December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

New Clinton (anti-) Encryption Policy nnn
by forsvunnet＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought you all might be interested in these documents. They were put out as press releases internationaly on 7/25. It occurs to me that the list of companies collaborating with the Department of Commerce on key escrow must be publically available. If someone could get a copy it would allow us all to contact those companies with our views and (more importantly) begin a campaign against companies supporting the escrow project on the net. Here are the press releases: CLINTON ADMINISTRATION FACT SHEET: U.S. CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY (Industry, international cooperation urged) WASHINGTON -- Because advanced encryption technology is posing problems for law-enforcement officials to investigate crimes and terrorism, the Clinton administration is pressing for a global system for unlocking encrypted messages when necessary. A July 12 fact sheet from the U.S. Department of Commerce elaborates the administration approach, called key recovery encryption. While the United States sets no limit on the level of encryption technology that can be used domestically, it does restrict exports of it. The administration says it might relax those export controls if U.S. industry cooperates on building a key recovery infrastructure. Following is the text of the fact sheet: (begin text) U.S. Cryptography Policy: Why We Are Taking the Current Approach We live in an age of electronic information. Information technology is transforming society, creating new businesses, new jobs and new careers. The technology also creates new opportunities for crime and new problems in investigating and prosecuting crime. As a result, electronic information, be it corporate trade secrets, pre-release government crop statistics, or a patient's medical records, must have strong protection from uninvited modifications or disclosure. Cryptography enables that protection. The United States is the world leader in information technology. U.S. firms continue to dominate the U.S. and global information systems market. Retaining this leadership is important to our economic security. The Clinton administration, through its National Information Infrastructure initiative, has long recognized that government has an important role as a facilitator and catalyst for the industry-led transformation of the way we use computer and communications technology to work and live. In particular, government has a strong interest in promoting the legitimate use of robust encryption to support U.S. international competitiveness, foster global electronic commerce, prevent computer crime, and ensure that the information superhighway is a safe place to conduct one's business. At the same time, there is a growing recognition, affirmed most recently by the National Academy of Sciences, that the use of encryption to conceal illegitimate activities "poses a problem for society as a whole, not just for law enforcement and national security." In brief, criminals can use encryption to frustrate legal wiretaps and render useless search warrants for stored electronic data. We know of no technical solution to the problems that would result from the global proliferation of strong cryptography. The implications of this are no small matter. Encrypted computer files have hampered the prosecution of child pornographers. Militia groups advise their members to use encryption to hide illicit weapons, financial, and other criminal activities. Aldrich Ames was instructed by his Soviet handlers to encrypt computer files that he passed to the Soviets. And international terrorists and drug dealers increasingly use encryption to prevent law enforcement officials from reading their voice and data transmissions. Grave crimes, such as a plot to shoot down several airliners over Chicago, have been foiled by the use of wiretaps. Had the FBI been unable to read those transmissions, however, a major tragedy might have ensued. Cracking Coded Messages We should not underestimate how difficult it is to decode encrypted electronic information. One approach advanced in the popular debate is to provide our law enforcement officials with more computing power. At first glance, this suggestion seems promising because in theory any encrypted message can be decoded if enough computing cycles are applied. This approach fails for five reasons: First, it relies on mathematical theory, not operational reality. Digital technology reduces voice, faxes, images, and text in any language to indistinguishable 1s and 0s. A great variety of encryption products are also available. Under ideal conditions -- if the type of communication or file, language, and encryption algorithm are known with certainty, and a short key is used to encrypt the information -- a large, specially designed computer could decode a single message relatively quickly. But state, local, and federal law enforcement officials do not operate in the clean confines of a high-tech computer center. They must first capture the 1s and 0s and discern what kind of encryption they have encountered. Second, after the decoding problem is isolated, acquiring a machine to decode a message is neither quick, easy or inexpensive. Commercially available computers could not be used because they will not have sufficient capacity. It would, for example, take years for the computers used to process all Social Security claims, payments and earnings years to decode one message using the Data Encryption Standard (DES), a widely used system originally developed by the U.S. government that uses a 56-bit key. Third, this approach betrays a misunderstanding of how crimes are prevented. Used only in the most critical cases, legally authorized wiretaps provide crucial information just before a crime is to occur. Thus a near real-time ability to decode messages is needed. Days or weeks are too long to wait to find out that a terrorist attack is about to happen. Fourth, this approach fails to acknowledge the volume of messages that could need decoding. Each wiretap results in the collection of thousands of messages relevant to the investigative purpose of the wiretap. Even under the most ideal conditions, had these messages been encrypted, the computing resources required to decrypt them quickly would simply not be available. And this example does not include the additional burden of decrypting, if possible, any digital information such as computer disks that are seized as evidence after a crime has been committed. Finally, revealing the precise capabilities of law enforcement agencies to decode messages, as would be necessary in order to present the fruits of that work as evidence in court, could provide a tutorial to criminal elements bent on eluding law enforcement. No restrictions apply to the U.S. domestic use of cryptography, and the administration has no plan to seek restrictions. Cryptography has long been controlled for export for national security reasons, so as to keep it from getting into the hands of foreign governments. But it has today become a dual-use technology, and international businesses want to use the same security products both domestically and abroad. The administration is thus under strong pressure to provide relief from cryptography export controls. For our cryptography polIcy to succeed, it must be aligned with commercial market forces and operate on an international basis. Further, it should preserve and extend the strong position that U.S. industry enjoys in the global information systems marketplace. Accordingly, the U.S. government is working with U.S. industry and our international trading partners on an approach that will protect information used in legitimate activities, assure the continued safety of Americans from enemies both foreign and domestic, and preserve the ability of the U.S. information systems industry to compete worldwide. Key Management and Recovery A consensus is emerging around the vision of a global cryptography system that permits the use of any encryption method the user chooses, with a stored key to unlock it when necessary. The encryption key would be provided voluntarily by a computer user to a trusted party who holds it for safe keeping. This is what many people do with their house keys -- give them to a trusted neighbor who can produce them when something unexpected goes wrong. Businesses should find this attractive because they do not want to lock up information and throw away the key or give an employee -- not the company -- control over company information. An individual might also use this service to ensure that she can retrieve information stored years ago. This will require a new infrastructure, consisting of trusted parties who have defined responsibilities to key owners. Under law, these trusted emergency key recovery organizations would also respond in a timely manner to authorized reques! ! ts from law enforcement officials who required the key to decode information lawfully obtained or seized from a subject of investigation or prosecution. The federal government will use key recovery encryption on its own computers because it makes good management sense. It would be irresponsible for agencies to store critical records without key recovery, risking the loss of the information for programmatic use and the inability to investigate and prosecute fraud or misuse of the information. A number of U.S. and international companies are working with the U.S. and other governments to create a system of trusted parties who are certified to safeguard the keys. In some cases, organizations might guard their own keys. In other cases, persons will use the key recovery services provided by third parties, one of a suite of services that will include electronic directories and electronic "notaries" in support of online commerce. Persons will be free to choose the type and strength of encryption that provide the degree of security they believe appropriate for their use. Taken together, an overall key management infrastructure is needed to make electronic commerce practical on a global scale. Some commercial products and services which provide emergency key recovery are already available. Testing and refinement is needed before a widespread, robust infrastructure is put in place. The U.S. government is committed to supporting the development of such a key management infrastructure through pilots and experimental trials. The State Department is expediting the review of several export license applications that test commercial key recovery on an international scale. An interagency working group is identifying several potential governmental uses of commercial cryptography -- both internal transactions and in communications with the public -- where key recovery can be tested. A plan outlining these government tests will be available in August. The government will be purchasing key recovery products for its own use and will adopt a federal standard for evaluating such products to assure agency purchasers that the key recovery features operate properly. T! ! he Department of Commerce will be establishing an industry-led advisory committee to make recommendations regarding such a standard this summer. While we are open to other alternatives, a key recovery system is the only approach we know of that accommodates all public safety interests. And even it is imperfect. Some people will not join voluntary systems, preferring to run the risk of losing their keys and being unable to recover their encrypted information. Although in some countries (e.g., France) mandatory key escrowing is already in effect, we are pursuing a market-driven approach in part because we hope and believe that key recovery will develop as a cost-effective service in an electronic commerce infrastructure. We are encouraged in this effort by recent discussions we have had at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that are leading to international cryptography management principles which support key recovery. Export Controls No matter how successful we are in realizing this vision, American users of computer technology are demanding stronger encryption for international use now. Although we do not control the use of encryption within the U.S., we do, with some exceptions, limit the export of non-escrowed mass market encryption to products using a key length of 40 bits. (The length of the encryption key is one way of measuring the strength of an encryption product. Systems using longer keys are harder to decrypt.) U.S. industry asserts that it is losing overseas sales to its European and Japanese competitors because it cannot include stronger cryptography as a component of its commercial software and hardware products. It warns that loss of a significant share of the world information systems market would cause serious economic damage to the U.S. economy and could reduce the U.S. government's ability to influence the long-term future of global cryptography. It also argues that, beca! ! use customers do not want to use one product in the U.S. and a different one overseas, export controls are causing U.S. firms to