December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Netscape Mail Security and PGP Plugins
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>However as has been mentioned here a PGP/MIME mail type could >theoretically be used to activate a handler for that incoming mail. I >don't know exactly how this would work. Glancing at the netscape plug >docs near <URL: >http://home.netscape.com/eng/mozilla/2.0/handbook/plugins/ > it appears >that plugins are activated on HTML page downloads, not (necessarily) on >mail receipt. So unless you typically find your incoming mail on a web >page, it doesn't look like this will work. I will ask about it on >coderpunks for clarification. Netscape 2 seems to support HTML in email files. Has anyone tested it with a plugin?

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Re: Fuseable Links - no guarantees??
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:44 AM 6/15/96, Warren wrote: >I have never paid much attention to the protection of firmware or the >technical issues revolving around such schemes...was wondering: > >I recently saw an add for a UK based group that says they can take a PIC >OTP micro and read the prom (for a fee, of course) - How the heck is this >done?? I have my suspicion that they (somehow) magically peel off the >ceramic coating (without destroying the chewy center), get a circuit mask >and 'micro probe' the I/O of the IC...they then download the secret recipe >to the afore mentioned 'chewy center'. > >Is this close to accurate?? How is it 'done' ??? I don't know of any modern chips that have "ceramic coatings." (Some chips, esp. CPUs, are still ceramic-packaged, but in these cases the metal or ceramic lids are easily removed.) Most chips are plastic-packaged, and plasma ashers and/or chemical baths will expose the chip surface easily enough. Once exposed, various methods exist to read internal voltage levels. For example, electron beams in a scanning electron microscope (SEM) can fairly easily read at least surface potentials. Whether a SEM in voltage-contrast mode can read voltages on lower levels depends on a lot of things, and I can't even make a guess here as to whether OTP (one-time programmable) memories from particular vendors can have internal nodes probed. With enough money, many things are possible. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What the heck: I'm bored tonight... Well, not that bored. Don't need another 'tear snake-oil to bits or is this a damned troll' thread. Why does "M. Wagoner" sound familiar? On 17 Jun 96 at 17:21, "M.Wagoner" (safemail(a)ntrnet.net) wrote: > We would like someone to be able or should I say try and crack our > encryption. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. > > Our Web site is http://www.sfmc.com Phone number is 1-800-252-9938. > > Randy Estridge > SafE Mail Corporation Uh oh. I checked the page. Claimed Public Key, Sigs, Error Correction, Compression, lots of nice stuff. They kind of got the vocabulary down. Only in a fuzzy way. Hypes "INTERNET Compatible" is if that means anything, a "22 character public key" (no, it's not a type. twenty-two character public key, in several places said that), proprietary algorithm, etc. etc. Yawn, Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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pretty bad idea (was Re: pretty good reputation)
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 16 Jun 96 at 12:32, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: [..] > > That's the point, though. PGP *does not* try to model a reputation > > system. When you sign keys, you only attest that you are sure that > > that key belongs to the person whose name is on it. A signature says > > *nothing* about a person's reputation. [..] > in that case if alice receives a key signed by bob, she would know > the key is good. Pretty-good, yes. (Assuming she trusts anything signed by Bob.) > ... and there is no need for the two other fields. > infact the reason why i felt pgp is trying to model a reputation system > if because of these two fields that carry trust values. Those are private/personal trust values only. Alice rates Bob on how well she'd trust a key signed by Bob. This is subjective for Alice, based on her relationship with Bob. She may not know him well and assign him a low rating. Or she may know him all too well, and give him a low rating. This has no meaning for Carol, or Don, or anyone else, since they have different (if any at all) relationships with Bob. > > You can't set up a global web of trust. It's computationally > > infeasable, esp. with contradictions, to resolve. It's also > > meaningless. Say Alice trusts Bob. Bob trusts Carol. Carol trusts > > Don. Should Alice trust Don? No... subjective factors like "trust" > > don't commute. > > this is precisely what i wanted to know. can there be a model wherein one > can compute a trust-like parameter? if yes in what ways should this parameter No, at least not one with meaning. There are many factors that would go into one's rating of another: how well one knows the other; part history; bias for or against another because of thing like race, religion, political viewpoint, favorite OS, skills/talent or lack thereof, etc. People's ratings of each other change as well... just imagine global ratings of a once overly well-liked famous person who after several years is now infamous (or an infamous person who is now forgiven). And again, social pressure to give someone a certain rating... [..] > lets say a reputation system involves alice, bob, carol and don. Computing > trust parameter with respect to each other can lead to situtions where > alice trusts bob x% and has y% proof that he is a liar, after considering > all other relations. If this x% > y% she'll believe him, if not she won't. Generally x+y=1 in this scheme. But lets say for a moment they are separate: x = trust level; y = mixtrust level, independent of x... that makes little sense, since if y>.5, then Bob isn't trustworthy, but why is x > y? x and y would always have to be adjusted for each other... (so it's better off to use something like x+y=1). > thats why i feel the liar paradox doesn't really pose much of a > threat. But even then, For Alice, x(Bob) > y(Bob), so Bob is trustworthy. For Bob though, x(Alice) < y(Alice). So what of Carol? She does not yet know Alice and Bob, and sees their ratings about each other [Note: some people would assign ratings based on others; others would assign ratings based on personal experience... another problem with a global rating scheme]. Carol asks Alice about Bob, who says he's trustworthy. She asks Bob about Alice, who says Alice is untrustworthy. If Alice is correct, then according to Bob she's not worth listening to, but then why listen to Bob. If Bob is correct, Alice isn't worth listening to, but then again, maybe Bob isn't since she says Bob is... so why should Carol bother with any of them. Ok, in real life it's possible to meet two people, one of him is a liar but not so much as to admit another is more truthful... and that truthful person agrees. It's actually quite common... but how does a third person who doesn't know any of them figure it out? How does a computer program using a formula? But given a system with several variables (ie, several people rating each other) you'll have something that's even harder to resolve. Given a global system with thousands or millions of variables... how does one make sense of all those ratings about a particular aspect of one person? [..] > There will be inconsistency only if trust/untrust values are absolute. > that is you either trust someone or you don't. i am talking of a system > wherein trust values lie between 0..1 which are derived from a set of Oh no. There's also a lot of inconsistency there too. Doesn't matter if you use boolean or fuzzy values. > tags. in that case bob alice trusts bob x% bob trusts carol y% and carol > trusts alice z%. if z < x, z < y simply implies alice trusts bob, bob trusts > carol more than carol trusts alice. so the system will be relative rather than You're ignoring how much Alice trusts Bob, how much Carol trusts Bob and how much Alice trusts Carol. > absolute. a person who is trusted by more people will carry greater > weight Why should that person carry more weight? (more weight than who else?) What if all the people who trust that person are idiots? Why should I, or you, or anyone else care about somebody more or less because "x number of people trust so-and-so"? > and people trusted by him will carry higher weight too. this way snoopy There's another flaw. And what if those people trust him? Exponentially increasing trust? > who is not trusted by many people will automatically have a weak relationship > with others. Not many people know Snoopy, so he has no trust level. Nobody wants to get to know Snoopy just because he has no trust level. He's locked out. Bad idea. > > There's the other point that someone else on the list (Perry?) brought up: > > if people publicly rate each other, there may be social/political > > pressure to give some people lower or higher ratings. > > again these ratings will be decided in a web rather that on one-to-one basis. > that way the social/political pressure can be reduced though not completely > eliminated. No. Individuals put their ratings in the web to skew or confuse things. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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THIS IS SORT OF ... CRYPTIC
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, I'm not sure what this item is about. Anybody know? S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 17 Jun 1996 14:31:16 -0700 (PDT) From: CHINANET Moderator <cnm(a)SDSC.EDU> To: chinanet-tech(a)sdsc.edu Subject: CINET-L Newsletter, Issue No. 69 (CN96-012), June 16, 1996 Optic Fiber Automatic Surveillance Network Ready in Three Years The construction of the national optic fiber automatic surveillance network has been going on smoothly. The three surveillance stations located from Beijing to Tianjin are operating normally. It was estimated that the construction of another 23 surveillance stations will be completed by July. People concerned also estimate that the construction of the national optic fiber automatic surveillance network, installed with 500 surveillance stations, will be completed within three years. (Info(a)AsiaInfo.Com, June 5, 1996) ____ ____ ____

