December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Hack DigiCash: Payee Anonymity
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >This is for a "WorldCurrency Access Interest Account", which I don't >think is what is used for ecash. For ecash the account opening fee is >$11 and the per-month fee is $5. I don't see any reference to required >account minimums. Aha. That's where I got the $11 figure from. I suppose I should try actually _reading_ all the fine print :) IANAL, but then I never claimed to be. I'll be writing to Mark Twain's contact ("ftrotter(a)marktwain.com") and try to figure out just what the deal is. Dave - ----- David E. Smith, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0c92732139 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ Sorry, the full signature is being interrogated by news.admin.net-abuse.misc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMI5y7AwyfvCScyE5AQEn7wQAoUT/6fBZcUSM5eT7HYnY0Tx5Q35Q4aeB a2lTJWnMRta5i16qCtKF/0OiK/9bfs0i3FQqUMpireXp7YZn5n0D83mr+AWuJZBc +0170zWpsVZElAoZU8ZPV06PDQwuraH2pmdBMt9Kfabi4w4BGbqJ3E4rYvhx95dj hWnAp+6RzJg= =IM+h -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: textbooks
by koontz＠MasPar.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IP/FP and PC1 describe how to get from input bytes to L, R, C and D Blocks: The Initial Permutation The Initial Permuation (IP) is a description of how a byte wide interface is connected to a 64 bit block comprised of two 32 bit blocks (L and R). Consider a byte wide interface with the bits numbered 1-8. The event numbered bits go to the L Block and the odd numbered bits go to the R block. Note that the bit order is big endian, where bit 1 is most significant and bit 8 is least least significant. The input block is typically loaded as 8 successive byte loads: Port MSB7 Input (LR) Left Bit Bit Block (64 bits) Block (32 bits) 2------6-------58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 4------4-------60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 6------2-------62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 8------0-------64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Right Block (32 bits) 1------7-------57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3------5-------59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 5------3-------61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 7------1-------63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Input Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The Final Permutation The Final Permutation (IP-1) provides the inverse, it standarizes the output of the R16L16 output block to a byte wide interface. The Output block is ordered Right then Left to allow complementary operation for subsequent decryption. Were one to perform an IP followed by IP-1 without any intervening round iteration operations, one would end up with odd and even bits swapped: Right Output (R16L16) Standard Port Block (32 bits) Block (64 bits) Bit Bit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8---------6--------2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16---------4--------4 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24---------2--------6 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32---------0--------8 Left Block (32 bits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40---------7--------1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48---------5--------3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56---------3--------5 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64---------1--------7 Output Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 >From FIPS Pub 46-2: Final Permuation IP-1: Output Byte 40 8 48 16 56 24 64 32 1 39 7 47 15 55 23 63 31 2 38 6 46 14 54 22 62 30 3 37 5 45 13 53 21 61 29 4 36 4 44 12 52 20 60 28 5 35 3 43 11 51 19 59 27 6 34 2 42 10 50 18 58 26 7 33 1 41 9 49 17 57 25 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Port Bit 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 MSB7 Bits In the simplest hardware implementation of DES, the Left and Right blocks are comprised in hardware of four 8 bit register each. Each 8 bit register can be serially loaded (IP), serially unloaded (IP-1), or parallel output and parallel loaded (round interation). DES is an encryption algorithm originally required to be implemented in hardware, specified in 1977 - predating 16 or 32 bit microprocessor peripherals. Permuted Choice 1 PC1 performs a similar function loading the C and D 28 bit registers (comprised of three 8 bit bidirectional shift register and 1 4 bit bidirectional shift register, all with parallel outputs). The C and D registers can be serially loaded (shifting right), or serially shifted left or right in a closed ring for encryption or decryption. Port MSB7 Bits Bits Input (CD) C Block, 64 bits Block (28 bits) 1--------7------57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 MS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2--------6------58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 3--------5------59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4--------4------60 52 44 36 ----------- (C(28)) 25 26 27 28 D Block (28 bits) 7--------1------63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6--------2------62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 5--------3------61 53 45 37 29 21 33 5 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4-------(D(25)--------------28 20 12 4 25 26 27 28 8--------0------64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 LS (parity) Input Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Note that bit 4 is used as input for both C and D. This implies that C(28) output is used as the serial input to D(25). The least significant bit is used for odd parity.

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crypto and law enforcement
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In June, four people were arrested for allegedly producing the illegal newspaper "radikal" in Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany. One of the main reasons for imprisonment was that they refused to decrypt the disks found with them. The Attorney at the Federal Supreme Court now claims that three disks have been partially decrypted, but does not reveal the texts to the defense counsel because that could be "a danger to the investigations". The fact that the accused did not help in decryption is seen as an indicator for danger of collusion, so they will remain imprisonned on remand. It seems that these four people will face several years of imprisonment mainly because one of them chose a weak passphrase.

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Re: Quick commercial package question
by leonardr＠aladdinsys.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 PM 10/24/95, Marshall Clow wrote: >> http://www.uccs.edu/~abusby/mac_u-g/RemoveIt.sit.bin >> I also just checked this out, and I as the engineer currently responsible for StuffIt (and having worked on it for a number of years), I can tell you that the thing simply won't work as documented. I'll even explain why... StuffIt actually encrypts data (it doesn't just password protect it), but it does so using a COMPLETELY RANDOM key and then that random key is encrypted using the password that the user entered (user key) and then stored in the MKey resource. We do this so that the same file encrypted with the same "user key" doesn't generate the same data (and therefore aid in easier breaking). So by replacing an archive's MKey resource, only means that you can manipulate an encrypted archive (delete things, etc.) BUT it still won't decrypt your data, since the original encryption key is not present. If you know the person who wrote or posted the information, please feel free to forward my message along to him. Thanks, Leonard Rosenthol ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leonard Rosenthol Internet: leonardr(a)aladdinsys.com Director of Advanced Technology AppleLink: MACgician Aladdin Systems, Inc. America Online: MACgician

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arg
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Frissell: "The average seasoned citizen pays a higher percentage of his income for medical expenses today than he did in 1964 before the passage of Medicaid." Do you set aside a quiet hour every day to think up this crap?

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Re: Quick commercial package question
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:05 AM 10/25/95, Leonard Rosenthol wrote: >At 10:57 PM 10/24/95, Marshall Clow wrote: >>> http://www.uccs.edu/~abusby/mac_u-g/RemoveIt.sit.bin <...> > If you know the person who wrote or posted the information, please >feel free to forward my message along to him. I don't know the person, but I posted your note--and, BTW, thanks for responding--to alt.hackintosh, where the above web page proffering this pseudo-crack is regularly mentioned; I know that "abusby" monitors the group (and maintains a big hacking BBS), so hopefully he'll pull the crack from circulation. Cheers. And thanks, also, for all of your very excellent work. Ted

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Re: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those interested in the first bank to back Ecash: Mark Twain Bank opened to serve the wealthy suburbs of Saint Louis (Ladue and Town & Country) a few years ago. It was meant to be a public "private bank" for sophisticated customers. A few years ago when the rules were eased, it started offering accounts and CDs denominated in 25 foreign currencies. These accounts were meant for international investors and business types in the area. They were discovered by "hard money" newsletters and became popular with that crowd. They have been the cheapest place to get foreign currency accounts in the US. Initially, the bank didn't realize that this sort of "hedge" market existed but have since exploited it fairly well. These accounts are FDIC insured up to $100,000.00 in $US equivalents. Obviously, exchange losses are not covered by FDIC insurance. The Ecash trial involves opening a World Currency Access Account which *is* FDIC insured and using it to fund your Ecash account which is *not* insured. They are treating the Ecash Mint part of their operations and the various customer Ecash accounts as investment accounts (hence the investor sophistication disclosure questions on the application form). Unanswered questions --- What will the SEC say? Mark Twain seems to be carrying on the fine old tradition of Saint Louis banks being a bit independent and out in front of the crowd. Other examples include Southwest Bank always leading the nation on Prime Rate changes and the Saint Louis Federal Reserve Bank (the only FRB to publish a hard money newsletter). I may wait for the Swedish Postal Bank to start offering its Ecash accounts just cause I like foreign climes. DCF "The Revolution will *not* be FDIC insured BTW."

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Welcome to cypherpunks
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Welcome to the cypherpunks mailing list! If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: About cypherpunks ----------------- I. Administrivia (please read, boring though it may be) The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for privacy in the digital domain. It is a high volume mailing list. If you don't know how to do something, like unsubscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)toad.com and the software robot which answers that address will send you back instructions on how to do what you want. If you don't know the majordomo syntax, an empty message to this address will get you a help file, as will a command 'help' in the body. Even with all this automated help, you may still encounter problems. If you get really stuck, please feel free to contact me directly at the address I use for mailing list management: cypherpunks-owner(a)toad.com Please use this address for all mailing list management issues. Hint: if you try to unsubscribe yourself from a different account than you signed up for, it likely won't work. Log back into your old account and try again. If you no longer have access to that account, mail me at the list management address above. For other questions, my list management address is not the best place, since I don't read it every day. To reach me otherwise, send mail to eric(a)remailer.net This address is appropriate for emergencies (and wanting to get off the list is never an emergency), such as the list continuously spewing articles. Please don't send me mail to my regular mailbox asking to be removed; I'll just send you back a form letter. Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed. It's rude. The -request address is made exactly for this purpose. To post to the whole list, send mail to cypherpunks(a)toad.com If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list. Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages. There is no digest version available. There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume. Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and important developments will be posted there. Mail to cypherpunks-announce-request(a)toad.com if you want to be added or removed to the announce list. All announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no need to subscribe to both. II. About cypherpunks The cypherpunks list is not designed for beginners, although they are welcome. If you are totally new to crypto, please get and read the crypto FAQ referenced below. This document is a good introduction, although not short. Crypto is a subtle field and a good understanding will not come without some study. Please, as a courtesy to all, do some reading to make sure that your question is not already frequently asked. There are other forums to use on the subject of cryptography. The Usenet group sci.crypt deals with technical cryptography; cypherpunks deals with technical details but slants the discussion toward their social implications. The Usenet group talk.politics.crypto, as is says, is for political theorizing, and cypherpunks gets its share of that, but cypherpunks is all pro-crypto; the debates on this list are about how to best get crypto out there. The Usenet group alt.security.pgp is a pgp-specific group, and questions about pgp as such are likely better asked there than here. Ditto for alt.security.ripem. The cypherpunks list has its very own net.loon, a fellow named L. Detweiler. The history is too long for here, but he thinks that cypherpunks are evil incarnate. If you see a densely worded rant featuring characteristic words such as "medusa", "pseudospoofing", "treachery", "poison", or "black lies", it's probably him, no matter what the From: line says. The policy is to ignore these postings. Replies have never, ever, not even once resulted in anything constructive and usually create huge flamewars on the list. Please, please, don't feed the animals. III. Resources. A. The sci.crypt FAQ anonymous ftp to rtfm.mit.edu:pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt The cryptography FAQ is good online intro to crypto. Very much worth reading. Last I looked, it was in ten parts. B. cypherpunks ftp site anonymous ftp to ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany. There is a glossary there that all new members should download and read. Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are there for the perl-literate. C. Bruce Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_, published by Wiley This is required reading for any serious technical cypherpunk. An excellent overview of the field, it describes many of the basic algorithms and protocols with their mathematical descriptions. Some of the stuff at the edges of the scope of the book is a little incomplete, so short descriptions in here should lead to library research for the latest papers, or to the list for the current thinking. All in all, a solid and valuable book. It's even got the cypherpunks-request address. IV. Famous last words My preferred email address for list maintenance topics only is hughes(a)toad.com. All other mail, including emergency mail, should go to hughes(a)ah.com, where I read mail much more regularly. Enjoy and deploy. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions. The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to defend it. Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good cryptosystems. Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications of all kinds. Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress. Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy. [Last updated Mon Feb 21 13:18:25 1994]

