December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The Living and the Dead
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 PM 9/16/96 -0400, Brian Davis wrote: >On Sun, 15 Sep 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> .... >> How would an AP-type system treat Robert McNamara? He'd be dead in a >> second. To those who say, "What good would this do?" I respond: Anyone in > ^^^^^^ >Kind of kills the betting pool, doesn't it? > >EBD Okay, it was just an expression... It would probably take a couple weeks. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:24 AM 9/16/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca writes: >> dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) wrote: >> >Starting with the lying old fart himself. >> >> You shouldn't be so hard on Tim. I tried giving up farting years ago but I = >> found >> I gained a lot of weight. It's also become more socially acceptable as evid= > >I wonder why containing one's fart would cause one to gain weight. Volume maybe, >but I'd think that gas weight about as much as the air it displaces. Actually, less: It's mostly hydrogen. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Spam blacklist project
by hallam＠ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, The following idea just hit me. How about a server which maintained a list of people who don't want to recive SPAM? The idea being that email recpients who don't want SPAM send their email address to the list. A SPAMer who want to check an email to see if it is on the list could then obtain the SHA-Digested list of addresses and remove them from their internal databases. Of course I don't for a moment imagine that this will be 100% effective. Without government regulation there will always be slimeballs who send mail to people who don't want it. The advantage of this scheme is that it would mean that the spam industry can avoid regulation pressure and they can deflect criticism. Meanwhile recipients of unwanted spam have a legitimate beef. Comments? Phill

6 7

Re: New Remailers?
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:53 AM 9/16/96 BST, you wrote: >I recently secured an account with anon.penet and then a few days later got >a post informing me that the servive was now terminated. Anybody out there >know of any remailers where you dont have to have a Phd in computer science >and a thorough working knowledge of PGP in order to operate? Raph Levien's remailer list lives at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Most of the remailers on it are the one-way variety - you can send mail to someone anonymously, but you don't get an address for people to reply to you. They're easy to use. Some of them also support anonymous reply blocks, which are a somewhat difficult-to-use feature - you basically PGP-encrypt your return address (in the correct syntax), and tell anybody who wants to reply to you to include the block at the beginning of their mail. There have been some pseudonym servers besides anon.penet.fi, which provide higher security, and are easier to use than anonymous reply blocks, once you set them up (which generally involves creating anonymous reply blocks :-) Two of them have been spammed to death, but the cyber remailer at alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net is still up. Send it a request for help to get information. Raph has a new system coming soon; see his remailer list for details. Private Idaho is Joel McNamara's friendly user interface for remailers and PGP. http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi_list.html . Runs on MSWindows. It made it _much_ easier to use the alpha nymserver while that was still alive; don't know if the new version supports cyber yet or not. Remailer security depends on encryption - otherwise wiretappers can watch mail going into the remailer and know where it's going. So you'll need to learn to use PGP, but it's pretty straightforward, and Private Idaho makes it more convenient. The Mixmaster remailers provide higher security remailing, also with no reply capability; you need to get special client software, which I think isn't ported to Windows yet? >Also, are there any remailers which will accept binary attachments? There are three popular ways to do binary attachments - 1) MIME-encoding (uses MIME headers and maybe a 7-bit content transfer encoding.) 2) UUENCODE (simple-minded header and 7-bit ASCII.) 3) Mail-handler-specific headers with binary stuff following Uuencode is a no-brainer - just stick the uuencoded binary after the remailer headers. As far as I know, none of the remailers are particularly MIME-aware, but they do glue headers together. So you could probably start sticking MIME headers after the remailer headers and try a few times to get it to work. Mail-handler-specific behaviour is, of course, mail-handler-specific :-) You can try it and see, and remember that the person at the other end may not have the same kind of mail handler you do, so even if you sent the mail directly instead of through a remailer, it might not work. You may have trouble getting your mail client to do what you want for sending the message (e.g. if you use Cc:Mail or MSMail.) I looked at the code for my remailer, which is a modified Ghio2, though I don't think I modified this part, and it'll trash binaries. The problem is that, after processing headers, it shoves the rest of the input stream into the output file by a loop of fgets() check for cutmarks fprintf() which will trash anything that contains nulls, and may not do the right thing for newlines either, though it won't bother high-bits. I suppose it wouldn't be too hard to write a getchar/putchar loop that checks for cutmarks while transferring data safely (this would be easier if cutmark behaviour includes outputting the cutmark.) However, the remailer uses the native mail program (e.g. sendmail) to forward the mail, so if your sendmail trashes binaries, or does annoying vestigial things like changing "From " to ">From " at the beginnings of lines, it'll still lose. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

1 0

Re: Kiddie porn on the Internet
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:51 AM 9/15/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >[Allegations that "save the children" is a political organization >providing cover for an effort to ban cryptography] > >At 01:54 PM 9/9/96 -0400, Hallam-Baker wrote: >> Their main mission is sending food to Ethiopia and other famine >> areas, development work etc. It is ultra-worthy stuff. > >Not everyone who sends food to the starving children is ultra >respectable. >Problem is that the usual cause of starving children is tyranny. >In order to get close enough to the starving children to take >those cute fund raising photographs you have to pay off and get >cosy with tyrants. This creates a moral hazard, in that it is >hard to tell the difference between normal bribery needed to do >anything in a tyrannical state, and bribery to bribe tyrants to >create starving children for photo ops. >It is very common for international charities to develop excessively >friendly relationships with murderous tyrannies, Yet another obligatory AP (Assassination Politics) reference: If a person is really interested in helping out "starving children" he may be able to do far more good by purchasing the death of the local tyrant(s), rather than (just) buying more food. After all, if the donor really believes that this starvation isn't endemic to the country, he has to conclude that it's a condition which is forced on the victims. In addition, you almost always find that these starving countries have well-supplied militaries, defending the local warlords against each other as in Somalia. Indeed, in Somalia the incoming food was actually used to buoy up one group against another, because access to it is controlled directly or indirectly by the factions. Some might argue that the death of a single leader doesn't normally fix the problem. While that's often true, it's normally because there isn't an automatic guarantee that the next 20+ leaders will ALSO be killed if they display the same problems as the first. Provide that guarantee, and (somewhat paradoxically) not only do you not need to kill the 20+, you probably won't have to kill the first one! (wondering when the world will see the light...) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

2 1

Redundancy in XOR encryption
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have a question I hope someone here might be able to answer: As the method of cryptanalysis of XOR (Ie. index of coincidence) relies on redundancy in the plaintext, would the following be strong: Compress P to get perfect compression (ie. 0 redundancy) Encrypt F (the compressed text) using a repeated key XOR of course this is all rather theoretical as there is no such thing as perfect compression, but I just thought it might be interesting to see if this is indeed strong, superficially it appears so to me... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMj2TvL5OPIRbv66xAQGRpgP+LU0Y8sxzO6rObCYAQdrD8/R/iDJN3m0Z 4ZetS7jcbz7wT6bj2l7Usb0F4h/YMhxtl0y9EQ91ozg35jfRKdy2IwUoMDvqsVSZ wKmaM/DpEt2LDyRQnzIvlNYQp6/eXQoBUb7r9SH/dZbjM7culpjzJLhd07Nx5okE jUmPNBLm9m0= =RHie -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ 9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= =CMZA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

2 1

Pro-CODE bill may not help much
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

