December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Orbiting Datahavens
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Or About 2 Jul 96, 17:06, Brian Lane wrote: > to have a backup satellite in case of a disaster. Once the Delta > Clipper is functional They did have that big wreck a couple of weeks ago. I am not sure of the salvage status. Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

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Re:NT remailer
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat Aug 17 20:37:49 1996 > At 21:08 8/16/96, rednax wrote: > >Speaking of NT, I downloaded the full version of msie 3.0 the other day > but > >when I tried installing it, an error message came up saying that it > requires > >a Win95 or WinNT4.0 build of 1381 or higher. I am currently running NT > 4.0b > >that has a build of 1314, does anyone know of where is the upgrade or > >service packs(if available)? I have tried looking around microsoft.com, > but > >they neither provided any detail nor did they provide an e-mail. 1381 is the full release version of NT 4.0 - there probably isn't an upgrade or service pack. You'll have to lay down your cash just like the rest of us poor slobs. dave - ---- David E. Smith POB 324 Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 dsmith(a)prairienet.org http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith send mail of 'send pgp-key' subject for my PGP public key "Welcome to the human race." -- Snake, _Escape from L.A._ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Automagically signed with Pronto Secure for Windows. iQEVAwUBMhZz8DVTwUKWHSsJAQEelQf+I7iHCNOwFnYn94uvxuczY0PTYP5nU9dp nQXVbdlVNO+vZH4y+9CLEhoaNbD+BLxSaULk6nAIUmvwyL9dniKJ9wmcUsAoJrk0 ML/najbDHQJ8BsSbV9ivyLJZxwwnCGmLHwcvchJtppLdXzkKFO0EwvY0LGtim4CZ uWjhKlI6rUo9trHeLtPCn/RuQheaT4x4I7TEA4OZkP46DnWRl/4288MPAcL4SxUO ojt/Bw8eAxhNOeBhuj7s2UaFmfCejH6ml1jLI/b7+a9tUvDnq8hPMlRAyVDzkj4I n9kHLvO0spjweXWNgj2NqDHfu2Ygtz+vMlpXJN4FUX++aYOlMOvytQ== =kUCL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[NOISE] Re: Greetings from Whore.com
by Daniel Miskell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nope. No web access. However, when school is back in session, and I get my radio show back and head back to the computer labs... <cackles evilly> Greetings from <property not found>, Daniel.

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Re: Protecting floating datahavens?
by Sean Sutherland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat Aug 17 20:15:22 1996 > The basic risks with such things are: > 1) Getting governments to agree to leave you alone. If you're doing a > 2) Getting governments and other pirates to actually leave you alone. > 3) Making it work financially, for the proprietors and tenants/co-owners. > 4) Convincing investors that you're safe enough on 1) and 2) Auctually, the one real big problem is that the data is all in one place. Rememeber that the whole point of a data haven isn't secure backup -- it's secure storage. And if the place gets blown sky-high (which can easily be done discreetly and possibly made to look like an accident), all the data is going to be lost, and you're basically screwed. The only workable solution to this that I can see has nothing to do with floating countries or anything of the sort. Instead, the use of data-splitting programs could be used. I'm not all up on the security or reliability of these programs, so if I'm making unwarranted assumptions, guess I did a lot of typing for nothing. This has probably been proposed before, too, but what the hey... For example, lets say you set up an office in 100 countries (it would be more effective to have more, but let's say 100). Through the use of anonymous remailers and encryption, he could apply for a customer ID number and password. To avoid any possibility of forgery, such IDs could be prehaps 100kb-1Mb (this is just for confirmation of identy when sending the data into the data havens -- shorter IDs would be used for identifcation). Then, he could split the program into 100 parts, with (say) 70 parts being needed to restore the entire file. He would then encrypt and send each of these files to each remailer through the Internet. To get the data back, he would send in the ID and password, encrypted again, to the nessecary number of offices in order to retrieve the data. Payment, if nessecary, could be made by anonymous bank transfer or something like ecash. Proprietary encryption systems (PGP-like, with IDEA/RSA hybrid in it, but can accept 5000+ bit keys and padding) might be used, as well. This scheme has several pluses. One, it doesn't rely on any fancy legal manuevering with off-shore nationalities and crap. Second, it isn't very vunerable. They would need to get legal jurisdiction in 70 different countries to sieze the data, and then they have the encryption to deal with. Third, if there's any server problems, it wouldn't affect the entire system. Fourth, you don't have to attach missle launchers and hire a private security force to defend it. There are several problems, though. First, it relies on the Internet, something which is inherantly insecure anyway. Second, if someone's being wiretapped in their own country, then the whole effort is in vain. Third, it would be incredibly costly, but probably no more so than any kind of off-shore platforms. In fact, it would probably be cheaper. Any comments? - --- Sean Sutherland | GCS/C d- s+:+ a--- C+++ V--- P L E- W++ N++ K w o O-(++) Key: E43E6489 | M-- V PS+ PE++ Y PGP++ t--- 5+++ X++ R b++ DI+ D+ G e- Vote Browne '96 | h! !r y -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Key: finger or email w/ 'send key' in subj. http://www2.interconnect.net/maverick iQEVAwUBMhZuq1ZoKRrkPmSJAQE9QQf7B+ikk1/dFKyydIzQkGcfX8+srK5GeRlr 5IhEFkXJY34dI4Dqg/yKQ6m/XwRMyqPHxcyV6lR6qU9ngaawBWjd1Q+HBtCOzEs6 Ch8AgTq5CWox8/7FZKz32xGJCVpPJ+etzeJSK2kqKfPnTW+yhz7rch+DIvEJKnM1 ktlxsi/3c1Hn89OLZrCHUeJQqBMoU7rVnmVv6sfGVUQuwJ09yWT457HCN7dZbH1z Nrc+w7ewlxivH1r6KZ1DNk8BJrroQXD7mSHvXmEwyTiyr9DzaPhtlllarz/iPNFF 295F/4Cj9K2HiwJfKH7pDy60OKLBGP72xnc0cjxj8TlIp/KDY7VsPQ== =BNfl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Orbiting Datahavens
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Or About 17 Aug 96, 5:24, Brian C. Lane wrote: > > How about an orbiting DataHaven. No jurisdiction to bother with, > extremely difficult to get to (except by large governments...). <SNIP> > it would work. Might even be cheaper than outfitting the oil-rig > with the rate that they are tossing satellites into space. > > If the HAM radio community can get a satellite into space, why not > the > Cypherpunks/Linux communities? This is a fascinating concept that needs to be further researched. It would be interesting to do some cost examinations. I have always been behind any private space programs! I am even behind the Govt. Programs. Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906 Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

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anonymizer and cookies
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

is there anything definite about the Anonymizer and cookies? according to the DEC browser tester at http://www.research.digital.com/nsl/formtest/stats-by-test/NetscapeCookie.h… shows some successful cookies passing through www.anonymizer.com and some bad cookies. What's the final word?

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Final release of Navigator (with strong crypto) now available
by Jeff Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The final release of Navigator 3.0, complete with non-exportable strong crypto, is now available for download by US citizens. Note that this is the released version of 3.0, so it will not expire. You can get it from: http://wwwus.netscape.com/eng/US-Current/ --Jeff -- Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw Any opinions expressed above are mine.

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Hackers invade DOJ web site
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN online (http://www.cnn.com) is reporting a "breakin" by "hackers" to the DOJ web site. They don't elaborate exactly how thy did it. ______c_________________________________________________________________ Mike M Nally * Tiv^H^H^H IBM * Austin TX * For the time being, m5(a)tivoli.com * m101(a)io.com * <URL:http://www.io.com/~m101> * three heads and eight arms.

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Re: Final release of Navigator (with strong crypto) now available
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: jsw(a)netscape.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, tomw(a)netscape.com Date: Sat Aug 17 21:26:37 1996 Thanks for the info. Downloading now and it appears to be going more smoothly than the time I got beta 6. No delays and good throughput. And I have yet to talk with someone that has successfully downloaded the `other guys` 128-bit version. I sure have not been able to! Thanks, Lou Zirko > The final release of Navigator 3.0, complete with non-exportable > strong crypto, is now available for download by US citizens. Note > that this is the released version of 3.0, so it will not expire. > You can get it from: > > http://wwwus.netscape.com/eng/US-Current/ > > --Jeff > > -- > Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist > Netscape Communication Corporation > jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw > Any opinions expressed above are mine. > > Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMhZ/dstPRTNbb5z9AQEIggf/d0Q53oNSB3gM2Kk0XMsZhQVVd1gqYfoS sK1Ja5Qy6wqpzX452oEO21qetQsjs6yW19T3PdLqfr+YZW0zTbOcsbmUoNnzs8xF +2hfKdtRiMeZRo1HpKZ1kx3SUGR9SCLymVV0mWecOpwpdnj8i69K8Xv3eEEhbX4S aQJakxjr/qmjOtW5k5iuU93eosdhXjsHCkICY75YzuwX/VtkN3tMU28jsuYXGokf LjxuXBoTi/1+U80iSlCLYwXFrwoeZ+FTc2NACRPDJnAnLX4GbatLlLbP92918Xvt SeiVEeia46WQqRbJRHMnlif2z3gn1Fit0qdgn1U7f59aKUVgKQu95Q== =LIdQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Possible opportunity for school recruitment
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One wonders if they could be persuaded, in return for a donation of money or time, to include some cypherpunks-related web pages; these could include ones on PGP and on anonymous remailers, so they could later get email & ftp access and use these. -Allen > Centura > CYBERED BIG RIG TRUCKS INTERNET ACCESS TO SCHOOLS > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net > Copyright &copy 1996 Los Angeles Daily News > LOS ANGELES (Aug 17, 1996 00:00 a.m. EDT) -- Like some futuristic, > hi-tech bookmobile, "Ed" came calling on Charles Maclay Middle School > in suburban Los Angeles. [...] > The privately funded CyberEd program is designed to provide hands-on > Internet experience and advanced, on-line communications training. > "Ed" -- a veritable cyber classroom on wheels, offers personal > computers, Internet connectivity and CD-ROMS, as well as presentation > facilities, printing, faxing and video conferencing capabilities. [...] > Inside the yellow-and-black big rig in the Pacoima section of Los > Angeles, children and teachers alike tried their hand at surfing the > Net, pointing and clicking and generally immersing themselves in > everything from home pages of fellow students to cyberchats with > astronauts at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration > headquarters in Houston. [...] > Plank said a $3 million fund-raising campaign was under way to > bankroll a fleet of rigs modeled after "Ed," each with a different > technological focus -- manufacturing, media, biotechnical and other > disciplines. > CyberEd is funded by the MCI Foundation, the William G. McGowan > Charitable Fund, DSC Communications Corp., Milken Family Foundation, > Corning Incorporated and Microsoft. > Copyright &copy 1996 Nando.net

