine bad-guys. >>How long do you think that such groups would last with AP functional? > >Murder Politics (lets give your psychopathic scheme an acurate name) >will never be functional. If anonymous cash implied muder politics then >society would be right to reject anonymous cash. Except that the current political system is far worse. The system has been hijacked by a small subset of the population, who manipulate it for their own benefit. Once in control, it became in their interest to vastly increase the power and influence of government, which they did in America over the last 80+ years. AP provides the prospect of making control of government useless and even potentially fatal, eliminating much of the corruption that is normally seen. I think people will reject AP only to the extent that they misunderstand it. In addition, one of the benefits of living in a world with many different countries is that each may try out a different system, with the successful ones tending to prosper, and the less successful ones dying off. (Witness 1989 and Communism, for example.) I contend that the first society to adopt AP will be so dramatically successful, it'll spread inexorably. That's why the people in control of the current political systems will want to resist AP so strenuously. >It is easily done >since money only has value so long as it is convertable. > >Not only are rights dependent on a social infrastructure that >guarantees that they will be respected but currency is as well. >Without the social and political infrastructure of the US >government a dollar bill has only the value of the paper its >printed on. An electronic balance has zero value. All you're saying is that the people who are currently in power will resist. I know that. But they will fail. >If you want to live in a society where the political system has been >"reformed" through murder of inconvenient politicians then go and >live in Columbia. Its the nearest thing you will find on the planet >to libertopia. No, not nearly enough politicians have been killed in Columbia to result in a society that could best be described as an "anarchy." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Wrap Up: Conference on Law Enforcement and Intelligence
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Summary: 1. Digital Cash is on the map. The Department of Justice will be aggressively pursuing it. Money laundering is becoming an increasing priority and crypto policy in the United States is almost certain to be a casualty. It's no longer, as it seemed to have been 6 months ago, a question of "well until the government finds out what the potential is, we are ok." It is now: "Until the government can manage to get the right people in an office together." I'm not sure this is a particularly long time. 2. Remailers are on the map. The Department of Justice will be watching these and an active effort to penetrate them is under way. What this means exactly is unclear. The Department of Justice, according to Jeff Smith and acknowledged by nods and "hmmm"'s of agreement from the DoJ panel members, is going to be attacking remailers. No idea how this may take shape, but its in the works. Beware Vatis and his ilk. 3. Both law enforcement and intelligence are displayingh an unnerving amount of cooperation. No longer can we depend on turf wars to distract them. 4. Might be a good idea to review implementations of crypto. Both James Woolsey and Stewart Baker made sly remarks about the reliability of crypto in the public domain. While this is to be expected, it might be a good idea to begin to look at crypto with a more discerning eye. In private conversation with Stewart Baker, my collegue mentioned the potency of crypto algorthms in the public domain. Wouldn't this make criminal use simply too easy? Should law enforcement not be considering banning all crypto. Baker wasn't giving away any secrets, obviously, but he did suggest that tho many of the publicly available methods were potent, their implementations might be weak. (This while touting a cute little "PGP" litigation bag. Anyone know where these can be found?) Perhaps its time to consider a more direct and careful implementation review of IDEA, 3DES, MD5 and other common methods? How widely reviewed is PGP's implementation REALLY? What about other public products? Bottom line: Be afraid, be very afraid. -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li

