December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [noise] (was Re: PBS show)
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-06-15 16:15:17 EDT, perry(a)piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: > > new lows??? Its a rather reasonable question about the protected mode on the intel chips considering the limits of 640K mem...Sorry if Im not as 'versed' in proteected mode as you,master, seem to be. Oh please teach us lesser ones. Gee. But..... Is it OK to go over encryption ran in straight ASM to you?? Would that maybe please you a little more oh mentor. Gee.. Later god. or is that............. nevermind.

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Netscape Mail Security and PGP Plugins
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There hasn't been a lot of discussion on this list about the future of secure e-mail via Netscape. The most i've seen has come from Raph Levien on the standards battle between S/Mime and other various implementations including one using PGP. Raph has said at various Cypherpunks meetings now that( and not wanting to totally put words in his mouth) the PGP based implementations have lost ground to S/MIME. The reason I believe that this whole area has received so little quarter on the list is that either few people use Netscape for e-mail and that few people actually send encrypted e-mail. I'm going to try and put together a compendium of web links on this so it's a little easier to track the developments and various schemes. At the second to last Cypherpunks Bay Area meeting we had a discussion of crypto GUI's. It's my opinion that Netscape would be an excellent place to start because it does encryption relatively seemlessly. Incorporating S/MIME into the mail would be a great step forward in bringing easy crypto to the general community. Any PGP plugin I would hope eleviate the many UI problems PGP has. A couple of questions I have right off the bat are; 1. In Hal's Java mail encryptor, what are the legal aspects of sending code across that contains crypto? 2. Can any plugin access the Netscape Mail program. 3. When is S/MIME going to be in Netscape, I tried to find info on the web site but thier statements about S/MIME seem vague. I hope I'm not running over old ground, but this has to be alot more intresting than discussing that PBS show! Greg Kucharo sophi(a)best.com

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Netscape Mail Security and PGP Plugins
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually there is a web page covering quite a bit www.c2.org/~raph/pgpmime.html This is Raph's page and is still under construction. The whole gist of my last mail was to level more discussion at using Netscape and browsers in general as a low common denominator way of getting more crypto out there.

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Re: [Slightly less Off-topic] Re: Insults (was: PBS show)
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:18 PM 6/15/96 -0000, nelson(a)crynwr.com wrote: > But the "crypto-" prefix has an additional > meaning that may make its use somewhat problematic. A "crypto-" > something can be a "fake-" or "hidden-" something. So if it actually > became popular to be a geek, you'd have cool people becoming > crypto-geeks. Incorrect: Crypto-something means a hidden something, not fake something: Most popular usage is "cryptofascist" since fascism is so terribly politically incorrect these days, and many fascists are politically correct, so they do not call themselves fascist. Another common usage is crypto-totalitarian. A crypto-anarchist could mean either someone who seeks to destroy the state by higher mathematics, or someone who conceals his real aim of destroying the state. Because cryptography is in many ways subtle attack on the state, with consequences far more radical than is at first apparent, those who seek to destroy the state by this means often are not obvious anarchists -- crypto-anarchists are often crypto-anarchists. The intended meaning is usually obvious from context: I have never seen the word crypto-anarchist used in the sense of a secret anarchist. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: WEB: Child molester database
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 14 Jun 96 at 22:40, Damaged Justice wrote: > Along with the arms trafficker page, now we have a "child molester > database": > > http://www.greatworld.com/public > > Deadbeat Dads, Drug Dealers and more, coming soon according to blurb. I took a look at the "Crooked Cops" page. There was an anonymous note about this one copy from AL(abama?) who smoked grass while the contributer had sex with his daughter in the next room. Amusing, sort of. Rob.

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Re: Attorney General wants to "expand crypto laws"
by Scott Staedeli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Nando Time has a short story at: http://www2.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/061596/info2_10501.html I have to give Janet some credit for persistance, after all the events of the last week, she's still pushing the four horsemen. --- ==================================================== Let's see, Dole, Clinton... Do I get another choice? ====================================================

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:43 AM 6/17/96 -0400, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >I believe we used the term "email exploder" instead of "mailing list," >particularly in cross-examination and closing arguments, to convey the >idea that such a device is often used for conversation, not just one-way >communication. Was this term invented during the hearings or has anyone heard of it before? DCF

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New nym server nym.alias.net
by lcs Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have just set up a new 'nym server on nym.alias.net. Options include public-key encrypted replies, multiple and probabilistically weighted reply-blocks, and fixed size response messages. Right now the software should be considered in alpha test, so I can't guarantee it won't crash or do bad things. However, please feel free to test it out and send me bug reports. Send mail to help(a)nym.alias.net for more information. - admin(a)nym.alias.net

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Re: alpha.c2.org in deep shit?
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Am I the only one who receives apparently empty messages > > for my alpha.c2.org account? > No. Since late Thursday. What happened?

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Re: More info on this?
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Lexis-Nexis, one of the nation's leading private >> information brokers, has discontinued a new online >> offering that provided access to >> millions of individuals' Social Security numbers, after an >> onslaught of complaints from customers and the credit >> information bureau that originally supplied the data. An article in The NYT Sunday on criminal misuse of stolen and sold SS numbers says: "Such trade in information is legal, and regulation is difficult, perhaps even more so since a Federal appeals court ruling last week struck down restrictions and defended the 'chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech' on the new medium." "The freedom for market aggression is a wisely hidden by the freedom to argue." -- Wealth Through Capitalist Anarchy: Friedman's First Amendment

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Re: Money Laundering
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, Earlier this week some people on a british financial services list I lurk on talked about this book. I forwarded the reference to e$pam, and one of my e$ list people hunted it down. It's a book for british financial people on, heh, how not to be a money-launderer... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Sun, 16 Jun 1996 12:06:44 +0200 From: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: Re: Money Laundering I received the following information from the author Nigel Morris-Cotterill <100520.2472(a)CompuServe.COM>: ----------- The Book "How not to be a money launderer" is ISBN 0 9527365 0 0. Stockists incude Smiths (Ludgate Circus, Holborn Circus, Liverpool Street), Hammicks (Chancery Lane), Lambs (WC2), Dillons and Waterstones (quite a number of shops around the country including Harrods), Blackwells, HMSO Birmingham, Bloomsbury, Hong Kong and a few smaller bookshops around the UK. Any bookshop can order it. Bookshop price is L20. Some will charge an ordering fee or a "notification " fee, others will not. Or you can buy it direct from Silkscreen Publications, P O Box 1882, Brentwood Essex CM15 0GA, CWO, for L23 including postage and packing. Regards Nigel -- iang iang(a)systemics.com --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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No Subject
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Depending on how you have your nyms set up, some of those apparently empty messages may be posting "receipts" from remailers. I have received similar and later the messages.