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[Noise] Re: Java
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca writes: > [...](One thing that detractors of > Smalltalk claim is that it is slow--slower than Java. However there is a > research dialect from Sun called Self which is supposed to be 50% as fast > as C.) Self also give a new meaning to phrase "code bloat." A 'Hello, world!' that requires more than a megabyte kind of kills any enthusiasm one might or a language which otherwise takes a neat slant message passing... [Although I gave up before version 4.0 so maybe things have gotten better] jim

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Re: "Termination"?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:54 PM 6/17/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: > > >On Sat, 8 Jun 1996 ichudov(a)algebra.com wrote: > >> Since corrupt officials are likely to have more anonymous cash that >> phreedom phighters, guess who will win. Remember, Chudov was wrong about this. It's not just the amount of money you have, it's whether you can identify people as your "enemies." >> Also, think about this: lots of people have someone they'd like >> to assassinate but do not actually do it because of lack of anonymity >> and associated hassles (like dealing with assassins non-anonymously, >> abundance of traces, possible confession of the assassin and so on). >> With your assassination clearinghouse these hassles go away. I think it >> would present an excellent prospect for reducing the population. > >I could see an easy possibility for sting operations with the added >feature that you can have assassinated all the supected assassins (ie anybody >that may have come near whatever surveillance there may have been). >Why bother with courts and trials? > >I still think assassination politics is self-terminating. It would probably be more accurate to say that it is "self-limiting." There's a difference, you know. There may never be a "last" AP death. However, AP deaths may (and probably will) eventually become comparatively rare, precisely because they so straightforwardly obtained if there is a justification for them. That will cause the behavior of people to change, to avoid doing anything which draws the ire of somebody else. Think back to integral calculus, where the area under an infinitely long curve may be finite. If we think of X as being time, and the rate of deaths as the height of the curve above Y=0, the total number of deaths is reflected in the area. Some death rate schedules will integrate to a finite, limited number of deaths. Even if reality doesn't quite approach this optimum situation, it MAY approach a much better reality where the eventual rate of deaths is far lower than the status quo. However, the system will only self-limit to the extent that overt agression among people will be eliminated. If nobody agresses against you, you will have no reason to agress against anyone else. Therefore, the system cannot end in a dictatorship. >> Maybe *that* will help the whales and trees, because of the effect on demand. > >Don't you mean supply? Stores and physical companies are easier to target >than consumers. But the only remaining environmentalists or for that >matter any other people with strong views will be net-based pseudonyms. >Usenet flamewars, editorials and talk shows just don't seem dying for, imho. It is true that there may be a strong deterrent against "people with strong views." However, as I pointed out to the head of a 'Net freedom organization (who was worried about his future!), the only reason our society NEEDS figurehead people such as him is to change unpopular policies that are forced on the rest of us. Once AP begins operating, you don't have to stick your neck out to deter agression against you, and you don't need heads of organizations such as him, or for that matter organizations either. Quite simply, why do you need the head of the ACLU, or for that matter the ACLU as an organization, if you can target anybody who violates the rights that the ACLU currently protects? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:21 PM 6/17/96 -0400, you wrote: >We would like someone to be able or should I say try and crack our >encryption. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. > >Our Web site is http://www.sfmc.com Phone number is 1-800-252-9938. > >Randy Estridge >SafE Mail Corporation Well, when I read this letter, I was sure it was a troll. I was amazed to find that not only are these people serious, but they're convicing other people to buy into this nonsense! Almost every page on their web site contains factual errors that range from misleading to incorrect to slander. Here's a gem from the comparison page: http://www.sfmc.com/comp.html Security of different programs | Public | Compres.| Error | ITERNET Program | Key | | Correct.| Compatib. --------------+---------+---------+---------+---------- SafE Mail(TM) | YES | YES | YES | YES PGP | YES | NO | NO | NO PEM | YES | NO | NO | Yes --------------+---------+---------+---------+---------- [ So, how many of you were surprised to learn that PGP is not Internet compatible, and doesn't do compression? I'm sure Mr. Zimmerman will be quite amazed! ] -- >From their FAQ: http://www.sfmc.com/faqu.html * SafE Mail utilizes a short 22 character Public Key which I realize is "great" for key exchange. Does this short Public Key the encription code vulnerable to attack? No! The Public Key is generated by a "One Way Hash Function" when the owner of the software names a private key or passwords. This makes the encryption code secure and not vulnerable to attack by unautorized individuals. * Is SafE Mail software a solution to concerns about under age or general viewing of obscene material on the INTERNET? Yes! Remember SafE Mail will encrypt virtually any type of computer generated files including pictures, video and audio. * How can SafE Mail be used for exchanging sensitive or obscene materials over the INTERNET? Image provider and Subscriber should both utilize SafE Mail software. Upon exchange of Public Keys by both parties, Image provider can transmit encrypted files that can be decrypted by Subscriber with his public and private keys. Files encrypted with SafE Mail will be a strong barrier to any unauthorized viewing. [So, remember, the next time you wish to break the law by transmitting obscene images (which have been shown in court already to be illegal), use SafE Mail.] -- More from the comparisons page: http://www.sfmc.com/comp.html SafE Mail and RSA® algorithms comparison table | SafE Mail(TM) | RSA (RC4+MD5) -------------------+-----------------------------+-------------------- Programm | SafE Mail(TM) for Win 1.12 | Entrust 1.1r1 | SafE Mail(TM) for DOS 1.12 | | | Performance Speed | ~4400kB/Sec (In addition to | ~770kB/Sec (Only (Results based on | Encryption also performs | does Encryption) 33mHz SunSparcs | Compression, Error | Station) | Correction, Internet | | Compatibility and Electronic| | Signature at the same time).| | | Compression | Yes, up to 85% | No, increases | | file size by up | | to 40% | | Internet | Yes | No Compatibility | | | | Electronic | Yes | Yes Signature | | | | Public Key | Yes | Yes Distribution | | | | Length of Public | 22 characters only | Over 1200 characters Key | | can distribute on the | | diskettes only | | Integrity Checking| Yes | Yes | | Error Correction | 9 different levels, selected| None Available | by user. | | | Best Attack | No known way | Statistical | | Analysis | | [ Where to begin? I wonder if it's their DOS or Windows version that runs on the 33MHz SparcStation? Oh, and I love the "no known way" to attack them. ] -- What are the trade magazines saying about SafE Mail? Well, this is from that traditional bastion of reporting integrity, the Carolina Computer News, June 1995: http://www.sfmc.com/scop02.html " ...SafE Mail is designed to be a powerfull business and personal communications tool, ideal for public or private network communications. SafE Mail provides the least expensive, fastest, INTERNET compatible, secure file transmission on the ma rket today. SafE Mail has a unique encryption algorithm. It's encryption key is longer than any other similar product currently available on the market today. The user can define the distortion/error correction level which determines the length of the encryption key. The longer the key length, the more difficult it is to break. SafE Mail employs the Public Key Distribution algorithm. Unlike currently available encryption algorithms (DES,RSA), SafE Mail generates a unique 22 character public key for each user. Des has no public key generator and the RSA Public Key becomes larger (up to several kilobytes) as the number of recipients increase. SafE Mail error correction is capable of restoring a binary file having 15% distortion errors or an ASCII file with 30% errors. SafE Mail excellent compression capability allows an ASCII file to be deflated by almost 85%!... " [ If you read the quotes from the various magazines, you probably won't be surprised at the list of quality magazine names that have been taken in by these hucksters: Byte, PC Week, PC Today, and others. ] -- However, it gets even better than this. The capstone (if you'll pardon the pun) of these folks is their contest, described at http://www.sfmc.com/cont.html If you can break their security, you'll win FIVE FREE COPIES of SafE Mail! Gosh, how can we pass up such an opportunity? -j, ROTFLOL :-) -- J. Deters >From Senator C. Burns' Pro-CODE bill, which I support and you can find at: http://www.senate.gov/member/mt/burns/general/billtext.htm " (2) Miniaturization, disturbed computing, and reduced transmission costs make communication via electronic networks a reality." +---------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'33"N by 93^16'42"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +---------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 17:21 6/17/96, M.Wagoner (1 wrote: >We would like someone to be able or should I say try and crack our >encryption. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. Sigh. Yet another one... Unless you make source code available, you will be at best ignored, and at worst sued by users of your product should they discover that your unbreakable encryption isn't so unbreakable after all. Unless you use a hardware RNG and OTPs, your statement that it is impossible to break your encryption software is simply false. Do not expect that individuals who do have clue are going to waste their time on trying to break an encryption scheme invented by someone that so obviously doesn't know what he is doing. Go back to bed. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Disclaimer: My opinions are my own.