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Re: CJR returned to sender
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Even if the T-shirts are a joke, it seems like applying for an export license is a win-win proposition. If the government denies the license, they end up looking extremely silly and it's easier to point out to Joe Sixpack (or a judge) how silly ITAR is w.r.t. cryptography. If they grant the license or say one isn't necessary, it might open up the way for "cypherpunk party-streamers" which also happens to be your favorite crypto program on colored paper tape or perhaps even limited edition, hand painted, collectable cypherpunk CDs containing mostly music but with a data track or two. The only bad response would be none at all, so I think pushing for one is worthwhile even if the answer is "that's a frivolous request". | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: Frank Stuart | It always takes longer than you expect, even fstuart(a)vetmed.auburn.edu | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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Public key Steganography?
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following are bits and pieces of a message I've sent to someone inquiring about stego... It brought back the old idea I had about expanding WNS to do public key.... Would something like this be feasable? the beginning of this is a description of what WNS does, followed by the public key idea... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- <<I am researching Steganography and related topics of a security course at George Mason University. As part of my research, I am reviewing PC products that provide such services. White Noise Storm (tm) which you developed in one such product. I am interested in the kind of research you did to develop it (publications, readings, inspiration). If you could point me to any documents I would be grateful.>> Hi there, Anyway to answer your questions, the idea of WNS came to me from the idea of spread spectrum technology and frequency hopping, however, I added several twists to it in order to improve security. Instead of just having X channels of communication which are multiplexed or changed with a fixed formula and passkey, I have eight channels which are spread within a number of 8 bits*W bytes channels. W here represents a random sized window of W bytes. Each of these eight channels represents one single bit out of a whole byte, so each Window holds one byte plus a bunch of unused bits. These channels rotate amongs themselves, for instance bit 1 might be swapped with bit 7, or all the bits may rotate positions at once. Further, these bits change location within the window on the byte level. The rules for these swaps (similar to the substitution boxes in other cyphers) are dictated not only by your passphrase - which is unlimited in length, but also by the previous window's random data. This means that if you encrypt message M with key K two times, you get two different cyphertexts, C. C1 and C2 may be different, however, decrypted with key K, both will yield the original message M. This makes cryptanalysis very hard because the same message will give you different cyphertexts each time, thus making known cyphertext atacks useless. (Of course if you don't use random numbers, but rather the LSB's in an image, the same passphrase and the same window size, you'll get the same cyphertext each time you run it - which is one of the reasons you should destroy the original picture after injecting it. More about this later.) Since the window size changes with each window, the bits both rotate among themselves, and within the data window, it is close to impossible for an attacker to guess where there is cyphertext data versus where there is random data, which bit in that cyphertext represents what bit value, and in which byte it is located in. The unused bits are actually random data when WNS is used by itself generated by either a hardware random number generator, or by your compiler's random functions which addmitedly aren't all that great. However, if you are using WNS for steganography, that random data is actually the least significant bits of your original file, be it sound, or a picture or whatever. An injector is included for the PCX format because that is a format I am most familiar with, however you may write your own for other media. The reason I'm using live data out of the file you want to hide a message in is so that the cyphertext produced by WNS closely matches the natural, native LSB's of that file. Also, WNS, when used with a large enough maximum window size will give you a very secure stego channel since it will be very hard to dected that 1 in say, 500 bits has been altered. That's a bit extreme and will waste a lot of data, but for small messages stored in very large complex, noisy files, will look very much like the original image. Another thing to throw off the attacker is that statistical fixing. If WNS writes a 1 bit over a 0 bit of an LSB file, it will look for an unused 1 bit to write a zero over. This balances the distribution of 0 and 1 bits to match that of the original file as closely as possible, so that you cannot use statistical analysis to even detect the presence of steganography, much less break it. Additionally, WNS's schema of steganography does give you a very strong advantage: your recipient does not need to have the original picture or sound in order to extract the hidden message. There is a huge concern about this since if, as some other algorithms require, your recipient needed to have the original picture, you can bet that the bad guys would also have it and compare the two and also be able to extract the message. It is a good idea for nobody to have the original image, not even you. That is, scan something in, inject your message in it, and destroy the original. If the bad guys search your hard drive and find the original picture, they can compare it to the one you've sent which contains the data, thus they are able to find out which bits WNS has changed, and possibly analyze the algorithm to see which passphrases would generate such bits, extract the passphrase and then the message. With the original pre-WNS210 version, it was possible to break an encrypted message by decoding it repeatedly with the same password while changing one bit at a time in a window so as to find out which bits WNS wrote and which were random, however this brute force method is a lot worse than most brute force methods because given a stream of bits, and an unlimited password size you have numbits^numpasswords combinations to work with - a very huge space size for bruting, even for small messages. However, this version uses not only the previous window's plain-text, but the current window's unused random data bits to form the next window, that is in a sense the algorithm is recursive. (Not that the encryption function calls itself, but rather it uses the previous window to form the next.) Keep in mind that no-one, to my knowledge has done a differential cryptanalysis or any other formal attempt to break this code. It is possible that the boys at the NSA would attempt this if they thought it was a threat to them, but I haven't seen anyone report any weaknesses in this algorithm. This is why I suggest that whatever you send with WNS be compressed and then encrypted with something like PGP first. That extra bit of entropy generated by first compressing, and then by encrypting with RSA and IDEA will increase the entropy in your cyphertext even if the LSB's from the host picture aren't all that random. Related subjects from which I was inspired to write WNS: random numbers, the sliding window protocols such as Zmodem which change their window size depending on how noisy the channel is - WNS changes the window size to improve security, not to help against noise - in fact, if you change a single byte in a WNS cyphertext, the rest of the message gets garbled completly. Spread spectrum and channel hopping radio communications, finite state machine automatons, steganography and stealth in general, etc. At the time I wrote this, I did not have any papers I used to write this code, only my own knowledge of the above topics, things I learned in school about automatons and spread spectrum, the Zmodem protocol description of DSZ, etc. I would like to sometime in the future expand WNS to use a public key system instead of a symmetric key, but I haven't yet found a feasable way to do this. As is, you'd have to know your recipient's private key in order to encrypt something to send them. If you do, it beats the whole point of public key encryption. If you use their public key, everyone has access to it, so it's a kind of a catch 22 here. Using their public key as the inital WNS key, then using an RSA encrypted block to send the session key for WNS will produce the RSA encrypted block - while this is fairly strong, RSA might have some tell-tale signs that would give away the presence of steganography in the message? I'm not sure how insecure or secure this would be, but so far it is the only idea I have. This would basically work like this: 1. pick a randomly generated session key for the IDEA cypher, call this K1 2. pick a randomly generated session key for the 2nd part of the WNS session, call this K2. 3. Use the recipient's public key Pub for an RSA or Diffie-Hillman session key exchange. 4. Encrypt Sessionkey=RSA(K1+K2,Pub) 5. Encrypt Sessionblock=WNS(Sessionkey,randomnumbers,Pub) and merge with random numbers generating a random sized block. 6. First encrypt blocks of your plaintext with idea using cyphertext1=IDEA(plaintextblock,K1) 7. Then encrypt and write cyphertext2=WNS(cyphertext1,randomnumbers,K2) to the output file. 8. Go to 6 until no more data to write. To decrypt ( you are the recipient): 1. Set the session key to your public key Pub. 2. Decrypt the start of the stegoed picture using WNS and your public key to get K1 and K2: K1+K2=WNSDecrypt(cyphertext2,Pub) -> here cyphertext2 comes from the file 3. Decrypt next block of code using cyphertext1=WNSDecrypt(cyphertext2,K2) 4. Decrypt the cyphertext1 with IDEA plaintext=IDEADecrypt(cyphertext1,K1) 5. Goto 3 until no more data. Problem is, how much does it weaken WNS to use your recipient's RSA's public key as the initial WNS key not only in terms of security, but also in terms of allowing the attacker to detect the presence of stego'ed data in your host image?

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Re: Privacy Marketing
by todd＠lgt.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Reply to: RE>Privacy Marketing > >Nick - > >I read your well-reasoned and articulate post just after sending my own (much >less complete) one which largely contradicts your view. > >Either future is plausible. I think the key issue here is risk. The >commercial market for transaction detail exists today. Call it a mature >industry. The market for individual digital privacy has been identified at a >general level, but, as you point out, has not exactly crystallized. Call it >an embryonic industry. > >Does the former need to die in order for the latter to gain ground? Probably >not. There's a lot of mutual dependence here. Each needs the other to be >relevant - kind of a Yin/Yang thing. Depending upon how the regulatory >environment shapes up, it may be quite possible that both are thriving >businesses in the future, with transaction service providers enjoying revenue >streams from both selling data and selling anti-data (privacy). Look at >Caller ID and Caller ID Blocking services for an historical precedent. > >- Art > > >Art Hutchinson E-mail: >hutchinson(a)ncri.com >Senior Consultant Phone: (617) 654-0635 >Northeast Consulting Resources, Inc. FAX: (617) 654-0654 >One Liberty Square WWW: http://www.ncri.com >Boston, MA 02160 This dovetails into a conversation currently going on in inside the cypherpunks alias, here is a reply I posted to a query about Transaction Models, and security or anomymous status of the transaction initiator or closer. --- Snip --- >I must disagre here and side with *gasp* FC. Ughhh, Me too..., Dr. Fred scores 2 Points! >If your so called *secure* server happens to get broken into by grace of >god, you want to know at least where the attack came from. If Netscape >wants to hide internet hostnames they would to well setting up to DNS >servers, one for internal resolutions where IPs resolve to their real >hostname, and one in front of the firewall that resolves all IP's to >unkown.netscape.com. I think there are reallty two bigger conceptual issues up for bashing about here, and they are different. It is unlikely that they can be by the same protocol... They both are valid transaction models and must be met. The one - Authentication Based transactions, i.e. I am doing *stuff* from a "known" system or "authenticated channel". These transactions are based upon a level of trust that I say I am who I am and that my "tresources" are as they are protrayed to be. Clearly there is an electronic trail generated here. This is the "credit card" model. and The other, - What I now call "Unauthenicated transactions" are based upon the actual resource's being authenticated rather than myself being authenticated. ----- Hence if you follow this model to extrapolate that these two types of "environments" exist, that of "known and trusted users" and that of "unknown users, but trusted cash". They are inb and of itself what will drive the need to both collect and enforce privacy for both types of transactions. IMHO - Anything less just wont fly long term. This concept of collecting client data has to be a part of the "Known Entity" Transaction Models and relegated to stay within that context. "Unknown Entity" transaction processing will have to be made avalaiable as well with anonimity being insured as part of the process model. Todd Regards, T. S. Glassey Chief Technologist Looking Glass Technologies todd(a)lgt.com (415) 324-4318 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQB1AwUBMFu5E6gNRnWhagU5AQHI+gL+Mwpcd3lAWd8FF06qcG6rnLhIYveHW71a XC7xh1T0uu8qnYX31yMp17OG28jWpKUbWec1IM9/eXOi+gInA7rKICWczV8zo9Z0 0puxjRRN7yO4KfRb3cPpk+r0p6pDg01Y =bTYb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Payments FAQ
by hallam＠w3.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Im'm getting overloaded by requests as to where various payments info happens to be. Here is the URL of an overview I produced. http://www.w3.org/hypertext/WWW/Payments/roadmap.html You can find SEPP from here and most other schemes, even Magic Money for cypherpunks afficianados. Phill