provide an unsatisfactory level of protection to their electronic information, making them vulnerable to industrial espionage by their competitors and foreign governments. While 40 bit encryption products are still strong enough for many uses, the administration recognizes that some export liberalization may be useful to build support for a key management regime. Accordingly, we are actively considering measures that would provide limited, temporary relief from cryptographic export controls in exchange for real, measurable commitments from industry (e.g., investments in products that support key recovery) toward the building of a key management infrastructure. The liberalization proposals under discussion, which would continue the current one-time review of products by the National Security Agency, include: permitting products using longer key lengths to be exported to specific industry sectors such as health care or insurance (similar to current policy for the financial sector); allowing export of non-escrowed products to a list of trustworthy firms beyond those sectors, with provisions for monitoring compliance to prevent product d! ! iversion to other firms; export of cryptography-ready operating systems; and, most dramatically, the transfer of jurisdiction over commercial encryption products from the State Department's munitions list to the Commerce Department's list of dual-use technologies. Our goal is to obtain commitments from industry by the fall. We must, however, be careful in any relaxation of controls. Other governments' law enforcement and national security needs to access material encrypted with U.S. products could drive them to erect trade barriers by imposing import controls on strong non-escrow encryption products. In addition, we do not want to do anything that would damage our own national security or public safety by spreading unbreakable encryption, especially given the international nature of terrorism. Even 40 bit encryption, if widespread and not escrowed, defeats law enforcement. It is for these reasons that we oppose the legislation (S. 1726) introduced in this Congress by Senator Burns and co-sponsored by Senator Lott and former Senator Dole. Although it contains some provisions, such as the transfer of export control jurisdiction for commercial cryptography to the Commerce Department, with which we could agree if constructed with appropriate safeguards, the bill is unbalanced and makes no effort to take into account the serious consequences of the proliferation it would permit. The importance of the U.S. information technology industry, the security stakes, and increasing congressional interest make it clear that there is an urgent need for clear policy and direction. The administration's proposed approach is broadly consistent with industry suggestions and the conclusions reached by the National Academy of Sciences in its report. That report recognizes the need to address a complex mix of commercial and security issues in a balanced manner. We agree with that need. We also agree with the report's recommendation that export controls on encryption products need to be relaxed but not eliminated, and are actively considering ways of providing short-term relief. (We do not agree with the report's recommendation that we eliminate most controls on 56-bit key length products.) Finally, we agree that key escrow is a promising but not fully tested solution, and are promoting the kinds of testing the report recommends as a way of demonstrating! ! the solution's viability while providing stronger encryption internationally. We will continue discussions with industry, other members of the private sector, the Congress, and governments at all levels to arrive at a solution that promotes a future of safe computing in a safe society. (end text) TEXT: ADMINISTRATION STATEMENT ON COMMERCIAL ENCRYPTION (International agreement sought for security, safety) WASHINGTON -- The Clinton administration has proposed a framework for an international agreement that would give law-enforcement officials around the world some access to encrypted information in telephone transmissions, electronic mail and Internet communications. A July 12 press release from the U.S. Department of Commerce gives the essence of the proposal, which would entail use of private-sector third parties who would hold spare keys to encryption tools and would surrender them to law-enforcement officials having proper uthority. While developing this proposal, the administration would consider relaxing U.S. export controls on encryption technology. Following is the text of the administration statement: (begin text) Administration Statement on Commercial Encryption Policy The Clinton administration is proposing a framework that will encourage the use of strong encryption in commerce and private communications while protecting the public safety and national security. It would be developed by industry and will be available for both domestic and international use. The framework will permit U.S. industry to take advantage of advances in technology pioneered in this country and to compete effectively in the rapidly changing international marketplace of communications, computer networks, and software. Retaining U.S. industry's leadership in the global information technology market is of longstanding importance to the Clinton administration. The framework will ensure that everyone who communicates or stores information electronically can protect his or her privacy from prying eyes and ears as well as against theft of, or tampering with, their data. The framework is voluntary; any American will remain free to use any encryption system domestically. The framework is based on a global key management infrastructure that supports digital signatures and confidentiality. Trusted private-sector parties will verify digital signatures and also will hold spare keys to confidential data. Those keys could be ortained only by persons or entities that have lost the key to their own encrypted data, or by law enforcement officials acting under proper authority. It represents a flexible approach to expanding the use of strong encryption in the private sector. This framework will encourage commerce both here and abroad. It is similar to the approach other countries are taking and will permit nations to establish an internationally inter-operable key management infrastructure with rules for access appropriate to each country's needs and consistent with law enforcement agreements. Administration officials are currently working with other nations to develop the framework for that infrastructure. In the expectation of industry action to develop this framework internationally and recognizing that this development will take time, the administration intends to take action in the near term to facilitate the transition to the key management infrastructure. The measures the administration is considering include: 1. Liberalizing export controls for certain commercial encryption products. 2. Developing, in cooperation with industry, performance standards for key recovery systems and products that will be eligible for general export licenses and technical standards for products the government will purchase. 3. Launching several key recovery pilot projects in cooperation with industry and involving international participation. 4. Transferring export control jurisdiction over encryption products for commercial use from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce. Administration officials continue to discuss the details of these actions with experts from the communications equipment, computer hardware and software industries, civil liberties groups and other members of the public to ensure that the final proposal balances industry actions towards the proposed framework, short-term liberalization initiatives, and public safety concerns. The administration does not support the bills pending in Congress that would decontrol the export of commercial encryption products because of their serious negative impact on national security and law enforcement. Immediate export decontrol by the U.S. could also adversely affect the security interests of our trading partners and lead them to control imports of U.S. commercial encryption products. A Cabinet committee continues to address the details of this proposal. The committee intends to send detailed recommendations to the president by early September, including any recommendations for legislation and executive orders. The committee comprises the secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce and Treasury; the attorney general; the directors of Central Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and senior representatives from the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Economic Council. (end text) SENATORS, ADMINISTRATION CLASH OVER ENCRYPTION CONTROLS (Bill would allow more exports) By Bruce Odessey USIA Staff Writer WASHINGTON -- Clinton administration officials and members of a Senate committee have clashed over policy on export controls for advanced encryption technology. At issue at a July 25 Senate Commerce Committee hearing was a bill that would relax those controls by allowing U.S. exports of any encryption technology that was already generally available for sale in foreign markets. Encryption is the use of a string of letters or numbers -- known as a "key" -- that renders computer files and digital transmissions unreadable to those without access to the code. The complexity of the key is measured in bits. Present regulations prohibit U.S. exports of encryption products using a key length of more than 40 bits. "It is widely agreed that 40-bit security equals no security. It is simply too easy to break," said Senator Larry Pressler, committee chairman. "However, U.S. companies are not allowed to provide products at this level abroad .... This is a boon for our foreign competitors. They are actively developing markets we are forced to abandon." Senators of both parties expressed dissatisfaction with an administration policy announced July 12. The policy would allow some relaxation of the export controls but only if U.S. industry lent support to an administration proposal for a global cryptography system -- called an internationally inter-operable key management infrastructure, or a key escrow system. A number of governments in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are already working to create such a system. Under it, non-government parties would hold encryption keys in escrow; law-enforcement officials with court authority would have access to the keys to unscramble data transmissions, telephone conversations and electronic mail in criminal or terrorism investigations. Supporters of the bill and administration officials opposed to it differed not only about interpreting the facts but also about the facts themselves. For example, one issue concerns whether attempts to control encryption technology are already too late because advanced products -- including 56-bit products available for downloading for free from sites on the Internet -- are already widely available. "Some observers say the encryption genie is out of the bottle and that attempts to influence the future use of encryption are futile," said Louis Freeh, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). "This is not true, in my view." He argued that a little time remains to protect public safety because few people use encryption technology yet. "Some strong encryption products can be found overseas, but they have not yet become embedded in mainstream operating systems, which I think is a critical distinction," Freeh said. "There is still a window of opportunity for us to act here. Administration officials guessed that countries might have two years yet to reach international agreement before the infrastructure builds up to make robust encryption products widely useful. An agreement could help create an infrastructure open to scrutiny by law-enforcement officials around the world through key management. Then, even if wealthy criminal or terrorist organizations used advanced non-key escrow technology to block interception of communications among their own members, law-enforcement officials could still scrutinize their external communications to banks and other legitimate businesses conducted with key escrow products. That was the Clinton administration view, anyway, but it was not shared by many on the Senate Commerce Committee. "Is it possible to get every country on the planet to agree to this approach," asked Senator Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who is sponsoring the bill, "and, if we cannot, wouldn't the entire approach be undermined if one or more countries chose not to adopt such an approach?" Senator Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, said the Clinton policy would force U.S. industry permanently behind foreign competitors. "The terrorists and drug merchants of the 21st century are not going to be encryption simpletons," Wyden said. "Many of them are going to be savvy and sophisticated, and they are going to be hunting worldwide for these data-scrambling products," not just from U.S. suppliers.