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Re: "Termination"?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:54 PM 6/17/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: > > >On Sat, 8 Jun 1996 ichudov(a)algebra.com wrote: > >> Since corrupt officials are likely to have more anonymous cash that >> phreedom phighters, guess who will win. Remember, Chudov was wrong about this. It's not just the amount of money you have, it's whether you can identify people as your "enemies." >> Also, think about this: lots of people have someone they'd like >> to assassinate but do not actually do it because of lack of anonymity >> and associated hassles (like dealing with assassins non-anonymously, >> abundance of traces, possible confession of the assassin and so on). >> With your assassination clearinghouse these hassles go away. I think it >> would present an excellent prospect for reducing the population. > >I could see an easy possibility for sting operations with the added >feature that you can have assassinated all the supected assassins (ie anybody >that may have come near whatever surveillance there may have been). >Why bother with courts and trials? > >I still think assassination politics is self-terminating. It would probably be more accurate to say that it is "self-limiting." There's a difference, you know. There may never be a "last" AP death. However, AP deaths may (and probably will) eventually become comparatively rare, precisely because they so straightforwardly obtained if there is a justification for them. That will cause the behavior of people to change, to avoid doing anything which draws the ire of somebody else. Think back to integral calculus, where the area under an infinitely long curve may be finite. If we think of X as being time, and the rate of deaths as the height of the curve above Y=0, the total number of deaths is reflected in the area. Some death rate schedules will integrate to a finite, limited number of deaths. Even if reality doesn't quite approach this optimum situation, it MAY approach a much better reality where the eventual rate of deaths is far lower than the status quo. However, the system will only self-limit to the extent that overt agression among people will be eliminated. If nobody agresses against you, you will have no reason to agress against anyone else. Therefore, the system cannot end in a dictatorship. >> Maybe *that* will help the whales and trees, because of the effect on demand. > >Don't you mean supply? Stores and physical companies are easier to target >than consumers. But the only remaining environmentalists or for that >matter any other people with strong views will be net-based pseudonyms. >Usenet flamewars, editorials and talk shows just don't seem dying for, imho. It is true that there may be a strong deterrent against "people with strong views." However, as I pointed out to the head of a 'Net freedom organization (who was worried about his future!), the only reason our society NEEDS figurehead people such as him is to change unpopular policies that are forced on the rest of us. Once AP begins operating, you don't have to stick your neck out to deter agression against you, and you don't need heads of organizations such as him, or for that matter organizations either. Quite simply, why do you need the head of the ACLU, or for that matter the ACLU as an organization, if you can target anybody who violates the rights that the ACLU currently protects? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Britain to control crypto - official (fwd from Usenet)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:38 PM 6/17/96 -0400, Simon Spero wrote: >4) Will LEAs be permitted to impersonate a non-consenting third party >for the purposes of allowing a conversation to be intercepted? >(blatant violation of the 4th ammendme... oh shit- never mind). You may recall discussions on CP many months ago concerning the extent to which an Internet provider would be obligated to obey a cop with a warrant who asks for (for example) a "data wiretap" of a customer. I happen to believe that one of the things that's going to have to be settled, and settled soon, is a ban on governments coercing people (ISP's, etc) to violate their contracts with others. If my ISP enters into a contract with me to (among other things) tell me if my data is tapped, OR he agrees to send me a certification of non-tap status daily as long as it's valid and cease sending them when tapping starts, etc, presumably if he fulfils his part of the agreement I will soon learn of a tap. One of the things that was particularly important to the Founding Fathers was what they referred to as "Impairment of Contracts," which meant as I recall the act of government passing laws and rules which affect my ability to contract with you. Not surprisingly, they didn't like that, such restrictions. If their desires were respected, presumably there would be no way for the government to come between two contractors to get one to betray the other. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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"Mail Exploders"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:23 PM 6/17/96, Lucky Green wrote: >At 9:45 6/17/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >>At 08:43 AM 6/17/96 -0400, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >> >>>I believe we used the term "email exploder" instead of "mailing list," >>>particularly in cross-examination and closing arguments, to convey the >>>idea that such a device is often used for conversation, not just one-way >>>communication. >> >>Was this term invented during the hearings or has anyone heard of it before? > >I have heard of it before. I believe "mail exploder" is a rather old term. I haven't heard the term in many a year, but it fits with the "Internet = explosives instructions" slant in popular opinion. "Those nerds are getting their revenge by developing "mail exploders" and spreading mayhem across the Net." I wonder where they got their technical information? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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David Kahn's "The Codebreakers", a new version. (question)
by Michael Pak 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi there. I have noticed while browsing through http://www.amazon.com that in December 1996 a new version of "The Codebreakers" will be published. The complete title says: "The Codebreakers : The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet" Does anyone know if it will also include the complete 1967 edition, or just the abridged 1973 one? I have managed to locate one copy of the 1967 edition in our central library and found that there is quite a lot of information that I fear the writer might want to ommit in this new edition. Does anyone have any more info about it? Thanks a lot, Michael Pak Tel-Aviv Israel.

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Re: "Mail Exploders"
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Nerd AOL using explosive mail, this Cyberia-L pointer: http://infolawalert.com/stories/061496a.html [Excerpts] Cyber Promotions sends a collection of short ads, written as if they were newspaper classifieds, to upward of 900,000 recipients, 600,000 of whom are America OnLine subscribers. America OnLine contends that its computer systems have been swamped by Cyber Promotion's mass mailings, especially when 5,000 undeliverable messages start to pile up each day. ... When the mailings continued, an AOL employee collected a bunch of Cyber Promotions's undeliverable messages and redirected them to UUNET, a large Internet service provider used by Cyber Promotions. According to Cyber Promotions' complaint, this "stunt, known as an 'e-mail bomb,' was knowingly and maliciously sent to UUNET by AOL in order to severely tie up and/or bring down UUNET's computer system." UUNET subsequently cancelled Cyber Promotion's account. According to Cyber Promotions' complaint, AOL bombed another service provider used by Cyber Promotions. ...

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test
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In approximately 2 weeks the export controls on strong cryptography will be lifted. Not sure about escrow provisions. You heard it here first.

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Snake_Oil_punks was Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by Scott Schryvers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Talked with Randy of Safe Mail Corporation on the phone. Among the stuff he claimed was that PGP has the secret key in its public key! Found out that not only does this algorithm use 22 characters. The characters are the ones only found on the keyboard. SafeMail uses a proprietary Russian algorithm. Not only is this company misquoting it's making up as it goes along. :)

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Federal key registration agency
by tmpeters＠calvanet.calvacom.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Compuserve Online Today Daily Edition, 15 June 1996: Attorney General Janet Reno is advancing a plan to establish a new agency overseeing all digital encryption, saying that would make it tougher for criminals and terrorists to use the Internet to carry out crimes. Speaking to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco, Reno said her plan would require people to register with the new agency the secret codes -- or "keys" -- they use to encrypt messages online. Reporting on this speech, Sandra Ann Harris of United Press International adds, "Federal authorities could then obtain the information they need to decipher the encryptions using a court order and secretly monitor electronic communication on the Internet the same way wiretaps are used to monitor telephone conversations of suspected criminals." Reno added, "We look only to make existing law apply to new technology," adding new computer programs designed to crack the new complicated encryptions take too long to be useful to law enforcement. "Some of our most important prosecutions have depended on wire taps." She also said registration of keys might end up being a worldwide requirement, since the Internet is used increasingly for international communication, commerce, and criminal enterprise. Reno told the group that effectively regulting electronic encryption will depend on fiding a blance between protecting privacy interests while stopping criminals from cashing in on the new technology. "If we do our job right citizens will enjoy the Information Age without being victimized" by high technology, Reno said. United Press International Charles Bowen