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ABA Conference on Law Enfrocement and Intelligence - Debrief
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I got sidetracked and it has been awhile, I am reposting the entire summary along with the second half, which I just finished. Typos are all mine. : The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security - Law Enforcement and Intelligence Conference - Debrief The ABA's Standing Committee on Law and National Security is one of the more successful Committees to come out of the ABA. It's conferences and early morning breakfast briefings and lectures are attended by some of the leading experts in the fields of National Security, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence and no small number of the beltway power elite. I'm not sure if many people outside the legal community understand the degree to which attorney's have impacted and thrived in both the law enforcement and the intelligence communities. In fact many, if not most, CIA case officers and station chiefs, as well as field operatives, are attorneys or have law degrees. Other intelligence organizations are no different. It should come as little surprise then if a committee of the ABA should happen to attract a surprising amount of intelligence professionals. This conference was no exception. Spooks, Feds, Legislators, and even a few Kooks were in attendance. Members of the British, American, Canadian, and German intelligence communities were in attendance. A colleague and I attended the majority of the conference and except where noted the reflections below are a summary of our collective notes and thoughts on the subject matter discussed. I'm taking a broad view of relevance to cypherpunks, but I will omit that which seems clearly not of direct or somewhat indirect interest. Part One: A Changed World for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the 21st Century Thursday, September 19 7:45 AM Registration and Continental Breakfast 8:15 AM Welcome Remarks Paul Schott Stevens Chair ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security 8:30 AM I. An Overview of a Changing World. *The Traditional Relationship of Law Enforcement, Foreign Intelligence and National Security (1945-1995): *How Have Other nations Balanced Legal and National Security Requirements and Responded to a Changed World. *The Changed Threats to U.S. National Security- New Problems and Priorities Elizabeth R. Rindskopf Bryan Cave Former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency Member, Standing Committee on Law and National Security Ms. Rindskopf outlined the three classic "periods" of intelligence community and mission development in U.S. history and set the stage for the discussions to follow. Interesting subjects she did touch on included section 715 of the Senate intelligence bill. The section allows the law enforcement community to request assistance from foreign intelligence in collection efforts on foreigners outside of the United States. The BNC and BCCI scandals were discussed as a backdrop of the hazards of law enforcement and intelligence separation. Zoe Baird Senior Vice President and General Counsel Atena Life and Casualty Company Member, Standing Committee on Law and National Security. Ms. Baird discussed the dangers presented by globalization and new technologies. She highlighted the point that crime globalization often follows corporate globalization and the manner in which a single individual's ability to cause harm has increased in scope (The NYNEX Hack). Also interesting was her discussion of the manner in which the more organized elements of criminal activity worked to take advantage of the very open society in the United States (Fund raising, publications, anonymous communications). Those activities once merely violations of criminal law are, she argued, now increasingly national security concerns and that national security events impact elections in very dramatic and direct ways (Atlanta and Israel bombings as examples). Crime, she pointed out, gets about an 80% response in the polls, where as "National Security and Foreign Policy" get perhaps a 3% response. Merging these elements together serves an administration. She also pointed out the trend toward making these issues generally more accessible to the public. (Specifically by use of language. "Transnational threats"- which was a term of art for non-state terrorism and organized crime- becomes "Global Crime" or "Global Lawlessness." Ms. Baird ended by asking how the firewalls between Law Enforcement and Intelligence could be rebuilt with these new considerations in mind. I considered her a balanced cynic. She managed to get across some very realpolitik notions without much murmuring from the (limited) civil libertarian crowd. David Bickford Former Legal Adviser to the British Intelligence Services (MI5- MI6) Mr. Bickford has in past served as a conduit between British Intelligence services and the United States. He is well known and respected among the American and European Intelligence communities. Knowing Mr. Bickford I can also say that he pays a great deal of attention to who his audience is and speaks to their interests with disarming accuracy. His discussion is important because it is a good insight into what the policy makers in the United States are looking at. He began by highlighting the new international nature of crime. No longer is it confined to power blocs. "Multi-jurisdictional illegality" is increasingly a concern. New highspeed communications channels are a contributor and organized crime groups are possessed of extremely advanced administration abilities. They are leaner and meaner because they use computers, encryption, communications, and use up less resources in administration. The ability to make the organization smaller also makes it harder to penetrate. In this environment, international cooperation is essential. He called for more active and expansive extraterritorial jurisdiction for certain crimes, and lamented his own country's lack of enthusiasm for this concept though they are slowly "coming around." His solutions included the labeling of organizations, even when they are not geographically based, as "illegal international organizations" and using all means to combat them. He envisions a wide cooperation by the G7 to accomplish this, leaving such organizations with no safe haven. Sanctions regimes formerly employed only as against "rogue states" and countries in disfavor should be employed to destroy these illegal international organizations wherever they are. He indicated that the other G7 states should build on the recent Clinton Executive Order which seizes the assets of such organizations which may be located in the jurisdictions of the G7. He called for measures to deny these assets access to the major securities and international finance markets and proposed that only organizations like the NSA could confront and complete these tasks. Intelligence, he argued, is the only organization that can keep up with international crime and as a result there should be developed court processes to introduce intelligence into criminal cases while protecting the more sensitive information (sources and methods) as irrelevant. "Evil men" have taken an "early lead." $500 billion a year comes out of the United States alone in money laundering. 400 billion in assets is attributed to drug cartels, 80% of which are Cali Cartel assets. There are over 250 international Russian criminal organizations currently operating. Mr. Phillip Heymann James Barr Ames Professor and Director, Center for Criminal Justice Harvard Law School Member: Standing Committee on Law and National Security [Didn't find his comments particularly relevant] II. Political Challenges in the World Environment *Breakup of the U.S.S.R. *Loss of National Sovereignty and Control by Nation States *Erosion of National Legal Systems Military Threats at the Subnational Level: The Terrorism Dilemma (This looked very much like the section given to the Soviet Analysts, who no longer have much of a job to do). Mr. Morton H. Halperin Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Democracy, National Security Council [Canceled] Mr. Peter Rodman Director, National Security Programs Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mr. Rodman discussed the new "trans-national areas." Terrorism, corruption, economic and criminal activity. He discussed the side effects of collapsing empires (the rise of organized crime to enforce property and contract rights that cannot be enforced by the government, the shift of power to the local from the regional and executive areas) and discussed, in this context, the importance of avoiding petty squabbles over issues like trade and the like because they threaten the more important strategic cooperation that will be necessary to battle global and transnational criminal activity. Ms. Jessica E. Stern Consultant Lawrence Livermore National Laboraory and Former Director, Russian, Uklrainian and Eursian Affairs, National Security Council Ms. Stern discussed the severe proliferation problems presented by a weak Russia, particularly the weakening of MPCA (Material Protection Control and Accounting). 11:15 AM III. Technical and Practical Changes in the Relevant World Environment *Global Technologies Emerge *"Equal Access" to Advanced Technology by State and Private Actors * Change in Size, Type and Location of National Security Threats: Challenge for Modern Intelligence and Law Enforcement Stewart Baker Steptoe and Johnson Former General Counsel, National Security Agency Member, Standing Committee on Law and National Security Mr. Baker's remarks were brief, but he discussed the evening of the odds with respect to government and private organizations caused by technology. Admiral William O.. Studeman United States Navy (retired) Former Acting Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Studeman discussed "Information Warfare," pointing out specifically that advanced societies were more vulnerable because of their financial, banking and revenue system's dependence on computer. Power, air traffic control, public safety and media were also mentioned in passing. Admiral Studeman went on to call for more intense secrecy in law enforcement (not intelligence) as to collection methods and new technology. He called passionately for funding for the DigiTel program as well as a "key escrow" policy. Anthony Oettiger Chairman, Program on Information Resources Policy Harvard University Mr. Oettinger was perhaps the only moderate speaker in the conference. He discussed Executive Order 13010 (establishing the Critical Infrastructure Protection organization) and called for more private sector input in policy making (Banks, markets, businesses want to make their own security arrangements, and are not very interested in paying much attention to the suits at their door who claim 'Hi, we're from the government, we are here to help.' He pointed out the difference between the movements in Airline Security (which is drifting from privately maintained, to publicly maintained) and Internet security (which is doing the reverse). He called for reasoned response to the new threats which did not commit expensive intelligence and law enforcement resources to combat the single hacker. Proper threat assessing is important, and intelligence should be used to pinpoint the weak points. Walter Pincus National Security Affairs Reporter The Washington Post Mr. Pincus asked if (a lovely analogy to chicken little and osterages with their heads in the sand). His most interesting remarks regarded the wisdom of dedicating such substantial resources to repell non-strategic efforts to disrupt networks. (Hackers, lone gunmen, etc.) He questioned. Doesn't, afterall, a strategic attack require much more preperation? Should we really allow the personality of e.g., Louis Freeh, who has the capital dazzled from his glow, to direct these resources? 12:30 PM Luncheon John Deutche Director, Central Intelligence Agency [Cancelled in the wake of the investigation into alleged CIA drug connections in California] Part Two: The Implications of a Changed World for a Set of Critical Decisions 2:00 PM IV. Protections Against New High Tech Dangers; Problems of Encryption, Information Warfare and Computer Theft Stewart Baker: Mr. Baker, considering what his position once was, was surprisingly mellow. There wasn't much warning for law enforcement, he commented. Cryptography lends itself to criminal activity and subversive warfare. It's hard to reherse attacks because you have to do it on real live systems. For defenses, he suggests the following: 1. Monitor and protect government systems. 2. Launch attacks, both on our systems and on others. (!) 3. Take note that attacks on private systems are the most worrisome. (Financial institutions, exchanges, utilities) There is a manifest mistrust between government and private sector business. Private parties are unlikely to accept help from government. The liklihood of government systems being adopted is slim. Banks, for example, make high security expenditures and the choice of system is best left up to them. (!) There are, however, market failures in the private sector. 1. No one in the private sector bothers to protect against a simutanious attack on power and telephone service. This is HIGHLY unlikely to happen by chance, but by design it is almost certain to happen in an attack. 2. Reporting of incidents. Incidents are rarely if ever reported by private sector interests. (Flight of funds on reporting, bank runs, lost of customers all make reporting incidents difficult to justify). Collection or REQUIRED disclosure, Mr. Baker argues, is required. 3. Some minimum recovery mechanism is required. There is no independent information system for private sector interests because there is very little financial incentive to build one. How will the civilian system be recovered after an attack? Lee Bollinger Provost Dartmouth College Mr. Bollinger discussed 1st Amendment issues. He had, however, a strange take on the way they should be broken down. Namely: Pro Crypto: ITAR as prior restraint. Yes the 1st Amendment is painful sometimes. So what? This is the cost of a freedom of speech culture. Anti Crypto: This is a foreign affaris matter. Courts are not fit to make analysis here. This is not the pentagon. It is "Technical" data and therefore outside 1st Amendment scope. Kate Martin Director, Center for National Security Studies. The Center for National Security Studies used to be a section of the ACLU, but has since broken off and gone its own way. Ms. Martin pointed out that the FBI shouldn't WANT to get involved in the sources and methods problems that taking intelligence information would present. The confrontation clause will present problems for the FBI if it gets information which fall under intelligence "Sources and methods" and then tries to use it in court. (Greymail - Where the defense calls for sensitive records necessary to the defense and if they get a ruling in favor of the discovery, the government either has to make national security documents public or drop the charges). She also pointed out that in the current draft of the anti-terrorist bill, the FBI can "task" the CIA to make collections abroad. The CIA could then break into a foreign residence, and look for evidence, find evidence implicating a previously unknown American citizen in e.g., drug smuggling. The FBI could prosecute the evidence, which was obtained without warrant and would constitute illegal search in the United States, and the U.S. Citizen would have, under current 4th amendment standards, NO STANDING to move for exclusion of the evidence found by the CIA. Howard Shapiro General Counsel Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr. Shapiro was quite slippery. He spent most of his time dodging Ms. Martin's barbs by indicating that the FBI tended to err in favor of applying the constitution even in extraterratorial cases (Achille(?) Laro, where the terrorists were read their rights even though outside of U.S. Territorial Jursidiction) and the the FBI would respect limits even if not required to. Rather weak argument, quite well presented. Suzanne Spaulding General Counsel U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [Not Present - Ms. Spaulding was doing markup on the new Intel Bill (Since signed) at the time, though she arrived later] 4:45 Adjournment 6:30 Reception and Dinner Speaker Ernest R. May Charles Warren Professor of History The John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University [My associate and I were forced to miss this session] Friday, September 20, 1996 8:00 AM Continental Breakfast 8:30 Overview Philip B. Heymann 8:40 VI. New Uses for Intelligence as a Necessary Arm of U.S. Policy Presentation: R. James Woolsey Shea & Gardner Former Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Woolsey made some very interesting comments. He called rather passionately for "Key Escrow," more potent funding for "DigiTel" but also suggested that perhaps the dictator that was using modern encryption "might not be hiding as much as he thinks he is." 10:15 AM VII. Law Enforcement and Intelligence * Can Intelligence Technical Capabilities Better Support Law Enforcement Objectives: What are the Legal and Practical Limits? * Should Covert Action and Technical Intelligence Gathering be Available to Law Enforcement? * Rethinking Jurisdicitonal Lines, Roles and Responsibilites: Are New Structures Required? * The Law Enforcement and Intelligence Relationship; Past, Present and Future. * Can Common Standards be Achieved for Collection and Oversight? Moderator: The Honorable John H. Shenefield Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (Introductions and short statements only) Presentations: Mark M. Richard Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice Mostly discussion of anti-drug efforts but a few interesting comments: Internet banking is on the radar screen and there may soon be an entirely seperate department of DoJ which addresses internet banking crime. DoJ is clearly leading the effort here. Intelligence agencies less so. Jeffrey H. Smith General Counsel Central Intelligence Agency (Soon to return to Arnold and Porter) A few rather vague quesitons came up about anonymous transactions and internet came up. The Attorney general "is putting together structures to attack that." Rather ominous. Michael A. Vatis Associate Deputy Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice Vatis is a young shining star in Justice, a Gorelick protege and likely to be the most dangerous individual to cypherpunks in the coming years if he stays with justice. Vatis understands remailers, encryption, PGP, even mentioned "mixmaster" and so forth specificlly. He is sly, knows just when to shut up and is probably the front man on the DoJ attempt to attack remailers and anonymous communications in general. He is a real problem for cypherpunks and the party is clearly over. Jonathan M. Winer Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affaris Winer's points of interest to the list were money laundering related. The tactic, he indicated, is to get foreign governments to adopt legislation to make money launderers move elsewhere. (The carrot and the stick approach is used). He did acknowledge the need for money laundering in the intelligence community, and urged, vaguely, for cooperation as money launding regulation "is an increasingly important priority." He discussed, vaguely, the CIA "tasking" issues brough up by Ms. Martin. 11:45 AM Luncheon Speaker: Jamie S. Gorelick Deputy Attorney General of the United States Ms. Gorelick most tooted everyone's horn for the increasing cooperation that between the various communities. -end- -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li

