December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:30 PM 4/13/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: > > >On Wed, 10 Apr 1996, sameer wrote: > >> >> Frankly, I'm getting antsy. Is C2 going to get subpoena'd or >> not? I would be very disappointed if we don't. >> (Subpeonas envy!) > >All you have to do is call up CoS's lawyers. Let your fingers do the >walking... > >Seriously though, might it not be nicer (easier?) to establish some court >precedents on remailers vs. CoS rather than the government? Think of it as >a preemptive strike. Sounds like forum shopping/defendant shopping/plaintiff shopping. An excellent idea. The best part is that COS is one of the most unsympathetic organizations that could possibly be chosen, with the possible exception of the American Nazi Party or the KKK. The argument of CoS's religious copyright and trade >secrets don't seem to me be as emotionally effective horsemen as "National >Security Threats" or "Child Pornography". I really wouldn't want to see >Congress get away with legislating on remailers in a legal vacuum. I sure hesitate to "hope" that the COS thing gets turned into an SC decision, because that means that SOME defendant has to get pulled through the ringer until he eventually wins. Great for us; terrible for him. >Go for it Sameer. ;-) (Hope you won't be needing Jim's ISP-Aspol inc. >insurance against them pesky scientologists...[double ;-) ]) It's at this point that somebody usually observes that the COS could use AP to get rid of its critics. However, they're forgetting that with AP, its critics can remain absolutely anonymous and still punish COS. It would be no contest.

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Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: noring(a)netcom.com (Jon Noring) >On Wednesday afternoon, February 8th, three private >investigators visited the Caltech Security Office and the Campus >Computing Organization. The P.I.s wanted to know the identity of >the holder of the account "tc" on the Caltech Alumni Association >computer system (alumni.caltech.edu) They claimed to have >gotten the account name from the anon.penet.fi server via the >Helsinki police. Due to the unusual nature of this request, the >P.I.s were told that Caltech would need more information before >this type of information could be given out. Later that day, an >attorney representing the Church of Scientology called the >campus computing support office demanding the name of the >account holder. The attorney claimed that a document had been >stolen from a CoS computer system, and that the document had >been posted to the a.r.s newsgroup from alumni.caltech.edu via >the anon remailer. (The claim was the document was created on >Jan. 21 and appeared in a.r.s. on Jan. 24). The computing support >staff did not divulge the name of the account holder, and the CoS >attorney was referred to the Caltech General Counsel's office. Given that they didn't have a subpoena at this point, wouldn't the simplest way to solve this problem be to wipe the records? Somehow, I suspect that the judge is unlikely to put Caltech in contempt of court on suspicion that they're lying about the records being wiped. Now, contempt of court out of irritation... -Allen

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carrick, Blowfish & the NSA
by Jerry Whiting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One reason we chose to use Blowfish as the basis for carrick is that it _is_ a new algorithm. One has to assume that the NSA et al. has tools optimized to crack DES and possibly IDEA/RSA. At least let's give them something else to sweat over. In the short term there's a high probability that a cross-platform Blowfish-based encryption toolkit will muddy the waters and make life interesting for us and a bit more challenging for them. We're shooting for a May 1 release for Windows with the Mac and DOS 6 weeks behind and VAX/Sun a month after that. We're aiming for the stars: encryption, time/date stamps, signatures, message digests, etc. all based on Blowfish. We're doing a core engine with APIs, a standardized file format, and extensability for other developers. We're very committed to making the spec including the API and file format VERY PUBLIC. Like I said, we're aiming high. So yes, if we're successful Blowfish should be taken more seriously. And yes, when I outlined the above to the NSA while asking for an export permit, I was met with silence on the phone. I can't wait to meet with them mid-May when they come out to visit. My sense is that some junior level person(s) looked at Blowfish when Bruce originally published it in Dr. Dobb's and that their report was filed away waiting for the day when someone actually used it in the real world. Our marketing tag ("Encryption software so good, the Feds won't let us export it.") may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy. But that's OK because having others adopt carrick is our real goal. Building up a strong U.S. user base is OK while we wrestle with the NSA over how big a key length we can export. Their initial response was that 40-bit keys were specific to RC2 and RC4 and that Blowfish was another kettle of fish (bad pun intended). Either way we're going to publish an extensive FAQ on carrick that should allow someone to not only work with carick but perhaps clone our efforts. IANAL but my understanding is that publishing such a document, with or without source code, and making it publicly available to non-U.S. citizens is perfectly legal. So NSA if you're reading this: This may be yet another example of locking the barn door after the genie is out of the bottle. Prohibiting us from exporting carrick the product is pointless if we're allowed to fully document carrick the API and file spec. Jerry Whiting jwhiting(a)azalea.com 1 800 ENCRYPT