After reading the text of Senator Burns's pro-CODE bill (S.1726), I'm not convinced that the bill would actually remove the barriers to the export of PGP and other strong encryption software. I'd like to know whether you agree with my concerns, or if you think that the bill would adequately protect encryption software exports. shabbir(a)vtw.org (Voters Telecommunications Watch) writes: >DESCRIPTION OF S.1726, PRO-CODE BILL >The Pro-CODE Act resolves to: > >1. Allow for the *unrestricted* export of "mass-market" or "public-domain" > encryption programs, including such products as Pretty Good Privacy and > popular World Wide Web browsers. > >2. Requires the Secretary of Commerce to allow the less restricted export > of other encryption technologies if products of similar strength are > generally available outside the United States, roughly up to DES > strength. > >3. Prohibits the federal government from imposing mandatory key-escrow > encryption policies on the domestic market and limiting the authority > of the Secretary of Commerce to set standards for encryption products. I'm not sure that this interpretation of the pro-CODE bill is correct, at least as far as points (1) and (2) are concerned. It appears to me that the bill allows the goverment to retrict all exports of cyptographic software for general use, as long as similar retrictions are imposed on the export of software for use by foreign banks. PGP could still be prohibited. I will quote the relevant sections of the bill, with my comments. >From the text of the Pro-CODE Bill: >SEC.3 DEFINITIONS. > > (8) GENERAL LICENSE- The term "general license" means a > general authorization that is applicable to a type of > export that does not require an exporter of that type > export to, as a condition to exporting- > (A) submit a written application to the Secretary; > or > (B) receive prior written authorization by the > Secretary. In other words, a "general license" means that rules may be established regulating the export of certain materials, as long prior written application or prior written authorization for the export is not required. For example, "Permission is hereby granted to export all encryption software with a key length not exceeding 40 bits; no written application is necessary." would be an example of a general license to export a particular type of software. >SEC. 5. PROMOTION OF COMMERCIAL ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS. > > (c) CONTROL OF EXPORTING BY SECRETARY.- > (2) ITEMS THAT DO NOT REQUIRE VALIDATED LICENSES.- > Only a general license may be required, except as > otherwise provided under the Trading With The Enemy Act > (50 U.S.C. App.1 et seq.) or the International Emergency > Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (but only to > the extent that the authority of the International > Emergency Economic Power Act is not exercised to extend > controls imposed under the Export Administration Act of > 1979), for the export or reexport of- > (A) any computer software, including computer > software with encryption capabilities, that is- > (i) generally available, as is, and designed > for installation by the user or purchaser; or > (ii) in the public domain (including on the > Internet) or publicly available because it > is generally accessible to the interested > public in any form; or > (B) any computing devise or computer hardware > solely because it incorporates or employs in > any form of computer software (including > computer software with encryption capabilities) > that is described in subparagraph (A). I interpret this to mean that export of this type of software can still be restricted by the terms of a "general license". Even though prior written permission cannot be required for export, export is permitted only if the terms of the general license are complied with. This is not the same as "unrestricted export of mass market software"; in fact, for some types of software, the "general license" rules could still forbid export entirely. The following section describes the conditions under which the Secretary of Commerce is required to grant a general license allowing export: > (3) COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND COMPUTER HARDWARE WITH > ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES.- > (A) IN GENERAL.- Except as provided in subparagraph > (B), the Secretary shall authorize the export > or reexport of computer software and computer > hardware with encryption capabilities under a > general license for nonmilitary end-users in > any foreign country to which those exports of > computers software and computer hardware of > similar capability are permitted for use by > financial institutions that the Secretary > determines not to be controlled in fact by > United States persons. In other words, the Secretary must define the terms of the general license in such a way that software of "similar capability" to software that is exportable to foreign banks is also exportable for general use. Note that the requirement is that the software must be similar to software that can already be exported for use by foreign banks; it is neither necessary nor sufficient that similar products be available from foreign sources. The "similar products available from foreign competitors" rule was in the Leahy bill, but I see nothing like it in the pro-CODE bill. PGP could be held not to be of "similar capability" to the banking software, and not exportable under the terms of the general license, because it uses a different encryption algorithm, a different key length, and is capable of encrypting arbitrary data, not just financial transactions. In the future, if key escrow requirements were imposed on software exported to foreign banks, the same restriction could be imposed on software exported for general use. It seems to me that the idea behind section 3(A) is that if foreign bankers are willing to accept a certain level of encryption, then everyone else will accept it too, so the software industry will be able to make money exporting it; the few people who want something better (e.g. to protect their privacy against government wiretapping) don't have to be protected, because denying them protection won't cost the software companies any money. I include section 3(B) only for completeness, because it is mentioned in section 3(A): > (B) EXCEPTION.-The Secretary shall prohibit the > export or reexport of computer software and > computer hardware described in subparagraph (A) > to a foreign country if the Secretary > determines that there is substantial evidence > that such software and computer hardware will > be- > (i) diverted to a military end-use or an end- > use supporting international terrorism; > (ii) modified for military or terrorist end- > use; or > (iii) reexported without the authorization > required under Federal law. Do other people agree with this interpretation of the bill? Are most people satisfied that the bill would actually protect the right to export PGP and other strong encryption software? I haven't seen this discussed in this group before. I realize that this may be academic, because the bill is unlikely to pass now.

1 0

Flamewars and events of the outside world
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there anybody who saw a correlation with the occurences of flamewars or nut-cases on the list with important things that happened in the outside world that could benefit from having the CPunks looking the other way? Like this one with "Anonymous" going on. And a few others lately. Some clueless or semi-outsiders seems to drop in the group and sling mud to detract every active participants from the other topics discussed (usually, more to the point with CP). I am not ranting about the answering, I'm simply puzzled by the phenomenon. Just like, as a rule here in Canada, every time the country is really going down and that everybody start getting fed-up of the govt, suddenly the debate on death penalty or abortion or racial equality or salary inequality among sexes just pops-up. Every times, it looks it happened purely as an happenstance but every time, there was something very fishy going on at another level. Ciao jfa Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultant physicists and engineers, LabView programming PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

1 0

Re: J'accuse!: Whitehouse and NSA vs. Panix and VTW
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:33 AM 9/13/96 -0700, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: > >At least one of the newspaper articles I've read has referred to the need >for real authentication on the net to prevent the anonymity that makes >this kind of attack possible, and in particular for the major network providers >to make sure that they don't export messages with bogus addressing, >a cure that the article said would take several months to deploy. >I don't know if they were referring to IPv6, or sendmail modifications, >or router hacks, or what; the article's author seemed to think this was >about bogusly-addressed email messages rather than understanding SYNs. > Well IPSec provides for authentication of endpoints which would identify the syn attacker. What amazes me is that routers happily pass packets with foreign IP return addresses. I guess there is some valid utility to being able to originate a connection that actually goes somewhere else for intiating a many to many protocol. But I can't think of any practical application that would necessarily be that way. So why do routers let packets leave local networks that do not appear to originate from said local network? Doesn't routing work "both ways" so to speak?

4 3

Re: Diffie Hellman - logs in Galois fields
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk writes: > > Hi all, > > A question for the matematicians out there: > > I am looking at the Diffie Hellman public key exchange protocol and > am trying to find out why it is computationally hard to take logs in > a finite (Galois) field. I think polluting this mailing list with trivial questions such as this is just as bad as polluting it with personal attacks. Read the FAQs. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

1 0

Re: [Long] A history of Netscape/MSIE problems
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>[...] The reason for the 40-bit key and (according to RSADSI, the >>company that developed RC4) the reason why details on it were kept >>secret was that these conditions were required under an agreement >>between the Software Publishers Association (SPA) and the US >>government which gave special export status to the RC4 algorithm and >>a companion algorithm called RC2. > >Hadn't heard that before, that the trade secret requirement was imposed on >RSADSI. What was your source for that info, it is an interesting assertion on >the part of RSADSI, and I am intrigued. It's in AC II, p.319 (I was getting worried for a minute, I missed it the first time I looked and then couldn't figure out where I'd got the info from). >You ought to reference Andrew Roos paper [posted to the list, and sci.crypt, >at least] analysing key schedule biases in RC4. It's mentioned in the list of minor RC4 weaknesses. I didn't include refs for all of these because I've already probably got as many references in there as text (the term "reference terrorism" has been used to describe some of my papers in the past). >Strangly (I'm not sure if anyone lost money due to this), I think Netscapes >prices hardly suffered, perhaps even improved slightly. Could be due to the >`any publicity is good publicity' syndrome. There was a *lot* of publicity, >and Netscapes response in fixing the problem was good. Several US cypherpunks >were tracking the stocks at the time, and could probably verify this. Interesting... does anyone want to comment on this? This kind of damages one of my assumptions in the paper that publicity attacks can hurt a company providing poor security. Could it be that at the time people would buy Netscape stock no matter what happened? If MSIE had been widespread at the time, would it have caused people to jump ship en masse? >One omission: you didn't say anything about Paul Kocher's timing attack on >RSA, which I think affected Netscape servers, and was fixed after his >publicizing the attack. Then you could discuss Ron Rivest's blinding >solution, and the time delay solution. It's a pretty obscure attack and one which most implementations (ones running on home PC's) won't ever need to worry about, given that it's many times easier to get a victim to download some whiz-bang ActiveX applet which quietly patches their browser to use a fixed key for all SSL sessions. Has anyone thought of doing this? If I had a system (and compiler) capable of building ActiveX apps I'd love to do this - create an espionage-enabling screen saver or something. Peter.

3 2

Re: Gaining trust in OCO crypto code
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree with most of Bill's points. It is the right sort of analysis. At 3:06 PM 9/12/96, Bill Frantz wrote: .... >(2) Key generation. There are published ways to encode an RSA secret key >in the corresponding RSA public key. A key generation algorithm which only >uses 32 bits of the random number would be hard to detect, but easy to >break by one who knew its secret. You have to be able to examine in detail >how keys are generated. Actually if you generate 100,000 RSA keys with the algorithm the birthday effect says that you will have some collisions. Of course even 100,000 key generations takes a long time. .... >(1) Implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. If we can feed it enough >test cases, and compare the output with a public, well vetted >implementation, we can come to believe that it is correct. For some purposes. On the transmitting end if the enemy can choose the plain text then a tested but bogus implementation can take special action upon seeing a signal in the plain text stream. One such action would be to merely shut down. On the receiving end a bogus implementation can detect a signal inserted in the cipher text by the enemy and cause damage. I havn't thought of any low visibility attacks but I suspect that there may be some. If random number generation is specified not to be integral to RSA key generation, then two or more untrusted programs, from mutually hostile sources, can generate your RSA key if they yield the same output from the same input. In paranoia situations I would rather trust my keyboard random than an algorithm chosen by my enemy.