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Whats new at Bletchley Park
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings; I have just returned from spending a week at Bletchley Park, and have the following to report: On Thursday, 6 June, we had the official switch-on of the rebuilt Colossus. There is still a lot of work to be done on Colossus, but that which is there is definitely working. What remains is to fill in the holes to expand it to the full five wide system that was the Mark-II machine. The switch-on was accompanied by a reasonable sized media affair with many of the original Colossus users present. Also in attendance was Tommy Flowers, the designer of the original, along with his wife and son. It was the first time that his wife had seen or even heard a lot about Colossus. Dr. Flowers, now in his nineties, has a wonderful memory and is a first class gentleman. It was a real pleasure to spend some time with him. There was a lot of local media coverage, but as yet I have seen nothing in international media, such as The (London) Times or the Financial Times, both of whom were represented at the switch-on. During this time, I also installed a new Sun Netra-I server at BP. This server was most kindly donated by Sun Micro Systems. Many thanks to Scott, who set the direction for this gift, and to Matthew, Michael and Steven at Sun-UK for all their efforts in making this happen. A four GByte disk farm was also donated by BoxHill Systems. Thanks to Carol, Ben, Philip, etal at BoxHill for this contribution. This server will provide Internet and WWW access to BP and will serve as the BP mailhost. Once we have the communications facilities in place, the server, elgar, will be on-line. I'll keep the net informed re: our progress in that direction. Once on-line, Tony Sale has a lot of very cool ideas for web pages, including an interactive, GUI-based Enigma emulation. Tony and James Bristow also plan to move their existing Web pages to elgar. The plans to make BP into a one-of-a-kind museum are well underway. Many improvements and added facilities have been added since I was there in April, including a nice bar and restaurant in the original Hut Four. Again I will keep the net up-to-date until the Web server is generally available. I strongly urge everyone who has the opportunity to visit BP to do so. At this point they are open every other weekend, but will, at some point in the future, improve on that. If you have any questions, e-mail me, or for 'open weekend status' call BP directly at: (011 44) 1 908 640404. Many thanks to my friends and colleagues at Bletchley Park; Roger, Peter, Tony, Harry, Margaret, etc, for their hospitality and kindness. -paul (pjb(a)23kgroup.com)

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Re: Fuseable Links - no guarantees??
by wxfield＠shore.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I don't know of any modern chips that have "ceramic coatings." (Some chips, >esp. CPUs, are still ceramic-packaged, but in these cases the metal or >ceramic lids are easily removed.) > >Most chips are plastic-packaged, and plasma ashers and/or chemical baths >will expose the chip surface easily enough. Yep....I guess my age was showing ;-) _______ Warren Crossfield Programmer/MacOS "Buy a Pentium - so you can restart Windoze faster!"

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Time (of CyberPorn fame) puts up a nice CDA page; commentary from PED
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Netly-L is the mailing list that goes with www.netlynews.com. The traffic is quite low, and occasionally something entertaining comes by. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 05:58:20 -0400 From: Philip Elmer-DeWitt <ped(a)well.com> Reply-To: netly-l(a)pathfinder.com To: Multiple recipients of list <netly-l(a)relay.pathfinder.com> Subject: Re: So... Chris, a couple of omissions in your very good techwatch CDA extravaganza (http://pathfinder.com/technology/netdecency/) 1) the screening software sidebar in this week's TIME (preferably with live pointers) 2) John Perry Barlow's TIME essay from late 1995 (search TIME for "this bill is full of shit") I could argue the omission of the "cyberporn" cover round or flat. Philip Elmer-DeWitt ped(a)well.com TIME Magazine ped(a)cis.compuserve.com philiped(a)aol.com

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unsuscribe
by Pascal Mattiocco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsuscribe

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Re: Pickle Angels?!? (Humour)(Noise)
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 17 Jun 96 at 19:35, William Knowles wrote: > On today's Sally Jesse Raphel was Curtis Swiva? > founder of the Guardian Angels talking about his new record > of eating pickles. He plans to break the record for eating > 22 hot dogs in 12 minutes.... I can see it now... "In a rather ironic twist of fate, Curtis Sliwa was the first person charged with violating the Communications Decency Act (upheld by the Supreme Court) after a web-surfer in Tennessee complained about digitized pictures of himself breaking the world's record for eating hot dogs which were posted on his web page..." Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: "Mail Exploders"
by vin＠shore.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wonderful tale! I can see that -- maybe, just maybe -- AOL or another targeted online community (a semi-moderated mailing list or even a semi-moderated newsgroup) could be slapped for just bouncing the SPAM back at the sender. I bet they could get away with it, however, if they appended a brief polite notice that this mailing exceeds some (anti-spam) perimeters that the subscribers of AOL (or other online community) agreed -- in their intial subscriber contracts -- to have AOL refuse for them. (Which text, of course, would add to the reply mail burden for the Spammer's IAP.) The only meaningful control on SPAM I can see is to start enforcing a chain of contracts that forbid it (without reference to content) from the backbone back through the IAPs to the users. (I think Long-Morrow at Yale had a nice paper on this a couple of years back.) But this sort of auto-return mechanism could make a dent on the super-Spanners now. Yea for AOL! Suerte, _Vin > On Nerd AOL using explosive mail, this Cyberia-L pointer: > > http://infolawalert.com/stories/061496a.html > > [Excerpts] > > Cyber Promotions sends a collection of short ads, written > as if they were newspaper classifieds, to upward of 900,000 > recipients, 600,000 of whom are America OnLine subscribers. > > America OnLine contends that its computer systems have been > swamped by Cyber Promotion's mass mailings, especially when > 5,000 undeliverable messages start to pile up each day. ... > > When the mailings continued, an AOL employee collected a > bunch of Cyber Promotions's undeliverable messages and > redirected them to UUNET, a large Internet service provider > used by Cyber Promotions. > > According to Cyber Promotions' complaint, this "stunt, > known as an 'e-mail bomb,' was knowingly and maliciously > sent to UUNET by AOL in order to severely tie up and/or > bring down UUNET's computer system." UUNET subsequently > cancelled Cyber Promotion's account. > > According to Cyber Promotions' complaint, AOL bombed > another service provider used by Cyber Promotions. ... > > > > > > Vin McLellan +The Privacy Guild+ <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, Ma. 02150 USA Tel: (617) 884-5548 <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>

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Re: "Mail Exploders"
by long-morrow＠CS.YALE.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: vin(a)shore.net (Vin McLellan) > The only meaningful control on SPAM I can see is to start enforcing >a chain of contracts that forbid it (without reference to content) from the >backbone back through the IAPs to the users. (I think Long-Morrow at Yale >had a nice paper on this a couple of years back.) But this sort of >auto-return mechanism could make a dent on the super-Spanners now. Actually the paper was written by our Assistant Chairman (Dunne-Bob(a)CS.Yale.EDU) I only made the paper available via FTP, Gopher, WWW and email. ftp://www.cs.yale.edu/pub/dunne/jurimetrics/ gopher://www.cs.yale.edu/11/pub/dunne/jurimetrics/ http://www.cs.yale.edu/pub/dunne/jurimetrics/jurimetrics.html mailto:majordomo@cs.yale.edu ( put 'get sneakers jurimetrics.txt' in message body ) H. Morrow Long, Mgr of Dev., Yale Univ., Comp Sci Dept, 011 AKW, New Haven, CT 06520-8285, VOICE: (203)-432-{1248,1254} FAX: (203)-432-0593 INET: Long-Morrow(a)CS.Yale.EDU UUCP: yale!Long-Morrow BITNET: Long-Morrow@YaleCS WWW: http://www.cs.yale.edu/users/long-morrow.html

