December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[NOISE] Far-reaching tentacles . . . ?
by abostick＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Found in the news: (SACRAMENTO)- The principals of six Sacramento area schools have received 46 used computers that were renovated by inmates at Folsom Prison. Warden Theo White delivered the machines after they were given a reprieve from the scrap heap. The prison obtained the donated personal computers from the non-profit Detwiler Foundation... which began working five years ago to bring new technology into the state's classrooms. [Would you want *YOUR* CHILDREN to use computers that had been HACKED by CONVICTED CRIMINALS????] -- Alan Bostick | Usenet is living proof that if you analyze a mailto:abostick@netcom.com | blackbody spectrum for semantic content you get news:alt.grelb | "Call 1-800-HOT-GIRL now!" http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick

1 0

Re: Imminent Death of the Internet, GIF at 11
by Alexander 'Sasha' Chislenko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:40 AM 9/7/96 -0700, Martin Minow <minow(a)apple.com> wrote: >For several months (years?) Bob Metcalf has been predicting that >the Internet will self-destruct from overload. His argument >appears to follow one of Gordon Bell's maxims: "anyone can predict >the future: all you need is semi-log paper and a ruler." As I >understand it, Metcalf's argument is that network load (messages, >packets) is growing exponentially, while network bandwidth (fiber >capacity, switch performance) is growing linearly. At some point, >these two curves cross -- and demand will exceed capacity. > I would add one word into that Gordon Bell's maxim: "anyone can predict the SHORT-TERM future: all you need is semi-log paper and a ruler." Rulers are liner-extrapolation predictors; the only predictions with still lower intelligence are pointers - with the assumption that things are going to always remain the same. Unfortunately, these two kinds of prediction methods populate most of the human "visionary" landscape, with rare flowers of visionary minds elevating above it - Metcalf's doesn't seem to be one of them. This very observation on the population/food dilemma was made by Malthus quite a while ago. However, both population and food are still here, and natural resources are no longer a serious limiting factor for the production of food. If you notice that your attempt to extend your ruler farther than it can go, will not work, it's a good prediction of a breakdown - *of the ruler*, not the system you are trying to measure. The role of a visionary is not to mistake the horizon of current trends for the horizon of the world, but look ahead and predict future trends - and advise what should be done to adapt to the imminent transitions. An important observation for the net traffic/bandwidth "crisis" is that human ability to perceive textual and visual information remains pretty much the same. Addition of graphics, video and sound to the Net, as well as the growing number of users, increase the bandwidth, but this all has (though still distant) saturation point - say, 24 hour-a-day single-channel video feed to every human and his dog. (Inter-machine communications do not have this limit though). Already, most of the newsfeed coming to any single server, is never read by anybody; this is also the fate of most messages from 60 or so mailing lists coming to my PC. A solution here, that will be also quite instrumental for many future problems, is not to send messages that are not going to be read - i.e., server-side filtering agents; I have been suggesting collaborative message filtering (see proposal on my home page) for more than 5 years now - only to find people who could help implement it, uselessly running around the Net whining and waving their stiff rulers. Of course, there are also other methods of making Net traffic more intelligent and robust; if Internet was recognized as the most revolutionary development in the evolution of the global ecology of intelligence, and if there existed some mechanism for turning truly visionary ideas on the Net's evolution into changes in its structure, then, well, things would be much better. <x-rich></x-rich><x-rich> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Alexander Chislenko <<sasha1(a)netcom.com> www.lucifer.com/~sasha/home.html Firefly Network, Inc.: <<alexc(a)firefly.net> www.ffly.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- </x-rich>

1 0

Mailing list
by Webeus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I have been away for over 2 months and in returning find that alpha.c2.org is lo longer. Can you suggest an alternative, FAQ's etc ?? Thank you Webeus

1 0

[PARANOID NOISE] Satellites flying formation?
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Sep 96 at 12:16, John F. Fricker wrote: > >I don't know. I would presume so. I only guess that it was a 3-4-5 > >formation. But it does make some constants easy! <g> > Maybe we could each watch for these formations and keep a log of > observations. I've done a little searching for more information but > I find nothing easy. Perhaps one of my hard core skywatcher friends > would know something as well. I'll try to link with my old stargazers friends and ask questions around. If you get something new, write. Cheers and good luck! jfa

1 0

towards an eternity service
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[the relevance of this to remailer-operators, is that my example prototype architecture for discussion relies heavily on mixmaster remailers] Ross Anderson's eternity service (postscript paper somewhere on http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/) is a distributed file system with the criteria that it should not be possible to delete information from it. The paper outlines ways that you might go about doing this, and gives as a design goal that it should not be possible even for concerted government attacks to remove information from the service. Roughly the approach described is to have anonymous servers with secret shared data. The server doesn't know what it is serving, and the server charges per Mb/year of data storage. This seems a pretty interesting idea, as it would be a great boon to free speech to be able to reliably publish information that would survive attempts to "unpublish" it, which seem to be gaining in popularity. Notable recent examples of such attacks being Scientologist attacks on distribution of it's `scriptures', the German governments banning of nazi revisionist material, and the impending possibility of a repeat of the CDA at a (US) state level. I think it is desirable to get something working now, even if it is far short of the design criteria Anderson describes. A working model would provide something on which to base discussion of improvements, and would also be an interesting experiment to see the sorts of uses such a system would be put to, and the political reaction to it's uses. The following doesn't depend on, but would be helped by having direct socket delivery of packets (for performance) in the mixmaster remailer-net and forward secrecy (for resilence to attack). The idea comes in two parts, the first part, an anonymous www proxy using mixmaster to deliver packets, is present to provide cover traffic for real eternity system requests, the second part describes a way to acheive an eternity like system with the traffic mixed in with part 1 traffic, so that the two types of traffic can not be distinguished by attackers. 1. anonymous www proxies over mixmaster The stated design goal for this part (it's partly a cover goal, though useful in its own right) is to ensure that users can access publically accessible www pages without divulging their identity to the sites they are accessing, or even to an attacker who is monitoring net traffic. The user wants to hide which sites they are accessing, and what information they are accessing. No attempt is made to conceal the identity of the www sites accessed, a normal URL is used to access them. This is basically just like www.anonymizer.com, except that traffic is routed over the mixmaster net. An http <-> mixmaster interface would be added to the existing mixmaster. You add a blip in the line for outgoing traffic on your own machine which converts all outgoing http requests into mixmaster packets and feeds them into the remailer network. You choose random chains to get to the http servers. The delivered packet at the exit remailer node is a new mixmaster packet type, a http request type, rather than a request to email to an individual, or post to a newsgroup, it results in an (where possible SSL encrypted) http request being made to the specified http server. Also included with the request is a mixmaster reply chain, so that the exit mixmaster node can route the return the requested www pages, and SSL session traffic back to the originator. As you might imagine if this became popular, it could generate a lot of traffic. For a practical system I think it's inevitable that you'd need to provide some financial incentive for the mixmaster operators to subsidize their T3s :-) So you would need to incorporate per hop payments, for the remailers. This could be a relatively small payment, but is just there to ensure that they have the money to increase their bandwidth if the demand requires it. I think that about explains part 1. 2. an eternity like system built on this system There are a couple of extra requirements for the eternity system, firstly that the address of the www site must be concealed also, and secondly that the data is secret shared across multiple eternity www sites. The first requirement can be met by the anonymous eternity www sites publically posting to a newsgroup (via a mixmaster remailer of course:-) a mixmaster chain pointing at themselves. To reduce the problem of the flood attack for finding the endpoint of a chain, firstly some of Peter Allan's suggestions on extra cover traffic, and on adding extra hops to increase cover traffic should help, but ultimately this only makes a longer concerted flood necessary to find the output. I don't see any easy solution to the flood attack, the only _real_ answer is a DC net. A slightly simpler, but less robust solution would be to find ways to have fixed levels of traffic between nodes in the remailer network. Surplus traffic at entry points could be rejected, so that the sender knows to try another remailer. The other requirement for eternity is that the data should be secret shared. If all the eternity www servers publish their reply blocks, the user sends requests to a number of the eternity servers selected randomly. Choose the number so that it is likely that you will get the required k of n shares, given that there are n servers, and they all hold shares in the data, and that k of n shares are required to recover the secret. You also need to ensure that the exit mixmaster which is acting as a http forwarder server can't tell whether it is making an eternity system request or an anonymous www proxy request. The fact that http traffic is blindly forwarded means that if the http request is SSL encrypted the http forwarding mixmaster remailer will not know the contents of the traffic, and so will not be able to distinguish traffic type: eternity or anonymous proxy. As the eternity www servers don't know what the data in the shares they are holding is, they can't provide the indexing facility directly. Rather ordinary www pages, and other eternity www pages can be used to collect links to interesting eternity pages. In otherwords, it's decentralised, as is the www, and any indexing left up to the authors of eternity hosted www documents, or anyone elses indexing to interesting links. A compromise technology which would greatly simplify access to the service would be public www proxies or gateways to the eternity service, so that no new software was required for the client. This would serve a similar role to WWW based remailers. The scheme is complex in places but basically requires no new technology, at least for a crude implementation, without the finer points. What can be missed out in a first pass implementation, and deferred for later incremental improvements: ecash postage to pay for remailer resources fixed traffic between remailers payment for www sites (anonymous www proxy and eternity service) oblivious transfer to setup shares so that leaves the following to be done: blip in the line which routes http requests over mixmaster mixmaster reply chains for return http traffic secret sharing of data to send to eternity www servers periodic posting of mix reply blocks by eternity www servers public access www proxy, or www-cgi based gateway comments, volunteers? Adam -- exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)

