December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim, You have a very good point about what goes on in this thread. I wasnt speaking about you yelling at me.. some of the members decided to write me 'personal' memos..one idiot being 'AOL SUCKS KILL ALL AOL SUCKS' or some stupid idiotic undereducated statement like that. Thanks for the response though..it was appreciated. :) Adam

1 0

Re: Style gettting in the way of clear reporting
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Believe it or not, this has some very slight cypherpunk relevance. (Gasp) At 10:06 PM 7/7/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > Sadly, simple expository prose must be considered to be too boring, too banal. > > (Actually, were only a few writers doing this, it might be mildy tolerable. > Speaking for myself, that is. But so _many_ "cyberspace journalists" are > doing bad pastiches of famous stylists that the reportage is being lost in > the noise. When news media were concentrated into fewer and fewer hands during the twentieth century, the appearance of neutrality, objectivity, and authoritativeness became a major selling point, and so media adopted a tone and manner of neutrality, with an accompanying "just-the-facts" style, though in reality they became far less neutral Now that everyone can grab the megaphone, people are not so worried about objectivity. If something is unfair to Nazis or blacks or evil polluting capitalists, they know they will hear about it from the Nazis, the blacks or the evil polluting capitalists. As a result, people no longer value the superficial appearance of neutrality and objectivity. Suddenly colorful and openly biased reporting has become popular. This has led to some people engaging in florid excesses of colorful style and concocting totally phony attitudes., just as when word processing programs first gained the capability to handle a wide variety of fonts, some people produced memos that looked like ransom notes. Soon enough they will settle down. English prose was at its greatest in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when many voices could be heard, and some of them were on the florid side. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

Re: Style gettting in the way of clear reporting
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 AM 7/8/96, James A. Donald wrote: >When news media were concentrated into fewer and fewer hands during >the twentieth century, the appearance of neutrality, objectivity, >and authoritativeness became a major selling point, and so media >adopted a tone and manner of neutrality, with an accompanying >"just-the-facts" style, though in reality they became far less neutral An interesting point. You are probably right that journalism is becoming more florid as "amateurs" flood the market. However, I don't quite buy the concentration argument, as things were pretty concentrated in the Hearst era, and the explosion of magazines in the past few decades has not been as concentrated. (In any case, these are hard things to quantify without more research, which I for one am unlikely to pursue.) >Now that everyone can grab the megaphone, people are not so worried >about objectivity. If something is unfair to Nazis or blacks or evil >polluting capitalists, they know they will hear about it from the >Nazis, the blacks or the evil polluting capitalists. > >As a result, people no longer value the superficial appearance of >neutrality and objectivity. Suddenly colorful and openly biased >reporting has become popular. I still think of "The Wall Street Journal" and "The Economist," two of my favorites, as being _careful_ in their reporting (careful is different from unbiased). But my main focus in this thread was on the _styles_, and this I think is more explained by faddishness. And advertising. To get "mind space," as with "shelf space," the packaging must entice, fool, and trick the reader. >This has led to some people engaging in florid excesses of colorful >style and concocting totally phony attitudes., just as when word >processing programs first gained the capability to handle a wide >variety of fonts, some people produced memos that looked like >ransom notes. Yes, and many of the newsletters we're seeing--as many are cc:ed or forwarded to our list--are the kissing cousins of "zines." Same faux style, same emphasis on "flash" over substance. (Not all of them of course.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

Re: more about the usefulness of PGP
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> make sure that you are protected from replay attacks. > a good idea would be to make the server to send cookies by request of > the remote user (you can limit the number of people to whom the server > sends cookies) and make sure that messages without the latest cookie > will NOT be executed. A simpler solution would be for the user to number each message. He would send message #1, then message #2, then #3, etc... Skipping some numbers should not be a problem. The server would just have to keep track of the most recently recieved message number, and only accept messages with a larger number. The user would also have to keep track... It would be very easy to do; the user could number each message based on date and time. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 8 Jul 96 6:48:30 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *+*#+*#-*### 3:36 100.00% replay remailer(a)replay.com **+*******+* 4:23 99.99% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******** 16:45 99.98% c2 remail(a)c2.org +-++++++-+++ 46:47 99.97% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +*********** 17:25 99.97% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com #+#-##*##### 2:49 99.97% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++++ 38:37 99.96% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com *___.+#*+#*+ 4:34:27 99.95% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .------+++++ 5:42:01 99.92% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net .-++---+--++ 3:59:13 99.91% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +###+#* #+## 3:07 99.80% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++ -+++++++ 48:41 99.78% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net .__.___-... 24:13:12 99.68% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ----.----.- 7:38:28 99.39% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ---- -----+ 3:42:52 99.31% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org +++*****++++ 38:39 99.29% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ...--....- 27:11:56 99.00% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org --##* ### 1:26:57 98.73% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #+*####- ## 3:52 98.05% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +++- --+ + 2:18:51 97.06% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com **+**** ** 4:35 95.60% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Hurricane Bertha hitting Offshore Information Services
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hurricane Bertha is almost certainly going to hit Anguilla, where Offshore Information Services is located. It will probably be at the strongest about 9 am Eastern time Monday morning. This is still not a really big hurricane, so we will not get anything like the trouble we had with Luis last year. Still, there is some chance that we will be offline at some time. If so please understand why. I have about 8 hours of battery backup. If power is out at our location for longer than that I will relocate the server to another location, as I did after Luis. There is little chance that power will go out everywhere for longer than 8 hours. There is a good chance that we get through this without going down, but I just wanted to let people know what our status is. Be patient if sometime tomorrow you can not get to our site. -- Vince Cate Offshore Information Services, Ltd. Anguilla http://online.offshore.com.ai/

1 0

Re: Style gettting in the way of clear reporting
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:38 PM 7/7/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 12:40 AM 7/8/96, James A. Donald wrote: > >>When news media were concentrated into fewer and fewer hands during >>the twentieth century, the appearance of neutrality, objectivity, >>and authoritativeness became a major selling point, and so media >>adopted a tone and manner of neutrality, with an accompanying >>"just-the-facts" style, though in reality they became far less neutral > >An interesting point. You are probably right that journalism is becoming >more florid as "amateurs" flood the market. However, I don't quite buy the >concentration argument, as things were pretty concentrated in the Hearst >era, and the explosion of magazines in the past few decades has not been as >concentrated. (In any case, these are hard things to quantify without more >research, which I for one am unlikely to pursue.) It is probably true that journalism was more concentrated in the late 1800's and early 1900's, since it consisted of a few newspapers. However, I think a good argument could be made that because government was dramatically smaller than today, that concentration was not nearly as detrimental as it would be today under similar circumstances. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Cypherpunk Enquirer
by enquirer＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I finally lost the tail somewhere around the docks, and slowly worked my way into Chiba, watching my back all the way. I dumped the chip in the saddlebag of a bike messenger who almost ran me down in front of the Jarre, figured he'd get a good scare out of a midnight visit from the NSA goons who'd been using it to follow my tracks out of Tokyo. They weren't going to like the way I rearranged the facial features of their buddy who tried to waylay me outside of the pachinko parlor. One last glance behind me, and I ducked into the Chatsubo. She was waiting for me there, a vision of pure lust in a red mini-dress with cleavage all the way down to her waist and legs all the way down to the floor. I tried to stay casual as I sauntered over to the bar next to her. "Vodka martini. Shaken, not stirred," I said to Ratz, the regular bartender. Ratz slammed the drink down on the counter in front of me. "Shaken enough for you, Dick?" he said. "Dick. Nice name." She had a voice that sounded like wind blowing through pine trees on a hot summer night. Low. Breathy. Wet. "He's being an asshole. Dick's American slang for a PI. Mind if I join you?" "Suit yourself." I pulled up a stool, surreptitiously slipping her PGP signature into my PDA. It checked out. Good. Now if she just had the merchandise. I hadn't come 5,000 miles just to check out her pectoral development. I leaned over close, trying not to stare at that pair of 38Ds. "You got anything else you'd like to show me?" Her emerald green eyes bored into mine, and then slowly dropped down to the level of my zipper. She slowly slid the hem of her dress up her creamy thigh, just high enough so that I could see that she wasn't wearing any panties. And there it was. Tucked into the top of her silk stocking, just next to the black lace garter. "That floppy's got the source to Declan McCullagh and Ian Goldberg's crack of the Surfwatch database. Worth a small fortune to anyone with the cojones to spam a sample to K12." She licked her lips like she was getting ready to go down on a double dip of Cherry Garcia. "Would you like to come up to my room and take a closer look?" (OK, Nobody, knock it off. You got rid of Tim May three paragraphs ago. Let's get on with it, huh?) (Shit, boss, just trying to have a little fun ... ) THE CYPHERPUNK ENQUIRER "Encyphering minds want to know." Fresh on the heels of the Chicago Bull's triumph in the NBA finals, Michael Jordan has announced the release of his new signature Internet encryption product, Michael Jordan's Awfully Good Snake Oil. Based on a tried and tested but proprietary algorithm, AGSO is guaranteed to provide superior 40 bit encryption of all important Internet traffic. Michael himself personally guarantees that AGSO will integrate perfectly with the Eudora mailer, and used no 14 year old Nicaraguan programmers like that inferior Kathy Lee Gifford shit, and no feminine frou-frou like with Liz Taylor's Black Perl. Jim Bell was injured today when a mail exploder went off in his hands. Doctors at the Bethesda Naval Hospital reported that the mail exploder had been upgraded from critical to stable condition and was resting comfortably in a private room. After a visit from fellow patient Louis Freeh, the mail exploder commented, "It's surprising how well he's learned to talk through that proctoscope." Matt Blaze has finally come clean, and agreed to provide a partial transcript of the NSA's famous "If you knew what we know, you'd support key escrow" presentation, which according to Mr. Blaze starts out, "If you knew about the video tapes we have of you with that 16 year old blonde at the Motel Six ... " Due to continuing controversy over the Michael Jackson case, and bowing to extreme election year pressure from the religious right, President Clinton today announced a new policy to prevent child abuse in the music industry. The Rock Musicians Penis Escrow Bill would require all musicians selling more than 10,000 CDs to file photographs of their (presumably tumescent) genitals with the FBI so that they could be examined and identified in the event of accusations of lascivious behavior with minors. Leon Panetta was reportedly flying to Chicago for discussions with the presently retired Plaster Casters, hoping to garner their support for the bill, while the Wall Street Journal announced an investigation into rumors that Chelsea has a standing request with the FBI for multiple copies. The Libertarian Party immediately announced its whole-hearted support for the plan after Jim Ray snuck the plank into the party platform when no one was looking. Tim May's experimental plan to reduce the noise level on the Cypherpunk Mailing List was declared a resounding success after massive doses of Ritalin actually caused Perry Metzger to apologize for flaming a clueless AOLer. In related news, AwakenToMe has finally figured out protected mode, and has announced the first Pentium condom that actually fits over the cooling fan. Sameer Parkesh announced that c2.org is now hosting an "Unanimizer" web browser, which makes web servers think that the entire population of the WhoWhere search engine has just accessed their pages. Next in the Enquirer: Bob Dole on the dangers of the abacus virus.

1 0

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent Tim's original post to a psychiatrist friend, who responded: Ritalin is a lifesaver for a small % of children who suffer from a condition characterized by hyperactivity and poor attention span. These kids (usually boys) may be bright as hell but fail in school because they can't sit still or pay attention; they get made fun of, they behave badly, get depressed, it's a mess. Some of them (milder cases) respond to behavior modification therapies which involve training of the parents and teachers to have realistic expectation, recognize the specific difficulties the kids have, set them goals, reward them for achieving them, give them disincentives for misbehaving etc. Others really do need Ritalin. It's a relief not just for the parents and teachers but for the kids to be able to sit still and pay attention and learn and succeed and be liked etc. Most of them grow out of it by their mid-teens. However, there are many more kids on Ritalin than there need to be; some teachers pressure parents to get kids put on it... I know one very bright little girl who's bored out of her mind in school, the school refuses to move her up a grade or give her more challenging work to do, instead complain that she is not paying attention and suggested that she be put on Ritalin... mother was furious. Some of the kids who use foul language (a very small %) have Tourette's disease, and also need medicine (a different one)... by and large the politically correct thing is sometimes to label a kid as sick rather than bad or spoiled, this is probably why drugs are over-used. But we can't throw the baby out with the bathwater! By the way, some old people who are severely depressed after a stroke also do well with Ritalin and don't respond to any other antidepressants... Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://mahavir.doe.ernet.in/~pinaward/arun.htm The protestors of Tiananmen Square will be back. Next time, the battle will be fought in cyberspace, where the students have the more powerful tanks...