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MD5 completely broken!
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks -- Atfer much scientific research, I have finally found a way to restore any message given only its MD5 checksum. The method is based on the so called "enthropy restoration" algorithm. I have also written a libMD5hack library for restoring messages given their MD5 checksums. I plan to license the library for commercial use. The price of the library is to be determined. - Igor.

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Re: Orbiting Datahavens
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:32 PM 8/17/96 -0500, snow wrote: > > It is just as easy to take out a satelite in LOE as it is to sink an >oil rig, plus swapping defective Hard Drives is a real bitch. Hard drives don't work in a vacuum, at least conventional ones don't. (And I'm not aware of any hard drives which are designed to be permanently pressurized against a hard vacuum, either...) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Software manpower exports and the power of governments
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 13:23 16/08/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: > > It is overwhelmingly clear that the question is simply who has the > > power? Those who wish to hire peoples services in order to produce > > wealth, or those who can command peoples services because they have > > guns? At 06:17 PM 8/17/96 +0600, Arun Mehta wrote: > Are you suggesting that Indian programmers come to work with like > a chain gang, with armed government guard? No. I am suggesting that the more that power over business activities and decisions lies with those who do not need to make a profit or serve the customers needs, the less of value will be produced. > Look, governments in the 3rd world are often stupid and corrupt > -- no doubt that contributes to poverty, but that isn't the only > reason. I'm sure one of the reasons is cultural: Was the culture of the refugees who fled to Hong Kong any different from those who failed to escape from Communist China? --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: [NOISE] Re: Stopped Clock. Was: Schlafly on Crypto
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:18 PM 8/16/96 EDT, you wrote: >Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: >> (If Clinton had said things like "Of course I tried to avoid the draft >> and smoked dope, I'm no fool" and had dropped the draft and the Drug War >> instead of supporting both after he was President, I might have > >There been no draft for about 20 years. What have _you been smoking? There's still draft registration. Sure, they don't currently ask that your body show up at Camp LeJeune for basic training, but they still insist that you register where you live and essentially give them permission to draft you if they feel like taking the political heat for doing so. It's illegal not to register if you're 18 and male. And they do occasionally track whether people are registered; college loan databases are used for it, and there are occasional mentions in the press that they've used other sources of lists-of-18-year-olds to "remind" people that they have to register, such as public school records. Some day that you're not too disgruntled, walk into a Post Office and look at the posters oon the wall. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Reassign Authority!

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Post Office restrictions
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've told some people about a few of the loopholes mentioned on the list about the new post office restrictions on airmail packages. What's disturbing is that none of the people I'd talked to, all of whom are at least reasonably intelligent, had thought or heard, for instance, that PanAm103 only took 12 ounces or that someone could just send two packages. How does the news media justify its existence? (Down here, it seems to be serving as a propaganda arm for the Republicans)

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Re: forget photographing license plates!
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 Aug 96 01:31:08 -0800, null(a)void.com wrote: >"In the 22 Jul 1996 issue of Fortune was an interesting look into the future >of automobile electronics, "Soon Your Dashboard Will Do Everything (Except >Steer)". " >From the control center, they can "electronically reach into the car" to >unlock the doors, or honk the horn and flash its lights." ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ How long do you think it would be before thieves subverted this feature? >>>> It is extremely comforting to me -- I don't know about you -- to think >that GM will maintain a control center able to communicate with my auto >electronics. Shit, why not TRW? I'm just waiting for them to integrate with TRW. Then, with people they've determined can afford a new one, they can trigger the car to have mysterious engine failures... | Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> - Webpages for sale! Se habla JavaScript! | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp | Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY"

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Re: MD5 completely broken! -- JOKE
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

april 1 is not very near on my calendar, wiseguy. Subject: Re: MD5 completely broken! To: vznuri(a)netcom.com (Vladimir Z. Nuri) Date: Sun, 18 Aug 1996 01:10:33 -0500 (CDT) From: ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > this is front page of new york times fodder for sure > if what you claim is true. in fact it is a *major* > *major* breakthrough if real. I would expect many > months of press fallout based on it. in fact if > for real, you are guaranteed instant worldwide fame. I agree, but my message was a joke. - Igor.