2 1

Re: Cypherpunks subscribers - Singapore and NZ gvts, plus IRS
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:56 PM 9/8/96, Declan McCullagh wrote: >I suppose it would be only polite to ask the Singapore government folks >and IRS employees to join our conversation. > >The cypherpunks list now has nearly 1,400 direct subscribers, plus >whoever reads it through local mail-news gateways. > >(Note I'm not indicating that a .gov.sg or .irs.gov address implies >anything about an individual's personal political beliefs.) > >video(a)nhmxw0.fnal.gov >e875836(a)popcorn.llnl.gov >foley_p(a)kosmos.wcc.govt.nz .. What, so now my group, Government Office of Technology, is no longer considered part of the military-bureaucratic complex? -- tcmay(a)got.net (And to think I get paid a GS-16 salary just to keep tabs on you folks, feed you disinformation, and entice you into various operations.) We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Imminent Death of the Internet, GIF at 11
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:40 PM 9/7/96, Martin Minow wrote: >We certainly are seeing changes in the way we use the network. When >I "got on the net" in the late 1970's, I was on two mailing lists >(SF-Lovers and Human Net) and could read *all* of Usenet traffic >in an hour or two. In the late 1980's, Usenet traffic totalled The 2002 version, unless our list is outlawed as being part of a TICO (Terrorist-Influenced and Corrupt Organization) conspiracy: "I could read *all* of the Cypherpunks traffic in a day or two..." --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: [NOISE] Far-reaching tentacles . . . ?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:38 PM 9/8/96, Alan Bostick wrote: >Found in the news: > > > (SACRAMENTO)- The principals of six Sacramento area schools have >received 46 used computers that were renovated by inmates at Folsom >Prison. Warden Theo White delivered the machines after they were given a >reprieve from the scrap heap. The prison obtained the donated personal >computers from the non-profit Detwiler Foundation... which began working ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >five years ago to bring new technology into the state's classrooms. > >[Would you want *YOUR* CHILDREN to use computers that had been HACKED >by CONVICTED CRIMINALS????] Who cares about the convicted criminals? It's the connection to the Detwiler Foundation that would worry me. (Now that's what you call an S. Boxx!) --Medusa

2 1

Re: ASEAN nations generally pro-censorship
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> _________________________________________________________________ > ASEAN FORUM AGREES ON NEED TO POLICE THE NET > __________________________________________________________________________ >[...] > But the statement suggested there was no agreement on a uniform > approach to policing the Internet. One could argue that the hundred years war was in substantial part the result of regulatory arbitrage against attempts to censor the printing press, that it was in large part an unsuccessful attempt to create a uniform standard of censorship by force of arms. History suggests that there *wont* be a uniform approach on policing the net. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

"Intended Purpose" of the Cypherpunks List
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:09 PM 9/8/96, Wayne H. Allen wrote: > Well maybe, political issues galore certainly, but very very little >to do with cryptography. I mean what does TWA 800 have to do with this >list. I mean lets be completely honest here, whatever the original >purpose of the list was for its been allowed to shift away from its >intended purpose considerably. I'm curious. You say the list has "been allowed to shift away from its intended purpose considerably." First, who "allowed" it. (We should perhaps track down those who allowed this and rap them upside the head.) Second, and more importantly, just what was its "intended purpose"? While I delete immediately fantasies about how the Bilderbergers ordered TWA 800 shot down with Russian Strelas as a warning for Bill Clinton, the other discussions related to TWA 800, e.g., mandatory person-number I.D. to board planes, increased inspections, national data bases of "suspicious persons," etc., are very much on-topic for this list. But, then, what would I know? --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

RE: Court challenge to AOL junk-mail blocks
by Will rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Declan, in reply to questions about Cyber Promo's statue re: AOL wisely wrote: >>No. A customer buys service from AOL and in doing so signs a contract >>with the company. AOL and the customer each has certain rights and >>obligations spelled out in the contract. >> >>I confess I don't know if AOL's contract allows them to block spam. But >>in any case, spammers are not customers. >> >>-Declan >> Cyber Promotions of course is not now a client of AOL, which is one the company's defenses against AOL. Although AOL attorneys don't make the connection outright, their filings seem to imply that once one is an AOL customer, he's always subject to their rules. Wallace, it seems, had an account or two with AOL and was spamming during that time in violation of terms of service. They soon bumped him from the service. Now that he's not a subscriber, they claim Wallace is still violating terms of service. How that's relevant to a former subscriber is far from clear. Wallace's attorneys, of course say it isn't relevant at all. No doubt about it; this one is going to be a lot of fun. Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Inter@ctive Week -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.9 iQEVAgUBMjN30UcByjT5n+LZAQEO0QgAhKgbD1ljZfDoZR/J9PF9wQFgZxoSM8DZ SfhfPMNDnBDqx1dq2qjxbxKC0uqP5AQq76ZPr+MVexvdI9ec+8W9DFW/O8ujOsJT yU/vg0XnWC3kNeQVW9OpTjlNZrlm37TRM5Fl/JeBxrFlws1aS1fG57Xnq2YYEJJ2 hrn20q9szJiRLnFJ0hSfjhsYkLir7qErhqMMOu0kw1HAqfA7kAzmoxD4ukaeqqL9 Hkqqf2E59xtOSvmMRtqgtGhUijiMeuO1K/wCITp0SS6U4XieeHrV5jpfY3RU6c2s g7OBHkMq6fjzWO29WJO67imOeb45bsZMM3vvqKlH5lxXHR+g1DjUnw== =Iatg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: flimflamery on anonymity
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

james donald: > > Lucky Green and Dark Unicorn are not accountable. This is a problem? > > Because it is a problem "We" need to do something about it, (last line is sarcasm for the sarcasm impaired) At 11:39 AM 9/4/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > scientists demand that each other be "accountable" for their > work, for example, and pseudonymous publication simply would > not be acceptable. So? Do you think cypherpunks are planning to go around with guns and force scientists to pay attention to pseudonymous scientific publications? > what about a business > that simply says, "we choose to require identity among our > customers, and you can go elsewhere if you disagree". the > extremist cypherpunks would be in a quandary over this example, > because they think they can support anarchocapitalist > freedom and anonymity at the same time. they will argue that > such a business will one day not exist. but shouldn't a business be > free to make this decision? rabid cpunks would probably > argue against such a decision. Cypherpunks would argue, do in fact argue, that such a business decision will be unwise in the long run for most businesses, but that all businesses, like anyone else, have the right to make stupid decisions. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

Re: talker (fwd)
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 8 Sep 1996 16:41:06 -0500 (CDT), Jim Choate wrote: >> Date: Sun, 8 Sep 1996 13:23:06 -0700 (PDT) >> From: "Z.B." <zachb(a)netcom.com> >> Subject: Re: talker >> >> I just checked www.juno.com to see what kind of system they have, and it >> appears that it is a free email service. No charges at all. No wonder >> we get so many idiots from there - free mail and they probably don't >> bother to verify the people they give service to, either. > >Well we know at least one cpunk who is anti-anonymity.... Not necessarily. I think he's just saying that if it's free and anonymous you have no quality control. Even a token fee keeps out an amazing number of loons... - "'Anonymity is bad,' says a source who wishes to remain anonymous." - Nuff' said. * Home: Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp * Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY" * Work: cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 | (619)689-6579 * Member in good standing of the GNU whirled hors d'oeuvre

1 0

Re: Voluntary Disclosure of True Names
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:49 AM 9/5/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > I have seen it repeated here often that somehow anonymity is some kind > of a "right" that one should have in all kinds of different & important > transactions, not merely on "cyberspace debate societies". I see > here frequently the implication that *private*entities* that want to > enforce identity in their own transactions are somehow implementing > a corrupt, orwellian system. We hold that private entities have the right to attempt to impose corrupt orwellian systems provided they do not do it at gunpoint, but we doubt that they will succeed without guns. > it sounded to me like that was all > Dyson was advocating. "Restrictions much stronger than a warrant" would imply that remailers would have to keep logs under penalty of law. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

Re: Browne and foreign tyrants
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: > >And this was a real shame. Over 30 million people died in WWII, directly or >indirectly. We knew that Hitler was going to be a problem well before 1936. > Think how many could have been saved... > >If anything, WWII is excellent proof that AP is a good idea. Stauffenberg >was the German who bombed Hitler's meeting in 1944 but failed to kill him. >Stauffenberg knew as early as 1942 that Hitler needed to be killed, and a >recent "60 Minutes" episode related how hundreds of people knew about this >plot. In the late 30's Bugsy Seigel was in Europe visiting a friend (a countess, I believe). At one of her parties Hitler and a few henchmen also showed up. When Buggsy found out who they were he went to get his gun and finish them off. It was only on the pleading of his friend, that it would set off an international incident and could ruin her, that Buggsy relented. Too bad he wasn't more of a hot head. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to perscription DRUGS.

1 0

Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One thing that occurs here. I imagine a scenario where you have a "share" of resources on a system(and ISP for example). You're metered as to how much you can post or store. Actually as it is now posting is regulated through extra payments per meg above the limit. Spam is being somewhat regulated by Terms of Service type things, but my point is what is to prevent pooling resources among several system to achive the same Spam pursuits some have. Say for example that an individual gets several accounts to balance the load at thier point. The Usenet for example has no "choke point". How could ISP's apply conservation here? If you limit the amount of traffic you still aren't holding back the flow of "spam". Here's where reputations could come in. You cound't open a new account anywhere without a good "reputation". This could aid in balancing the load of certain people. ??????????????????????????????????????? Greg Kucharo sophi(a)best.com "Eppur si moeve" -Galileo ???????????????????????????????????????