1 0

ISP-TV Interview with Solveig Bernstein
by ISP-TV Main Contact 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** ISP-TV Program Announcement: Interview with Solveig Bernstein *** Monday, September 16 9:00 PM ET Solveig Bernstein Assistant Director of Telecommunications & Technology Studies Cato Institute ISP-TV will present an interview with Solveig Bernstein from the Cato Institute. Ms. Bernstein will be discussing legal issues concerning the CDA, the upcoming Supreme Court case, and other telecom legal issues. This video interview can be viewed on the ISP-TV main CU-SeeMe reflector at IP 205.197.247.33, or other ISP-TV affiliate reflectors listed at http://www.digex.net/isptv/members.html See URL http://www.digex.net/isptv for more information about the ISP-TV Network

1 0

Government awards GAK contract to Nothern
by David Lesher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clarinet sez: OTTAWA, Sept. 16 (UPI) -- The federal government has chosen Northern Telecom's data security software, Entrust { } Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)... for gov't use..... worth $7.3 million...... -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close...........(v)301 56 LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead........vr vr vr vr.................20915-1433

1 0

Re: 56 kbps modems (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 17:56:43 -0700 (PDT) > From: Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> > Subject: Re: 56 kbps modems > > On Mon, 16 Sep 1996, Jay Gairson wrote: > > > Speaking of ISDN, how many people, can afford to have a personal ISDN > > line in there house? And then afford to connect to something/someone > > else on a next to permanent basis monthly? > > No problem here. My ISDN bill is a small fraction of my regular phone bill. > Count me in. I am wired 24 hrs a day via ISDN. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

1 0

Searching an email address
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been trying to find out info re: someone via his email address and didn't find anything. The server is telaver.com, e.g., name(a)telaver.com Any suggestions outside of the usual search machines?

1 0

U.S. Helped Wipe Out One of the Kurdish Factions
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:00 PM 9/16/96, jim bell wrote: >condition which is forced on the victims. In addition, you almost always >find that these starving countries have well-supplied militaries, defending >the local warlords against each other as in Somalia. Indeed, in Somalia the >incoming food was actually used to buoy up one group against another, >because access to it is controlled directly or indirectly by the factions. The reports that the U.S. spent $100 million supporting the Kurdish struggle against the central government is a related point. The $100 M went into weapons, food, etc., which the U.S.-supported side used against the Iran-supported side. Then the U.S.-supported side allied themselves with the central government, however temporarily, and is not engaging in a "mopping up operation" (translation: summary execution of all members found of the losing side, including wives and children). Our $100 million helped wipe out the "losing side" Kurds, and also strengthened the previously-poor reputation of Saddam Hussein (who just got a unanimous vote of support from the Arab League foreign ministers meeting in Cairo...this likely explains why the weekend's predicted massive raid on Baghdad was shelved...Clinton is already backpedaling, and may send Hilary/Hillary to Baghdad to help the Baghdad "Save the Children" chapter). (Note: Only this last point, about Hilary, is made up...the rest is what is actually happening.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Assassination Politics, was Kiddie porn on the Internet
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Yet another obligatory AP (Assassination Politics) reference: If a person >>is really interested in helping out "starving children" he may be able to do >>far more good by purchasing the death of the local tyrant(s), rather than >>(just) buying more food. > > >The problem is that assasination rarely leads to the installation of >a government that is any better. In most cases it gets worse. > >In the past the US excuse for supporting bloodthirsty murderers like >Pinochet, Saddam, Marcos and Noriega was that the alternative was >worse. > >In cases like Eritrea or Ethiopia the average term of office of any >given despot tends to be rather short in any case. In most cases its >a case of there being little to choose between the leaders of the >various factions and that ending the war on any terms is better >than allowing it to continue. > We've all heard these arguments, but are they true? Who says so, and how can they be certain? Jim's suggestion has never, to my knowledge, been tried on a consistant, large, scale. When all conventional alternatives have been tried and fail, what have we or the starving children got to lose? I'm sure there are qualified mercinaries available at the right price to put together wetwork operations, just look in soldier of fortune. I once had a hand in establishing a non-profit. Perhaps we can name it SPECTRE (SPecial Executive for Counter-intelligence, Terrorism, Revenge and Extortion) after Ian Flemming. Is it legal for citizens of the U.S. to engage in contract killing of foreign military, politations, etc? How about U.S. or foreign non-profits? In a related matter, I used to be an avid RC modeler. By marrying a single-board computers, DGPS (Differential GPS) and Giant Scale Remote Control technologies it now appears straightforward to produce inexpensive consumer cruise missiles capable of accurate (<10 meter radius) delivery of 10 kg. explosive, gas or biological payloads over several hundred km. for less than $10,000 each. Both reciprocating and miniature jet engines are available. Might make cheaper alternative to mercinaries. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to perscription DRUGS.

2 1

really undetectable crypto made somewhat practical
by jim＠suite.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The primary drawback to the stego scheme I described in the previous post was the ratio of stego bits per message. The scheme would only transmit an estimated 4 stego bits per message. Then it occurred to me that I can improve the ratio by basing the scheme on the hashes or words rather than the hashes of entire messages. Previous Scheme: construct a sequence of plaintext messages such that the first 4 bits of the MD5 hashes of the messages combine to produce the cyphertext of the true stego message. The sender would only need to send the plaintext messages. The recipient would calculate the MD5 hash of each plaintext message, extract the first four bits from each hash, append them together, then decrypt the result to obtain the true stego message. New Scheme: First, calculate the MD5 hash of all the words in the various dictionary files used by the password cracker program and create a database containing every word and the first 4 bits of its MD5 hash. Given such a database, it would be possible to write a program that accepts as input a block of cyphertext (the stego message, encrypted), chunks it up in to groups of 4 bits and then, for each chunk, displays the words that have hashes that start with those same four bits. The person running the program would select words that form meaningful sentences but also produce hashes that combine into the encrypted stego message. This scheme would send 4 stego bits per word. In addition to ordinary words, the database could contain names, misspelled words, abbreviations, words with alternate capitalization, slang terms, technical jargon, whatever. Fortunately, senders and receivers don't need to synchronize word databases. The recipient doesn't need to have any word database. The receiver can reconstruct the hidden encrypted message simply by calculating the MD5 hash of each word in the plaintext message, gathering up the appropriate hash bits and decrypting the result. This scheme could send more than 4 stego bits per word, but as you increase the number of stego bits per word (sbpw), you reduce the number of words that will work for a given chunk of cyphertext, making it harder to construct meaningful sentences (e.g. given a 40,000 word database, 4 sbpw yields 16 word groups with approx 2500 words per group; 8 sbpw yields 256 word groups with approx 156 words per group. 8 sbpw would probably not work well). Would this scheme work? It works in the sense that you can use it to send arbitrary encrypted messages through channels that don't allow anything but human-readable plaintext messages, but does it do so in an undetectable manner? I think so, but I don't know for sure. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

1 0

Re: Risk v. Charity (was: RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant).
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Mon, 16 Sep 1996 19:58:25 -0400, Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> wrote: > >Remember the original purpose of social security. A government fund which >was self sustaining because it only gave out what was put in and gained by >investment. Not quite. You'll remember that SS was pitched to the masses as such during the Great Depression, but its true purpose was to allow older workers to quickly retire and make room for the largely unemployed men in their prime, family raising, years. > >> A social safety net is simply a form of health and life >> insurance. Statistical arbitrage if you will. > >Yes, but not for the reasons you would cite. Social safety nets prevent >rioting by the lower classes, revolution and general civil disorder >because they appease the masses. Indeed this is a form of health and life >insureance for the middle and upper classes. No doubt. See my previous comment. > >> By spreading the risk you >> minimize the cost. Yes, some people will take advantage of the system. >> But like a virus, a robust system should be able to withstand this form >> of attack. > >This is absolutely silly. Speading the risk alone does nothing. The cost >for those who can pay is increased, and the cost for those who cannot pay >is made 0 (it already was 0 incidently). > >It is also the reason the taxpayers (and not the savings and loan >community at large) were forced to bail out the failed financial >institutions. Namely, because premiums were not tied to risk. The FDIC, >as of last year in any event, charges a flat rate fee for all financial >institutions. This is independent of any risk analysis of their >investments. i.e., a financial institution that invests in trailor parks >in Arkansas pays the same premiums for federal deposit insurance as a >institution that invests in government issued debt instruments. (There is >some ceiling for risk, but not a graduated system below the ceiling). > >The result was (is) an incentive to risky investments. If you are a >financial institution and I tell you "I will charge you $1.00 to insure >$1000.00 of low risk and low profit investments, but I will charge you a >while $1.00 to insure $1000.00 of extremely risky but highly >profitable option and currency investments" which one are you going to >choose? (Hint, you're an idiot if you pick option #1). > >The reason the insurance fund was depleted is because there was no risk >balancing built into the system. The premiums did not cover the losses. >They would have if they were risk adjusted. > Next major recession: Here we go again. >Spreading the risk, by itself, does NOT reduce cost. You must properly >PRICE risk. > >This is the distinction between insurance and welfare. Right on! >Welfare merely hands out money for those who have not bothered or cannot >afford insurance. The result is an INCREASE in cost (taxes) to those who >are coughing up the cash so that they may support. > PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to perscription DRUGS.