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Instructions for using nym.alias.net
by Help Message 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WARNING: This site is still in "alpha" state, and may have bugs. Please test it, but do not rely on it for truly sensitive pseudonyms until it has been tested for a while. Please report all bugs and problems to <admin(a)nym.alias.net> so that we can fix them. * SETTING UP A MAIL ALIAS: To set up an anonymous mail alias on nym.alias.net, you must first generate a new PGP public/private key pair for use with your mail alias. Do this by running "pgp -kg". You will be asked to choose a user-id for your new key. When you are prompted for the user-id, type something not very descriptive that gives no indication of either your real identity, the alias name you will choose, or even the nym.alias.net machine. Unlike your regular PGP key, you should make an effort to keep your remailer public key relatively secret, and you should not use it for any other purpose. Do not sign it, and do not submit it to any key servers or give it out to anyone. To make sure you don't accidentally sign other messages with your pseudonym's private key, you should probably choose a new passphrase for your remailer key. You may also wish to put a line like: MYNAME = <your.real(a)e-mail.address> in the file $HOME/.pgp/config.txt (which you can create if it does not already exist). Once you have a PGP key for your pseudonym, extract it to a file (for instance with "pgp -fkxa 'key ID' > tmpfile". Next, create a reply block for yourself. First choose some passphrases for conventional encryption. Suppose you want your message encrypted first with your public key, then with shared key "passphrase_b", then with shared key "passphrase_a". Create a remailer message like this ("Latent-Time: +0:00" will prevent any delay--use something longer for more security.) :: Request-Remailing-To: you(a)your.email.address Latent-Time: +0:00 Encrypt-Key: passphrase_a ** PGP encrypt this with a remailer's public key (you can get remailer information from fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu, and you can get the keys by running "finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu | pgp -fka"). This will yield a message like this: -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 hIwC/nqSW1QDQfUBBACknZMV93wFS2CH0orlgslmEm+alhjI1eKwbbTTmeRWC5Rg /S3vZw+95ZuCZfqxKE0XrgZXzOEwfoyBcpVvf9Pb9D19TqEMTmmL/Jpl1xcxmbJ2 OGsHpQ/TxpazBCVhdBmPblj5wWvwfG1+ZKpIkQ5hiLJhryQM/TUDarEscs3zdaYA AAB5231aMcQ74AKoDZizABMF3Tw+olV4mm4jVo9cMn2B3Rj2XBFl4pV9VL3h0ZQB cPY/ytBRyZPugr0NpLgjO+q6mEjCcgQrxpYQ+1PvFPdDx1GmJ5ogZqW+AVHsNqAp vRoiG8ZhXs4r3E8liFsNtMMf6CUAsdV2ZoX1Hw== =Bla3 -----END PGP MESSAGE----- Prepend to this the following header: :: Encrypted: PGP And finally add a command to send to the remailer you chose, yielding a response block for one remailer: :: Anon-To: remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl Latent-Time: +0:00 Encrypt-Key: passphrase_b :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 hIwC/nqSW1QDQfUBBACknZMV93wFS2CH0orlgslmEm+alhjI1eKwbbTTmeRWC5Rg /S3vZw+95ZuCZfqxKE0XrgZXzOEwfoyBcpVvf9Pb9D19TqEMTmmL/Jpl1xcxmbJ2 OGsHpQ/TxpazBCVhdBmPblj5wWvwfG1+ZKpIkQ5hiLJhryQM/TUDarEscs3zdaYA AAB5231aMcQ74AKoDZizABMF3Tw+olV4mm4jVo9cMn2B3Rj2XBFl4pV9VL3h0ZQB cPY/ytBRyZPugr0NpLgjO+q6mEjCcgQrxpYQ+1PvFPdDx1GmJ5ogZqW+AVHsNqAp vRoiG8ZhXs4r3E8liFsNtMMf6CUAsdV2ZoX1Hw== =Bla3 -----END PGP MESSAGE----- ** For greater security, you should repeat this process so that mail to your pseudonym travels through multiple remailers. You can simply encrypt the entire above message with another remailer's public key, and insert the new cyphertext in a message similar to the example one above. Now, to set up a pseudonym on nym.alias.net, you need to mail four things to config(a)nym.alias.net: The pseudonym you wish to use, a "create" command, your remailer public key, and the response block. The reply-block must always come last in your mail message. Thus, if you wanted to choose the alias <test(a)nym.alias.net>, you would could a message like this: Config: From: test(a)nym.alias.net Nym-Commands: create +acksend name="Full Name of Nym Test User" Public-Key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzGf6A8AAAEEAPknqWEUA8U4+l5TFkD5Fj0COten6bbIe5bBb/1MvI+w6mFl z06CPb2K/Z1fzjT48ZyxwYR+S3jU3Z96JEFRl99HYh3lTIUiBHW/XtwyefF0y61x qYkNuUpSFh9BDBFM7N3uVvaNbzLiFnqCpZLm5ZIfrLcla3qUgkTBtHVi58fRAAUR tDhsY3MgbWl4bWFzdGVyIGFkbWluaXN0cmF0b3IgPG1peC1hZG1pbkBhbm9uLmxj cy5taXQuZWRxPokAlQMFEDGf6ClEwbR1YufH0QEBX60D/jZ5MFRFIFA1VxTPD5Zj Xw2bvqJqFvlwLD5SSHCVfe/ka6ALuxZGFKD/pHpUAkfv1hWqAYsJpi0cf8HSdi23 bh5dUeLJnHHHDmd9d55MuNYI6WTi+2YoaiJOZT3C70oOuzVXuELZ+nZwV20yxe8y 4M3b0Xjt9kq2upbCNuHZmQP+ =jIEc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Reply-Block: :: Anon-To: remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl Latent-Time: +0:00 Encrypt-Key: passphrase_b :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 hIwC/nqSW1QDQfUBBACknZMV93wFS2CH0orlgslmEm+alhjI1eKwbbTTmeRWC5Rg /S3vZw+95ZuCZfqxKE0XrgZXzOEwfoyBcpVvf9Pb9D19TqEMTmmL/Jpl1xcxmbJ2 OGsHpQ/TxpazBCVhdBmPblj5wWvwfG1+ZKpIkQ5hiLJhryQM/TUDarEscs3zdaYA AAB5231aMcQ74AKoDZizABMF3Tw+olV4mm4jVo9cMn2B3Rj2XBFl4pV9VL3h0ZQB cPY/ytBRyZPugr0NpLgjO+q6mEjCcgQrxpYQ+1PvFPdDx1GmJ5ogZqW+AVHsNqAp vRoiG8ZhXs4r3E8liFsNtMMf6CUAsdV2ZoX1Hw== =Bla3 -----END PGP MESSAGE----- Note that the first line of this message was "Config:". ANY MESSAGE SENT TO <config(a)nym.alias.net> WILL BE SILENTLY DISCARDED IF THE FIRST LINE IS NOT "Config:"! This message must then be encrypted with the nym.alias.net public key, and signed by your new remailer public key. The nym.alias.net public key is listed here (pipe it to "pgp -fka" to add it to your public key ring): -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzGzy5AAAAEH/2JjaB4AuQff90Mejru+FVptG4/wPmwK7WteavNXJpYxWoRm SzxwNz70q4QCLKBR0QnzXqGeGtCB5IE4dIuPIkMiPvRv57rBaDe4qkzNkgwuZiH9 qGMsOSidCf+xaIJyL7RtljKuDSU8KH2OGIdwEpGa20U+9oXabWCpWwVvfJhgxPFF xhiFLeMzhEUgsVXxIn2ThD8AyHyTUXWd11nvvTeKt+y9qX+7fUDrn6HIl1lFmxQA RAOc83jjDNgWbanHWG9+1g8KFLkBrEdxJtNQeb/JMSZ122Dxda5CwtMnQGI0mCcr dHNr1NA6WWaIfV0pR+sluNWFxNYuTk0OFgtg8c0ABRG0Kzxjb25maWdAbnltLmFs aWFzLm5ldD4vPHNlbmRAbnltLmFsaWFzLm5ldD6JAJUDBRAxumL3RMG0dWLnx9EB AaRTA/4xIgNrem7Yay0/rFfXgoGHUhWsZVhAlQP1fVEIRYuYEC4Biodwx3nYL31r 9IcgBkm/DUddkfCUfroMr7wbm6GnYnrVLc4dZ9ACCjUVX7n5hvanc8/Efx0yE03l D+r9n5liz5X4vk65f+DIw1LykM9zTg/4GNwAENn6H5YTtg6Q+IkBFQMFEDG6YVlO TQ4WC2DxzQEBIvMH/jER9tiQcJG2NvkiOqcIeBSPLb15EPFMg1He3clRIz398ToH iv4oNKZEjVox3O0zowcUW0zfgtzhlMbudOwgoylCpCxVukuF1tsleoGlvDES0iA8 WdnYftt/rr3awf0j2pmLFbCmEDFaebuYgRXGe5yavaSjFDPzjFZqKwTYs5VnKOjP XjI0yrem4PXw6K5sOANJKaa6yFrHJ/58iqbV8Rl7p0qNwwIi1nDn5UgpDOFDqWMq sO9HUjRD2Y+Kmq6qlSg1gKV1hehZuAxHKtJAIZf+MPaI/sRbs79oN5GVwpmqoiZF vz6bLS+qs69kVwg2RQoY2BSAzyUeT+rw70YfLAc= =ekCY -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Create the message to nym.alias.net with the command: pgp -seat file config(a)nym.alias.net -u 'remailer key ID'. Once you have produced a PGP encrypted and signed message, mail it to <config(a)nym.alias.net> (preferably through some anonymous remailers for maximum security). If the name you chose is available, this will create your mail alias. You can send mail to <list(a)nym.alias.net> to get a list of pseudonyms already in use. * SENDING MAIL FROM YOUR PSEUDONYM Once you have created a mail alias, you will automatically receive mail sent to that alias (encrypted with the public key you mailed it). To send mail from that alias, simply create a mail message, encrypt it with the nym.alias.net public key, sign it with your remailer key, and mail it to <send(a)nym.alias.net>. Thus, for example, create a file with (substituting the name you chose for "test"): From: test To: mail2news(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu Newsgroups: alt.test Subject: ignore this nym test just a test If this file is called "testpost", and your remailer public key ID is "xx testkey", run the command: pgp -seat testpost send(a)nym.alias.net -u 'xx testkey' This will create a file called "testkey.asc", which you can then mail to <send(a)nym.alias.net> to post the above test message to the newsgroup alt.test. Any mail you send through send(a)nym.alias.net will be PGP signed and dated by the nym.alias.net private key to certify its authenticity. If you do not wish your mail to be signed, or if your alias has its own PGP key, you should simply send mail through ordinary remailers (setting the From: address to be that of your nym) and shouldn't need to go through send(a)nym.alias.net. * CHANGING OR DELETING YOUR MAIL ALIAS To change either your public, your response block, or the parameters of your alias, you can simply send another message to <config(a)nym.alias.net> as you did to set up the the alias initially (only without the "Nym-Commands: create" command). Once again, the message will have to be both signed and encrypted with pgp -seat message -u 'xx testkey' as described above for sending mail. To delete your alias entirely, send encrypted and signed mail with simply the lines: From: test Nym-Commands: delete (substituting your real alias name for test). After deleting your alias, you should receive PGP-signed mail explicitly acknowledging the deletion of that alias. An acknowledgment simply confirming generic "successful execution" of your request does not indicate that your alias has been deleted. There several commands you can give using the "Nym-Commands:" header in a message to <config(a)nym.alias.net>. You can place several on on line, separated by spaces, or you can place multiple "Nym-Commands:" headers in the same message. Valid commands are: +acksend/-acksend