2 1

AST Final Agenda
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I hope you will be able to join us for our conference in Ottawa next week. Here is the final agenda. Dave PROGRAM ADVANCED SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES CONFERENCE II Sponsored by Privacy International Electronic Privacy Information Center September 16, 1996 Citadel Ottawa Hotel and Convention Centre Ottawa, Canada 9:00 am COFFEE AND REGISTRATION 9:30 am WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION: NURTURING THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY Advanced surveillance functions have become an integral part of widescale information systems used by governments and businesses. Monitoring of the activities of individuals is seen as a desirable - and often technically essential - componennt in many of these systems. Once regarded as purpose-built stand alone innovations, the modern surveillance device for identification, profiling or tracking has been re-invented as a tool for commercial leverage. In these introductory remarks, Simon Davies and Dave Banisar explores the key technical, political, cultural and legal changes that are nurturing the growth of surveillance technologies across the world. o Simon Davies, London School of Economics & Director General, Privacy International oDave Banisar, Electronic Privacy Information Center & editor, International Privacy Bulletin 10:15 am FEATURED SPEAKER: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES What kinds of technologies are the intelligence agencies of the world using? Who are they using it against? Are they legally accountable for their actions? Mike Frost, a former spy for the Canadian Security Establishment will talk about his experiences using these technologies to spy on Canadian citizens and the relationship of the CSE to the US National Security Agency. o Mike Frost, Former Intelligence Officer, Canadian Communications Security Establishment & author, Spyworld 11:00 am BREAK 11:15 am SURVEILLANCE AND THE INTERNET SIGINT ONLINE: GOVERNMENT SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ON THE NET o Wayne Madsen, Author, Handbook of Personal Data Protection >From Fort Meade, Maryland to Cheltenham, England and from Canberra, Australia to Issy les Moulineaux in Paris, signals intelligence (SIGINT) specialists are honing their skills at monitoring digital information. SIGINT agencies everywhere are increasingly throwing their surveillance web over the Internet and other data networks of interest. This session shall examine the methods by which SIGINT agencies conduct such on-line intelligence-gathering activities, including manipulation of encryption systems to exploiting weaknesses in communications architectures, including the use of anonymous remailers, rigging encryption systems, and tampering with the simple network management protocol (SNMP). You will discover that Mae West is more than just a deceased movie star. Datamining the Net: Cookies, Crawlers and Trackers o Simson Garfinkel, author, Practical Unix and Internet Security and PGP: Pretty Good Privacy. A great deal of information is gathered on individuals on the Internet. >From Alta Vista to cookies to digital cash to Web Crawler, sophicated tools to collect, index and process this information are being developed. Simson Garfinkel will discuss these technologies, what information is being gathered and what is being done with it. 12:30 pm LUNCH (provided) 1:30 pm CONSUMERS AND SURVEILLANCE INTELLIGENT VEHICLES AND TRACKING Phil Agre will outline the remarkable variety of technologies of surveillance currently being planned or implemented for road travel. The motivations for these systems are numerous and include logistics, traffic management, law enforcement, pollution control, and marketing. Despite the diversity of motivations, certain unifying themes emerge. The vast majority of the functionalities provided by these systems can be provided anonymously. o Phil Agre, University of California, San Diego GENETICS AS A SURVEILLANCE IDEOLOGY Researches in the field of genetics are still largely dominated by the works of molecular biologists who tend to comprehend reality through the classical Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm which postulates that it is possible to reduce the universe to a mechanical model in which peticular effects can be described as the direct results of specific causes. Such an approach does not acknowledge the fact that human physical and mental health is the result of very complex interactions. Most illnesses and deviant behaviors are multifactorial (physical and social environments are at least as much important as the genetic factors) and polygenic (numerous genes could be involved). In short, there are large probabilities that an individual carrying many "defective" genes may never develop the corresponding illness. Unfortunately, such fields of activities such as risk management, insurance, law and policy-making also work mostly within the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm. In such a context, genetics can easily be transformed into an ideological justification for surveillance and social control of populations or individuals "at risk" as well as minimizing social and environmental responsabilities. o Pierrot Peladeau, Progesta Inc. & editor Privacy Files 2:45 pm BREAK 3:00 pm SOLUTIONS: PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES A PRIVACY COMMISSIONER CASE STUDY: INTRODUCTION OF A DNA PROFILE DATABANK TO NEW ZEALAND Bruce Slane, Privacy Commissioner of New Zealand, will outline aspects of a new law which came into force in New Zealand last month. The law sanctions the establishment of a DNA profile database for police use in criminal investigations. The law also spells out how blood samples may be obtained from suspects for DNA analysis - voluntarily, by court order, and ultimately by force if need be. Bruce will explain the role of a Privacy Commissioner in scrutinising laws increasing state surveillance using the DNA law as a case study. o Bruce Slane. New Zealand Privacy Commissioner CAN PRIVACY STANDARDS ACHIEVE EFFECTIVE DATA PROTECTION? Privacy standards are becoming an important feature of the privacy protection landscape. The CSA Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information is likely to followed by other attempts to negotiate standards in other countries and at the international level. What are the market and regulatory incentives for the adoption of privacy standards? Can privacy standards exist alongside data protection legislation? What are the minimum requirements for a registration/accreditation system for a privacy standard? o Colin Bennett, University of Victoria 4:30 pm WRAPUP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- MORE INFORMATION More information on the conference will be available at the Privacy International mailing list at pi-news(a)privacy.org (subject: subscribe) or at the PI Home Page at http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/ottawa/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- REGISTRATION Registration Fees [] Standard - $250 CAN ($175 US) [] Non-profit organizations/Educational - $125 CAN ($75 US) Information Name: ___________________________________________________________ Organization: ______________________________________________________ Address: _________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ Phone/Fax: _________________________________________________________ Electronic Mail:_____________________________________________________ Credit card Number/Expiration Date: _________________________________ (Your credit card will be billed by "Diane Publishing" - Do Not Email!) First Virtual Account (include email address)_________________________ Fax Registration form and credit card number to +1 202.547.5482 Send Check or Money Order in $US made out to Privacy International to: Privacy International Washington Office 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 USA 1-202-544-9240 (phone) 1-202-547-5482 (fax) pi(a)privacy.org(email) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Privacy International was formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance by governments and corporations. With members in more than 40 countries, it has created an international movement that has helped to counter abuses of privacy by way of information technology. Privacy International has conducted campaigns in Europe, Asia and North America to raise awareness about the dangers of ID card systems, military surveillance, data matching, police information systems, and credit reporting. It is based in London, UK, and is administered by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, D.C. Privacy International publishes a quarterly newsletter (the International Privacy Bulletin) and organizes conferences each year on privacy and technology. More information is available at http://www.privacy.org/pi/ The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research center in Washington, DC. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy issues relating to the National Information Infrastructure, such as the Clipper Chip, the Digital Telephony proposal, medical record privacy, and the sale of consumer data. EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional Government, a non-profit organization established in 1974 to protect civil liberties and constitutional rights. EPIC publishes the EPIC Alert, pursues Freedom of Information Act litigation, and conducts policy research. For more information, email info(a)epic.org, HTTP://www.epic.org or write EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301, Washington, DC 20003. +1 202 544 9240 (tel), +1 202 547 5482 (fax).

1 0

Re: Photoshop, Steganograhy, and cypherpunks?
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Sep 09 08:17:48 1996 > Digital watermarking > adds copyright information to > a photograph that doesn't alter the photo's > appearance. The watermark is detectable even > after the photo is edited or printed and rescanned. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ go ahead, have a laugh!!! (or show me an affordable scanner with REAL 8bit color and a calibrated color scheme). - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMjO2kBFhy5sz+bTpAQGbCwf/TCkJvS/8Z3ER3YdR7S2jNw0SrIkDXRT/ GtfvKgmTrk+YMI+5Ko9aL7wu2XgdUF5dzjo1slpNBp8hbrMWUGiNufcI5FDnzrqP z5lCTZefsHounFV8LaQk19iODOAt6EA5Bo7hAMNH4MTsl07dHJ2wudEntmLA4Hpl Xo1U/u/+PrTROK/O4wHEcDVyMsEFhHW7rBdhx5U5Sh58CtI3ijQ9xfW2L9dCQHUF +SVaXTgHYaHnpBpKitkAgEEd2m2jVC7E6S0pPkEBm0k0yXzBNT9zBaD5xtUxI/kI sJWNQCCq4f0VXm1wl27H+FYYUD/VdLc/pniFppmVa+WEDFGGlWXnqw== =ajST -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Erasing Disks, was Re: What the NSA is patenting
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See Peter Gutmann's paper, "Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory" in The Sixth USENIX Security Symposium Proceedings. My feeling after hearing his paper was that the only thing I would trust was thermite. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | "Lone Star" - My personal | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | choice for best movie of | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | 1996 | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

1 0

ALERT: Call the Commerce committee to protect your privacy! (9/7/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