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Re: Mondex
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Ray was right, Vulis. Eat your lithium.

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FWD: Binding crypto
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FORWARDED MESSAGE =++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=++=+= In this message, we introduce binding cryptography, a new proposal for establishing an information security infrastructure that does not hamper law enforcement. We present an alternative that can give law-enforcement agencies access to session keys, without users having to deposit private keys. Unilateral fraud in this scheme is easily detectible. We outline the proposal below, and announce two articles which will describe the proposal in more detail and which will provide the legal and the technical context. The text is also available at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/binding.htm. 9 October 1996 Eric Verheul, everheul(a)ngi.nl Bert-Jaap Koops, koops(a)kub.nl Henk van Tilborg, henkvt(a)win.tue.nl ------------------------------------------- (c) 1996 Eric Verheul, Bert-Jaap Koops, Henk van Tilborg This message may only be redistributed in its entirety and with inclusion of the copyright notice. Credit if quoting. _Binding Cryptography, a fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow proposals_ _1. Introduction_ Information security, and so cryptography, is essential in today's information society. A robust (information) security infrastructure must be set up, including a Key Management Infrastructure. However, the unconditional use of encryption by criminals poses a threat to law enforcement, a problem that is hard to solve. Consequently, governments have two tasks. The first is stimulating the establishment of a security structure that protects their citizens, but which does not aid criminals. The second task is coping with the use of encryption by criminals outside of this framework. We think that encryption outside of the framework (e.g., PGP) should not be outlawed - but it need not be mainstream either. It is crucial that any such established security structure is widely accepted and trusted, as this will lower the demand for encryption outside of this framework, and so will make the second goal easier to achieve (or, at least, not more difficult). The establishment of such a widely accepted and trusted security structure is now the challenge that (US) IT businesses face if they want to participate in the recent CLIPPER IV initiative. _2. Binding cryptography_ In a series of two articles, we address the establishment of an information security infrastructure. Several proposals have been made by governments and others to establish such an infrastructure, but a satisfactory overall solution remains yet to be found. In the non-technical article [VKT], we review several technical proposals and a few government initiatives, focusing on key-escrow proposals. We present a series of criteria that acceptable solutions should meet, and note that all proposals so far fail to meet many of these criteria. We argued that the establishment of a worldwide security infrastructure can not be achieved without strong cooperation of governments. In fact, governments themselves should take up the challenge of establishing a security infrastructure, based on public-key encryption, which does not hamper law enforcement. We offer a new solution to achieve this: "binding data", which also improves upon current proposals. It has the advantage that it helps the establishment of a strong security infrastructure which discourages abuse for criminal or subversive purposes by making unilateral abuse easily detectible. It allows a straightforward monitoring of compliance with law-enforcement regulations, without users having to deposit ("escrow") keys beforehand. Thus, an information security infrastructure can be established, which does not worsen the crypto problem for law enforcement. Metaphorically speaking, our solution consists of equipping public-key encryption systems used for confidentiality with a (car) governor (a speed-limiting device). The specifications of this governor are rather general, and so many systems can probably be equipped with them. It is inspired by the proposal of Bellare and Rivest [BR], in which users' encrypted messages consist of three components: 1. the (actual) message encrypted with any symmetric system, using a random session key; 2. the session key encrypted with the public key(s) of the addressee(s); 3. the session key encrypted with the public key of a Trusted Retrieval Party (TRP). In effect, the TRP is treated as a virtual addressee, although the message is not sent to it. When a law-enforcement agency is conducting a lawful intercept and strikes upon an enciphered message, they take the third information component to the TRP. If shown an appropriate warrant, the TRP decrypts the information component and hands over the session key, so that the law-enforcement agency has access to the message. Observe that users are not obliged to escrow their (master) keys, they only give access to the (temporary) session keys used in the communication. The concept of "virtual escrow" has been the base of several escrow products (AT&T Crypto, RSA Secure, TIS Commercial Key Escrow). The main drawback of this concept is that it offers no possibility, at least for others than the TRP, to check whether the third component actually contains the (right) session key; moreover, the TRP will only discover fraud after a lawful wiretap. This renders the solution almost entirely unenforceable. Therefore, we propose a binding alternative, which adds a fourth component to the encrypted message: 4. binding data. The idea is that any third party, e.g., a network or service provider, who has access to components 2, 3 and 4 (but not to any additional secret information) can: a. check whether the session keys in components 2 and 3 coincide; b. not determine any information on the actual session key. In this way, fraud is easily detectible: a sender that attempts to virtually address a session key to the TRP (component 3) that is different from the real one he uses on the message (or just nonsense) will be discovered by anyone checking the binding data. If such checking happens regularly, fraud can be properly discouraged and punished. The binding concept supports the virtual addressing of session keys to several TRPs (or none for that matter), for instance, one to a TRP in the country of the sender and one in the country of the addressee. The solution therefore offers the same advantage for worldwide usability as the Royal Holloway [Holl] concept. We also remark that the concept supports the use of controllable key splitting in the sense of Micali [Mica] as well: a sender can split the session key and virtually address all the shares separately to the addressee and various TRPs using the binding concept. Moreover, the number of shares and the TRPs can - in principle - be chosen freely by each user. Finally we remark that the time-boundedness conditon (the enforceability of the timelimits of a warrant) can be fulfilled by additionally demanding that encrypted information (or all components) be timestamped and signed by the sender; a condition that can be publicly verified by any third party (e.g., monitor) as well. A PKI that incorporates binding data hence has the following four players: - Users, i.e., governments, businesses, and citizens, - TTPs offering trusted services (e.g., time-stamping and certification of public keys), - TRPs aiding law-enforcement agencies with decrypting legally intercepted messages, - Monitors, monitoring communications encrypted via the PKI on compliance with binding regulations. For instance, these could be network operators or (Internet) service providers. In [VKT], we explain how we envision the framework in which the binding concept could present a security tool in the information society. We think the concept is flexible enough (e.g., in the choice of TRPs) to be incorporated into almost any national crypto policy, on both the domestic and foreign use of cryptography. In a mathematical paper [VT], Verheul and Van Tilborg propose a technical construction for binding data for an important public-key encryption system: ElGamal. This construction is compatible with Desmedt's [DESM] traceable variant of ElGamal. The construction is based on the techniques used in zero knowledge proofs. We expect that these constructions can be improved and that various other public-key encryption systems can be equipped with binding data. We present this as a challenge to the cryptographic research community. An outline of the mathematical construction of binding ElGamal can be found at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bindtech.htm. _3. References_ [BR] M. Bellare, R.L. Rivest, "Translucent Cryptography. An Alternative to Key Escrow, and its Implementation via Fractional Oblivious Transfer", see http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest [Desm] Y. Desmedt, "Securing Traceability of Ciphertexts - Towards a Secure Key Escrow System", Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp.147-157. [Holl] N. Jefferies, C. Mitchell, M. Walker, "A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services", Royal Holloway, University of London, see http://platon.cs.rhbnc.ac.uk [Mica] S. Micali, "Fair Public-key Cryptosystems'", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '92 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 113-138. [VKT] E. Verheul, B.J. Koops, H.C.A. van Tilborg, "Binding Cryptography. A fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow solutions", Computer Law and Security Report, January-February 1997, to appear. [*] [VT] E. Verheul, H.C.A. van Tilborg, "Binding ElGamal. A fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow solutions", will be submitted to Eurocrypt97. [*] For the Computer Law and Security Report, send subscription enquiries, orders and payments to: Pam Purvey The Oxford Fulfilment Centre PO Box 800, Kidlington Oxford 0X5 1DX UK Tel: +44 1865 843373 Fax: +44 1865 843940 For the United States: Elsevier Advanced Technology Fulfilment (enquiries) 660 White Plains Road, Tarrytown New York, NY 10591-5153 USA Tel: 914 333 2458 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Center for Law, Administration and facs +31 13 466 8149 Informatization, Tilburg University e-mail E.J.Koops(a)kub.nl -------------------------------------------------- Postbus 90153 | This world's just mad enough to have been made | 5000 LE Tilburg | by the Being his beings into being prayed. | The Netherlands | (Howard Nemerov) | --------------------------------------------------------------------- http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm --------------------------------------------------------------------- -- " The way to combat noxious ideas is with other ideas. The way to combat falsehoods is with truth. " -- Justice William O. Douglas, 1958