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Re: Federal key registration agency
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:27 PM 6/18/96 +0200, TM Peters wrote: >Compuserve Online Today Daily Edition, 15 June 1996: > >Attorney General Janet Reno is advancing a plan to establish a new agency >overseeing all digital encryption, saying that would make it tougher for >criminals and terrorists to use the Internet to carry out crimes. [...] >Reno added, "We look only to make existing law apply to new technology," Such a claim is bogus. "existing law" already "applies" to new technology. It's just that this only means that cops think they have a right to wiretap. It does not mean that they are able to usefully understand the meaning of what they hear. >adding new computer programs designed to crack the new complicated >encryptions take too long to be useful to law enforcement. Like a billion years too long, huh? > "Some of our >most important prosecutions have depended on wire taps." But is the average citizen substantially impacted by crimes that would be assisted by good encryption? Probably not. >She also said registration of keys might end up being a worldwide >requirement, since the Internet is used increasingly for international >communication, commerce, and criminal enterprise. She forgot to mention REVOLUTION. >Reno told the group that effectively regulating electronic encryption will >depend on finding a balance between protecting privacy interests while >stopping criminals from cashing in on the new technology. I see no need for a "balance." I think that the advent of good encryption has the effect of increasing the security of individuals. >"If we do our job right citizens will enjoy the Information Age without >being victimized" by high technology, Reno said. Maybe she should have said, "without toppling the government-employed parasites from their positions of power." >United Press International >Charles Bowen Another one of those organizations threatened by media-bypass. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:55 AM 6/18/96 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: >At 17:21 6/17/96, M.Wagoner (1 wrote: >>We would like someone to be able or should I say try and crack our >>encryption. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. > >Sigh. Yet another one... > >Unless you make source code available, you will be at best ignored, and at >worst sued by users of your product should they discover that your >unbreakable encryption isn't so unbreakable after all. Unless you use a >hardware RNG and OTPs, your statement that it is impossible to break your >encryption software is simply false Don't even assume that hardware RNGs and OTPs by themselves make a system unbreakable. Go see NSA's web site on the Verona intercepts to see what people who know what they are doing can do when users slip up using a OTP system. http://www.nsa.gov:8080/ I'm with Lucky (and many others) 100% on this one. Snake Oil. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Source Laundering <was: You bet they have/are: NSA/CIA to snoop INSIDE theU.S.???>
by vin＠shore.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Nobody, an anonymous source of no repute, posted a pretty savvy analysis of the politics of unauthorized wiretaps a week back: > anyone who believes the FBI and a host of other U.S. agencies even > less scrupulous does not wiretap without permits, has been standing > behind the door. generally, it does not matter if the information >learned is > admissable in court --they never admit wiretapping in the first place as > the agency themselves, in many cases, *did*not*wiretap* --but the > agency does buy info from usually unsavory "contractors" who do wiretap. This conforms to my information too. Back in the mid-80s, I took a wiretap counterintelligence class with a lot of cops, PIs, and oil company securitymen. (The quietest guy in the class, a balding little whimp at the tech bench behind me, was a PI by the name of John Walker, who later drew some attention with his overseas business interests. The weirdiest guy in the class was another PI who kept trying to talk to the other guys about their work but was jerked around because everyone knew he was always wired and at the end of the day would rush back to his hotel room to put the tapes through a voice stress analyser. I would have said the most dangerous guys in the room were the grizzled Malasian oilmen, but in hindsight Walker probably takes the prize.) The instructors were big Ray Jarvis (now of Jarvis Security,) an ex-Marine reputed to have recently been the CIA's top wireman, and Allan Bell (now of Dektor Counterintelligence,) the former director of the US Army's spy shop R&D (who probably has as many secret patents as Friedman did) -- both smart, thoughtful, amiable guys who knew their tradecraft cold. What I remember most of the week long class was Ray Jarvis standing before my classmates and estimating that maybe 10-15 percent of the domestic wiretapping and bugging -- circa '85 -- by US police agencies was legally authorized. He paused and looked around the room for the consensus. Half the room (mostly big city US cops) paused, looked off in the distance for a moment, then nodded. My sense is that lawmen typically planted the relevant information in the hands (or mouths) of a maluable "trusted source" when they did the wire themselves. If a subcontractor did it for them (on a purposely vague assignment,) they just didn't ask how the "trusted source" managed to get the information. Either way, it worked like money laundering. Source laundering, you could call it. The cops didn't seem to view themselves as angels, but they were usually utterly certain the guys they were targeting were the scum of the earth. Maybe they were. My expectation was that most of the illicit wires would be focused on the drug trade (where cops feel like the Border Patrol in El Paso, hopelessly outclassed by their opponents) but -- at least at that time -- the scuttlebutt seemed to indicate it was much more broadly used in criminal investigations. Both wiretaps and bugs are just so damn easy to place, so cheap, so deniable, and (done properly) so untracable, the temptation was virtually irresistable. And there seemed to be a whole subculture of master wiremen, trained by the US Govt, accepting bids from both the Law and corporate security agents. (Outside the US, particularly in the oil business, it sounded like the Wild West before Judge Bean showed up. I've never doubted that the cost of a DES-cracking special purpose computer has been buried among the expense chits of many multinationals, certainly in the Big Oil Government budgets. I'd love to talk to the NSA guys who went in with Desert Storm to find out what the Iraqis picked up from Kawaiti government/oil IS installations;-) I don't expect much has changed, except everything has gotten smaller, cheaper, and (with datacom) vastly more automated. What those guys knew in the 80s were the phone systems (poor design left many PBXs with back doors, some of which could even be triggered remotely) but we've all learned new tricks -- and the NSA and others always concentrated on CompSec. > as for the NSA/CIA spying on US citizens --they dont, they spy on > British citizens with facilities provided by M5 and M6. in return, > British M5/6 agents spy on U.S. citizens from Langely or Gaithersberg, or > wherever. The fact they just happen to share information is an > "accident." In this, I doubt Mr. Nobody. I can't see either the Brits nor the Yanks willing to trust the other nation's bureaucratic system to keep in-country spying secret. The rule was: governments leak... eventually. And the fallout of Revelation would be awesome. (And there were so many safer options.) I suppose, however, Nobody's scheme fits the "laundered source" model too. I recall talk of this sort of arrangement mostly to cover US citizen to US citizen phone links across the US border. I'm not even sure the NSA couldn't legitimately do this, but after the Church Committee hearings in the 1970s, everyone wanted to keep their numbers low. (The extreme was the FBI, of course, which would show up annually to report what? 7 or 11 authorized wiretaps for the year. Everyone barely able to control their snickers.) My apologies if Memory Lane took up too much bandwidth, but the politics of crypto have a heritage that's ever more relevant. (Witness all the direct and indirect reference to Kahn and Bamford's work on this List.) A thought: Being pessimistic lately, and assuming our elected US pols continue their subservience to the spy agencies, I have a question. How difficult would be it to concoct a encryption-based scheme which would hold escrow keys in some sort of serialized time-sensitive one-way account -- a device that would make it all but impossible to get a key out of the account without leaving a permanent record that it was retrieved. How many were retrieved? When? By whom? Is there such a scheme? How does/could it work? In defending privacy, Accountability is a very powerful weapon. (Remember those FBI reports of 7-11 wiretaps?) I'd love to see such a tamperproof recording device imposed upon the FBI's access to its new Master Wiretap circuits, for example -- with a legislatively-mandated revelation of the unforgable results, something comparable to the current law in criminal cases, and maybe with some 5-year sunshine provison for national security cases. Such a scheme might be all we can get if this Administration or a future one gets a version of Clipper mandated. Cynics like many of you on this list may not realize how desperately these guys want to keep to the shadows. Bright Lights and Accountability ought to be a Cypherpunk Goal -- even when the tide is running against us. A well-documented tamperproof accounting scheme to document the use of these intrusive powers could result in a potentially powerful piece of legislation. Suerte, _Vin Vin McLellan +The Privacy Guild+ <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, Ma. 02150 USA Tel: (617) 884-5548 <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>

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Re: Applied Cryptography - used copy?
by Will Rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:43 AM 6/18/96 -0400, you wrote: > Hi, > Didn't I read that with the new Applied Cryptography there was a >diskette or cd included that had all the programs on it? I noticed a copy >at the B Dalton and when I looked at it it contained no cd or diskette. >Was the aforementioned new edition with disk/cd a limited edition >available through the mail only? > TIA, > moroni > > Mail only. And, of course, you have to live somewhere Schneier can legally send you the stuff. $40 the set in MS-DOS, $120 for two-year sub., updated 2X/yr. Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Inter@ctive Week