======================================================================== SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE SCHEDULED TO VOTE ON PRO-PRIVACY ENCRYPTION LEGISLATION (S.1726) ON THU SEPTEMBER 12, 1996 YOUR HELP IS NEEDED TO ENSURE PASSAGE CALL THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE (PHONE NUMBERS BELOW) September 8, 1996 Please widely redistribute this document with this banner intact until September 30, 1996 ________________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS The Latest News What You Can Do Now Background / What To Expect This Week Description of S.1726, Pro-CODE Bill Chronology of Pro-Crypto Legislation For More Information / Supporting Organizations ________________________________________________________________________ THE LATEST NEWS On Thursday September 12, the Senate Commerce Committee is set to vote on legislation designed to enhance privacy and security on the Internet. The bill, known as the "Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act," (S. 1726) is the best hope yet for real reform of U.S. encryption policy, and its passage by the Commerce Committee would signify a critical step forward in the struggle for privacy and security in the Information Age. The bill faces significant opposition from the Clinton Administration, who continues to cling to a cold-war era view of U.S. encryption policy. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE HEAR FROM SUPPORTERS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY ON THE INTERNET. Please take a moment to contact the committee by following the simple instructions below. ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW It's crucial that you call the Commerce committee members below and urge them to pass S.1726 out of committee without amendments. (This is also known as a "clean" bill.) Any opportunity for amendments (even if they are good) opens us up to the possibility of hostile amendments that could restrict the use of encryption even further than today's abysmal state. It could even prohibit the use of encryption without Clipper Chip-like key 'escrow' technology, which includes built-in surveillance and monitoring functionality. 1. Call/Fax the members of the Senate Commerce committee and urge them to pass S.1726 out of committee "cleanly". Do not use email, as it is not likely to be looked at in time to make a difference for the markup on September 12th. Use the sample communique and directory listing below to make it a simple TWO MINUTE task. 2. Sign the petition to support strong encryption at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ! Join other cyber-heroes as Phil Zimmermann, Matt Blaze, Bruce Schneier, Vince Cate, Phil Karn, and others who have also signed. 3. Between now and Wed. September 12, it is crucial that you call all these members of Congress. P ST Name and Address Phone Fax = == ======================== ============== ============== D SC Hollings, Ernest F. 1-202-224-6121 1-202-224-4293 D MA Kerry, John F. 1-202-224-2742 1-202-224-8525 D HI Inouye, Daniel K. 1-202-224-3934 1-202-224-6747 D KY Ford, Wendell H. 1-202-224-4343 1-202-224-0046 D WV Rockefeller, John D. 1-202-224-6472 na D LA Breaux, John B. 1-202-224-4623 na D NV Bryan, Richard H. 1-202-224-6244 1-202-224-1867 D ND Dorgan, Byron L. 1-202-224-2551 1-202-224-1193 D NE Exon, J. J. 1-202-224-4224 1-202-224-5213 D OR Wyden, Ron* 1-202-224-5244 1-202-228-2717 R SD Pressler, Larry* 1-202-224-5842 1-202-224-1259 R MT Burns, Conrad R.(*sponsor) 1-202-224-2644 1-202-224-8594 R AK Stevens, Ted 1-202-224-3004 1-202-224-2354 R AZ McCain, John 1-202-224-2235 1-202-224-2862 R WA Gorton, Slade 1-202-224-3441 1-202-224-9393 R MS Lott, Trent* 1-202-224-6253 1-202-224-2262 R TX Hutchison, Kay Bailey 1-202-224-5922 1-202-224-0776 R ME Snowe, Olympia 1-202-224-5344 1-202-224-6853 R MO Ashcroft, John* 1-202-224-6154 na R TN Frist, Bill 1-202-224-3344 1-202-224-8062 R MI Abraham, Spencer 1-202-224-4822 1-202-224-8834 * supporter or cosponsor. The bill also enjoys broad bi-partisan support from members not on the committee including Senators Leahy (D-VT) and Murray (D-WA). 4. Here is a sample conversation: SAMPLE PHONE CALL You:<ring ring> Sen:Hello, Senator Mojo's office! You: SAY I'm calling to urge the Senator to pass S.1726, the THIS-> Burns/Leahy/Pressler bill, S.1726 when the committee votes on it on Thursday. It's critical to the future of privacy, security, and electronic commerce on the internet. Sen:Ok, thanks!<click> IF THEY SAY "The Senator has concerns about the bill", please answer, "Please try to work these issues out as it moves to the Senate floor, but passage out of committee will send an important signal to the Administration." 5. To help us measure the effectiveness of the campaign, WE NEED TO HEAR FROM YOU. Please tell us who you called, and how they sounded. We'll be passing this information to folks in D.C. who can help apply pressure where needed. $ Mail vtw(a)vtw.org Subject: I called so-and-so Hey, I called Sen. Mojo. He sounded iffy, call in the reinforcements. ^D 6. Forward this to your friends and colleagues in appropriate forums until the date of expiration at the top. Forward a copy of this to your Internet Service Provider as well, and ask them to put the following text in their message of the day (motd), or on their WWW page: ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT The U.S. Senate will be voting on a proposal to encourage better security on the Internet on Thu Sep. 12th. Your help is needed to call Congress. See http://www.crypto.com/ for more details. ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND / WHAT TO EXPECT THIS WEEK For the past 3 years, Cyber-Rights Activists, citizens, and industry leaders have been working hard to reform US encryption policy. Support has been building behind several legislative proposals this year because they send a clear signal to the Administration about the need for security and privacy in the Information Age. The digital revolution is currently being held hostage by the White House's Cold War restrictions on privacy-enhancing encryption technology. Now, with Congress less than a month away from adjournment, everyone who supports encryption and privacy is working to see this bill leave committee in order to send a clear message to the White House that they are on the wrong side of the encryption issue. Although this bill may not become law this year, its passage out of committee will be a landmark event that will clearly tell the White House that the Congress, the public, and the computer industry care about security and privacy, and need strong, reliable encryption technology in order to make the Internet a viable platform for commerce, education, and democracy. Success for our side is not certain, and the next week is not without risks. On September 12th, the Senate Commerce committee will hold a "markup", where the bill is examined, voted on, and if there are enough votes, passed out of committee. Two things could happen: -the committee could pass the bill as written, -the committee could pass the bill with amendments. Any amendments are not likely to be friendly, and in particular, quiet sources have told privacy activists that the Clinton Administration has been readying a legislative assault on your right to use encryption for several weeks now. A Clipper-like amendment could be attached to the bill if our side does not have enough votes to block all amendments. It is crucial that all netizens who consider privacy and security important take a moment to call members of the Commerce Committee right now and urge them to vote S.1726 out of committee without amendments. ________________________________________________________________________ DESCRIPTION OF S.1726, PRO-CODE BILL Privacy-enhancing encryption technology is currently under heavy restrictions kept in place by the White House. Encryption that is currently allowed to be exported is not sufficient to protect confidential information. This policy acquires an "Alice-in-Wonderland" quality when one realizes that strong encryption products are available abroad both for sale and for free download off the Internet. The Pro-CODE Act resolves to: 1. Allow for the *unrestricted* export of "mass-market" or "public-domain" encryption programs, including such products as Pretty Good Privacy and popular World Wide Web browsers. 2. Requires the Secretary of Commerce to allow the less restricted export of other encryption technologies if products of similar strength are generally available outside the United States, roughly up to DES strength. 3. Prohibits the federal government from imposing mandatory key-escrow encryption policies on the domestic market and limiting the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to set standards for encryption products. ________________________________________________________________________ CHRONOLOGY OF PRO-CRYPTO LEGISLATION 9/12/96 (scheduled) Senate Commerce committee will hold markup of S.1726 and hopefully pass it out of committee with no amendments. 7/25/96: Full Senate Commerce committee holds positive hearings on S.1726. FBI Director Louis Freeh testifies along with many cyber-luminaries. Hearings are cybercast Internet Cyber-Rights activists with HotWired and WWW.Crypto.Com. You can see the photos, read the testimony, and listen to the audio transcript at http://www.crypto.com/events/072596/ 6/26/96: Senate subcommittee holds positive hearings on S.1726. Hearings are cybercast Internet Cyber-Rights activists with HotWired and WWW.Crypto.Com. You can see the photos, read the testimony, and listen to the audio transcript at http://www.crypto.com/events/062696/ 5/2/96: Bi-partisan group of Senators introduce Pro-CODE Act, which would free public-domain encryption software (such as PGP) for export, free much commercial encryption for export, and reduce the government's ability to push Clipper proposals down the throats of an unwilling public. Original sponsors include: Senators Burns (R-MT), Dole (R-KS), Faircloth (R-NC), Leahy (D-VT), Murray (D-WA), Pressler (R-SD), and Wyden (D-OR). 3/5/96: Sen. Leahy (D-VT) and Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA) announce encryption bills (S.1587/H.R.3011) that significantly relax export restrictions on products with encryption functionality in them, as well as free public domain software such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). ________________________________________________________________________ FOR MORE INFORMATION / SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS There are many excellent resources online to get up to speed on crypto including the following WWW sites: http://www.crypto.com http://www.privacy.org http://www.eff.org http://www.cdt.org http://www.epic.org http://www.vtw.org Please visit them often. The following organizations have signed onto this alert: Center for Democracy and Technology Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Privacy Information Center Voters Telecommunications Watch ________________________________________________________________________ End alert ========================================================================

1 0

RE: IDC_ard
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young) forwarded: >9-8-96. NYP Mag: >"The True Terror Is In the Card." >Faced with rising crime, illegal immigration, welfare >fraud and absentee parents, many bureaucrats and members >of Congress insist that the nation would run more >smoothly if we all had counterfeit-proof plastic >identity cards. >http://jya.com/idcard.txt (11 kb) And to get all the Christian Right (no pun intended) up in arms, just suggest that the best way to prevent theft of these ID cards would be to place the information on a microchip and implant it in your body. Forehead and right wrist preferably. James