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Re: RSA 1024bit Key for Export
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:26 AM 10/19/96 +0700, you wrote: >Just a short question : >What is the exportable maximum key length of RSA if >use for encrypting session keys? My local Cylink VAR >in Malaysia says it is 1024bit for encrypting the >Omega algo. There isn't one well-defined limit that applies to everything. You still need to ask for permission, and they still have arbitrary power to grant or not grant it, though they have some guidelines about what they will usually approve and what they usually won't.* I've seen 512-bits as the usual number, but the session key has to be for a weak symmetric-key cypher like RC4/40. They probably wouldn't approve 512-bit keys for encrypting session keys to be used with triple-DES or IDEA or RC4/256. Cylink may have permission to use 1024 bits in some specific export-approved product (I'm guessing that's what Omega is?), but that isn't something you can get approved for general use, unless the NSA has relaxed a bit under pressure. Padgett's response on coderpunks wasn't really relevant - the section he was quoting was for authorization-protecting systems only (e.g. protecting PINs), explicitly saying that it wasn't for encrypting files or text, which would affect session keys used to encrypt files or text. (*They also have guidelines about how fast they will usually approve or reject things, but they still haven't approved or rejected Raph's application for exporting the RSA T-shirts after a year, and the shirts are now semi-obsolete because the RSA implementations are shorted now :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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[NOISE] Re: Q.E.D. reply to petty MESSger
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat Oct 19 21:13:00 1996 Don Wood writes: ... > ... I headed the OTP group at NSA, ... ... For those of you also on fight-censorship, I hereby rest my case regarding deficiencies in the NSA's hiring practices. :) JMR One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other way around. -- me Defeat the Duopoly! Vote Harry & Jo http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. <mailto:jmr@shopmiami.com> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMml8oW1lp8bpvW01AQFP3AQArzx/eUWKl4Pc9l3YWk4CUIqtWlPQoo6v vi+F6KXi+VUTKgkSJAW8GZWgFrk3cJxrJVJnESCC0WPwzaEiMmDvW0y2bRhxSxX5 XYuIBMmMDM2j+eYddwI0ip8uiBUSTvPu23m5hBKmEsBv5+8CsJ13xhwXD+g+2Rtm sAEO3P5xtfo= =fWFy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: NSA/GCSB spying shown on NZ television [RANT]
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>clint barnett wrote: [snip] >If you think that you >can resist the NSA and win, more power to you, and I'll help if I can, but >I don't think you can.However, I strongly believe that you have the power >to limit the information they steal from you, and thereby limit the >control they have over you. If you can keep your wits about you, act fast >when you have to, and run away to fight another day, then you can maybe >do some good, but don't make a martyr of yourself or anyone else, because >martyrs can't write code, they can't attack or defend a system, they can >only lay there and rot in jail or in the ground. > To paraphrase Gen. George S. Patton, "No dumb bastard ever won by dying for his cause, he won by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his." PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Counter-cultural technology development our specialty. Vote Libertarian. Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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Re: is there no end to Murder Politics & Creative Wiretap
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 19 Oct 96 at 15:08, jim bell wrote: > >At 02:14 PM 10/19/96 -0400, hallam(a)ai.mit.edu wrote: > >>Murder Politics (lets give your psychopathic scheme an acurate name) to assasinate = to commit murder : the previous term was accurate... Why nitpick? > >>will never be functional. If anonymous cash implied muder politics then > >>society would be right to reject anonymous cash. The thing is, *how* exactly are you gonna prevent the advent of e-cash? The same mechanisms that will make a group try to prevent it's apparition will work for groups that try to promote it. Prostitution was virtually always repressed. But was it ever eradicated? Only, the odds are immensely stacked in favour of AP as long as *any* kind of e-$ exists. Doesn't even have to be denominated in dollar, donations could very well be made in ounces of gold... > >>It is easily done > >>since money only has value so long as it is convertable. > >> > >>Not only are rights dependent on a social infrastructure that > >>guarantees that they will be respected but currency is as well. > >>Without the social and political infrastructure of the US > >>government a dollar bill has only the value of the paper its > >>printed on. An electronic balance has zero value. Well, let's get into that passionnate topic... Many peoples pretend that theses pieces of paper are worth nothing *right now*. But what about gold e-bonds? You don't like gold? OK, what about a composite of precious metals, patented antibiotics, some choosen chemicals, some choosen stock, etc, all of them *privately owned* by the issuing bank? :-) ROTFL! > >>If you want to live in a society where the political system has been > >>"reformed" through murder of inconvenient politicians then go and > >>live in Columbia. Its the nearest thing you will find on the planet > >>to libertopia. > > > >No, not nearly enough politicians have been killed in Columbia to result in a > >society that could best be described as an "anarchy." While some peoples want anarchy, I jsut want peaceful living... The example of Columbia is completely out of context. Some dictators were replaced by other dictators, both being different sides of the same coin. In Columbia, any member of the gang of drug cartels could be identified and get targeted by peaceful citizens the same way they would target politicians. AP would thus stop street terror. AP is not against govt per se, it is something acting against any opressing "leadership", whomever it might be. Jim Bell's conviction being that the human animal is basically a reasonnable animal that enjoys life, AP, IHHO, will bring a world in which the golden rule will be "live and let live (or die).... or get killed". Here, "live and let live (or die)" is opposed to "live and make die (or live)" The operative is *let* versus what we currently have now: "make" Jim Bell, as it is evident by his writings, believe that the word "freedom" means "to be free from other men". In that sense, an I think that I am quoting him, he claims that anarchy is not "the lack of order" but rather the "lack of orders". jfa Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds (Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Re: IP: - Biham/Shamir Differential Fault Analysis of DES, etc
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Note that this attack requires physical access to the DES chip, to >stress it so it will fail. It works great against "tamper-proof" >devices such as smart cards. It doesn't work against encryption >happening at any distance from the attacker (e.g. across the network). >It doesn't work against stored information like PGP-encrypted >email messages either. > >However, it might be possible to use the attack by beaming disruptive >energies (heat, electrons, microwaves, etc) at a computer which is >doing a lot of encryption, while simultaneously monitoring that >computer's activity across a network. > > John Although using physical/electrical attacks to cause circuit disruptions to ICs (like smartcard) may be feasible, it appears to be much more difficult to mount this sort of attack on specially hardened crypto modules, which can more effectively isolate themselves from invasive sources or detect them and take action (i.e., key clearance) before an attacker can pry out their secrets.