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Privacy Marketing
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Most Internet businesses, especially the Web software and payment systems providers, are severely underestimating the market for privacy features that is out there. Consider: * A recent general survey showed that 83% of Americans are very concerned about their privacy on the "Information Superhighway". One can expect even stronger figures from European customers, which have more first-hand experience with private data, much of it originally compiled for innocuous reasons, being used for political repression. The vast majority of our customers are concerned about privacy. * Marketing surveys on privacy that are both detailed and accurate are hard to come by, because customers who care more about their privacy tend to dislike filling out detailed forms (even if they claim to be anonymous). * Over half the BBS, and potentially the Internet, online service market is in controversial services, where customers are even more concerned about privacy than average. * Privacy, once considered merely a political issue, is now being recognized for its more important aspect, as a market differentiator and value-add. Marketers correctly recognize that government "privacy regulations" mean much less privacy for businesses if it is to be enforced, and the voters no longer expect such laws to have any teeth in the face of modern technology. That hardly means that customers are not concerned about it, as the numbers show. The alternative to regulation is market solutions. Recognize that many customers do want privacy, give them what they want, and contrast yourself to your competitor. Making visible the ways your competitor is violating their customers' privacy will become a powerful marketing strategy. This strategy was used rather timidly, and inaccurately, by AT&T against MCI, where it nevertheless had great success. (Inaccurate because all major phone companies compile lists of who calls whom, and use them for marketing as well as billing -- MCI was simply being more honest about it). Used boldly and accurately, privacy marketing has vast potential to upset competitors who rely too much on marketing data and not enough on empathy with the human customer. For an idea of what such a marketing campaign might be like, imagine combining Apple "1984" Mac ads, one of the most effective campaigns in history, with the AT&T vs. MCI campaign, to sell products and services that in fact do protect customer privacy where the competition does not. * Most Americans do _not_ participate in frequent flier and similar customer tracking programs. Many who do participate don't realize the extent to which their lifestyle is tracked, since these actions are performed on remote databases, well hidden from the customer. If customers aren't concerned about their privacy, then why the need for all the distracting gimmicks and giveaways? Why not just promote these programs straightforwardly to the customer as "Customer Tracking Programs"? A competitor who can provide a privacy protecting solution can do just that, damaging these tracking programs severely. * It is ludicrous to argue that cash transactions, which leave no identified paper trail, provide no practical privacy. In fact they prevent detailed compilation of lifestyle habits, by (a) not depending on identity to settle the transaction, (b) making identity tracking, where it occurs, a visible, separate process, and (c) making it too expensive to track identity via the payment system itself, except in extreme, very rare cases. In practice, this means that cash customers don't get their lifestyles described in detail in remote databases, while non-confidential electronic payers increasingly do. Eventually this sharp difference in outcome will feed back to the customer, greatly increasing the demand for cash over non-confidential electronic payment. * A big challenge for vendors value-adding privacy is to accurately communicate these privacy features, through both the user interface and their marketing, while debunking fraudulent claims (such as calling non-confidential payment systems "cash") and exposing the privacy violating actions of their competitors. I conclude that privacy marketing will be an important value-add for Internet commerce. It will be a terrific way to gain market share at the expense of the competition -- or to lose much of your market share, if you find yourself on the wrong end of a privacy campaign. Nick Szabo szabo(a)netcom.com

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Digital Cash, Privacy, Anonymity, Double spending protection and Cheating protection
by ali＠eit.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's think out loud here for a minute... I am sending this to Cypherpunks to see if someone out there has already thought of a solution to this. Alice wants to get a file from Bob and wants to pay him $1 using some Digital Cash scheme. - Do we want Alice's identity to remain Anonymous (and Bob's too)? (Note that this means that neither party knows who the other really is. They could be using aliases to conceal their real identity.) - Do we want both Alice's & Bob's Privacy maintained in the interactions. (Note the seperation of Privacy and Anonymity with the former referring to the fact that the transaction detail is only known between the parties involved. The transaction detail includes, knowledge of what was purchased, how many, and in the ideal case between which parties! Those parties could have used an alias and therefore have remained Anonymous independent of whether their Privacy was maintained. Privacy also means more than simple confidentiality because it may involve having a merchant, for example, not maintain a database of purchasing habbits, or if it does maintain such a database, keep it to itself.) - Do we want to prevent Alice from double spending (and Bob too)? - Do we want to protect either party from cheating each other? - Do we want a self-enforcing protocol? (e.g. No need for Bob to verify the e-coins with a Bank every time.) - Do we want minimum book-keeping by each party for practical implementations? - Have I missed more? Tax, Export, etc (beyond the scope of this email ;-) The question is can all of the above requirements be achieved? AND Are they all required/desired? I know cryptography does wonders, but I ponder upon 1) the need to satisfy all the above requirements, as well as 2) the feasability of such a solution. At first glance, it appears that Anonymity and Double spending prevention are contradictory. You want to punish a double spender and you need to know their identity to do that. Also, Privacy covers a broader scope than cryptographic protocols can address (e.g. the merchant database.) Finally, to prevent/punish cheating using a third party requires the loss of both Privacy and Anonymity as the third party/judge is presented with the transaction details and asked to arbitrate. Nevermind the other requirements for now... :-) Please include me in all responses. Thanks. Ali

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Re: Mark Twain Bank [good news]
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Also note that, per a conversation w/Frank Trotter, there are no minimum balances for those wanting to just establish ECash accounts. There is also no significant operational difference between merchant and customer accounts (it's mostly a matter of fees.) Individuals can set up shops w/personal accounts. Frank seems to think that he posted an announcement to this effect to cypherpunks in the middle of the night last night. I suspect he was tired. (I'm apparently account number 10; the software should be put up for download by Marcel either tonight or tomorrow. He's apparently playing squash.)

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E-mail Spy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1995. A '90s Espionage Tale Stars Software Rivals, E-Mail Spy By Glenn Simpson Technothriller novelist Tom Clancy might have a hard time dreaming this one up. In a computer-age case of spy vs. spy, a small software firm is claiming to have uncovered an industrial espionage attempt by a much larger competitor by using a controversial e-mail program. Court documents and interviews tell a tale of intrigue, deception and twist upon twist. Not to mention the alleged involvement of a mysterious "classified government agency." The protagonist is Performix Inc., a closely held eight-year-old firm in McLean, Va., that has carved out a significant niche for itself producing Empower, a software program used for "load testing," which measures the ability of a software program to serve many users simultaneously. Every major computer manufacturer now uses Empower. Enter Mercury Interactive Corp., a $300 million publicly traded California firm that also is in the business of selling software-testing products and produces competing software called Load Runner. In June 1995, a senior Mercury Interactive official, Graham Burnette, allegedly wrote to Performix inquiring about a possible corporate alliance to develop load-testing software. Performix spurned the offer. Around the same time, a Virginia businessman named Joel Dietrich, president of an obscure company called Styx Systems, approached Performix asking to try out a version of Empower known as Empower/CS on behalf of an anonymous client. According to Performix, Mr. Dietrich said he couldn't identify the client because it was a federal government intelligence agency. On June 16 Performix granted Mr. Dietrich and Styx a short-term license to use Empower/CS. At 1:55 a.m. on Saturday, July 29, Performix received a most curious e-mail message over the Internet. The message indicated that someone who wasn't authorized to do so was trying to install Empower/CS on a large computer and examine its "source codes" -- the software's secret programming language. A feature Performix had embedded in Empower/CS automatically causes an e-mail alert to be sent to Performix whenever there are indications the software is being used improperly. The e-mail indicated the address from which it had been sent: "merc-int.com." This is the registered Internet address of Mercury Interactive. The e-mail also gave the name of the network on which someone was installing the copy of Empower/CS: "testrun.mercury." The license number of the software apparently now in Mercury Interactive's hands, the e-mail further indicated, was the license number of the copy that had been leased to Styx. While Mercury Interactive and Mr. Dietrich have disavowed any knowledge of a possible software transfer, Mercury Interactive's Mr. Burnette acknowledged in an interview that Mr. Dietrich's daughter and son-in-law work for Mercury Interactive. In mid-August, in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va., Performix sued Mercury Interactive, Styx and Dietrich, alleging copyright infringement, fraud, conversion, unfair competition, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Performix alleges Mercury Interactive "acquired Empower/CS so that it could unlawfully, willfully and maliciously copy, use and/or reverse engineer Empower/CS for the purpose of improving the performance and features of existing Mercury Interactive products in an attempt to gain significant economic advantage." Mercury Interactive hasn't yet formally responded to the allegations, but Mr. Burnette denied any wrongdoing by the company. "Mercury Interactive has a very strong policy against industrial espionage," he said. "We don't do it." Mr. Dietrich's response filed with the court has raised some eyebrows. While claiming no knowledge of any transfer to Mercury, he hasn't backed away from his claim to be working for the federal government. Indeed, Mr. Dietrich is asserting that he is immune from the suit because he was acting as an agent of the U.S. government. He claims in court papers that he obtained the software on behalf of "a classified government agency." None of the parties to the case who were willing to be interviewed said they knew the identity of the agency, and Mr. Dietrich didn't respond to interview requests. However, Mr. Burnette of Mercury Interactive said: "I know that Mr. Dietrich works as a contractor for a government agency. I know it's a secret government agency, but I don't know what it is." Officials of both Mercury Interactive and Performix said the two firms have reached a tentative settlement, although they disagree on what it contains. "Everything Performix needed from a business perspective they received, including the ability to review Mercury Interactive product releases," said Performix attorney Nelson Blitz. In addition, "money will be paid to Performix under this agreement in principle." But Mr. Burnette asserted that no money would change hands. The penultimate turn: Mr. Burnette claims that Performix is eager to settle the case because it has a problem of its own. He contends that it is illegal to secretly embed in commercial software code a program that causes the customer's computer to send out e-mail. Mr. Blitz of Performix denied there was anything legally questionable about the practice and said Mercury Interactive never raised that issue in settlement negotiations. He also said the feature isn't intended to be a spycatcher. Rather, he said, it is meant solely to help clients who are improperly installing the product by alerting Performix that they need help. Empower's documentation informs customers of the feature, he added. James Haggard, president of Vasco Data Security Inc., said the purpose of such programs is ambiguous, and it would be hard to rebut Performix's claim that the feature is merely meant to serve the customer. He noted that Microsoft Corp.'s new Windows 95 software contains a program that can send Microsoft a report on the software products being used by those who sign up for its on-line service albeit only with the users' permission. While critics label it a means of economic snooping, the company says the program simply helps it assist customers. "The concept of a program calling home of its own accord" is controversial in the computer industry, said computer security expert Samuel Bellovin of Bell Labs. "People tend to get very upset when it happens," he said, because it can look as if the software maker is spying on them. The final twist: Performix last week agreed to be acquired by Pure Software Inc., a publicly held firm as large as Mercury Interactive-which now will be up against someone its own size. ----- [How many CompSecExp S. Bellovins o'BellLabs?]