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Re: Data_havens
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Auctually, the one real big problem is that the data is all in one place. I would rephrase this slightly to read "the data, or knowledge of its location, is all in one place." Sure, with a satellite, both the data and the info required to access it is in the same physical location; it's a target as soon as someone tracks a transmission to its source. But I think there will be problems, even with distributed systems, for a haven under the control of any single entity. Whether that control is implicit, such as the coercive force of the host governments, or the explicit policies of the owner, it will tend to force patterns in data storage. This could become problematic. [snip] > The only workable solution to this that I can see has nothing to do with > floating countries or anything of the sort. Instead, the use of > data-splitting programs could be used. I'm not all up on the security or > reliability of these programs, so if I'm making unwarranted assumptions, > guess I did a lot of typing for nothing. This has probably been proposed > before, too, but what the hey... Actually, Eric Hughes gave an inspirational talk on this very subject at DEF CON IV. I have to say that I'm a convert, now. Time to go forth and make the world safe for crypto-anarchy. Much of what I'm going to say is influenced by that talk. My only regret is that I didn't get his autograph. Enough about that... Basically, I think allowing a single entity to create such a network may lead to a dangerous concentration of information. If we are to assume that an attack on a data haven will involve the resources of large, unfriendly governments, along with the full legal (and extra-legal) powers of said governments...then it becomes possible to imagine a scenario where one's "network technique" is _studied_ in order to find possible caches for servers in the data-haven network. Once the location of the servers/caches are known, the network becomes vulnerable to seizure. In friendly jurisdictions, subopenas and warrants may be issued. In unfriendly or extra-jurisdictional circumstances (e.g. space), one uses anti-satellite measures, black-bag jobs, bribes, or, heck, let's be paranoid and say they can send TEMPEST-equipped vans to sit outside and read the hard drives directly. Even if seizure is made impossible, enough heat can be brought to bear to limit the growth of one's haven_net and concentrate new nodes in certain specific jurisdictions...which of course become more attractive targets for seizure tactics. The problem is that a single entity may tend to keep records of what nodes are situated where. Not necessarily in the protocols, either. All those computers will need servicing, upgrading, network links, etc. etc. This requires some kind of a control and payment structure. Setting up a new node is particularly hazardous, especially after initial deployment. To make matters worse, once a node is found, it may leak information about the rest of the network (traffic analysis, anyone?). What is more, it leaves open the door for truly stupid acts, like keeping a network map where it might be found in case of a search. Don't laugh. A good deal of design will need to go into a data haven; if the documents are not destroyed or secured in some way, they could bring down the whole system. > For example, lets say you set up an office in 100 countries (it would be > more effective to have more, but let's say 100). Through the use of This can be a double-edged sword. 100 countries means 100 _different_ points for an adversary to bribe/steal/warrant his way onto a point in one's haven_net. Sure, maybe he can't get _all_ of them, but what can he do with the nodes he does have? Note that the haven operator may not necessarily know a jurisdiction or node has been compromised; how many times have you detected the NSA reading your personal e-mail? (on second thought, don't answer that question :) I honestly believe it is necessary to involve mass numbers of _individuals_ or small groups in a sort of Godwin-esque federation for a robust, reliable, and unkillable haven_net. This implies a certain degree of flux on the part of the network; nodes have the right to secede at any time. The trick is to make it financially rewarding to be a part of the network, so the number of new nodes exceeds the number of imprisoned crypto-rebels/dilettantes/students looking for a buck/other former node-type people. A "data haven", then, in the sense of a corporation which manages and serves the stuff, is more of a coordinator or a broker than a warehouser. It acts as a front end to such a distributed system, and assumes the risk if the client's data should fall through the cracks. The added value over entering the system oneself comes from the technical assurance and insulation from legal risk. [description of obtaining user ID and password thru anon remailers] Not such a bad idea, but I don't know about tying the ID and password to a specific number of nodes. Certainly it minimizes leakage of one's client list; certain nodes only serve a particular subset of clients. What happens if enough of the client's nodes are seized? Also, what about spoofing and lost identities? Sure, the protocols involved between haven and client may offer no chance of either, but what about the client's network? Just because they are paranoid enough to use a data-haven does not mean they are clueful enough to encrypt that modem link they may be using for SLIP, PPP, or whatever. > To get the data back, he would send in the ID and password, encrypted > again, to the nessecary number of offices in order to retrieve the data. One of the ideas advanced at DEF CON, and one I really liked, was to make the data retreivable simply by knowing its MD5 hash. No need for identies, no worrying about keeping a meta-secret or nym secret...just keeping or revealing the hash for file-by-file protection. Now, of course, what if the user loses his hash? > Payment, if nessecary, could be made by anonymous bank transfer or > something like ecash. I like the idea of allowing a node to accept payment up front, or accept for free (but charge a fee to downloaders). Each node can set its own prices in terms of e$/MB or other units (you like octets? megawords?) for a given amount of data. I'd like to accept "in-demand" data (Quake alpha, anyone?) on a 'consignment basis', but can't figure out how to ensure the node pays the original uploader w/o blowing away anonymity. Anyone got a paper lying around which could help (beg beg beg)? Anonymous bank transfer is probably a good idea, too, but it can be a major hassle. Not just from the State, either; how do you keep track of what money transfer came from which nym? > > Proprietary encryption systems (PGP-like, with IDEA/RSA hybrid in it, but > can accept 5000+ bit keys and padding) might be used, as well. IMHO, this kind of application will need to be built anew, and built well. Becoming a new node should be an install-and-forget process. This requires certain features. Most importantly, the node's owner should not known, and should not be _able_ to know what exactly he or she is storing. I haven't looked at the new steg and crypto packages for linux, but that's about what I'm thinking of. > > This scheme has several pluses. One, it doesn't rely on any fancy legal > manuevering with off-shore nationalities and crap. Second, it isn't very None of that is really necessary for a data haven, anyway. Why bother, when the whole point is to disappear it from physical space in the first place?? It simply allows Them to have a single point of attack. > vunerable. They would need to get legal jurisdiction in 70 different > countries to sieze the data, and then they have the encryption to deal > with. Unfortunately, it also means if they get jurisdiction in even one of those 70 countries, you are in trouble. Even if the encryption is good, just looking at how much data is on the server, and from where, could be most unfortunate for business. There's a more serious concern in reliability, too; if one uses a data-splitting scheme, capturing enough servers has a probability of removing access to data. That's bad for business. > Third, if there's any server problems, it wouldn't affect the entire > system. Fourth, you don't have to attach missle launchers and hire a No, but again the splitting scheme needs to be smart. (M, N) thresholds would be good; losing one server wouldn't mean losing the data. It also forces Them to capture N servers instead of just one. > private security force to defend it. There are several problems, though. > First, it relies on the Internet, something which is inherantly insecure > anyway. Second, if someone's being wiretapped in their own country, then > the whole effort is in vain. Third, it would be incredibly costly, but It is not necessary to obtain a warrant to wiretap. We know that. The system then relies upon the security of the locations of the servers. I am very skeptical of the idea that this can be acheived with a single organization. > probably no more so than any kind of off-shore platforms. In fact, it > would probably be cheaper. What we really need is a robust architecture, like Eric Hughes' "Universal Piracy Network" which is as popular and as prevalent as <name your favorite app> is today. We need to make it easy, simple, profitable, and most of all, _FUN_. Getting people financially dependent on such a system wouldn't hurt, either. > > Any comments? I have a vision...and I caught it just recently...of a day where I will be able to sell my disk space to the highest bidder, and know I am helping the cause of freedom and frictionless data. A day where I can go forward and create value from "garbage" - unused cycles, unused HD space, underutilized graphics cards and coprocessors mouldering away in closets. Where people spontaneously join haven_nets because it's "cool", or "sensible", or any of the other justifications people make when they're jumping off the cliff with the other lemmings. When participation is a mouse-click away. When the NSA advises Congresscritters on how to best distribute their files, and spends most of its time figuring out cost/benefit analyses of the myriad haven_nets, and actively contributing its own latest, greatest, and "just unclassified" entry into the market for server software. When no one will be able to imagine having a file without splitting it across half a dozen countries and half a hundred computers. Where it will be those who want un-encrypted data who are "strange" and "old fogies", because distributed data is _orthodox_, and the anonymity and e-cash is just a simple little feature, along with the rest, and hardly worth mentioning in and of itself. In short, no where. Utopia. But a nice vision to get wild-eyed and hand-waving about just the same.

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Re: Burden of proof
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 Aug 96 20:55:12 -0800, molnard1(a)nevada.edu wrote: >> This relates to something I have been wondering about: If one could >> get one's company to pay one in electronic cash, what is to stop one >> from piling the coins in a Datahaven somewhere (assuming one existed >> that would be usable for these purposes) and say to the IRS: Money? >> What money? Can you find any of my money? I, uhh... lost it! Yeah, >> that's it!! > What is to stop the IRS from pointing out that you received the >money from your employer? Maybe you could convince them you were unable >to pay, but that would require squirreling away(and refraining from >using) all your assets. On the other hand, if your employer was willing to do some sneaky ecash stuff, then it might get interesting. Alternately, how about having an off-shore bank that supposedly has very high interest rates and fees. "Sorry, this is all I have left" | Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> - Webpages for sale! Se habla JavaScript! | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp | Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY"

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Re: MD5 completely broken!
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:49 PM 8/17/96 -0500, Igor Chudov wrote: >Cypherpunks -- > >Atfer much scientific research, I have finally found a way to restore >any message given only its MD5 checksum. The method is based on the >so called "enthropy restoration" algorithm. I have also written a >libMD5hack library for restoring messages given their MD5 checksums. > >I plan to license the library for commercial use. > >The price of the library is to be determined. Research, my ass. You should stop drinking. -- Greg Broiles |"Post-rotational nystagmus was the subject of gbroiles(a)netbox.com |an in-court demonstration by the People http://www.io.com/~gbroiles |wherein Sgt Page was spun around by Sgt |Studdard." People v. Quinn 580 NYS2d 818,825.

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Re: Drive the SF Central Freeway, have your license plate
by Bob Jonkman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >At 21:55 8/8/96, i am not a number! wrote: > >>CBS radio news this morning: 80,000 commuters traveling the > >>central f'way in SF will have information mailed to them > >>regarding the quake retrofit How? Their license plates have > >>been photographed. > At 10:45 PM 8/8/96 -0700, Lucky wrote: > >You *are* making this up, right? Please say you did. Maybe '!number' was making it up, but license plate photography exists today in the Great White North. A new freeway is being built through Brampton, the 407ETR, for Express Toll Route. At each on and off ramp there are electronic pickups and video cameras. You can subscribe to the toll by buying a transducer that sits behind your rear-view mirror, signals from which will be picked up by the the toll gates as you enter and leave the freeway. If you elect not to subscribe your license plate will be photographed and you'll get a bill in the mail. If you elect not to pay the bill you'll be nabbed for it the next time you go to get your drivers license or car registration renewed... Big Brother is not only watching, he's recording your location and destination, measuring your distance travelled, and charging you for the privilege of driving... ===== Bob Jonkman SOBAC Microcomputer Services 4 Gold Pine Court mailto:bjonkman@sobac.com Brampton ON L6S 2K6 Canada Voice: 905-793-4537 Networking -- Office & Business Automation -- Consulting Key fingerprint: 9F AF A6 AC B5 67 BC 10 89 73 7C F0 CB 27 03 17 finger -l bjonkman(a)sobac.com or send mail with subject 'send key'

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Re: Hackers invade DOJ web site
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>CNN online (http://www.cnn.com) is reporting a "breakin" by "hackers" >to the DOJ web site. They don't elaborate exactly how thy did it. I certainly don't support the person or people responsible for this and it may very well end up having an overall negative impact. Since it has happened, however, I think those in a position to do so should start with the spin control. Some suggestions: The fact that even the U.S. Justice Department is unable to adequately protect it's own site from intruders underscores the need for widely- available strong encryption. While this is certainly a major embarrassment for the Justice Department, at least the mandatory "key escrow" program the Clinton administration is insisting upon has not yet been implemented; no private citizens' data appears to have been compromised this time. It's doubtful that a new law or government bureaucracy would have prevented this from happening but it's entirely possible that tools such as strong encryption could have. It's ironic that the U.S. Government is focusing on the former while fighting use of the latter. This event could potentially draw a lot of interest from the general public. Since we're dealing with public perceptions largely created through the main- stream media, it's important to remember that "sound bites" are more important than carefully reasoned arguments. | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: | It always takes longer than you expect, even Frank Stuart | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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Re: Ad Hoc Bay Area Cypherpunks Thing--Sat., 24 Aug, 3 pm, Menlo Park
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:17 PM 8/17/96, Simon Spero wrote: >On Sat, 17 Aug 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> There is no Cypherpunks event scheduled for that Saturday, but we can have >> an ad hoc gathering, informally arranged. I suggest meeting at 3 p.m. at >> Cody's Bookstore, on El Camino Real in Menlo Park (hard to miss). Or at the >> coffee shop next to it...either should be sufficient Schelling points to > >Do you mean Kepler's? That's the one right near Menlo Park caltrain >station; the coffee shop next to it is Cafe Borone. Get the Mocha. > Yeah, I was thinking of Kepler's. (Cody's is in Berkeley, of course.) Once again: KEPLER'S BOOKS. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Final release of Navigator (with strong crypto) now available
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeff Weinstein (jsw(a)netscape.com) wrote: : The final release of Navigator 3.0, complete with non-exportable : strong crypto, is now available for download by US citizens. Note : that this is the released version of 3.0, so it will not expire. : You can get it from: Would it be possible to both supply an Linux ELF and a.out binary ? : http://wwwus.netscape.com/eng/US-Current/ : --Jeff -- Alex de Joode | Replay IP Service & Web DZign -- The Netherlands usura(a)replay.com | http://www.replay.com mailto:info@replay.com