3 3

Cypherpunk Enquirer
by enquirer＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I finally lost the tail somewhere around the docks, and slowly worked my way into Chiba, watching my back all the way. I dumped the chip in the saddlebag of a bike messenger who almost ran me down in front of the Jarre, figured he'd get a good scare out of a midnight visit from the NSA goons who'd been using it to follow my tracks out of Tokyo. They weren't going to like the way I rearranged the facial features of their buddy who tried to waylay me outside of the pachinko parlor. One last glance behind me, and I ducked into the Chatsubo. She was waiting for me there, a vision of pure lust in a red mini-dress with cleavage all the way down to her waist and legs all the way down to the floor. I tried to stay casual as I sauntered over to the bar next to her. "Vodka martini. Shaken, not stirred," I said to Ratz, the regular bartender. Ratz slammed the drink down on the counter in front of me. "Shaken enough for you, Dick?" he said. "Dick. Nice name." She had a voice that sounded like wind blowing through pine trees on a hot summer night. Low. Breathy. Wet. "He's being an asshole. Dick's American slang for a PI. Mind if I join you?" "Suit yourself." I pulled up a stool, surreptitiously slipping her PGP signature into my PDA. It checked out. Good. Now if she just had the merchandise. I hadn't come 5,000 miles just to check out her pectoral development. I leaned over close, trying not to stare at that pair of 38Ds. "You got anything else you'd like to show me?" Her emerald green eyes bored into mine, and then slowly dropped down to the level of my zipper. She slowly slid the hem of her dress up her creamy thigh, just high enough so that I could see that she wasn't wearing any panties. And there it was. Tucked into the top of her silk stocking, just next to the black lace garter. "That floppy's got the source to Declan McCullagh and Ian Goldberg's crack of the Surfwatch database. Worth a small fortune to anyone with the cojones to spam a sample to K12." She licked her lips like she was getting ready to go down on a double dip of Cherry Garcia. "Would you like to come up to my room and take a closer look?" (OK, Nobody, knock it off. You got rid of Tim May three paragraphs ago. Let's get on with it, huh?) (Shit, boss, just trying to have a little fun ... ) THE CYPHERPUNK ENQUIRER "Encyphering minds want to know." Fresh on the heels of the Chicago Bull's triumph in the NBA finals, Michael Jordan has announced the release of his new signature Internet encryption product, Michael Jordan's Awfully Good Snake Oil. Based on a tried and tested but proprietary algorithm, AGSO is guaranteed to provide superior 40 bit encryption of all important Internet traffic. Michael himself personally guarantees that AGSO will integrate perfectly with the Eudora mailer, and used no 14 year old Nicaraguan programmers like that inferior Kathy Lee Gifford shit, and no feminine frou-frou like with Liz Taylor's Black Perl. Jim Bell was injured today when a mail exploder went off in his hands. Doctors at the Bethesda Naval Hospital reported that the mail exploder had been upgraded from critical to stable condition and was resting comfortably in a private room. After a visit from fellow patient Louis Freeh, the mail exploder commented, "It's surprising how well he's learned to talk through that proctoscope." Matt Blaze has finally come clean, and agreed to provide a partial transcript of the NSA's famous "If you knew what we know, you'd support key escrow" presentation, which according to Mr. Blaze starts out, "If you knew about the video tapes we have of you with that 16 year old blonde at the Motel Six ... " Due to continuing controversy over the Michael Jackson case, and bowing to extreme election year pressure from the religious right, President Clinton today announced a new policy to prevent child abuse in the music industry. The Rock Musicians Penis Escrow Bill would require all musicians selling more than 10,000 CDs to file photographs of their (presumably tumescent) genitals with the FBI so that they could be examined and identified in the event of accusations of lascivious behavior with minors. Leon Panetta was reportedly flying to Chicago for discussions with the presently retired Plaster Casters, hoping to garner their support for the bill, while the Wall Street Journal announced an investigation into rumors that Chelsea has a standing request with the FBI for multiple copies. The Libertarian Party immediately announced its whole-hearted support for the plan after Jim Ray snuck the plank into the party platform when no one was looking. Tim May's experimental plan to reduce the noise level on the Cypherpunk Mailing List was declared a resounding success after massive doses of Ritalin actually caused Perry Metzger to apologize for flaming a clueless AOLer. In related news, AwakenToMe has finally figured out protected mode, and has announced the first Pentium condom that actually fits over the cooling fan. Sameer Parkesh announced that c2.org is now hosting an "Unanimizer" web browser, which makes web servers think that the entire population of the WhoWhere search engine has just accessed their pages. Next in the Enquirer: Bob Dole on the dangers of the abacus virus.

1 0

Re: The Net and Terrorism
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 19:52 02/07/96 -0500, John Deters wrote: >Even so, there are a couple of problems with even attempting "to take away >the root causes", not the least of which is the Constitutionally protected >right to free speech. I am allowed to teach my kid to hate anyone for any >reason. I can blame this or that group for this set of troubles, and that >the best way to deal with this is not only to scare them away, but to kill >as many of them as possible. It may be morally repugnant, but it is >protected speech. I think we've all been exposed to awful teaching in some aspects of our upbringing, but experience taught us otherwise. I love the anarchist poster that says, "We are the people whom our parents used to warn us about." Just because you were taught hate, doesn't mean you won't outgrow it. My mother was active in the freedom struggle against the British, and told me enough horror stories that I grew up hating them. But once I met some perfectly decent specimens, it evaporated. If the hate persists, there is likely to be reinforcement in the form of injustices, further bad experiences, etc. India is a large, diverse country with lots of injustice, poverty and other problems. When we analyze what breeds terrorism, we find aspects such as: - Severe neglect by the government (i.e. problems keep getting worse): For instance, the north east (which is east of Bangladesh, and has a long history of militant opposition) had to agitate for a long time to even get a railway line to connect them to the rest of the country. - Meddling by politicians: in Punjab, there was a Sikh regional party that was quite strong. To erode its popular base, Indira Gandhi encouraged the fundamentalists on its right. Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi's government helped train the Tamil LTTE. Both paid for these blunders with their lives, at the hands of the very groups they had once tried to foster. - Disenfranchisement: In Kashmir, most elections were rigged, as the central government pretty much admits now. Interestingly, some of the leaders of the terrorists were polling agents at the time of the previous elections, and were quite disgusted at what they saw. >The countries that sponsor terrorists have not been noted for their >successful educational systems. And they certainly are not going to listen >to Western discussions on how best to solve their "problems". No, but give the people the conviction that they can get their problems redressed legally, that they can win political power peacefully, and basically not let problems fester for so long that all trust in government is lost, and people will be far less likely to take to arms. Phoolan Devi (seen "Bandit Queen"? Great movie) was a dacoit, supposedly responsible for serious massacres. She went to jail, now she is an elected member of the federal Parliament. That is a great message to send to the poor and deprived. The cynic in me sees this as a way of depriving the poor suffering masses of their leaders, by co-opting them into the ruling elite. But there is no shortage of followers eager and willing to take their place. >The U.S. has a level of tolerance for diversity that I >only recently came to >appreciate. We hosted a foreign exchange student from Scotland (hardly >culture shock to him), but he surprised me when he commented on how >surprised he was that different groups of people were mixed together I've had a similar experience. I was part of the Indian delegation to a couple of Amnesty International International Council meetings. In this organisation, multiracialism and multiculturalism are heavily promoted. But if you looked at delegations from Europe, even from countries with sizable racial minorities, they were typically all-white. The US delegation, on the other hand, had blacks, different kinds of Asians, Hispanics... and not by design -- the US section leadership is highly "mixed", so they did not have to think about multiracialism, it just happened. Of course, given the "melting pot" ethos in the US, this is hardly surprising. However, every society has its blind spots. Communism is a real US phobia. The way you treat puny Cuba I find truly amazing. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://mahavir.doe.ernet.in/~pinaward/arun.htm The protestors of Tiananmen Square will be back. Next time, the battle will be fought in cyberspace, where the students have the more powerful tanks...

1 0

Re: DEA Intercepts
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 7 Jul 96 at 23:59, Timothy C. May wrote: > At 9:19 PM 7/7/96, John Young wrote: [..] > > "I don't think J. Edgar Hoover would contemplate what we > > can do today in terms of technology," Reno testified during > > a Senate hearing in May. A double-edged quote, isn't it? [Tim's sort-of techie comments deleted.] Who needs high-tech for a surveillance state? I remember several years back a Soviet-history class that put a lot of emphasis on the Czar's totalitarian regime, much of which was already in place when the Bolshviks took power (and one of the reasons they held it). Irregardless of the literacy rate (which I'm guessing was low anyway), it was apparently common practice in many European countries in the early 19th century (incl. Russia) to have 'black offices' in the post offices that would steam open EVERY piece of mail to be read for intelligence and surveillance purposes. And back then there was probably a higher proportion of meaningful mail since there was no telephone, radio, or (very little) direct-mail marketing. Generally such offices were used for political purposes. Oddly enough the secret police organizations spied heavily on those in power as well: sometimes I wonder if Americal political scandals are (or will ever be) linked to US intelligence agencies listening in one some pol's calls. This is akin in some ways to building a postal system where there's a black office in every station. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

1 0

Re: The Net and Terrorism
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:16 PM 7/8/96 +0500, Arun Mehta wrote: >India is a large, diverse country with lots of injustice, poverty and other >problems. When we analyze what breeds terrorism, we find aspects such as: > >- Severe neglect by the government (i.e. problems keep getting worse): For >instance, the north east (which is east of Bangladesh, and has a long >history of militant opposition) had to agitate for a long time to even get a >railway line to connect them to the rest of the country. this is totally back to front. The primary cause of terrorism, and indeed the primary party guilty of terrorism in India *is* the government. For example the war upon the Sikhs started off with government sponsored terror against Sikh civilians, similar to Krystalnacht. We mostly see terrorism in countries with a large and intrusive government, not in countries like Hong Kong where there is massive government "neglect" >- Disenfranchisement: In Kashmir, most elections were rigged, as the central >government pretty much admits now. Oh wow: So the Muslims of Kashmir were more upset by rigged elections than by the murder of women and children. If that is true, why do we not see terror in Hong Kong (no elections until recently) and Singapore, (rigged elections) > The US delegation, on the > other hand, had blacks, different kinds of Asians, Hispanics... and not by > design -- the US section leadership is highly "mixed", so they did not have > to think about multiracialism, it just happened. Pull the other leg. They even have a black lesbian quota. US ambassadorships had gay quota even under Reagan, though not a black lesbian quota. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

Laughing my ass off
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Holy Exon that was good!! Please publish a PGP pubkey so that I may send you a token of my appreciation. (A token which is exchangeable for a national currency, perhaps.) Bryce - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Certificate-Type: Chudov/Wilcox Content/Author Rating Rating-Type: Content Object-ID: Date: Sun, 7 Jul 1996 23:32:37 -0700/From: enquirer(a)alpha.c2.org Topicality: 10 Entertainment: 10 Value: 8 Signer: 0x2c2998ad Signature: <wrapped> - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMeE0U0jbHy8sKZitAQF6QwMAqj1CTsV7VzSLBxbwL8vZKG93a1nG8nrn p6WQB7BXQ/0shyjKpaKhfQKiiYVAAcINvfS2Df8ZcAYaEbIzoh3R6jMFvEye3ocp qI1ipX08vdUp8H01CqtDugjfmGt1ZcM6 =Wnyy - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMeE0kUjbHy8sKZitAQEKIAL+IGV5vlaKU9PL6fGdr2dCGUsDoLNnl+un oWowEa4+Wtw3lAoPN68kEaXd+UPedS+oaxuTNwvFz7SHmS25+BvhTOylYVhs+ASx L0+Cv/BCDqCx22r2EfGm9JSncidwmF9G =mP3K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Computing
by Eric Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am a new person here, so I am not directing this message to any specific person. Answer freely. It seems to me that the computing age is advancing too quickly. I bought an excellent Pentium 75Mhz system about one and a half years ago. Now, I can buy a laptop of the same setup for the same price. I do computer programming and just bought a copy of Borland C++ 5.0 for $300. I expect it to be out-dated very quickly. I dodn't bother with Windows '95, because it is way too buggy and Windows '97 is soon to come. '95 was simply an introduction to what Microshaft can already do. I don't fall for the daily updates, or bug changes, because I know that none of my internet software or printer software will run on it. I wouldn't mind, however, making a program for '95 that would make me a few buck$. I have observed that in the time that the P6 came out, Motorola (if that's how you spell it) has signed with another company to make a Gigabyte RAM chip. Won't that be interesting?

1 0

Technology- vs. Human-based Surveillance
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:35 AM 7/8/96, Deranged Mutant wrote: >Who needs high-tech for a surveillance state? I remember several >years back a Soviet-history class that put a lot of emphasis on the >Czar's totalitarian regime, much of which was already in place when >the Bolshviks took power (and one of the reasons they held it). ... A human-based surveillance state is very expensive, even by the standards of modern America and its bloated government. The recent example of the DDR's "Staasi" provides an example. Hard to hide the extent of the surveillance when so many people are involved. Better, think the Thought Police, to use technology to do the intercepts and pre-screening of the take. Also, the right technology (right for them, not us) makes widespread tapping possible, where human-based systems are not. (As but one example, hard to get human spies into companies on short notice to monitor a target.) In short, technology-based surveillance is "scalable" in a way that human-based surveillance is not. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

TACDFIPSFKMI (fwd)
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 08 Jul 1996 16:36:09 -0400 From: Elaine Frye <elaine.frye(a)nist.gov> Subject: Announcement re New TAC July 8, 1998 Note To: Key Escrow Distribution List From: Ed Roback Subject: Establishment of the Technical Advisory Committee to Develop a Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure (TACDFIPSFKMI) FYI, the following notice was published today in the Federal Register. --------- Published 7-8-96 in the Federal Register, Volume 61, Number 131 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Technical Advisory Committee to Develop a Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2, and the General Services Administration (GSA) rule on Federal Advisory Committee Management, 41 CFR Part 101-6, and after consultation with GSA, the Secretary of Commerce has determined that the establishment of the Technical Advisory Committee to Develop a Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure is in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed upon the Department by law. The Committee will advise the Secretary on the development of a draft Federal Information Processing Standard for the Federal Key Management Infrastructure. The Committee will consist of no more than twenty-four members to be appointed by the Secretary to assure balanced representation among individuals with established expertise in cryptography and the implementation and use of cryptographic systems. The Committee will function solely as an advisory body, and in compliance with provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The charter will be filed under the Act, fifteen days from the date of publication of this notice. Interested parties are invited to submit comments regarding the establishment of this committee to Edward Roback, Computer Security, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, telephone: 301-975-3696. Dated: June 27, 1996 Mark Bohannon Chief Counsel for the the Technology Administration [FR Doc. 96-16896, Filed 7-5-96; 8:45 a.m.] ***************************************************** Elaine Frye Computer Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology Bldg. 820, M.S. Room 426 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-0001 Voice: 301/975-2819 Fax: 301/948-1233 *****************************************************