Enable/disable an automatical acknowledgment each time a message is successfully remailed for your alias through <send(a)nym.alias.net>. +cryptrecv/-cryptrecv Enable/disable automatic encryption with your public key of messages received for your alias. If public-key encryption is disabled, you absolutely must conventionally encrypt your messages if you wish to preserve your privacy (conventional is a good idea anyway--see the section on security). +fixedsize/-fixedsize When you send the +fixedsize Nym-Command, all messages you receive will be padded to exactly the same size (roughly 10K). This padding will take place outside the public key encryption, and so will only be useful if you also use shared-key encryption. If you do used shared-key encryption, however, (and you really should), having all your messages be the same size will make it significantly harder for anyone to do traffic analisys on mail to your nym. +disable/-disable One of the most effective forms of attack on a pseudonymous remailer such as this is to flood the system with messages for a particular destination. Moreover, because this alias software does not know a message's final destination, it is possible that some joker could point an alias at itself (maybe even using two reply-blocks to create exponentially increasing levels of traffic). To protect against this, if you receive more than 256 messages in one day, your alias will be disabled and further mail to you it will bounce. You will receive mail notifying you of the situation if this happens to you. At this point, you can re-enable your alias by sending a message with "Nym-Command: -disable" to <config(a)nym.alias.net>. name="My \"Alias\" Name" To set up a name to be printed in all your outgoing messages, like this: From: My "Alias" Name <aliasname(a)nym.alias.net> You can set it with the name= Nym-Command. Note the outer quotes are necessary even if your name does not contain any white space. Any quotes and backslashes in your name must be escaped with a backslash. create This command must be given when creating a new alias. delete This command deletes your alias and wipes your response block. As described above, you should receive PGP-signed mail explicitly acknowledging the deletion of your alias. An acknowledgment simply confirming generic "successful execution" of your request does not indicate that your alias has been deleted. * REPLAY The remailer keeps a replay cache, and will not accept the same message twice unless each copy has been separately signed. Thus, it is safe to send multiple copies of outgoing E-mail messages through very long remailer chains, if you are worried about one copy not getting through. Whether one or more copies actually make it through, only one copy will go out. One side effect of this is, however, that if you PGP sign a test message and mail in the same message multiple times, it will only work the first time. Note that signatures are only considered valid for a week. Thus, if mail comes to send(a)nym.alias.net more than a week after you signed it, that mail will be dropped. * MULTIPLE REPLY BLOCKS Sometimes anonymous remailers can be unreliable, and you would like to receive two copies of all your messages through two independent remailer chains. Alternatively, perhaps you want to send one copy of each E-mail message you receive to the bit bucket through a long series of anonymous remailers. You can assign multiple reply blocks to your nym by prefixing each with "Reply-Block:" at the end of a message to <config(a)nym.alias.net>. For example, the following message to <config(a)nym.alias.net>: Config: From: test Reply-Block: :: Anon-To: nobody(a)some.remailer.machine Latent-Time: +0:00 Reply-Block: :: Anon-To: your.real(a)email.address Latent-Time: +1:00 Will setup your alias to send one copy of each message you receive to "nobody(a)some.remailer.machine" immediately, and to send a second copy to "you.real(a)email.address" after up to one hour of random delay. Of course, in order for this to be useful, you should use more complex reply-blocks which chain through multiple remailers. It may also make traffic analysis more difficult if you don't always use the same remailer path. You can assign a probability to a remailer block by adding "p=probability" to the remailer block (where 'p' can be any single letter variable name). For example, consider the following reply-block: Reply-Block: p=0.5 :: Anon-To: you(a)through.one.remailer Latent-Time: +1:00 Reply-Block: p=0.5 :: Anon-To: you(a)through.another.remailer Latent-Time: +1:00 Reply-Block: q=0.75 :: Anon-To: nobody(a)some.remailer.machine Latent-Time: +0:00 3/4 of the time, a copy of a message you receive will immediately be mailed to nobody(a)some.remailer.machine. After some random delay, your message will be mailed to either "you(a)through.one.remailer" or to "you(a)through.another.remailer". Multiple reply-blocks with the same probability variable are mutually exclusive. Thus since the p blocks are "p=0.5" and "p=0.5", and since 0.5 + 0.5 = 1.0, you are guaranteed to get a copy of all your mail. Generally speaking, you will probably want all the weights associated with a particular variable to add up to 1.0 unless the reply-block is just for cover traffic. Bizarre behavior may occur if your probabilities add up to more than one--this is not recommended. While the idea of using many different reply-blocks with small probabilities may seem appealing for defeating traffic analysis, keep in mind that each reply block is traceable back to you. Suppose you have 10 reply blocks for your 'nym, each with probability 0.1. If those reply blocks become compromised, only one of the 10 will have to be uncovered to find out your real identity. * SECURITY If you care about the secrecy of your identity, then the only truly secure way of of protecting it is by pointing all your response blocks to usenet newsgroups. The most important thing to realize about the privacy of your messages is that anyone can determine your PGP public key ID from looking at an encrypted message. That means if you don't conventionally super-encrypt mail, an observer on the network or at a remailer may be able to determine which public key corresponds to which nym, and use this to track messages. If you redirect your mail to news group alt.anonymous.messages, observers will be able to determine your public key ID and observe how much mail you are getting. For this reason, you should conventionally encrypt your mail in addition to public-key encrypting it. If you only want to use conventional encryption for most mail, you can disable RSA encryption by sending signed/encrypted mail with 'Nym-Commands: -cryptrecv' to <config(a)nym.alias.net>. There is a large benefit to using public-key encryption. If you only use conventional encryption and your reply-block is compromised, then previously recorded messages sent to you will be able to be decrypted. With RSA-encrypted messages, there is no way for anyone but you to read the message once it has left nym.alias.net. * POLICY Any use of this alias service for illegal purposes is strictly prohibited. Do not rely on this nym server to protect your identity. You should be relying far more heavily on the integrity of the remailers through which you chain your replies. The nym.alias.net service is provided in the hope that it will be useful, but the administrators can make NO GUARANTEES WHATSOEVER that your identity will not be compromised. That said, we will make a reasonable effort to keep the machine secure and to ensure that your reply block never gets backed up to tape or otherwise copied. Note, however, that your PGP public key will get backed up to tape, and so will likely be available for a while even after you delete your Nym. The server also keeps, not backed up, two additional pieces of information on your nym: First it counts the number of messages your alias received in the current 24 hour period, so as to detect flooding attacks and alias loops with exponential message explosion (see the description of the -disable Nym-Command for more info). Second, the server stores the date of the last day on which you sent a PGP-signed message to config(a)nym.alias.net or send(a)nym.alias.net. This is to help garbage-collect inactive accounts with lost PGP keys at some later point should that become necessary. Nym.alias.net is the same machine as anon.lcs.mit.edu. Keep this in mind when choosing which remailers to chain through. (In other words, using mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu as your last hop for mail to nym.alias.net is probably a good idea if and only if you you also chain through one more hop than you would otherwise have felt comfortable with.) * E-MAIL ADDRESSES <admin(a)nym.alias.net> The address to contact if you are having any problems with nym.alias.net. <help(a)nym.alias.net> Sending mail to this address gets you a copy of this help file. <remailer-key(a)nym.alias.net> Get the PGP public key for nym.alias.net. <list(a)nym.alias.net> The address to contact for a list of all taken pseudonyms. <config(a)nym.alias.net> The address to which to send configuration messages. All messages to this address must be PGP encrypted and signed with "pgp -seat". In addition, THE FIRST LINE OF PGP-SIGNED TEXT IN A MESSAGE TO config MUST BE "Config:". Otherwise your message will be completely ignored. When sending one or more reply-blocks to <config(a)nym.alias.net>, they must come at the end of the message after any Public-Key: or Nym-Command headers. <send(a)nym.alias.net> To send mail from your alias address, PGP encrypt and sign the message with "pgp -seat", and mail it to this address.