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Micropayments, Anarchy, It's All The Same... ;P
by Stephan Vladimir Bugaj 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>that is associated with any new technology should be better analyzed by the >>few who care about the future rather than those who just worship the future >>to ensure that the decisions which are made by this almighty 'market' >>(again, I distinguish this from either the 'people' or the 'consumers') > >Er...just how did you draw that distinction? I seem to have missed it. >I suppose that by believing the free marketplace best satisfies peoples' >and consumers' needs (not perfectly, just best) that I am a worshiper >here. So be it, but see if you can explain the difference between >non-marketplace decisionmaking and bureaucrat decisionmaking for me. > > > The distinction that I'm making is that the 'market' is governed by both consumers and producers. As such, what the market will bear can and sometimes does diverge from what consumers want. Taking a really silly example, let's say you want a blue car, but the auto industry decided that blue cars constituted too few of their sales to justify the purchase of blue paint. However, they did this study in Malibu, where everyone wanted a red car, because some statistician felt that was the perfect demographic for their line of cars. He was wrong. Now middle America, who loves blue cars, can't get any. They have to settle for red cars as the next best thing. Next year the market will probably readjust and blue cars will again be available, but for the year the bulk of consumers had little say in market decisions. Producers can and will also 'dump' undesirable products on the market as we have all seen before. Sometimes consumers complain, sometimes they just groan and bear it. But the fact of the matter is that the 'market' is comprised of two main elements: 'consumers' and 'producers' and the market climate is not solely determined by consumers' needs. Bureaucratic (government) decision making is no better. Keep in mind, however, that capitalist organizations (producers) are themselves bureaucratic institutions. Therefore, bureaucracy plays a central role in the free (sic) market. A balance between the power of the public and private sector generally best represents the peoples' and consumers' needs. How the market diverges from the polit is clear. The market is only concerned with consumers, and this leaves out the poor, who are undeniably part of the polity. In fact, if you take just the technology market, that market is primarily producer-to-producer (business-to-business) and the traditional consumer (an individual or family) is a relatively recent addition to this market. Interbusiness concerns still drive this market. >>'rammed down their throats'. Sometimes people forget that technologists >>and their venture capitalist backers aren't the best representative sample >>of the world's population, nor are they a reliable source of objective >>information about the correlation between the 'market' and the 'polit'. > >They aren't the best, they are simply more reliable than Hillary >Clinton and co. are. > > There are two ways to go on this. It's important to realize that while government officials are professional politicans with all the moral and ethical compromise that this entails, they are also ultimately responsible to their constituency. The role of government is different than the role of business, and I for one would not be willing to give up democratic government (ragardless of its hypocracies and flaws) in favor of a business bureaucracy as our national ruling hegemony. Businesses, especially ones governed by unmitigated capitalists, are responsible only to profit. The social darwinist perspective of most capitalists is such that this profit can come at any cost, and things will 'work themselves out' according to natural (sic) social selection. This is a morally and ethically dangerous viewpoint to have. The polity is supposed to be able to count on their government to be their voice of power against the transgressions of more powerful individuals at the top of the capitalist power structure. This is not usually the case, as government officials rely on these powerbrokers for their jobs and kickbacks, but at least in the United States the people have theoretical constitutional recourses against serious infringements of their rights. While centralized government has serious problems, weakening the federal protection of the bill of rights would serve only to increase the ability of the powerful to abuse the polity (and create chaos since 50 different sets of state laws would provide an amazing web of loopholes for would-be tyrants). Our government is supposed to be kept in check by the people, and I believe that is what people like the Cypherpunks are and should be doing. However, don't go running to Laissez Faire capitalists as your comrades in arms in the struggle to keep powerful institutions out of your personal lives, because you'll be more than just disappointed if you help private sector powerbrokers whittle away the protective powers of the public sector. Morally I'm more Anarchist than Centrist, but I'm also willing to face reality. >Agreed. The most forthright possible debate comes on cypherpunks IMO. >The least forthright comes from the government/media complex. Crypto- >anarchists aren't proposing utopia, just improvement -- which is a >much easier standard to meet considering what we have. I am sure >there will be problems and frauds, just as there were Ford Pintos. >Note that the Pinto phenomenon was possible in spite of pervasive >and growing govt. regulation, yet the response: Even more regulation. >Hmmmmm. >JMR > > There needs to be a balance between too much regulation, and too little. The public sector has a system of checks and balances which doesn't always work, but is institutionalized and respected. The private sector, however, is not so accountable and their only checks and balances are the laws that we the people are obligated to insist be enforced. Morality and justice break down easily in the face of bribes and hush-money, but with an institutionalized system of justice there is at least a modicum of accountability which is necessary for a society(ies) which is far too immature for true Anarchism. Keep in mind the role that capitalists played along side the government in Nazi Germany, (unchecked) power corrupts - regardless of whether you're in the public sector or the private sector. (Yes, capitalism was technically regulated in Nazi Germany, but that is not the point.) I am as unwilling to support Laissez Faire capitalism as I am to support an intrusive and restrictive government. ttl Stephan ------------------------------------------------------------------- This signature has been kidnapped by space aliens. If you find it you can call (415) 703-8748. I work for Studio Archetype, and they don't find any of this funny.

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Safemail
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the below is accurate, your company is in even more trouble. I do hope no one would think of RECORDING a conversation with a safemail represenative. I admit that it would be valuable to an attorney looking to sue Safe Mail, but it's not a very nice thing to do. Even if its legal. (which it would be in most states). ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 08:39:12 -0500 From: Scott Schryvers <schryver(a)radiks.net> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Snake_Oil_punks was Re: SafE Mail Corporation Talked with Randy of Safe Mail Corporation on the phone. Among the stuff he claimed was that PGP has the secret key in its public key! Found out that not only does this algorithm use 22 characters. The characters are the ones only found on the keyboard. SafeMail uses a proprietary Russian algorithm. Not only is this company misquoting it's making up as it goes along. :)

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Re: Micropayments, Anarchy, It's All The Same... ;P
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:02 PM 6/18/96 -0700, Stephan Vladimir Bugaj wrote: >How the market diverges from the polit is clear. The market is only concerned >with consumers, and this leaves out the poor, who are undeniably part of the >polity. The poor are consumers and indeed can regularly outbid the middle class and rich for resources (if they couldn't, poor neighborhoods would never grow in size but they do all the time.) DCF

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Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 18 Jun 1996, M.Wagoner (1) wrote: > Thanks for responding. You're lucky I even bothered to take the two minutes it required to do that. > >> We would like someone to be able or should I say try and crack our > >> encryption. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. > > > >With the above you have saved me the trouble of even trying. > > > I can understand your reaction but this is a brand new approach to > crypotrography that no one else has thought about doing. Any approach to "cryotrography" [sic] which includes absolute statements about unbreakability (like your quote above) betrays such ignorance about the nature of the science as to render it a literal glowing neon brand on your forehead reading :DO NOT PURCHASE CRYPTO FROM THIS MAN: and accompanied by a loud speaker repeating same at 100dB. Using cow feces to encrypt messages is also a brand new approach which no one else has thought about doing. That hardly means it is worth more than the feces itself. > >Your appraoch to cryptography betrays such ignorance that nothing which > >your "corporation" produces could be of the slightest redeeming value. > > > >(Bloody snake oil venders) > > > >Now go away. > I really wish I knew what you meant by this. If I made you upset, I apoligize. It means I consider your product dirt. Cryptography is about economics. I'm not going to spend time teaching you the tenants of the science itself though it is clear you need such a lecture. Try reading "Applied Cryptography" for starters. Calling a given cypher "uncrackable" is simple fiction or ignorance. I might add that I am an attorney licensed to practice in the District of Columbia, among other jurisdictions. Having looked at your web page and the comparisons you make to PGP I can tell you without much qualification at all that it is at worst defamation and fraud. I would not at all be surprised to find that each sale of product you make constitutes a count of wire fraud (18 U.S.C.A. sections 1341, 1343) and a count of mail fraud if the product is shipped via the mails. I also believe that ViaCrypt and whoever else may have claim to the rights to market PGP commercially has a clear action of defamation, tortious interference with contract and depending on the state, unlawful sales interference. The fraud element would activate punative damages provisions. Should any of these parties come to me asking for advice I would direct them immediately to the nearest courthouse. Tell me, is your "corporation" licensed to do business in any state? Is it licensed as a corporation? Limited Liabiltiy? Many states impose sanctions, including administrative disolution and fines, for the use of misleading corporate forms or names while conducting interstate commerce (which you are clearly doing). > >> Our Web site is http://www.sfmc.com Phone number is 1-800-252-9938. > >Clearly a waste of good storage space. > > > Again thanks for your comments. Mr. Estridge, were I your attorney, and I thank my lucky stars that I am not, I would suggest that you post a retraction immediately, and forward a very polite letter of apology to ViaCrypt and perhaps Mr. Zimmerman. Maybe they are too busy to sue you, report you to the better business bureau, the FTC, or the state attorney general and the postmaster. > >> Randy Estridge > >> SafE Mail Corporation --- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Snake_Oil_punks was Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Snake oil alert!] > PGP has the secret key in its public key! > > Found out that not only does this algorithm use 22 characters. > The characters are the ones only found on the keyboard. > > SafeMail uses a proprietary Russian algorithm. > > Not only is this company misquoting it's making up as it goes along. :) > > Okay, then I hereby claim the secret key 1234567890qwertyuiop+- as my public key. Now, by running that through the SafeMail Russian algorithm, I get "Nyet!" Would somebody please give these chums a clue or two, or mailbomb their sorry asses, or something? dave ----- David E. Smith, dsmith(a)prairienet.org PO Box 324 Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702-0324 http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith/dave.html "fighting ultimate cosmic evil... ... one bean burrito at a time."