2 1

All Bets Off
by Brock N. Meeks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just so this isn't hanging in cyberspace forever, my $5,000 bet for anyone to prove the TWA 800 flight was downed by a U.S. missile is now *off the table*. It's been two-plus weeks since I tossed out the bet and no one took me up on it, so it's now being formally withdrawn. --Brock

4 3

WinSock Remailer Now Accepting Only PGP Encrypted Messages
by Joey Grasty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Y'all: Effective immediately, the WinSock Remailer (operating at winsock(a)c2.org) will now accept only PGP encrypted messages. All incoming messages (with the exception of messages with subject headers of help, remailer-help, remailer-stats, and remailer-key) must now be encrypted with the public key for winsock(a)c2.org. All other messages will be rejected. Regards, Joey Grasty (jgrasty(a)gate.net) Jim Ray (liberty(a)gate.net) WinSock Remailer Operators -- Joey Grasty jgrasty(a)gate.net [home -- encryption, privacy, RKBA and other hopeless causes] jgrasty(a)pts.mot.com [work -- designing pagers] "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin." -- John Von Neumann PGP = A7 CC 31 E4 7E A3 36 13 93 F4 C9 06 89 51 F5 A7

1 0

Re: forward secrecy in mixmaster
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:29 PM 9/12/96 +0000, paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote: >Stewart> I think they chose a strong prime (form p = 2q+1, q prime), ... >Strong primes are no longer of any benefit for cryptographic >applications. You're probably right, for today's factoring techniques. For a key you're only planning to use for the next couple of years, you can pretty much ignore strong primes, unless you're stuck with 512-bit keys, in which case you need to glean any crumbs you can. But for a value that needs to last a long time, such as a Diffie-Hellman modulus that's going to be a default value in a standard, and which you're only going to generate once anyway, it makes sense to generate a strong prime in case factoring methods that are affected by it become popular again in the future. It also makes sense to turn loose a bunch of people using different primality tests just in case somebody gets lucky (e.g. crank the test long enough that the probability of non-primality is 10**-9 or 10**-12 instead of just 10**-6. >Implementing strong primes won`t make your code any less secure, it >will just take longer to create the keys and won`t gain you any >security, all the big boys are using elliptic curve factoring methods >now so you really have nothing to gain. Do Generalized Number Field Sieve and its friends count as elliptic curve methods? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

1 0

The GAK Momentum is Building...
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:59 AM 9/17/96, David Lesher wrote: >Clarinet sez: > >OTTAWA, Sept. 16 (UPI) -- The federal government has chosen >Northern Telecom's data security software, Entrust { } Public-Key >Infrastructure (PKI)... for gov't use..... > >worth $7.3 million...... Add to this these items: -- the IBM GAK product -- the "Clipper IV" (or is it only Clipper III?) GAK announcement expected "soon" It seems that several of these announcements are happening at the same time, which I doubt is coincidental. As the Republican challenger (whose name escapes me at the moment :-}) is not making an issue out of this, and is not making any issues out of anything related to liberty issues as near as I can tell, Clinton and the national security establishment seem to have free rein (and reign) to deploy GAK> As Lucky pointed out, GAK now appears inevitable. There's probably still time to monkeywrench these schemes, though. A few Blaze- or Wagner/Goldberg-type hacks could undermine confidence in the Key Authority (not to be confused with the Port Authority, which I presume handles i/o port assignments). --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2

Re: Spam blacklist project
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: hallam(a)ai.mit.edu, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Sep 16 21:57:31 1996 Phill wrote: [interesting anti-spam idea.] > Of course I don't for a moment imagine that this will > be 100% effective. Without government regulation there will > always be slimeballs who send mail to people who don't want it. Your faith in big government, despite seemingly every bit of evidence possible to the contrary, astounds me sometimes. Churches, Mosques, etc. struggle mightily for this kind of thought pattern in believers, yet it comes to you naturally, in secular life. Truly a marvel, and on _this_ list, of all places. It has kept me from killfiling you, but I must occasionally express my awe at the power of faith to literally move mountains. There is a "regulation" (law) against [murder, selling/growing reefer, selling sexual services, assault, you name it] yet you'd never deny that these behaviors still exist, would you? Somehow, though, you still seem to manage to think that spamming slimeballs will just disappear with more regulations. It's astonishing. > The advantage of this scheme is that it would mean that > the spam industry can avoid regulation pressure and they can > deflect criticism. I thought that "The Hippie of Crime" proved that spammers, if slick enough, could deflect criticism from themselves without any government help. > Meanwhile recipients of unwanted spam have > a legitimate beef. Don't we already have a legitimate beef, though? [I like your idea, BTW.] In fact, in view of Ian's recent posting, don't we already have a law, too? JMR -- "I think I'll reattach my printer to this machine." Regards, Jim Ray -- DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy "As govt.s grow arithmetically, corruption grows exponentially." -- Ray's Law of official corruption. Defeat the Duopoly! Stop the Browne out. Harry Browne for President. Jo Jorgensen for Vice-president. http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ http://www.twr.com/stbo ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. <mailto:liberty@gate.net> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMj4FkG1lp8bpvW01AQFvzAQAlLcZV+zsFfsvGodK7uyJP2hxNgugWpwD qYV23LgwV2dU5NRb7TPbqhp9Z6R7J5YZ3DnA6QuLnvn0pKVFITIyhcq7Wn3zu4PK 5uQ3slYJof1nT3l79zDA6Xx/2pBUm4IxhYXsrw4z4jQFGWHl28rZ1JpbAWghCRcM b7JXzqaRnek= =AbJE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 2

Re: Report on security of e-money by BIS
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: lvhove(a)vnet3.vub.ac.be (Leo Van Hove) Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 10:39:14 +0100 From: lvhove(a)vnet3.vub.ac.be (Leo Van Hove) To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: Re: Report on security of e-money by BIS >So, I am still keen on that report ... > >> No political recommandations. >(ok) >> Possibliy the report will soon be online. Meanwhile it should be >> possible to order a copy at www.bis.org. > >but the site has no email address or ordering info. The report >is not listed as far as I could see. As I have a scanner, I >shall attempt to secure a paper copy, but it looks like recourse >to historical methods of communications is called for. Now, how >does one operate this push-button dial thingy... > >-- >iang >iang(a)systemics.com Found the following on the FRB of New York site at http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/g10.html --- SECURITY MEASURES FOR ELECTRONIC MONEY ARE EFFECTIVE, G-10 TASK FORCE REPORTS NEW YORK -- Existing security measures to protect electronic money products, when implemented correctly, can provide consumers and issuers adequate protection from fraud, according to a report by G-10 central bank computer and security experts. The report, issued through the Bank for International Settlements, was prepared by <snip> *** This report will be available in its entirely on this site in the near future.*** --- leo _________________________________________________________________________ Leo Van Hove Centre for Financial Economics Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University of Brussels) Pleinlaan 2 B-1050 Brussels vox: +32 2 629.21.25 fax: +32 2 629.22.82 e-mail:lvhove@vnet3.vub.ac.be home page: http://cfec.vub.ac.be/cfec/leo.htm _________________________________________________________________________ --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

1 0

Re: 56 kbps modems
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Also note there's no mention of the hype-writer's old friend, > compression. But than if ypou are doing the compressed rate 56k is not that high. There are 28.8k modems that (in theory) do 336k including compression, so 56k would be redundant. Most current modems specify they will compress to 115k, whether they ever get close to this is unlikely Craig ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