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Re: FCC_ups
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:36 AM 8/18/96 +0000, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: >> >First flat rates would have to go out. >> >If Alice uses her phone for 5 hrs in month and pay _x_ dollars and Bob uses >> >his for 100 hrs and pays _x_ dollars, then Alice is subsidising Bob, which >> >is not really ethical. Everyone should pay for the amount of bandwith >> >one is using. >> >> I'm afraid you're promoting what I consider a rather old (and, now, odd) way >> to look at it. Unlike old mechanical telephone switches, the new hardware >> does not "wear out" and thus a person who uses it more doesn't cost the >> phoneco any more bucks. If that's the case, I don't see the logic in >> charging a person more for greater use. >> >Machinery 'wear and tear' is a small part of Infrastructure maintainance costs. There are tons of other things. Hidden costs, management, laying new pipes,etc. Well, let's consider such costs. Most of which (maintenance, management, rolling stock) are unrelated to amount of telephone usage. So there is no reason that these costs should be unequally attributed to a person who makes local calls 1 hour per day, as opposed to another who only calls 15 minutes per day, for example. As for the "laying new pipes" issue: Years ago in the the US, when inter-central-office trunk connections were all implemented using large bundles of copper pairs, it would have been _correct_ to say that higher telephone usage resulted in larger costs, since more trunk lines were necessary. Today, on the other hand, inter-office trunks (at least the new ones, and I presume that even many of the old ones have been switched over) are implemented in fiber optics. Extra capacity is either automatically available (since the capacity of a given fiber is unlikely to be fully used) or can be fairly simply added by converting old fiber from about 450 megabits per second to 2.4 gigabits, or even faster rates which have become more recently available. >But you miss my point, if a phoneco is not getting a penny for its long distanceservices (which subsidise the flat rate local calls) then the choice would >be to close down. Which would be a severe attack to the local internet usage. That's an entirely unsupported claim. Nobody claims that telephone usage (term used generically) is on the way out. "Closing down" is only going to happen if local phonecos cease to be able to provide a service that people are willing to pay for. And as for the amount of the subsidy, let's look at it. I've read around here recently that the amount of the charge is 3 cents per minute. If we assume an average LD rate of 15 cents per minute, that's 20% of the bill. If an average LD bill is $15 per month, that's only $3 per line, per month. It seems to me that those local phonecos could simply raise their local charges by this and totally compensate for the loss of that subsidy. However, an even more likely outcome is that they will make structural changes which they've been able to avoid after decades as a regulated, monopolized business: Reduce personnel levels, especially in areas other than those in which they are actually providing telephone service. Reduce salaries from "comfy" to "competitive." Before it was broken up in 1983, AT+T was a regulated monopoly and was, more or less, guaranteed a profit. Extra costs, such as higher staffing levels and higher salaries, simply increased the rates, they didn't reduce the profits. This system is still in force with the local phoneco side of the business. Anther thing which could be done, from the government's side (as part of an industry restructuring) is to allow phonecos to greatly accelerate their tax write-off of existing depreciating equipment, perhaps down to as low as 5 years or so. The theory is, these phonecos are going to start competing with companies who are only buying their equipment today, and it would be unfair to saddle the older companies with old, inefficient equipment without allowing them to completely write it off quickly. (This, of course, doesn't mean that they need to actually take it out of service...) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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_Secret Power_ (re: "world communications being monitored")
by Paul Foley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forewords from Nicky Hager's book _Secret Power_: Once upon a time life was easy for the intelligence community. Michael Joeseph Savage made a mark in the sands of history with his `where Britain stands we stand' declaration. It was only right that we saw the world through British eyes and, when Britain retreated, only sensible that we should go all the way with LBJ as an Australian Prime Minister (in whose memory a swimming pool in Melbourne was named) once declared. The cold war kept us in line and on line. In the mid-1980s we bucked the system. We may have been ahead of our time on matters nuclear, but we were out of step with what was called the `Western Alliance'. It took a break with the United States and Britain to make the people of New Zealand aware that we were part of an international intelligence organisation which had its roots in a different world order and which could command compliance from us while withholding from us the benefits of others' intelligence. Life at the time was full of unpleasant surprises. State-sponsored terrorism was a crime against humanity as long as it wasn't being practiced by the allies, when it was studiously ignored. In the national interest it became necessary to say `ouch' and frown and bear certain reprisals of our intelligence partners. We even went the length of building a satellite station at Waihopai. But it was not until I read this book that I had any idea that we had been committed to an international integrated electronic network. It was with some apprehension that I learned Nicky Hager was researching the activity of our intelligence community. He has long been a pain in the establishment's neck. Unfortunately for the establishment, he is engaging, thorough, unthreatening, with a dangerously ingenuous appearance, and an atonishing number of people have told him things that I, as Prime Minister in charge of the intelligence services, was never told. There are also many things with which I am familiar. I couldn't tell him which was which. Nor can I tell you. But it is an outrage that I and other ministers were told so little, and this raises the question of to whom those concerned saw themselves ultimately anwserable. It also raises the question as to why we persist with the old order of things. New Zealand doesn't have much in common with Major's Britain and probably less with Blair's Britain. Are we philosophically in tune with Clinton's USA? Is he? Does all of that prejudice our new orientation to Asia? There will be two responses to this book. One will take the easy course of dumping on Hager. He is quite small and can easily be dumped on. The other will be to challenge the existing assumptions and to have a rational debate on security and intelligence. I have always enjoyed taking the easier course but we may have been the poorer for it. David Lange Prime Minister of New Zealand 1984-89 ------------------------------------- The world of signals intelligence is one that governments have traditionally tried to keep hidden from public view. The secrecy attached to it by the United Kingdom and its allies in the Second World War, particularly codebreaking operations, carried over into the Cold War. Whether their adversaries were attacking them with weapons or diplomatic strategies, the concern was the same --- that revelations about methods and successes would lead an adversary to change codes and ciphers and deny the codebreaker the ability to read the foe's secret communications. Another aspect of the Second World War that carried over into the Cold War era was the close co-operation between five countries --- the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand --- formalised with the UKUSA Security Agreement on 1948. Although the treaty has never been made public, it has become clear that it not only provided for a division of collection tasks and sharing of the product, but for common guidelines for the classification and protection of the intelligence collected as well as for personal security. But over the last 50 years, codebreaking has become far more difficult, and often impossible --- due to the use of computer based encryption. At the same time, the interception of unencrypted communications (for example, air-to-ground communications) and other electronic signals --- particularly radar emanations and missile telemetry --- has grown dramatically in importance. This expanded role for signals intelligence was made evident in the construction and operation of a vast networkof ground stations spread across the world, aircraft equipped with intercept antenna patrolling the skies (and sometimes being shot down), and eventually the launch of eavesdropping satellites. This activity did not escape the notice of the Soviet Union, which also was busy establishing its own elaborate network. It also became very evident to outsider observers that signals intelligence was an important and very expensive part of the Cold War. That signals intelligence became more noticeable did not, for many years, alter the attitudes of the authorities about the necessity for strict secrecy. In the United States, the National Security Agency, established in 1952, was officially acknowledged only in 1957. For years, what were well known to be US operated signals intelligence stations have been officially described as facilities engaged in the research of `electronic phenomena' or the `rapid-relay of communications.' It took the US over 20 years after the Soviet Union obtained detailed information on a US signals intelligence satellite even to acknowledge the existance of such satellites. Other nations have been equally reticent --- the very existance of Canada's Communications Security Establishment was first revealed by the media in 1975. In recent years some of the UKUSA governments have been somewhat more forthcoming about signals intelligence sometimes with regard to historical events, sometimes with respect to organisation structure, and sometimes about some aspect of current operations. But secrecy is still intense (although no more than in other countries). What the public does know, it knows largely because of the efforts of industrious researchers who have collected and analysed obscure documents and media accounts, and interviewed present and former intelligence officers who can shed light on signals intelligence operations. These researchers have included Desmond Ball in Australia, James Bamford in the United States and Duncan Campbell in the United Kingdom. Nicky Hager's _Secret Power_ earns him a place in that select company. Indeed, he has produced the most detailed and up-to-date account in existance of the work of any signals intelligence agency. His exposé of the organisation and operations of New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) is a masterpiece of investigative reporting and provides a wealth of information. The reader of Mr Hager's book will learn about not just New Zealand's signals intelligence activities, but those of its partners. Specifically, the reader will learn about the origins, the evolution, and internal structure of the GCSB; the Tangimoana and Waihopai ground stations and their operations; New Zealand's role in the UKUSA alliance, and some of the signals intelligence operations of the other UKUSA nations. _Secret Power_ also serves as a fascinating case study of the role of a junior partner in an intelligence alliance. Some, undoubtedly, will object to the unprecendented detail to be found in the book, taking the traditional view that secrecy is far more important than public understanding of how tax dollars are being spent on intelligence. Certainly, revelations that defeat the purpose of legitimate intelligence activities are unfortunate and waste those tax dollars. But the UKUSA governments and their intelligence services have been far too slow in declassifying information that no longer needs to be secret and far too willing to classify information that need not be restricted. A Canadian newspaper made the point rather dramatically a few years ago --- after being denied access to a Canadian signals intelligence facility, the paper promptly purchased on the open market, and published, a satellite photograph of the facility, and its antenna system, first obtained by a Soviet spy satellite. There are many individuals within the services who would prefer greater openness, but they frequently cannot overcome the intense opposition of those preaching the need for tight secrecy. The internal bureaucratic battle to get information declassified can be a long and intense one and those opposing disclosure have an advantage --- often they are those in charge of security, who have developed a mindset which views any revelation as damaging. In the meantime, the public is kept in the dark. A free press, as manifested in books such as Mr Hager's, is large step towards alleviating the problem. Jeffrey T. Richelson Alexandria, Virginia May, 1996 Jeffrey Richelson is a leading authority on United States intelligence agencies and author of _America's Secret Eyes in the Sky_ and co-author of _The Ties That Bind_.