1 0

Distributed data haven monetary supply?
by DAVID A MOLNAR 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When writing about Eternity services or other distributed data havens, one has to cover the issue of cost. After all, it takes some expenditure of resources to store data, which can translate to actual $$ (or riyals or dinar or kroner or whatever). So far that I've seen, the problem of delivering that payment has been put down to "e-cash payment" of some kind (hopefully untraceable), or creative wire transfer. In both cases, we end up needing to implement e-cash on a wide-scale basis, or completely reforming the way banks work in most countries. After all that trouble, then, our value is still stored in terms of a real currency. What if a node in a data haven could issue its own certificates/money for goods/services? The idea seems similar to me to the "TrustBucks" discussed recently on the list. A node's operator issues credits to others in exchange for money, favors, or space on their own machines. However, if every node issues its own currency, but only to those it trusts, we have the same problem as w/PGP...there is no guarantee that data may flow freely from node to node, which invites weakness. It's also an open invitation to inflation, as each operator may mint many billions of $ w/o immediate consequences (perhaps combined w/spam in a misguided publicity attempt?) Question : would it be preferable for a group of nodes to issue e-cash? I'm thinking in terms of a system where the bank's secret key is split between the participating nodes (or a certain voting subset), with a certain threshold needed to mint new currency. If there are several such constallations (and methods of exchanging currency between them), it multiplies the number of points one must subvert in order to manipulate the system. Perhaps groupings might agree to share stored data freely between nodes in the interests of security. A user then has several different "economies" to choose from, each of which has different policies. Once a data haven begins to devrive actual _income_ or benefit from these transactions, its attitude toward economic policy may affect its ability to secure and retreive data on command. A rich haven, for instance, may be able to afford better bandwidth between nodes, or funding for research into distributed computing. In contrast, a "poor" haven may suffer from outdated equipment, hardware failures, and possibly intermittent loss of data. Of course, such effects will not be particularly pronounced so long as a data haven is largely a volunteer effort. If a haven were to evolve into a socially stronger entity, with clearly defined "rights" and "responsibilities" for nodes, then its policies would have greater effect. I do not see a guarantee that such a structure would be anarchic in nature, even though the technology itself is amenable. Y'know, a group currency could prove to be a powerful tool to assert dominance/influence over a single node, much as we may speak about "dollar zones" or "yen blocs" in the real world. Gridlock might also be a problem...what if the system is set up to demand unanimous consent, but one of the nodes just died? How does one cast out a node or add a new one without collecting the bank's key in one place? What's to stop me from adding myself as a node under 15 assumed names? My concern is that these fears might engender the kind of 3l33t mindset sometimes seen on really lame wAR3z BBSs : a small power group, intense distrust of outsiders, almost cultish fac,ade of devotion to said small power group, et. al. None of which is helpful. Comments? Is it a good idea, or will it lead to ever-more confusion? Sorry if this is a bit long, repetitive of other things previously discussed to death elsewhere, or rambling. :-) -David Molnar

1 0

TWA 800 - hit by an unarmed US missile?
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A collision with an unarmed missile would explain why they are not finding much evidence of high explosives (the pitting, ruptured metal, and residue). If a missile going at supersonic speed hit a 747 in the underbelly, near a fuel tank, I sure believe that it could take out the 747. If it was coming toward the 747, not catching up to it from behind, the collision speed would be the addition of the two speeds. In this case a soft civilian airplane would not stand a chance. Civilian airplanes are designed to survive collisions with birds, but not supersonic missiles. If the Navy was firing missiles in this area, it really does seem like the press should be checking out this angle. -- Vince

5 4

Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi
by Jon Lebkowsky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:04 PM 9/9/96 +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >On Mon, 9 Sep 1996, Gary Howland wrote: > >> Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >> >> > Perhaps, but defamation is an issue that can't be ignored either, >> > especially if one tries to build systems based on reputation. >> >> It _is_ an issue that can be ignored - if the "defamer" backs up his >> claims, then fine, the claims can be shown to be valid, otherwise ignore >> those claims. Simple. > >I and you may well choose to do so, but the vast majority of the human >beings believe just anything that is repeated loud and long enough. >Otherwise, nobody would hire PR and pay for advertisement, politicians >wouln't be fedwith taxpayer's money, Bosnians would trade goods instead >of gunshots, etc. I'm personally not interested in conjuring up the latest >utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati: I need to live in the real >world, and push for viable solutions that change it for better, now. > >Enzo One viable solution you can push for: educate the 'vast majority' to understand that these wordstreams have no mojo, that skepticism is a surivival skill in the 'Information Age.' -- Jon Lebkowsky <jonl(a)hotwired.com> FAX (512)444-2693 http://www.well.com/~jonl Electronic Frontiers Forum, 6PM PDT Thursdays <http://www.hotwired.com/eff> "No politician can sit on a hot issue if you make it hot enough."--Saul Alinsky

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash ksub latent cut ek mix reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 9 Sep 96 6:45:23 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca +**+******** 18:19 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++++++++++++ 1:04:20 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com +*******#**# 1:51 99.98% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --.++++-+++ 1:54:34 99.97% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*** *+***** 5:02 99.83% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com +---------- 3:22:14 99.78% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com +*********** 5:08 99.75% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +*+*+*+* *** 27:34 99.47% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++ -++ 1:00:20 99.36% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -+* 2:46:09 98.70% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com --+++++ -- 1:08:18 98.27% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +### #*#### 3:19 95.26% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---------- 4:55:16 94.74% winsock winsock(a)c2.org -+-------- 3:14:43 91.19% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +******* 24:33 57.62% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

China joins Singapore, Germany, ....
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN is presenting coverage of China's decision to pull the plug on more than 100 sites, and issuing a list of sites which are illegal to connect to. (Net censorship is getting to be a big story....when the list of countries reaches 15, it will of course no longer be news. And when the United States block access, this will all be transmogrified into an "Anti-Terrorist Action.") --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol...
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam and Matt put my casual remark under the grill: Peter Allan <peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk> writes on cpunks: > [Matt Blaze's Oblivious Key Escrow paper] ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps > > This all hinges on a policy to be followed by archive holders defining > the conditions under which they release their shares. > This could be receipt of a signed request from the owner (remailer). > > Maybe the table relating nyms to reply addresses could be stored in > netescrow style so that captured remailers reveal nothing. The problem > of operator coercion is not addressed by this. Adam: > Just to clarify, if I understand correctly you are proposing a penet > style system with the database held in `netescrow'. Yes. What I had in mind resembled the split list scheme used at a church I used to go to. UK tax law has concessions for regular giving (Covenants, in the jargon) and the church needed to know that comittments were being met. At the same time it was preferred not to know who was giving what. This was done by having 2 lists eg Namelist: Mr J Smith = member 999 Cashlist: member 999 gives 1000 / month If member 999 didn't give as planned, cashlist-holder could say to namelist-holder "have a word with 999". These were held by 2 people, trusted not to collude. Also I suppose committee reshuffles shouldn't put one person straight into the other post. My idea was to replicate this split list so that addrlist: leukos.gleukos(a)c2.org = index97b6150200000564 nymlist: index97b6150200000564 = an0001002304000101(a)this.remailer This would be altered for the remailer table as: addlist: leukos.gleukos(a)c2.org = index97b6150200000564 addlist: an0001002304000101(a)this.remailer = index97b6150200400281 and these 2 mappings would be escrowed: index97b6150200000564 -> index97b6150200400281 index97b6150200400281 -> index97b6150200000564 (Or just escrow the _keys_ for the latter, as Matt first thought.) > However the aim is not to prevent others > censoring your publically available writings, but to allow a second > avenue of access only in the case of `mob cryptography'. The aim is to prevent a seized remailer having its data read. The "angry mob cryptanalysis" is a side issue. > If the police are unsucessful (seems likely) does this offer the > operator much solice in his jail time for contempt of court, to > know that he has a vote of confidence in the moral correctness of > his decision from a population of the net? > Does it offer him any legal benefit? Are the share holders guilty > of contempt also, does this lessen his guilt, and harshness of > prosecution? (Remember that the share holders' identity and > location are unknown to the operator... > I'm not sure how useful this part is, unless the possibility of > `mob cryptography' is the desired feature. I'd have thought an > individual remailer operator would be more likely to fold than a > group of anonymous crypto-anarchists. I did say this didn't address operator coercion. The widespread cross-jurisdiction aspects of netescrow will be important here. Capture of hardware without scope for operator coercion would be protected against - but is an easy problem anyway. > 2. You could add the twist of an alternative duress key, that would > stand a real chance of successfully nuking the database. More > satisfying. I was thinking of calling this the "shredder ticket" and giving it to the sender (who can then distribute it to all remaining remailers without needing to use the seized one). This would depend on him realising that the remailer was (about to be) seized, and would have to be done before the enemy rounded up the shares. [Incidentally I'm not that keen on regarding the police as the enemy. My mention of "angry mob cryptanalysis" in the event of a crime was to show that it was not the ideal vehicle for crime. But then maybe I'm a statist pig.] In any case it would be necessary to > 3. Negative comment on the system: TLAs have a vested interest in > themselves being most of the share holders. True of the ownership > of the current remailers also of course. > The widespread cross-jurisdiction aspects of netescrow will be important here. (Perhaps including compulsory cross-border secret reassembly. ) I was envisaging this being combined with Mixmaster. (I see from your Eternity post that you'd run a netescrow scheme that way.) This gives us "vertical integration" a sort of "of the remailers, by the remailers and for the remailers". Careful design of message formats could make it hard to tell the escrow mechanics from the traffic. To mount this collusion attack the TLAs would have to be part of the scheme - helping to pass most anonymous messages in order to trace some random ones, not necessarily those they want to trace. (If there was nothing in it for them they wouldn't join.) (Compare that to the current state quoted as near as I can remember from AC2 "It seems reasonable to assume that the NSA can break any message that it intercepts, but not all messages") It takes time to collect the shares and determine the next destination, during this time the message is sat in a pool. (Is there scope for traffic analysis in the fact that the average speed of messages will be lower than that of shares ?) With that in mind I was looking at the scope for cheating. Cheating seems possible by: 1) Collusion (as mentioned) 2) Not releasing (valid) shares when requested This can be caught by traps. The list of where the shares went is usually destroyed, but need not be. The shareholders are none the wiser, and when they get known for not releasing shares the remailer excludes them from future share issues. 3) Flooding attacks - storing rubbish in escrow servers who are eventually forced to accept no more shares, or ditch some existing ones. So far as I can see Matt's Netescrow scheme has exactly this problem. Ecash payments might help. If existing shares are ditched the reply-ability will not last long. You might get a message you can reply to for 2 weeks, but no later. Sender might resend periodically - a bit like following up an unanswered snail mail. > At the same time it would provide an argument against GAK, all > legitimate (in the publics eyes, what other opinions count, this is a > democracy isn't it) law enforcement needs met. As in the last sentence or so of the OKE paper. Matt: > My original idea for OKE was as a way to backup long-term, > slow-changing sensitive data without also introducing a single point > of failure for either security or availability. The remailer model is > a bit different, and I'm not sure it's a good fit, in particular > because I haven't thought about the various new failure modes in this > application. But let me think ``out loud.'' > > So can this scheme be improved upon? Is there a better way to run a > persistent-reply-address remailer? These are interesting, and I think > largely open, questions. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