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Re: PICS
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 12-APR-1996 22:58:59.49 >I had a chance for a brief look at the PICS protocol, and it seems to have >a lot of cypherpunks relevance. It includes features such as: > Multiple third party rating systems No problem. Although it looks like the CDA-replacement bill would essentially require using one with at least as great anti-minor censorship abilities. > Digital signatures This is a problem, unless one simply deletes the signature on modifying a message, and takes the deny-everything-to-minors approach. -Allen

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Re: Tense visions of future imperfect
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:33 PM 04/13/96 EDT, "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU> wrote: >From: IN%"stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com" "Bill Stewart" 11-APR-1996 00:21:15.87 > >>Personally, I find the idea that the government could hope to track the >>economy so closely as to notice a $10M/year addition to the money supply to >>be disturbing (though it was done in a science fiction story about >>20 years ago :-) With digital cash, it's also unrealistic - we >>finally have a technology for moving money around _without_ >>them being able to track it all, if we want to deploy it. > > One related question is if the government would notice an underground >fully anonymous digital cash setup - transactions disappearing from their >"radar screen." I wouldn't expect Gov't to notice any individual transaction, of course, but doubtless they would eventually notice that the expected amounts of money weren't where anticipated. At that point, I suspect things would get "interesting" (moreso than now :-) regarding currency tracing. Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMW/Ii8VrTvyYOzAZAQEkdgQAqKqqbAAn3GIaW3/pdHKMWj8zN2FPuIa+ UEwJsz0Kjs4Whlt+UzjygJtKX1sXPnNjjf47l8tDQWqknrhxO1SDBlmsk1lHeM24 FPYFSwWH+y/zhlxjfj0mn2LlLngvN5UuWU7UG2Q7lKk0DjHvxqAYdbQDNfs1bXRm pxlXPaz1T2k= =rnwR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> http://www.shellback.com/personal/merriman/index.htm

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Re: Enforcing the CDA improperly may pervert Internet architecture
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:15 PM 4/13/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > Quite. It's interesting in that regard that, as well as differentiating >between homosexual and heterosexual content, the W3C PICS scheme includes a >filtration scheme for attacks on religions. One wonders if they considered that >Scientology is currently (probably unjustifiedly) considered a religion? The more the irrational and indefensible the faith, the more that the proponents of that faith view any sort of debunking attempt as "an attack". (It is not just Scientologists that suffer from this mentality. I have seen those of the more fanatical Christian varieties make the same claim.) What these schemes will do is shield children from anything resembling a "controversial" discussion. (I expect Cypherpunks to be labeled as "could cause criminal behaviour" or some such malarky by the more protective and clueless. (It may be true, but why warn them upfront? ]:> )) You will see the forces of "good" try and protect the little kidlets from anything that might get them to think for themselves. It is already happening in some sectors of public thought, I expect the net to become its next victim. Soon everything will be "Sanitized for your Protection". --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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Re: Lotus Notes 24-bit sellout
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:21 AM 4/12/96 -0700, Jerry Whiting wrote: > >When Ray Ozzie announced the work reduction sellout at the RSA conference, >both he and Ms Denning (whom I spoke with about it later) mentioned that >there was something else in Lotus Notes 4 besides the 40+24 bit compromise. > >My thought is that the NSA gave them something else in exchange for the >mandatory escrow scheme they're all talking about publicly. Perhaps some >other crypto code the NSA had lying around unused. > >So looking for a common 24-bit subkey may reduce Notes' key to a 40-bit >brute force exercise but the 40+24 is probably not ALL that's in Notes 4. > >Definitely a deal with the Devil. Given that we're talking about IBM, not >Lotus none of this surprises me given IBM's Lucifer/DES history with spook >input years ago. Then again to be fair, I don't know if the 40+24 deal >was cooked up before or after the IBM/Lotus merger. What about the following idea, which I think might have been indirectly discussed a few months ago. Let's suppose "you" agreed with the NSA to limit their effort to 40 bits, and put 24 bits at the beginning of the file. The code to do this could be separated and highlighted and identified publicly, and a software patch could be engineered by somebody to NOP this stretch of code to death. The result is that those 24-bits simply don't appear; you've already gotten the export license. The NSA doesn't have any real reason to complain: _ANY_ program can be modified by suitably changing object code bit patterns. An even smaller change would be to put the number of bits to expose ("24") in a byte value ("00011000"), one that will be zeroed by a patch later on. I guess I'm not really suggesting this; I think that even appearing to come to some arrangement with the NSA is wrong. However, it would be an excellent way to give the finger to the NSA, because there is no way that they can ensure that a given program is "finagle-proof."