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Orbiting Datahavens
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In> How about an orbiting DataHaven. No jurisdiction to bother with, In> extremely difficult to get to (except by large governments...). You In> could put together a couple of Linux boxes with a RAID system, some In> backups and a large solar panel and have a very nice, secure DataHaven. I bet one of those "weather" satalites would blow that thing out of the air in no time flat... :) P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... "Very funny, Scotty. Now beam down my clothes." ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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New type-I middleman!
by John Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following message is a courtesy copy of an article that has been posted as well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Everyone! I just completed beta testing my Type-I (ghio-style) Middleman remailer and I'm ready for it to go online publically. Just like the Middleman type-II (mixmaster) remailer, the type-I Middleman randomly selects a remailer path to send messages based on Raph Levien's remailer list. Additionally, to foil traffic analysis, the Middleman type-I remailer also supports message reordering. This means that middleman(a)jpunix.com is now a fully functional type-I/type-II remailer that uses the middleman random remailer feature in additon to reordering. All of the available functionlity that you would find in either a Mixmaster remailer as well as a Cypherpunks remailer is available in the middleman(a)jpunix.com remailer. Below is the public PGP key for middleman(a)jpunix.com. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzIXHroAAAEEAPLBq/n4a5ldzm8F51Lk63iHyOJfm+lmxW8PgjbKdAPAJBHk xUHXEeOX/gQ8RXV0W6vYwmiFcQBA7b4w3iJwptC8GN98t4o31SVHlouQozjMwaVH eu5dDUg/CJ9P2Wnwc0AtP4s9cBxQho3FK7mjeqhMXKhB2oqliX+quM/iBuHlAAUR sAGHtD5NaWRkbGVNYW4gVHlwZS1JIFJlbWFpbGVyIGF0IEpQVW5peC5Db20gPG1p ZGRsZW1hbkBqcHVuaXguY29tPrABA4kAlQMFEDIXMfh/qrjP4gbh5QEBc2kD/1hw oHPcTasnlSVzMxD68hoCI1GYNNM4JSU+rHS+3PVy++992PcyuhqdH8PhuDozeYkz C8Q5y4tmddg30ED+/W2QJwYS0iySG3yH4jrvOstws+Kn5LpD1JQJT1qGLVWHpTxG n5MZO014NGT+wVkySRCornpuaqevTum8ygp+lyPIsAHH =/xR/ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMhdusVOTpEThrthvAQErOwQAqBZo5D7RaSAiymovj7Y/FU649scaYI+v JwP9Nm1T9ZQ1rX3mscN/a37PpohKKoLHf9gYvgkJm5kPdODd9HRNoSdBcp72xrxo JDnhYdAW6iw4c6xZOde7o54maIWuITiN8X1kQcZ591Ava7DaVSdjMypm9hGzq9tx PRqQEvVDb2I= =lN7a -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES STRONGHOLD VERSION 1.3
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Immediate Release - August 19, 1996 Contact: Sameer Parekh 510-986-8770 COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES STRONGHOLD VERSION 1.3 Oakland, CA - Community ConneXion, Inc., the leader in uncompromising security for the Internet, today announced the version 1.3 release of Stronghold, the commercial version of Apache-SSL. Stronghold is based on the popular Apache server, the most popular webserver on the Internet, according to the Netcraft server survey at http://www.netcraft.com/survey/. Stronghold 1.3 is a significant improvement from the Stronghold 1.2 product. The latest version is based on Apache 1.1.1, which supports features such as Keep-Alive, server information modules, a proxy server, an easier to use API, more flexibility in authentication, and greater configurability. "We're happy to have a final release version of 1.3 available," said Sameer Parekh, President of Community ConneXion. "Because of our close involvement with the Apache Group, we can quickly track new Apache releases. We expect to have an Apache 1.2-based server available soon after the Apache 1.2 release." Stronghold 1.3 is the result of an extensive Internet-wide beta test, which started soon after the full release of Apache 1.1.1. Apache 1.1.1 includes features such as the status module, which gives the server administrator the ability to monitor in real time the server's activity. An information module is also available which gives administrators easy access to a list of which modules have been installed on their server, as well as their configuration directives. The latest version includes modules which support database access, including mSQL and Postgres95. Apache 1.1.1 has much more flexible configuration with regards to virtual hosts and multiple IP addresses. This feature allows such innovations as the ability within Stronghold 1.3 to serve both SSL and nonSSL documents from the same server instance. The latest version of Stronghold supports "Session ID Caching," which allows for dramatic performance improvements. Session caching allows servers to process connections much faster because the processor intensive calculations happen less often. Limited performance tests have shown speed improvements of eight hundred percent. "With Session ID Caching, the SSL protocol is not noticably slower than not using the encryption protocol. There is no excuse not to encrypt everything," said Parekh. Community ConneXion is now shipping binaries for Sparc Solaris 2.5, x86 Solaris 2.5, Sparc SunOS 4.1.3_U1, FreeBSD 2.1, BSDI 1.1, AIX 3.2.5, IRIX 5.3, HP/UX, OSF/1, Ultrix, BSDI 2.0, and Linux (ELF & a.out). More platforms will be available soon, and even more may be supported on request. Stronghold may be ordered and downloaded at http://www.us.apache-ssl.com/. Existing commercial licensees may download the latest version free of charge. Portions developed by the Apache Group, taken with permission from the Apache Server http://www.apache.org/. This product includes software developed by Ben Laurie for use in the Apache-SSL HTTP server project. This product includes software developed by Eric Young (eay(a)mincom.oz.au)

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Whereis is the shell scsh?
by qut＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, I printed and skimmed through the Secure Shell FAQ. Is there a version for csh instead of sh? -- OBC

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Re: BlackNet as a Distributed, Untraceable, Robust Data Haven
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:40 PM 8/17/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > >>I have to speak up here and say that there is an actual working exemplar of >>a distributed, untraceable data haven. While it lacks a robust _payment_ >>mechanism, that is also untraceable, so does the "Visit Port Watson" >>example (which has never actually existed). > >agree with Jim Bell that blacknet by any stretch of the imagination >is not a "data haven". I've not yet commented on this thread! Sounds like you're confusing me with somebody else. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Private Idaho
by Blake Wehlage 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could anyone tell me the URL of the latest version of Private Idaho..... Thank You! ========================================== Blake Wehlage <jwilk(a)iglou.com> ±» RëVðLû¡ØÑ Bø+ ©ÖmP@ñ¥ «± Goto: http://members.iglou.com/jwilk

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Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike McNally wrote: >Bart Croughs wrote: >> ... better arguments (after reading the books I suggested) >Like what is it with you and these books? Is "Austrian" a code word >for "Divine omniscient extraterrestrial super-being"? No, but a number of posters claimed they were Austrians, and among them was Timothy May. So if I can show that Timothy's statements contradict the economic theories he says he supports on the most fundamental level (the level of methodology), then I have a pretty solid case that he is a bit confused and that he should do his homework better before he continues arguing. Unless of course he can show the Austrians (or me) to be wrong; but he hasn't done this yet. >Through all this sophist gibberish I've completely lost track of >what exactly it is you're trying to say. I don't blame you when you get the impression that Austrian methodology, compressed in a couple of sentences, is sophist gibberish. Without the proper background knowledge, this is probably unavoidable; methodology is a rather difficult subject. But if you are really interested and want to know more about it, you now know where to look... Bart Croughs

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Re: Imprisoned Capital
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James A. Donald wrote: >[In response the argument that attempts to imprison capital will cause >capital flight] >At 10:50 PM 8/16/96 +-200, Bart Croughs wrote: >> This is a good point when you talk about governments that will >> prevent *all* capital from flowing out. But a government could >> prevent the outflow of capital of it's own citizens, and still >> allow capital of foreigners to leave the country. As long as >> foreign capital isn't imprisoned, foreign capital could be >> attracted. >Been tried. Does not work. >1. If foreign capital is allowed to freely enter and leave, internal >players find ways to sneak their capital out. This forces the >government to start regulating and supervising foreign businessmen >in ways that at best terrify them (such controls look very much >like creeping confiscation), and at worst cause them huge harm >with no real benefits to anyone. I think you are probably right that *in practice* it will not work when the government tries to prevent domestic capital from flowing out and at the same time will allow capital of foreigners to freely flow in and out. After all, government doesn't work. But this doesn't prove the theoretical case that an outflow of capital wouldn't hurt the standard of living of workers in a country. As long as this isn't proven, governments have an excuse to try again and impose controls on capital (and this time of course, they will do it better...) Bart Croughs