1 0

Re: Style gettting in the way of clear reporting
by Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

May complains loudly about Meek and other writers style. Meek hardily needs my defense, he's the best in the biz (speaking as another writer, I add, damn it!) But, your problem is simply one of style, not of substance. Like it or not, Meek does communicate well with the vast majority of his readers. His faux-Chandler isn't for everyone, but he makes his points loud and clear. Steven Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols sjvn(a)access.digex.net http://www.access.digex.net/~sjvn/vna.html QOTD: "You have a job. I work for a living" -- sjvn, freelance writer

1 0

Re: The Net and Terrorism
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks for the fine comments (and the comments from your shrink-wrapped friend on Ritalin). A very few comments: At 8:16 AM 7/8/96, Arun Mehta wrote: >because you were taught hate, doesn't mean you won't outgrow it. My mother >was active in the freedom struggle against the British, and told me enough >horror stories that I grew up hating them. But once I met some perfectly >decent specimens, it evaporated. This is my experience, too, with using common sense in deciding which races, if any, to hate. >India is a large, diverse country with lots of injustice, poverty and other >problems. When we analyze what breeds terrorism, we find aspects such as: > >- Severe neglect by the government (i.e. problems keep getting worse): For >instance, the north east (which is east of Bangladesh, and has a long >history of militant opposition) had to agitate for a long time to even get a >railway line to connect them to the rest of the country. A case, of course, where the government set the policy on who to connect, based on votes and influence. In a market economy, regions get connected by rail when a market for goods to be shipped appears likely, when customers will pay for tickets, etc. (Until the last several decades, this is the way railroads and shipping in the U.S. expanded. J.J. Hill built the "Great Northern" rail line across the northern part of the U.S. without a dime of subsidy and without much interference by government.) >- Meddling by politicians: in Punjab, there was a Sikh regional party that >was quite strong. To erode its popular base, Indira Gandhi encouraged the >fundamentalists on its right. Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi's government helped >train the Tamil LTTE. Both paid for these blunders with their lives, at the >hands of the very groups they had once tried to foster. This "tactical move" of pitting one religious or ethnic group against another should be a lesson for the rest of us. Much better to take a hands-off attitude and essentially pretend that differences don't matter. (As opposed, say, to giving special privileges to Baptists, blacks, Catholics, etc.) In this regard, I think the U.S. got it "right" (though we are drifting toward a "minority rights" situation, which is sowing the seeds of Indian-style sectarian conflict, e.g., the riots in Los Angeles a few years ago). (Arun is now quoting someone else) >>The U.S. has a level of tolerance for diversity that I >>only recently came to >>appreciate. We hosted a foreign exchange student from Scotland (hardly >>culture shock to him), but he surprised me when he commented on how >>surprised he was that different groups of people were mixed together > >I've had a similar experience. I was part of the Indian delegation to a >couple of Amnesty International International Council meetings. In this >organisation, multiracialism and multiculturalism are heavily promoted. But >if you looked at delegations from Europe, even from countries with sizable >racial minorities, they were typically all-white. The US delegation, on the >other hand, had blacks, different kinds of Asians, Hispanics... and not by >design -- the US section leadership is highly "mixed", so they did not have >to think about multiracialism, it just happened. Of course, given the >"melting pot" ethos in the US, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, Americans are often branded as racist yahoos by the enlightened, racially-tolerant folks of Europe. They cluck at our "racial problems." However, America is a melting pot, as Arun notes. On a daily basis we interact with blacks, Asians, Mexicans, whites of all flavors, etc. Blacks, for example, are very well-represented in so many areas (not science and technology, for educational/cultural/image reasons--see Note if you want to hear why). For anyone who buys the UNESCO line about how American is a fundamentally racist society, a visit for a few weeks should clarify things. There is still a lot of racial separation, by choice and not by law, and economic disparities. But the fact is that the races mix on a daily basis, with little or no conflict. Music, sports, entertainment, business, etc. (Note: For various cultural and image reasons, science and technology are _not_ emphasized as careers for black children. Contrast the image of science in predominantly black environments with the image of science in, say, predominantly Jewish environments. The result is clear: blacks are severely underrepresented in these areas, and Jews are overrepresented in these same areas. Hey, I'm just citing a basic truth of our times, at least in this country. Similar statistics apply to Asians, with more than half of all U.C. Berkeley science and engineering undergrad students being Asian, and something less than 3% of them being black. The figures for who _graduates_ are even more skewed. There are various reasons for this. One of my pet peeves is how the terms "dweeb," "nerd," and "geek" are used to characterize science and engineering majors and professionals. Hardly terms that are likely to make a brother in the hood consider studying science!) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

2 1

Pseudo-DC-net Project
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am working on a project to implement a variation of a DC-net to be run over the Internet. I am posting this summary to find out if it overlaps with projects others are working on; to see what members of the lists think of the general ideas for the network I have in mind; and to see if anyone is interested in helping me out. The variation of a DC-net I have in mind will vary in three important ways from a true DC-net: Difference (1) (Pseudo-random numbers) It will use pseudo-random numbers in place of true random numbers. Difference (2) (Star shaped network) The graph of the network will be star shaped instead of completely connected. Difference (3) (MACs) Messages broadcast on the pseudo-DC-net will have a MAC appended in a key shared by the channel participants. Difference (4) (Encryption) Messages sent to the channel will be encrypted in a key shared by the participants. Because of these difference from a true DC-net I will refer to the network I have in mind as a "pseudo-DC-net". Difference (1) is desirable since current techniques for generating true random numbers on PC's are slow, and distribution of the resulting true random numbers is enormously consumptive in terms of bandwidth. Difference (2) is made possible by the use of pseudo-random number generators, and is desirable since it reduces the total number of messages that need to transferred. Difference (3) is desirable to identify messages broadcast by unauthorized parties to the network, and, as a side benefit, to help clients filter out collisions--- when two parties try to broadcast at the same time. Difference (4) is desirable so that eavesdroppers cannot determine what messages are being broadcast to the network. Difference (1) implies a downgrading of the level of anonymity from unconditional to cryptographic, and difference (2) opens the possibility for protocol attacks. I would like to break this project up into three parts: a formal protocol specification, a client implementation or implementations, and a server implementation or implementations. I would like the formal protocol specification to be publicly available to allow anyone to write their own clients and servers, and to communicate their criticisms of the protocol. The protocol will not dictate what pseudo-random number generator is to be used, although there will be a note of a rule to ensure that pairs of users are using the same generator for the "coin flips" they share. Similarly, the protocol should be flexible enough to allow the use of any reasonable length MAC. A general outline of the protocols I have in mind are as follows: Protocol (1) (Channel registration protocol) Channels will be registered with the server. A channel will be specified by a time frame in which a pseudo-DC-net is to be run; the IP address and port to which clients are to connect to join the channel; the length of each message block to be transmitted to the channel; and a channel ID. Protocol (2) (Pseudo-DC-net real-time protocol) The protocol for running the channel will consist of a series of "rounds". Each round will consist of the following steps: Step (1) The transmission of a round synchronization number from the server to the clients, along with a string of bits specifying the set of users connected. Old clients should make sure that the synchronization number is consistent with the synchronization number of the previous round. Step (2) Receipt by the server from each client of a block of input for that round. (If the user does not wish to broadcast, this will be the XOR sum of the next blocks in the the pseudo-random number streams shared by the user with the other users (call this sum S). If the user wishes to broadcast, it will be the encryption of the following: the XOR of S with a message consisting of the concatenation of the channel id, round number, message length, message, message padding, and MAC of these five components.) Step (3) Transmission from the server to each client of the XOR sum of the blocks received. Protocol (3) (Optional Payment Protocol) I would like to add the option for the server to charge e-cash for the administration of the channel. I have also thought about an extension in which messages to the server would be signed so that the server could prevent an unauthorized user from hijacking a connection and disrupting a channel. If you would like to help me out with this project, if it overlaps with something you are already doing or have done, or you just think my ideas are no good (or good! :) ), please let me know. I am especially interested in attacks in which the server lies about the round number or set of connected users. If this project is works out well, I would like to later work on protocols for voting using a pseudo-DC-net. Leonard Janke (pgp key id 0xF4118611) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMeFVY0MBIFf0EYYRAQErKwf+OcQjqoODovlRJZtrXuqTGeiRHTobFDa+ DFWEmGl+yditRBt9nAlCgXGiRkCXhqroX30M+SEVw02trc1eBMCeJUSvxB9d0pN6 9x3vDN/XB4Kj6kAuAypulBCa0f74Uim4nJvZDw7boEW/hXY3Yuf7d3mgOsNY/LRT p62FL24wnz8aeBAVYnE6SJp59u9Yssrvb2lez1IuKIdN8Rqx590Fwn1VBZ2oqGk8 6UucJkvTht7XmKPuckND+Lhq7jv1vVZKZD3NRe4Uy21JstwKwwpuVXVX98YlNc+Y a15wW4WstZIzsKuPrYVsLsb+wXsETp1sgp5jDkKQABfit7XS8FVC9g== =KZsI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

[Announcement] - Crypto library for Java available
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Systemics Cryptix crypto library for Java is now available for download at http://www.systemics.com/software/ The library is FREE FOR COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL USE. Apart from much tidying up, there have been several signigicant additions to the library, including a Blowfish implementation, RSA encryption (including key generation routines), CFB and CBC block cipher mode modules, and a cryptographically secure random InputStream. Enjoy! CRYPTIX 1.1 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC EXTENSIONS FOR JAVA _________________________________________________________________ DESCRIPTION This library contains a suite of cryptographic classes for Java. Some of the classes have been implemented in native code for performance reasons, and have been tested on Windows 95, Windows NT, Solaris, Linux and IRIX. The package documentation is available on line. FEATURES All of the following have been implemented: * java.crypt.BlockCipher This class is a base class for all block ciphers. * java.crypt.Blowfish (based on code from A.M. Kuchling, Bryan Olson and Bruce Schneier) An implementation of Bruce Schneier's Blowfish block cipher. * java.crypt.CipherFeedback A class for implementing the cipher feedback mode of block cipher encryption. * java.crypt.CSRandomStream A cryptographically secure pseudo random input-stream. * java.crypt.DES (based on code from Eric Young) An implementation of the DES block cipher. * java.crypt.HashMD5 An class encapsulating MD5 hashes. * java.crypt.HashSHA An class encapsulating SHA hashes. * java.crypt.IDEA An implementation of the IDEA block cipher algorithm. Based on native libraries. * java.crypt.MD5 (based on code from RSA Data Security, Inc.) An implementation of the MD5 message digest algorithm. Based on native libraries. * java.crypt.MD5OutputStream An output stream the creates an MD5 hash of its input. * java.crypt.MessageDigest A base class for all messsage digest algorithms. * java.crypt.MessageDigestOutputStream A class for using message digest functions to hash an output stream. * java.crypt.MessageHash A base class for classes encapsulating hashes. * java.crypt.rsa.PublicKey An RSA public key. * java.crypt.rsa.RSAKeyGen A class for generating RSA public/secret key pairs. * java.crypt.rsa.SecretKey An RSA secret key. * java.crypt.SHA (based on code from NIST and Peter C. Gutmann) An implementation of NISTs SHA message digest algorithm. Based on native libraries. * java.crypt.SHAOutputStream An output stream the creates an SHA hash of its input. * java.crypt.StreamCipher A base class for stream ciphers. * java.math.BigInteger (based on code from Eric Young). This class implements arbitrary length integers and some associated mathematical functions. Based on native libraries. * java.math.MPI A class for converting BigIntegers to and from MPI format integers. * java.math.PRNG A class for generating a pseudo random sequence with a period of 2**160. * java.math.RandomStream An input stream that is random. * java.math.TestPrime A class for testing the primality of BigIntegers. COPYRIGHT This library includes (or is derived from) software developed by (and owned by) the following: * Peter C. Gutmann * A.M. Kuchling * NIST * Bryan Olson * RSA Data Security, Inc. * Bruce Schneier * Eric Young &lteay(a)mincom.oz.au> Other parts of the library are covered by the following licence: Copyright (c) 1995, 1996 Systemics Ltd (http://www.systemics.com/) All rights reserved. This library and applications are FREE FOR COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL USE as long as the following conditions are adhered to. Copyright remains with Systemics Ltd, and as such any Copyright notices in the code are not to be removed. If this code is used in a product, Systemics should be given attribution as the author of the parts used. This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software must display the following acknowledgement: This product includes software developed by Systemics Ltd (http://www.systemics.com/) THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY SYSTEMICS LTD ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be copied and put under another distribution licence [including the GNU Public Licence.] _________________________________________________________________

1 0

Web redirector to defeat kiddie-filters?
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, sort of..... http://www.mordor.com/neslon/decide/ Ryan