1 0

Test...sorry about this - Reply
by Barbara Gamble 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got it too. And since I am a new subscriber, I thought it might be the normal traffic. The Welcome msg *did* say the list is high-traffic. Still, I was aghast--300 all at once, another 100 just in the last hour. Is that typical? (Please forgive such a question from a newcomer to the list.) >>> Z.B. <zachb(a)netcom.com> 09/06 10:38 am >>> I'm just posting this to see if there's something wrong with my mail filter - it dumped a ton of messages from this list over the night, and I'm trying to figure out why the !@%$# it did that. Sorry for the interruption. --- Zach Babayco zachb(a)netcom.com <----- finger for PGP public key http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Park/4127

2 1

Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:03 AM 9/9/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: > One thing that occurs here. I imagine a scenario where you have a >"share" of resources on a system(and ISP for example). You're metered as >to how much you can post or store. Actually as it is now posting is >regulated through extra payments per meg above the limit. Spam is being >somewhat regulated by Terms of Service type things, but my point is what is >to prevent pooling resources among several system to achive the same Spam >pursuits some have. Say for example that an individual gets several >accounts to balance the load at thier point. The Usenet for example has no > "choke point". How could ISP's apply conservation here? If you limit the >amount of traffic you still aren't holding back the flow of "spam". > Here's where reputations could come in. You cound't open a new account >anywhere without a good "reputation". This could aid in balancing the load >of certain people. The most basic principle is this: those with resources they control (and "own") set the rates and policies. We don't have to figure out how the pricing will ripple down the line, or whether what some call "spam" will be controlled. (My view is that the whole focus on "spam" has been singularly unfruitful. We don't call magazine or television advertising "spam," though it meets operational definitions of spam, or velveeta, or whatever the latest terms is. While much advertising is disgusting, unwanted, noisome, etc., we understand that the publisher of a magazine can choose what to include and we can choose whether to buy it or not. (Television and radio are somewhat different, due to the FCC licensing and limited bandwidth, but the principle is the same.)) Thus, when carriers of packet traffic begin market pricing of packets, the pricing will ripple back. Eventually. (Or not, should some steps in the chain decide not to pass on costs...) I expect the failure of the Internet to have proper conservation laws to be solved in this way: Removal of Market Distortions + Auctioning Mechanisms + Several Large Network Crashes = A More Rational Market Model for Network Usage --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Conjuring up the latest utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 AM 9/9/96, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >I and you may well choose to do so, but the vast majority of the human >beings believe just anything that is repeated loud and long enough. >Otherwise, nobody would hire PR and pay for advertisement, politicians >wouln't be fedwith taxpayer's money, Bosnians would trade goods instead >of gunshots, etc. I'm personally not interested in conjuring up the latest >utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati: I need to live in the real >world, and push for viable solutions that change it for better, now. Yes, Bosnians and Serbs would not be killing each other if only they could receive government-approved information! (Hint: This shows that neither governments nor churches nor the United Nations knows any better solutions to the "who do you trust" problem. And, I believe, mostly governments and other such entities exist to serve their own interests.) As to what I presume is an insult to the folks on this list ("I'm personally not interested in conjuring up the latest utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati"), you know where the exit is. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2

Re: Voluntary Disclosure of True Names
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:18 AM 9/8/96, James A. Donald wrote: >At 10:49 AM 9/5/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >> I have seen it repeated here often that somehow anonymity is some kind >> of a "right" that one should have in all kinds of different & important >> transactions, not merely on "cyberspace debate societies". I see >> here frequently the implication that *private*entities* that want to >> enforce identity in their own transactions are somehow implementing >> a corrupt, orwellian system. > >We hold that private entities have the right to attempt to impose corrupt >orwellian systems provided they do not do it at gunpoint, but we doubt >that they will succeed without guns. An overstatement which diminishes the power of your arguments. Namely, many, many corporations have Orwellian surveillance systems and policies which would be unacceptable if imposed by a government. No guns are involved, only the considerations of employment, paychecks, and the like. Likewise, many private schools have such systems. Likewise, no guns are involved. And so on. (Naturally, I am not criticizing these voluntarily-entered-into arrangements, merely rebutting the point that people will generally not put up with Orwellian schemes unless threatened with guns.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

E-Cash Poses Worldwide Banking Threat - Report 09/06/96
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA, U.S.A., 1996 SEP 6 (NB) -- By Richard Bowers. >By the year 2000, consumers, businesses, governments, and >educational institutions worldwide will use electronic cash (e-cash) >for nine billion payment transactions. According to a new study by Killen >& Associates, this increase in e-cash will pose a great threat to some of >the biggest institutions in the world. > >The report specifically highlights the risk to the retail and banking >industries. Speaking to Newsbytes, a spokesperson for Killen said that >the report, which will be issued later this month, gives little solace to >the problems facing traditional retail companies. The report does >however, say that the banks can regain the leadership position in >payments by moving quickly to leverage their payment transaction >infrastructure to fully support e-cash. > >"By 2005, e-cash transactions will escalate to almost 30 billion," >stated Michael Killen, president of the market research firm. "Banks >must act quickly to leverage their position in payment services. Non- >banks see this as a new opportunity to carve further market share >away from the banking industry. All will compete for new revenue >streams including Internet-based micropayments." > >The report uses a very broad definition of e-cash including among >others; secured debit cards, phone cards, electronic checks, ATM >transactions, point of sale loans, and automated tolls. > >Using this broad definition they estimate that in 1995 there were 536 >billion non e-cash transactions worldwide compared to only 1 billion >e-cash transactions, or about .0019 percent. By the year 2005, of a >total estimated 1 trillion transactions, the report predicts 3 percent >or around 30 billion transactions will be e-cash. > >"The impact of e-cash will be widespread on both banking and >commerce," Killen added. "Opportunities will open for financial and >other product and services players, including ATM vendors such as >NCR, Diebold, and IBM; credit card authorization firms, including First >Data, Total Systems, Equifax, and National Data; ATM/POS terminal >manufacturers and network suppliers, including bank-owned >networks, American Express, Deluxe, ACS, and VeriFone; and cash >handling/cash management services firms such as ADP, GEIS, National >Data, and Brinks. Software firms that understand the enormous >system integration opportunities of adapting legacy systems to on- >line, secured environments will also benefit from the need to support >e-cash transactions." > >The report will include forecasts of the overall payments environment >and the impact of e-cash on cash, checks, credit cards, and other >electronic payment systems though the year 2005. It will also have a >section on the opportunities for new business, dislocations, and >threats to existing businesses, with emphasis on acquisition and >alliance opportunities. > >"E-cash provides the necessary payment options to support new and >low-cost products and services, including micropublishing," Killen >continued. "Information services such as AC Nielsen, Dun & Bradstreet, >and Wall Street investment and advisory firms will fill their clients' >needs for customized news. This will lead to a new understanding of >personal and commercial buying patterns, wants, and needs. >Individual consumer purchase, transaction, and life-style profiles will >be developed. Advertisers can then use this information to target >market-customized advertising and marketing programs." > >(19960906/Press Contact: Jules Street, Killen & Associates, 415-617- >6130) > > > _______________________ Regards, Nothing is so strong as gentleness, and nothing is so gentle as true strength. -Ralph Sockman Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

1 0

IBM to unveil Internet banking alliance
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 11:20:03 -0400 >From: reagle(a)rpcp.mit.edu (Joseph M. Reagle Jr.) >To: reagle(a)rpcp.mit.edu >Subject: IBM to unveil Internet banking alliance > > > > SAN FRANCISCO (Reuter) - International Business Machines >Corp. <IBM.N> has made an alliance with more than a dozen >major banks to provide consumer banking services using >Internet technology, IBM and industry executives said Friday. > The consortium will be dubbed Integrity and will be owned >equally by IBM and each of the partners. > Banks will be able to use IBM's worldwide private network >as well as the Internet to enable their customers to do their >banking electronically. Specific details of the banking >arrangement have yet to be worked out, one of the executives >said. > IBM and the banking instititutions involved are due to >unveil the Integrity project in New York on Monday. > The alliance is one of several industry projects that >IBM's Internet Division is establishing to help large >companies utilize the Internet. > The banking alliance will have competition from other >electronic banking services being organised by companies like >Intuit Corp., America Online Inc. and Microsoft Corp. > Just this week, Intuit and America Online said a number of >leading financial institutions would offer their customers >online banking via AOL, using software developed by Intuit >known as BankNOW. > At an Internet and Electronic Commerce conference in San >Francisco this week, Intuit Chairman Scott Cook said the new >service targets people who want to use electronic transactions >to speed up their banking. > Cook said he expects the new service will differ from what >the IBM-led consortium might provide. > NationsBank has been among companies frequently mentioned >as participating in the IBM consortium, but a spokesman late >on Friday declined to discuss a Wall Street Journal report >that it would be involved in the consortium. > > > _______________________ Regards, Nothing is so strong as gentleness, and nothing is so gentle as true strength. -Ralph Sockman Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