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Re: RPK Public Key Cryptography
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tall men in dark suits made Stephen Cobb <stephen(a)iu.net> write: >My apologies to the list if this subject is old hat but someone just pointed >me to the RPK Public Key Cryptography site and I was wondering what people >thought of this particular technology. It's just Yet Another PKC. Look at the history of LUC for a similar example: An amazing new breakthrough in PKC is announced, after a couple of years of analysis by cryptographers it's found to be no better or worse than existing PKC's, but in any case noone uses it because the existing patent covers only the US and expires in a few years whereas the LUC ones cover much of the world and will be around for ages. RPK is a similar case (actually it's in a somewhat worse position, by the time it's been subjected to enough analysis for people to trust it, the RSA patent will have expired, making RPK unmarketable). Other comments on the system: - The inventor apparently has no plans to publish details on the system in a journal or present it at a conference for peer review. - Someone who used to work with him rates him as a fairly competent programmer. His crypto skills are unknown. Given what happened with LUC I predict more of the same for RPK. Peter.

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Re: You know it's getting late when... (fwd)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:24 AM 7/31/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Consider (to some) a trivial example. There are 20 million cats and dogs >killed each year because somebody was irresponsible. The vast majority of >these are or were pets (not feral or wild animals as some would claim) which >persons simply didn't want anymore. Now there is somewhere around 250 >million people in the US. This means that 1 out of 10 (roughly) are costing >the rest of us about $50 ea. to take care of their pet 'problem'. > >I see no difference in having my money taken via taxes (where most of it >comes from) for this than having somebody come and take $50 for whatever >reason by kicking my front door in. Why am I being forced to pay this money >to pay for somebody elses lack of discipline and simple human empathy? I agree, and this is one reason I am opposed to State-sponsored canine and feline genocide. And historically the lack of canine eradication programs has been a major way to control the "homeless problem," so the State is making the homeless problem worse by removing natural pest control mechanisms. --Klaus

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Re: Paranoid Musings
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm really feeling much better now :-). At 6:48 PM 7/30/96 -0400, Mark M. wrote: >On Tue, 30 Jul 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: >> The paranoid conclusion is that there is a significant weakness in RC4. > >An FPGA can break RC4 in a few hours. With several thousand of these, RC4 >could be broken in about a second. Besides, RC4 has been around for 9 years >and has not been successfully cryptanalyzed. The RC4 algorithm is extremely >simple and doesn't have any obvious weaknesses. IMHO, NSA's cryptanalysis is second to none. I have been assuming a weakness based on a classified cryptanalysis technique. They have certainly been thinking about "S-Box" cyphers since at least Lucifer and DES. But let's approach the question from a different angle. Consider the number of messages that need to be broken and the costs of machines to do it. How many encrypted messages do you think NSA wants to read? I have no idea either, but in the spirit of never depend on expert opinion when simple arithmetic will do, let's assume a world where major email packages use encryption as a matter of course. If we assume that the 30 million net users send one email/day, then that results in about 350/second. If I assume your "several thousand" is 2000, then we need a machine with 700,000 FPGA's. Given Matt Blaze et. al.'s estimate of $10/chip complete, that is $7 million. However if you take the NSA's estimate (in their response to Blaze et al) of $1000/chip, then you get $700 million. If we assume a machine designed to break *every* message, NSA's response makes more sense. From their response (reordered): >The factors not accounted for are: > > o Memory costs are not included. It needs to store all the messages it is attacking. > o When get [sic] to the very fast processing speed estimates, > machines can become Input/Output bound; so [sic] it cannot achieve > the estimated speed. It needs to get all those messages into the machine, the plaintext out, and distribute the data to the FPGAs. > o As more and more chips are added to a machine, two effects occur: > > o Interconnections increase and increase running time; > o Heat from the chips eventually limit [sic] the size of a > machine. Fast machines produce a lot of heat. > o R&D costs for the first machine, typically on the order of $10 > million. R&D costs for high-speed I/O, large memories, and efficient heat removal might be significant. > o Assuming every algorithm can be tested in same amount of time and > key length is the only difference. This is one of Blase et. al.'s simplifying assumptions. RC4 has a simple key setup and runs faster than DES. Brute forcing 40 bit Blowfish would be considerably harder. Probably about equal to 9 additional key bits harder. Now I have no problem with believing NSA would invest $7 million. However, $700 million makes me wonder. With FPGAs, there is a significant risk that people will change the crypto system and make the investment worthless. (Which, I guess, is why they prefer general purpose computers.) However, if they can get the equivalent of a few bits of key back by cryptanalysis, then they knock the costs down to entirely reasonable (for them) levels. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Cave ab homine unius lebri | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | [Beware the man of one | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | book] - Anonymous Latin | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Aspol=ego
by nobody＠vegas.gateway.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Bell raved: <snip> >If anyone out there still doubts that the time for my "Assassination ^^ >Politics" idea will never come, I claim that it's later than you think. If anyone thinks _YOU_ thought of it first, they don't know history...

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FPGAs and Heat (Re: Paranoid Musings)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:05 AM 7/31/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >I'm really feeling much better now :-). I guess Ritalin really does work. >How many encrypted messages do you think NSA wants to read? I have no idea >either, but in the spirit of never depend on expert opinion when simple >arithmetic will do, let's assume a world where major email packages use >encryption as a matter of course. If we assume that the 30 million net >users send one email/day, then that results in about 350/second. If I >assume your "several thousand" is 2000, then we need a machine with 700,000 >FPGA's. Given Matt Blaze et. al.'s estimate of $10/chip complete, that is >$7 million. However if you take the NSA's estimate (in their response to >Blaze et al) of $1000/chip, then you get $700 million. I for one don't have any way of estimating how many messages they might want to read. But note some figures we've discussed here before: * NSA spent upwards of $100 M to build the "Harvest" machine in the late 50s and early 60s (you worked with Norm Hardy, Bill, so you undoubtedly know about this). Some of this machine's capacity was for cryptanalysis, some for voice analysis, and no doubt a lot for other things. But it says something about the kinds of money that will be spent. * Spysats routinely cost a billion dollars or more. (A single launch of the space shuttle costs at least $500 M, as I recall. Some shuttle launches have been to deploy SIGINT sats.) * The NSA was one of the main investors in several high tech companies, including Control Data Corporation and Cray Research. I conclude, roughly speaking, that spending $100 M on a specialized machine to break RC4 or any other modern cipher (that is breakable at the key lengths used) would not even give them pause. >If we assume a machine designed to break *every* message, NSA's response >makes more sense. From their response (reordered): I don't believe that even _they_ would plan for something like this, unless RC4 is a lot weaker than experts seem to think it is. [stuff elided] >> o As more and more chips are added to a machine, two effects occur: >> >> o Interconnections increase and increase running time; >> o Heat from the chips eventually limit [sic] the size of a >> machine. >Fast machines produce a lot of heat. But, as many have pointed out, this is not a realistic limit. The pieces of the solution could be scattered from one end of Fort Meade to another, and still not be affected much by communications costs and delays. Power density is thus not going to be a problem. (A calculation can be done on how long it will take before electricity costs exceed chip costs...I haven't done this for the crypto FPGAs, as so many things are unclear about what they might be, but for the 200 MHz Pentium (CPU alone, not a system) I get: 40 kilowatt-hours per year x $0.10 per KWH = $4 per year in electricity costs. Heat removal costs are comparable.) FPGAs and custom chips will not be much different. I conclude that the costs of building the chips and system will be orders of magnitude more expensive than the costs of running the chips with power, and that removing the heat is not an issue. (Spread out enough, simple heat removal a la office computers is fine. Leaving windows open is even cheaper ;-)) >Now I have no problem with believing NSA would invest $7 million. However, >$700 million makes me wonder. With FPGAs, there is a significant risk that >people will change the crypto system and make the investment worthless. >(Which, I guess, is why they prefer general purpose computers.) However, >if they can get the equivalent of a few bits of key back by cryptanalysis, >then they knock the costs down to entirely reasonable (for them) levels. An FPGA is field-programmable. (FPGA = Field Programmable Gate Arrays) The Xilynx and Altera lines of FPGAs could be reconfigured for other algorithms, surely. (I recall several preliminary designs discussed in various places.) This doesn't mean they've done it, only that they could buy millions of FPGAs for the cost of a single spysat or shuttle launch. So, it seems likely. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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trust management workshop
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- | DIMACS: Center for Discrete Mathematics & Theoretical Computer Science | | A National Science Foundation Science and Technology Center | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIMACS Workshop on Trust Management in Networks Dates: Sept. 30 - Oct. 2, 1996 Location: CORE Bldg., Rutgers University Busch Campus, Piscataway NJ Co-Chairs: Ernie Brickell, Bankers Trust, brickell(a)btec.com Joan Feigenbaum, AT&T Research, jf(a)research.att.com Dave Maher, AT&T Research, dpm(a)research.att.com Theme: The use of public-key cryptography on a mass-market scale requires sophisticated mechanisms for managing trust. For example, any application that receives a signed request for action is forced to answer the central question ``Is the key used to sign this request authorized to take this action?'' In certain applications, this question reduces to ``Does this key belong to this person?'' In others, the authorization question is considerably more complicated, and resolving it requires techniques for formulating security policies and security credentials, determining whether particular sets of credentials satisfy the relevant policies, and deferring trust to third parties. This workshop covers all aspects of the trust management problem. Relevant topics include but are not limited to: General approaches to trust management Languages, systems, and tools Certificates and public-key infrastructure Formal models and analysis Trust management in specific application domains, including but not limited to: Banking E-mail Internet commerce Licensing Medical information systems Mobile programs and ``code signing'' Revocation of cryptographic keys Confirmed speakers include: Butler Lampson, Microsoft Matt Blaze, AT&T Research Steve Kent, BBN Carl Ellison, Cybercash Contributed talks: If you would like to attend and give a talk, please email a one-page abstract (NOT A FULL PAPER) in ascii format to Joan Feigenbaum at jf(a)research.att.com by September 1, 1996. The Trust Management workshop will be informal, and there are currently no plans to publish proceedings. For more information: If you would like to attend but not give a talk, contact Joan Feigenbaum at jf(a)research.att.com any time before the beginning of the workshop. There is a small amount of support available for people who do not have other sources of travel funds. Information about local arrangements, travel, lodging and registration can be found at http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Management. Those without WWW access can contact Pat Pravato at 908-445-5929 or pravato(a)dimacs.rutgers.edu. This workshop is part of DIMACS Special Year on Networks. Information about the Special Year on Networks can be found at DIMACS WWW site: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu or by contacting the center. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Special Year program is made possible by long term funding from the National Science Foundation, the New Jersey Commission on Science and Technology and DIMACS university and industry partners. DIMACS Center; Rutgers University; P.O. Box 1179; Piscataway, NJ 08855-1179 TEL: 908-445-5928 FAX: 908-445-5932 ** EMAIL: center(a)dimacs.rutgers.edu WWW: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu **TELNET: telnet info.rutgers.edu 90 DIMACS is a partnership of Rutgers University, Princeton University, AT&T Research, Bellcore, and Lucent - Bell Laboratories.

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RE: A Libertine Question
by j ubois 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Horowitz wrote: I am a strong libertarian...{deletia}...damn well maintain public order and decorum. ***Or I will scream to my councilman for the cops to adjust your attitude with their billy club.*** Sounds consistent and rational to me.