1 0

InfoWarCon V: DC
by winn＠Infowar.Com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* * * * * * * P L E A S E D I S T R I B U T E W I D E L Y * * * * * * * InfoWarCon 5, 1996 Electronic Civil Defense for the 21st. Century The Convergence of the Commercial and the Military Sectors: Vulnerabilities, Capabilities and Solutions September 5-6, 1996 Washington, DC Sponsored by: Winn Schwartau, Interpact, Inc./Infowar.Com National Computer Security Association/NCSA.Com Robert Steele, OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS, Inc./OSS.Net Sponsoring Organizations: Command Software Systems Digital Equipment Corporation Norman Data Defense IBM Phillips Publications Jane's Information Group Historically, civil defense has meant to protect citizenry against hostile military actions. Today, with the specter of Information Warfare representing new challenges to late-industrial and information age nation-states, the rules have radically changed. Societies are rapidly migrating to increased dependance upon four critical interrelated infrastructures and adequate methods of protection must be developed: - The Power grid is the basis of most of modern society. With it gone, not much else happens. If you think this is just a matter of building more generators, think again--what happens if the factories that *make* the generators are taken down, too? - The Communications infrastructure: land, sea, air and satellite. 95% of military communications go over the public networks, and 100% of all financial and industrial communications. Is it worth protecting? - The Global Financial structure depends upon the first two infrastructures, and is perhaps the most vulnerable to theft and denial of service attack. 99+% of all "wealth" is digital--what happens if it vaporizes? - Transportation systems rely upon the other three. The air traffic systems require both power and communications to manage the thousands of airplanes in the sky. What happens to the thousands of airplanes in the air if air traffic control across an entire country goes down? Without all of these infrastructures properly and reliably functioning, the private sector and the national security community cannot function. No heat, no air conditioning, no food distribution, no light, no radio or TV, no Internet. Are we prepared? Do we have a a crisis response for the day money as we know it vanishes? Electronic Civil Defense will soon become a critical component of any nation's well being while the needs of both the private sector and government converge. The convergence of military and civilian interests that Mr. Schwartau predicted two years ago is happening before our eyes. Defensive and commercial postures have so intertwined as to make them indistinguishable. This Fifth International Conference on Information Warfare is an unclassified, open source forum, and will examine the myriad questions of Electronic Civil Defense from the US, International and multi-cultural perspectives. Our seasoned experts will work with InfoWarCon5 delegates to outline a framework for the vulnerabilities, threats, risks and solutions for Electronic Civil Defense. From this conference participants will be able to draw critical insights which will improve their own legislative, regulatory, financial, and operational readiness and security. Last year's Washington InfoWarCon brought together over 600 people and was covered by CNN among other major media organizations. This year key world players in information warfare from the economic, military, and law enforcement communities of over 30 countries are expected to participate. Be prepared for highly interactive sessions with plenty of audience participation. Please bring your opinions and be ready to discuss them with us all! PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE September 4, 1996 16:00 - 20:00 Registration Begins 18:00 - 20:00 Sponsored Reception for attendees, speakers, sponsors and the press. Light food fare and liquid refreshments. Meet Mr.Schwartau, Mr. Steele, Dr. Kabay and many of our other world-class speakers. September 5, 1996 6:30 - 7:50 Registration 7:50 - 8:00 Welcoming Comments and Administration: Dr. Peter Tippett, NCSA Winn Schwartau, Interpact, Inc. 8:00 - 8:30 Keynote Presentation: "National Security in the Information Age" Senator William Cohen (R-Maine) * 8:30 - 9:00 "A Commander in Chief's View of Rear-Area, Home-Front Vulnerabilities and Support Options." General John J. Sheehan, U.S. Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command 9:00 - 9:30 "Global Finance: Protection in the Age of Electronic Conflict" Colin Cook, V.P. Information Security, Citibank * 9:30 - 10:00 "We Can't Do It Without the Private Sector" Ken Minihan, Director, NSA * 10:00-10:30 Break 10:30-11:45 National Policy Reviews of Electronic Civil Defense Programs Ms. Sally Katzen, Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, USA Dr. Anders Eriksson and Peter Wallstroem, National Defence Research Establishment, Dept. of Defence Analysis: Sweden Dr. Leroy Pearce, Canada, What is the current thinking in Electronic Civil Defense? How do plan on protecting our citizens against invisible unnamed assailants? What are the top policy makers planning for? International experts will present their views as well. 11:45 - 13:15 Sponsored Lunch 12:30 - 13:00 Luncheon Address 13:15 - 14: 30 Breakout Sessions A1 - A4 A1 A Military Briefing: The Electronic Projection of Power in a C4I World Moderated by General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) Barry Horton, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I * Captain Patrick Tyrrell, Assistant Director, Information Warfare Policy, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom A2 Protecting the Global Financial and Communications Infrastructures: Weaknesses at the Transport Layer Ron Eward, Martech, Inc. One scary session. Forget about HERF Guns and hackers. Mr. Eward will tell us how to wreak disaster with a few well placed pick- axes, from New York to Palermo to Taipei. An incredible research effort with global on the generally forgotten physical underpinnings of Cyberspace. Do not miss his tremendously important findings. Messrs. Eward and Schwartau upcoming book on this overlooked topic will shake the financial global community. A3 Media Manipulation, Perception Management and PsyOps Moderated by Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA Mark Bender, ABC News * Jim Roberts, SOLIC Neil Munro, Washington Technology How can a nation-state use the media to bend the will of an adversary, or leverage its own position prior to, in or after a conflict? Who is really using who? A4 National Defense University Session Moderator - Dr. Dan Kuehl, Professor, NDU Top students from the School of Information Warfare and Strategy, the Nation's top-level school for potential flag officers in the IW arena, will discuss their findings and concerns. 14:30 - 15:00 Break 15:00 - 16:15 Breakout Sessions B1-B4 B1 - Emergency/Disaster Planning for the Effects of Information Warfare: Moderator: Mark Aldrich, Chief Infosec Engineer, GRC International, Inc. Michael Logan, Federal Planning Associate, American Red Cross William W. Donovan, CISSP, FEMA Ken Barksdale, Association of Contingency Planners Assume the worst happens, and an infowar assault takes down major life sustaining portions of the infrastructure. What do we do about it? How do we minimize the damage and protect the victims and citizens? These esteemed experts will tell you what they think and then invite your comments. B2 Legal Liabilities and Responsibilities in Information Warfare Danielle Cailloux, Judge, Committee on Intelligence, Belgium Charles Dunlap, Judge Advocate, USAF Kenneth Bass III, Cyber-Attorney, Washington If a company is attacked and it loses significant assets, what are the recourses of the stakeholders? How do we measure and evaluate the losses and responsibility? On the military side, what constitutes an Act of War and what steps are necessary to formulate a response? B3 The Forensics of Information Wafare for Law Enforcement Moderated by Michael Anderson, New Technologies Investigation Division Howard Schmidt, Director, AF Office of Special Investigations Ken Rosenblat, Santa Clara County Prosecutor, Author "High-Technology Crime: Investigating Cases Involving Computers" How can you tell you are under attack? Once you determine you are, how do you make a case which will stand up in court? How do you collect evidence? How do you involve law enforcement without compromising your efforts? Experts share years of experience with you. B4 Naval Postgraduate School Session Moderator: Dr. Fred Levien, NPS Top field grade students from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California will present InfoWar papers and concepts. 16:15 - 16:45 Break 16:45 - 18:00 The Hacker/Underground and Social Engineering Moderated by: Nic Chantler, Australian Intelligence (Ret) Andy Mueller-Maguhn, CHAOS Computer Club, Germany Chris Goggans, co-founder, Legion of Doom, USA John Gilmore, Electronic Frontier Foundation If you've ever wanted to know how hackers think; what makes them tick and how they became the first Information Warriors, here are the people who can answer your questions. These sessions are among the most popular at every InfoWarCon. Gilmore will present his unique concepts for Defensive Information Warfare. 18::00 - 20:30 Sponsored Reception/"Live Hackers" Off-Line September 6, 1996 6:30 - 7:50 Continental Breakfast 7:50 - 8:00 Opening Remarks and Administration 8:00 - 8:30 "Domestic Law Enforcement and Electronic Civil Defense" Louis Freeh, Director, FBI * 8:30 - 9:00 "The Convergence of Military and Civilian Defense" General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) 9:00 - 9:30 "What is National Security?" Michael R. Nelson, Ph.D. Special Assistant for Information Technology White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 9:30 - 10:00 "Building a Society from the Net Up" Pedrag Pale, Chairman of the InfoTech Coordinating Committee, Ministry of Science, Technology and Informatics, Croatia 10:00-10:30 Break 10:30-11:45 The Russians are Coming Moderated by: Greg Treverton, Director of National Security Program, Rand Corporation From academia to the military to their business community, the Russians have been thinking long and had about Information Warfare. Here's what they have to say. Get front row seats and be ready to ask your questions. Dr. Victor I. Solntsev, Assoc. Prof. Moscow State Tech. Univ. "Information Warfare and Human-Operator Security" Dr. Dmitry Chereshkin Russian Academy of Sciences; Editorial Board, "Information Infrastructure and Policy." Dr. Georgy Smolian Russian Academy of Sciences and Scientific Council "Democratization of Russia and Information Security." 11:45 - 13:15 Sponsored Lunch 12:30 - 13:00 Luncheon Address 13:00 - 14: 15 Breakout Sessions C1-C4 C1 Corporate Civil Defense: Moderated by Don Sortor, Director Security Prgms, Corp. InfoSec., Motorola, Inc. A team of cross-industry experts from the primary infrastructures, will examine how industry and government can and should interact in the event of an Electronic Pearl Harbor. What is the role of the company and its management? What policies should be put into place to prepare for the malicious Acts of Man? How should the government work with the private sector to mitigate damages? These experts will set you on the right track. C2 Denial of Service in the Private Sector: The Nuclear Weapons of the Information Age: Magnetic Weapons from the Military to Electronic Pipe Bombs Carlo Copp, Defense Analyst, Australia Kelly Goen, Penetration and Security Engineer Get Seats Early! Magnetic weapons; directed energy weapons; HPM; HERF Guns; electromagnetic pulse cannons and EMP. Learn about the latest in high energy weapons systems and how they can be used to attack and destroy critical electronically based infrastructures. Then find out what the terrorist can do with home-brew electronic pipe bombs. C3 The Net Under Attack Dr. Dorothy Denning, Chair, Computer Science Dept., Georgetown Univ. Jim Christy, Permanent Subcommittee Investigations U.S. Senate (And USAF OSI) What makes an attack on the Internet and what do we do about it? Ms. Denning is an internationally recognized expert who will guide us and her panel of experts through the maze of possibilities. Incredibly valuable for security professionals. C4 USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies Moderated by Col. Richard Szafranski, USAF, Air War College National Military Strategy Col. Szafranski and his top students will discuss their views, opinions on Information Warfare. The USAF SAAS has produced some of the most revolutionary papers in IW, including the now globally recognized papers on taking down telecommunications and national power systems. 14:30 - 15:00 Break 15:00 - 16:15 Breakout Sessions D1-D4 D1 Anonymous Global Banking: Pitfalls and Solutions Moderated by Bruce Schneier Kelly Goen, Security Engineer Eric Hughes, Cypherpunks Phil Zimmermann * How does anonymous international banking work? Is it merely a front for Criminal Central? Or is there a true value? How do conventional banking institutions view it? What about cryptographic solutions? Are your funds "naked on the Net today? Come see for yourself! D2 The Ethics of Information Warfare Moderated by Winn Schwartau Col. Phil Johnson, Judge Avocate, USAF Dr. Dan Kuehl, NDU While CNN is looking over your shoulder, as a military commander, here is your choice: either use a precision smart bomb which will immediately kill 20 civilians for the world to see. Or, use a non-lethal IW weapon, no immediate TV deaths, but a predicted 200 civilian collateral fatalities within 30 days. What do you do? The Ethical conundra of Information Warfare will be examined from all perspectives. Or: you have been attacked anonymously--you suspect one party, without proof--another attack is coming. What now? Should we develop new intelligence capabilities to permit precision detection and response in cyberwar? D3 National Information Assurance: Cooperation is the Key to Safeguarding Communications, Power and Transportation Moderated by: Major Brad Bigelow, Office of the Manager, National Communications System Jeff Sheldon, General Counsel, Utilities Telecommunications Council Steve Fabes, Director of Electronic Delivery Services, BankAmerica Carl Ripa, VP National Security/Emergency Preparedness, Bellcore Experts from the major civilian infrastructures will discuss how past cooperation between industry and government has echoed economic realities. The bulk of the nations information infrastructure is not under the economic or regulatory control of the Federal government. So, how do we maintain a healthy balance between private initiative and legislative and regulatory actions? Today there is no "due diligence" standard which requires that communications and computing services be guaranteed in terms of security and data integrity. Our panel will provoke an active discussion of remedial cooperative measures. D4 "Understanding and Defending Against Industrial Espionage and Information Terrorism." Tom Fedorek, Managing Director, Kroll Associates New York* Matt DeVost TITLE COMING Charlies Swett, Acting Deputy Director for Low-Intenstity Conflict Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict A look at how modern espionage and information is conducted, why it's done and who's doing it. How much can it cost your company and how can you tell if you're targeted? Do not miss this fascinating session which is expected to feature the Kroll Managing Directors from Paris, London, and New York. 16:15 - 16:30 Break 16:30 - 17:00 Wrap Up: "What is War?" Moderated by Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) John Petersen, President, The Arlington Institute You - The Audience An exciting 'don't miss' interactive audience session. What a closing! (* Speakers with an * have been invited but have not confirmed as of June 28, 1996.) HOTEL INFORMATION: Crystal Gateway Marriott 1700 Jefferson Davis Highway Arlington, VA 22202 The Crystal Gateway Marriott is offereing a special conference rate of $129 single/$139 double occupancy. This rate is good until August 14, 1996. 703-920-3230 (Voice) 703-271-5212 (Fax) CANCELLATION POLICY After August 9th, any cancellation will incur a $100.00 processing fee. If the reservation is not cancelled and no one attends, the full registration price will be charged. Substitute attendees are welcome. InfoWarCon '96 Registration Form: Name: ___________________________________________________________ Title: ___________________________________________________________ Org: ___________________________________________________________ Address: ___________________________________________________________ Address: ___________________________________________________________ City: ___________________________________________________________ State: _______________________________ Zip: _____________________ Country: __________________________ Email: ________________________ Phone: __________________________ Fax: _________________________ FEES: Payment made BEFORE August 9, 1996: ( ) 595.00 NCSA Members/OSS '96 Attendees ( ) 645.00 All others Payment made AFTER August 9, 1996: ( ) 645.00 NCSA Members/OSS '96 Attendees ( ) 695.00 All others Make checks payable to NCSA, or Charge to: ( ) VISA ( ) MasterCard AMEX ( ) Number: ___________________________________________ Exp date: ___________________________ Signature: ___________________________________________ MAIL OR FAX OR EMAIL REGISTRATION TO: National Computer Security Association 10 South Courthouse Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 Phone 717-258-1816 or FAX 717-243-8642 EMAIL: conference(a)ncsa.com For more information about NCSA: WWW: http://www.ncsa.com CompuServe: GO NCSA EMail: info(a)ncsa.com Version: 1.10 Peace Winn Winn Schwartau - Interpact, Inc. Information Warfare and InfoSec V: 813.393.6600 / F: 813.393.6361 Winn(a)InfoWar.Com