1 0

Re: [WAS xs4all.nl] Terrorists
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:50 AM 9/9/96, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >At 11:01 AM 9/9/96 +0200, Stephan Schmidt wrote: > >>One thought : How many of you would support terrorist >>web server (say Oklahoma, TWA, Iran, Lybia, RAF, IRA, ...) ? > >I.e. "How many of you support the right to free speech regardless of content." > >Wellll...there is the rule about speech which endangers; "fire in a crowded >theatre" is the cliche-example. What could a terrorist SAY that would >endanger? Personally, I'd rather have terrorists building html than bombs. As Dettweiler is usually so fond of pointing out, it would be disingenuous of us not to acknowledge that the systems we are talking about (fully untraceable, strong anonymity, digital pseudonyms, digital cash, information markets, i.e., "crypto anarchy") will in fact be used for all sorts of things. Including folks who want to blow up Parliament, the Congress, the People's Tribunal, etc. And by folks who wish to trade in CBW secrets, who wish to arrange contract killings, and so on. This has been well-known for many years. My paper on "Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities" was villified by no less than Dorothy Denning for describing how these things may evolve. I don't worry overmuch about a few thousand or even a few million people dying as a result of something we have had an influence on developing, anymore than the developers of many technologies need to worry about how others use their technologies. And the net effect of crypto anarchy is to destabilize and marginalize central governments, which is a net positive effect. If some eggs get broken in the process, the biological imperative will generate more eggs. No big deal. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: [WAS xs4all.nl] Terrorists
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:32 AM 9/9/96 EDT, you wrote: >Stephan Schmidt <schmidt(a)pin.de> writes: > >> One thought : How many of you would support terrorist >> web server (say Oklahoma, TWA, Iran, Lybia, RAF, IRA, ...) ? > >http://www.terrorist.org ? > Damn! In my backyard no less! whois terrorist.org Terrorist Organization (TERRORIST2-DOM) 1525 SW 14th #4 Portland, OR 97201 US

1 0

[less paranoid NOISE] Re: Odd Satellite observations
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok well like I said it was just paranoid noise. So the sats can locate ships at sea. I wonder what else? At 01:58 PM 9/9/96 GMT, Jim wrote: >On Sun, 08 Sep 1996 11:45:45 -0700, I wrote: > >>I saw three satellites gliding across the sky (east to west) in >>a tight right triangle formation. The entire formation was not >>bigger than my hand at arms length. Has anyone else observed >>this? > >John: You probably saw one of the NOSS (Naval Ocean Surveillance >System) constellations. There are several of these groupings -- all >in triangular arrays. They use some form of interferometry to locate >ships at sea. > >Jim > > >

1 0

Lexis-Nexis Database
by Andrew Fabbro 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note: personal experience indicates that L-N can remove you without your SSN, so there's no need to provide it, though they'll ask for it. Expect to attend a mandatory on-hold-music concert with a 20-25 minute program. L-N won't verify if your name is in the database, but will "performa process which will remove you if you are there". Andrew Fabbro <afabbro(a)umich.edu> ITD Marketing Research http://www-personal.umich.edu/~afabbro/ PGP mail preferred; finger for key ---------------------------------------------------------------------- PRIVACY Forum Digest Tuesday, 3 September 1996 Volume 05 : Issue 17 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 11:22:15 -0400 (EDT) From: Larry Hunter <hunter(a)intr.net> Subject: Lexis-Nexis personal information database Lexis-Nexis sells a commercial database called "Ptrax" which holds detailed personal information on nearly all Americans (L-N claims it contains 300 million names). This database includes name, current address, up to two previous addresses, phone number, birth-date, social security number, mother's maiden name and possible other personal information. This database is kept quite current. Through the Nexis Express service, this information could be available to any individual with a credit card. As most readers will are aware, such information could easily be used for theft of identity and other frauds. It is possible to have one's name removed from this database by making a telephone request. Call (800)543-6862, select option 4 ("all other questions") and tell the representative answering that you wish to remove your name from the Ptrax database. You may also send a fax to (513)865-7360, or physical mail to LEXIS-NEXIS / P.O. Box 933 / Dayton, Ohio 45401-0933. Sending physical mail to confirm your name has been removed is always a good idea. As word of the existence of this database has spread on the net, Lexis-Nexis has been inundated with calls, and has set up a special set of operators to handle the volume. In addition, Andrew Bleh (rhymes with "Play") is a manager responsible for this product, and is the person to whom complaints about the service could be directed. He can be reached at the above 800 number, selection option 4 and then ask for extension 3385. The information in this note has been been confirmed by me, and was originally provided in forwarded messages from Russell Whitaker, Jason Werner, Vern Winters, Katherine Florman and Reuben Snipper. Larry Hunter hunter(a)intr.net ------------------------------ End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 05.17 ************************

1 0

Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi
by Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Gilmore wrote: > PS: I would counsel against the kind of false anonymity provided by > the Finnish server, though. Providing information under the promise > that it will "never be revealed or misused" is a lot more dangerous > than never providing it at all. E.g. "Anonymous cash" that is really > based on dossiers or account-numbers isn't anonymous at all. Even > physical cash is getting easier to trace; the British government has > been tracking money by serial numbers for years, with custom machines > in the banks, to de-anonymize Irish freedom-fighters (oops, I mean > terrorists). Anonymity is another area, like privacy, where changes > from technology can make big social differences. There is a massive difference between anonymous speech and anonymous transactions. Anonymous speech can create problems (defamation etc.) but in the main these are not problems the courts are particularly good at dealing with. In the UK the libel laws are not so much a redress for legitimate grievance than a way for a senior Tory to obtain a nice lump sum towards his pension if he should happen to be filmed handing over 5000 quid in a breifcase to a prostitute he'd never met. The "problems" encountered by the Church of Scientology demonstrate that the court process itself can be imeasurably more harmfull than any imagined grievance. Should society have laws to protect trades secrets? Probably , but not to protect the likes of the CoS. If the Internet makes such laws difficult to enforce then we should return to the original concerns that prompted society to create the laws in the first place and see if the Internet provides better was of achieving the same result. Anonymous transactions are a rather different matter. It is more difficult to argue for anonymity. The extreeme examples of Chaumian cash create considerable difficulties such as making a perfect conduit for ransom proceeds and the profits of drug trafficing. Simply ignoring these problems will result in the proponents of anonymity simply being ignored. The principle fear of the authorities appears to be terrorist rather than normal criminal activities. Terrorism is no longer limited to far off irredentist struggles that ex-patriates can harbour romantic thoughts about. The reality the the IRA is an organisation that murders children by placing a bomb in a rubbish bin outside a MacDonalds has been brought home to the suporters of Noraid through the bombings of the World Trade Center, Oaklahoma and Atlanta. If one lives in a country where there is little terrorism it is easy to imagine that people driven to extreeme actions are driven by a extreeme situation. If one is faced with the reality of terrorism one soon reaches the conclusion that its perpetrators are simply ordinary psychopaths. Having stated that terrorism is an important concern for the state it is necessary to ask whether it is necessary to restrict freedom to combat terrorism. In answering one must bear in mind that a central part of most terrorist strategies is to force the state to respond with disproportionate measures (here recent events in Chetchnya indicate that Trotsky was not widely read in the USSR). Absolutely anonymous cash may create problems, but what if it were possible to generate small quantities of "marked bills" within an otherwise anonymous system. If the circumstances under which the marked bills could be distributed were limited to a small set of tightly controlled circumstances the legitimate need of the government to oppose terrorism and organised crime could be met without imposing a Singapore style system with total monitoring. In effect what is taking place is a negotiation between two groups, the government and civil rights activists. If one side refuses to consider the needs of the other they will be marginalised. Absolutism in politics is usually a bad thing. Politics usually works through compromises. The art being to ensure that one compromises the inessential terms in order to defend the key items. In the present Presidential race the one policy area in which Clinton is potentially vulnerable is privacy. Its the one area which the Republicans could raise and claim it as their own (whether justifiable or not). The Clinton camp could not move from their current position without dropping Freeh overboard, since Freeh has run the FBI without any Ruby ridge or Waco style cockups on his watch I don't think that is likely to happen. If privacy is raised as a policy concern in this election it will reoccur in the next and both parties will have to justify their policies in terms of personal privacy as well as everything else. Just because the election is practically settled does not mean that the campaign will not affect what happens during the administration. Clinton clearly wants Gore to be his successor and is going to want to make it as easy as possible for him to win. Clinton is the kind of politician I can trust - give him an issue and I trust him to look at the opinion polls. If Dole makes any kind of headway in '96 with a privacy plank then Gore will have to have one in 2000. Phill