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FW: ANNOUNCEMENT: nym.alias.net enters beta testing (fwd)
by Mr. Brandon W. Wheaton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: William Knowles[SMTP:erehwon@c2.org] Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 1996 5:54 PM To: dc-stuff Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: nym.alias.net enters beta testing (fwd) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 19:40:36 -0400 (EDT) From: lcs Remailer Administrator <mix-admin(a)nym.alias.net> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, coderpunks(a)toad.com, remailer-operators(a)c2.org, mail2news(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: nym.alias.net enters beta testing Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm pleased to announce that the nym.alias.net pseudonym server has now entered the beta-testing phase, and seems quite stable. Nym.alias.net offers several interesting features: * Public-Key encryption of all received mail. Once mail has gone through nym.alias.net, no one can read it except you--even if you have been sending your mail to a newsgroup and your reply-block and remailers become compromised. * Support for multiple, probabilistically-weighted, reply blocks. These can be used for redundancy or to foil traffic analysis with decoys. * Replay detection. This foils replay attacks, but can also be used for higher reliability if you send redundant copies of a message through different remailer chains. * An option to receive only fixed-length messages (by splitting up large messages and padding small ones with garbage). * An option to sign mail you send with the remailer's public key, so as to give some assurance of authenticity without having to publish your own PGP public key. * Support for finger [pending DNS approval]. You can choose to make your nym's PGP public key available to all who finger its E-mail address. Right now you can test this by fingering at 18.26.0.252. In addition, experimental nym.alias.net support for Premail is now available (in the form of a patch to premail 0.44). With this patch, premail will store your nym's PGP key on encrypted keyrings. This allows you to publish a PGP key for your pseudonym without the danger of your identity being revealed to someone with access to your main PGP keyrings (or a backup copy of them). To obtain more information about nym.alias.net, finger <nymhelp(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> or send mail to <help(a)nym.alias.net>. To get information about using premail with nym.alias.net, finger <premail-info(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> or send mail to <premail-info(a)nym.alias.net>. These documents are also available on the new nym.alias.net web page: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html Please report all bugs to <admin(a)nym.alias.net>. I'll also be glad to consider feature requests, particularly from anyone interested in developing any more client software. Enjoy! mix-admin(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMf6dcUTBtHVi58fRAQE4NgP/SoKSqHxobEHuyWl6lXVAHgk9yqNS/WAD jUfKYGodThr93kJZkmreyIHrWgbromJJlXo6MPq9KpZzIh85uHRzBPRSh293hfUo ta8/sdZsW1+uoEkAs8JUWlwAEGo+bfmgRnFswf80pAPClpbGo52DAKyLKfdCaFps kQ+4hoouUvo= =qEWa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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FW: Securing 5% of the Internet against Wiretapping by Christmas (fwd)
by Mr. Brandon W. Wheaton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Something I picked up from a mailing list called dc-stuff. <dc-stuff(a)fc.net> It's mostly having to do with security and hacking, thought not typically the "bad" sort. Thought it might not only be of interest the cypherpunks, but perhaps you could offer some hints, tips, advice?? Cheers, Bdog Date: Sat, 27 Jul 1996 16:24:52 -0700 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> Subject: FW: Securing 5% of the Internet against Wiretapping by Christmas I've been working on a project in secret for a few months, and now am talking about it with everyone so that we can all help it along. Want all the Internet traffic between you and every other privacy-conscious site on the net, worldwide, to automatically be encrypted using Triple-DES, RSA, and Diffie-Hellman? Without changing your hardware or software, except to stick a Linux PC on your network, or install a new version of Linux on your laptop? Want it all by Christmas? Then check out http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/swan.html [...] -- John Gilmore An equal opportunistic encryptor

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Re:FPGAs and Heat (Re: Paranoid Musings)
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oddly enough, I just left a talk at the '96 Genetic Programming conference on developing adaptable hardware and silicon evolution. One of the speakers at this particular session was the Product Line Manager from Xilinx and one of the goodies he handed out was pre-release data sheets for the new XC6200 series of FPGAs they are producing (the chips are already out in limited quantities) so here is a little update on the state of the art in this area. Tim May writes: > Bill Frantz wrote: > >> o As more and more chips are added to a machine, two effects occur: > >> > >> o Interconnections increase and increase running time; > >> o Heat from the chips eventually limit [sic] the size of a > >> machine. > >Fast machines produce a lot of heat. > > But, as many have pointed out, this is not a realistic limit. One can also use reversible logic to get arond the heat problem if mechanical means are not enough. This is a necessity for molecular-scale computing and during the post-session BS at another talk we speced out a system that could probably evolve a reversible logic compiler. Heat will not be a "wall" at any scale, it may add to the cost a little bit but the problem is solvable. The interconnection problem has also been solved in this chip series. [A long-standing problem with FPGAs is that there were generally a limited amount of "wires" running between the logic elements and thus a lot of cells were wasted because there were no interconnections left, I/O to the outside world was also a problem.] The chip has a really cool interconnection method which allows a much more efficient use of the chip real estate and which makes the entire chip directly addresable (like regular RAM) through an on-chip interface module. Given the relatively compact design in Ian and Dave's paper and the new chips one might even fit two or four cracking engines on a single FPGA. Either the NSA did not do thier homework in this area or they are lying. > >Now I have no problem with believing NSA would invest $7 million. However, > >$700 million makes me wonder. With FPGAs, there is a significant risk that > >people will change the crypto system and make the investment worthless. > >(Which, I guess, is why they prefer general purpose computers.) However, > >if they can get the equivalent of a few bits of key back by cryptanalysis, > >then they knock the costs down to entirely reasonable (for them) levels. > > An FPGA is field-programmable. (FPGA = Field Programmable Gate Arrays) The > Xilynx and Altera lines of FPGAs could be reconfigured for other > algorithms, surely. (I recall several preliminary designs discussed in > various places.) There are two types of FPGAs, one is based on anti-fuse technology which is essentially a big complicated PROM, but the Xilinx FPGAs use SRAM to configure the interconnections between logic elements. The newest line from Xilinx, the XC6000 series has the capability to be reconfigured either partially or completely from an on-chip cache in 5 ns. That is five nanoseconds and you have a completely different piece of virtual hardware. If the configuration is loaded through the slowest I/O port on the chip it only takes 200 microseconds. Even if the encryption algorithm is secret these chips open up interesting posiblities for developing general-purpose cryptanalysis machines. [Hmm, there may be a paper in there... "Evolving A General-Purpose Cryptanalysis Engine"...] What is even better from the perspective of the NSA accountants is that they only need to build the machine _once_, after that they just load up a new set of interconnections and now the DES cracker is an IDEA cracker. Add to this the fact that the XC6000 series were designed to be built cheaply in large quantities (the Xilinx rep figures the price will get down to $29/chip in 5K lots for the samples he was passing around and he is a wafer guy and not marketting droid so this may be reasonably accurate.) If anything, the Blaze, et many als. paper _underestimated_ the cost of a FPGA hardware cracking engine, particularly if you amortize the savings FPGAs give over the long term with thier almost limitless flexibility. jim

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Re: G7 Anti-Terrorism Reports [BRIEF]
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 30 Jul 96 at 18:47, Jonathan M Summers wrote: > Cypherpunks: > > At 1735 CDT on Tuesday, July 30, 1996, CNN Atlanta during World News > Tonight reported (in a _very_ brief flash) several "resolutions" adopted > by the Group of Seven (G7) trade meeting in Paris. > > At the bottom of the list of resolutions was to "prevent terrorist from > using the Internet" (quote from CNN anchorwoman). The Pacifica Report noted 'more controls on the Internet' and controlling the use of encryption, but didn't discuss this at length. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Paranoid Musings
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 30 Jul 96 at 11:13, Bill Frantz wrote: [..] > (1) Now everyone knows that 40 bit RC4 is weak, but just how weak is it? Differentiate between the cipher and the key-initialization. There may be a flaw in how the key is set up that can make brute-force searches easier. Known plaintext of a few headers may also help in guessing the s-box state, even if partially: combined with flaws in the key, this could be exploited, especially if one has a lot of experience and computing power handy. [..] > (2) What did Microsoft give up to export its crypto API? > > Well, if you were a TLA, what would you want. I think I would want an > agreement to be able to insert my own code in that vendor's products. Then > I would be able to have widely distributed Trojan horses signed by the > vendor. I would have the opportunity to significantly weaken standardized > crypto systems installed world wide. Risky. Code can always be reverse engineered. If a flaw is exploited in too-strong an algorithm (3DES and 4k-bit RSA keys, for instance) to prosecute various people, somebody might notice. If US companies seem to magically have proprietary info from foreign companies, this would also be a sign of suspicion. I think the C[r]API will be used as a form of mandating GAK instead. Rob > > > Conspiracy theorists, start your mailers. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Bill Frantz | Cave ab homine unius lebri | Periwinkle -- Consulting > (408)356-8506 | [Beware the man of one | 16345 Englewood Ave. > frantz(a)netcom.com | book] - Anonymous Latin | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA > > > > --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Blaming the Internet for Terrorism
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This comes from today's (Wed. July 31) LI Newsday, though the byline is the AP: "Bombing Becoming All Too Popular" The Associated Press Washington - The number of Americans attacking and attempting to attack each other with bombs each year has nearly doubled this decade. For every Olympic park or Oklahamo City tragedy, police report dozens of foiled attempts where death and destruction are narrowly averted. [..] The rapid escalation poses a vexing problem for law enforcement. Unlike international terrorists with recognized agendas, these culprits are most often low-profile operators plotting in the privacy of back yards, garages and basements with easily obtained materials and simple instructions straight off the Internet. [..] In 1989, there were 1,699 criminal bombings attemted or carried out nationwide. By 1994, the last year with complete figures, the number has risen to 3,163, according to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Local cases, which seldom make national headlines, demonstrate the breadth of the threat. [Examples follow...only one names the Internet:] In Baton-Rouge, La., an 18-year-ooold dropout and two friends were indicted this month for stealing bomb-making materials from two high-school chemistry labs, Court records allege the three plotted to blow up a train returning the young woman's parents from vacation to get insurance money, and had followed a terrorist handbook published on the Internet. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: crypto CD source
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <16689.9607301944(a)exe.dcs.exeter.ac.uk> you wrote: : Some time ago on the list there was some discussion of putting : together a CD full of cryptographic software and reference material. : Nothing came of it, but I think several people expressed an interest, : for those of you who were interested, take a look at: : http://www.sevenlocks.com/ [..] : They have a large supply of crypto software available on-line as well. : (No mention of ITAR on their software down load pages (78 Mb of : security related software they claim), and it looks you could download : the lot even if you weren't in the US). ftp.replay.com has 220 Mb of crypto software available for download at no charge .... bEST Regards, -- Alex de Joode | Replay IP Service & Web DZign -- The Netherlands usura(a)replay.com | http://www.replay.com mailto:info@replay.com