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Re: [noise] (was Re: PBS show)
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-06-16 11:57:22 EDT, nelson(a)crynwr.com writes: << Perry, if someone is so clueless as to post a general programming question to cypherpunks, do you think they're going to "get it"? You need to explain it in very small words. This mailing list, cypherpunks, is about encryption. It's not about reminiscing about old personal computers (however much fun it is to do) and showing off our respective ages. Yes, you may consider this a Russ-o-gram. >> Yes you are right. BUT its funny. I only asked something about another mailing that was done yesterday about real-protected mode and the chip desing. So while its there.. why not take a question outta it!! hehe

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Bye Bye Middleman
by middle-man-admin＠nym.jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To Whom it may Concern: The middleman remailer has not been as robust or reliable as I had hoped. It relies too heavily on the nym servers and the reliability of the other remailers that it randomly selects. As you can tell by Raph's list, middleman has not responded to a ping a ping in some time. I've been looking at the process for several days now and have come to the conclusion that it will probably never achieve a level of reliability that will make it a reasonable remailer. With this in mind, I am formally announcing the retirement of the middleman Type-II remailer. It was an interesting experiment but it just didn't pan out. middle-man-admin(a)nym.jpunix.com

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Re: [noise] (was Re: PBS show)
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-06-16 06:17:43 EDT, perry(a)piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes: << AwakenToMe(a)aol.com writes: > new lows??? Its a rather reasonable question about the protected mode on the > intel chips considering the limits of 640K mem...Sorry if Im not as 'versed' > in proteected mode as you,master, seem to be. Oh please teach us lesser ones. Some people really just don't get it, do they. Let the sewer flow... .pm >> Guess Not. Maybe thats why I subscribe to mailers. So I can learn and share what I know. Although the internet is such a vast resource..... it is nevertheless an area where egotistical, hard headed, and very arrogant people lurk. Take this to heart some of you. Remember... internet is information. let the sewer flow?? Man.. get outside one of these days.

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Snake Oil on the Water...
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I recieved this on another list. The snake oil is starting to flow pretty heavy. I expect it to get worse... >Subject: Windows 3.x or Win95 FREEWARE Mail/Encryption Program >X-UIDL: 788ef8d7083cb4f8e94b2c20183773b5 > >Date: Sat, 15 Jun 1996 13:26:23 -0600 >To: freematt(a)coil.com (Matthew Gaylor) >From: Joe Horn <6mysmesa(a)1eagle1.com> >Subject: Re: Security and Freedom through FREEWARE Mail/Encryption Program. > > >At the following two sites, you may download the FREEWARE Pegasus Mail >program version 2.3.3 16 bit for windows 3.x or a version for WIN95. The >unique thing about it, besides its simplicity and that it's a great mail >program better than Eudora, it has a built in encryption program that is as >effective as PGP and lots simpler. All you do is agree on a password with >your correspondent. That simple. The encryption program and the mail program >were developed in New Zealand, and were legally imported, so the encryption >program is better than PGP, which is regulated by Federal Cypher Laws. >Honest.Plus, it's free. The sites are: > >http://www.pegasus.usa.com/ > >or > >http://www.env.com/tucows/files/winpm233.zip >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >**************************************************************************** >Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues >Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA >on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) >Matthew Gaylor,1933 E. Dublin-Granville Rd.,#176, Columbus, OH 43229 >**************************************************************************** --- |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: alpha.c2.org in deep shit?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I peeked at a few messages passing through my remailer from alpha.c2.org (mea culpa) to see whether the problem might be at my end. As far as I could tell, the messages were correctly formatted and all, but simply lacked message bodies. So it looked like the data being sent from alpha.c2.org was already messed up and had stripped the bodies. I set up an alpha.c2.org alias a few days ago and when I sent mail to myself I got mail without a body, so I think it is a definate screwup. I sent a report of this to remailer-operators list but have not seen a response yet from Sameer. Hal

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Re: Netscape Mail Security and PGP Plugins
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Greg Kucharo <sophi(a)best.com> > A couple of questions I have right off the bat are; > 1. In Hal's Java mail encryptor, what are the legal aspects of > sending code across that contains crypto? There are two main issues, export and patent. Export laws keep it from being used outside the U.S., and patent laws keep it from being used within the U.S. Everyone else should have no problem. > 2. Can any plugin access the Netscape Mail program. According to discussion on the coderpunks list, this is not presently possible: : From coderpunks-errors(a)toad.com Sat Jun 8 18:33:32 1996 : Date: Sat, 8 Jun 1996 18:07:06 -0700 (PDT) : From: Kurt Thams <thams(a)thams.com> : Subject: Re: plugging in : : On Sat, 8 Jun 1996, strick -- henry strickland wrote: : : > > >> >You could hand any websurfer a Netscape PGP plugin without much work : > > >> >at all, and you could easily build it on lots of platforms. After all, : > > >> >look at how many platforms that lowly C code like PGP runs on. : > : > not knowing what Netscape plugins do, : > let me ask the plumbing question: what would this do, and how? : > allow users to send/receive encrypted PGP mail in the "netscape mail" window, : > transparently like Raef's sendmail wrapper? : > how do you invoke a plugin, when & why? : : This is not possible yet. The Netscape API doesn't expose the mail service : to plug-ins. One would think that future versions of Navigator will do : this, however. : : -- kurt thams : -- thams(a)thams.com However as has been mentioned here a PGP/MIME mail type could theoretically be used to activate a handler for that incoming mail. I don't know exactly how this would work. Glancing at the netscape plug docs near <URL: http://home.netscape.com/eng/mozilla/2.0/handbook/plugins/ > it appears that plugins are activated on HTML page downloads, not (necessarily) on mail receipt. So unless you typically find your incoming mail on a web page, it doesn't look like this will work. I will ask about it on coderpunks for clarification. > 3. When is S/MIME going to be in Netscape, I tried to find info on the > web site but thier statements about S/MIME seem vague. Sorry, can't help you here. > I hope I'm not running over old ground, but this has to be alot more > intresting than discussing that PBS show! Agree! Hal