5 5

Snake-Oil FAQ
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Snake-Oil FAQ's New Maintainer From: Rob Rothenburg Walking-Owl <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> C. Matthew Curtin <cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com> will be taking-over the "Snake-Oil FAQ". I no longer have the time to finish (let alone maintain) it. - --Rob -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3b Charset: cp850 iQEVAwUBMjRWPATNlSxdPy6ZAQEnIwf+PXgXNNBZP7ylTfMhugeH8FuFDY/zybNb poSIWCRUhM7EEndYkuyzaTYC44aE0ltAkiN7HvaqXbExQEmEv34aYTa+u9ISabOK BOEQdgi8oCHJlQ3R6lBTMWKfpFELpORsjDJbsKt/Gcgef+uInMUG8RF7F3Va40dh CTar/Nr4Quj/EkkVaY6hkaXsMF0CvWq+cKZmo8KR0v4vPeWEKHskslfgXSpfPR9d uXYyUVD21HRSG5YTZmdm3PJn3GUvgXuQdz1pooQ+x+u8EXsOFRjAEiaFtMey2DYW imHub+XewnbS93JGZ+q+J93hHpL2OE8LMQFB8ViUe6K05uj7RBi06Q== =wMjQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Crypto Anachy MUD
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did anyone make the point (I gave up on the thread) that we already have a great Crypto Anarchy MUD with lots of the coding already done. We call it the Internet. Digital cash, strong crypto, remailers, everything. I have never been able to figure out why anyone would want to play games on a computer in any case when the whole system is a game. Word processing, spreadsheets, telecoms -- it's all a game. And they pay you to play it. DCF

2 1

Anonymous FedEx, was: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>David Lesher wrote: >Try & mail an anonymous FedEx package. Not a problem. You merely use the FedEx number of local company. Get FedEx forms from an unmanned FedEx pick-up point, fill one in (using an impact printer, if desired, to simulate the appearance of the pre-addressed forms given to their regular customers), attach to parcel and drop it in the box (no finger prints please). Works like a charm. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to perscription DRUGS.

2 1

Re: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactly?)
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:03 PM 9/7/96 CST, roy(a)scytale.com wrote: >In Minneapolis, USWest has Telecard phones everywhere, and vending >machines with bill accepters. The calls are also flat rate at $0.25. ... >Can Telecards be audited for usage? If a TLA black-bags my $25 Telecard >from my wallet, can they reconstruct what calls I made with it? Easily. They get the card number off the card, and then check their long distance records for calls made with that card number. With some cards, you can recharge the card instead of getting new ones, if for some reason you want to increase the audit trail substantially. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

2 1

TWA flight 800, surface to air missles, conspiracypunks
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 11:26:23 -0700 (PDT) From: Brock N. Meeks <brock(a)well.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)eff.org> Surface to air missles do not need to make contact to explode. They have a proximity system that explodes the missle if it gets within range. Of course, sometimes the missle does hit; there is a famous story -- documented -- of an SA-2 (an old Soviet SAM) hitting an RF-4 during Viet Nam. The missle didn't explode but stuck in the plane like a dart; the pilot flew the plane back to the airfield and was told to ditch the plane when the air traffic control noticed it stuck in his plane. -- Brock

1 0

Re: talker
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sure sounds like it. is it possible that there could be two such as this? -paul > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Sun Sep 8 03:04:36 1996 > X-Authentication-Warning: jekyll.piermont.com: Host perry@localhost didn't use HELO protocol > To: doom13(a)juno.com (Floyd W Odom) > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: talker > Reply-To: perry(a)piermont.com > X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission > Date: Sat, 07 Sep 1996 23:40:18 -0400 > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 255 > > > Floyd W Odom writes: > > I am doom13. If there is anyone out there who is a hacker or > > would like to be one you can talk to me and find out stuff like cracking. > > Just drop a message at doom13(a)juno.com. > > Are you the same jerk who was posting a week ago? >

3 2

Re: [WAS xs4all.nl] Terrorists
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:35 AM 9/9/96 -0500, Adam Shostack wrote: >Stephan Schmidt wrote: > >| One thought : How many of you would support terrorist >| web server (say Oklahoma, TWA, Iran, Lybia, RAF, IRA, ...) ? > >I've given support to at least two terrorist organization, probably >closer to five in the last year. I can't see supporting one more >would do any more harm. > >Adam And I support a terrorist organization (the US Government) every year whether I want to or not. The US was convicted of a major violation of international law (akin to terrorism) in the International Court of Justice back in the '80s for air sowing mines in Nicaragua's main harbor. DCF

2 1

CATO terrorism conference -- tomorrow @ 8:30 am, free
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

More info on tomorrow's terrorism conference at CATO is at: http://www.cato.org/events/calendar.html This is especially timely given the report that the Aviation Safety and Security Commission (chaired by Gore) sent to Clinton with 20 recommendations. One is to enact "automated passenger profiling" of all domestic travellers, which would include airline access to FBI/CIA databases. This $10 million project bans anonymous air travel and, needless to say, raises significant privacy questions. -Declan >Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 12:23:13 -0400 >Mime-Version: 1.0 >To: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) >From: Solveig Bernstein <sberns(a)cato.org> >Subject: Terrorism Conference > >Cato's Conference, *Combatting Terrorism, Preserving Freedom," scheduled for >Tuesday, September 10, 1996 is now > > >* FREEEEE* > >That's right, the registration fee of $50 has been WAIVED!!! > >Come listen to Nadine Strossen, Dorothy Denning, David Kopel, and many >others discuss terrorism, foreign policy, civil liberties, and the >telecommunications infrastructure. > >Please redistribute freely. > >Conference begins at 8:30 at 1000 Mass. Ave. > > >- Solveig >********************************************************************** >Solveig Bernstein, Esq. >(202) 789-5274 >(202) 842-3490 (fax) > >Assistant Director of Telecommunications & Technology Studies >Cato Institute >1000 Mass. Ave. NW >Washington, DC 20001 >

1 0

Re: Kiddie porn on the Internet
by Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn wrote: > > "News" stories are now circulating on radio about child pornography on > the Internet, and how an organization called "Save The Children" is > working very hard to identify the trafficers and their accomplii. > > Save The Children is complaining that they can't find all of the dirty > dealers of kid-porn, since much of the traffic is encrypted! > > So who is Save The Children? First, since they're an international > organization raising funds in the U.S., they obviously operate at the > pleasure of the State Department. Ho hum. Remember the incidents at the > Denny's restaurant chain where Denny's was sued for discrimination > against minorities? Did it seem a little bizarre for the 1990's? I'm trying to work out just what sort of confused idea is going on here. Save the Children is an international charity that is based in the UK. It is ultra respectable, Princess Ann being its president and very active in that role (ie not merely titular). Its also a-political which it has to be for tax reasons and because otherwise the royals couldn't have anything to do with it. Their main mission is sending food to Ethiopia and other famine areas, development work etc. It is ultra-worthy stuff. I think that a more rational explanation of the Dennys case is that being weasels the Dennys management decided they needed some good PR before the judgement brought them bad PR. >*** The recievers of the porn should not be punished for the photographers >action, the same as if I would complain that someone burglarized my home becuase >i left the door open. It was their ignorance that caused their loss. Its the consumers who create a market. If someone burgals your house and I knowingly buy the stolen goods its a crime. Phill

1 0

Re: [WAS xs4all.nl] Terrorists
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:49 AM 9/9/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >I don't worry overmuch about a few thousand or even a few million people >dying as a result of something we have had an influence on developing, >anymore than the developers of many technologies need to worry about how >others use their technologies. > >And the net effect of crypto anarchy is to destabilize and marginalize >central governments, which is a net positive effect. If some eggs get >broken in the process, the biological imperative will generate more eggs. >No big deal. Particularly since governments murdered 160 million in the last 100 years while we civilians have only managed to murder a paltry 20 million or fewer. A savings of 160 million deaths leaves a lot of room for a non-harmful increase in private murder. We could increase the private murder rate by 8 to 10 times and still break even. Note too that most terrorism is aimed at governments (even if practiced on civilians). In the absence of government, terrorist incentives may be reduced. DCF "I don't know if we ought to trust governments with the Net, they might use it to nuke Hiroshima or conquer Europe or something."

1 0

L.A. Times articles, etc.
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure everyone is familiar with how newspaper articles are not necessarily "pure" news, i.e., they're often slanted toward a particular point of view. Go back a few years, maybe 20 or more, and look at the front page of the L.A. Times (or probably any big-city paper). Many or most news pieces written by UPI, AP, etc., now 100% are written internally. What y'all might want to think about is not just slanting and bias, but how certain people and organizations can actually *plant* a phony story on page one of a major paper like the L.A. Times. Go back a few months and check out the front-page article on real estate prices in the Calif. "Ventura Keys" area. Totally false. Story alleged that prices were "skyrocketing"; prices actually were absolutely flat, after having fallen by 35% or more in the previous couple of years. Whoever authorized this story, if they didn't get a big kickback or gain some points for some future operation, then I can't imagine why they would print such a thing. I hate to suggest anyone become more cynical than they already are, but, the front page(s) of a big-city newspaper are some of the most valuable real estate in western civilization, so do the math....

1 0

Re: Test...sorry about this - Reply - Reply
by Barbara Gamble 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I subscribed just once, real name. Yep, the Welcome msg is ReallyTrulyFine[M]. I reallytrulyread it. High-traffic, though, is relative. In light of Z.B.'s post , I thought that maybe I , too, had a mail probem. Seriously, thanks for the info. >>> Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 09/09 2:26 pm >>> On 9 Sep 96 at 11:10, Barbara Gamble wrote: > I got it too. And since I am a new subscriber, I thought it might > be the normal traffic. The Welcome msg *did* say the list is > high-traffic. Still, I was aghast--300 all at once, another 100 > just in the last hour. Is that typical? (Please forgive such a > question from a newcomer to the list.) Usually, between 35 and 100 posts a day, most of which I delete. Did you subscribe twice or three times under slightly different names (but identical e-mail adresses)? RTFine Welcome Message, it explains everything you have to know Hope you'll stay with us. Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultant physicists, technologists and engineers PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

1 0