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Re: Any examples of mandatory content rating?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:59 AM 4/13/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Fri, 12 Apr 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> >> I'm interested in hearing about any _actual_ examples where a government >> body in the United States has mandated that intellectual property (roughly, >> written words, magazines, motion pictures, CDs, etc.) be "rated" or >> "age-labelled." Before anyone out there fires up his "Reply" and tells us >> about movie ratings, magazine warning labels, and the like, read on. > >Well, my examples aren't all going to be in the United States, or >strictly intellectual property, or 'age' based, but here: > >Age rated, I don't think there are many examples. General ratings exist. >The best place to look for this kind of thing is e.g., FAA safety >ratings on potential aircraft/aircraft part designs. > >While at first it may seem a bad example, It is a poor example. Aircraft parts are not "intellectual property." They are physical objects. Their design may be "intellectual property", but they are not being rated BECAUSE of their intellectual property. In fact, they would be rated for aircraft application even if nothing about their design or construction was patented, copyrighted, or was in any way restricted. >> So, if anybody's still reading this, I am interested in _any_ examples >> where intellectual content (as opposed to food or drug packaging, for >> example) is required to be labelled. >Still, governments are quite talented at making ratings schemes look >voluntary when practically speaking they are not. You know, it's amazing how you fail to ask and answer obvious questions when they arise! Why, exactly, should the government NEED to "make ratings schemes look voluntary when practically speaking they are not"? After all, you would love to take the position that the government has this authority anyway. Is it possible you're just afraid to admit that the government(s) doesn't have this authority? Is it possible to don't want to acknowledge that the government(s) try to force people do things it has no right to? >> Such examples might shed some light on how these various proposals for >> "labelling" of Net traffic might work. And absent such examples, might show >> just what a tough road lies ahead for those advocating such labelling. > >I think it will end up much like motion pictures. The net will be asked >to regulate itself under the threat of government regulation, which might >be an empty threat if the First Amendment rights are applied. Most >people will comply, it being easier than making a fuss. Sounds like wishful thinking on your part. See, unlike movies and TV shows, which are produced by a relatively tiny number of companies which are easily targetable, Internet content will be produced by hundreds of thousands or even millions of sources. Nobody will have to "make a fuss," they'll merely FAIL to rate their material. No fuss, just no rating. And there will be people out here who will excoriate anybody who complies with such a ratings system. There will be essentially no pressure on the smallest organizations, because there will be far too many of them to target. Besides, since there will be no enforceable standards they will not be targetable anyway. Over time, ever larger organizations will refuse to rate, if they ever did. Eventually, and probably immediately, the whole system would collapse. At that point, there will be no government "threat" to regulate, because everybody will realize that the system is working just fine without regulation. Everyone will see an unregulated Internet, and nobody will see a powerful need to regulate it.

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cyherpunks archive
by Kris Steven Shannon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I can't get access to the cypherpunks archive at berkeley Is there a mirror site anywhere? (I don't have FTP access but have been using ftpmail(a)doc.ic.ac.uk) Any suggestions very welcome! Thanx. -- Kris Shannon <kss01(a)cs.uow.edu.au> 1st year Bachelor of Computer Science.

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Re: Digital Cash Escrow
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:51 PM 4/11/96 -0400, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >Does anyone, especially in Canada, ever noticed that them or their local net >friends had their snail mail opened? > >A friend of mine has his regularly opened; he complained to Canada Post >three times, but it stills goes on AFAIK. He is pissed off at me, convinced >that the forwarding of Jim Bell's AP related articles is what justified the >mail opening. Actually, he does not even reply to my e-mails anymore. >We used to be great friends... >Neither of us ever engaged in any subversive activities or are involved in >illegal actions. It seems that FUD got him. ...sigh... It does sound like the guy is overreacting a bit. However, I don't know much about Quebec politics; with that close vote recently on separation, perhaps they are getting nervous about things. Is he in Quebec? I can say, however, that I've never gotten any kind of "official" feedback on the subject, not that I really expect it. I've gotten a few inquiries which on the surface appear to be innocuous, but which I suspect have hidden motives. This could be a little hidden official research, or maybe just self-motivated individuals trying to do a "good deed." It doesn't matter; my idea doesn't need any secrets in order to be successful.