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12.58 PM 6/15/96 -0700, Hal wrote: >I am pretty sure it is illegal, CDA or not, at least if the material >is obscene rather than merely indecent. As Declan says, the issue is >accountability. If the remailer operator ends up being considered the >person who sent the mail, he could be in deep trouble. This is the problem I have with the whole issue. Obviously, since nyms use reply blocks, the remailer operators that are inside the reply block have no control over what is sent (PGP-encrypted) through their remailer. If I was to go out into the city, and tack up some porno on a building, maybe something where kids walk by, then someone would take it down, most likely, but there would be no tracing it to me, because I would be already long gone from the building. We should make the best efforts we can to make remailers fully anonymous. My ideas are more that accept PGP, and (has this already been suggested and/or rejected?) automatic chaining. That is, remailer #1 could automatically encrypt and send to #2, #3, ... #n before going on to its destination. The number of added remailers and which were used could be made random. (ie, have a list of remailers and pick from it each time...) Would this work? =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo o chiisaku dekimasu) -------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu For PGP key 0xD37692F9, finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or get from keyservers pub 1024/D37692F9 1995/07/01 David Rosoff <drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu> Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 I accept anonymous mail. If I didn't sign it, you don't know I wrote it. === "Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will / To strive, to seek, to find-- and not to yield." <---- "Ulysses", by Alfred, Lord Tennyson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMcRVXhguzHDTdpL5AQFc1wP9GiJ6mXeAOY1x/7g1GrCPsWYEZlS5iq84 wfKwgs1W8L+PBQcbrgdhyK2RKDJ7sFrCbz0eSa3OLbDiw5NeKD0LSDAvxuF3Redu aUpv4yWdYMz71sHz8MF7TxzdOo5a6dg3XtIaRA3Sbt4i2p9dozm/Xg5h4vhgKwWu /nG1BhTlNGs= =O4wy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Snake Oil on the Water...
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:19 AM 6/16/96 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote: >I recieved this on another list. Me too :) >The snake oil is starting to flow pretty heavy. I expect it to get worse... Here's the reply I sent to that list. I cc'd the person who sent the original message... =========== At 01:00 PM 6/16/96 -0400, Joe Horn <6mysmesa(a)1eagle1.com> wrote: [snip] >At the following two sites, you may download the FREEWARE Pegasus Mail >program version 2.3.3 16 bit for windows 3.x or a version for WIN95. I like Pmail. Had I not been an experienced Eudora user before I tried it (and pretty stuck on the Eudora interface) I would have probably stuck with it. Kudos to the Pegasus team for releasing a freeware program with such excellent filtering capabilites. It is much more of a full-fledged program than Eudora Lite, IMHO. > The >unique thing about it, besides its simplicity and that it's a great mail >program better than Eudora, it has a built in encryption program that is as >effective as PGP and lots simpler. All you do is agree on a password with >your correspondent. That simple. This would seem to eliminate the immense benefit of public key encryption -- that you can send encrypted email to someone you haven't met, without any prior communication. If you have security concerns, they will probably apply to whatever communication media that you would use to agree on the password. If I have a secure method to agree on a password with someone, what the heck do I need crypto for? ;) Also, I'm assuming that you can only send encrypted mail to other Pmail users. PGP is above those kinds of limitations -- it can be used on many platforms and with many different types of email packages. > The encryption program and the mail program >were developed in New Zealand, and were legally imported, so the encryption >program is better than PGP, which is regulated by Federal Cypher Laws. This is misleading, IMHO. While the export of the US version is "regulated by Federal Cypher Laws," PGP is not like some products which export a weaker version to accomodate ITAR. The version of PGP for people outside of the US is developed outside of the US, and is just as strong as the domestic version, AFAIK. Some people's lives, business, etc. depend on what type of crypto they use. I don't think it's really appropriate to make misleading claims like the one above when the stakes are that high. Please drop this claim for your promotional efforts, or back it up with specific evidence showing how ITAR has weakened PGP. >Honest.Plus, it's free. The sites are: [snip] For those people who want to use PGP with Pegasus, there's a nice little plug-in for Pegasus called PGP JN, by John Navas, which allows you to choose to encrypt with PGP (you need to have a copy) instead of the Pmail crypto. It has a few small drawbacks, IMHO, but I found it much easier to use than PGP shell interfaces that require cutting text to the clipboard first. John's program is available at: http://www.aimnet.com/~jnavas/winpmail.html I really think the Pegasus team would do better to mention that John's program is available, rather than try to steer people away from PGP. PGP JN makes using the basic email features of PGP more streamlined than most other mail packages I've used (except Private Idaho, which is not a full-fledged email package). I think it would be better to mention that both options exist, rather than seeking to convert the masses away from PGP, which is unlikely to succeed anyway, IMHO. PC users who use PGP should try Pegasus and PGP JN. Private Idaho is available from Joel McNamara's page, at: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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new type2.list/pubring.mix
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello everyone, A new type2.list/pubring.mix combination that reflects the retirement of the experimental remailer, middleman, has been posted. You can get it by web from www.jpunix.com. or by FTP from ftp.jpunix.com. John Perry - perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com - PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMcR58lOTpEThrthvAQGocgP/V3UuU11iwo6Yme295YygWqXekKKxkXXH 4u94vrwkYF3qTT+9W3vrgRuUueOf/xF6FP0FZj14wc0sZ51wAnHvPxpHNxzoXuFH Z7IAOv7MsSfm8Cn2/kFqK+KAGlaKRFpHzJUZS61Oo2u7HrLvejjNd4ZOfAhZ83m7 opBUlcYqCPA= =0LW8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Does information want to be free?
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:41 PM 6/14/96 -0400, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >I confess I was amused by how he described >those Internet anarchists who delighted in publicizing books that should >in fact be restricted. I am amused (though I am not taking sides) by the general lack of attention or rhetoric that "crypto-anarchists"/"crypherpunks"/whatever, otherwise privacy respecting people, usually espouse. If someone found out all the medical information of cypherpunks list members and distributed about the Net, how would people feel? (This is a rhetorical question, and I am familiar and agree with some of the arguments regarding public interest, public figures, copyright isn't a privacy protecting mechanism, yada yada yada. Just something to think about, what if large corporations, public interest groups, lobbeys, or governments can use this as a precedent against "us".) _______________________ Regards, Democracy is where you can say what you think even if you don't think. -? Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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The Molson Great Web Anonymizer
by Damien Lucifer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually, they call it the Molson Web Canadianizer, but it looks like an anonymizer to me. You give it a URL and the Canadianizer grabs the URL and adds some funny canadian modifications to the page, and sends it back to you. It changes all the links to link through the canadianizer, also, which is convenient. This page originally allowed you to specify a url, but now it seems they only allow you to click and grab a random page. Specifying the address to connect to in your browser will solve this though.. Heres the URL: http://www.molson.com/cgi-bin/cize?url=http://www.your.site.com/the/url

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Java
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I am new here, and its probably been asked one billion times... .. I've only heard a tiny bit about a problem that existed with security and Java about 6 months ago.... What was it?

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whitehouse queries files on political enemies
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

what goes around comes around.. this reminds me of the old stories of Nixon and the various NSA domestic programs mentioned by Bamford ("Puzzle Palace") - ------- Forwarded Message Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 22:23:03 -0700 (MST) To: fsnw-l(a)freespeechnews.com From: Free Speech <ron(a)grapevinenews.com> Subject: [FreeSpeech-NewsWire] Files White House Got >From POLITICSnow I just picked up the following Associated Press story, dated June 7, 1996: "The Clinton White House acknowledged Friday it sought and received more than 300 FBI files, including those of House Speaker Newt Gingrich's press secretary, former Bush chief of staff James A. Baker III and other prominent Republicans." - - -- Associated Press=20 Also, in POLITICSnow is another press story which states, "Blankley, Baker, Fitzwater Among 330 FBI Files White House Got". The following is from that story: Friday, June 7, 1996=20 =A9 The Associated Press=20 "WASHINGTON (AP) - The Clinton White House acknowledged Friday it sought and received more than 300 FBI files, including those of House Speaker Newt Gingrich's press secretary, former Bush chief of staff James A. Baker III and other prominent Republicans.=20 Republicans immediately denounced the White House, saying President Clinton's aides misused the FBI to get information on political enemies. A top GOP leader suggested hearings were in order.=20 White House spokesman Mark Fabiani called it "an innocent bureaucratic mistake" and said there was no indication anyone reviewed the FBI background material.=20 But among the unanswered questions were who at the White House knew the files had been gathered and why they were kept at the White House rather than returned to the FBI after the error was discovered by a low-level White House employee sometime early in 1994.=20 The files - some 330 in all, almost all of them former employees of Republican administrations - were stored in the White House security office's vault in late 1993 and early 1994, the White House said." My comments: I have heard posters say, "So what, I'm alive. I have a job. Why should I care about this Whitwater stuff?" I, myself, have defended President Clinton in POLITICSnow when they were known as PoliticsUSA. I have held firm that there is no evidence against the Clinton's. This still holds true, in my opinion, with Ron Brown, Vince Foster, etc. I stated that Travelgate, Whitewatergate, Troopergate, etc. were much to do about nothing. Maybe they are in themselves. Although, I am on the verge of making a public apology in POLITICSnow based upon the evidence that is beginning to come forth. For anyone who counts himself a liberal, a basic premise is to have the government out of our personal business unless there is an absolute need for it. What apparently has happened is that the Whitehouse, for purely political reasons, obtained 330 FBI files almost all of them former employees of Republican administrators. This violates, in my opinion, the basic principles of liberalism. I will answer any posts in this news forum by anyone who terms himself a liberal and at the same time defends, what I consider, Nazi behavior. I want to add that I have the highest respect for the FBI and all the other Intelligence Services of the United States. The buck stops somewhere, and it is not with the FBI. Best regards, Bob Drake snoball(a)mail.idt.net - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: Snake Oil on the Water...
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 16 Jun 96 at 11:19, Alan Olsen wrote: > I recieved this on another list. The snake oil is starting to flow pretty > heavy. I expect it to get worse... > >Subject: Windows 3.x or Win95 FREEWARE Mail/Encryption Program > >X-UIDL: 788ef8d7083cb4f8e94b2c20183773b5 [..] > >At the following two sites, you may download the FREEWARE Pegasus Mail > >program version 2.3.3 16 bit for windows 3.x or a version for WIN95. The > >unique thing about it, besides its simplicity and that it's a great mail > >program better than Eudora, it has a built in encryption program that is as Actually, it is much better than Eudora and has plug-ins for encryption. The native encryption sucks, and the author warns against it (it's there as a demo of the crypto API!). There *is* a PGP-plugin (w/source) that uses PGP to encrypt or decrypt mail and add keys. The last version I saw had shitty key management... if you're emailing somebody at an address different from the key-id, it didn't prompt you for another key (and Pegasus 2.2 sent it out in cleartext!). I don't like the add on much, but many others do, aware of that flaw and some others. Seems like the person who wrote that message doesn't know what he's talking about. There's a difference between snake oil and a user who doesn't understand a product. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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[noise] Re: SM3 ?'s (fwd)
by Damien Lucifer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 16 Jun 1996 19:09:45 -0400, eron(a)in-sync.com (Eron Cohen) wrote: Don C. Jenkins wrote: > 3) Now that I am almost convinced that SM3 is the software I wish to > purchase - I was wondering if there is a way to make it automaticley edit > out irritating clients from my schedule? Or insert an extra million in my > bank account? > Yes. We are planning to ship this effect with 3.5 version of Razor next month. Not only does it remove the clients from your schedule but from your entire life using an advanced form of pattern recognition. We need to get this approved by the bureau of tobacco and firearms before we are allowed to start shipping it though, because in some places its considered a munition. Once approved we hope we can open our market to annoyed people in other fields too.