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Re: Welcome to cypherpunks
by sharborth＠hai-net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why am I getting this when I am already subscribed to the list?????? Skip ______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: Welcome to cypherpunks Author: Majordomo(a)toad.com at internet Date: 25-10-95 12:17 -- Welcome to the cypherpunks mailing list! If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: About cypherpunks ----------------- I. Administrivia (please read, boring though it may be) The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for privacy in the digital domain. It is a high volume mailing list. If you don't know how to do something, like unsubscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)toad.com and the software robot which answers that address will send you back instructions on how to do what you want. If you don't know the majordomo syntax, an empty message to this address will get you a help file, as will a command 'help' in the body. Even with all this automated help, you may still encounter problems. If you get really stuck, please feel free to contact me directly at the address I use for mailing list management: cypherpunks-owner(a)toad.com Please use this address for all mailing list management issues. Hint: if you try to unsubscribe yourself from a different account than you signed up for, it likely won't work. Log back into your old account and try again. If you no longer have access to that account, mail me at the list management address above. For other questions, my list management address is not the best place, since I don't read it every day. To reach me otherwise, send mail to eric(a)remailer.net This address is appropriate for emergencies (and wanting to get off the list is never an emergency), such as the list continuously spewing articles. Please don't send me mail to my regular mailbox asking to be removed; I'll just send you back a form letter. Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed. It's rude. The -request address is made exactly for this purpose. To post to the whole list, send mail to cypherpunks(a)toad.com If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list. Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages. There is no digest version available. There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume. Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and important developments will be posted there. Mail to cypherpunks-announce-request(a)toad.com if you want to be added or removed to the announce list. All announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no need to subscribe to both. II. About cypherpunks The cypherpunks list is not designed for beginners, although they are welcome. If you are totally new to crypto, please get and read the crypto FAQ referenced below. This document is a good introduction, although not short. Crypto is a subtle field and a good understanding will not come without some study. Please, as a courtesy to all, do some reading to make sure that your question is not already frequently asked. There are other forums to use on the subject of cryptography. The Usenet group sci.crypt deals with technical cryptography; cypherpunks deals with technical details but slants the discussion toward their social implications. The Usenet group talk.politics.crypto, as is says, is for political theorizing, and cypherpunks gets its share of that, but cypherpunks is all pro-crypto; the debates on this list are about how to best get crypto out there. The Usenet group alt.security.pgp is a pgp-specific group, and questions about pgp as such are likely better asked there than here. Ditto for alt.security.ripem. The cypherpunks list has its very own net.loon, a fellow named L. Detweiler. The history is too long for here, but he thinks that cypherpunks are evil incarnate. If you see a densely worded rant featuring characteristic words such as "medusa", "pseudospoofing", "treachery", "poison", or "black lies", it's probably him, no matter what the From: line says. The policy is to ignore these postings. Replies have never, ever, not even once resulted in anything constructive and usually create huge flamewars on the list. Please, please, don't feed the animals. III. Resources. A. The sci.crypt FAQ anonymous ftp to rtfm.mit.edu:pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt The cryptography FAQ is good online intro to crypto. Very much worth reading. Last I looked, it was in ten parts. B. cypherpunks ftp site anonymous ftp to ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany. There is a glossary there that all new members should download and read. Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are there for the perl-literate. C. Bruce Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_, published by Wiley This is required reading for any serious technical cypherpunk. An excellent overview of the field, it describes many of the basic algorithms and protocols with their mathematical descriptions. Some of the stuff at the edges of the scope of the book is a little incomplete, so short descriptions in here should lead to library research for the latest papers, or to the list for the current thinking. All in all, a solid and valuable book. It's even got the cypherpunks-request address. IV. Famous last words My preferred email address for list maintenance topics only is hughes(a)toad.com. All other mail, including emergency mail, should go to hughes(a)ah.com, where I read mail much more regularly. Enjoy and deploy. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions. The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to defend it. Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good cryptosystems. Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications of all kinds. Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress. Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy. [Last updated Mon Feb 21 13:18:25 1994]

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ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update
by ACLUNATL＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------- October 25, 1995 ACLU CYBER-LIBERTIES UPDATE A bi-weekly e-zine on cyber-liberties cases and controversies at the state and federal level. ----------------------------------------------------------------- IN THIS ISSUE: * Universities Censor Student Internet Use * Conferees Named for Federal Online Indecency Legislation * Search for Plaintiffs Continues in Suit to Challenge Online Indecency Legislation * Effect of Telco Bill on Universal Access * Conferences ----------------------------------------------------------------- STATE PAGE (Legislation/Agency/Court Cases/Issues) ----------------------------------------------------------------- * Universities Censor Student Internet Use In a knee-jerk reaction to the cyber-porn scare, many universities around the country have begun to enact policies to regulate student Internet use. The ACLU believes that university censorship of student Internet usage is inconsistent with the principles of academic freedom. In addition, state universities are required as state institutions to uphold the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment. The Internet flourished for years as primarily an academic -- and uncensored -- domain. Colleges should not now cave in to the Luddites by enacting restrictive computer usage policies. Here are a few examples of university computer usage policies that tread on cyber-liberties: * After a year-long battle that made national news, Carnegie Mellon University is expected this November to approve a policy to censor certain Usenet newsgroups on Andrew, their flagship computing system. Their decision to censor is based on fear that the university could be held criminally liable under state obscenity and harmful to minors laws for providing access to newsgroups that "might be" obscene. The administration refused to accept the suggestion of both the CMU Faculty Senate and the ACLU that the computer network be categorized as a library, which would entitle the network to an exemption from the Pennsylvania obscenity statute. * The University of Minnesota will not allow students to have "offensive" content on their web sites, or even to create links to "offensive" content elsewhere on the Internet. They have also adopted the double standard of commercial services like America Online and Prodigy -- despite U of Minn's explicit content control, student web pages must include a disclaimer that the university takes "no responsibility" for anything on the pages. * At George Mason University, the "Responsible Use of Computing" policy begins with the following statement: "The following rules are not complete; just because an action is not explicitly proscribed does not necessarily mean that it is acceptable." (One could hardly imagine a better example of ambiguity with the potential to chill protected speech.) The policy creates a Security Review Panel that investigates reports of "offensive" computer behavior. As could be predicted, the backlog of cases before this panel is already quite long. (The head of the Security Review Panel is none other than Dr. Peter Denning, husband of Dr. Dorothy Denning, infamous proponent of the Clipper Chip.) On the bright side, students and faculty groups continue to hotly oppose these policies when they arise, and have been instrumental in shaping Internet usage policies to be less inhibitive of free speech and privacy rights. The following online resources will be useful to students and faculty faced with a draconian Internet usage policy: * Report on Computers at Harvard, by the Civil Liberties Union of Harvard: _Very_ comprehensive and useful report on students' computer usage rights on Harvard's network. Included are five general principles for computer use, an application of the general principles to specific aspects of computer use, and a discussion of areas where Harvard should take immediate action to secure students' rights on the network. Available at gopher://fas-gopher.harvard.edu:70/00/.studorgs/.cluh/.computer_report * Web Site on CMU Censorship Proposal: Thorough history and database of documents on Carnegie Mellon University's battle over online censorship. Also includes information on CMU's Coalition for Academic Freedom of Expression (CAFE). See http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/usr/kcf/www/censor/ * ACLU letter and legal analysis to CMU: send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "Letter to CMU" in the subject line. The ACLU will continue to monitor university polices that restrict online free speech and privacy rights. The ACLU urges all students and faculty to actively work for university computer usage policies that protect their rights. To inform the ACLU of a computer usage policy at your school that may violate cyber-liberties, contact Ann Beeson, ACLU, beeson(a)aclu.org. ----------------------------------------------------------------- FEDERAL PAGE (Congress/Agency/Court Cases) ----------------------------------------------------------------- * Conferees Named for Federal Online Indecency Legislation Congress recently named the official conferees to the telecommunications bill. The Senate version of the telco bill (S 652) contains the Exon Amendment, approved 84-16 by the Senate on 6/14/95. The House version of the telco bill (HR 1555) contains the Cox/Wyden Amendment (the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act), approved 421-4 on 8/4/95. The House version also contains Exon-like amendments to the existing federal obscenity statute, which came out of the House Judiciary Committee and were adopted as last-minute additions through a larger Manager's Amendment on 8/4/95. The conference committee is in charge of reconciling the differences between the House and Senate versions of the telco bill, including the obviously incompatible provisions regarding online content. While more details are offered in the list below, the following facts should be highlighted: _Notable Conferees_ -Senator Exon: sponsored the Exon Amendment and launched the cyber-porn scare. -Senator Gorton: original co-sponsor of the CDA. -Representative Hyde: sponsored the inclusion of indecency amendments to the federal obscenity laws in the House telco bill. -Representatives White, Markey, Goodlatte, Fields, and Barr: spoke in favor of Cox/Wyden amendment on the House floor during the telco debate. _Some Absent Conferees_ -Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. -Senator Leahy: sponsored the study alternative to the CDA in the Senate (Senator Leahy is a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee). -Representatives Cox & Wyden: sponsored the Cox/Wyden "Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act." -Senators who voted against the CDA. _Other Notable Facts_ -All the Senate conferees voted for the CDA. -All the House conferees voted for the Cox/Wyden amendment. -All the House conferees also voted for the Exon-like indecency amendments to federal obscenity laws. However, they may not have been aware of this vote because it was not a separate vote but rather a vote to approve the Manager's amendment, which contained many provisions unrelated to the censorship legislation. -Given the conferees named, it is highly likely that the House leadership, including House Speaker Newt Gingrich, will play a substantial role in the conference process. THE LIST OF CONFEREES: Conferees from the House were assigned to particular titles of the telco bill; Senate conferees have jurisdiction over all titles. The list that follows indicates the titles over which each conferee has jurisdiction, and the conferee's relevant committee status, party, and area of constituency. *Title I: Development of Competitive Telecommunications Markets (contains the Cox/Wyden amendment) Title II: Cable Communications Competitiveness Title III: Broadcast Communications Competitiveness *Title IV: Effect on Other Laws (contains the Exon Amendment and the Exon-like indecency amendments to the federal obscenity statute) Title V: Definitions Title VI: Small Business Complaint Procedure Representatives from the House: Jurisdiction over Titles I and IV (these conferees may participate in discussions to reconcile the conflicting online content provisions in the Cox/Wyden Amendment, the Exon Amendment, and the Exon-like indecency amendments to the federal obscenity statute): Representatives from the House Commerce Committee, in order of rank: Republicans: Bliley, Thomas J. (Richmond, Virginia) all titles Fields, Jack (Houston, Texas) all titles Oxley, Michael G. (northwest Ohio) all titles White, Rick (northwest Washington) all titles Barton, Joseph (Fort Worth, Texas) I, II, IV, V Hastert, J. Dennis (northeast Illinois) I, II, IV, V Klug, Scott (Madison, Wisconsin) I, III, IV, V, VI Democrats: Dingell, John D. (southeast Michigan) all titles Markey, Edward J. (northeast Massachusetts) all titles Boucher, Rick (southwest Virginia) all titles Eshoo, Anna G. (San Francisco Bay Area, California) all titles Rush, Bobby L. (Chicago, Illinois) all titles Representatives from the House Judiciary Committee, in order of rank: Republicans: Hyde, Henry J. (Chicago, Illinois) all titles Moorhead, Carlos J. (Los Angeles area, California) all titles Goodlatte, Robert W. (Western Virginia) all titles Buyer, Steve (northwest Indiana) all titles Flanagan, Michael P. (Chicago, Illinois) all titles Democrats: Conyers, John (Detroit, Michigan) all titles Schroeder, Patricia (Denver, Colorado) all titles Bryant, John (Dallas, Texas) all titles Title I only (these conferees may participate in discussions to revise the Cox/Wyden Amendment, but may not participate in discussions to reconcile the conflicting online content provisions in the Cox/Wyden Amendment, the Exon Amendment, and the Exon-like indecency amendments to the federal obscenity statute): Representatives from the House Commerce Committee, in order of rank: Republicans: Paxon, Bill (western New York) I, III Frisa, Dan (New York, New York) I, II Stearns, Cliff (northeast Florida) I, III Democrats: Brown, Sherrod (northeast Ohio) I Gordon, Bart (central Tennessee) I Lincoln, Blanche Lambert (northeast Arkansas) I Representatives from the House Judiciary Committee, in order of rank: Republicans: Gallegly, Elton (southern California) I Barr, Bob (western Georgia) I Hoke, Martin R. (northeast Ohio) I Democrats: Berman, Howard L. (Los Angeles area, California) I Scott, Robert C. (Richmond, Virginia) I Lee, Sheila Jackson (Houston, Texas) I Conferees from the Senate Commerce Committee, in order of rank (the Senate conferees have jurisdiction over all titles): Republicans: Pressler, Larry (South Dakota) Stevens, Ted (Alaska) McCain, John (Arizona) Burns, Conrad (Montana) Gorton, Slade (Washington) Lott, Trent (Mississippi) Democrats: Hollings, Ernest F. (South Carolina) Inouye, Daniel K. (Hawaii) Ford, Wendell H. (Kentucky) Exon, James J. (Nebraska) Rockefeller, John D. (West Virginia) For a copy of the online indecency amendments, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "Online Indecency Amendments" in the subject line of the message. For more information on the legislation and what you can do to fight it, see: http://epic.org/free_speech http://www.panix.com/vtw/exon http://www.eff.org/ http://www.cdt.org/ ----------------------------------------------------------------- * Search for Plaintiffs Continues in Suit to Challenge Online Indecency Legislation As noted above, the online community should continue to urge the conference committee to remove the censorship provisions from the telco bill. At the same time, a coalition has formed to organize litigation to challenge these provisions if they are signed into law. The first step is the selection of plaintiffs. We need plaintiffs who use online networks to discuss or distribute works or art, literary classics, sex education, gay and lesbian literature, human rights reporting, abortion information, rape counseling, controversial political speech, or any other material that could be deemed "indecent" and therefore illegal under the proposed law. We received a tremendous response to our first call for plaintiffs, in the last issue of the ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update. Thanks to all the organizations who contacted us. We urge other groups to join the battle to save free speech in cyberspace. Please contact Ann Beeson at the ACLU if your organization is interested in being a plaintiff in this ground-breaking litigation that will define First Amendment rights in cyberspace. 212-944-9800 x788, beeson(a)aclu.org. ----------------------------------------------------------------- * Effect of Telco Bill on Universal Access In addition to the online censorship provisions in the telco bill, the ACLU is seriously concerned about the effect of other provisions in the bill on universal access. For more information about the effect of the telco bill on universal access and other public interest matters, see the Ad Hoc Site Against the Telecommunications Bill, co-sponsored by Center for Media Education, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Consumer Federation of America, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Media Access Project, People for the American Way, and Taxpayer Assets Project, at http://www.access.digex.net:80/~cme/bill.html. ----------------------------------------------------------------- CONFERENCES ----------------------------------------------------------------- Oct 26, 5 pm: "Law in Cyberspace: Free Expression and Intellectual Property on the Internet," Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey NW, Gewirz Conference Room, Gewirz Hall. Co-sponsored by ACLU-GULC and Student Intellectual Property Law Association. Panelists include David Post (GULC Law professor and author of column on cyberspace law in American Lawyer); John Podesta (GULC professor and former senior policy advisor to President Clinton on govt information policy); and David Johnson (co-founder of the Cyberspace Law Institute, President of Lexis Counsel Connect). Nov 3, 8 pm: John Perry Barlow on "Creating Cyberculture," Kane Hall - University of Washington in Seattle. $12 ($10 students). The lecture is part of a series, co-sponsored by the ACLU of Washington, that explores the impact and implications of the technology revolution on art and culture. Other cosponsors include 911 Media Arts Center, the University of Washington's New Media Lab, and the University of Washington Technical Communications Department. Nov 16, 5 pm: Nadine Strossen (National President, ACLU) speaks on "Defending Pornography: A Feminist Perspective on New Technologies and Old-Fashioned Sex," GULC, 600 New Jersey NW, 12th Floor Ballroom, Gewirz Hall. Co-sponsored by ACLU-GULC and the Student Bar Association Speakers Fund. ----------------------------------------------------------------- ONLINE RESOURCES FROM THE ACLU ----------------------------------------------------------------- Stay tuned for news on the ACLU's world wide web site, under construction at http://www.aclu.org. In the meantime, you can retrieve ACLU documents via gopher at gopher://aclu.org:6601 (forgive the less-than-updated state of our gopher -- we've devoted all our resources to WWW construction!). If you're on America Online, check out the live chats, auditorium events, *very* active message boards, and complete news on civil liberties, at keyword ACLU. ----------------------------------------------------------------- ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update Editor: Ann Beeson (beeson(a)aclu.org) American Civil Liberties Union National Office 132 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 To subscribe to the ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "subscribe Cyber-Liberties Update" in the subject line of your message. To terminate your subscription, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "unsubscribe Cyber-Liberties Update" in the subject line. For general information about the ACLU, write to infoaclu(a)aclu.org. ----------------------------------------------------------------- **PLEASE REPOST WITH HEADER INTACT**