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Crypto Law and Veincheck
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.ispo.cec.be:81/ispo/lists/ispo/0464.html ---------- European Crypto Law information sources Robert Horvitz (horvitzr(a)omri.cz) Tue, 21 May 1996 13:22:59 +1GMT Reply to aadamski(a)cc.uni.torun.pl (Andrzej Adamski) who said: My name is Andrzej Adamski, I'm from Poland, Nicolas Copernicus University . I would be very grateful for getting hints where to find information on the current EU encryption policy/ legislation. What about present developments in the area of the European infrastructure of pubic (sic) key look like? ------------------------------------------------------------ Adam, the best place to start your research is at the "Cryptography in Europe" website: http://www.modeemi.cs.tut.fi/~avs/eu-crypto.html To see the wider context, visit the "Crypto Law Survey" website created by Bert-Jaap Koops in the Netherlands, at: http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm The EU and EC seem likely to cave in to pressure (blackmail?) from the American spy agencies and impose "back doors" on any strong encryption package. Unless Europeans stand up and insist that privacy of communication is an essential human right. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Robert Horvitz, International Coordinator, OSI Internet Program Motokov Building - Room 518, Na Strzi 63, 140 62 Praha 4, Czech Rep., tel 42 2 6114-2751, fax 6114-2750, email horvitzr(a)omri.cz ---------- For more on cryptography and encryption, see the IPO search page at: http://www.ispo.cec.be/topic/simple.html As an example, for artful use of crypto, see the "veincheck" proposal at: http://www.ispo.cec.be:81/ispo/lists/ispo/0252.html Social Applications of Biometrics Joe Rice (joerice(a)innotts.co.uk) Tue, 26 Mar 1996 21:28:20 -0800 I would welcome some input to shape the following IT technology. The technology is a physiological biometric based upon the detection and comparison of subcutaneous blood vessels, essentially bar-code reading of people.

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Re: New Clinton (anti-) Encryption Policy nnn
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> CLINTON ADMINISTRATION FACT SHEET: U.S. CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY (Industry, > international cooperation urged) > Following is the text of the fact sheet: kersnip > Militia groups advise their members to use encryption to hide illicit > weapons, financial, and other criminal activities. Using encryption to hide illicit weapons? I think somebodys been watching too much TV. VR Troopers Transform!!

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defcon
by TQDB 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 17:31:25 -0400 > From: Stephen Cobb <stephen(a)iu.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)feist.com > Subject: Re: fbi, crypto, and defcon > Okay, so their boss is part of the law making process, subject to the checks > and balances that exist between the three branches of US government. They > are in a position to supply their boss with data and I am personally > impressed with their grasp of some of that data (it sounds to me like they > are telling their boss that hackers like the ones at Defcon are not the > problem). I think what they are really saying is that they would love to bust most hackers, but since they can't they might as well use some of them to catch the bigger fish. If they truly did believe in the laws they are supposed to uphold they wouldn't associate with hackers (who commit computer crimes) at all. > All of us who have some understanding of these issues need to do our best to > educate the public and the politicians, even if we have to start from the > "See Jane hack" level (pun intended). Otherwise dumb laws will be passed and > then we will have to engage in mass civil disobedience (which I have > personally done in the past). Stopping bad laws from becoming law is a lot > easier than overturning them later. This is exactly one good reason for having additional support for our Hack The Lies (HTL) project. Besides spreading truthful and factual information to the public, we recognize that the government definately could use its share of help from people who know what they are talking about. .TQDB

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Re: Smart cards "a giant leap backwards" - Canadian Privacy Commissioner
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:23 PM 7/30/96 -0400, Richard Martin wrote: >Very little that might be new or enlightening to the world; attendees >of CFP '96 will remember [fuzzily, in my case] the closest thing to >Bruce's counterpart in the states admitting that the USA doesn't actually >have much of a counterpart to the privacy commissioner. Most Central European countries have both privacy commissioners and legal requirements that everyone register their addresses with the police. I'll do without the former if I can also avoid the latter. DCF

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G7T_err
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts of four reports on the G7+1 antiterrorism meet in Paris: WSJ: + Mass Transport: The International Civil Aviation Organization will implement new standards for bomb detection at domestic and international airports. The eight nations will jointly develop standards for more detailed and accurate passenger and cargo lists, as well as new vehicle-identification tagging methods to make car-bombing investigations easier, U.S. officials said. + Information Sharing: The U.S Federal Bureau of Investigation will lead an effort to develop an international forensic database. The FBI offered to share certain computer records with the other seven countries. + Wiretapping and Internet: The eight countries said they would develop new lawful means to intercept communications among terrorists. They agreed to study how to prevent the Internet from becoming a tool for planning and executing terrorist events. + Explosives Tracing: The U.S. will share its research on new technologies to trace the origin of explosive devices U.S. officials said, and will push for international use of such technologies if they are found to be workable. + Other Measures: Controlling trade in certain weapons and chemicals financing of terrorist organizations and forgery of travel documents also will be studied. WaPo: The 25-point plan calls for close cooperation in formulating a range of security measures, including tightened controls on firearms and explosives; prevention of terrorist communications on the Internet; improved bomb detection methods at airports; and interdiction of terrorist groups' financial resources. They also called for the expediting of extradition procedures and faster exchanges of information on terrorist activities, including any use of chemical, biological or nuclear materials. Details on all 25 points were left for law enforcement and forensic experts to work out, with deadlines for finalization of specific measures set for 90 days to six months. FiTi: Among the measures agreed in Paris were an accelerated programme of research designed to find ways to mark explosives so their origin could be identified after a blast; the development of ways to prevent terrorists using electronic or wire communication systems, including the Internet and tougher sentences. The ministers also called for investigations into organisations with social, charitable and cultural goals which were abused by terrorists; restrictions on asylum- seeking by those who had committed attacks or were suspected of planning or funding them; and more effective border controls and extradition procedures. NYP: The details were not all made public today, but the measures the officials agreed to draft included devising methods to monitor terrorist attempts to communicate over the Internet; developing standards to make it easier to trace the origin of explosives used in terrorist bombs and cracking down domestically on the manufacture, sale, transport and export of explosives and firearms. ---------- For extensive background, links to related sites and latest information on the G7 series of meetings see: http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/g7lyon/index.gb.html ---------- For today's four full reports: http://jya.com/g7terr.txt (20 kb for 4) G7T_err

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Re: A Libertine Question
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:01 AM 7/31/96 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote: >Which is a long way to say that street cops >don't usually torment people with nice cars and/or houses, so those folks >don't need to be so concerned about making sure their "papers" are "in >order". Most demands for ID and conformations with police involve the operation of motor vehicles. I have never been "IDed" except at border crossings and when I was operating motor vehicles. Clean and dressed up people are rarely IDed on foot. Maybe you should mention some of the specific practices in Seattle that disturb you. >So the unconstitutional and oppressive character of the various laws >Mike Duvos refers to is mitigated by their lack of evenhanded enforcement. >If a cop can demand ID from someone who "looks like he doesn't belong here" >he can demand it from you. (modulo driving, this isn't legal. But give >Justice [sic] Rehnquist and Clinton and random congressional maniacs a few >more years and see where things stand.) Or flying on a commercial flight. So far, prosecutions for "failure to possess ID" have not succeeded. You *can* be prosecuted for failure to identify yourself (which is *not* the same thing). The Philadelphia airport was allegedly requiring *two* pieces of ID for flights. If they are talking about two pieces of photo -- government-issued ID, I wonder where the 80% of Americans without a Passport (x the 90% of Americans who are not government employees) get the second piece of ID. [Is it a violation of something if you Heil Hitler od Sieg Heil the airline clerk when they ask to see your ID. It's not a threat, it's an expression of honor.] >with guns or other weapons. And just as some people "don't have a right to >live in Seattle" if they won't toe the line, other people may find they >"don't have a right to live in the United States." * The Supremes outlawed exile as a punishment in a case during the 1950s. Said it was cruel and unusual punishment. Guess it's OK to execute people but not deprive them of having a government. DCF "If the security guard did it in Atlanta, that will be the second US Olympics in which the only 'terrorist incident' was perpetrated by a security person. I guess we should outlaw security at such gatherings to prevent terrorism."