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Re: SafE Mail Corporation
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-06-18 02:34:54 EDT, sandfort(a)crl.com (Sandy Sandfort) writes: << C'punks, At 05:21 PM 6/17/96 -0400, M.Wagoner (1) wrote: > >We would like someone to be able or should I say try and >crack our encryption. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. >Our Web site is http://www.sfmc.com Phone number is >1-800-252-9938. So I pulled up the Web site to see what sort of reward they offered to the successful cracker. Under the heading "Attention `Hackers'" they said if you crack their unbreakable SafE Mail code, you get 5 free copies of ... SafE Mail! Oh, that's a really primo prize, broken software. Duh. Since cracking their encryption is IMPOSSIBLE, I suggest they make the stakes interesting--$100,000, or hell, a cool million. After all, it's unbreakable. It's not like they will have to pay up or anything. S a n d y >> Very good point. Hell I have a book that offers $1,000 to crack a little string. How much does everyone here actually talk about the techniques of decryption?? Is is something any of you are well versed at and would welcome any questions to? Thanks..... Adam

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Recipients get the postage
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I was reading old threads on remailers, where various ideas were suggested to reduce abuse. One was to charge postage, in order to discourage spam and somewhat discourage nastygrams, as well as to compensate the remailer operator for his risks. A variant was to tell the recipient that he had anonymous mail waiting, and possibly charge him to receive it. I had a different idea, which has probably been suggested before: make the sender of the anonymous mail pay, but pass the money to the recipient. All my complaints come from people who have received mail, never from people who have sent it. So obviously the steps we take need to make recipients happier. Paying them is one way to do it. Of course there are lots of details: how much should be charged, will recipients really be so thrilled when a "fuck you" note has a nickel wrapped in it, how will they cash their checks, etc. If ecash were used this might be a motivation for people to open an account. Nym servers could be funded by the nym owners to pay for a certain number of messages. Since the nym owner ends up receiving the cash it doesn't actually cost him anything and he can easily afford to keep a pool of cash in the nym server to keep the messages coming through. Remailers which wanted to apply this rule would have to deposit the money and immediately withdraw the same amount to include in the outgoing mail. Users would basically have to trust the remailers to do this honestly. Maybe it only needs to be done when the mail goes to a non-remail end user destination, not for the intermediate links in the chain. Postings to newgroups and mailing lists would make the cash available to the first one who grabs it. It can be a fun game; we've done it here occasionally. This might also motivate people to sign up for ecash. Just a thought - Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBMcdENBnMLJtOy9MBAQFbpAH+NCq3HMN4+ar6UVWBFxvhAQ2OCu+EehX7 CgnLButTRJEM4OdOEsBaLzYBdi5bk0acelSpE/Zqj1S46bD2UQt50w== =2NAN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Digital Cash application
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In 1996, the Libertarian Party will apparently qualify for Federal matching funds for its Presidential political campaign. That does not mean that it will _accept_ them, being stolen goods. However, a few years ago I heard of an idea that they should accept the money, and return it to the people, a small amount at a time, to whomever asks for it. Besides returning the stolen money to its rightful owners, that would produce substantial positive publicity for the Libertarian party, embarrassment for the Democrats and Republicans, while at the same time reducing the amount of money available for the D's and the R's. But there's been a practical question of how to actively do this, economically. Issuing checks and mailing them costs money, and they're traceable, etc. The advent of digital cash suggests an answer: Make the payments in the form of digital cash, payable on the Web. This will encourage the use of digital cash, and provide a sudden infusion that will promote other uses. There's another advantage, however. Since "Netizens" are somewhat biased towards libertarianism, this will have the effect of keeping more of this money "in the family" as it were, while at the same time being open, technically, to everyone who can get on the 'net. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Federal key registrat
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-=> Quoting In:jimbell@pacifier.com to Harka <=- > "Some of our >most important prosecutions have depended on wire taps." In> But is the average citizen substantially impacted by crimes that would In> be assisted by good encryption? Probably not. And how about: "Would not the average citizen be assisted by good encryption to NOT be impacted by (certain) crimes?" And from that perspective, shouldn't the protection of millions of "average" citizens have much more importance than the "unprotection" (i.e. Clipper) of a few godfathers, who _might_ use e-mail and who _might_ use crypto? >Reno told the group that effectively regulating electronic encryption will >depend on finding a balance between protecting privacy interests while >stopping criminals from cashing in on the new technology. In> I see no need for a "balance." I think that the advent of good In> encryption has the effect of increasing the security of individuals. Absolutely. As somebody a few days ago already mentioned in connection with the CDA, the gov.'s have enjoyed a lot of centralized power so far. A medium like the Net is the antithesis to that kind of centralization. Now all over the world gov.'s try to hold on to the "old" way, which _only_ works if things are regulated, censored, outlawed etc.. That is what ensures the survival of centralized and hierarchical structures. But they are failing to realize, that people's conciousness changes _away_ from such limiting ways towards more open and natural relationships. The Net is maybe the (currently) most important medium in that process and will be hopefully the last nail in the coffin of governments, as we know 'em. Harka ... "If cryptography is outlawed, no outlaw will use clipper" -:) ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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Re: Class III InfoWar: TST Article
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:15 AM 6/18/96, Moroni wrote: > What are the effects of an EMP on the persons releasing the bomb >,those in te vacinity and what is the distance that the bomb has a >physical effect on people. Also ,is there any knowledge of reusable EMP >bombs yet? > TIA .... Interesting idea. I have no idea about impact on humans. The capacitor connected to some wierd shape antenna all assembled in a vacuume to muffle the sound upon discharge would probably be reusable. It also probably provides only a fraction of the energy of a high explosive version.

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Re: Federal key registration agency [NOISE]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:20 AM 6/18/96 -0500, you wrote: >> Compuserve Online Today Daily Edition, 15 June 1996: >> >> Attorney General Janet Reno ... said her plan would require people to >> register with the new agency the secret codes -- or "keys" -- they use >> to encrypt messages online. > >This would be the "Bad Cop" line, for those playing along at home. Problem is, she's the one playing Good Cop. :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Dispel Authority!

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Re: Federal key registration agency
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Compuserve Online Today Daily Edition, 15 June 1996: > >Speaking to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco, Reno said >her plan would require people to register with the new agency the secret >codes -- or "keys" -- they use to encrypt messages online. > >Reporting on this speech, Sandra Ann Harris of United Press International >adds, "Federal authorities could then obtain the information they need to >decipher the encryptions using a court order and secretly monitor electronic >communication on the Internet the same way wiretaps are used to monitor >telephone conversations of suspected criminals." Consider the logic of this statement. If some *criminal* has registered his/her secret key with the government, then why the hell would s/he then encrypt an incrimating message knowing the government could crack it?! Great plan, Janet..... Medea

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Re: Applied Cryptography disks / EMP noise.
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:43 AM 6/18/96 -0400, you wrote: > Hi, > Didn't I read that with the new Applied Cryptography there was a >diskette or cd included that had all the programs on it? I noticed a copy >at the B Dalton and when I looked at it it contained no cd or diskette. >Was the aforementioned new edition with disk/cd a limited edition >available through the mail only? If you look at the inside back cover of the book you'll find instructions for ordering the diskette, just as there were with Edition 1. Distributing the diskette with the book was too much trouble for the publisher, given the ITAR issues. The disks that Phil Karn applied for export permission for had just the code from the book typed in, and not any other material that may have been on the official disks, but they still denied it. As far as EMP goes, there are three interesting kinds of EMP generators 1) Nuclear weapons, detonated at high altitude to get wide spread EMP effects. The folks who drop such things generally clear out of the territory very fast before the explosion. 2) Mythical portable devices for attacking computer facilities - the folks who set off these don't exist, so they don't need to worry about the effects. 3) Very large capacitor/inductor banks at defense contractors like Harry Diamond Labs in New Mexico, which are used to test electronic equipment (up to airplane size) for EMP-resistance. They're supposedly quite impressive structures (the buildings used for the equipment under test are all wood) and the folks who run them are careful about lots of things when using them. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Dispel Authority!