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Re: DigiCash
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Darren New: > If I give you a dollar for an online newspaper and the > newspaper never gets to me, or I give you $50 for a textbook and the > textbook never shows up in the mail weeks later, who do I go to to get my > money back? This is a bad-case scenario, since it involves long delay and delivery of goods that, unlike information, have a nontrivial marginal cost to the merchant. These both give the merchant incentive to skip the delivery step. For this kind of business, there are several possibilities, none of which is mature enough to have actually been deployed yet (which is why ecash is currently aimed at small, immediately delivered goods and services). * Escrow services, which take responsibility for delivery each way (and develop a public reputation for reliably doing this). This has the value that it still allows the parties to be mutually anonymous (although additional tools are needed to actually have strongly anonymous connections, the payment/delivery protocol doesn't preclude it). * Ripped bill protocols might be able to substitute for escrows. (these are quite esoteric, but can again be hidden behind a nice metaphor). * Deal only with a jurisdictionally reachable merchant and hope the law is on your side (often not an available solution on the global Internet, but usually assumed by identified payment schemes, so it's a reasonable fallback from that point of view). For smaller transactions with rapid delivery times, complaining loudly and publicly on Usenet will soon put the business out of it. Receipts will give such complaints more credibility, and will also allow the clearing agent to credibly get involved. (Obviously in these cases anonymity is lost for a particular transaction, but unlinkability with one's unchallenged transactions remains). Finally, in a few markets the value add of confidentiality is enough to outweigh the risks for even large transactions. Nick Szabo szabo(a)netcom.com

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The real value of munition t-shirts (Re:
by QLDM75A＠prodigy.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I've found that the real value of my shirt is the fact that it's > a valuable cypherpunk detector device for strangers who have come > up to me and said,"Wow! Is that the shirt I've heard so much about. . are > you really a cypherpunk... hey there nice perl... " etc. etc. etc. I've > been approached about it at a Taco Bell, at the movies, and > at a favorite coffee house of mine (several times, in fact). One night I > wore it to a dance club here in Baltimore, and no less than 6 people, all > of whom I had never met before, approached me about it and wanted to talk > about cypherpunk issues. None of them were on the list. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------- Same here. I also find that it is a good way to let other people - know- about ITAR and crypto. At school I have had around 20 people ask me about it. From students to teacher to administration. I also wore mine to a dance club here in Salt Lake City and was approached by a few people. I think it is a good way to at least let people know about the situation. Makes some news friends also. Eldon Jenkins PRODIGY Tech Support =================== Usual disclaimer ===================

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Re: Crypto's Role in Evil?
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote: >Date: Tue, 24 Oct 95 12:52:40 EDT >In-Reply-To: Timothy C. May's message of Mon, 9 Oct 1995 11:20:41 -0700 <199510100354.UAA10505(a)comsec.com> >Subject: Re: Crypto's Role in Evil? >I heard a particularly scary quote from Director Freeh last Sunday on NPR's >Weekend Edition (I believe that was the show -- segment A-1) in which he >declared "our job is to protect the people". The show was Thursday 10/19, All Things Considered. BTW, there was another interesting quote on the 15th on ATC -- a segment about the DA office in New Orleans -- with a DA claiming that the presumption of innocence is a legal fiction which *starts* when the trial starts -- implying that from arrest to trial, the person is guilty. Interesting way of thinking.... - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+

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symmetric key algorithms
by Goh Seow Hiong 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could anyone comment on the acceptability and reliability of the SAFER algorithm, in comparison with other algorithms such as IDEA, Triple-DES, DES, RC4, .... Has there been any comparison paper written on the pros and cons of the different symmetric key algorithms? Thanks.. SH