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Re: Writing A Remailer
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:06 AM 10/20/96 -0700, William Davidheiser <wgd(a)netcom.com> wrote: >Hi all. I want to try to write a re-mailer that will run on my ISP's UNIX >shell account. I am familiar with Windows socket programming (C/C++) but >have never done anything in the UNIX environment. > >Any pointers on where I should start? I'd start by looking at the existing remailers, and thinking about the problems they're trying to solve and the service objectives they have. Mixmaster code is easy to find, and I've got my own modified ghio2 somewhere under my web page (idiom.com/~wcs/remailer, probably). Freedom remailer is another Type 1. Nymservers are trying to solve a different, and harder, problem. Writing a remailer that solves a slightly different problem than the others is a good thing to do. For instance, a remailer that's useful at work, such as one that decrypts PGP mail and forwards it inside the domain, or one that only sends mail to the suggestion box account, could gain acceptance and help add respectability for remailers. I don't remember if code for the Winsock remailer is available, but it works by fetching mail from a POP3 server and remailing it out SMTP servers. Also, you could benefit from feedback from people who used to run remailers and have switched to other code or quit. The usual problem is abuse, whether it's spam posted to the net, mailbombing victims, or forging mail/postings from victims to lists/newsgroups that will generate flames in response. Any blocking code you can write is good - you definitely need to be able to block by source, destination, and Subject:, and grepping message bodies may help. Limiting source and destination to pre-approved lists is also a good feature. Good code for auto-detecting attacks would help, e.g. shutting down or blocking if you get more than N messages for a given source or destination in a given time period, with a tolerable user interface for the administrator. You also need to integrate with encryption - PGP is the obvious choice (it'll be _so_ much easier when PGP 3.0 comes out, as we've been saying for the last couple of years :-) but S/MIME or SSL may also be good. I'd recommend having the default behaviour be to refuse non-encrypted mail - otherwise, any eavesdropper can compromise your system. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

1 0

Don't ask why, thank you.
by red 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why? Date: 20th October 1996. The purpose of life,... is not to be found. I have been pursuing this thought and question to many of the people I have met in the past few weeks. Sad enough to report that I have found no answers or clues that if anyone ever know what it is or could be. One thing for sure is material and physical objects are close to replacing the purpose, the real purpose if there is one. I am still quizzed on how there is a purpose in which we all strive to attain. There must an objective somewhere which clearly states,"You, whatname whatage, will have to do this, do that." Somehow, in the pursuit for the answer I have strained my physical and emotional self. I have realised what I am doing and that I am actually directionless, like all the people I know. Doing things for the sake of doing. Clearly, I think television or rather, the mass media in general has caused the gradual eradication of purpose in life for many people. What do you want? What do I want? Sure enough, we do not ask ourselves that question once too often, but spending more time pondering about it, it really makes no sense in what we do having corellation to what we want. What is it actually that we seek in life? Which brings us back to the time when we thought we had a purpose. Could you recall the times when you really wanted something? Or someone? Why? Simply because we didn't have it. It's a mass media driven, pointless race to own something, which actually doesn't make much sense. I am not sure why all of us are acting the way we are. In trying to understand it, I began to question why I would want to know. Why do I want to know? So that I could talk about it? Write a book? Be famous and rich? Be respected? Now, take a minute off and think of what you just read. It's from the media to the people. The people made the media. People are driving people nuts. Is this what we want? Once you shrink the big picture, you realise that nothing makes any sense anyway. And what is "making sense"? What do we gain from realising all this which makes us act and live the way we are? We get to past our time. Since we were born, we had nothing except time. Shitloads of it, excuse me. So we start doing things. Things that actually do not mean much to us but, "heck, I've got all the time in my life" So, it starts to generate a sort of hype, "hey, he's doing something, maybe I should too." Then another fella comes in, "Well I've got nothing to do, maybe I should tell others what these two guys are doing" So the snowball gets rolling. The moment it stops, if it ever stops, I guess we go crazy. Now what is crazy? Understanding why we actually have no reason of being here? I'm not going to start on religion, if you're getting my rift here. So here we are, pretending that we love this and like doing that. Okay, I admit somethings are fun but 90% of the time you realise, "gee, what is it that I want?" If everyone were to ask the same question at the same time, then we'd all be crazy or something, whatever. The problem is, there's five billion people and each one not voicing what they think would hold themselves back by saying "Now, if I say that, these guys would think I'm nuts, and my..." Some do get to express, and once they express it, they are lost in the world of understanding, they realise that we all have no reasons, logical or whatsoever, to be where we are doing what we think we need to do. Now these guys are labeled "nuts" and grouped together. See how happy they are in "Cuckoo's Nest". Okay, so the interns are a little pain in the ass. But look at yourself! We are basically doing things of no relevance. Question what you do with "So?" You are bound to realise what you have probably tried to hide all your life. That we are all alone. That we are all meaningless. That we are all trying to hide from each other what we fear. No, this is not a scam. And sorry, I don't have the solution. I guess we are the same. In the dark we are alone, in the bright we skin and hide. rednax(a)tm.net.my http://www.asiapac.net/~rednax "I have seen little angels turn bad But that's just because they have grown Likewise the problems I currently access They are small matters full blown"

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Mondex -Reply
by Raymond Mereniuk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> Anonymous <nobody(a)replay.com> 10/19/96, 12:00am >>> Timothy C. May must have been sharing needles with a rabid hedgehog. To Anonymous Just as a matter of interest, my own personal interest, what type of society do you come from? The insults are not the type normally originating from a person of the American type culture as these insults would mean nothing to the average American. I have been to places where people give serious concern to such statements but I doubt many people in those places read this list and I doubt anyone on this list does anything but delete your messages. But, please give me a hint where you developed this classy style of insulting the character of Mr T. C. May. Normally Lurkin Raymond

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Re: Writing A Remailer
by Michael Peponis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Hi all. I want to try to write a re-mailer that will run on my ISP's UNIX > shell account. I am familiar with Windows socket programming (C/C++) but > have never done anything in the UNIX environment. Developing these things is actually eaiser to do in UNIX than Windows. I guess it depends on where you wish to being. Do you wish to write a remailer from scratch, or do you wish to just run a remailer? In either case, take a look at what other people have done, one site I like is ftp.hacktic.nl, there is source for a number of remailers there, among other things. You could compile that, and see what you like and dislike about a given remailer, and then adjust the code appropriatly. Most are written in C, so if you know C, you won't have very many problems. One thing to note, UNIX privilages, you would want to run your remailer as a deamon, a constantly running program(similar to a DOS TSR or NT Service). I am not sure if your ISP gives you enough access to run deamons. Good Luck Michael Peponis

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Re: is there no end to AP & Creative Wiretap Arguments? [RANT]
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Schear wrote: > >Steve Schear wrote: [snip] > >If you read the US declaration of Independence it is very clear that its > >authors rejected natural law arguments. The rights that they hold to be > >"self evident" are extreemly abstract principles which could be > >justified within almost any ethical system. The removal of the word > >"God" was deliberate and reflects a concious rejection of the natural > >law argument. I read the DOI, and its meaning was clear. It stated that while people are disposed to put up with the excesses of govt. to a certain bearable extent, that when the govt. tilted toward totalitarianism, the people should revolt. How can you say "Self Evident" and "extremely abstract" in the same context? Self evident merely means that when you subtract out the factors of disinformation that are applied in political/economic areas to guarantee the cash flow to the bosses, you can see clearly that nobody has a Right, "divine" or whatever, to rule someone else. It's not abstract, religious, or anything. Think of the analogy in sound reproduction. The salesman is trying to tell you that perfect reproduction doesn't exist, so you should consider that $20,000 system to be like a "very fine musical instrument". On the other hand, your finely-tuned mind is aware that there is an "true original" sound that you're trying to reproduce, and whether it's 100% attainable is not the relevant issue. In other words, don't let the bosses confuse you with their rhetoric, if you're well-read and intelligent, you should be able to trust your own instincts. That's what self-evident means. As to the removal of "God", they said "...endowed by their Creator...", and I think that Creator when capitalized is more than clear, i.e., "God". Almost all of the signers were Freemasons, whose membership requires belief in God (although I don't know that they require extensive testing as to how their members conceptualize God), and so it would appear that the exclusion of the term God would be more an act of conciliation or even superstition than a rejection of anything.