1 0

Something crypto-financially relevant for a change
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C-punks, I have somr wire clippings that I think are more relevant to this list's stated topic that the constant personal attacks, rants, and newbie questions. I don't have the resources to send them out on request like JYA does. Would anyone be interested in my sending more materials like this to this list? BANKS BANK ON INTERNET Internet banking is poised for a rapid growth in Europe according to a survey of the European banking industry by Booz Allen & Hamilton. Thirty seven banks took part in the survey, which found that 80% were planning to upgrade existing Web sites to incorporate most traditional banking transactions within three years. There was also signs of the emergence of the first Internet-only banks. Wide-spread concerns about security are more an issue of perception than of real obstacles, according to Claus Nehmzow, a principal of BAH. The survey predicts that over the next five years 2,000 European banking institutions will be online. -- New Media Age, 9/12/96 IBM TEAMS WITH 15 BANKS TO FORM INTEGRION FINANCIAL NETWORK Fifteen of North America's leading banks and IBM today announced the formation of Integrion Financial Network. Beginning in early 1997, Integrion will offer a broad range of interactive banking and electronic commerce services to banks in the U.S. and Canada. Representing over half the retail banking population in North America, over 60 million households, Integrion will be owned and operated by IBM and the member banks (ABN AMRO, BANC ONE, Bank of America, Barnett Bank, Comerica, First Bank Systems, First Chicago NBD Fleet Financial Group, KeyCorp, Mellon Bank, Michigan National Bank, NationsBank, PNC Bank, Royal Bank of Canada and Washington Mutual). This ownership structure enables banks to play a central role in determining the manner and format in which these services are offered to their customers, ensuring that electronic banking services are consistent with the bank's full range of services, are branded by the bank, and that the bank's customers receive maximum benefit. -- Business Wire, 9/9/96 IN CHECK FRAUD WAR, SIMPLE IDEA MAKES ITS MARK In Texas, Nevada, Arizona and more than a dozen other U.S. states, bankers are fighting check fraud by equipping tellers with ink pads so they can affix the thumbprint of customers who are not regular patrons of the bank to the backs of checks they cash. Banks lose millions each year to organized crime and gang members who steal checks or duplicate payroll checks and then cash them. These crimes cost banks $815 million in 1993 alone, more than 12 times what they lost in robberies, according to American Bankers Association statistics. Said Dawn Duplantier of the Texas Bankers Association, which began selling its member banks the pads last December, "Across the board in the first six months, we have had a 70% decrease" in check fraud," she said. Bank of America, the third-largest U.S. bank, began taking prints at 43 of its branches in Nevada in 1994. Since then the bank has seen a 40% to 60% decline in check fraud, said Robert Randolph, liaison officer for the bank's investigative services division. -- Int'l Herald Tribune, 9/7/96 DAIWA SECURITIES SELLS U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OVER INTERNET Daiwa Securities America has expanded its trading room into cyberspace by allowing dealers to negotiate purchases and sales of U.S. government securities through the Internet, the worldwide computer network. The move will let clients log on to the bank's network using any Internet Service Provider and effectively close a deal online. Clients can access Daiwa's network through the bank's Web site -- located at http://www.oddlot.com -- and from t here place their buy or sell orders. To skirt the security holes, Daiwa is using several mechanisms, ranging from Internet firewalls to Secure ID cards, in an effort to prevent hackers from placing rogue or phony deals into the system. "Anybody can hook up to our Web site, but they can only get as far as our firewall. Then they have to have a Secure ID card and an account open with Daiwa," a spokesman said. The "secure IDs" are in fact small electronic cards that give the user an entrance code, which change s every 60 seconds, to a computer network. The system is now available only for financial institutions and brokerage houses interested in dealing with Daiwa. No individuals are allowed to open personal accounts and trade using the system at this point. -- Reuter, 9/6/96 BANKS SHOULD PREPARE TO CASH IN ON E-CASH According to a new study by Killen & Associates, banks can regain the leadership position in payments by leveraging their payment transaction infrastructure to support electronic cash (E-cash) services. "By 2005, E-cash transactions will escalate to almost 30 billion," stated Michael Killen, president of the market research firm. "Non-banks see this as a new opportunity to carve further market share away from the banking industry. All will compete for new revenue streams including Internet-based micropaym ents and 'by the byte electronic commerce purchasing services. E-cash, including secured credit/debit cards, stored-value cards, smart cards, ATM derivatives, and other forms, is less expensive for business than handling cash or standard credit cards and more secure than checks," Killen continued. "Opportunities will open for financial and other product and services players, including ATM vendors; ATM/POS terminal manufacturers and network suppliers, including bank-owned networks, American Express, Deluxe, ACS, and VeriFone; and cash handling/cash management services firms." -- Business Wire, 9/4/96 THE CHECK IS NOT IN THE MAIL The federal government must stop using checks by Jan. 1, 1999. Can the rest of us be far behind? A quarter-century ago digital visionaries were predicting the checkless society, and the number of checks written in the U.S. has tripled since then, to 61 billion in 1995. But one day, the predictions will come true, and that day moved closer with a little-noticed provision in April's federal budget compromise. It will force the biggest check writer of all -- the U.S. government -- to abandon paper checks almo st entirely by Jan. 1, 1999. After that, virtually all 1 billion federal payments made each year, including Social Security, must be made through electronic funds transfers. Yet, 90% of U.S. banks, and some federal agencies, aren't capable of electronically transmitting and receiving key information that accompanies vendor payments. The new law will force them all to get moving. -- Forbes, 9/9/96 --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

1 0

Forwared message from Pres. of juno.com
by Rabid Wombat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just thought I'd pass this along. I had jumped all over Juno on the list after the "talker" started, and tarred all of juno with the same brush. I was rather harsh on a company that I really don't know all that much about, except by judging a small sample of its clients. Sorry, Charles, and good luck with the grand social experiment. - r.w. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 13 Sep 1996 15:25:58 -0400 From: Charles Ardai <charles(a)staff.juno.com> To: Rabid Wombat <wombat(a)mcfeely.bsfs.org> Subject: Annoying spam incident(s) Hi. Your posting to cypherpunks was brought to my attention, and I wanted to take a minute to respond. (I also forwarded a copy of it to "postmaster(a)juno.com", where we have a (small) staff of people to deal with incidents like the one you ran into. If you run into more in the future, please e-mail the information to that address.) Since this is not directly relevant to cypherpunks, I'm replying directly to you, but you are welcome to forward this note to the list if you want. > Complaints about spamming and cross-posting probably won't get you far, > either. On-Net spamvertizing seems to be their source of revenue. Perhaps > shaw.net needs to be contacted instead. A couple of clarifications: Juno has never sent a single piece of spam and, as long as I have anything to say about it, never will. We provide a free e-mail service which is paid for by advertising, but the advertising takes the form of graphical banners built into Juno's custom interface and the ads only appear on the screens of Juno's members. We have never sent any ads by e-mail, and have never sent any online ads of any sort to anyone who was not one of our members. What's more, we expressly prohibit the use of Juno to transmit commercial solicitations in the Service Agreement that all members have to accept before they can create a Juno account. When we hear about violations, we investigate and (if it seems appropriate) take actions up to and including terminating a violator's account on our service. Needless to say, we do not read or in any way screen the mail our members send or receive, so until we hear about a spamming incident we have no way to prevent a particular piece of spam from being transmitted; but I promise you we do listen to the complaints we receive and act on them as quickly as we responsibly can. In short, we do not send spam, we do not tolerate spam, and we will not allow our service to become a home to spammers. Note that today we supply e-mail to more than 400,000 members, and over 6000 people create Juno accounts every day. At this rate of growth, we can expect to have millions of members by this time next year. The vast majority of our members use our service responsibly; it's only a fraction of a fraction of one percent who send spam. I appreciate your frustration at dealing with these abusers of our service -- and believe me, they don't frustrate you half as much as they do us -- but I ask that you not penalize the hundreds of thousands of responsible Juno members (and those users of your network who want to communicate with them) because of the actions of the handful of miscreants doing their best to give us a bad name. Juno has no more (and, alas, no less) spam-producing potential or control over the spam its members send than Netcom, AOL, CompuServe, or any other e-mail provider. (We're slightly better, perhaps, because Juno currently offers its members no tools for direct posting to newsgroups or information about mail->news gateways, and slightly worse because it is possible to get a Juno account without having to give us a credit card number.) By shutting off access to your network by our members' mail you hurt the spammers only minimally -- they'll find another address elsewhere and spam again, I'm afraid -- but may hurt Juno quite a lot. And since we're the only major provider of free e-mail in the country today, I'd hate to see the service needlessly or inappropriately hurt. (I also have personal reasons, of course, for not wanting to see Juno hurt.) I apologize for the length of this message, and if we have been unresponsive to your past complaints I apologize for that as well. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me directly. Best regards, Charles Ardai President Juno Online Services, L.P.

1 0

Re: Judge Kozinski Responds
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:21 PM 9/16/96, Jim Ray wrote: >I have been having a private e-mail conversation with Judge Alex Kozinski of >the 9th circuit. Today he said: >>Halloween, it only really works when the people dressed up >>are about four feet tall. In the rare instances where there >>have been adults at my door that were so disguised you >>couldn't tell who they were, I felt threatened--kept my >>Glock handy before opening door. I'll only comment on this one item, for now. Any judge who talks about keeping his Glock handy has my vote. (Of course, I've heard of such things many times before. Chief Supreme Warren Burger once got a lot of publicity by answering his door--in D.C.--with a revolver in one hand. I suspect that an awful lot of judges fully appreciate the kind of perps that are out there, and know the threats they could face, both from random acts of violence and home invasion and from targetted acts of revenge. As they learn that perps they send away to prison are requesting archived copies of "Assassination Politics," I rather expect their paranoia will increase sharply.) (Hint: One reason I seldom discuss AP is that to me it's just a special case of the larger issue of untraceable markets for such acts, something I've been worried about for almost a decade now. There is little reason to engage in the fiction of a "betting pool" when a hit may be untraceably contracted for and the standard fee ($1000 or less in some inner cities, $5000 for ordinary suburbanites, $30,000 or more for high-profile cases...so I hear) be paid with untraceable cash...as soon as truly untraceable digital cash becomes a reality.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

Re: Unsolicited email advertising already illegal in US?
by Richard Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 15:54 9/16/96, Ian Goldberg wrote: >This piece from RISKS looks interesting. My computer certainly _is_ > > "equipment which has the capacity to transcribe text or images > (or both) from an electronic signal received over a regular > telephone line onto paper." > >Now, are HipCrime et al. liable for $500 in damages for each piece of spam? >If so, where do I sign up? The intent of that law is to prevent the shifting of advertising costs to the unwilling recipients of junk faxes. (The $500 per message damages figure is what prompted me to raise my proofreading rates to $500 per message.) Twisting this law to apply it to junk email sent to computers with carefully selected peripherals and net connections is certainly following that anti-cost-shifting intent. Quite amazing, that, to twist a law so cruelly and at the same time follow its intent. However, which way a judge would jump on it remains to be seen. One source considers its application to junk email to be unlikely, because in essence it's too much of a twist. See: http://www.ca-probate.com/faxlaw.htm for another copy of the law, and http://techweb.cmp.com/net/issues/036issue/036law.htm for an opinion that actual application of the law to junk email is unlikely. Richard -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMj4YF/obez3wRbTBAQEHVQQAgP+35ZmOpsw1A7VsMHAONCFL4c5+xXSI 8NR9bibFZ+X+vNRSgp8KsEH2JyUk3g50ygYWx8DrzC0jhDdu902VTTN9lI92RJf5 66P5mzOCIzbfULra7wy4nSjfGR7vRTNrvY3y5fKodDvPRekkd8TcBSn/aPW/ONRa Gk/AbxKd6Cc= =qTcT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "As the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental intrusion. ... Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects." -- Judge Stewart Dalzell Unsolicited advertising/promotional email proofread for $500/message! Your sending such a message to me is an explicit request for my services!