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Re: Hackers invade DOJ web site
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:42 AM 8/18/96 -0500, you wrote: >>CNN online (http://www.cnn.com) is reporting a "breakin" by "hackers" >>to the DOJ web site. They don't elaborate exactly how thy did it. Well the DOJ site still is down, but here's some details I pulled out of a USENET newsgroup this morning (hopefully L.G. Shirley won't mind the forward). All in all, it sounds like a fairly childish stunt... From: "L. G. Shirley" <lgshirley(a)mail.worldnet.att.net> Newsgroups: rec.radio.scanner Subject: DOJ homepage hacked!!! Date: 17 Aug 1996 22:47:59 GMT Organization: AT&T WorldNet Services Lines: 49 Message-ID: <4v5i6v$hm8(a)mtinsc01-mgt.ops.worldnet.att.net> About 10PM last night I clicked on my bookmark for the Federal Gov't and then selected, by random, the Dept of Justice. http://justice2.usdoj.gov/ SURPRISE!!!!!!!!!! Someone had made a few changes, For one it is now called the Department of Injustice. You are immediately greeted by the Nazi swastika all over your screen's background. A flag w/the symbol is apparent. George Washington's picture is captioned with his words, "Move my grave to a free country! This rolling is making me an insomniac". Janet Reno's portrait has been replaced by Hitler's. And a flag now bears the Nazi symbol. She is now called Attorney General Furher. There is plenty of nudity and the many links will take you to places you may never have been before. I don't think we're in Kansas anymore Toto! I have no clues how it was done or when. My guess is someone changed all the links to the DOJ page to another one, the one you see when you click on the DOJ's homepage. I worked today and when I came home and tried to get back to the DOJ's page, no luck. Must be a major overload <grin> of people trying to get to the link of women clad in, well, next to nothing and tied with rope! I don't think the author will make any brownie points w/women. He hacked the homepage they have w/the DOJ on violence against women. I'm not condoning such action and violence is a very serious issue but whoever did the hack was also very serious. He changed a Clinton speech on affirmative action and insulted blacks with his choice of words. There is a lot of rambling about the internet and the Gov't taking away our rights on it. The author has a interesting slant on things. This should be enough of a warning if you're easily offended by racism, hate, foul language, porn on the net, and general crudeness. Don't go there. I would like to know just how this was done, any ideas? Is it that easy to hack someones homepage? I wonder how long it'll be before this homepage link is removed and can they find who did the evil deed? Two months on the Net and just when I think I'd seen it all, wow.

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CS First Boston lawsuit
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a lawsuit files in federal court in New York City, CS First Bostom has charged an unknown party with libel, slander and violation of the Federal Telecommunications Act, as well as with impoerly obtaining confidential financial information and sending it out in e-mail messages. The lawsuit seeks damages of at least $1M against "FBCbuster" and "FBCbuster2", the aliases of an America Online AOL) subscriber or subscribers. AOL was not named as a defendant in the lawsuit, which concerns two separate e-mail messages sent to First Boston employees. The suit sais the firsy e-mail message, which was sent on March 3, included a "macabre poem" about the destruction of the firm. In a second message, sent a week later, the lswsuit states that the writer included confidential salary information about current and former officers of the firm. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: US Taxes on X-Pats
by Stephen Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pardon me for jumping in...but a year ago I won a case in tax court brought aainst me by the IRA for not paying taxes on income earned while living overseas...apart from the verdict, the whole thing was a complete farce! My advice is to research the subject in detail before leaving the country and file IRS returns faithfully every year regardless of where you live even if you owe no tax (I owed no tax so filed no returns, penalty for not filing = % of tax owed, so no penalty for not filing, but only IF the IRS agrees you don't owe). Yes, there has been talk in the Clinton administration of dropping the overseas earning provision. You might want to email either Sen. Byron Dorgan or Sen. Kent Conrad of N.D. since both these guys were State Tax Commssioners before going to Washington and seem to be clued in on federal tax issues. The report I read in the Orlando Sentinel suggested that Clinton felt the exclusion was a money loser desined to help US corporations get employees to work overseas. However, it seems to me that it is also part of the complex web of international tax treaties designed to prevent double taxation. If you are a US citizen earning in a country that has an income tax they are likely going to expect you to pay tax, just as we tax foreign nationals living here. My impression is that many IRS staff lack in-depth knowledge of this very complex area (for example, I paid tax on my overseas income to the government of the country in which I was living when I earned it and that country has a tax treaty with the US...after about 6 very scary phone calls the agent assigned to the case agreed that I did not owe income tax...but then he tried to hit me up for thousands fo dollars in self-employed soc sec contribution -- when I told him that was also covered under a reciprocal treaty it was complete news to him...he asked me, and I wish I had taped the call, to send him the IRS document in which I had read this!) The result is often months of very stressful waiting, staring huge penalties in the face, while they learn up on the subject and say "I guess you're right, you don't owe that $60,000 in unpaid tax and penalties we asked the judge to award us." I still have a state tax lien triggered by this bogus action against me lying around on one of my credit reports. Respectfully...Stephen ps The recent US legislation denying soc sec benefits to legal aliens seems to be a breach of the referred to above. pps The relation to cypto is :-)?

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Re: Schlafly on crypto
by Stephen Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:44 PM 8/17/96 -0400, you wrote: >I don't think that Schlafy is a usefull aly any more than Bob Dole >basically its just opportunist politicians latching onto the rhetoric >of debates without engaging in the argument. Dole senses that the mood >of the country is pro crypto so he supports that, he senses that it >is anti porn so he will support that. > >Basically Schlafy is playing the same game. She is saying things that >she knows will curry favour so she can get people to join her Wacko >club. > Phil I tend to agree...anyone who thinks victory for Dole/Kemp in 96 means strong free unescrowed crypto in 97 needs to read a few history books. Stephen

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THE POUCH
by C Matthew Curtin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Allow me to quote from your web page: http://www.flagler.com/security.html Quote #1: "The POUCH is a secure e-mail terminal program for IBM compatible computers. It uses a secret key phrase, advanced cryptographic techniques and several unpublished algorithms to protect data in the body of e-mail messages. The key phrase, which can be up to 48 bytes long, is easily remembered and communicated. The POUCH is highly resistant to all known forms of cryptographic attack." Quote #2: "We warrant that the product when delivered to you has no short cuts, covert channels or secret solutions of any kind. No other warranty, either expressed or implied is given." These two statements are contradictory; an unpublished algorithm is itself a secret solution, and a covert channel. Why is it that software manufacturers keep popping up and spewing nonsense? Obscurity is not security. Making the algorithm proprietary does extremely little in making it resistant to attack. All of your statements regarding the security of "The Pouch" are worthless, for you have no data with which to substantiate your claims. If it is any good, there's no way for us to know. But your marketing of the product has every indication that it's nothing more than smoke and mirrors. To coin a phrase, "pseudocrypto." Please refrain from your bogus marketing techniques. This kind of stuff, by claiming to be "real cryptography" makes real cryptographers look bad. - -- C Matthew Curtin MEGASOFT, LLC Director, Security Architecture I speak only for myself. Don't whine to anyone but me about anything I say. Hacker Security Firewall Crypto PGP Privacy Unix Perl Java Internet Intranet cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com http://research.megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Have you encrypted your data today? iQCVAwUBMhdZaBhyYuO2QvP9AQHaxQP+OvqYc9U/3BTPwnEhL/9ADkzL+ulhILpj 1zbyhktoCB4yMB13WQgm05DM6lolUufo63nkhsX4giMhrQ2XCBeM5/8pxJOD2ThY 3+foxma7e3tUv8r6PjNlnhn2TzVPPgbN+6NdpUCbNtOpG8GsD4EdQ35S+H0Y+aJm 75FfHfaDrNQ= =6Zxy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Hackers invade DOJ web site
by Stephen Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:03 PM 8/17/96 -0500, you wrote: >CNN online (http://www.cnn.com) is reporting a "breakin" by "hackers" >to the DOJ web site. They don't elaborate exactly how thy did it. > >______c_________________________________________________________________ >Mike M Nally * Tiv^H^H^H IBM * Austin TX * For the time being, > m5(a)tivoli.com * m101(a)io.com * > <URL:http://www.io.com/~m101> * three heads and eight arms. > If anyone happens to know which vulnerability(s) this hack exploited I would be most grateful if they could let me know, either on the list or privately (stephen(a)iu.net) I am not asking for someone to publish the attack script or specifics of what was done to get in, but I would like to know what holes were used (e.g. cgi script error). Respectfully...Stephen

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Re: Private Idaho
by Shawn Dudar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:55 AM 8/18/96 EDT, Blake Wehlage wrote: >Could anyone tell me the URL of the latest version of Private Idaho..... > >Thank You! >========================================== > Blake Wehlage <jwilk(a)iglou.com> > ±» RëVðLû¡ØÑ Bø+ ©ÖmP@ñ¥ «± > Goto: http://members.iglou.com/jwilk > > http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ __________________ / PGP public key |___________________________ / available on | ~ Shawn Dudar ~ |___________________ ( keyserver | |Fingerprint: / \ KeyID: 0xC0AF244D | <sdudar(a)solutions.net> |90 AA D0 52 D3 A6/ \__________________| <sdudar(a)westeel.ca> |93 96 AD C2 CB ( (_____________________________|98 12 C0 FF 30 \ PGP. Use it! Protect yourself! (____________________\ For more info, point your browser to http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ "There are two major products to come out of Berkeley: LSD and UNIX. We don't believe this to be a coincidence." -- Author Unknown -- "Practice safe eating - always use condiments." -- Author Unknown -- "In a press conference held yesterday in Seattle, WA, Bill Gates formally announced that Microsoft Corporation has declared bankruptcy..." -- Dream headline --