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Re: Snake Oil on the Water...
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:03 PM 6/16/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: >On Sun, 16 Jun 1996, Rich Burroughs wrote: > >AFAIK, "The Pegasus Team" is still one person, and he's not an idiot. The >person who sent the message was some random idiot, not a member of "The >Pegasus Team." Just thought that should be straightened out lest any >unwarranted ill will be left floating around... Yes, you're absolutely right, and I owe the Pegasus author a big apology for assuming that this guy who thinks there's a 40 bit domestic version of PGP had anything to do with Pegasus. I really misspoke, and I apologize. BTW, I've heard that Pmail is progressing quite well. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: Snake Oil on the Water...
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: richieb(a)teleport.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, alano(a)teleport.com Date: Sun Jun 16 22:36:53 1996 Now if we could get John to get it to work with the 32-bit version it would be even better. Lou Z. > John's program is available at: > http://www.aimnet.com/~jnavas/winpmail.html > > I really think the Pegasus team would do better to mention > that John's program is available, rather than try to steer > people away from PGP. PGP JN makes using the basic email > features of PGP more streamlined than most other mail > packages I've used (except Private Idaho, which is not a > full-fledged email package). I think it would be better to > mention that both options exist, rather than seeking to > convert the masses away from PGP, which is unlikely to > succeed anyway, IMHO. Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMcTTBstPRTNbb5z9AQEWpAgAoNBF5M+xyRPRAQjdBR8NpMgwEsb2lROj Now8Ku1ovNvTDc+Y7ZJ8InN1pyM53SA72LIjXFX5Tjughbkkh+96nXCsdEvStBO2 im4rIA+cv2QmcdhGVScgokUkY5BRiNnCc92bH+zOxmQMx/r7Bx8779phChQebF6P 01GP94Vlwh8lVoM7T4LCfAto5tsgMQVIwbOoYqkeDU1SpSQvz030XpQqaN94oCTh le7foWIWMJuAD26zetsbWgeEfZpIL/9M4e1dfDbcSJsBBN3Wwzs2XxKYqgbsz7ob 18+4toNNblt6WcPnhvbFzSgf3v0sYUAEcqawg/7QJiCBjNGncBwjJw== =nVgx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Snake Oil on the Water...
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:27 PM 6/16/96 -0700, Rich Burroughs wrote: >For those people who want to use PGP with Pegasus, there's a >nice little plug-in for Pegasus called PGP JN, by John Navas, >which allows you to choose to encrypt with PGP (you need to >have a copy) instead of the Pmail crypto. It has a few small >drawbacks, IMHO, but I found it much easier to use than PGP >shell interfaces that require cutting text to the clipboard >first. It is very nice with one major drawback. It does not support conventional cryptography with PGP. This means that it is absolutly useless for use with nyms. (Which is one of my main uses for PGP in the first place.) Other than that... --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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Re: Snake Oil on the Water...
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:47 PM 6/16/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote: >Actually, it is much better than Eudora and has plug-ins for >encryption. The native encryption sucks, and the author warns >against it (it's there as a demo of the crypto API!). I found this part out later. My mistake for not checking the program docs. [snip] >Seems like the person who wrote that message doesn't know what he's >talking about. That is very true. He is clueless and unrepentantly so. His private e-mail to me indicates it in spades. (As well as being rude and insulting for even challenging his claims about the program.) >There's a difference between snake oil and a user who doesn't >understand a product. True. I was not aware that the author of the program had warned against using it as well. Evidently this guy did not read that part as well... --- |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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How to find out if the list is down? [ADMINISTRIVIA]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Subject: Is the list down? No (and the delay between your posting and my reply is just because I've been too busy to read it all.) In general, if the list isn't reaching you, it's occasionally because mail is stuck between toad.com and your machine, occasionally because the list is stuck, and occasionally because you've been dropped. If you send mail to majordomo(a)toad.com saying who cypherpunks it will send you a list of everyone on the list, possibly including you. (If it doesn't include you, then you know what's wrong.) If mail's working, it usually answers pretty fast. If mail's jammed, sometimes this kicks it off, and sometimes it stalls, just like a posting you sent to the entire 1200+ list members would (:-). And sometimes there's something more subtle going on, in which case you can send mail to cypherpunks-owner(a)toad.com and/or owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com. Of course, it could be that nobody's posted anything to the list in the last 24 hours, which probably means that Hugh's implemented the Signal-to-Noise-Improver Bot and nothing made it past the filters..... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Slander of Catholic Church
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:59 PM 6/11/96, attila wrote: > too strong, moroni --remember _our_ values; not those of a critic. > last night in FHE I covered the first mob in Jackson County where Bushop > Partridge turned the other cheek to make it easier after the first was > tarred by the mob. Thanks, Attila. I think Paul Penrod and the Archangel Moroni missed my main point. I was not singling out Mormonism for special criticism, just using it as an example of a "cult" or "religion" which is in many ways even more "outre" to many of us than Scientology is. Belief that a body rotting in the ground can be baptized into one's church is at least as odd as believing that Mankind is descended from the survivors of spaceships fleeing an evil overlord. My point, in using Catholicism as an example (interesting that only my brief lines on Mormon views were critiqued...Catholicism must indeed be nearly extinct on lists like ours), was that one's man's "criminal cult" is another man's "holy religion," and that the "net.war" declared by some on the Church of Scientology is little different than having a similar war against Catholics, Rosicrucians, Parsees, whatever. The Church of Scientology is no more a cult than is LDS or Catholicism....it is just much newer. Believing that clam consciousness suffuses our thoughts is no stranger than are the bizarre claims of most religions. Talk is of some belief systems being "cults" and others being "religions." When the Constitution speaks of "Congress shall make no law regarding the establishment of religion...," it is clear that this is not just for "recognized" and "established" religions. (Before the usual suspects jump in with quibbles, this does not mean that a religion may not be constrained in various ways. The laws against polygamy constrained the Mormons, the laws against certain drugs constrained certain Native American religions, etc. Constitutional law classes are the best forum to debate this.) I am no supporter of the CoS, nor of any religion. I find it hypocritical for folks bashing the "clams" and bombarding a.r.s with copyrighted CoS material to now be whining that the clams are "unfairly" using a.r.s. I also find it "unsurprising" that the CoS is taking steps to preserve what it thinks is its copyrighted, proprietary material. (I am not interested in debating the ins and outs of whether the NOTS material should or should not have been published, nor of whether some investigators went overboard in investigations of Grady Ward, etc. This stuff is boring ephemera to me, just another religious war.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Zimmerman/ViaCrypt?
by vin＠shore.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Edgar Swank noted: >There was a big discussion recently on alt.security.pgp about PRZ and >ViaCrypt. Apparently Phil now wants to produce his own commercial >version of PGP and has "requested" ViaCrypt to sell back the >commercial rights under threat of a lawsuit if they don't. > >Phil disagrees with ViaCrypts new "business" version of PGP which >apparently encrypts all messages with an employer-supplied public key >in addition to any specified by the employee. ViaCrypt has their side >of the argument on their web page. <http://www.viacrypt.com/> PRZ is becoming a businessman. Nothing wrong about that -- business is what makes the cars shine and the toilets flush. To me, however, it seems self-servingly pious to seek to reclaim previously sold rights on the grounds that a corporate customer should not have the right to set up an escrow key for company communications. There's another debate due about whether an employee should have the right to also -- on company time, over company nets, etc. -- use e-mail with a private (non-escrowed) encryption to secure personnal communications. I, predicably, think the employee should have such a right -- as part of the permissible and acceptable "personal space" allowed an employee. (Just as he/she should be allowed to make unmonitored personal phone calls, and go to the bathroom when the urge strikes.) Today, this level of privilege is probably an artifact of white collar or professional employment; not an employee's or citizen's right, but rather a perk associated with the independence granted a valued employee who expects and demands it. >The basis of the possible lawsuit would be that ViaCrypt violated >their agreement not to put any "back door" into any product with the >PGP name. Whether the "business version feature" could be defined as a >"back door" would be the crux of the argument. That's an argument that should be laughed out of court. And off the Net even sooner. (Although Phil is so much of a hero to most of us, for his own productive efforts and for having endured the DoJ's squeeze, he probably got an outrageously tolerant hearing on alt.security.pgp.) Steve Reid <root(a)edmweb.com> added: >>IMHO Phil Zimmerman has good reason to object to the mutant version, >>if >>it's going to cause the PGP name to somehow endorse escrow. Balderdash! There is nothing corrupt or nasty about escrow, per se -- the issue is who gets access to the escow key and under what conditions. If the legitimate owner of the protected information totally controls the escrow key, there is no issue. In business communications, key escow is just another dimension in backup. >>If there really is a demand for escrow, maybe cypherpunks could create a >>One Time Pad escrow service. Different custom 'keys' could be produced, >>depending on who's asking for the data... <G> There is a demand for escrow. For a while, seven or eight years ago, I collected tales of all the weak commercial crypto system which were then being busted. One of the most striking things was the number -- four or five commercial products that I recall, Lotus 1,2,3 being the most prominent -- which were cracked by legitimate administrators desperate to retrieve something encypted by an employee who had lost his/her key. Suerte, _Vin Vin McLellan +The Privacy Guild+ <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, Ma. 02150 USA Tel: (617) 884-5548 <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability? [NOISY RESPONSE]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> distributed to a minor who was using a nym. I think pressure on anonymous >> remailers is going to increase as various groups complain that the paw >> innocent widdle kiddies are "vulnerable to corruption"(or some bullshit like >> that) because their age can be hidden. Read the decision. The CDA _may_ be > >This is true. Yesterday evening I interviewed the director of >enforcement for a TLA here in DC. He expressed his concern about >anonymous remailers and anonymity online. (More on this later.) > >The word here in DC is "accountability." You can always attract government officials by offerering them other bureauspeakisms, like "plausible deniability" and "convenient leak mechanisms for 'reputable sources'". # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Does information want to be free?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I confess I was amused by how he described those Internet anarchists >> who delighted in publicizing books that should in fact be restricted. > I am amused (though I am not taking sides) by the general lack of >attention or rhetoric that "crypto-anarchists"/"cypherpunks"/whatever, >otherwise privacy respecting people, usually espouse. Many of us do care about those privacy issues - computers are very good at combining information from multiple sources, and crypto is about the only technology that lets you change the balance of power away from computerized centralization to individual-controlled decentralization. On the other hand, the phrase "books that should in fact be restricted" is viewed by many of us to be a synonym for "the empty set"; "books about government leaders which should be restricted" is an even emptier set, whether they're true, bogus, or some of each. In general, a Cypherpunk(tm) approach to protecting private information is not to advocate laws against distributing it, but to build tools to let you protect it while giving it to people that you _do_ want to have it; perhaps to use individual contracts to protect the information, but also to build tools to support contractual agreements and identify leaks. In some cases, boycotting organizations that violate privacy is a good idea (and building alternatives can support boycotts); flaming them for rudeness is another approach :-), and helping organizations understand the privacy implications of what they're doing and helping them use privacy-preserving methods instead of hanging an SSN on everything is another good cypherpunks activity. On the other hand, building anonymous publishing systems so people can blow the whistle on their government officials is a good thing, even though it may be used by people rude enough to pry into people's private lives. Also, while publishing one politician's cancer experience may be rude, publishing a recent American president's growing senility should have been done more aggressively, as should publishing the moral failures of his Vice president.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:53 PM 6/15/96 +1000, Zed wrote: > >Unlikely. The use of anonymous remailers was given as a reason for why it >was impossible to effectively determine if indecent material was being >distributed to a minor who was using a nym. I think pressure on anonymous >remailers is going to increase as various groups complain that the paw >innocent widdle kiddies are "vulnerable to corruption"(or some bullshit like >that) because their age can be hidden. Read the decision. The CDA _may_ be >declared constitutional if there was an effective and reliable way of >preventing minors from accessing "indecent" material - which anonymous >remailers make harder to do. However, even if remailers didn't exist, kiddies could still be unknowingly reached via mailing lists (anyone know who came up with the term "email exploder" that the Court used instead of "mailing list"?), freenet accounts, un- age verified accounts opened anywhere on earth, or borrowed accounts. The decision mentioned some of this. DCF