1 0

Synchronization Attack on Pseudo-DC-net's
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's an easy attack on a pseudo-DC-net that I thought up over lunch if the clients trust the server to be honest in telling both the round number and who is on. Let Stephanie be the person running the server, and let Alice and Bob be two users. Let f(n) be the pseudo random function they share. Assume that Stephanie knows their secret encryption key. It is then possible for her to compromise their anonymity as follows: First Alice joins the net, and Stephanie tells her that it is round 100 and Bob is on. Alice sends a messages. Stephanie sends back some random junk to Alice to convince her that there was a collision. Alice backs off for a few rounds. Stephanine now receives f(101), f(102), f(103), etc. and then tells Alice that Bob has left. Alice leaves now. Later Bob joins. Stephanine tells him that it is round 101 and Alice is here. Bob starts talking right away, sending three message: f(101) xor M1, f(102) xor M2, and f(103) xor M3. From this Stephanie is able to recover M1, M2, and M3 by xor'ing f(101), f(102), and f(103), which she has from before, back in. Bob has completely lost his anonymity! Thus, it looks like trusting the server for both who is on and the round number is a bad idea! It might be possible to remove the need for a round number if the number of seconds since channel creation is used instead, and the clients are time synchronized. In that case running the pseudo-DC-net on top of UDP might be preferable to running it on top of TCP. Can anyone think of an attack if the server is just trusted for a list of who is on? If there is one, I guess new clients could ask for signed messages of who is on: "It is 456 seconds since channel creation, and, I---Alice---am on. (signature)". That would complicate the protocol, of course, and cost Nancy---a new client---some time in verifying the signatures. Good attacks so far! Keep 'em coming. :) Leonard Janke (pgp key id 0xF4118611) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMeF6nUMBIFf0EYYRAQGITQf/U0Wjpsyb7XpG6uCVFCPNaAYVIJpLeEyk Mxl6X/TQPhJFRclbRJwFoWfwH46M2le/QKHu6nFFjioyYbXofaLWqDeOa61XY5/c 4law80/xxAg9IdzoQp4mAz6QOvToMCOlNE21MCL8YlPrrdhIL4MfAH9gpU8+Otui IH1S5VB7TGE6ttZEx18sKdBUxYeJeU4jrXb4Uj2HEN5inLrhJBic/fsZ0hZXjCAH 5kbZLI8sf+leLyoW03qILeVl8jjYuPy/z16MsY2SDzJ3hFv8nngT9+fzVItX7sO2 ngvqvyUW4SIWfK8XwRWUiMFW7i7gyMcKteSSEJBaEdOZNcGUvXY+5Q== =jmVk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: What remains to be done.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 96 at 14:12, Ray Arachelian wrote: [..] > I'm constantly switching between NT and 95 and have them installed on the > same drive. Would be cool to have some low level driver to encryption > from the Master Boot Record for example to get around unfriendly OS's- but > then NT won't respect the BIOS calls, 95 in 32 bit mode won't, Linux sure > as hell wont, etc.... that was the whole idea of having a BIOS in the > first place, but woe is us. BIOS was written for real mode... part of the problem. Another is the not-made-here syndrome, and in a sense Linux, OS/2, NT and 95 are different types of operating systems, so a shared BIOS is unfeasible. It would be nice to develop an encrypted filesystem that could be ported across operating systems for those of us with multiple OS's. BTW, Linux 2.0 is making a nice step in that direction by adding support for mounting a file (which contains a filesystem), specifically to allow encrypted file systems as well as things like testing out iso9660-fs before buring CD-ROMs, etc. In theory something similar can be done with Win95/NT and OS/2, but it hasn't been done the proper way (SecureDevice is really a hack in that sense). --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

1 0

Re: NYT/CyberTimes on CWD article
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:01 PM 7/6/96 -0800, Norman Hardy wrote: >At 9:17 AM 7/6/96, Declan McCullagh wrote: >>"We are writers, not crytographers." >> >>-Declan >.... >This seems to be an application for Bloom filters. >See page bottom of page 561 in Knuth's "Searching and Sorting", First Edition. >(Vol 3 of Art of Computer Programming) > >With a Bloom filter you can hide which URLs you reject yet quickly rejecting >particular URLs. > >Compute SHA(URL) yielding 160 bits. Divide that into 16 ten bit quantities >b[i], for 0<=i< 10. >Reject the access if P[b[i]] = 1 for each i. P is an array of 1024 bits >computed by someone >with the index prohibitorum. (pardon my Latin) > >Yes, this excludes 1/1024 "falsely accused" URLs, but you get the idea. As Norm knows, we used this algorithm to provide a label search function (What Unix people use grep for) for an IBM OS back in the 1970s. SHA is probably overkill for the hash function, but you need something better than a barber poll hash. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

1 0

DIAL: directed information assembly line
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

over the past few months I've been intermittently posting some snippets and fragments of ideas on a new information processing system. I've codified most of what I was talking about into a semi-formal protocol description. I think this has tremendous potential for wide applications, and I suspect many of these ideas below are already being used in many diverse contexts but have not been unified into a single specification (which I think will increase their value and use signficantly). I suspect something like the following is actually going to be a natural, inevitable evolution of the current "information infrastructure" and cyberspace-- i.e. something like the following is going to evolve whether I personally work on it or not, or whether future designers see this particular essay or not. anyway, I will try to incorporate comments from correspondents into future revisions. I would love to put together a group of people interested in continuing to develop this although that's probably premature at this point. thanks to everyone who has (unwittingly) contributed to this so far based on responding to my earlier essays. === DIAL = introduction = terminology: flits, floutes & bloxes = fault tolerance = tracing = time estimation = common bloxes = implementation = examples introduction == The industrial revolution was driven by specific technologies. Similarly, the "information revolution" is now in full pace using a different array of new tools. However, it is unlikely that all information processing tools have been invented yet. This paper is a preliminary sketch of one such potentially significant tool called DIAL. DIAL stands for "directed information assembly line". This document contains a description of this novel information processing architecture. This proposal outlines the idea and contrasts it with existing systems, showing how it highlights certain aspects of data processing that are not specifically addressed in, but seem to be implied by, other existing tools. The system can be viewed variously as a programming environment, a monitoring system, a revision control system, a quality assurance and quality control mechanism, a fault tolerant computing system, a workflow (re)engineering technology, a company intranet routing algorithm, an operating system based on virtual reality, etc. terminology == DIAL is something like a "dataflow" oriented system. This document will not describe any specific implementation of the DIAL concepts (such as giving a language syntax) but instead focus on its abstract properties which can be implemented in multiple ways. There are 3 basic components in the DIAL universe: "flit" - a flit is a unit of information that has an associated DIAL state. The information can change over time. One aspect of state is "location". "flit" stands for "fleeting bit", i.e. a piece of data that can "move". The number of binary bits allocated to a flit may vary per flit or over time. "floute" - a floute is a "flit route" or a path that a flit can take. Conceptually flits move through the flouts. A flout can be implemented in various ways, such as "last in, first out", "first in, last out", a pool of data, etc. "blox" - a blox is a "black box" or a component that changes the information content of a flit. Bloxes are connected to floutes. The DIAL system is recursive in that any of the 3 basic objects can be contained or encoded in the 3 objects. For example, flits can contain flits, bloxes can contain further floutes and bloxes, etc. Conceptually, a DIAL system is a directed graph, with nodes called "bloxes", edges called "floutes", and a superimposed set of things called "flits" that can, over time, "move through" the network. In many cases flits have a natural analogy to messages being passed through the system. Bloxes contain a single internal state, like a regular automaton. They can send requests, and respond to, memory bloxes. DIAL is unlike a programming language in that "time" is considered a key property of what it models. Many languages handle the concept of time implicitly through the use of variables. But programming languages have a computation-centric view of processing, such that programs are seen as directing and operating on data. In DIAL, data is seen as flowing through components, a data-centric view. fault tolerance == To be implemented correctly, the state of a DIAL system at any given time is incorruptable. All operations have total integrity. The system is designed to coordinate unreliable subprocesses and must itself be reliable. In DIAL, a blox is roughly analogous to some kind of process. The process may or not be entirely computational. The blox models an unreliable process. The process is activated when a flit approaches the blox from a connecting floute, at which point the flit "enters" the blox. DIAL handles the protocol of informing the blox (or rather, the process represented by the blox) of the presence of the flit. DIAL keeps track of all flits that are currently being processed by bloxes. The blox should process the flit and push the flit into some other floute which signals it has successfully operated on the flit. Combinations of flits at inputs can be processed, and multiple outputs are supported. The DIAL system allows processing time limit rules to be associated with flits, floutes, and bloxes, such as a floute assigning time limits to flits that move through it, time limits associated with all flits going through particular bloxes, or time limits attached to flits. (The system will have a precedence to these rules.) The motion of flits through floutes is handled by the DIAL system and is incorruptable. Flits can "pile up" in floutes if not processed by connecting bloxes as rapidly as they accumulate. All bloxes may have different amounts of processing times on incoming flits. When a blox fails to "return" a flit in the time limit, the DIAL system can be programmed to automatically take particular countermeasures. The countermeasure programs are associated with flits in the same way the expiration time is (via the flit, a floute, or a blox, and having precedence rules). - DIAL can ask the blox, "have you heard of this flit". The blox can reply, (1) "yes, I am still working on it", or (2) "no, I have not heard of it". The rules can specify possibilities such as resubmitting the flit, cancelling the flit processing and redirecting it elsewhere, propagating other flits into floutes (which might represent message(s) sent to "failure controllers"), etc. - The blox may reply, "the flit has corrupted the blox". This may happen in systems without transaction integrity. Again rules can automatically be followed to try to "clean up" the system by propagating new flits to particular floutes or possibly resubmit the flit. - The blox may not reply. Again, rules for countermeasures can be programmed into the DIAL system. tracing == All flits have unique IDs that can be traced. At any time a query can be sent to the DIAL system, "where is so-and-so flit?" and the system will describe the exact location of the flit. Flits can never vanish, even when bloxes fail to operate correctly. Every flit has a history as well. The flit may contain different information at different times. The system allows some number of earlier information states of the flit to be accessed. Information about the past flow-path of the flit and each associated change in contents (prior and subsequent to entry and exit of a blox) is available. This could be called a "replay" feature. In a query of a DIAL system, it may actually reply, "the flit was deleted", although its earlier states would still be accessable. Another possible response is, "the flit moved out of this DIAL system", but again some number of its penultimate states, while it was still "inside", would still be accessable. Again, customizable rules determine how much history is available. General queries such as "locate all type [y] flits that have not moved within [x] time period" are supported. Past histories of the flits that have moved through flouts and bloxes are also available. The system can support some degree of "global or local rollbacks" in which prior processing flows are reset, redirected, restarted, etc. An ability to locate components based on traffic is supported, such as floutes where current flit queue lengths are of some size, etc. The system allows the assignment of arbitrary version numbers with particular flit states that are also allowed in queries. time estimation == An implementer of a DIAL system might support specialized queries called "time estimates". A flit is passed into a system with a special flag that indicates processing time should be estimated but results should not be computed. The flit flows as far through the system as possible and records time estimates as it passes the bloxes. When it finally emerges, cumulative statistics on the time estimates that would be associated with an actual processing of the flit are available to the requester. Common bloxes == - extracter/combiner Bloxes to extract flits, floutes, or bloxes encoded in flits are available, as well as to create flits that encode any of the same objects. - warehouse The DIAL system can support a flit warehouse in which all flits are stored when they are not being propagated elsewhere through the system. The warehouse is a blox that responds to flit queries in the form, "move flit [x] into floute [y]". (The motion of the flits into and out of the warehouse resembles the checkin and checkout task of RCS software.) - create bloxes In a static DIAL system, all bloxes and floutes are predetermined and fixed. In a dynamic system, the bloxes and floutes may change over time. This is accomplished by feeding special flits into bloxes that can create other bloxes and floutes as their result. Other bloxes can connect them in specified ways. The dynamic system is far more complex and is reserved for specialized situations. - rerouter A special rerouter blox is useful for dealing with new versions of other bloxes. A frequent problem that arises with new versions of software (i.e. a new blox) is that it is incompatible or has bugs. The rerouter blox is capable of rerouting a request to a new version of a blox to an older version when problems arise in the processing. - tester Often results output from bloxes are to be tested for consistency to ensure the bloxes are functioning properly and not returning spurious results. - tester/comparer/rerouter Another useful blox for fault tolerance can take the results of two other bloxes and compare them for discrepancies. Flits output from a new version of a blox could be compared with the flits from the previous version, and automatic actions be taken on any discrepancy (such as passing through the old version while flagging the exception). The comparer allows the system designer to more elegantly deal with regular "upgrades". In fact it is the embodiment of automated regression testing. - isolater Often input of flits is batched into groups, and some flit in the group may cause problems in the processing, but further detail in revealing the exact "bad" flit is not available. The isolater can automate this process in an algorithm that resembles the classic linear search. The input batch into a blox is consecutively split into halves by the isolater until the smallest erroneous pieces are isolated and hilighted. - global versioner Often a system with many bloxes has new versions of the bloxes, and there is need in globally switching control to new bloxes. This can be accomplished with the use of a special global versioner blox. It can keep track of the different versions of all bloxes in a given DIAL configuration, and switch between configurations. - bad blox isolater Combining many of the previous bloxes, a special system that automatically isolates new versions of bloxes that fail to be backward and/or forward compatible is possible. This is a direct implementation of the software development pipeline. implementation == The DIAL system should be implemented graphically and visually. A corresponding language specification to describe a DIAL network is possible and desirable, but a visual or graphical interface to any operation should always be possible; likewise a representation of all DIAL states should be supported. Ideally, the DIAL universe could be visualized in a 3d virtual reality, and a person could physically "grasp" and manipulate all the basic objects (flits, floutes, bloxes). The one-to-one visual representation of DIAL and its states is a key aspect of its accessability and usefulness. There should be in principle no memory limits on the core DIAL entities: flits, floutes, or bloxes. Limits in implementations such as "a maximum of 50 queued flits per floute is supported" are antithetical to the basic design principles. However there may be various memory limits associated with particular uses of the entities that model a particular application. The DIAL system internally must have many protections that maintain its internal consistency at all times to prevent corruption of its state. However, unreliability of all components it models is allowed (and specifically designed for). The states of components are allowed to be inconsistent to some degree, such that a state like "blox went down" might arise at a random time. Typically in implementations, the "last known state" of a blox would be tracked, along with protocols to retrieve the most recent state and allow resetting or other manipulations of the state. Recent new technologies such as the Web and Java may be excellent environments for implementing aspects of the DIAL specification. Recent widespread interest and developments in intranets, workflow analysis, and reengineering may be very tangibly furthered through the introduction and use of DIAL systems. examples == 1. a DIAL system can be used to model the workflow of a company. Individual flits can be thought of as documents, and bloxes are the operations that transform the documents. The history mechanisms are identical to revision control. Floutes represent interactions or communication paths between people or departments. This is the primary "information assembly line" application of the DIAL concept. In this system, the "paperwork" cannot be lost because of the inherent properties of DIAL. In fact it is in these sitations that history, tracing, and "timeout" mechanisms are most valuable. The estimation feature gives an approximation of "how long will this take when submitted". 2. a DIAL system could reflect the internal state of packets on a network. Individual computers, routers, etc. are seen as bloxes, and messages are the flits, and floutes are the network routes. The DIAL tracing features are especially useful in this context. 3. a DIAL system could represent a large, complex software project. Individual bloxes are the components in the program. The versioning capabilities deal with the development pipeline. Regression testing and the process of moving to new versions is explicitly built into the system. 4. the DIAL system might represent data being sent over the World Wide Web. 5. the DIAL system could represent a distributed computing system in which the bloxes are spread out over the Internet (the floutes), and socket communication is used to transport flits. 6. In many debugging situations, "bad data" is detected without any knowledge of its history and complex measures are employed to try to deduce the prior processes that led to it. The history mechanism in DIAL allows a user to trace prior states of the flit and find the exact point or blox where the corruption occured. Also, the capability of putting a "rider" on a flit that detects when it is modified in some way is possible. 7. There is a natural correspondence between every computer language and the DIAL system. Subroutines or arithmetic operations are like bloxes, and parameters are passed in floutes. Variables are the contents of specific "floutes" at various points in processing.