1 0

RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:18 AM 9/16/96 EST, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >Two questions, two observations: >Do you have health insurance? >Do you have life insurance? > >I have commented on your line of reasoning before and and it still seems to me >that an important part of the discussion is missed. Specifically, that anyone >can "save for a rainy day" and still not be able to provide for events that can >always happen: Heart attack, stroke, car accident, pinched nerve that leaves you >in excruciating pain and unable to work for several years. However, one can also prepare in the traditional way by having friends and family. If you have same, you will always have enough to eat and someone to take care of you (and also to kick you in the ass when you need it. >I don't think that a reasonable person would argue that medical insurance should >be outlawed because everyone should take care of their own needs. A social >safety net is simply a form of health and life insurance. Statistical arbitrage >if you will. By spreading the risk you minimize the cost. Somewhat actuarily unsound however. If "the welfare" or SS were private charities or insurance schemes, their management would be in prison for self-dealing and fraud because of the high overhead of welfare and the Ponzi scheme nature of SS. Note too the recent article in the Economist about how European firms are raising capital in the UK and the US because it is available there in private pension savings while European government retirement systems suck loads of capital out of the system leaving nothing but massive government debts. DCF

1 0

Re: 56 kbps modems
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> People who seemed to know used to say that 'the Shannon limit' >>> set an absolute upper limit around 40 kbps. Has Shannon been >>> proven wrong, or what? >>Well, it all depends on the signal-to-noise ratio. Also, if the noise is >>not white gaussian the situation can be even better. > >Or it can be worse. Almost all voice traffic in the US these days, >either once it gets to your local telephone wire center or maybe before, >is carried on T1 digital connections, which use 64kbps digital voice - >it's sampled at 8000 samples/second, A/D converted using a non-linear >8-bit scale called mu-law (or A-law for Europe), and (for the most common >framing format) has a signalling channel stego'd onto the LSB of every 6th >byte. >If you knew which the "robbed bit" was, you could get 63 kbps of digital data, >but since you don't, digital signals are limited to 56kbps since they >can't trust any of the low bits (analog doesn't lose much from this.) > Couldn't you just 'assume' you knew which bit was 'robbed' and test to see the result? If you were wrong, couldn't you advance/retard your clocking and via a process of elimination sync with the 'robbed bit? --Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to perscription DRUGS.

1 0

Re: Gaining trust in OCO crypto code
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree with Norm's points. At 6:59 PM 9/16/96 -0700, Norman Hardy wrote: >At 3:06 PM 9/12/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >.... >>(2) Key generation. There are published ways to encode an RSA secret key >>in the corresponding RSA public key. A key generation algorithm which only >>uses 32 bits of the random number would be hard to detect, but easy to >>break by one who knew its secret. You have to be able to examine in detail >>how keys are generated. > >Actually if you generate 100,000 RSA keys with the algorithm the birthday >effect says that >you will have some collisions. Of course even 100,000 key generations takes >a long time. This statement was not as clear as I wish I had been. The trap door in RSA key generation is sufficient to require careful examination of the source for any RSA key (unless you can take the out Norm suggests as): >If random number generation is specified not to be integral to RSA key >generation, then two or more untrusted programs, from mutually hostile >sources, can generate your RSA key if they yield the same output from the >same input. In paranoia situations I would rather trust my keyboard random >than an algorithm chosen by my enemy. When I started discussing using only 32 bits of the random number, I was thinking of random session keys such as PGP generates for its IDEA cypher. I agree you could detect a small number bits being used to generate these keys by a birthday attack. However, most systems make sure these keys are never revealed outside the system (to preserve the secrecy of the messages). It is not easy to do a birthday audit of e.g. PGP session keys. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | "Cave softly, cave safely, | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | and cave with duct tape." | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Marianne Russo | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

1 0

Re: Snake Oil FAQ 0.4 [comments appreciated]
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:06 AM 9/17/96, The Deviant wrote: >Not to mention, the basic flaw of OTP.. if you have the only copy of the >key, and the key is non-repetitive, how do you send the key to another >person without being just as insecure as not encrypting it in the first >place... almost any OTP claims are gonna be snake oil. Not quite. Many cryptographic messages have a *time value*. The canonical example is "Attack at dawn." A one-time pad carried by a unit out onto the battlefield is eminently valuable for receiving such time-critical messages. Many other examples abound: embassies receiving instructions from the home country, travelling businessmen exchanging messages with the office, Air Force One receiving encrypted transmissions from NORAD, and so on. This is why OTPs are still in use by the military, embassies, etc. Granted, asymmetric key systems have various advantages, discussed here all the time, but to say almost any OTP claims are snake oil is untrue. (Many claims about OTPs _are_ of course snake oil, but usually in that they are not true OTPs in the Shannon sense.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: 56 kbps modems
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Tue Sep 17 08:09:26 1996 > > > > On Mon, 16 Sep 1996, Jay Gairson wrote: > > > Speaking of ISDN, how many people, can afford to have a personal ISDN > > line in there house? And then afford to connect to something/someone > > else on a next to permanent basis monthly? > > No problem here. My ISDN bill is a small fraction of my regular phone > bill. > In Switzerland you pay 25 CHF/month for a normal phoneline and 50 CHF/month for an ISDN line (but you get two channels), so basically here it doesn't matter, which technologie you choose. (BTW, usage charge - by the seconds - is the same for both) :) Remo Pini - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMj5AlxFhy5sz+bTpAQF2KQgAgzAfEFb/NDW+J1Ub77CsOhCA578hiGFJ +0i2/yQApQFh4nztiAZoa2VeRlJV6TFcueF4wrGLmsZzw1j+jgo6SvW4ZRqZzfjC Ob+1wF2SKskEWKoRkAz/+u+RcEAGiQObgTu4VbM59LSYMfX/oba9OurwClhqhg0y /twMQ1BLUbFLqhZrruLO4rM1H2px+2FhWd6CP2jwEkiC/ghLPzGFPwcMoS1nSAfQ PGCVbajLaLJalD31FjFT1Z48sA+waBkdCISe8DTx2LQfKq+WK2A1CRyNOlNZUZdj ReaFBvciSTc8Eq01RmFZFOwoPvw7uxi8VpqE/xEBvq6v6UxrBF8xPQ== =BEhi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: 56 kbps modems
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: erp(a)digiforest.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Tue Sep 17 08:20:07 1996 Argh, criticism!!!!! :-0 > > 3. NO transmission over a standard phoneline can have more than 3100 > > baud, because the frequency of anything transmitted over that line is > > band limited to 300hz - 3400hz. (If you have ISDN it's not relevant > > anyway, since you are fixed with 8000hz or 64000 bps->in europe :), > > 56000 bps in usa) > > Personally, by saying that no transmission on a standard phoneline can > have more than 3100 baud, is a statement saying that technology and > science, shall never advance, to a point where things are possible. > If you remember right, just 10 or so years ago, we stated that 2400 baud > was the highest possible baud, and we would never go over. My modem, > running on a standard phone line, is a 28.8 USRobotics modem, with > the software, and hardware upgrades to a 3400 baud, I get on an average > day anywhere from 3500 to 3600 baud for send/receive. On a bad day, I > only get 3100 to 3200. SO I would say, that my phone lines, are cleaner > than most eh? And Yes, I am in the US. > Speaking of ISDN, how many people, can afford to have a personal ISDN > line in there house? And then afford to connect to something/someone > else on a next to permanent basis monthly? Well, if your modems says to "hell with the switch", you can do a lot of things with frequencies. And since the filters in the switch are not that accurate, you *might* get away with 3400 hz, which I doubt. Now if your phonecompany for what reason ever supports more bandwidth, thats good for you, but try to get your 3600 baud = 3600 hz modem to be accepted by the FCC will pose a problem, since it states in the regulations, that a modem has to stick to the 300-3400 hz band limits. > > 4. Most modern transmission schemes work with multiple bits per baud. > > I.e. you transmit 10 bits in one baud if you have a 31000 bps modem. > > the only limitation in transmission speed is the amount of binary > > values you can pack into one baud. that on the other hand is limited by > > the S/N (signal to noise) ratio of your line. If you have a noise of > > 0.9%, you can't use more than 100 steps or you have ambiguous signals. > > since people talk about 56000 bps modems (we tried 34000 modems here > > and they couldn't produce more than 28800 on a very good connection) > > that would mean, that you have to transmit 18 bits = 262144 (!) > > distinguishable signal forms per baud. > What about new ways of splitting the steps and baud more so that it > shows less at a higher level.... Just a question.. Ahh well, I'm > getting a page so I shall finish this now... Answer appreciated.. Huh? - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMj5DGBFhy5sz+bTpAQFQtwf/diE965nL6MCKX4ikXDyda9hq4a4yGQmV dxYHxD7ADCu32j+InC0FSCevO9Cjn5SoUhrHxsXHj/ZVaBEXRtJLX9g771FciBAz dqq1kKVVoFOJZGUCLUoHSD56tAU2t8pwXHu0QdnJWSpTLj9BausXGGcLH8PEJlAG 5bi3WP4M95Np/8nXUbR/GHlHiVLULRzDCgRLgVfDYe5NHgft69wXB5S3PoD/QUul ranoj1+4xk92M9SarPzcG8/gboR1EFVxgRdgLIi0zeyO+D0Ler648Btf6BgMdaSd Cr+9mzn/KXmrxHS4t6IPt+ZmZiUhzZHCcuxKrkb1JDz7pP6czhytyA== =0WaE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Forwared message from Pres. of juno.com
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:55 AM 9/17/96, Rabid Wombat wrote: >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Fri, 13 Sep 1996 15:25:58 -0400 >From: Charles Ardai <charles(a)staff.juno.com> >To: Rabid Wombat <wombat(a)mcfeely.bsfs.org> >Subject: Annoying spam incident(s) ^^^^ >> Complaints about spamming and cross-posting probably won't get you far, ^^^^^^^^ >A couple of clarifications: Juno has never sent a single piece of spam and, ^^^^ ... And so on, with the word "spam" being used frequently throughout the exchange. Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't recall seeing _any_ "spam" from the account holders at Juno. What I _do_ recall is one or more young kids signed up to our list and then began engaging in posting to the list various boring comments about their interests, their "warez," and so on. Stupid comments are not necessarily (or even usually) spam. When we start calling stupid postings "spam" and complaining to sysadmins about "spamming" by a user, we have seriously devalued any use the term might have once had. This applies whether the stupid posts are from "talker" or from _me_. We have an open mailing list, with anyone able to subscribe via majordomo. This means we'll get inexperienced users, flamers, and, yes, even true commercial spammers who use the open-reflector nature of the list to post their ads. (By the way, when various political organizations, e.g., EPIC, the Libertarian Party, EFF, VTW, etc., use this open-posting feature, is this also to be called "spamming"? Why is an alert to dozens of mailing lists and newsgroups not spam, while "Buy Wheaties" _is_ spam? The answer is that spam is in the eye of the beholder, and the law should not attempt to decide which "unrequested messages" are OK and which are not.) Some suggestions: -- if people want a closed list, use a version of list software that only allows members to post -- if people want "levels" of expertise involved, a la "29th Level Cypherpunk," this is not the place and time to try to implement this -- use filters, e.g., procmail, Eudora, whatever -- don't refer to unwanted posts as "spam," as this invites talk of applying laws about spam -- as always, use technology and related tools (filters, reputations) whenever possible instead of laws and the threat of laws The sooner we move to a system where people make positive decisions about which messages to accept and which not to, the better. This is a technological effort--seeking to influence the direction mail takes--worthy of some serious thinking, in my view. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: 56 kbps modems
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Mon, 16 Sep 1996, Jay Gairson wrote: >> Speaking of ISDN, how many people, can afford to have a personal ISDN >> line in there house? And then afford to connect to something/someone >> else on a next to permanent basis monthly? It's Phone Company Dependent. Here in Pac Bell territory, an ISDN phone line costs about 2.5 analog phone lines, and gets you two phone lines plus some signalling. Connection costs are free at night, and 1 cent/minute daytime. That may change - the phone company is appalled that all these computer people interpret the phrase "free at night" as meaning "it's _free_ at night", so their holding time predictions were bogus :-) Night is defined as 7pm-7am for ISDN. ISDN-equipped ISPs start at about $30/month; don't know if that's unlimited connect time or not. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