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DEADBEEF Attack??
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I am looking for some detailed information on the "DEADBEEF" attack for key fingerprint spoofing. If anyone has any information or know where to find it please let me know. Thanks, -- ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting WebExplorer & Java Enhanced!!! Merlin Beta Test Site - WarpServer SMP Test Site Author of PGPMR2 - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice Look for MR/2 Tips & Rexx Scripts PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info -----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: forget photographing license plates!
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:46 PM 8/17/96 -0800, Adamsc wrote: >On 15 Aug 96 01:31:08 -0800, null(a)void.com wrote: > >>"In the 22 Jul 1996 issue of Fortune was an interesting look into the future >>of automobile electronics, "Soon Your Dashboard Will Do Everything (Except >>Steer)". " >>From the control center, they can "electronically reach into the car" to >>unlock the doors, or honk the horn and flash its lights." > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >How long do you think it would be before thieves subverted this feature? It already happens now. There is a device for determining the code sequence and frequency of electronic locks that was designed for locksmiths and repair personel. Thieves have been using it for breaking into vehicles. The scam usually happens in large mall parking lots. They just sit in their car and wait for you to open yours, watching for the lock information displayed. Once you are gone, they unlock it and swipe all of your freshly purchaced goodies. Theives have also been known to use replacement garage door openers to open up the homes of those too ignorant to change the default codes of their garage door systems. Something to be said for low tech in this case... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:59 PM 8/18/96 +-200, Bart Croughs wrote: > No, but a number of posters claimed they were Austrians, > and among them was Timothy May. So if I can show that > Timothy's statements contradict the economic theories > he says he supports on the most fundamental level > (the level of methodology), Obviously the Austrians, like anyone with half a brain, said that more capital means more wealth for everyone, and more capital relative to workers means a bigger share for the workers. It does not follow however, that the Austrians said that if the government directs the flow of other peoples capital like a farmer watering his fields, the fields so watered will benefit. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Why BlackNet *IS* a Data Haven
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim McCoy and Larry Dettweiler have, in their own ways, raised objections to my characterization of BlackNet (and that class of mechanisms) as a distributed, untraceable, robust "data haven." Without splitting too many semantic hairs about the precise definition of "data haven," let me examine some ways in which BlackNet behaves identically to a conventional data haven. Imagine a piece of data has been outlawed in some jurisdiction. For simplicity, imagine this to be a book, a text. Let's give it a name, "The Necronomicon." This "Necronomicon" is contraband, illegal, forbidden, banned, on The Index in many countries, including the Vatican and the United States. (This is just an example. Replace "Necronomicon" with "child porn" for a more realistic, if distasteful to many, example.) The classical, Sterling-style "data haven" would have it that this piece of data, this book, is stored and is available (perhaps for a price) in a physical site. Maybe Anguilla (thought this is appearing less and less likely), maybe "The Raft," maybe an orbiting DeathStar, maybe a weather balloon drifting in the jet stream... The classical data haven is closely identified with "place." To many people, they naturally assume "data haven" = a haven for data, a "harbor" (same IE root as haven) = a physical place. But is "place" important? Consider someone in the United States who wants a copy of the Necronomicon. He can't get it locally, as it is banned. He can try dialing-in or connecting to a country where it is not banned, but this introduces risks (as with those who download child porn, arrrange to have it shipped to them, etc.). (And the physical jurisdictions which carrry the Necronomicon, or child porn, or Church of Scientology secrets, etc., will likely be under pressure to limit or deny access.) Cryptography offers another way, as it does in so many other areas. A person in the U.S. seeking the Necronomicon posts a message to BlackNet (or any similar forum, using the same methods) asking for a copy of it, or offering to pay for it. (Whether the information is free or for a fee is not central to the idea.) This request is, of course, untraceable. Anyone, anywhere in the world, with a copy of this banned material on his or her private machines may see this request and respond, either giving the material away, or negotiating a fee. (As I said before, the absence of a robust digital cash system, bidirectionally untraceable, is a known limitation of all such systems.) Thus, it is as if there is a "virtual data haven" (tm), or a "virtual library," for banned/controversial/etc. materials. Anyone may "check out" materials by submitting requests (and perhaps paying a fee). The source of the materials is, of course, unknown. The receiver of the materials if, of course, unknown. I call this at least as functional as a "physical data haven," where someone might physically travel to Anguilla, say, to buy a copy of the Necronomicon... ...and a whole lot more convenient. This is, then, my vision of a "distributed, robust, untraceable data haven." It's a data haven. And it exists, or at least there are exemplars of it. It's lacking robust digital money, to keep the transactions untraceable, but it's here. The Church of Scientology documents essentially exist at this virtual data haven site. Think about it. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Anonymous info
by admin＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You have requested information about your account at anon.penet.fi. Your code name is: <an611909(a)anon.penet.fi> Your real e-mail address is: <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> Your nickname is: <> Your password is: <> Regards, admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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MSIE 128 bit version
by Andy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I know this topic has been covered before, but could somebody point me to MSIE's 128 bit version? Thanks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMhfJNtZDmDuLFgC9AQEdgwP+MjfLcs+KiZkMg/MIR0Hp+Gz6ksgjRSvL D2NS3k3zzPNqj316Kod0/i8p+rNoWcWJ08aQRsykni1mPSkhPSxCVgEbSRv/eb+g 3ePKekPhZEaXWQDskcQ1yw4rC7meqQqKF2R1nwrohzQvX369hGsrg1xxP0jlvBuF nrrUeP3Sg4E= =d3S9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Final release of Navigator (with strong crypto) now available
by qut＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > > Jeff Weinstein (jsw(a)netscape.com) wrote: > > > > > > > > : The final release of Navigator 3.0, complete with non-exportable > > > > : strong crypto, is now available for download by US citizens. Note > > > > : that this is the released version of 3.0, so it will not expire. > > > > : You can get it from: > > > > > > > > Would it be possible to both supply an Linux ELF and a.out binary ? > > > > > > No, we will only be supplying ELF. Since linux is not officially > > > supported, we really don't have the resources to do multiple versions. > > > > ELF is cool. What about BSD? I've seen how you support BSDI so the > > binary should work with FreeBSD or NetBSD.? > > I'm not quite sure what the question is here. Your old version supported BSDI. Will the new 128bit version support BSDI in ELF or a.out? > Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist > Netscape Communication Corporation > jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw -- Love, Qut(a)netcom.com

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No Subject
by Alan Horowitz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 17 Aug 1996, Faun A. Skyles wrote: > Are the typical "mom & pop" mail forwarding companies going to understand > snail-mail gateways? Some of them refuse to use a computer! Oh my God. A business that didn't computerize itself. Don't they know, that modern situational ethics require a business to place itself at the mercy of a computer, whether or not the old, manual systems were working JUST FINE. And then they have to upgrade their hardare every two years, so that they can balance their checkbook in 256 colors. And then they have to upgrade to the latest version of WordPerfect every two years, whether or not the old typewriter and manila file folders were working JUST FINE. Oh how superior we young squirts are to those antiquarians. Hey, let's sit around and make fun of them and criticize them. > For example, > many charge $2 - $3 to transcribe a telephone message for you, then they > snail mail it to your next location. Oh my God. Charging the customer for each service rendered, so that those who place demands on the time of the business - pay for it. Oh my God, someone using the Postal System, which is still head-and-shoulder above the Internet in universal accessibility on the road, entry costs and security. Hey let's sit around and criticise that. After all, we don't want to admit that not every message in the world needs to be delivered to the recipient in ten minutes or less. > It's pretty low-tech. I'd like to offer a high-tech alternative. And who's stopping you? I've got ten dollars that says that you don't have the balls/intestinal fortitude to do it, and keep it going for - oh, let's say the five years that the IRS uses to judge a business's profitability? > My grandparents are still using old forms of communications too! Well that's the final straw. What a useless and meaningless life they have. We couldn't admit or accept that they've got a completely happy life, could we.