1 0

Re:Pseudo-DC-net Project
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

janke(a)unixg.ubc.ca writes: > I am working on a project to implement a variation of a DC-net to be run > over the Internet. I am posting this summary to find out if it overlaps > with projects others are working on; to see what members of the lists think > of the general ideas for the network I have in mind; and to see if anyone > is interested in helping me out. Short version: Your proposal will not work and is trivial for a TLA to break. Long version: There are two problems with this proposal, the star topology collapses the DC network into a two-party version of the DC-net protocol (in which collusion is trivial) and the shared PRNG allows _any_ participant to compromise a target member of the network (or evesdrop at the server and decode all traffic.) A simple example of such an attack would be for the TLA to register a host on the network and get the shared secret key for the PRNG. The TLA then taps in either to the server's internet connection or any point in the network which divides the client graph into two parts, the server and a single client on one side and the remaining clients on the other. The TLA then just XORs out the blinding data (which it knows because it is a member of the network) and it has all of the connections. Additionally, having a MAC is just plain silly, the objective is to hide who is sending and having a MAC defeats the entire purpose of the proposal. You have basically created a simple packet anonymizer, which is not bad in and of itself, but it is not even close to a true DC-net (at least I am assuming so, based upon the initial description.) You have not mentioned whether or not all traffic exits the network at the server, if this is the case you are better off having each client establish a secure link to the server, running a PRNG constantly that is mirrored by the server, and XORing all of their traffic in to this stream. The constant PRNG stream hides when the client is sending or receiving and the secure channel to the server discourages passive evesdropping. This does not defeat traffic analysis at the server, but then again neither does your proposal. Some other tips from someonw who has spent too much time thinking about DC-net implementations: Ignore collision detection, just use ALOHA or a similar protocol. Until you get up to serious bandwidth the computational cost is not worth the effort. Don't abandon the ring topology (this is where the DC-net gets its security.) Use multiple small (4-7 host) rings with overlap between the rings, think of each ring as a LAN and hosts which are on multiple rings as bridges/routers and you should get the picture... Bandwidth economy will always suck, you can use hash trees to get around a few of the problems but for the most part you have to accept the costs and work around them in other areas. You really, really need to read the 1987 Eurocrypt proceedings. jim

4 3

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children [RitalinPunks]
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Something like 10% of ALL public school students in Tennessee are on Ritalin. Presumably, the percentages are similar in other states. I have trouble believing there are so many kids suddenly suffering from a disorder that wasn't even discovered until a few years ago. The following rant from a Ritalin user may be of interest (though not too relevant to cryptography): ************************************************************************* Occasionally I will see something about the practice of giving kids RITALIN for alleged attention-deficit disorder. I can't think of better evidence that the owners of the schools and the world are trying to destroy the kids in this country. I was big drug-taker. I've also had occasion to receive medication by prescription. I wil admit that I took a lot of amphetamines. Speed that is. I liked it and took it frequently, so I can attest that it has some very attractive char-acteristics that anyone taking it could not help but like at the time. It also has a gigantic letdown that is nearly intolerable. This discomfort leads ANYONE to do something to alleviate it. It's probably a matter of personal preference as to whether the discomfort of the letdown outweighs the positive feeling of the high. If not, people will keep taking speed. Now for reasons, I also had a prescription for ritalin. You know it's a controlled substance. The fact is it's an amphetamine derivative and imparts nearly the exact same experience, though not as sharp-edged. It has the high and the letdown. And people undoubtedly make the same kinds of decisions as is the case with amphetamines. They say that ritalin has a paradoxical effect on kids - meaning, I suppose, that the reasons that make it a controlled substance for adults doesn't apply to kids. Then they say in the same breath that ritalin treats disorders in the ability to concentrate or to pay attention, which are the exact things that speed and ritalin accomplish in adults. Both of these allow someone to focus exclusively on one task in an enjoyable state of mind and body and accomplish it. Any nervousness is just left over from the channeling of all the generated energy into one task. What is created is not only the false sense of security but the false ability to accomplish things. As time goes on, one aspect of the letdown is the now- understood knowledge that speed is generating false successes. This is a depressing realization that can have detrimental ramifications beyond anything to do with the drug. In college, say, false successes on exams are acceptable and desired because this is one occasion in which performance is measured. But when someone's life consists of false successes, false interactions, and false experiences - and the fact that these are false is well-realized - the result can be a very unhealthy individual self-conception whose validity is proved and reproved constantly as amphetamine use continues. I heard recently that now educators and other quacks find that ritalin enhances performance for everyone (I just said that), and they're thinking of prescribing it for that reason. This kind of poisoning of the self-concepts being developed by kids will create a generation of suicidal invalids. The idea is outrageous. This has gotten extremely long, and I wasn't planning on it. But this ritalin thing is so insidious and is so OBVIOUSLY meant to do harm that I have to write this long thing about it. The whole attention-deficit disorder is a fabrication that traitors use to pump kids full of controlled substances. Now i saw yesterday that kids not on ritalin are paying those who have it, stealing to get it, killing to get it, and on and on. Ritalin is speed, and the idea that educators, doctors, and other alleged public servants are colluding in this way to cripple kids into thinking they have no innate skills and no ability to function without a drug is one of the worst things I have come across in my entire life.

2 1

Re: Word lists for passphrases
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AwakenToMe(a)aol.com, in a profound display of stubbornness, continues to insist that his program to enumerate all possible words of length N (that is, aaaaa, aaaab, aaaac, etc.) is somehow interesting. I am therefore forced to drive in the nail with a sledgehammer. Forgive me. He writes: > > > > It's [...] trivial enough to be done by 99% of the people on > > > > cypherpunks in their sleep. > > > > > > Yes. But let me ask you this. Have you done it yet?? > > > > Most of us don't bother writing up four line programs and shipping > > them out, no. > > really? Wow. four lines of code? You must be a really good programmer. duh. Hardly. A ten year old could do it. I know, since I wrote substantially more sophisticated stuff when I was ten. Since you insist, here is less than a minute's work. Yes, I timed it. ------Cut Here------ /* This could be more elegant, but the point is obviousness. */ #include <stdio.h> int main() { char i[6]; for (i[0] = 'a'; i[0] < 'z'; i[0]++) for (i[1] = 'a'; i[1] < 'z'; i[1]++) for (i[2] = 'a'; i[2] < 'z'; i[2]++) for (i[3] = 'a'; i[3] < 'z'; i[3]++) for (i[4] = 'a'; i[4] < 'z'; i[4]++) printf("%s\n", i); } ------Cut Here------ The operative portion of the program is six lines ling, and five of those lines are virtually identical. You can write the thing much more elegantly, without redundant code. However, I have elected to leave it as utterly brainless as possible to demonstrate that ANYONE could write the thing. > Youd be surprised at the # of requests from people who actually had a good > use for it, and didnt have the time to spend writing it themselves. Human stupidity is never a surprise. Perry

2 1

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim writes about Ritalin: >I've been over visiting my friend to see some of this. The Ritalin-sodden >kid arrives like a zombie. When the Ritalin wears off, he's rambunctuous, >but all kids are. My friend Paul has had to discipline him a bit to keep >him from--as the psychobabbles would say--"acting out." This discipline >sets him straight, but it's not something his New Age "supermom" would ever >think of doing. Hence the kid throws temper tantrums, acts out, calls her >"You fucking asshole" (remember, he's only 8 or so), and so on. So she >cranks up his dose of Ritalin and he's zoned out for a while. Frankly, I >think telling the kid that if throws a tantrum he'll get punished for it is >a whole lot more normal--ever notice that a dog smacks her puppies when >they get out of line, or that a cat swats her kittens the same way? It >establishes the rules of the game. It sounds to me like the mom is abusing the drug -- Ritalin is tricky stuff and you can really mess up a kid by overdosing. That's child abuse, IMHO, not some benigh paddling. Alex, our 8 year old son, uses Ritalin. He doesn't need Ritalin to concentrate. He can get caught up in a building project for hours and create a masterpiece. He can focus so thoroughly you can't pry him loose. What Alex *can't* do is get comfortably through a day of grammar school. I sympathise -- I was the same way when I was that age. I had a tough time and I saw Alex having problems similar to mine. So I sic'ed the educational establishment on the problem. Alex ended up with a Ritalin prescription. At least for now. And it's been pretty effective. With Ritalin he finds it much easier to concentrate on drivel, an important skill to make it through school, or sports. The problem is that Ritalin isn't some useful, generically wholesome substance like milk or peanut butter -- you risk more than "acting out" if you're not incredibly careful. Sleep disorders at least. But I don't like the downside of doing nothing, so we're trying it out. I've *never* seen Alex zoned out on Ritalin. Rick.