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****Tacoma, Washington Starts Taxing Internet Access 07/30/96
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>WASHINGTON, DC, U.S.A., 1996 JUL 30 (NB) -- By Bill Pietrucha. >Tacoma, Washington, has just gained the distinction of being the >only municipality in the United States to tax Internet Access >providers (IAPs) like telephone service providers. > >The city of Tacoma has extended its six percent gross receipts tax on >telecommunications services to include Internet services, Information >Technology Association of America (ITAA) spokesperson Bob Cohen >told Newsbytes. > >"IAPs use telephone lines to provide consumers with the `on-ramp' >access to the Internet," Cohen told Newsbytes. "Since consumers and >providers already pay taxes on basic telephone service," Cohen said, >"the new Tacoma tax would amount to double taxation, applying to >both the telephone service and the content transmitted over the >telephone line." > >Cohen said ITAA has called on Tacoma Mayor Brian Ebersole to rescind >the new tax, saying that "excessive regulation and taxation will >change the fundamental nature of this new medium (the Internet)." > >In urging the mayor to stop the city's attempt to impose a tax on >the IAPs, ITAA President Harris N. Miler said that "Tacoma will be >hurting both the Internet and its own economic future." > >Miller told Newsbytes that the tax will mean "a loss of profits >to Tacoma-based IAPs, as well as a paperwork nightmare which may >drive companies out of business. IAPs doing business in Tacoma will >be at a competitive disadvantage to their competitors in other >municipalities." > >Miller noted that the tax regime could cause Tacoma-based IAPs to >move to other jurisdictions, "taking the jobs they provide, and the >taxes they currently pay, with them. They (IAPs) may also decide not >to provide service to Tacoma residents rather than deal with the >administrative nightmare of complying with the new tax regulations," >Miller said. > >If other cities attempted to follow Tacoma's lead in taxing IAPs, >Miler said, it could cause the "Balkanization of the Internet, a >hodgepodge of confusing, conflicting, and difficult to administer >Internet tax rules and regulations. > >Miller also hinted that the tax could inadvertently be in violation >of international tax treaties. > >"To begin taxing at the local level before it is clear what the >impact will be on industry and the public in general is bad public >policy," Miller said. > >(19960730/Press Contact: Bob Cohen, Information Technology >Association of America, 703-284-5333, Internet e-mail bcohen(a)itaa.org) > > > _______________________ Regards, There are no facts, only interpretations. -Friedrich Nietzsche Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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re:WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
by Vinnie Moscaritolo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

here is something my girlfriend sent me the other day, after reading the Klinton-Antifreedom/terror news Setting: Germany in the late 30's. Quote from "Stones from the River", by Ursula Hegi. I think this rings true for our country today. The tragic reality is that the majority of people have simply forgotten the urge to question what they read in the news. "The people of Burgdorf went to parades and speeches--some because they genuinely believed in their leaders; others, because not to go would call attention to themselves. Most practiced the silence they were familiar with, a silence nurtured by fear and complicity that would grow beyond anything they could imagine, mushrooming into the decades after the war which, some began to fear, was about to happen. To justify this silence, they tried to find the good in their government or fled into the mazes of their own lives, turning away from the community. They knew how not to ask questions; they had been prepared for it by government and church. Over the years, they had forgotten that early urge to question." Vinnie Moscaritolo http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 4FA3298150E404F2782501876EA2146A ------------------ "And someone said Hey man did ya see that? His body hit the street with such a beautiful thud.. I wonder if he knew what he was getting into... Or was he just lost in the flood?"

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Re:FPGAs and Heat (Re: Paranoid Musings)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:14 AM 7/31/96 -0800, Jim McCoy wrote: >The interconnection problem has also been solved in this chip series. [A >long-standing problem with FPGAs is that there were generally a limited >amount of "wires" running between the logic elements and thus a lot of cells >were wasted because there were no interconnections left, I/O to the outside >world was also a problem.] The chip has a really cool interconnection method >which allows a much more efficient use of the chip real estate and which >makes the entire chip directly addresable (like regular RAM) through an >on-chip interface module. Given the relatively compact design in Ian and >Dave's paper and the new chips one might even fit two or four cracking >engines on a single FPGA. However, I think it very unlikely that an organization like the NSA would bother with an FPGA to do a cracking engine. FPGA's have substantial limitations, as you alluded to above, due to the need to make them "general purpose." A non-field programmable Gate Array, a hard-wired chip, would tend to optimize the interconnections on chip including minimizing the delays, but not incur the full-custom costs such as the penalty for low volume. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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If you have Fortezza experience
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please excuse the interruption. If you have experience building software that uses the Fortezza card, Murray Mazer at OSF would like to chat -- he's trying to scope out what would be involved in adding it to some WWW work for an ARPA project. (Yes, we already have the various Lock-step, etc., documents from the NSA.) Please respond to Murray directly. By way of penance for sending email to a list that I am not on, I offer a short page on exporting crypto software, http://www.osf.org/crypto-export.html, that some might find useful. /r$

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Geo-Politics
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two articles today in WSJ and FiTi show an unpected link between geo-technology and geo-politics: One reviews the explosives sniffing technology invented by geologist Anthony Barringer for global mineral exploration -- like copper, luxury metals and oil -- but which came to have more practical utility in the antiterrorist market (the company's stock is rocketing). Even so, its best use may prove to be in discovering petroleum and other wealth of the earth. As this tech becomes more widespread, Shell has good reason to encrypt its geological logs and steganographize its governmental bribes. And, a column reviews the tie between nationalist conflicts (markets for cheap explosives) and the invention of modern states (markets for expensive munitions). How the citizenry of modern nations are united by "the need for context-free communication" that was once limited to the members of the "high culture" of pre-modern communities. And how the nationalist citizenry are adopting the cheap versions of expensive munitions of the states' high culture to get their overdue share of the earth's pie. It explores the geopolitical differences among: Ethnic community Ethnic category Nation Nation-state Nationalism ----- http://jya.com/geopol.txt GEO_pol

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"An who shall guard the guardians?"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Latin maxim "And who shall guard the guardians?" has some relevance to the headlong rush into converting the U.S. into even more of a security state than it is now. The investigation in Atlanta is now focussing on a rent-a-cop who may have planted the pipe bomb and then "discovered" it. Check the usual Web news sources for more details. Whether he is the bomber or not is not the point, which is, "who watches the cops?" A string of arsons up and down the north-south highways of California was finally shown to correlate with the travels up and down those highways (at those same times) by a Glendale arson investigator! And cases where cops have planted evidence, drugs, and guns are almost too much a part of our culture to even notice anymore. My point is not that all cops are corrupt. Indeed, I suspect that they are no more corrupt proportionately than is the general population...which is not too reassuring to me, though. ObClipper: "Who shall guard the guardians?" While the various Clipper proposals have putative safeguards to limit access, think of Craig Livingstone, a rent-a-cop the Clintons hire to work on their Enemies List. And think of the dossiers of J. Edgar Hoover. And think of Nixon. And think of what President Pat Buchanan would do with Government Access to Keys. No thanks, I'll lock my own doors. I have no plans to "voluntarily escrow" my door keys with the local cops. "Secure in one's papers and person" rings a bell, doesn't it? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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****Tacoma, Washington Starts Taxing Internet Access 07/30/96 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 11:26:59 -0400 > From: "Joseph M. Reagle Jr." <reagle(a)rpcp.mit.edu> > Subject: ****Tacoma, Washington Starts Taxing Internet Access 07/30/96 > > >WASHINGTON, DC, U.S.A., 1996 JUL 30 (NB) -- By Bill Pietrucha. > >Tacoma, Washington, has just gained the distinction of being the > >only municipality in the United States to tax Internet Access > >providers (IAPs) like telephone service providers. > > Somebody needs to do their homework. Austin, TX has been taxing ISP's for at least a year now. A recent Internet Provider meeting on this issue resulted in a return to ISP's of a goodly amound of their taxes because of various issues (read that I didn't go to meeting, I don't run an ISP but a SOHO consultancy w/ Internet services). > >The city of Tacoma has extended its six percent gross receipts tax on > >telecommunications services to include Internet services, Information > >Technology Association of America (ITAA) spokesperson Bob Cohen > >told Newsbytes. I have to pay the state 8.25% interest on any funds my customers deliver to me. > >If other cities attempted to follow Tacoma's lead in taxing IAPs, > >Miler said, it could cause the "Balkanization of the Internet, a > >hodgepodge of confusing, conflicting, and difficult to administer > >Internet tax rules and regulations. Agreed. Jim Choate

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Re: DESZIP
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Photo IDs (Re: A Libertine Question)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:12 PM 7/31/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >was allegedly requiring *two* pieces of ID for flights. If they are talking >about two pieces of photo -- government-issued ID, I wonder where the 80% of >Americans without a Passport (x the 90% of Americans who are not government >employees) get the second piece of ID. [Is it a violation of something if >you Heil Hitler od Sieg Heil the airline clerk when they ask to see your ID. >It's not a threat, it's an expression of honor.] Yeah, this "two photo IDs" is strange, given that: a. many ordinary people have only one form of photo I.D., namely, their driver's license (and many don't even have that) b. terrorists and other such persons are _very_ likely to have multiple forms of I.D., though of course not in their "true name." Hence, the policy looks ineffectual and just a sop to public relations. And just what is a "true name" for the purposes of this law, anyway? Birth name? And what is that? What about people who marry, change names, etc.? Given that there is no "standard" for photo I.D.s, will my Official Cypherpunks Card count? I can easily make my own photo I.D.s, or even order "fake I.D.s" from various mail-order outlets advertising in the Usual Places. If I show up at the airline with two photo I.D.s, one showing me to be "Security Officer Mickey Mouse" and the other showing me to be "Mickey Mouse, Internal Security Agency," will I be violating any laws? --Mickey Mouse (I just changed my name--if you don't like it, FAA, fuck off)