2 1

Re: Snake Oil FAQ 0.4 [comments appreciated]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:06 PM 9/16/96 -0400, The Deviant <deviant(a)pooh-corner.com> wrote: >Not to mention, the basic flaw of OTP.. if you have the only copy of the >key, and the key is non-repetitive, how do you send the key to another >person without being just as insecure as not encrypting it in the first >place... almost any OTP claims are gonna be snake oil. The way you send OTPs to people securely is to use couriers with briefcases handcuffed to their arms, or whatever level of physical security you need. The kinds of things software packages can help with are providing a friendly user interface for getting the next N bits out of the pad and trashing them after use, keeping track of where you were in the pad, handling the different pads you use to communicate with different people, driving the robot arm that drops the tape into the shredder, etc. Slightly less trustably, they can be used to help generate a pad by crunching down the data from your hardware random number generators, and perhaps emailing Geiger Counter data to the Safety Department after rounding to the nearest order of magnitude. Somebody else wrote: >> I would also suggest that the generation of OTP 'pads' for users is >> *highly* questionable. Who else is getting a copy of them, assuming they're >> even valid? Definitely - that concept loses big time. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

1 0

Re: Risk v. Charity (was: RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Personally, I paid my way through uni...full fees. I took out a loan when I developed cancer to pay for it (as the health insurance was not finalised for aproval - so they got out of paying). The few months I was unemployed after I left the military because of a confict of interests I earned money by doing whatever I could get (even though I am an engineer I have worked in a petrol station). So why and for what reason sould I have to pay several 10's of thousands each year to support others. I have never taken help from the govenment, I do not feel I should have to pay as well. And what am I paying for...to protect the status quo. I believe that there is more than enough help for ppl available. They just need to get off their butts and work. > > tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: > > >"Saving for a rainy day," whether saving, investing, getting an education > > (while others are out partying), preparing, etc., all takes effort and > > commitment. If those who save and prepare are then told they have to pay > > high taxes to support those who partied....well, the predictable effect > > [...] is _more_ people in agony. When you tell people that a compassionate > > society will meet their basic needs, a predictable fraction of them will choose > > not to work hard and prepare themselves. > > > > Two questions, two observations: > > Do you have health insurance? > > Do you have life insurance? > > Yes, so? > Yes, so? Myself also yes,yes > > I have commented on your line of reasoning before and and it still > > seems to me that an important part of the discussion is missed. > > Specifically, that anyone can "save for a rainy day" and still not be > > able to provide for events that can always happen: Heart attack, stroke, > > car accident, pinched nerve that leaves you in excruciating pain and > > unable to work for several years. > > Understand what it is you are saying. > ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

3 2

Re: SPL -- Suspicious Persons List
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:19 AM 9/16/96 -0400, you wrote: >The Tories put an exclusion into the act deliberately to cover the >Ecconomic League. Only record which are kept on computer are covered. >The Ecconomic League deliberately keeps all its records on paper to >avoid the act. .... >This is the same government which used MI5 to monitor the activities of >the peace movement and which used 5000 crack troops to evict 50 elderly >women from land they wanted to turn into a missile base. Whether you >agree or disagree with the policies the methods sound very much like those >of Hoover at the FBI with a strong dose of Nixon thrown in. Yeah. The Los Angeles Police Department, and to some extent many police departments that once had "Red Squads" chasing "Communists", doesn't have any records of who's a commie and who's been caught in bed with whom or what or caught stealing what from whom, and very few records of who's been shoving what else up their nose. However, there are a number of cops who have file cabinets in their garages at home, or who these days have personal computers, often with BBSs. And they talk to their friends, and maybe share the material in their file cabinets and PCs. None of the City's business. I've met four gentlemen from the Philadelphia Red Squad - I went out and offered them coffee after they'd spent the day lurking in a car outside an anarchist convention I was at a couple years back. They'd brought their own, and were set for the next couple hours :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

1 0

Re: Spam blacklist project
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

But all governments are so GOOD and wholesome...how could they EVER do anything that their ppl did not like 100% ;) > Your faith in big government, despite seemingly every bit of evidence > possible to the contrary, astounds me sometimes. Churches, Mosques, etc. > struggle mightily for this kind of thought pattern in believers, yet it > comes to you naturally, in secular life. Truly a marvel, and on _this_ list, > of all places. It has kept me from killfiling you, but I must occasionally > express my awe at the power of faith to literally move mountains. There is a > "regulation" (law) against [murder, selling/growing reefer, selling sexual > services, assault, you name it] yet you'd never deny that these behaviors > still exist, would you? Somehow, though, you still seem to manage to think > that spamming slimeballs will just disappear with more regulations. It's > astonishing. > ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

1 0

Bernstein hearing reminder: THIS Friday 11:45AM, SF Federal Building
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When: Friday, September 20, 1996, 11:45AM (hearing starts at Noon) Where: Federal Building, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco; Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's courtroom upstairs. (two blocks east of Van Ness Avenue and Golden Gate Avenue, in the Civic Center neighborhood) What: Dan Bernstein's case to declare the export controls unconstitutional will hold a hearing in which the judge will cross-examine both Dan's lawyers and the government's lawyers, to decide whether to strike down the ITAR and AECA as unconstitutional, throw out the case, or do something in between. Who: me, Dan's lawyers, NSA & State & Justice dept lawyers, the press, and as many cypherpunks and friends-of-encryption as will show up. Don't forget your costume! Formal dress is strongly recommended; you're going to court, remember! Why: To see justice in action; to hang out with your friends; to be there while cryptographic history is made; to get your picture in the Feb '97 Wired Japan. PS: Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 19:30:29 -0700 (PDT) To: gnu(a)toad.com Subject: I've got "go ahead" from my editor From: Rika <rika(a)well.com> ... I have read about "cypherpunk dress up day" and found it a good oppotunity to let Japanese reader of Wired know about law suit and circumustance of encription exporting, as well as actual activity of cypherpunk people. So far, "cypherpunk" is more like just a image/notion than actual living people to Japanese. If I can take a couple of group pictures after the court, I can develop an article for their Feb '97 issue. I hope it is ok with you and lots of lots of people show up this friday! Rika ... +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ $B3^86(J $BMx9a(J $B")(J183 $BEl5~ETI\Cf;TGr;eBf#6(J-13-13 Rika Kasahara POBox 25427, Los Angeles, CA 90025 Voice:+1-310-478-0653 Fax :+1-310-478-0493