1 0

Re: Technology- vs. Human-based Surveillance
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 96 at 9:20, Timothy C. May wrote: [..] > A human-based surveillance state is very expensive, even by the standards > of modern America and its bloated government. The recent example of the > DDR's "Staasi" provides an example. Hard to hide the extent of the > surveillance when so many people are involved. Very true, but many totalitarian countries don't try to hide it. Q: are surveillance tools (sophisticated analysys and search engines, miniature cameras and microphones and other electronics) under the same countrols as crypto? de facto controls or on paper only? It would seem that 'emerging democracies' in the East Bloc can obtain sophisticated Western tech to strengthen and hide surveillance systems (perhaps in ways that even J.Edgard Hoover would have found repulsive, if that was possible). I wonder if anyone has any stats about foreign countries or orgs purchasing such equipment. Yet another arg for liberal crypto-export rules, perhaps. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

1 0

Re: What remains to be done.
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:09 PM 7/8/96 +0000, you wrote: >On 8 Jul 96 at 14:12, Ray Arachelian wrote: >[..] >> I'm constantly switching between NT and 95 and have them installed on the >> same drive. Would be cool to have some low level driver to encryption >> from the Master Boot Record for example to get around unfriendly OS's- but >> then NT won't respect the BIOS calls, 95 in 32 bit mode won't, Linux sure >> as hell wont, etc.... that was the whole idea of having a BIOS in the >> first place, but woe is us. > >BIOS was written for real mode... part of the problem. Another is the >not-made-here syndrome, and in a sense Linux, OS/2, NT and 95 are >different types of operating systems, so a shared BIOS is unfeasible. > >It would be nice to develop an encrypted filesystem that could be >ported across operating systems for those of us with multiple OS's. > >BTW, Linux 2.0 is making a nice step in that direction by adding >support for mounting a file (which contains a filesystem), >specifically to allow encrypted file systems as well as things like >testing out iso9660-fs before buring CD-ROMs, etc. In theory >something similar can be done with Win95/NT and OS/2, but it hasn't >been done the proper way (SecureDevice is really a hack in that >sense). > One of these days Microsoft will officially release NT's IFS SDK. A few "preliminary" and incomplete copies of a 1993 beta release do float around but for a mere $50K there's a company that will sell you the complete source for an IFS. It's a crime that Microsoft hasn't shipped this SDK yet as the Installable File System is one of the great powers of NT. So, if someone is interested in coughing up the $50K I know a couple NT programmers just chomping at the bit to build cool IFS's like PGPDrive, etc. --j

1 0

RE: wordlists and al that bologna
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-07-08 19:27:44 EDT, perry(a)piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: << Just so you understand this, most adults very quickly notice when they are in danger of looking foolish, and stop talking so as to prevent themselves from looking even worse. You have to be fairly stupid to keep ranting when you have nothing to back you up. I suggest learning this lesson now. If you are in fact an adult, my apologies to your parents -- tragic mental impairments strike even the best of homes. .pm >> In danger of looking foolish? Man.. you said it all. Young child?? Hardly. Nothing to back me up? Hardly a clue is what you have. 16 people so far asked me for the program. Obviously they had a use for it. for SOMEEEE reason that is beyond you to comprehend. If it doesnt work for you.. then it shoudlnt be for ANYONE. Wow.. you sound like some of the politicians I get to see logs of trying to regulate encryption..etc. I wonder if you are one of them!! My..wouldnt that be a funny coincidence. In a message dated 96-07-08 19:27:44 EDT, perry(a)piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: << If you are in fact an adult, my apologies to your parents -- tragic mental impairments strike even the best of homes. .pm >> As they say in your case... Sad But True

1 0

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children [RitalinPunks]
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:03 PM 7/8/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >Something like 10% of ALL public school students in Tennessee are on >Ritalin. Presumably, the percentages are similar in other states. Imagine how much worse slave schools would be if you *weren't* drugged. DCF

1 0

Re: TACDFIPSFKMI (fwd)
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 08 Jul 1996 16:36:09 From: Elaine Frye <elaine.frye(a)nist.gov> Subject: Announcement re New TAC [Snip Carl's forward] [Distribution relocated from header] To: Dunn(a)podesta.com (Elizabeth Dunn), Ditoston(a)btec.com, ereed(a)novell.com, cameron(a)novell.com, jwinston(a)tis.com (Joan Winston), ptd(a)tis.com (Peter Dinsmore), denny(a)tis.com (Denny Branstad), steve(a)tis.com (Steve Walker), kam(a)tis.com, landgrave(a)aol.com (Landgrave Smith), perillo(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil, anne.shepherd(a)nist.gov (Anne Enright Shepherd), 100126.3650(a)COMPUSERVE.COM, roz(a)mtb.com (Roszel Thomsen), abd(a)cdt.org, kkonechy(a)rnbo.com (Ken Konechy), pfh(a)netscape.com (Peter Harter), romeror(a)frb.gov (Ray Romero), karen.randall(a)att.com (Karen Randall), jeff(a)netscape.com (Jeff Treuhaft), exp(a)mk.ibek.com (E. J. Prior), rplesser(a)pipermar.com (Ron Greg_Garcia(a)aeanet.org (Greg Garcia), csmith(a)steptoe.com (Clint Smith), William_Baugh(a)cpqm.saic.com (William Baugh), fred_mailman(a)hpatc1.desk.hp.com (Fred Mailman), uscibproh(a)delphi.com (Melanie Janin), KaneS(a)wangfed.com (Steve Kane), hill(a)po3.bb.unisys.com (John Hill), peasley(a)worldbank.org (Peter Easley), foreilly(a)worldbank.org (Frank O'Reilly), maitgmu(a)aol.com (Tucker Cox), ghilborn(a)csc.com (Gene Hilborn), padgett(a)tccslr.dnet.mmc.com (Padgett Peterson), whitfield.diffie(a)Eng.Sun.Com (Whitfield Diffie), jeff.rulifson(a)Eng.Sun.Com (Jeff Rulifson), ankney(a)emc2-tao.fisc.com (Richard Ankney), rmedlock(a)mitre.org (Roberta Medlock), JNGUYEN(a)MILCHEV.COM (Jonathan Nguyen-Duy), ttobin(a)atl.ge.com (Tim Tobin), csmother(a)atl.ge.com (Carl Smothers), randy(a)mci.net (Randy Catoe), denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning), jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young), dn(a)pipeline.com (Deborah Natsios), brow(a)clark.net, mbohannon(a)banyan.doc.gov (Mark Bohannon), ads012(a)email.mot.com (Don Sorter), Mary_Smolenski(a)ita.doc.gov (Mary Smolenski), lshomo(a)hqops.hq.nasa.gov (Lawrence Shomo), Jean_M_Baronas(a)co.xerox.com (Jean Baronas), jag(a)jgvandyke.com (Jonathan Gloster), rsabett(a)spyrus.com (Randy Sabett), Martin.Ferris(a)treas.sprint.com (Martin Ferris), Karla.King(a)treas.sprint.com (Karla King), lthrash(a)hqamc.army.mil (Lawrence Thrash), trstsc(a)tevm2.nsc.com (Russ Tobolic), steve.katz(a)citicorp.com (Steve Katz), jill.oliver(a)citicorp.com (Jill Oliver), jgrabo(a)infsec.com (John Grabowsky), madavids(a)us.oracle.com (Mary Ann Davidson), palamber(a)us.oracle.com (Paul Lambert), geiter(a)mitre.org (Jisoo Geiter), Ezzy_Dabbish-AMTE09(a)email.corp.mot.com (Ezzy Dabbish), BFlowe(a)MCiMail.com (Ben Flowe), sking(a)mitre.org (Sue King), ablee(a)mitre.org (Annabell Lee), murray2(a)vnet.ibm.com (Vera Murray), french(a)zeke.ENET.dec.com (Roger French), pescatore(a)idcg.com (John Pescatore), barker(a)st1.ncsl.nist.gov (Elaine Barker), FKeenan_+wshsr02+1Florence_Keenan+r%PGFM(a)mcimail.com (Florence Keenan), SROSE42008(a)aol.com (Steve Rose), john(a)ipower.nsc.com (John Power), david.bicknell(a)rbp.co.uk (David Bicknell), mschneck(a)phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Melanie Schneck), lhg(a)nrc.gov (Louis Grossman), RAVENIS(a)novell.wd.cubic.com (Joe Ravenis), stw(a)boeing.com (Steve Whitlock), corcorane(a)Washpost.com (Elizabeth Corcoran), hoffman(a)seas.gwu.edu (Lance Hoffman), Thorne_Graham(a)ccmail.irs.gov (Thorne Graham), lovornj(a)dyncorp.com (Jan Lovorn), Squires(a)arpa.gov (Stephen Squires), davido(a)cylink.com (David O'Brien), al.williams(a)gsa.gov (Al Williams), JDRANDALL(a)vnet.ibm.com (James Randall), RHDANCK(a)DELPHI.COM (Renee Danckwerth), Kpauley(a)pipermar.com (Kay Pauley), PFarrell(a)gmu.edu (Pat Farrell), darnstein(a)hns.com (Donald Arnstein), Thomas_C_Jones(a)ccm.ch.intel.com (Tom Jones), P26730(a)email.mot.com (Helen Hammond), hpodell(a)ids2.idsonline.com (Harold Podell), beccag(a)bsa.org (Becca Gould), mccord(a)nosc.mil (Marion McCord), orestib/dcpo/bruceh%mcimail.com(a)micf.nist.gov (Bruce Heiman), elaine.frye(a)nist.gov, cme(a)acm.org (Carl Ellison), jhalpert(a)pipermar.com (J. Halpert), ads012(a)email.mot.com (Don Sorter), paradise(a)wellsfargo.com (Jane Paradise), Lynn.McNulty(a)internetmci.com (Lynn McNulty), lawrence.shomo(a)hq.nasa (Larry Shomo) [End]

1 0

HotWired -- "Third Choice" for Netizens may be Libertarian Party
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 8 Jul 1996 19:46:34 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu Subject: HotWired -- "Third Choice" for Netizens may be Libertarian Party HotWired: The Netizen http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/ "Third Choice" -- Campaign Dispatch by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Washington, DC, 8 July The nervous sweat of US voters forced to choose between character-impaired Clinton and vision-impaired Dole may distill into fuel for the Libertarian Party. At the party's ragtag convention last week, Harry Browne began to make a case that the Libertarian Party isn't just for cyberheads and conspiracy theorists. [...] It was a refreshing departure from the highly scripted 1992 Democratic National Convention - more an exercise in infotainment than anything else - where party insiders worked quietly to block a loudmouth Jerry Brown from speaking unless he signed an agreement pledging fealty to Bill Clinton... Not so with the Libertarian convention, which netizens attended in force. Phil Zimmermann, author of Pretty Good Privacy, appeared at a privacy workshop on Saturday where delegates received PGP on floppies. On Thursday, Jim Ray, a cypherpunk and Libertarian delegate from Coral Gables, Florida, introduced a motion to strengthen the party's stance on encryption by condemning "government access to keys" - a mandatory backdoor for the Feds. "Or GAK, as we call it on Cypherpunks," Ray told the other delegates, who passed the revised crypto plank unanimously. [...] The so-called Year of the Net marches on, but the Libertarian Party now stands as the only serious political party with a commitment to defending the rights of netizens. ###

1 0

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:32 PM 7/8/96 -0500, you wrote: >Tim writes about Ritalin: > >>I've been over visiting my friend to see some of this. The Ritalin-sodden >>kid arrives like a zombie. When the Ritalin wears off, he's rambunctuous, >Alex, our 8 year old son, uses Ritalin. He doesn't need Ritalin to >concentrate. He can get caught up in a building project for hours and >create a masterpiece. He can focus so thoroughly you can't pry him >loose. > >What Alex *can't* do is get comfortably through a day of grammar >school. I sympathise -- I was the same way when I was that age. I had Errrrr. Ever hear of home schooling? Seems like if your child needs drugs to go to school than perhaps school is the problem not that your child's body lacks Ritalin. Sheesh. So it happens that I was talking with a fellow Saturday who grew up on Ritalin. He's 36 now and strung out. Life with Ritalin prepared him for drugs, you know. They were natural. Like the body is made for different laboratory made molecules with dubious effects. He never got into the hard stuff (like the opiates) like the anti-drug people promised though. Also turns out that he now has a neurological disorder that is untreatable and uncurable. So now he's goes through his days in constant pain courtesy of the best childhood his wealthy Pacific Palisades Parents could buy. I wonder if there are any other Ritalin side affects that don't become prominent until 30 years later? But than someone who thinks milk is wholesome needs some lessons is nutrition, anatomy and physiology. --j

2 1

Re: Word lists for passphrases
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

perry(a)piermont.com (perry e. metzger) In a message dated 96-07-08 19:21:11 EDT, you write: << Human stupidity is never a surprise. Perry >> I know. Just look at your posting a private message to a newsgroup because of something thats just beyond your use. So... you can't handle it and become like a baby.. and start something so utterly pointless as this.. by writing me back to begin with. You dont like the program..or think its so trivial (which it is... big fuc*in deal ) then thats fine. EVERYONE has their opinion. Some people find a use out of it...obviously you dont. Its Ok man. Just take some prozac (or is the topic ritalin now??) and youll be A OK

1 0

Re: Word lists for passphrases
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-07-08 23:10:44 EDT, perry(a)piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: << > Youd be surprised at the # of requests from people who actually had a good > use for it, and didnt have the time to spend writing it themselves. Human stupidity is never a surprise. Perry >> Just goes to show.look at the name right above. It says PERRY Didnt I say it was rude to post private email to group? Guess an arrogant very self-opinionated asshole such as yourself doesnt care.

1 0

Re: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 AM 7/9/96 -0400, you wrote: > >John F. Fricker writes: >> Seems like if your child needs drugs to go to school than perhaps school is >> the problem not that your child's body lacks Ritalin. >> >> Sheesh. >> >> So it happens that I was talking with a fellow Saturday who grew up on >> Ritalin. He's 36 now and strung out. Life with Ritalin prepared him for >> drugs, you know. They were natural. Like the body is made for different >> laboratory made molecules with dubious effects. > >Yeah, you know, I bet your body doesn't get infected for lack of >penicillin, either. I suspect that taking Penicillin prepares you for >drug dependancies. Why, next, you might take insulin to deal with >diabetes, or worse! > >Thank god most of those heroin addicts never had Ritalin as kids -- you >never know how much worse off they might be now. And if they'd gotten >antibiotics, why, forget it. > >Quit from modern medicine cold turkey. Its the only way. > >Perry > Perry, you're typically vitriolic wit fails you. What's up? Lost your prescription? Snide pills spill in the toilet again?