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[crypto-philo]OTP or DES?
by walrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a thread going in coderpunks about some software company that claims to have invented a software OTP that uses a PRNG. The local experts have ruled that this is impossible and I would have to agree, but this thread got me thinking. I would argue that the security of an OTP is derived not from the fact that it really is secure, but from the fact that it is claimed to be an OTP. Imagine a plaintext, encrypted with triple-des. It looks like a bunch of 1's and 0's to the casual observer, but to you it is your secret plan to take over the world. Or so you would have us believe if we crack the cypher. actually you plan to take over the world using a completely different plan. It is quite easy to take the bits of the des-encrypted message, and calculate the OTP key nessasary to decrypt the message into your real plan. It would seem you could build a key to have your message say anything of equal length. Why then must a true OTP be based on a true RNG? Because one of the actual possible keys of a real OTP is indeed the encrypted des message, you can claim that it is an otp and no-one can prove otherwise. They can say "But we cracked your des key and can decypher this message!" and you say "nope i used an OTP, that is a false message, here is what it really says! The fact that by PURE coincidence that OTP could be decrypted using that particular key means nothing, because a true OTP can generate that bit sequence. So in conclusion i would say that we can give pgp complete and perfect security but the simple process of changing the header from ---Begin PGP message--- to ----Begin OTP message----. This makes you immune from decryption because no one will ever know or can ever prove that the decryption they got is the correct one. Any comments? Walrus

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Re: Question: OTP
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:30 PM 10/19/95 -0500, "Robert J. Shueey" <rshueey(a)tcgcs.com> wrote: >ok, not to drag this disscussion out, but apparently I am missing something. What you're missing is that the IPG guy is a troll. The reason there are contradictions is that he's making the stuff up as he goes along. Maybe he's having a good time. Maybe he's a tentacle of the spammer pretending to be D..V.. On the other hand, the POTP folks are serious. Wrong, but serious, actually selling a product and trying to convince other people to include it in their email systems. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Re: IP: - Biham/Shamir Differential Fault Analysis of DES, etc
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:45 PM 10/18/96 -0700, John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> wrote: >Note that this attack requires physical access to the DES chip, to >stress it so it will fail. It works great against "tamper-proof" >devices such as smart cards. It doesn't work against encryption >happening at any distance from the attacker (e.g. across the network). It's probably most useful for defeating attempts to force smart cards on the public as the government's solution to Key Recovery (e.g. Clipper 4 fails, so after the election they come out with Clipper 5 or the Anti-Terrorism Airplane Traveller's License Smartcard.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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anonymous oddsman
by winsock＠c2.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A quickie post-debate-update from the oddsman. Looks like Ladbroke House is still heavy on Clinton, with prices the same as last time, William Hill and Ladbroke's have now agreed on a {bearish} number for Dole, but the strange disparity in Perot odds remains. The oddsman still seeks a Moscow correspondent for UK arbitrage opportunities. Possible nym soon, so stay tuned. Prices @ 09:10 BST Sat 18th Oct 96 +---------+----------------+----------------+ | | Ladbroke's | William Hill | +---------+----------------+----------------+ | Clinton | No bets taken | 1:16 | | Dole | 7:1 | 7:1 | | Perot | 50:1 | 500:1 | | Browne | Not currently offered by either | +---------+----------------+----------------+ | Phone | +44-800-524524 | +44-800-444040 | | Numbers:| | | +---------+----------------+----------------+ The oddsman's roving reporter can't get any reply on the phone from Coral, so they may be out of the running on this year's horse race. I'll keep you posted -- 'till next post-time. anonymous oddsman "Demeaning the integrity of the U.S. Presidential election process for you on a regular basis, at no charge."

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RE: Goodbye [NOSTALGIA]
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Dale Thorn C'mon now, you guys sound like a bunch of old men, groaning over the checkers board about how you can't keep track of the six or seven medications you take every day. ........................................................................ I was not complaining about an inability for keeping track of the list traffic. Neither was I bemoaning the fact that things change or go out of use, nor discussing the nature of true invention, nor seeking after general judgements on pinnacles per se. None of my statements were in reference to things per se, but only as they relate to the cypherpunks, to the present circumstance of the S/N ratio, and to James A. Donald's conclusions about the list. .. Blanc

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IP spoofer
by h2＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone got a good IP spoofer that can spoof the whole domain? The only shit I can find is those shitty ones that spoof the first part of the IDENTD which is possible to do in mIRC if you use it. Oh yeah, it has to be for Win95. Yes I know that no one likes win95 but I dont have a choice....I'll tell about that later.

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unsibscribe?
by Squirrel Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Alexander.Kvache" <alexk(a)hcl.com> sent the new word: > >unsibscribe to the list. I am pretty sure we have seen them all, now. OBcrypto - are these spellings randomly generated? JMR

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ANother Timmy May clone
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy-May-style pseudo-crypto: >From: Edgar Stahley <EStahley(a)tricryption.com> >Newsgroups: comp.security.misc >Subject: Finally, an easy Encryption System >Message-ID: <3269375D.469A(a)tricryption.com> >Date: Sat, 19 Oct 1996 16:17:33 -0400 >Organization: Tricryption >Lines: 14 >NNTP-Posting-Host: u029.comcat.com >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > >What if an encryption program was really easy to use? > >What if you could send important documents securely over the >internet without having to enter any keys at all? > >What if this was possible because you and your group of >recipients could be the only ones in the world having access to >your very own customized encryption system? > >What if there was a $2000 contest to check it out? > > * (R) Edgar Stahley ES(a)tricryption.com >* TRICRYPTION - IBM file encryption. Fax/Phone: (215) 453-1452 > * Web site: http://www.tricryption.com

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Vulis' Trash
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Black Unicorn I'm I the only one who is sick of Vulis' trash? ....................................................................... No. How often can a person open up a message only to read: "Look, see how cleverly I put words of comparison and degradation in conjunction with a person's name? Wow - Am I impressive, or what?" "See me - see the jig-saw puzzle of words and meaning I can stick together - aren't I a clever person? See how I can convert the ability to understand into a regrettable, abhorrent waste of time?" "Look at me - hey, see what I'm doing? See me stringing these words together, unpleasant combinations to ponder, about which you can do nothing?" "Put me in a category somewhere and give me significance! I don't have anything of substance to contribute to your minds, but I'm unavoidable, see? Pay Attention to Me!" ...without becoming weary of his shallow "amusement". .. Blanc

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Re: Don't ask why, thank you. [NOISE]
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

red wrote: > Why? Date: 20th October 1996. > The purpose of life,... is not to be found. I have been pursuing > this thought and question to many of the people I have met in the past > few weeks. Sad enough to report that I have found no answers or clues > that if anyone ever know what it is or could be. One thing for sure is > material and physical objects are close to replacing the purpose, the > real purpose if there is one. [remainder deleted] You could ask yourself, as a technical matter of some importance, just how you came to be thinking about purpose, or about it in the way that you think about it, i.e., was the thought developed in you through bombardment from "philosophical" sources, or did you actually develop it independently? Try to track that down and deconstruct it, and it will help in getting a handle on the issues you want to look at. On the other hand, you could try what I call the Consciousness Experiment. Intelligent persons have argued (contrary to the notions of certain religious philosophies and possibly even quantum physicists) that there is no *free will*, since all *things* are fully predictable, given sufficient detachment from the universe being studied, and sufficient resources to analyze the motions of all particles, waves, and/or other constructs. In the Consciousness Experiment, you get up every day and attempt to do something *good* for which you have absolutely no motivation, kinda like a "Mother Teresa act" or whatever. Use your imagination. The goal is to separate your "purely altruistic" (for sake of argument, whether this is real or not) acts from your base acts, i.e., eating, sleeping, and even loving (in the sense of attachment to particular persons as opposed to living beings or "earth things" as a whole). If you can stay focused on the goal, to "prove" that you truly are a sentient being and not just a living-flesh motivation-driven automaton, then eventually you will have an answer of sorts to your question, but with your mind in a different frame of reference or perspective, I believe you'll be somewhat amused at your original posting on this topic, assuming you keep a copy around.

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FWZ1 encryption algorithm
by Jüri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there any data available on FWZ1 encryption algorithm? This is used in CheckPoint FireWall-1 product for securing virtual private networks. As it is exportable from US, it must be pretty weak, but even considering that I would like to know how it exactly works. JK - jk(a)stallion.ee

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sprint pulled plug on cyberpromo..
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ah. I feel *much* better now... For the time being, anyway. Cheers, Bob --- begin forwarded text Date: Sun, 20 Oct 1996 13:53:01 -0400 Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld(a)ORCHARD.MEDFORD.MA.US> Subject: sprint pulled plug on cyberpromo.. To: CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM Since this issue was brought up here a little while ago, it seems appropriate to forward this.. (NANOG is the "North American Network Operators Group"). Subject: Re: Cyberpromo.com spam snuffed? Date: Fri, 18 Oct 1996 20:02:17 -0400 (EDT) From: "Todd R. Stroup" <tstroup(a)tstroup.inhouse.compuserve.com> Reply-To: "Todd R. Stroup" <tstroup(a)tstroup.inhouse.compuserve.com> To: pferguso(a)cisco.com cc: nanog(a)merit.edu On Fri, 18 Oct 1996, Paul Ferguson wrote: > It appears that the infamous cyberpromo site has been disconnected. > > - paul > > [snip] > [snip] Cyberpromo is a suspect in sending mail from a host with the name and local domain of compuserve.com (the exact name of one of our mail gateways) They were creating fakeing mail headers by actually haveing a machine on their network with the same name and domain. I could have thought of more creative ways to do this but this is what we saw... Since were getting an influx of mail from upset individuals asking why CompuServe was the host of all this spam. After we found out what Cyberpromo was up to, we asked for cooperation from Sprint to pull the plug. At this time (and to my knowledge), CompuServe has not yet made an effort to engage in any legal action. I am unable to comment on anything else at this time. Todd R. Stroup Network Engineer - CompuServe --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: unsibscribe?
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: > "Alexander.Kvache" <alexk(a)hcl.com> sent the new word: > > > >unsibscribe > > to the list. I am pretty sure we have seen them all, now. > > OBcrypto - are these spellings randomly generated? Naw, it's a new stego method... ;-)