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UK users about to get clippered
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you live the UK, brace yourself for HMG's "Clipper" annoucement later this week. Look particularly carefully at the escrow agencies. - Remailereuters

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:53 PM 6/15/96 +1000, Zed wrote: >On another front, anonymous remailers were brought up in the latest hearing >of the Church of Scientology's court case against Dennis Erlich. Judge Whyte >expressed concern that trade secret status could be destroyed simply by >posting information through an anonymous remailer. Of course, trade secret status could also be destroyed by posting something straight without anonymity. And were one judgment proof one's exposure as the poster would be meaningless. Even a completely non-anonymous account may be hard to trace if you have a common name and the account is based somewhere far from home. If you open an account on a Dutch system using your (common) name, you might be hard to find. It's the ease of publication not the anonymity that makes the Net dangerous for trade secrets. DCF "If the most common given name on earth is Mohammed and the most common surname is Lee does that mean that the most common name is Mohammed Lee?"

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Re: pretty good reputation
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are some references to the material on reputations I mentioned before. ftp://prospero.isi.edu/pub/papers/security/insurance-cccs94.ps * Charlie Lai, Gennady Medvinsky, and B. Clifford Neuman. Endorsements, Licensing, and Insurance for Distributed System Services, In Proceedings of 2nd the ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security November 1994. This discusses some concepts related to extending trust relationships through a network. ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/policymaker.ps "Decentralized Trust Management" by Matt Blaze et al This suggests a formal way of specifying trust relationships among keys. In effect you have little programs that get activated by certain keys, or by certain signatures. It is a very flexible methodology which could be adapted to many ways of specifying trust relationships. http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/sdsi.ps (or .tex) "Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure" by Ron Rivest and Butler Lampson This is a key certificate structure which is somewhere between a hierarchical and a web of trust system, somewhat influenced by Blaze's ideas. It is pretty limited though in the kinds of trust delegation it allows. You can accept another person's signatures on specific keys but you can't mark him as a generally-accepted signer. However you can develop chains of signatures as in PGP and perhaps some extra mechanism could be used to decide when to trust them. Hal

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 17 Jun 96 6:46:17 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- replay remailer(a)replay.com ****+*+***+* 6:14 99.98% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #######**#+# 2:57 99.97% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org *##.-#+--#+# 50:08 99.96% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com -** **+*#*+# 6:21 99.90% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .-+++++++-+ 3:15:05 99.90% c2 remail(a)c2.org -++-++++-++ 1:07:45 99.89% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++++++++ 1:05:51 99.76% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi _______._ 60:16:03 99.64% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ##*### ##+# 2:46 99.49% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com +**#++*+* * 9:43 99.45% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +-++++++++++ 45:49 99.29% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *** *++***+* 5:07 99.23% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#* +--#*-*+ 23:51 99.18% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ------- --- 3:19:01 96.26% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---.-- ---- 6:23:54 94.00% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -....- .. 14:29:58 89.44% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +-++++++ 3:28:59 62.60% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ++***+- 37:51 49.39% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: PBS show
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Received: from toad.com [140.174.2.1] by alcor.process.com with SMTP-OpenVMS via TCP/IP; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 14:15 -0400 Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id JAA03979 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:36:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.pacifier.com (root(a)mail.pacifier.com [199.2.117.164]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id JAA03971 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:36:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ip9.van1.pacifier.com (ip9.van1.pacifier.com [206.163.4.9]) by mail.pacifier.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id JAA22527; Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:36:13 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <199606131636.JAA22527(a)mail.pacifier.com> X-Sender: jimbell(a)mail.pacifier.com X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Thu, 13 Jun 1996 09:35:16 -0800 To: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May), cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Subject: Re: PBS show Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Jim Bell wrote: >But the Apple II WAS a toy! Non-detached keyboard, poor placement of reset >key, upper-case only, 40-character wide display, odd microprocessor, VERY >SMALL capacity floppies (which were very slow as well), as well as a hostile >legal situation regarding the building of clones. Hell, they even objected >to other companies building boards which plugged into the bus! The reason for the 40 column screen was quite simple - many customers did not want to shell out a few hundred dollars for a monitor, and instead installed a cheap RF modulator and used an old TV for a screen. The resolution of a TV is inadequate for 80 coumn text (think about the smallest easily readable text you've seen on braodcast or cable). The Apple ][ did not include the RF modulator because it wasn't FCC certified with one - but every dealer also sold $20 modulators tailored for the machine. With the unshielded plastic case, I could wipe out any other TV within 30 feet - a significant distance for a NYC apartment dweller, which I was at the time. While it was not the first machine I programmed (the PDP-8e has that dubious honor, circa 1971), I learned a lot from my Apple ][. Among other feats, I added lower case support to Apple Kermit, and implemented Life in 6502 assembler using HIRES graphics. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Spy Tech
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Three feathers for spying technology: TST: "MI6 stole secrets from French navy." Top secret technology for tracking nuclear submarines has been stolen from a French naval base by MI6, Britain's foreign intelligence service, after a French civilian engineer was paid thousands of pounds to betray one of his country's most closely guarded secrets to an MI6 front company which posed as a technical defence consultancy and publishing house. TST: "High-flying gliders replace satellites." Solar powered gliders circling above cities could provide a cheap alternative to satellites for global communication systems, according to a group of American scientists. WaJo: "Israel Asks White House to Place Curbs On 3 U.S. Satellite-Surveillance Firms." The request is regarded as "very sensitive," according to one U.S. official, because Israeli officials say it relates to their national security concerns. However, officials of the affected U.S. companies charge it amounts to unfair competition because an Israeli company is about to enter the space surveillance business and it wouldn't face similar restrictions. http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/tekspy.txt (18 kb) Spy surf: http://www.anonymizer.com Or, TEK_spy