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Let's Not Merge Mailing Lists, OK?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's been an upsurge in "cross-mailed" messages, with Cypherpunks copied on "www-buy-blah-blah," and vice versa, and Cypherpunks copied on the growing number of lobbyist lists (EPIC, EFF, etc.). A lot of this is not new, but some of the cross-posts between our list and the various "Net commerce" and like groups are causing debates to blur. This message drove it home for me: -----begin excerpt----- From: ali(a)eit.COM (Ali Bahreman) Date: Wed, 25 Oct 1995 15:28:00 -0700 To: ali(a)eit.COM, dnew(a)sgf.fv.com, www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com, ljo(a)ausys.se Subject: Digital Cash, Privacy, Anonymity, Double spending protection and Cheating protection Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Reply-To: bahreman(a)eit.COM X-Sun-Charset: US-ASCII Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Let's think out loud here for a minute... I am sending this to Cypherpunks to see if someone out there has already thought of a solution to this. Alice wants to get a file from Bob and wants to pay him $1 using some Digital Cash scheme. - Do we want Alice's identity to remain Anonymous (and Bob's too)? (Note that this means that neither party knows who the other really is. They could be using aliases to conceal their real identity.) ... rest of speculations about crypto elided.... ----end excerpt---- I don't know if "ali(a)eit.COM (Ali Bahreman)" is subscribed to the Cypherpunks list or not. From the nature of his comments, I suspect not. There is great danger in constantly "casting the net wider," in trying to reach more and more people. I understand the temptation for some on both lists to cross-post some messages. I urge that they do this, as Bob H. has done on occasion, by personally forwarding the message, with only _one_ of the lists getting it. (This because the real danger is as above, where multiple lists are in the recipient or cc: fields, and followups semi-spam multiple lists.) Clearly we cannot have our list used to educate others on other lists. Or, rather, I'm finding it hard enough to stay on top of a list with 1200+ subscribers. Adding people from other lists, at varying levels of competence in areas we think important, will simply be too much. For me, at least. For now, I plan to filter out stuff that gets echoed over from www-buy, as I can't keep track of their conversations as well as our own. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Mandatory ID in California?
by btmoore＠iquest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 08:45 AM 10/25/95 -0700, Ian Goldberg wrote: >>From "The Daily Californian", Wed., 25 October, 1995, page 3: > ><snip> >"Police were called to the scene by an officer who passed Burton >and smelled marijuana smoke, Phelps said. The officer believed >it was coming from Burton's cigarette. > >"The officer issued a citation to Burton for smoking marijuana >and requested to see identification. Burton refused to show >identification and argued that smoking marijuana is legal in >Berkeley, Phelps said. > >"The officer, in accordance with police policy, arrested Burton >for refusing to properly identify himself." ><snip> > >That last sentence seemed ominous to me... > > - Ian > Actually, "Failure to Identify" is a misdemeanor in most municipalities nationwide. It is definitely so here in Indiana, and in most places I've been to. The only thing surprising is that YOU were not aware of this! :-) The point being the Cops always want to know who they're fuc... er, dealing with. The first thing they'll do is radio in who they're accous... er, stopping. The reason for this is, should they get their just desserts... I mean come to some harm, the rest of their gang... I mean, brother officers will know who to come after! :-) Benjamin T. Moore, Jr. (Jian #AJF IRChat) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMI7qioSAJOVFNaChAQG4pAf+MzOXKt3SvEkPiOERTGBGsz1SpJk7/XR2 8L0FeCfWcrVsxiPunXz58ekqeSXuiWy0y4bx+zu4TMo8Rq/rgwlzyYAcztI+FMnn VmA562w5RUMmwPZ6UznrRYpaOcycUeQ4ewEdVyCqogR7L3Itm14Jwd8QEekEyUGz BVNoZEc5XQReCKQU2WVFDA1Q6ycyc1IZDcQE0JIjTXVD8L8wTr2LgHXD7pHKEsmA /jfHfNj0Gm0v2SQTWOtY0UL219UaniWuwU3R+GuDJd/YtpizyTQpDZDPHjsZhAs9 lvgevrvFBRluvLdI2oDk47L6n1qnnzPCy73uQ/GFGlyKsumizFOtqw== =qtGt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Welcome to cypherpunks
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Why am I getting this when I am already subscribed to the list?????? > Because someone signed the list up to the list...probably inadvertently. They probably sent something to majordomo with a line like: subscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com thinking it actually made sense for some reason...then again they might have done it on purpose. Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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HTTP Request-Header & Server Environment Echoes
by Richard.Johnson＠Colorado.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<HTML> <HEAD> <TITLE>What Your Browser Says Behind Your Back</TITLE> </HEAD> <BODY> <PRE><TT> The what your browser told me about you when you weren't looking echo CGI at UIUC mentioned on cypherpunks (http://www.hks.net/cpunks/ cpunks-9/0095.html) in Nov. 1994 seems to be down for the count (it was http://www.uiuc.edu/cgi-bin/printenv )). It would provide you with a page showing the information your browser had given to the server in the HTTP Request-Header. However, others exist to take up the slack. Here's a directory I compiled today (thanks to WWWW, Lycos, etc.) of current, working HTTP Request-Header and resulting server environment variable echoes. I'm sure I've missed some, if not many. Follow up with additions, if you want. Better yet, add these and the additions to your favorite privacy and security pages. HTTP Request-Header Echoes Machine Information at MIT (http://www.mit.edu:8001/machine) Feeds back your machine name, IP address, and finger info. Not really a request-header echo at all, but useful. Echo at TU-Berlin (http://www.cs.tu-berlin.de/sui/eserte/cgi-rcs/home/ eserte/.public_html/index.html Raw text echo of your HTTP request-header info. Echo by Pierre Omidyar at best.com (http://www.best.com/~pierre/printenv. cgi) and at ebay.com (http://www.ebay.com/printenv.cgi) Two paths for reaching the same CGI script. Produces nicely formatted HTML output showing your HTTP request-header info. Simple perl source for the script is available from Pierre's Web Tips (http://www.best. com/~pierre/web-authoring.html) page. Echo by mjd at cis.upenn.edu (http://www.cis.upenn.edu/cgi-bin/mjd/ printenv) Produces formatted HTML echo of your HTTP request-header info. Echo at hyperreal.com (http://www.hyperreal.com/cgi-bin/printenv) Produces plaintext HTML echo of your HTTP request-header info. Echo at Whithead Institute--MIT (http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/WWW/ examples/Ch9/printenv.pl Produces formatted HTML echo of your HTTP request-header info. Simple perl source for this script is available in the Chapter 9 script examples (http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/WWW/examples/Ch9/) from Lincoln Stein (http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/~lstein/)'s book, How to Set Up And Maintain a World Wide Web Site (http://www-genome.wi.mit. edu/WWW/). Echo by cloos at io.com (http://www.io.com/cgi-user/cloos/environment) Raw text echo of your HTTP request-header info. Also provides a whole bunch more, including the script's runtime environment. And now, again in the original HTML: </TT></PRE> The <CENTER>what your browser told me about you when you weren't looking</CENTER> echo CGI at UIUC <A HREF="http://www.hks.net/cpunks/cpunks-9/0095.html">mentioned on cypherpunks</A> in Nov. 1994 seems to be down for the count (it was http://www.uiuc.edu/cgi-bin/printenv) It would provide you with a page showing the information your browser had given to the server in the HTTP Request-Header. However, others exist to take up the slack. Here's a directory I compiled today (thanks to WWWW, Lycos, etc.) of current, working HTTP Request-Header and resulting server environment variable echoes. I'm sure I've missed some, if not many. Follow up with additions, if you want. Better yet, add these and the additions to your favorite privacy and security pages. <H3>HTTP Request-Header Echoes</H3> <DL> <DT>Machine Information at MIT <DD>Feeds back your machine name, IP address, and finger info. Not really a request-header echo at all, but useful. <DT><A HREF="http://www.cs.tu-berlin.de/sui/eserte/cgi-rcs/home/eserte/.public_html/inde…">Echo at TU-Berlin</A> <DD>Raw text echo of your HTTP request-header info. <DT><A HREF="http://www.best.com/~pierre/printenv.cgi">Echo by Pierre Omidyar at best.com</A> and at ebay.com <DD>Two paths for reaching the same CGI script. Produces nicely formatted HTML output showing your HTTP request-header info. Simple perl source for the script is available from <A HREF="http://www.best.com/~pierre/web-authoring.html">Pierre's Web Tips</A> page. <DT><A HREF="http://www.cis.upenn.edu/cgi-bin/mjd/printenv">Echo by mjd at cis.upenn.edu</A> <DD>Produces formatted HTML echo of your HTTP request-header info. <DT>Echo at hyperreal.com <DD>Produces plaintext HTML echo of your HTTP request-header info. <DT><A HREF="http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/WWW/examples/Ch9/printenv.pl">Echo at Whithead Institute--MIT</A> <DD>Produces formatted HTML echo of your HTTP request-header info. Simple perl source for this script is available in the <A HREF="http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/WWW/examples/Ch9/">Chapter 9 script examples</A> from <A HREF="http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/~lstein/">Lincoln Stein</A>'s book, <CITE><A HREF="http://www-genome.wi.mit.edu/WWW/">How to Set Up And Maintain a World Wide Web Site</A></CITE>. <DT><A HREF="http://www.io.com/cgi-user/cloos/environment">Echo by cloos at io.com</A> <DD>Raw text echo of your HTTP request-header info. Also provides a whole bunch more, including the script's runtime environment. </DL> </BODY> </HTML>

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Your Majordomo request results
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Your request of Majordomo was: >>>> subscribe cypherpunks cypher(a)infinity.nus.sg Succeeded. Your request of Majordomo was: >>>> end END OF COMMANDS

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Welcome to cypherpunks
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Welcome to the cypherpunks mailing list! If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cypherpunks cypher(a)infinity.nus.sg Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: About cypherpunks ----------------- I. Administrivia (please read, boring though it may be) The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for privacy in the digital domain. It is a high volume mailing list. If you don't know how to do something, like unsubscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)toad.com and the software robot which answers that address will send you back instructions on how to do what you want. If you don't know the majordomo syntax, an empty message to this address will get you a help file, as will a command 'help' in the body. Even with all this automated help, you may still encounter problems. If you get really stuck, please feel free to contact me directly at the address I use for mailing list management: cypherpunks-owner(a)toad.com Please use this address for all mailing list management issues. Hint: if you try to unsubscribe yourself from a different account than you signed up for, it likely won't work. Log back into your old account and try again. If you no longer have access to that account, mail me at the list management address above. For other questions, my list management address is not the best place, since I don't read it every day. To reach me otherwise, send mail to eric(a)remailer.net This address is appropriate for emergencies (and wanting to get off the list is never an emergency), such as the list continuously spewing articles. Please don't send me mail to my regular mailbox asking to be removed; I'll just send you back a form letter. Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed. It's rude. The -request address is made exactly for this purpose. To post to the whole list, send mail to cypherpunks(a)toad.com If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list. Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages. There is no digest version available. There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume. Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and important developments will be posted there. Mail to cypherpunks-announce-request(a)toad.com if you want to be added or removed to the announce list. All announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no need to subscribe to both. II. About cypherpunks The cypherpunks list is not designed for beginners, although they are welcome. If you are totally new to crypto, please get and read the crypto FAQ referenced below. This document is a good introduction, although not short. Crypto is a subtle field and a good understanding will not come without some study. Please, as a courtesy to all, do some reading to make sure that your question is not already frequently asked. There are other forums to use on the subject of cryptography. The Usenet group sci.crypt deals with technical cryptography; cypherpunks deals with technical details but slants the discussion toward their social implications. The Usenet group talk.politics.crypto, as is says, is for political theorizing, and cypherpunks gets its share of that, but cypherpunks is all pro-crypto; the debates on this list are about how to best get crypto out there. The Usenet group alt.security.pgp is a pgp-specific group, and questions about pgp as such are likely better asked there than here. Ditto for alt.security.ripem. The cypherpunks list has its very own net.loon, a fellow named L. Detweiler. The history is too long for here, but he thinks that cypherpunks are evil incarnate. If you see a densely worded rant featuring characteristic words such as "medusa", "pseudospoofing", "treachery", "poison", or "black lies", it's probably him, no matter what the From: line says. The policy is to ignore these postings. Replies have never, ever, not even once resulted in anything constructive and usually create huge flamewars on the list. Please, please, don't feed the animals. III. Resources. A. The sci.crypt FAQ anonymous ftp to rtfm.mit.edu:pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt The cryptography FAQ is good online intro to crypto. Very much worth reading. Last I looked, it was in ten parts. B. cypherpunks ftp site anonymous ftp to ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany. There is a glossary there that all new members should download and read. Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are there for the perl-literate. C. Bruce Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_, published by Wiley This is required reading for any serious technical cypherpunk. An excellent overview of the field, it describes many of the basic algorithms and protocols with their mathematical descriptions. Some of the stuff at the edges of the scope of the book is a little incomplete, so short descriptions in here should lead to library research for the latest papers, or to the list for the current thinking. All in all, a solid and valuable book. It's even got the cypherpunks-request address. IV. Famous last words My preferred email address for list maintenance topics only is hughes(a)toad.com. All other mail, including emergency mail, should go to hughes(a)ah.com, where I read mail much more regularly. Enjoy and deploy. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions. The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to defend it. Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good cryptosystems. Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications of all kinds. Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress. Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy. [Last updated Mon Feb 21 13:18:25 1994]

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Lance Cottrell writes: >> If all nym servers were standardized to run from the same account name >> (nymserve for example) the remailers could be configured to only deliver >> final hops to addresses with that username. > >A detail I missed before: the remailers used in pseudonym reply blocks must >somehow deliver replies to the True Name (verinymous ?) address of the holder >of the pseudonym. I suppose they could all finally be routed to the >pseudonymizer, which would deliver the messages directly to the intended >recipient (holder of the pseudonym). > >-Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> They could also end up getting dumped in a message pool. Perhaps all (or most) nym servers could operate mailing list message pools. Anyone could subscribe to the pool, and any nym could have its mail directed to that pool. It should not be too difficult to rig a procmail script to try to decrypt all mail from that list, and deliver those that could be decrypted. -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- How open is the protocol? Is there and API for it? Does anyone know how big the coins are? There will have to be room for one per header in Mixmaster. Do they vary in size, or are all coins identical? There is so much stuff to try to keep track of all at once! :/ -Lance (going down in a blaze of questions) Cottrell At 5:20 PM 10/23/95, sameer wrote: > With the release of digicash I hope that we can soon make this >stuff for-pay and much of the spam problem will be fixed. (Not all of >it, of course.) > (I am rather hesitatnt to setup an account with Mark Twain >though.. $2,500 min balance and not FDIC insured?) > > <SNIP> -Lance -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMI8m5fPzr81BVjMVAQFXUAgAxNhdCxBCRJPLfbgIihe3OLjmnlggfjIQ lgNIf50DoGtiighGMCzvFYRChqYCJfhZKLJOp1uTOtqe6v/y7ybNk4tTUFR9DWwV HKO0orhdlUuaxBIm4QXtKBGjHa5effgelWfUuKrwt7Bd4x+SF7fY7MEq549Ujbz1 J+DoRnjadeoHYbZYQ7TlCbiuEofuvVZfTWgkBIx1rbQgYxF7Hr8sHlP+TnVcGSv9 NkHvkwbd7ZQ8hMmIvGQtWAXQjeNmCQpd4ZJO82Fb9pw11RADVL8JfFO9ru6sbyOU /b1lIvB38APSRA4Ova6I9mmiHAjQPegZKuTgtAM7TDy3vJXRxGNS+Q== =7BTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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[Noise] Paranoia in the Comics
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This has no real crypto relevence, but some anarchistic relevence. Sometimes you find anti-government paranoia in the strangest of places... In the Ziggy strip for 10/25/95, Ziggy is in a Psychiatrist's office. The shrink is stating "You're afraid of the government, are you? I'm required to report that sort of thing you know." You can tell the state of distrust of the state when you see such things in a generally bland and spineless strip like Ziggy. What next? Little Billy from Family Circus bringing home a copy of the Anarchists Cookbook? Charlie Brown getting his phone tapped by Louie Freeh? Garfield joining the EFF? The mind boggles... | Visualize a world without lawyers! | alano(a)teleport.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | -- PGP 2.6.2 key available on request -- | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano | <fnord> |