1 0

Re: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>And this? Mr. Green hardly advocated an authortarian regime, quite the >contrary, he simply advocated one which refused to hand out money to every >outstretched hand. and the hands are usually those of a forgein government anyway...not the "starving masses". Not only is the money I pay as tax be used for funding the country I am in...but also the military in others. > In article <Pine.3.89.9609152124.A20702-0100000@netcom9>, > Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> wrote: > > On Sun, 15 Sep 1996, Dale Thorn wrote: > > > Just a comment: "The world population really should go back to around > > > one billion", etc. And how could we achieve that without severe govt. > > > oppression, one wonders? > > > > Quite simple. End all food and medical aid to developing countries paid > > for with money stolen at gunpoint from our citizens. Or make Norplant > > implants the condition for financial/in kind aid. Both US and > > abroad. > >And this? Mr. Green hardly advocated an authortarian regime, quite the >contrary, he simply advocated one which refused to hand out money to every >outstretched hand. ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

1 0

no internet gambling
by Jüri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From todays Baltic News Service newswire (my free translation): According to the ministry of finance of Estonia, they will not give any licences or permission to organize Internet gambling or lotteries in Estonia. The reason given was, that arranging lotteries on the Internet would take the activity outside from Estonia. According to the news, the only Internet gambling licences given out are in Liechtenstein and Ahvenamaa (part of Finland). My question is: how easy it is to get a licence for Internet casino in either Liechtenstein or some off-shore country (Belize, Bahamas etc) ? I believe Belize was one of the first to sign legislation on Internet gambling, does anyone have more information about the costs and requirements? Jüri Kaljundi AS Stallion jk(a)stallion.ee

2 1

German providers continue to censor XS4ALL network
by Felipe Rodriquez 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Released by: XS4ALL Internet BV Date : 17-september-1996 Author : Felipe Rodriquez (felipe(a)xs4all.nl) *** PRESS RELEASE *** GERMAN PROVIDERS CONTINUE TO CENSOR XS4ALL NETWORK German providers have continued their ip-filtering actions against dutch provider XS4ALL. These ip-filtering actions where started after the German Authorities ordered the providers to block access to a specific document on the XS4ALL website. The document is not illegal in Holland, and is the property of one of XS4ALL's customers. So far German authorities have not contacted XS4ALL, no official requests where made to remove these documents from our server. Xs4all customers are prevented from communicating with German internetusers, because Email is not passed through a number of German internet routers. Xs4all customers are prevented from accessing German websites. Therefore German providers, particularily EUnet Germany GmbH, are violating article 10 of European Convention on Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information an ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." They are preventing our Xs4all subscribers to execute their rights of free expression. Some of our customers have terminated their account at Xs4all, because of these restrictions, that were imposed by German providers, after an order from the German government. These restrictions have caused a major disruption on the business interests of XS4ALL Internet BV.

1 0

Re: [Long] A history of Netscape/MSIE problems
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case anyone's interested, I've finally found the source I used for the claim that RC2/RC4 were exportable if the details were kept quiet: "Details about them [RC2 and RC4] have not been published (including by patenting) in order to maintain their special export status". -- RSA FAQ, version 1.0, draft 1e, 14 September 1992, p.40. This makes sense - the NSA wouldn't want the details published to stop non-US non-crippled versions appearing, and I can't really imagine RSADSI volutarily not patenting a new algorithm. Peter.

1 0

radikal update 17-9-1996
by tank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL of the main radikal-site has changed: ********************************* * http://www.xs4all.nl/~radikal * ********************************* We need more mirrors to stop Germany censoring the radikal and the internet. As you can see, free speach is not a gift, but something you have to fight for. Join the struggle ! If you got a mirror up and running let it know. Send your url to: tank(a)xs4all.nl *********************************************************************** ** Radikal Mirrors ** ** *********************************************************************** Receive Radikal 154 by email: Send a empty message to radikal(a)xs4all.nl and you receive issue 154 by mail. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Read the radikal by calling the netherlands (25 numbers). All telefonnr. are listed at the end of this mail. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Download the radikal archive: http: http://www.xs4all.nl/~bslash/radikal.tar.gz Radikal-site unix http://www.xs4all.nl/~bslash/radi.zip Radikal-site dos-zip archive ftp: ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/incoming Radikal 154 in plaintext ASCII http://www.xs4all.nl/~radikal/radi154.tgz Radikal 154 unix http://www.xs4all.nl/~radikal/radi154.zip Radikal 154 dos-zip If you got your mirror up and running let us know +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Special mirror: de.soc.zensur de.org.politik.spd http://www.altavista.digital.com usenet-search for radikal.zip +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Radikal-sites: 1.http://www.xs4all.nl/~radikal 2.http://burn.ucsd.edu/%7Eats/RADIKAL/ Arm the Spirit statement "Radikal Mirror Site At ATS WWW Page" 3.http://www.jca.or.jp/~taratta/mirror/radikal/ 4.http://www.serve.com/~spg/ 5.http://huizen.dds.nl/~radikal 6.http://www.canucksoup.net/radikal/index.html 7.http://www.ecn.org/radikal 8.http://www.well.com/~declan/mirrors/ 9.http://www.connix.com/~harry/radikal/index.htm 10.http://www.ganesa.com/radikal/ 11.http://www.denhaag.org/~radikal 12.http://www.knooppunt.be/~daniel/radikal 13.http://emma.unm.edu/radikal 14.http://www.tacacs.com/radikal/" 15.http://www.dsvenlo.nl/~vvd/radikal/ 16.http://www.why.net/home/static/radi 17.http://users.abcs.com/dockmstr/mirror/radikal/index.htm 18.http://www.xs4all.nl/~jeroenw/radikal/ 19.http://home.ipr.nl/~radikal/ 20.http://www.dreamy.demon.co.uk/occam/ 21.http://www.ibmpcug.co.uk/~irdial/live_free/ 22.http://zero.tolerance.org/radi/index.htm 23.http://www.meaning.com/library/radikal/ 24.http://www.xs4all.nl/~irmed/radikal/ 25.http://www.walli.uwasa.fi/~tviemero/radikal 26.http://www.sko.it/~sfede/radi/index.htm 27.http://www.bart.nl/~sz/index.html 28.http://bellp.med.yale.edu/index.htm 29.http://www.euronet.nl/users/funest/radi/index.htm 30.http://fine.com/~rsr/radikal 31.http://www.lab.net/radikal 32.http://www.charm.net/~gbarren/radikal 33.http://login.datashopper.dk/~pethern/radikal/ 34.http://www.interlaw.com 35.http://hyperreal.com/~rich/radikal/index.html 36.http://www.citinv.it/iniziative/info/radikal/ Phone: Call and login as "new". So first dail the international number +31 (hollands international code) and than one of these numbers. Amsterdam Zoetermeer Maarssen 020 5350535, V.34 079 3611011, V.34 0346 550455, V.34 020 4223422, UUCP 079 3600800, ISDN PPP 0346 553613, ISDN PPP 020 6265060, ZyXEL 079 3630569, ISDN X.75 0346 555285, ISDN X.75 020 4229700, ISDN PPP 020 4206782, ISDN X.75 Hoorn Geleen Leeuwarden 0229 212177, V.34 046 4789478, V.34 058 2157815, V.34 0229 219717, ISDN PPP 046 4230555, ISDN PPP 058 2130910, ISDN PPP Goes Assen 0113 252900, V.34 0592 331531, V.34 0113 270110, ISDN PPP 0592 331278, ISDN PPP Willemstad Deurne 0168 472472, V.34 0493 323344, V.34 0168 476472, ISDN PPP 0493 351566, ISDN PPP

1 0

RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by Dustbin Freedom Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >> By spreading the risk you minimize the cost. <...> >Canada has a single payer system Translation: a more palatable term for "socialised medicine" >and we spend about two thirds as much as the >U.S. on health care as a percentage of G.N.P. We manage to insure all Canadians >while about 35% of people in the U.S. have *no* health insurance. So why in the world do those crazy Canadians keep coming here for medical care, when they can get it from your compassionate bureaucrats? What could be their compulsion to spend money they don't need to spend? Charitable impulses toward our impoverished medical profession? BTW, looking at historical costs of medical care and the level of government involvement, it is safe to say that the US has too much socialism in our medical system right now, and that it what's making the best system (ours) so expensive when it would not be otherwise. >Yes, the insurance premium is not optional. True. >Yes, it *is* cheaper. *False.* It is cheaper for _SOME_, and more expensive for others (in terms of either money, or waiting with pain, or both) and has an _ultimately high cost [the death penalty] for still others, who are forced to wait for the "compassionate" bureaucrats [who naturally know more about what patients' bodies need than the patients do themselves] to give them permission to get medical care they would otherwise purchase before death.

2 1