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terrorists to hit Dem convention?
by an224850＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following is brought to you thanks, in part, to the kind assistance of CyberNews and the fine folks at Cornell University. Conspiracy Nation -- Vol. 8 Num. 85 ====================================== ("Quid coniuratio est?") - ----------------------------------------------------------------- RUMOR MILL NEWS SERVICE #4 ========================== The Rumor Mill News Service is edited by "RU". The following, from what I can tell, appears to be RUMOR ONLY. What is more, I have NO IDEA who the author is; I received the following anonymously, with the promise of "more to come". + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + HIT THE ROAD JACK! ================== Clinton Told to Step Aside Before Democratic Convention ---------------------------- The President Retaliates: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13010 Creates Terrorist Gestapo ---------------------------- CHICAGO BRACING FOR TERRORISTS! ------------------------------- Police State Reactivated In Chicago Is The Nation Far Behind? ----------------------------------- Will Clinton Use EO# 13010 To Declare Martial Law? -------------------------------------------------- Later this month, the Democratic Convention returns to Chicago. When it was there in 1968, the country was ablaze in anti-Viet Nam War fever. Anti-war demonstrators all but brought the convention and Chicago to their knees. In today's world, demonstrators are labeled terrorists. Armed with today's stronger "label," the Chicago police are gearing up for a repeat performance of the Chicago 7 and "Brutalmania." Terrorists have officially replaced demonstrators, according to the terrorist bill recently passed by Congress. As an accompaniment to the terrorist bill, "Terrorist Bill" signed Presidential Executive Order 13010, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Order. This Presidential Order creates a special Task Force called the Infrastructure Protection Task Force, IPTF. The sweeping array of power and information that will be provided to the IPTF makes FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Association] look like the Mouseketeers. -+- Effective Date August 17 -+- The Presidential Order goes into effect August 17, just shortly after the Republican Convention. Speculation exists that the Terrorist Gestapo will be trotted out just in time to prevent riots and terrorism in Chicago at the Democratic Convention. As a result of the expected terrorist threat, the Chicago police superintendent has seen fit to restore all the old police powers, powers that some citizens of Chicago say bordered on a police state. -+- The Red Squad Joins The Terrorist Gestapo -+- The infamous Chicago Police intelligence unit, the Red Squad, has been reactivated and given an all-encompassing directive of keeping the city free from terrorist activity. The Red Squad bears a striking resemblance, on a local level, to the Terrorist Gestapo created by Presidential Executive Order #13010, which goes into effect on August 17. The Democratic Convention begins August 26. Thanks to the new terrorist bill and the Presidential Executive Order on protecting the critical infrastructure, the new handy-dandy terrorist label can easily fit almost anyone in any situation. Back in 1968, the police were slightly encumbered by the Constitution and "probable cause." Under today's terrorist bill, which was passed in the nick of time to ensure terrorist cooperation at the convention, the Chicago police no longer have to be hamstrung by the "outdated," "antiquated" Constitution. "The IPTF's function is to identify and coordinate existing expertise, inside and outside of the Federal Government." In Chicago, the "existing expertise" is the Red Squad. Under Executive Order 13010 the IPTF, otherwise known as the Terrorist Gestapo, is ordered to "provide, or facilitate and coordinate the provision of, expert guidance to critical infrastructures *to* *detect*, *prevent*, *halt*, *or* *confine* *an* *attack*..." Chicago is getting ready to declare martial law to protect the President and other members of the Democratic party while they are at the convention. They will coordinate all activities with the Terrorist Gestapo. The IPTF has been given the go-ahead to detect, prevent, halt or confine an attack. All executive departments and agencies have been ordered to cooperate with the IPTF and provide requested assistance. Furthermore, all executive departments and agencies have been ordered to share information when "requested" by IPTF. In other words, the Terrorist Gestapo has been given an all-encompassing power by Executive Order 13010. Anyone or any agency or department that refuses a "request" made by the IPTF can be labeled a traitor or a terrorist and prosecuted accordingly. This Terrorist Gestapo force will parlay its power into a national police force. The tap dance they plan on doing in Chicago with the old Chicago Red Squad will be a trial run to see how much they can get away with in order to call up the next round of Presidential Executive Orders and Directives. -+- Even the Sewer Covers Are Welded Shut -+- To prevent terrorist moles from infiltrating any part of the convention, the police have even welded shut all the storm sewers around the United Center in Chicago, the forum for the Democratic Convention. -+- Step Down or Step Aside -+- Does all the rapid activity in the Office of Presidential Executive Orders have anything to do with the secret White House meeting which took place Saturday, August 3, 1996? The meeting took place barely a day and a half after President Clinton raged at a Rose Garden news conference. He had been asked if he had gone back on his word to pay the legal bills for fired and then prosecuted White House Travel Office employee, Billy Dale. He bristled in anger and rage and began berating the CBS correspondent who asked the question. As his temper and voice rose, Chief of Staff Leon Panetta was seen frantically waving to press aides to end the news conference. As the President's staff tried to herd him back into the safety of the Oval Office, the President was heard screaming at the media. Could the reason for this uncharacteristic outburst of temper and rage have been that the President knew that 10 of the top leaders of the Democratic party were planning on ordering him to step down or step aside, and do it two days before the Democratic Convention begins in Chicago? RMNews sources from the Chicago and Washington stations have reported that the secret meeting was chaired by former DNC Chairman and Ambassador to Russia, Robert Strauss. Mr. Strauss, who vehemently denies being at the meeting, is considered the ranking elder statesman of the Democratic party. Strauss and his gang of 10 high-ranking Democratic leaders allegedly told Clinton that the gathering storm of indictments and revelations against Hillary would destroy the Democratic Party. The President was shown a photograph of the upcoming federal criminal indictment which accuses her of perjury and obstruction of justice. The President shouted in rage that they were all "traitors." Knowing that Executive Order 13010 had just created the Terrorist Gestapo, the President's angry use of the word traitor carried sinister and potentially deadly overtones to the 10 brave men who are risking their careers and lives to save the Democratic Party. Countering Clinton's raging outburst with one of his own, Ambassador Strauss reportedly smashed an ashtray on a desk near the President and shouted, "You use cocaine and liquor. You are unfit to deal with worldwide emergencies." The President screamed back at Strauss with a string of obscenities and curses. Strauss fired back that the President is acting deranged and as such could be removed by the 25th Amendment to the Constitution. Strauss allegedly ordered the President to resign his office or to declare before the Democratic Convention that he does not wish to be nominated for a second term. The President has never officially declared that he is a candidate for the Presidency. Of course, since, as already noted, Strauss denies having been present in person at the August 3rd meeting, he presumably would also deny having smashed down an ashtray, having engaged in a shouting match with President Clinton, etc. Prior to the secret meeting, the "Gang of 10," with the aid of others, have secretly arranged for damaging stories on the president and his wife to leak out. One story was already leaked by the Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch. The CIA Director ordered the Inspector General to investigate claims that U.S. Intelligence Agencies were involved in illegal arms shipments and drug smuggling at an isolated airstrip in Mena, Arkansas during the years that Bill Clinton was Governor. Susan Schmidt of the Washington Post broke the story on August 7, four days after the secret White House ultimatum. [CN: Late breaking: Deutch now says he wants to resign as DCIA and return to the Pentagon. Did trying to lift the lid on Mena expose him to too much hostility within CIA? Or perhaps, as suggested by Linda Thompson, it is "cross pollination" between CIA and the military.] Clinton later sent word to the Gang of 10 that he did not accede to their demands. He was then told that a floor fight would take place at the Democratic Convention by prominent delegates. These delegates would charge him and the first lady with participating in a string of crimes and accuse them of damaging or destroying the Democratic Party. -+- The Secret Trials Begin -+- With the all-encompassing powers given to the Terrorist Gestapo by Presidential Order 13010, "Terrorist Bill" has the power to "confine an attack." The attack upon the Office of the President is coming from loyal Democrats. Using the power of the Executive Order that he just signed, the President now has the power to label any loyal Democrat a traitor and a terrorist and "confine" him in order to "halt" his upcoming activities against the President. The words within the quotation marks are the exact words taken from Executive Order 13010. RMNews has reported that Chicago is run by the Rothschild family. In that issue, Bill Clinton's illegitimate Rockefeller roots were detailed. The deadly feud between the Rockefellers and the Rothschilds was also described. Bill Clinton, the politician, was created by his maternal grandfather, Winthrop Rockefeller, a former governor of Arkansas. He was promoted and supported by the Rockefellers. But even the Rockefellers have seen the writing on the wall. Bill Clinton is a disaster for America. Four more years of Clinton and his wife could destroy the Rockefeller base in America. It could bring down the illegal Federal Reserve, abolish the IRS and create full-scale warfare in the streets of America. While limited riots and wars are always good for business, the type of war that a continued Clinton presidency could bring will totally devastate and destroy the Rockefeller family, as well as all other wealthy Americans. In other words, America would be leveled and possibly conquered by an outside power. If this outside power is backed by the blood enemy of the Rockefellers, the Rothschilds, there is little doubt that any of the vast Rockefeller fortune would be spared. More than likely it would all be nationalized for the benefit of the state. Sensing the danger to themselves by their illegitimate creation, the Rockefellers have seen fit to demand that Bill Clinton remove himself from the office. If he chooses to fight them, he will have the support of their enemies, the Rothschilds. Could that be the real reason that the Democratic convention is being held in Chicago this year? Is the Chicago Red Squad owned outright by the Rothschilds? Will the Gang of 10 find themselves "confined," i.e., detained for questioning for the duration of the Democratic Convention? RMNews Agency. Serving Liberty and Freedom Worldwide. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + For reprints of other RMNews editions, send a self-addressed, stamped envelope with 3 or more FRN's (Federal Reserve notes) to cover the cost of copying to: RMNews Agency PO Box 1784 Aptos, CA 95001-1784 Books and Tapes list also available. - ----------------------------------------------------------------- Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of Conspiracy Nation, nor of its Editor in Chief. - ----------------------------------------------------------------- I encourage distribution of "Conspiracy Nation." - ----------------------------------------------------------------- If you would like "Conspiracy Nation" sent to your e-mail address, send a message in the form "subscribe cn-l My Name" to listproc(a)cornell.edu (Note: that is "CN-L" *not* "CN-1") - ----------------------------------------------------------------- For information on how to receive the improved Conspiracy Nation Newsletter, send an e-mail message to bigred(a)shout.net - ----------------------------------------------------------------- Want to know more about Whitewater, Oklahoma City bombing, etc? (1) telnet prairienet.org (2) logon as "visitor" (3) go citcom - ----------------------------------------------------------------- See also: http://www.europa.com/~johnlf/cn.html - ----------------------------------------------------------------- See also: ftp.shout.net pub/users/bigred - ----------------------------------------------------------------- Aperi os tuum muto, et causis omnium filiorum qui pertranseunt. Aperi os tuum, decerne quod justum est, et judica inopem et pauperem. -- Liber Proverbiorum XXXI: 8-9 - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)alterzone.com - -> Posted by: Brian Redman <bigred(a)duracef.shout.net> --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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