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Re: CJR returned to sender
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:30 PM 10/25/95, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > Should they also reject the same content (RSA-PERL) delivered >in any of the following ways: > > Printed on paper > Printed on paper in OCR font > Printed on paper in barcode > Printed on paper with magnetic ink (like checks) > > The lines being drawn here seem very arbitrary. FWIW, in principle I agree with Michael and Tim: 90% of the point of the lark was the absurdity of a T-shirt being a "munition." OTOH, the arbitrariness of ITAR enforcement--regardless of the form of the CJRs filed--is very troubling. When the USG so selectively enforces federal law, one has to wonder what criterion is informing the selection. And this "little" adventure could (IANAL, etc.) have a bright side: if the CJR were submitted in a verifiable way (courier, certified, etc.) and the agency in question had documentably refused to examine the materials submitted or to take the application seriously, wouldn't this weaken any subsequent effort to prosecute in another, more practical case involving the same code? If so, maybe something halfway between a T-shirt and a book--y'all can figure out what--encoded with machine-readable source for PGP might be in order. In order not for some silly thread but, rather, for a meticulously documented CJR, with an eye toward slowly upping the ante: submit the exact same code in a variety of less and less absurd formats until the USG chooses to deal with it--all the while presuming that their failure to consider a CJR in this or that format constituted a de facto approval for export. ted

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Bill Gates on anonymity
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BEGIN QUOTE I'm not suggesting we do away with all forms of anonymity. I can imagine electronic communities where anything goes and no one can trace the real origin of information - or verify its authenticity. You would enter such a community - by deciding to read or watch the information posted there - at your own risk, and if people said offensive or untrue things to you, your only recourse would be to set the record straight in the same forum. Consenting adults should be entitled to participate in this kind of community. But kids certainly should not. END QUOTE The full text is at http://nytsyn.com/live/Gates/270_092795_082520_2997.html

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Linux security issues
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard of any information on the Linux swap partition, for example, if it does me the favor of storing my pgp passphrase? Anyone who's interested in compiling PGP under ELF, add ASMDEF="-DSYSV" to the end of their linux make line. Don

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ANNOUNCEMENT: sepp-talk mailing list
by Erik Bataller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The sepp-talk mailing list is a forum for comments and discussion regarding the Secure Electronic Payment Protocol (SEPP), proposed by MasterCard to support credit card payments over the Internet. The SEPP specification is available for review from the MasterCard home page: http://www.mastercard.com The CommerceNet consortium operates this mailing list as a service to the Internet community. To subscribe to the sepp-talk mailing list, send email to: majordomo(a)commerce.net ...with a message body of: subscribe sepp-talk <your full name> You should receive a confirmation message which includes instructions for unsubscribing from the list. Shortly, CommerceNet will provide a WWW archive of this list on it's server. A notice will be sent to the mailing list.

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FBI/CIA/NSA, let's merge them all into one. [???!!!]
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AP on 10/25/95: FBI Gets CIA Help On Olympics The FBI and CIA are working together to deal with "substantial" threats to security at next summer's Atlanta Olympics, top administration officials told senators Wednesday. [...] Sen. Bob Kerrey of Nebraska ... chided the FBI for seeking to build a $37 million code encryption center that he said would duplicate facilities operated by the National Security Agency.

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Re: Let's Not Merge Mailing Lists, OK?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm cc:-ing this to both lists just this once, because this message is more or less administrative. I'm not trying to merge www-buyinfo with cypherpunks. tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) said: >There is great danger in constantly "casting the net wider," in trying to >reach more and more people. I understand the temptation for some on both >lists to cross-post some messages. I urge that they do this, as Bob H. has >done on occasion, by personally forwarding the message, with only _one_ of >the lists getting it. (This because the real danger is as above, where >multiple lists are in the recipient or cc: fields, and followups semi-spam >multiple lists.) I agree with Tim. I've been doing one-way forwards from cypherpunks to www-buyinfo for most of a year now. Most of the people on www-buyinfo are business people who understand that digital commerce *is* financial cryptography, but they don't have time to read all of cypherpunks to find the e$ juicy-bits. When I do this, I put a "(cpx)" in the subject line so that the sizable community of cypherpunks on www-buyinfo can filter them out and won't have to see double. I've gotten a lot of fan-mail for this, even though it's not really in keeping with the original charter for www-buyinfo, which seems to have been subsumed by other groups, like the e-payments list and others. Recently Dave Kristol has said that he's going to retool www-buyinfo, and when he does, I'm hoping to have set up my own structure of 3 hypermail archived e$ lists (a netwide e$ digest, a discussion list, and a newsletter). I'm talking to about 3 or 4 different people about it, and I should have the details worked out within a few days, with an announcement next week, if I'm lucky. Anyway, I've sent a few messages in the opposite direction on occasion (from www-buy to c'punx), but I do try to hold it down, mostly because whatever the topic is, we've usually talked about it on cypherpunks before. I should note, however, that there's a good-sized discussion, for www-buy, anyway, going on over on over there about anonymity, which has heated up over the past few days. I forwarded a message here from Nick Szabo as an example of it yesterday. The cross-posting Tim's talking about is a result of that discussion. There's a whole lot of "what do we need anonymity for, anyway?" opinion in the business community, and it should be addressed with as much reason as possible, and not by shouting them down with moral arguments to the contrary, no matter how right those moral arguments are. Fortunately, I believe there's a great business case for anonymity, and frankly, there had better be, because, in a cryptoanarchic geodesic economy like the one we're fixing to have, nothing is going to survive without a market. Anyway, like I said, I agree with Tim. If you want to post to cypherpunks, you should subscribe to cypherpunks, and suffer the firehose like the rest of us have to do. However, those of us who are on both lists, especially those of us longer-term cypherpunks like Hal, and Nick, and Adam Shostack, should be the ones to forward messages, if any, to cypherpunks, because they are the ones who know whether cypherpunks has seen this before. For instance, the posting of Nick Szabo's that I sent to cypherpunks was more of a rah-rah exercise (no pun intended) than anything else. It was so well thought out that I thought it bore passing around a bit. However, as an actual contribution to the information content on cypherpunks, what Nick said has been said on cypherpunks before, if not typically with such eloquence. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 3:35 PM 10/23/95, Futplex wrote: >Lance Cottrell writes: >> I think one solution to this problem is to encourage (require) the use of >> pseudonym servers. Having a server like alpha as the entity on the from >> line has several advantages. >> >> 1) Less Spam since it takes some effort to set up the nym and it will be >> taken away as soon as the spam starts. > >I fear this will be a short-lived gain. User-friendly scripts for >establishing pseudonymous accounts are pretty easy to write. They may be >beyond the average Fast Money Maker, but I expect myself and others will be >putting them out on the Net for general consumption. One need not automate the process of setting up anonymous accounts. One might also require some sort of exchange before activating the nym to verify that the return address is working. <SNIP> >Semi-permanent account status confers privileges to the user, IMHO. I >believe a pseudonymous account ideally should be treated the same as a >regular account on an ISP. For example, an admin will not unilaterally close >an account upon receiving a single complaint about the account user. >Certainly I don't know of an ISP that routinely blocks its users' accounts >from sending mail to selected other accounts. Lest I seem too presumptuous, >let me say that I realize all immediately foreseeable pseudonymizers are >free services. Clearly these service providers can set whatever policies they >wish, and are not directly competing with the fee-charging ISPs. Perhaps >future fee-charging pseudonymizers will consider these criteria in offering >enhanced services. > >-Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> I agree. With both free and for-fee nym servers must clearly spell out what actions will result in the termination of the nym. Perhaps 1 spam, 1 systematic harassment, or more than 5 serious complaints per month. Obvious this would need to be tuned to preserve free speech while allowing abusers to be quickly squelched. I would imagine an ecology of these servers would develop with some short lived permissive servers mixed with long lived more restrictive ones. -Lance -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMI8kEfPzr81BVjMVAQF3QAgAh+Q03VU3b69uQqylri/S2EJvfS5MqQ4V JRTZRu8ZQTjb7Ic6KowQXogXG0yAv/GUa6jEWup+fO1omR2t/s7AtXjcFC6du1hh iwSeRw1QVtyspDu6FHAJNL98uG3b0taSHJxfAueA4CA8lZm00vP1exM1A0ndPjXN 6/oM/O5xdUET2tanlpcW2WDdVOZDDGQGvMORlrG8WmJKWebmcg9GnrE5gyZLs3Wr ijze7CccyPLnET4dZiry9Qd/NRx2hgdfkDopTNiTbvmGCXulzqBpqSZ689KDITAK MNgSagZKgOsy7pRGCFSK9EPljZ2IwPtCrE/s9YX0kkJtDhq84SU3EQ== =UBy5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Anonymous Account Help
by hroller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been having problems trying to set up an account at alpha.c2.org. I have followed all the instructions but am still unable to get a reply or anything that works right. What I am doing wrong? This is what I have done so far. I am about to pull my hair out. I have been working on this for 2 days now. Anyway, 1. Created a Reply Block like this: Request-Remailing-To: hroller(a)metronet.com 2. I then encrypted it with remailer(a)replay.com's Public Key. I prepended it with the "Encrypted: PGP". 3. I then created the following message: From: hroller(a)alpha.c2.org Password: MyPassword Reply-Block: :: Anon-To: remailer(a)replay.com :: Encrypted: PGP -------Begin PGP Message---------- "The Encrypted Reply Block Message" ------End PGP Message------------- 4. I then sent it to "alias(a)alpha.c2.org". Then I wait. But never get anything from alpha.c2.org. I have gotten some anonymous messages from replay, but they are still encrypted so I don't know what it is sending me. Any help you can supply would be greatly appreciated. hroller

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Re: [Noise] Paranoia in the Comics
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:27 PM 10/25/95 -0700, you wrote: >This has no real crypto relevance, but some anarchistic relevance. > >Sometimes you find anti-government paranoia in the strangest of places... >In the Ziggy strip for 10/25/95, Ziggy is in a Psychiatrist's office. The >shrink is stating "You're afraid of the government, are you? I'm required >to report that sort of thing you know." Ziggy has long been a libertarian/right winger. Note a Sunday strip of a few years ago. Ziggy bends over and looks closely at some red ants who are carrying picket signs reading "Down with Communism", "Freedom Now", etc. Ziggy observes "It had to happen sometime." Since we are being semi-irrelevant here, yesterday's Broom Hilda strip was good for the net "Universal Access" wars. Broom Hilda sits down at a computer to take a ride on the Information Superhighway. The computer says "Sorry, the information superhighway is a toll road." "What's the toll"? "Brains." So Broom Hilda gives up and sets off on a tour of the back roads of America. Note the proof that competition provides better service than government-monopoly Universal Service. After years of being one of the few Local Telcos that charged residential customers metered rates for local calls, NYNEX (New York Telephone) has announced some flat rate pricing plans. Nothing like a little local loop competition. DCF "School Bus Safety - Are your children safe? - Story at 11:00" -- They're safer on the bus than they are when they arrive at their local institution for the mentally/morally defective.