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Re: Usenet and Re: extortion via digital cash
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 12:34 AM -0400 on 10/20/96, Scott McGuire wrote: > >> I've been thinking about the use of Usenet as a message pool and this >>seems to be a good place to bring up my thoughts. As an already existing, widely disseminated and easily used message pool, Usenet is very valuable to us. I'm concerned that it may not last though. Many people now complain about how low the signal to noise ratio is (even more than they complain about this list). I've heard people say that they have given up on newsgroups in favor of mailing list, web-zines, etc. So, if it gets too bad, might it just fade away? Or, if it remains but becomes unpopular, will it be easy to restrict if we use it for anonymous messages? > >IMHO, it will end up similar to the late night infomerical spots on TV. >Not puch of value there, but bored people will still look. > >Any effort to regulate it will come from a tangent; IDs of some sort >to post in public, or have access to the net, or screening it out of >the hypothetical InfoBahn II networks, or similar. In the U.S., at least, attempts to enforce identification of Internet users or anonymous posters to newgroups and such are likely to meet with stiff legal resistance. The Supreme Court has ruled that anonymous use of protected speech (e.g., political handbills) must be permitted. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Counter-cultural technology development our specialty. Vote Libertarian. Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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IETF meets in San Jose, Dec 9-13; want to come?
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Internet Engineering Task Force will hold one of its thrice-yearly meetings in San Jose in December, making it accessible to many cypherpunks. (The following two meetings will be April in Memphis, and August in Munich.) IETF sponsors working groups which propose new protocols and procedures to evolve the Internet technology and infrastructure. Many of these working groups are of interest to cypherpunks. Working groups are open to all interested parties and transact almost all of their business by email. An IETF meeting is a place where working groups can meet and resolve issues that are hard to handle by email. It's also a place for newcomers to the working groups to be introduced to the issues and existing players. An IETF meeting is not a standards committee meeting, nor is it a technical conference. It's a unique animal. The working groups meet in parallel sessions, usually several times per meeting. Participants are encouraged to submit any large publications by email before the meeting, so that they can be intelligently discussed, rather than merely read, at the meeting. There is little or no voting, and few or no "papers". The working groups run by "rough consensus and running code" -- a method near and dear to the cypherpunk credo. There's a whole Security Area with these working groups: aft Authenticated Firewall Traversal cat Common Authentication Technology dnssec Domain Name System Security ipsec IP Security Protocol otp One Time Password Authentication pkix Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) tls Transport Layer Security wts Web Transaction Security I'm actively working with the DNSSEC and IPSEC groups, on my S/WAN project. In addition there are lots of other interesting working groups for Mobile IP, Web evolution, MIME and email security, IPv6, Dynamic DNS update, etc. All of these have security implications. For more information about any of this, see www.ietf.org. You'll find full info about the upcoming meeting, as well as minutes from past meetings, working group charters and web pages, archives of working group email lists, more info than you'll be able to read. Many working group sessions are multicast on the MBone for those who can't travel to participate, and there is excellent Internet access available on-site, with acres of terminals, printers, and laptop-plugins. Attending the meeting will cost $250 if postmarked before Nov 8. Non-local c'punks who wish to attend, but who can't afford to stay in a hotel, can probably find other c'punks in the area to stay with. (I'm in San Francisco, 50 miles from the meeting, so I'm not a good candidate.) John