3 2

Secure Computing extends deal with NSA for E-mail system
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Tue Jul 09 00:01:32 1996 Following is an article from PC Week that some might find of interest. Also available at this URL - http://www.pcweek.com/news/0708/08escc.html Secure Computing Corp. has signed a $15 million deal with the National Security Agency to develop the agency's secure network server system for Department of Defense employees' E-mail. Officials of the St. Paul, Minn., company announced that Secure Computing will take about a year to complete the project, which will ensure security within the Defense Department E-mail system. The agreement is an extension of a deal Secure Computing first signed with the National Security Agency in 1992, according to company officials. Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMeHntstPRTNbb5z9AQEAfggAmM16zuktn2KeIsr4WNIYP69LZ1lZ4veY bqllaZfccr17NIvffqSINrxY62Xl5daVHnLcpy7y0QSMa3pksj3+FKT5X8C+GYQ6 tCOlTPO8VC0mXONXAmsZSvHEqQrHYHwJDZ9ljciXOyjajaPoElzTm3XScKLGR9p9 tac+3HIMuKmdXrVJ23Z8OmEvvKAiUqQdZtgS+FE+hwP2vzVh68Tqv+yUM5Ac6gAS i3Z5YxJ+0Ycugqa0BLyoJi1aOe2PqC6EbEzPI0LG2WNPA25MRFSDMJxWr2pulEas pBqZmzbAVSVI/JqaMU50LRKFIGb58gl+47QLFmCWqFWKlarDs6NcvA== =LbOA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

RE: What remains to be done.
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:32 AM 7/9/96 +0100, Andy Brown wrote: >On 09 July 1996 02:04, John F. Fricker[SMTP:jfricker@vertexgroup.com] wrote: > >> One of these days Microsoft will officially release NT's IFS SDK. A few >> "preliminary" and incomplete copies of a 1993 beta release do float around >> but for a mere $50K there's a company that will sell you the complete source >> for an IFS. It's a crime that Microsoft hasn't shipped this SDK yet as the >> Installable File System is one of the great powers of NT. > >You can do this with the existing device driver kit since they supply the >entire source code to the AT hard disk driver. I took a look and decided >that it would be too much work for me alone. They also seem to suggest that >you can write "filters" that extend the capability of existing drivers. > >> So, if someone is interested in coughing up the $50K I know a couple NT >> programmers just chomping at the bit to build cool IFS's like PGPDrive, etc. > >I'm one of them, but this low level device driver stuff makes me shudder! > > >- Andy > > That's why the IFS SDK is so important. Writing device drivers is one thing and nasty at that but the IFS is higher level and exactly what is needed to create a PGPDrive that could exist on scsi, ide, tape, network drives, floppies, cd-roms, etc. A device driver implementation would be married to a particular controller type. --j

1 0

A case for 2560 bit keys
by David F. Ogren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Jul 08 23:06:11 1996 Here is a few thoughts on RSA key sizes. There is nothing new or revolutionary herein, but I think it does provide a good case for using large RSA keysizes. Traditionally, we examine the threat model and determine the approximate ability of the attacker to factor secret keys. Then a keylength is selected that exceeds the attackers ability to factor in a reasonable amount of time. For example, if we assume that the NSA can factor any number with the speed of the special number sieve, and has 10^9 mips of computing power (doubling every 1.5 years) we can make the following estimations:_1_ Using these assumptions, the NSA could crack a 1024 bit key in ~11 days, a 1536 bit key in 10 years and a 2048 bit key in 26 years. _2_ Note that this would require the full resources of the NSA, however. Thus, even the mighty resources of the NSA could only crack 42 1024 bit keys in 1996 (including Moore's law). _3_, _4_ Similarly, a large corporation with 10^7 mips in computing power (and the same super-efficient factoring algorithm) could crack a 1024 bit key in 2 years, a 1536 bit key in 20 years, and a 2048 bit key in 36 years. My interpretation of these results: 1024 bit is probably safe for most reasonable threat models. Only individuals with extremely high threat models should be concerned about 1024 bit keys in 1996. Even those with extremely high threat models should be satisfied with 1536 bit keys. Despite the above, there are convincing arguments for longer RSA keys. Instead of asking "Why should we have longer keys?", perhaps we should be asking "Why _shouldn't_ we have longer keys?" In a hybrid cryptosystem such as PGP, very little of the computational process is consumed by RSA encryption. Only a tiny fraction of the message is RSA encrypted (the session key), and thus the time-critical operation is the symmetric crypto system (IDEA for PGP). As an experiment generate a 2047 bit PGP key and a 512 bit PGP key. Encrypt a file (preferably of a reasonable size) using both keys. Depending on the computer you are using, the time difference between the two keys will be a matter of few seconds or even a fraction of a second. And so we have to ask ourselves, why _not_ use a 2047+ bit key. It has greater longevity and greater security. Why not be overcautious when the cost is so small? It seems foolish that we use RSA keys that are less secure than our IDEA session keys. Our RSA keys are much more valuable than our session keys. I will use my RSA key to encode hundreds of messages. Each session key I will use only once. An attacker who learns one of my IDEA session keys can decrypt only that message. An attacker who learns my RSA key can decrypt any of my messages, past or present. (He can also impersonate my signature, but that's another discussion entirely.) If I send one message weekly that my attacker is interested in, and change my RSA key every two years, my RSA key is at least 104 times more valuable than any individual key. Does it not make sense that the RSA key should ideally be 104 times more difficult to crack? If increasing the RSA keylength was overly cumbersome to the process then designing the RSA keylength to meet minimum acceptable standards could be understood. But since increased RSA keylengths are cheap in terms of computing power, would it not be better to pick RSA keylengths that are more secure than the session keys? And thus, 2560 bit keys are not unreasonable. They are not significantly slower to use (most of PGP's time is spent IDEA encrypting), and yet are effectively invulnerable. By "invulnerable" I mean that any attacker capable of cracking your RSA key would have an easier time hacking your individual IDEA session keys, and would never have any need to hack the RSA key itself. And if you have threat models this severe you are a) hopelessly paranoid, b) SOL. Footnotes: _1_ These approximations of factoring difficulties and the computing resources are taken directly from Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schneier, page 161. _2_ Taking into account Moore's law, the amount of processing power spent during a period of time is the integral of Power * 2^(t/1.5)dt (from 0 to x) = Power * 1.5 / (ln 2) 2 ^(t/1.5) (also evaluated from 0 to x). Which is approximately equal to Power * 2.164 * (2^(x/1.5) - 1). Thus in three years a corporation starting with 10^7 mips could produce 10^7 * 2.164 * (2^(3/1.5)-1) = 6.492 * 10^7 mips-years. _3_ Any attempt to determine the computing power and cryptanalysis power of the NSA should be taken with a grain of salt. There are several very critical and arbitrary assumptions made in order to obtain these numbers. _4_ Additionally, any attempt to discern the future of cryptanalysis should also be taken with a grain of salt. Who can tell what computers will like be in ten years? - -- David F. Ogren | ogren(a)concentric.net | "A man without religion is like a fish PGP Key ID: 0x6458EB29 | without a bicycle" - ------------------------------|---------------------------------------- Don't know what PGP is? | Need my public key? It's available Send a message to me with the | by server or by sending me a message subject GETPGPINFO | with the subject GETPGPKEY -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMeHMpOSLhCBkWOspAQH4gwf+NiP184ve2W06ClO92uEfjbaHpn3l9zAz 1ckt8PE8kMxkq8etcq/NM/IZ3QuTIBbeOr4ey6dIptQafmarb7sSMAx0KGgPALp8 v6a77as2RUCaJYjjviYlXh/0OIt+c7c+w9HbVZCmgpru/VQjT7++6eAa1f4K+225 K12wEX2TXou4s8+qYVUAT3B0iesuq/Z2iBzO942+v3u7rkCHLMghYlLIXR+SP43l E15IQRez5nHkMb7VB9kL8ku/aDlXfKjURDQji8LBm+V+3i/9tcR/9+4EjKAqo1nB qnXCFBKrzWRev4bbI9tbVnTc83VWeJRXGZxlpXhzc40kov7GbrT9Bg== =B0h0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: What remains to be done.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 96 at 18:04, John F. Fricker wrote: [..] > One of these days Microsoft will officially release NT's IFS SDK. A few > "preliminary" and incomplete copies of a 1993 beta release do float around > but for a mere $50K there's a company that will sell you the complete source > for an IFS. It's a crime that Microsoft hasn't shipped this SDK yet as the > Installable File System is one of the great powers of NT. > > So, if someone is interested in coughing up the $50K I know a couple NT > programmers just chomping at the bit to build cool IFS's like PGPDrive, etc. Coughing up a mere $200-500 (depending on the cmpany) to write a few freeware drivers for Windows NT/95 or OS/2 is a bit much for poor hackers like myself. A GNU/FSF project should be to develop freeware DDKs for Windows or OS/2. There'd be many grateful people out there. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

1 0

Re: Word lists for passphrases
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:10 PM 7/8/96 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >Ben Holiday wrote: >> If you have access to a shell, and to the news spool, you can generate >> some quick lists by hopping into the directory of any newsgroup that >> interests you and doing: >> >> cat * | tr -cs A-Za-z '\n' | tr A-Z a-z | sort | uniq > my-big-ol-wordlist >> >> With most unixes that will generate an alphabetized list of all the unique >> words in your source text, converted to lowercase. I've had some problems >> with tr on a few machines, however. Adding a '-c' after 'uniq' will tell >> you how many times each word occured (useful for grepping out words that >> appear too infrequently, or too frequently) .. > >Actually I am fairly sure that your selection of words will be mediocre >at best. There are words (such as nethermost, insatiable, insufferable) >that are almost never used in news. If the purpose is for use with "Crack" or some similar program, it might be better than you would think. You won't get the "unusual" words, but you will also get the words in common usage that do not appear in dictionaries. (Such as fnord, jedi, killfile, and the like...) You will also get alot of proper names, which may have been used as passwords. The idea is that words in common usage may be more likely to be used as passwords. Another thing to look for when choosing dictionaries/wordlists for crack is not sticking to english. If you have a userbase that is known to have a certain percentage of people of a non-english background, you will want to find lists of words from that background. (I had a sysadmin asking me about Yiddish and Hebrew wordlists for just that reason.) These can be a bit harder. (Especially for unusual languages.) But knowing your userbase can make all the difference in what it might take to crack the passwords from the outside. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

1 0

ACLU: NJ Alert! Personal Data Chip in DL! (fwd)
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From notes(a)igc.org Tue Jul 9 15:12:01 1996 Date: Mon, 08 Jul 1996 19:48:10 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: Moderator of conference "justice.polabuse" <bwitanek(a)igc.apc.org> From: Bob Witanek <bwitanek(a)igc.apc.org> Subject: ACLU: NJ Alert! Personal Data Chip in DL! To: Recipients of pol-abuse <pol-abuse(a)igc.apc.org> Message-ID: <APC&1'0'a9f989e8'c0a(a)igc.apc.org> X-Gateway: conf2mail(a)igc.apc.org Errors-To: owner-pol-abuse(a)igc.apc.org Precedence: bulk Lines: 32 Posted: sspnj(a)exit109.com *Computer Chips in Driver Licenses?* NEWARK, N.J. -- The Associated Press reported today that drivers may soon be using a new high-tech driver's license to pay tolls and do banking in New Jersey. The soon to be tested "Smart Card" will carry a data packed computer chip that will provide authorities with access to private information including fingerprints and medical records. The pilot cards will be limited to standard driver's license information. By the time the cards are issued to all New Jersey drivers in July 1997, they would also contain fingerprints and an "electronic purse" to be used to pay bus and train fares, the AP said. Civil libertarians said the new licenses raise privacy concerns. Ultimately, the AP said, the license will contain arrest records, medical records, vehicle registration, and could be used as a debit card to pay for groceries and do banking. "I think citizens should be extremely scared about loss of privacy," David Rocah of the New Jersey ACLU told AP. "They could store tax data. They could store medical data. They could store driver's records, insurance data, virtually any data in the government's possession." The ACLU also warned that the potential for misuse of the information --government surveillance or telemarketing research - - could pose potential problems. ---------------------------------------------------------------- -- "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_ +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+ |Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union | |proff(a)suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = | |proff(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 | +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+

1 0

Re: Word lists for passphrases
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>AwakenToMe(a)aol.com, in a profound display of stubbornness, continues >to insist that his program to enumerate all possible words of length N >(that is, aaaaa, aaaab, aaaac, etc.) is somehow interesting. I am >therefore forced to drive in the nail with a sledgehammer. Forgive me. >------Cut Here------ >/* > This could be more elegant, but the point is obviousness. >*/ >#include <stdio.h> > >int main() >{ > char i[6]; > > for (i[0] = 'a'; i[0] < 'z'; i[0]++) > for (i[1] = 'a'; i[1] < 'z'; i[1]++) > for (i[2] = 'a'; i[2] < 'z'; i[2]++) > for (i[3] = 'a'; i[3] < 'z'; i[3]++) > for (i[4] = 'a'; i[4] < 'z'; i[4]++) > printf("%s\n", i); >} >------Cut Here------ > >Perry I agree with you, but it could also be correct. Since the char array is allocated on the stack as an auto, its contents are not guaranteed. So i[5]='\0'; is needed as the first statement. And of course it will never include a 'z' because the '<' will not permit it. Replace all the '<' with '<='. Plus there is the small matter of non-ASCII character representations breaking the increments and comparisons. Oh, and don't forget that main() returns an integer. This will generate at least a warning from the compiler, since the code does not return anything. It may well return a random number or something that will be interpreted as an error code. (also less than a minute's work) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | Technology (n): | | A substitute for adulthood. stevenw(a)best.com | Popular with middle-aged men.

1 0

Metered Phone
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any ideas about this metered phone? I am from Philippines and heard some news that it will be existing in 1997. Quite a big problem! Every dial will be counted, every seconds will be measured...

1 0

Metered Phone
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any ideas about this metered phone? I am from Philippines and heard some news that it will be existing in 1997. Quite a big problem! Every dial will be counted, every seconds will be measured...

1 0