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Re: your mail about Dr. Dobbs CD-ROM. (fwd)
by Cypherpunks Maintenance Account 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from Unicorn ----- >From cpunks Fri Sep 12 07:14:53 1997 Message-ID: <19970912124749.42396(a)sequent.com> Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 12:47:49 +0200 From: Unicorn <hvdl(a)sequent.com> To: coderpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: your mail about Dr. Dobbs CD-ROM. References: <c=US%a=_%p=EDS%l=AUADMEDS001-970911232759Z-1185(a)sg-energy-nt01.sg.eds.com> X-Mailer: Mutt 0.81 In-Reply-To: <c=US%a=_%p=EDS%l=AUADMEDS001-970911232759Z-1185(a)sg-energy-nt01.sg.eds.com>; from Garrard, David on Fri, Sep 12, 1997 at 08:27:59AM +0800 X-Files: The Truth Is Out There! X-Disclaimer: Comments contained do not necessarily represent thoseof my current employer. X-Copyright: Portions of this message may be subject to copyright.(c) 1994-1997 Hans "Unicorn" Van de Looy. Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk --- On Sep 12, Garrard, David apparently wrote -------------------------------- > Has anyone gotten a copy of the Dr Dobb's Cryptography CDROM outside the > US yet ? Nope. But where did you hear that it was available inside the US already? > David Garrard --- and thus sprach: "Garrard, David" <David.Garrard(a)EXCH.EDS.com> ------------ Ciao, Unicorn. -- ======= _ __,;;;/ TimeWaster ================================================ ,;( )_, )~\| A Truly Wise Man Never Plays PGP: 64 07 5D 4C 3F 81 22 73 ;; // `--; Leapfrog With a Unicorn... 52 9D 87 08 51 AA 35 F0 ==='= ;\ = | ==== Youth is not a time in life, it's a State of Mind! ======== ----- End of forwarded message from Unicorn -----

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MD4-derived hash functions
by JMKELSEY＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Tue, 24 Oct 1995 13:14:41 -0400 >From: hallam(a)w3.org >Subject: Re: MD5 weakness >Ron has not mentioned such an event to me and if that were the case I would >seriously doubt that he would not have been told about it. The only comment he >generally makes is that he wrote MD5 because "MD4 was making me nervous". In the MD5 RFC, I seem to recall the statement that MD4 was trading off too much strength for additional speed. However, sometime around that time, it came out that there were attacks on two-round variants of MD4, which is the stated reason for the development of RIPE-MD. Does anyone know whether Rivest was motivated to design MD5 by the partial attacks on MD4, or whether those came later? (This is totally idle curiousity.) >NIST and the NSA trusted MD4 sufficiently to base SHA upon it. SHA is preferable >in many ways to MD5, it has a different approach to extending the scheduling and >resist differential cryptanalysis. There is a problem with the compressor >function of MD5 which I dislike. All of the well-known software hash functions seem to be based on MD4 these days, but that doesn't mean much about the security of MD4--3DES with three independent keys looks pretty strong, as does 3DES with two independent keys, but that doesn't mean that single DES is a strong enough cipher for modern applications. One issue that exists with MD5, but not with SHA or the longer hash versions of Haval, is that MD5 has only a 128 bit hash function output, which corresponds loosely to having a 64-bit key. This implies that a wealthy enough opponent could determine a pair of MD5 inputs that collide, and conceivably use this in an attack. I think we should stick to 160 bit or longer hashes for future designs. (See P. van Oorschot and M. Weiner, "Parallel Collision Search with Application to Hash Functions and Discrete Logarithms," in the proceedings of the 1994 Fairfax Conference, for example). As an aside, what hash functions are there out there that look reasonably strong, have hash outputs of at least 160 bits, and aren't based on MD4? Some of the Snefru variants with many passes (eight?) come to mind, and the GOST hash function fits all the criteria, except I have a hard time convincing myself it's as strong as it claims to be. Is there a generic construction for arbitrary-length hash functions from good block or stream ciphers? > Phill --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)delphi.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMI+Mc0Hx57Ag8goBAQFJ9gP/VMvNefSm77prSY/NMbJfGO1EVmQrUAHn kEQEse+cXiaoJTe7njxUqycuDX0PN09C4XhNVOQJ6IBpCPZOKQMiXsI9FwAfjGWb mibwSfzyiXwxny1kYgfDCffS8KwdlWiVjxj1+MhvqhGQnxPsVA6UVrSCyAyHPZVJ UTXUWBJlJho= =2Pti -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Welcome to cypherpunks
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Why am I getting this when I am already subscribed to the >>list?????? > >Because someone signed the list up to the list...probably inadvertently. >They probably sent something to majordomo with a line like: > >subscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >thinking it actually made sense for some reason...then again they might >have done it on purpose. Well, the Welcome message says this: ->If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, ->you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command ->in the body of your email message: -> -> unsubscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com So it is but a small leap of logic to remove the 'un' in order to subscribe, since to my knowlege the Welcome message does not tell you how to subscribe. A human interface problem? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more +1 415 390 9732 | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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Re: Court proceedings under new SAFE act
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green asked about judges of the FISA court, and Declan named Joyce Green. The Chief Judge of FISA is Royce Lambert, who gave talk on C-SPAN about the operation of the court at an ABA conference in D.C. a few months ago. He made the point that few applications for electronic surveillance are turned down by the court (of 8,000 applications 12 were denied) because the judges coach the applicants until they get a request right. And that the DoJ teams are quite adept at complying with the court's requirements, because all pass muster first of a special office set up for that purpose. Judge Lambert said the job is "a lot of fun" because its deals with supremely critical events of national urgency, and that all the judges involved really do like it, especially the secrecy and prestige of being part of one of the most exclusive groups in Washington. This is not a joke. Indeed, the Chief joked that the court's role "may be constitutional." And then said that he'll probably get in trouble for the statement. For how the snoop system is supposed to work see the Foreign Intelligence Suveillance Act: http://jya.com/fis.htm (107K)

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Re: CJR returned to sender
by Richard.Johnson＠Colorado.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michael Froomkin wrote: >I agree strongly with Tim May that this (fun) little joke has gone far >enough. I enjoyed it while it lasted, but the CJR was clearly frivolous, >the T-Shirt was clearly not a munition, IMHO, and that's that. Write up >the experience, post it on the web somewhere (I'll provide a space if you >need it), and call it a day. The CJR for the t-shirts was not frivolous. Not in the least. Letting the NSA/Dept. of State off the hook on this one leaves them with wiggle room. The goal of filing these CJRs is to find out just where the NSA/Dept. of State draw their lines, and to _force_ them to draw lines where they'd rather retain flexibility. At the very least, we can point out the rather strange ideas they have about what constitutes speech, for the PR value, during the splashes of media attention silly CJR rulings generate. Even more useful: other things remaining equal, a rigid agency is safer to deal with than one that retains the flexibility to selectively harrass. Richard

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Spooks' New Charter
by Kent Borg, remove X for real email 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been thinking about the secret briefings the CIA/NSA/pick-your-TLAs have given to folks such as the House National Security Committee, the briefing that caused them to gut SAFE. What did they say? What are they after? Now, with the 50th anniversary of the CIA, there are some news stories such as one I saw in the International Herald Tribune--also available at <http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1997-09/14/155l-091497-idx.h…>

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Re: Fred, Fred, Fred: Enough already!
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:58 AM 10/24/95 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: > Can we please talk to Dr. Fred, the Poster Child of the Informal Fallacy, > if we *really* have to, off line? Yes, please, will everyone please killfile Dr Fred. I am tired of seeing things that are glaringly obvious explained in painful detail to someone who is reluctant to understand them. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Welcome to cypherpunks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:16 PM 10/26/95, Steven Weller wrote: >Well, the Welcome message says this: Actually, not "the" Welcome message, but a particular instance of it, namely, the instance directed at the new subscriber (in this case, cypherpunks(a)toad.com was the new subscriber). >->If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, >->you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command >->in the body of your email message: >-> >-> unsubscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >So it is but a small leap of logic to remove the 'un' in order to >subscribe, since to my knowlege the Welcome message does not tell you how >to subscribe. A human interface problem? Except that the list would _have_ to have been subscribed to itself _before_ that particular Welcome message would have gone out. Sort of a binding issue. I would prefer the Welcome message to always say the command is: unsubscribe cypherpunks yournamehere and subscribe cypherpunks yournamehere But this is presumably a Majordomo feature. In any case, let's hope subscribing the list to itself is not a trend. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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CAS_bah
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-22-95. NYPaper: "High Stakes, High Tech. Imagine the Internet As Electronic Casino." Mr. Fields is the former director of Darpa. He now hopes to transform the Internet, developed to defeat the evil empire, into a powerful medium for indulging America's growing weakness for wagering, to bring casinos to the people -- and into the center of American life, the home. "When I was looking around for what I would do next I decided to do something in the entertainment and gaming industries because they're now the greatest users of advanced technologies," Mr. Fields said. "It used to be the defense industry." CAS_bah (6 kb)

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Re: CJR returned to sender
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:30 AM 10/26/95, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > Should they also reject the same content (RSA-PERL) delivered >in any of the following ways: > > Printed on paper > Printed on paper in OCR font > Printed on paper in barcode > Printed on paper with magnetic ink (like checks) > > The lines being drawn here seem very arbitrary. I'll try to think like a bureaucrat responsible for actually trying to limit the export of weapons, munitions, cluster bombs, nerve gases, secure communications gear, crypto tools, etc. My test would be this: "Is the product actually usable by an adversary or helpful to them in any major way as a tangible product?" (I have no idea of what their review criteria are, just suggesting some plausible considerations.) How different products get evaluated by these criteria: * cruise missiles -- Yes. * designs for cruise missiles -- Yes. Blueprints, especially. Books are more problematic, as the U.S. has no tendency to screen books for publication, and no border checks for books. (Not that outgoing luggage ever gets checked anyway.) * functional crypto systems, such as RSA products or PGP -- Yes, thinking as a bureaucrat. (I won't argue the effectiveness of such steps, or the ultimate futility of trying to control software export.) * "RSA in Perl," even in machine-readable form. I would not block export of it, as it is not a "usable system" (no key management, unwieldy to use). The proof of the pudding: how many people are using "RSA in Perl" to actually communicate? How many Pablo Escobars or Saddam Husseins are likely to ever use it? (If the argument that the few lines of RSA in Perl "give away" the secret of RSA, this is bogus. The core steps are widely, widely (did I say "widely") known, and are standard programming examples. One of the first things I did in Mathematica, several years ago, was to code up "RSA in Mathematica"...took about 15 lines, without much effort to compact it.) * "RSA in Perl" on an unreadable t-shirt. Yes. Yes, thinking as a bureaucrat I would certainly approve it. Or try to lose it, return it unopened, etc., knowing full well the CJR was being done as a publicity stunt (well, isn't it?) and that reporters were waiting to make the State Department look foolish by reporting: "State Department Rules "Munitions T-Shirt" May Be Exported!" (Or to look just as foolish by rejecting it.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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