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The Ultima Spy Book
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Ultimate Spy Book by H. Keith Melton (Dorling Kindersley, London) DK Publishing, New York First American edition, 1996. $29.95. ISBN 0-7894-0443-5 Over 600 illustrations of the tools and tricks of spycraft for killing, betraying, deceiving, surveilling, encrypting, decrypting, communicating, burgling, recruitment and training, fucking up and rotting in jail, and flacking spy fluff until tip-canoe-ed. --------- Eye pix of cipher devices: Kryha, Bolton, Hebern, M-94: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/cd1.jpg Hagelin's M-209 and CD-57: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/cd2.jpg Enigma: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/enigma1.jpg Enigma innards and Geheimschreiber: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/enigma2.jpg Purple: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/purple.jpg ---------- CYA: http://www.anonymizer.com

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No Subject
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:14 PM 6/16/96 -0500, "John A. Perry" wrote: :-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- :Version: 2.6.2 : :hIwDSReYoIbc3PkBA/9xblBrrofx89t5QoJVwCyGB/+futdCXEolwcsQdwWGcDtc :7Vn7orCB8v6iQO+sCgAlYf38ftUxGmzebDd/7eWodTGx8XKnzBIZ9E6bRS38XLRa :XDaipoiNRDi7gX2DA5ADtshTLtUiCjaYurGxGEla2iIMrEacGEyyekdZpUYT1KYA :AAJ17fM4D2X8vpKTtWLr/6REeQvxPU80FpWKa/q1b6wMZ43oG9ZolMONj65hWqX0 :mhY+wp/vUsvQ21P/9VzYF0sy9JIAr45VhoDZBBCG0UW23WoOInXko2Kl2UeZmrut :xR/nZm1sMzU+XYr7QG17aOfeezRs/frYEpvuAbrWYNELlPH72OBJ368nSkesiTo+ :gELda7vNsD12UTEl7gRAo3WizCY2zsQySLOShEiAX7f5vYco8A6pEwJ4XYs4pGn6 :xV4JNUeMjBKGtVkGoZJln3x7W1brgGmRNQbY/dcmCkExOOp+4myRVu0/ufH7n5TO :FWqrb+nqyjgnirqS9DwoqB5JsHiMWU/dJBaCtXH4i1p//oeE9FE82nE2vAOZGMvn :D+MRnheCVRi2TWnwe44PnB+L5z7+J+YJyulGM3bvXhZukjGCAj+EMmWxqkSgc2NS :/xh6efgZNACmQIqxLdsw6TLbh9p+yMaxtaCZU9Bs9jw8dN+7FBZxgFG/hrrI1uh3 :oFahFMDXXAUMUs7lFOcxjAWTRRZKKSOG2mg5M5mr8VbY+5BQdcJJeY+jSCnDinUC :wGFfEWlZMV7sdKhzA0YkHJYBgAPtmTaxrHQidPce46FbIeYVRsUOSEtvttYpMjIz :mCVc5ywueUXbUe5UW3KrlV8uxKH3fEIEZ9Pxf3M9XR/aFXysccnzNzbe87XN8PDk :mxzsRzmoD0CgCSAGfNrTdWl8bFQGnEaweMPnSIFzbSJkRcO0oiBU4/dhEFYiPgx5 :UD2r0uFNjKPt4KFBbFJLi0mrMuOCaxjhva7i70GQ95b4qVsyOZLN5KYSUnSDxDX4 :HFUIrEI/rsw= :=BesD :-----END PGP MESSAGE----- : My Cypherpunk's New Member's Package did not contain the key to decypher this obviously witty and succinct message; I would appreciate an individual with full membership to pgp this and post it for the benefit of others. Anyone with key id 86DCDCF9 come on down! Thanks.

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Damn, that snake oil is tasty! [was Re: SafE Mail Corporation]
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > We would like someone to be able or should I say try and crack our > encryption. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. > Mmmm... flamebait. > > Our Web site is http://www.sfmc.com Phone number is 1-800-252-9938. > The highlights: > >Because we believe our encryption algorithm for SafE Mail >is so strong and unbreakable, we will offer five free copies >of SafE Mail or cash equivalent, to anyone capable of cracking >a SafE Mail encrypted file. Uh, okay... but, uh, if we break the encryption, doesn't that make the package damn near useless? Also, they charge $40 (!!) shipping and handling for their free demo. ----- David Smith, Thinker Of Deep Thoughts :) http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith/library.html

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Re: UK users about to get clippered
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:03 PM 6/17/96 +0200, Anonymous wrote: >If you live the UK, brace yourself for HMG's "Clipper" annoucement >later this week. Look particularly carefully at the escrow agencies. >- Remailereuters And it should go over even less well than American Clipper. When that was proposed, in April of 1993, there was no standard encryption chip nor the immediate prospect of one. Someone might, at least arguably, have been attracted to Clipper with the argument that it's better than no encryption at all. However, now that the NTT chip has been revealed, nobody is going to be under the illusion that it's "Clipper or nothing." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>(anyone know who came up with the term "email >exploder" that the Court used instead of "mailing list"?) Brendan P Kehoe's "Zen and the Art of the Internet" (1993) discussing mailing lists says (p11), "Any mail sent to that address will "explode" out to each person named in a file maintained on a computer at ..." I have seen it used elsewhere as well. Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: alpha.c2.org in deep shit?
by sdudar＠solutions.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Huh? At 06:14 PM 6/16/96 -0500, you wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- >Version: 2.6.2 > >hIwDSReYoIbc3PkBA/9xblBrrofx89t5QoJVwCyGB/+futdCXEolwcsQdwWGcDtc >7Vn7orCB8v6iQO+sCgAlYf38ftUxGmzebDd/7eWodTGx8XKnzBIZ9E6bRS38XLRa >XDaipoiNRDi7gX2DA5ADtshTLtUiCjaYurGxGEla2iIMrEacGEyyekdZpUYT1KYA >AAJ17fM4D2X8vpKTtWLr/6REeQvxPU80FpWKa/q1b6wMZ43oG9ZolMONj65hWqX0 >mhY+wp/vUsvQ21P/9VzYF0sy9JIAr45VhoDZBBCG0UW23WoOInXko2Kl2UeZmrut >xR/nZm1sMzU+XYr7QG17aOfeezRs/frYEpvuAbrWYNELlPH72OBJ368nSkesiTo+ >gELda7vNsD12UTEl7gRAo3WizCY2zsQySLOShEiAX7f5vYco8A6pEwJ4XYs4pGn6 >xV4JNUeMjBKGtVkGoZJln3x7W1brgGmRNQbY/dcmCkExOOp+4myRVu0/ufH7n5TO >FWqrb+nqyjgnirqS9DwoqB5JsHiMWU/dJBaCtXH4i1p//oeE9FE82nE2vAOZGMvn >D+MRnheCVRi2TWnwe44PnB+L5z7+J+YJyulGM3bvXhZukjGCAj+EMmWxqkSgc2NS >/xh6efgZNACmQIqxLdsw6TLbh9p+yMaxtaCZU9Bs9jw8dN+7FBZxgFG/hrrI1uh3 >oFahFMDXXAUMUs7lFOcxjAWTRRZKKSOG2mg5M5mr8VbY+5BQdcJJeY+jSCnDinUC >wGFfEWlZMV7sdKhzA0YkHJYBgAPtmTaxrHQidPce46FbIeYVRsUOSEtvttYpMjIz >mCVc5ywueUXbUe5UW3KrlV8uxKH3fEIEZ9Pxf3M9XR/aFXysccnzNzbe87XN8PDk >mxzsRzmoD0CgCSAGfNrTdWl8bFQGnEaweMPnSIFzbSJkRcO0oiBU4/dhEFYiPgx5 >UD2r0uFNjKPt4KFBbFJLi0mrMuOCaxjhva7i70GQ95b4qVsyOZLN5KYSUnSDxDX4 >HFUIrEI/rsw= >=BesD >-----END PGP MESSAGE----- > >

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