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Re: Wrap Up: Conference on Law Enforcement and Intelligence
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:03 PM 10/20/96 +0000, James Morris wrote: >On Sat, 19 Oct 1996, Black Unicorn wrote: > >> 4. Might be a good idea to review implementations of crypto. >> >> Both James Woolsey and Stewart Baker made sly remarks about the >> reliability of crypto in the public domain. [...] > >There was also an interesting comment made in session three of the >Joint Australian/OECD Conference on Security, Privacy and Intellectual >Property Protection in theGlobal Information Infrastructure, >(Canberra, 7 - 8 February 1996), reportedly by a representative of >the DSD: > >"... PGP may not survive as a viable option for private security." > >For the full quote, see: > http://www.nla.gov.au/gii/sess3.html (1) If I were faced with an opponent who had a crypto system I couldn't break, I would attempt to make him think I could break it so he would stop using it. AKA FUD. (2) If I could break his system, I would want him to continue using it. I would have to be very careful about how I used the material so he didn't catch on to the break. There are some wonderful examples of this logic in "The Code Breakers". (3) The devil is in the details. I still am not convinced that MacPGP has enough sources of entropy for its IDEA key generation. (But I am not convinced that it doesn't either.) I put integrating Jon Callas's entropy manager into MacPGP as a high priority. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Tired of Dole/Clinton? | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | Vote 3rd party. I'm | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | Voting for Harry Browne | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Q.E.D. reply to Perry Metzger
by cypher＠cyberstation.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > IPG Sales writes: > > Some of you have sardonically written to say "Nihil Est > > Demonstrandum," N.E.D. because an OTP must be derived from a > > hardware source, that is, it must be a pure random sequence > > of limitless entropy. Accordingly, they unbashfully assert > > that an OTP generated by a computer program is not possible. > > > > How do they know that? Does the Bible tell them so, or the > > Koran, or do they get it from the Torah? Why not cite the > > source of their certainty instead of advancing an unsupported > > proposition. > > See Claude Shannon's papers on information theory. [Available as: C.E. > Shannon, Collected Papers: Claude Elmwood Shannon, N.J.A. Sloane and > A.D. Wyner, eds., New York: IEEE Press, 1993.] > > Shannon invented information theory in 1948 and 1949. Part of his > papers discuss the information theory of cryptosystems. He > mathematically proved that only a O.T.P.. using non-reused physically > random numbers could provide what he termed "perfect secrecy". I > accept mathematical proofs above the Koran or the Bible. (The Torah is > a subset of the Bible.) As in so many other cases, you are so F.O.S. that it is unbelievable. Your eminence pontificating about it does make it true. Furthermore, Shannon certainly did not prove that physically random numbers are required to provide what he termed "perfect security." I believe that closer reading and interpretation will reveal that what he was saying was that any mathematical series other than truly random numbers can theoretically be reconstructed by some means, including brute force, should that be required. Obviously that is true. I do not disagree with the fact that brute force can be used to attack the algorithm that I have advanced. It you try all of the possible OTPs, PRNG encryptor streams, against the ciphertext, then only a limited few and maybe only one meaningful plain text can be obtained. There is absolutely no dispute about that. Accordingly, Shannon is quite correct in saying that it is not "perfect." It is not perfect in a mathematical sense, and in that limited sense only, you are correct. However to try all possibilities, is mathematically impossible - thus the algorithm must be attacked analytically - as EVEN you, or anyone else, will be able to clearly see, if you examine the algorithm, it cannot be attacked analytically. My algorithm most certainly does NOT produce a theoretical pure Random Number Stream, accordingly it is a PRNG, but it most certainly does produce an OTP that meets each and every requirement of such, other than some theoretical definition that you seek to impose on it by your dogmatic words. You do not have to take my word for it, the FULL ALGORITHM, which has never before been published, is set out on our web site. There is no mathematical proof that my PRNG streams are not an OTP - because they are OTPs. There are 156.8816 megabytes of raw encryptor stream data at our site. They constitute 10 OTPs, all using the same key, only the message numbers vary.but with different message numbers only. > > I do not mean to be rude, > > You are anyway. > You are so vane, so crass, so dogmatic, so blinded by your opinions, that you obviously look at yourself in the mirror wheneever given the opportunity. You do niot know what the hell you are constantly pontificating about. talking aboutand including the one under discussion herein. Why not show everyone your prowess by telling us what the key and the As, Bs, and Cs, are they were used to generate the 156.8816 megabytes referred to above. Of course, you cannot, so you bray like an ass to cover up your crypto impotence. > > but excuse me, what > > scientific proof can they offer for that immovable avowal? > > See above. See above > > > There is no scientific proof whatsoever, none at all, > > See above. See above > > > except > > for the words and their steadfast, and maybe self serving, > > postulate. > > See avove. See above and below > > > Accordingly, obviously it is they, not us, who are > > the ones that have "Nihil Est Demonstrandum," in this matter. > > See above. See above > > > There is not one scintilla of sustainable evidence to support > > such a doctrine. > > See above. See above and below. > > > While the vast majority of people knowledgeable about > > cryptography have not heretofore believed that it is possible > > for software to produce an OTP, > > It is not possible. It is absolutely possible, Q.E.D. > > The information content, or entropy, of the key stream is necessarily > no larger than its keyspace. That is, if you have a software > pseudo-random number generator using an N bit seed, the entropy of the > keyspace is necessarily never greater than N. This is mathematically > certain -- no amount of prayer on your part can change that. > > > that does not make it a > > scientific fact, More of your meaningless B.S. - Obviously you wrote your reply before you read my entire message. > > Sorry, its even better -- a MATHEMATICAL fact. > You saying it, like a lot of other supercilious crap that oozes out of you brain as "write bites," does not make it so. All kinds of crap is running loose up there, you need to get it under control someway. It is absolutely not perfect in the Shannon sense, but it does not have to be theoretically perfect to fulfill the requirement of being an OTP. You definition of an OTP, or a OTP as you mistakenly refer to it, is an extraneous mathematical definition that people have mistakenly extrapolated from Shannon. > > In support of their position, some have pointed out that John > > von Neumann, to paraphrase, stated that ARITHMETIC cannot > > produce random numbers, > > von Neumann meant any deterministic algorithm, actually. > There you go again, pulling things out of you crazy hat, head, running off at the brain again, stating a falsehood and hoping that people will overlook it. I assume that you held a seance with von Neumann and he told you that from the great beyond, since that is clearly not what he said. A careful reading of von Neumann does not reveal that he said one thing and meant another. He used the word ARITHMETIC, if he meant something else he world have said so. Furthermore, he was referring random numbers, and to repeat emphatically, my algorithm is a PRNG, but it also happens to be an OTP, as we can prove. Q.E.D. > > We stipulate the obvious fact that the encryptor stream > > generated by EUREKA is a PRNG stream, though we do consider > > it gross denigration to castigate it as ONLY a PRNG stream. > > If it is a PRNG, you do not have a One Time Pad, period. What you have > is a stream cipher. > It is a stream cipher, but it is also an OTP, just as a hardware sourced RNG is a stream cipher that is also an OTP. > > Furthermore, past examination has shown you have a POOR stream cipher. > Did you see the movie, Dumb and Dumber - you are obviously getting dumber and dumber and dumber - would I have come back to you 5 months later with the same thing - you are obviously brain dead - as I have stated on numerous occasions, the previous proffer was only a part of the overall algorithm, to solicit help from some of the cypherpunks, which I did get. The so called breaking with "Known Plain Text," was an absolute farce, it would have applied to only one message where it could be applied, if at all - it did not apply to the whole system, each OTP was, and is completely different - but that is beside the point, we did make some changes to negate other possible attacks, but those were modest changes. Any one that looks at the algorithm, which obviously, as a self proclaimed crypto Diety, you have not deign to do, can determine that it is in now way what you have looked at before. > > It is a PRNG issue that also happens to be an extremely well > > behaved OTP sequence, with limited but ample entropy, as well. > > If the entropy is limited, you do not have a One Time Pad, period, end > of discussion, its over. > You say that Shannon, or you, or someone can prove that mathematically, so let's see someone do it. 156.8816 megabytes of raw encryptor stream output should be enough to work with - if you need more, I can provide same. I agree that theoretically it can be broken by brute force but that is patently impossible as you can quickly discern if you examine the algorithm and try it, instead of salivating your mouth off with baseless blabber. Obviously, my algorithm does not produce a pure random stream. I agree with Shannon that it is not "perfect," but it most certainly is perfect enough to meet any and all practical requirements, now and forever. > > It meets each and every criteria rationally established for an > > OTP in all reasonable aspects. > > Set by WHOM? By you? Your criteria bear no resemblance to those > accepted in general. Are you one of those people who sells someone a > loaf of bread and says "this is an automobile, by every criterion I > have set for automobiles"? > There you go again, strutting about and spreading your pretentious turkey droppings, manure, all over the place. As you know, I headed the OTP group at NSA, and while there I conceived and implemented, under the direction of Abraham Sinkov, Dottie Bloome, Leon O'mera and William J. Cherry, LONE STAR, the Library of ONe time pad Encryption Statistical Analysis Routines. I was responsible for the generation and computer analysis of OTPs at NSA. I have worked on thousands of OTPs, both in the generation of, and comprehensive analysis of same, including looking for repetitive usage of the same OTP, including direct as well as nth degree derivatives, over the last 40 years, at NSA and at Mauchly-Wood. I make no claim that I am the world's greatest OTP authority, or even an authority on them like you obviously THINK you are, but I think that I have more than a little knowledge about the subject of OTPs. That brings up something that utterly fascinates me. Which is your frequent oblique writings about VERONA, or is it VENONA, or maybe it is VERONICA, or maybe even VERONIKA - anyway you know what I mean. Would you be so kind as to enlighten me, us, about that subject - I would like to finally find out what really happened from an authoritative source. How were we able to break some of those messages. Please help me, us, out with details instead of blabber. For those who have not seen my resume', it together with dozens and dozens of references, many of whom are well known, and some of whom you may know, is posted on our web site, but obviously that does not prove anything, except to provide a point of reference. The point is that we have disclosed the complete algorithm, for the first time at the web site, so let's see someone provide us with the key or the ABCs. Our server is downloading an enormous number of the algorithms/data/statistical tests, over 1,000 so far, so we assume someone is testing it and evaluating it. And for you to claim that my contention is analogous to comparing bread to an automobile, petty nonsense and mindless hyperbole. > > Think about that simple supposition for a moment. What do we > > mean by an OTP? > > Something different from what everyone else means, so it makes no > difference. Obviously something different from what YOU, and most others, mistakenly think it means. It is not some esoteric, theoretical mathematical meaning that has no relation to our real world. It is a tool to encrypt and decrypt messages with, it is not a mathematical formula. If you say that a random number sequence is not generated, I agree. If however, you go on and add that, "thus by definition it is not an OTP," then that is patently and absolutely a false statement, though subscribed to by most of the cryptography community. You are a mix-master stirring up cryptography and IT, and you simply cannot homogenize them into a fully blended mix. I assert that an OTP is a tool used for encryption which by definition, can never be used again, and which consists of a sequence of bits which can not be derived by any POSSIBLE, not theoretical but POSSIBLE, means. Granted, our stream could theoretically be derived by trying all of the possible 10^34322 keys/table values, but that is theory, it is absolutely clear that there is no way to try all the possibilities, or even the first 800 bits of an encryptor stream. Any relatively informed mathematician can quickly discern that there is no analytical attack that can be made against the stream, it is that simple, as readers/evaluators will find. If the only method of cracking the system is by brute force, and that is impossible, then it is absolutely an OTP for encryption and decryption purposes, which is its purpose - it is not something to define in IT writings. Our algorithm is absolutely not perfect in the theoretical sense but it is PERFECT as far as the ability to determine the underlying plain text is concern. > > > Not only that, but you can prove it to yourself, Q.E.D. We > > maintain that it is discernible to any knowledgeable person > > who probes the algorithm, that the only analytical tack that > > can be mounted against EUREKA is brute force and that is > > patently impossible.. One of your Cpunk colleagues says he > > uses Triple DES, 168 bits, and he does not believe that it > > can be brute forced - I agree, 3-DES, 10^50+ possibilities, > > cannot be brute forced now, or in the foreseeable future - > > then what about the EUREKA's 10^34322 possibilities, > > 10^34271+ greater than 3-DES? No way, not now, not ever. > > Furthermore, EUREKA is an order, or more, magnitude faster > > than triple DES, easier to use, much more secure, etal. > > I believe that we have already established that your cipher is easy to > crack, so your claims that it is hard to crack really don't matter. > > Perry > To repeat, we have made some a changes, and for the first time disclosed, detailed, the FULL ALGORITHM at great length at our web site. The reason that you do not want to argue that is obviously because you are absolutely impotent in that regard and you are unable to dispute facts, so you blindly conjure up some witches brew of words and think that people will never know the difference. To paraphrase John Dean, the truth will always come out and your ass braying will never stop that truth. Don Wood,

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Blue Box Plans & hacker bbs's
by h2＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this is my second question in a short period of time...but anyone got or know where to get any good blue box plans?? I cant find shit on the web, and I need some good hacker telnet bbs's. Someone please give me either. THanks HeLiUM

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