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"adjust your attitude with their billy club"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:28 AM 7/31/96, Alan Horowitz wrote: >I am a strong libertarian. Sell crack cocaine, rent your pussy to horny >middle-aged businessmen, do any non-violent, >non-damaging-to-others-property you want, but damn well maintain public >order and decorum. Or I will scream to my councilman for the cops to >adjust your attitude with their billy club. When the local cops adjust my attitude with a billy club for dressing like a hippie and lounging around in a public place that my taxes have helped pay for, I'll remember that a "strong libertarian" said that he was doing the right thing. .... In my town, the City-State decided to crack down on the homeless by arresting people for "giving away food" in a public park. They charged the soup providers with various failures to have Health Department permits and for not having a permit to operate a restaurant, pay various fees to the City-State, and so on. I went to a City Council meeting when this was happening (1991-2) and spoke up in the public comment part of the meeting. I pointed out that the very same park at which these "food criminals" were doing their dastardly deeds in was a park at which other people and groups were cooking hot dogs and hamburgers, ladling out bowls of chili, serving potato salad, and generally "distributing food." All, of course, without benefit of licenses, health inspections, OSHA inspections, and so on. I suggested arrests of the picnic groups begin immediately, using the same exact charges used to harass the homeless helpers. The Council members, most of them leftist liberals, had no answer. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Photo IDs (Re: A Libertine Question)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:56 AM 8/1/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >I can easily make my own photo I.D.s, or even order "fake I.D.s" from >various mail-order outlets advertising in the Usual Places. If I show up at >the airline with two photo I.D.s, one showing me to be "Security Officer >Mickey Mouse" and the other showing me to be "Mickey Mouse, Internal >Security Agency," will I be violating any laws? > >--Mickey Mouse (I just changed my name--if you don't like it, FAA, fuck off) They want "government-issued" photo ID. They haven't said which government have they. Time to get my Barbados driver's license. DCF

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Re: "An who shall guard the guardians?"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:46 AM 8/1/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > >The Latin maxim "And who shall guard the guardians?" has some relevance to >the headlong rush into converting the U.S. into even more of a security >state than it is now. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

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RE: SECURITY GUARD
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Sandy Sandfort > >As per Duncan's lead, I say the government should stop spreading >terrorist bomb making information via police, military and >intelligence training. ............................................. Speaking of "security" and all the excitement about getting people's IDs (two of them), inspecting everyone's packages when they board planes, etc. -- It has been mentioned in the news that there was a warning call to 911 about 30 minutes or so before the blast. But "it didn't get to" the right people until it was too late for them to do much about it. There have been many other instances where the police or other security personnel have been been sent notice that there was a bomb or other such device to be on the alert for, but the warnings went unheeded. Or as in this case, the message "didn't get to" anyone in time. So I was thinking that it makes a joke of the need for telephone wiretapping to catch certain criminals and their dastardly plots, when warnings go unheeded or the security departments themselves are totally unprepared to respond appropriately in an emergency (also in the case of a lone pipe-bomber, there wouldn't be any conspirators making calls to coordinate the event). Furthermore, checking on the security guard's ID didn't prevent the bomb from going off and killing a couple of people. And knowing that no one's baggage in a plane contains explosives doesn't prevent some imaginative loon from using other ways to create havoc & destruction - from *outside* the plane or the building in which all those clean, examined people are sitting. Just more ironic notes on the issue of the needs of law enforcement and our "national security". .. >Blanc > >

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ANNOUNCE: 2nd trip to National Cryptologic Museum
by Zorak Ramone 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= The DC Cypherpunks are pleased to announce our second (annual?) National Cryptologic Museum Field Trip (and lunch) Featuring a talk on the Enigma cipher Co-sponsored by DC-SAGE -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- What: A gathering of folks at the National Cryptologic Museum for a day of exploration, education, and general schmoozing. Who: Cypherpunks, coderpunks, crypto enthusiasts, computer nerds, crypto liberationists/crypto anarchists, system administrators, political activists, hackers, rug-chewing wannabes, and Digex employees. Not forgetting Feebs, Case Officers, ATF Agents, and Counter-Intel Specialists. When: Saturday, August 10, 1996, 11am Where: The National Cryptologic Museum, Ft Meade, MD (just outside Washington DC, about 1/2 hr from Baltimore) Why: To give us a chance to catch up on things in a relaxed and stimulating environment, as well as give those who didn't get to come along last time a second try. General Information: The National Cryptologic Museum is located on Ft. Meade (NSA National Headquarters) and is dedicated to educating the public about the history of cryptography. The majority of the museum's exhibits pertain to cryptanalysis during WWII, with special attention given to the Enigma system. Immediately following the museum tour, which may take approximately 1 hour, a talk on Enigma will be given by cryptographer Carl Ellison (cme(a)cybercash.com) The talk will take place in the museum's conference room. Following the lecture, we will be going over to Henckles (10 minutes from the museum), a local resturaunt reported to be a favorite hangout for NSA employees. Henckles has amazing sandwiches as well as good beer on tap. Further information on the National Cryptologic museum, as well as a pretty good map to the museum can be found on their web site at URL http://www.nsa.gov:8080/museum/. If you would like more information about DCCP, please see our web page at http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/dccp/index.html. Otherwise, you can send email to Kathleen Ellis (auntie(a)thunderdome.goucher.edu) This year's gathering promises an even greater attendance than last year's, and we anticipate a great time for everyone. Please post this announcement anywhere you feel relevant and invite some friends along! DIRECTIONS: The following is adapted from the NCM web page. If you're coming from ... Baltimore, MD Take the B/W Parkway (Rt. 295) South towards Washington, D.C. Exit at Rt. 32, heading towards Ft. Meade. Before you reach the first light, make a left onto Colony 7 Rd. Go past the Shell station to reach the Museum. Washington, D.C. Take the B/W Parkway (Rt. 295) North towards Baltimore. Take the exit for Rt. 32. When you reach the light at the end of the exit ramp, make a left, towards Columbia. Take the first right, onto Colony 7 Rd. Go past the Shell station to reach the Museum. Annapolis, MD Take Rt. 32 towards Columbia. Go past NSA, and take the first right after Canine Rd., onto Colony 7 Rd. Go past the Shell station to reach the Museum. Laurel, MD Take Rt. 198 towards Ft. Meade. Make a left onto Rt. 32, heading towards Columbia. Go past NSA, and take the first right after Canine Rd., onto Colony 7 Rd. Go past the Shell station to reach the Museum. Columbia, MD Take Rt. 32 towards Annapolis. Take the first left after crossing the B/W Parkway (Rt. 295) onto Colony 7 Rd. Go past the Shell station to reach the Museum.

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Re: Taxes in the digicash world
by nv89-pla＠nada.kth.se 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Bell wrote: > If, for every $1 somebody paid in taxes, he instead (or, in addition to) > paid 10 cents to a fund to eliminate the tax collectors, at the end of that > year he wouldn't be paying any taxes anymore. That's why AP will work so well. > > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > Isn't getting rid of the tax collectors a public good? If I pay money to this fund, everyone will benefit (assuming getting rid of the tax collectors is good). -Peter

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Re: CPC_ode
by koontz＠netapp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

thanks

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Lords Boost Robust Crypto
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A positive excerpt from UK's House of Lords's July 23 lengthy, thoughtful report on the information society: http://www.hmsoinfo.gov.uk/hmso/document/inforsoc/ch5.htm#5.92 5.92 The US Government's restrictions on exporting software from the USA which includes high levels of encryption is threatening to become a major barrier to the development of the information Superhighways, which is in no-one's interests. The Government must join with other EU Member States in putting pressure on the USA to relax its restrictions on the export of encryption technology. Thanks to Mark Gould on Cyberia-L, see the full report at: http://www.hmsoinfo.gov.uk/hmso/document/inforsoc.htm INFORMATION SOCIETY: AGENDA FOR ACTION IN THE UK

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defc
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At this year's DefCon (last weekend), there were two speakers from the >recently created FBI San Francisco Computer Crime division. they were there >as spokesmen for the FBI, but people could talk to them later and ask any >questions they liked, and "the answers may surprise you". Evidence that >maybe some goons really do have a clue, but are still too afraid to do >anything about it... //cerridwyn// Since they were speakers, could they be part of the Spot The Fed contest? P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Can not read right brain: <A>bort <R>etry <F>rolic ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: WaPo on Crypto-Genie
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> ... I've unsubscribed ... In> Door. Ass. Bump. Just be happy :) P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Press any key ... EXCEPT THAT ONE! ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: You know it's getting late when...
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10.41 AM 7/30/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >If anyone out there still doubts that the time for my "Assassination >Politics" idea will never come, I claim that it's later than you think. No, I'm fairly sure that it will never come. :) =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo ga sukoshi dekiru) ---------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu PGP public key 0xD37692F9 -----> finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or keyservers 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Is it a forgery? --- I have PGP signed all email and news posts since May 1996. =============================================================================== "Relax. It's not a real alarm. They can't crack _Pentagon_ codes. Can they?" :p -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMf7oEBguzHDTdpL5AQHOPgP+PAHGvrHhQ9SBTY76dA9gYEflvGHqXKJx /NwFn+kwg/ZHxIcyYXdiLWmKIMmEuUMxyPfJaZ/OVhqqEUGqU11LpviflJp1u42B eNoMaugwybfaB3XM+k3WKieJB3Fekj29bYHXuhD1h9VNndTeX016MtR/rHeEM43u oCjX2BrjDsQ= =R+wB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: ANNOUNCE: 2nd trip to National Cryptologic Museum
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:15 PM 7/31/96, Zorak Ramone wrote: > Following the lecture, we will be going over to Henckles (10 minutes >from the museum), a local resturaunt reported to be a favorite hangout for >NSA employees. Henckles has amazing sandwiches as well as good beer on tap. Jeez, first they tap our phones, and now they're tapping our beer! --Klaus