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This might be interesting...
by nobody＠flame.alias.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do an AltaVista Query on: url:bmh.com crypto*

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German Federal Bank opposes e-cash
by um＠c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[What follows is my translation of a Reuters news item as seen on a mailing list.] "Risks with computer money" Frankfurt - the Federal Bank has once more warned against security risks with computer money. There is the danger that "Cyber-Money" stored in computers be counterfeited, said Directory Board member Edgar Meister at a conference in Schwaebisch-Hall. In addition there were the danger of money laundry, because the computer money could be wired across borders without problems. Meister announced that, if necessary, the EU Central Banks would take counter-measures, should computer money and re-loadable payment cards endanger the monetary policy. (rtr/18.6.96)

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RE: Fuseable Links - no guarantees??
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: Christian Wettergren[SMTP:cwe@it.kth.se] Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 1996 11:40 PM To: Timothy C. May Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Fuseable Links - no guarantees?? So I guess one can look at the circuitry and apply non-standard voltage and current values, or even non-standard timing values -- and do bad things to these circuits. So this begs the question: Is there anyone who has looked at "computer security" issues at this level? >>> Of course, many have.

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Re: Safemail
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:19 PM 6/18/96 -0400, you wrote: > SafeMail uses a proprietary Russian algorithm. Maybe it is GOST. Schneir covers it, and there is a white paper on it at the b_crypt site. _______________________ Regards, Democracy is where you can say what you think even if you don't think. - Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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Oil Change software snoops through hard drive
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan forwarded this to me. Thought it might be interesting. -Declan ------------------------------- Heads up: Privacy & Continuous Access Ks implicated by new software This press release for a new product - a software agent - has implications for privacy and continuing access issues, because it works by scanning user's hard disks and automatically providing software updates. Unanswered Qs: 1) What other kinds of info does/can it troll for? 2) What does it do when it finds unregistered software? 3) Does it implicate ECPA? 4) Will updates be available through other means? 5) Must a user affirmatively grant permission to the software agent? 6) Can a user decline or limit the agent's access? 7) What uses may the agent's owner make of data collected? etc. Alan L --- press release: *** "Digital Oil Change" CyberMedia announced today at PC Expo that it plans to automatically "service" personal computer software via the Net with a newly unveiled product called Oil Change. The company reports that Oil Change automatically replaces outdated, bug-ridden software and hardware drivers with clean updates. CyberMedia says the product is designed to use the Net to find, download, and install updates to Microsoft Windows 95 software applications and drivers. Oil Change reportedly tracks all currently installed versions and revisions of all Windows 95 software and hardware drivers on a PC, and then dials into CyberMedia's Internet Web Server for related updates. Users in need of an update are alerted by Oil Change with a description of what the update will do, and then the product finds the update on a software manufacturer's Web site, downloads, and installs it. Beginning today, CyberMedia says it will offer a free beta version of Oil Change for a limited time at its Web site.

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The IESG: Protocol Action: MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to Proposed Standard
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message To: IETF-Announce:; Cc: RFC Editor <rfc-editor(a)isi.edu> Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab(a)isi.edu> From: The IESG <iesg-secretary(a)CNRI.Reston.VA.US> Subject: Protocol Action: MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to Proposed Standard Date: Wed, 19 Jun 96 11:06:28 -0400 Message-ID: <9606191106.aa22287(a)IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US> The IESG has approved the Internet-Draft "MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)" <draft-elkins-pem-pgp-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard. This has been reviewed in the IETF but is not the product of an IETF Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Harald Alvestrand, Keith Moore, and Jeff Schiller. Technical Summary This document describes how Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) can be used to provide privacy and authentication using the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) security content types described in RFC1847. Working Group Summary This document was not the product of an IETF working group but was reviewed via a 4 week IETF wide last call. The last call failed to raise any significant issues. Protocol Quality This document was reviewed for the IESG by Jeffrey I. Schiller. The protocol provides for an elegant way of encapsulating PGP objects within a MIME framework by making use of Security Multiparts for MIME (RFC1847). This permits a MIME aware user agent to read and process PGP signed and/or encrypted messages, yet it provides sufficient backwards compatibility for users with non-MIME aware mail user agents to make use of PGP directly to manually process messages prepared with this protocol. ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: Federal key registrat
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-=> Quoting In:nobody@c2.org to Harka <=- >Speaking to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco, Reno said >her plan would require people to register with the new agency the secret >codes -- or "keys" -- they use to encrypt messages online. My keys? Sure Janet, no problem. pgp -kg (80000 times) Now can I email the hundred meg to you? :) Harka ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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Re: German Federal Bank opposes e-cash
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:25 PM 6/19/96 +0200, Ulf Moeller wrote: >[What follows is my translation of a Reuters news item as seen on a >mailing list.] > >"Risks with computer money" > >Frankfurt - the Federal Bank has once more warned against security risks >with computer money. There is the danger that "Cyber-Money" stored in >computers be counterfeited, said Directory Board member Edgar Meister >at a conference in Schwaebisch-Hall. Then the banks just need to be more careful about issuing it, huh? >In addition there were the danger >of money laundry, because the computer money could be wired across >borders without problems. Which, interestingly enough, is exactly the reason citizens should support it. Barry Goldwater, the 1964 US Presidential candidate, said something like "Any government that is powerful enough to give you everything you want, is powerful enough to take away everything you have." It was true, then, and it's true today. Fast-forward to 1996: Any government powerful enough to be able to eliminate money-laundering is powerful enough to eliminate all of our rights. I'm not willing to take that risk, and the way I see it, people who see digital cash as an undesirable risk to government are a risk to me. Meister announced that, if necessary, the EU >Central Banks would take counter-measures, should computer money and >re-loadable payment cards endanger the monetary policy. (rtr/18.6.96) Maybe somebody should tell Herr Meister that should actions of government be threatening, "Citizens would take counter-measures, should restrictions on computer money and reloadable payment cards endanger their rights." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Digital Cash application
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim: This is a nice idea, but it's not going to happen. Yes, Harry Browne has raised enough money to qualify for matching funds from the FEC. But he's unable to give out the cash or use it to pay down the gvt debt since doing so could violate FEC regulations. The FEC is also unwilling only to certify Browne for matching funds without giving it to him -- he's got to take the money and spend it on campaign foo and nothing else, says the government. Finally, once they give you cash you have to meet a higher degree of scrutiny, which costs money in lawyers and accountants. Talk about bureaucracy. At least this is what the party tells me. I'll be covering their convention, which is in DC a few weeks from now. -Declan >In 1996, the Libertarian Party will apparently qualify for Federal matching >funds for its Presidential political campaign. That does not mean that it >will _accept_ them, being stolen goods. However, a few years ago I heard of >an idea that they should accept the money, and return it to the people, a >small amount at a time, to whomever asks for it. Besides returning the >stolen money to its rightful owners, that would produce substantial positive >publicity for the Libertarian party, embarrassment for the Democrats and >Republicans, while at the same time reducing the amount of money available >for the D's and the R's. > > >But there's been a practical question of how to actively do this, >economically. Issuing checks and mailing them costs money, and they're >traceable, etc. The advent of digital cash suggests an answer: Make the >payments in the form of digital cash, payable on the Web. This will >encourage the use of digital cash, and provide a sudden infusion that will >promote other uses. There's another advantage, however. Since "Netizens" >are somewhat biased towards libertarianism, this will have the effect of >keeping more of this money "in the family" as it were, while at the same >time being open, technically, to everyone who can get on the 'net. > > >Jim Bell >jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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