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Violation or Protection? [OLYMPICS]
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I don't have any crypto references, but due to the Libertarian overtones on this list I believe it is on-topic enough. On the local news I saw footage of a couple schmoozing in the Olympic (Centennial?) Park after its reopening. The voice-over said that all bags are being searched, and the couple said that rather than be alarmed or nervous, they "appreciated" it. I'm not quite sure what to think about this. I don't have enough experience to form a well thought-out opinion. I'd like to hear some of everyone's thoughts on this: Is this bag-searching a violation, (which was my immediate reaction) or is it not, because you have to already be going into the controlled area to get searched? Thanks for your help. =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo ga sukoshi dekiru) ---------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu PGP public key 0xD37692F9 -----> finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or keyservers 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Is it a forgery? --- I have PGP signed all email and news posts since May 1996. =============================================================================== "Relax. It's not a real alarm. They can't crack _Pentagon_ codes. Can they?" :p -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMf7oqBguzHDTdpL5AQEtkQP8DjGWrL2n4V0C+Uz+S2adprh3QlXpEBhj xQEPH70mTIYT/iNSvuPQqWtmedlssa0f2A+ziAGPV/DFGTQnACflgcSy3okZVq64 QeuAYx3sDk230FI5vOKXwMPZt3cGwaaVpLwZhc1MkjuSgZwkE9T39JlS1worPGNQ iGkZ8Bp2ZlY= =FEjP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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re:WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:17 AM 7/31/96 -0800, Vinnie Moscaritolo wrote: >"The people of Burgdorf went to parades and speeches--some because they >genuinely believed in their leaders; others, because not to go would call >attention to themselves. Most practiced the silence they were familiar >with, a silence nurtured by fear and complicity that would grow beyond >anything they could imagine, mushrooming into the decades after the war >which, some began to fear, was about to happen. The Nets sure haven't been silent, however. Tyranny is tougher these days. DCF

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Re: Secure drive under Win95... a better way.
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

After much fiddling, I've found (IMHO) a "good" way of using secure drive 1.4a under Win95. After doing the partitioning and encrypting, put the following in your AUTOEXEC.BAT file... cd\utils\secdr14a sectsr login D: /S @choice /T:N,1 @if errorlevel 2 goto ContinueLoad :EnterPP login D: @if errorlevel 1 goto Again @if errorlevel 0 goto ContinueLoad :Again @choice Try again? @if errorlevel 2 goto ContinueLoad @goto EnterPP :ContinueLoad cd\ cls abviously you have to replace the D: with your drive letter, and the directory at the top with your SECDR14a dir. Then, in Win95 you have to turn off 32 bit disk access. To do this without losing all the speed of virtual memory, do the following... right-click on My Computer click on Properties, Performance, File System, Troubleshooting and check the box labeled: Disable all 32 bit protect-mode disk drivers. Re-boot. If you have a CD-ROM drive, you will have to load the DOS drivers in order to be able to access it. Granted, this is just a kludge until Secure Drive is re-designed for Win95, but I've tried a dozen different combinations, and this gives you all the SecDrv security under Win95 (except being able to lock/unlock after Win95 starts) and sacrafices the least amount of system performance. Enjoy! G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at www.pb.net/~wizard | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Reuter on P8 Anti-Terrorism
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12.59 AM 7/31/96 GMT, John Young wrote: > G7, Russia adopt anti-terror pact, avoid sanctions > Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 10:00:07 PDT > > > PARIS (Reuter) - The world's major powers closed ranks to > combat terrorism Tuesday, urging other nations to join > forces with them but sidestepping a dispute over U.S. > demands for sanctions against what Washington calls > "terrorist states." [...] > The ministers also vowed to prevent extremists from using > the Internet computer network to plan attacks and spread > bomb-making instructions. > > > Participants heard Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy > recount how his 11-year-old son had shown him where to find > such content on the Internet. That damn Alta Vista. We should have had it outlawed years ago. "If searching is outlawed, only outlaws will do searches." =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo ga sukoshi dekiru) ---------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu PGP public key 0xD37692F9 -----> finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or keyservers 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Is it a forgery? --- I have PGP signed all email and news posts since May 1996. =============================================================================== "Relax. It's not a real alarm. They can't crack _Pentagon_ codes. Can they?" :p -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMf+h4hguzHDTdpL5AQFveQP9GVX6xOLl5gFcwGP4NGBLKOBGTiphul0Z wqv+Tk7fpOvR66jg3xcl5Bhvmjx1oVaXQQnPPt39/R8vOBzD1HXcvnknRf4uhO7z xp06KZPeKf1V9MA8E1wzRJnifi2EBQEBcj5AzjHBtgN+gLZ3KhMpmguq+kZTxpa4 +TXozx5CrxQ= =RNL9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: A Libertine Question
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Horowitz <alanh(a)infi.net> wrote: <Something about horseshit not being allowed on city streets> _________________ Punkers denounce arrests - Police nab 70 Montreal Gazette, July 30, 1996, Page A1 Punkers returned to Berri park last night to protest against the arrest of 70 of their own during an earlier demonstration in defiance of a city curfew on parks. More than 250 punkers and other marginalized youth gathered in the park around 12:30 a.m. yesterday to protest against a new bylaw that changed the designation of the site from a *public place* to a city park. The change means that the park closes between midnight and 6 a.m. and can't be used overnight by punkers and the homeless. The bylaw also gives police the power to ticket people for such infractions as walking on the grass or taking up more than one space on a park bench. _________________ Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> wrote: >The regulation of ordinary social and economic activity is not a >"homelessness issue", it's a "freedom issue". If you admit that it can >legitimately be regulated but reassure yourself with your trust in the >discretion and good judgement of the regulators, your liberty is more a >matter of grace than of right. Have a nice day. Welcome to our model community. Please don't walk on the grass. Sit up straight. And remember to smile at all times. James

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Re: Dry Under the Waterfall
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:57 AM 7/30/96 -0700, David Kline wrote: > >A question though: What about the 3 million hard-working, reading, >middle-class folks who have been downsized into oblivion the last three >years alone? What about the tens of millions of readers who had the skills >needed for the industrial age, but not for the information age? I forgot to include a little anecdote about education in my original post. There seems to be a belief extant that education is something that you are completely dependent on others for. The masses will just sit there and melt away unless they are given a "program." "I need a program. Who's got a program? We need a program. All God's chillun's got programs." This is provably false. People can learn whatever they have to. (Within very broad intellectual limits.) If they *choose* not to learn (and you are not their parent or employer), it is a violation of their autonomy to browbeat them. You should leave them alone in their ignorance and, of course, not waste any money helping them since they have demonstrated that they aren't interested. An economist might say that those who reject education are making a choice. They are deciding that, for them, the value of today's leisure (L) plus today's income (I) is greater than the recreational value of education (R) plus the present value (PV) of future financial and psychic gains from education. L + I > R + PV In other words, all those people who were drinking beer or working construction while TM was going to college, graduate school, studying physics, and working for Intel were making the decision that *for them* the value of all that time off, plus current income, plus lack of skull sweat was greater than the chance of becoming a millionaire and retiring at 30-something. And they may well be right. In any case, we should honor their choices as we expect them to honor ours. To intervene in a big way in their lives (or in TMs) to challenge their choices is deeply wrong. We can't tell from the outside what the value of the education/work/leisure tradeoff is for an individual. All we can do is observe their actions. If you doubt that people can learn if they really have to... Greta spent her teens fleeing with he mother from Poland into the USSR on foot in advance of the Wermacht (religious differences). As the Wermacht receeded, so did Greta and her mother who preferred the West. In the course of events, they ended up in a Displaced Persons (DP) camp in Austria. There was an understandable reluctance on the part of the DP to be repatriated to areas in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. (Operation Keelhaul would later hand many thousands of DPs over to the commies.) England or America were *by far* the first choice. A rumor went around the camp that England was desperately short of glove makers. Some people in the camp knew how to make gloves. Within a few weeks, everyone in the camp knew how to make gloves. English lessons were also very popular. There were no "programs" to teach either of these skills. The happy ending to the story is that Greta and her mother secured a trip to New York City. In the 45 years since she's been here, Greta has neither returned to Europe or ever felt the desire to do so in spite of the superior European social welfare systems. When asked why, she says that Europe had its shot at her and she doesn't believe in tempting fate. The point is that people can learn if they have to and if they don't have to they don't have to. Life in America today is as easy as it's ever been in human history (at least since the invention of agriculture), so if people want to relax we should let them -- and not subsidize them. DCF

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Re: Photo IDs (Re: A Libertine Question)
by William Knowles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 31 Jul 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > At 02:56 AM 8/1/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > >I can easily make my own photo I.D.s, or even order "fake I.D.s" from > >various mail-order outlets advertising in the Usual Places. If I show up at > >the airline with two photo I.D.s, one showing me to be "Security Officer > >Mickey Mouse" and the other showing me to be "Mickey Mouse, Internal > >Security Agency," will I be violating any laws? > > > >--Mickey Mouse (I just changed my name--if you don't like it, FAA, fuck off) > > They want "government-issued" photo ID. They haven't said which government > have they. Time to get my Barbados driver's license. What about one of those camouflage passports from Britsh Honduras that they sell in the back of the Robb Report for $300? I personally doubt that your basic $4.75 an hour airport security guard knows about that. William Knowles erehwon(a)c2.org -- William Knowles <erehwon(a)c2.org> PGP mail welcome & prefered / KeyID 1024/2C34BCF9 PGP Fingerprint 55 0C 78 3C C9 C4 44 DE 5A 3C B4 60 9C 00 FB BD Finger for public key --

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RE: Game Theory and its Relevance to Cypherpunks
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In Iran, Chenghis Khan killed 30 millions out of 40 who previously lived there. Ghenghis Khan, not Chenghis Khan. It basically proves that people now are no better and no worse than people then. Really, there is no reason for things to be otherwise. I agree with you. Massacre done before is more worst than now. But there are a lot of moral people in those times.

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