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Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:34 PM 4/13/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >At 08:07 PM 4/13/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >> >>On Tue, 9 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: >> >>> Look, very carefully, at the last paragraph quoted above. Mr. Safdar says, >>> "No reasonable person is objecting to the FBI's right to conduct a wiretap." >> >>That's right. Because no reasonable person thinks they can convince Congress >>or the Supremes otherwise. It isn't impossible, but energies are best spent >>elsewhere, like getting the Burns bill passed. > >But that's not entirely the issue. Mr. Safdar's wording is critical, >because it concedes FAR too much about what the government is assumedly >entitled to do. Below, you've admitted that everybody here believes in what >Mr. Safdar claims "no reasonable person" believes. [snip] No. Shabbir claims just what he said, AFAIK, that "no reasonable person is objecting..." A very different matter. What I believe and what I choose to object to through organized political initiatives may be two different things. If Shabbir's wording is so critical, why did you change it by adding "believes?" I don't believe government should be able to wiretap it's citizens, but I also don't think there's a snowball's chance in hell of taking that power away from the FBI. That's why I want strong crypto. There is a far greater chance of getting some decent crypto legislation enacted than of completely removing the FBI's authority to wiretap. It's a much more "reasonable" goal, in that sense. There are people much more deserving of cypherpunk scorn than someone who works as hard on these issues as Shabbir. It's pretty pathetic, Jim. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:33 PM 4/12/96 -0500, Scott Brickner <sjb(a)universe.digex.net> wrote: >Actually, I expect configurations like yours to become more widespread >in the near future. There are a lot of cable-modem designs that >basically put an ethernet port on your cable box. This leads to the paradoxical situation where your cable TV company can deliver you motion picture images of sex and nudity on the TV channel, but it's highly illegal for them to send you the same material as data.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 13-APR-1996 11:57:34.92 >Are you planning on affording them due process rights? Due Process rights are an interesting question in this regard. One, self-defense goes up against due process, particularly lethal self defense. One liberal justification for various bans or limits on lethal self defense (i.e., those against potentially lethal defense against property crimes - including preventing the criminal from making away with his stolen property) is that the criminal does not get due process. In such a case, it's usually reasonably obvious to the victim that self-defense is necessary, although others (such as, so far as I can tell, in the Goetz case) may not realize it. Two, who's going to apply the trial? As you've noted regarding overturning contempt charges, judges are very rarely willing to consider each other wrong (outside of the realm of appeals), much less sentence each other. Another instance of how judges tend to resist even the appointed mechanisms for removal can be found in the recent judicial commentary regarding a threatened impeachment for another judge; while they were correct in that case, the instance is instructive. This is a common tendency inside the government in general; cops are very loyal to one another, even when they're crooked. Seldom is anyone but an internal body (Internal Affairs) permitted to go after a cop (except with massive opposition by the police department), and even they are hated. >How about a trial, or does it merely take a single bidder with money to have >someone offed? The risk of innocents dying is a valid problem, and is the major reason that I have not "endorsed" assasination politics. The essential question is whether more innocents will die under such a system than do now, or under other proposed (non-violent) alternatives. The latter would be preferable, _if_ they work. As yet, I have hopes that they will; others, such as Mr. Bell, are more pessimistic. >Sounds like tyrrany of the rich to me. Unfortunately, it isn't. I say unfortunately because a tyrrany of the rich would be preferable to the tyrrany of the (incompetent) majority we've got currently; even the provisions in the Bill of Rights are removable by a super-majority. Of course, a tyrrany of no-one at all would be preferable, but I'm not sure if there's any way to do that. >> To whatever extent it exceeds those limits, and to >> whatever extent the public can't get justice to prevent those violations, >> why would the public be obligated to accept them? >Really Mr. Bell has recognized something important, though I'm not sure >even he realizes it. Specifically, that when his allies are so few in >number he must resort to general terrorism and low intensity conflict to >have any hope of success at all. This is essentially the moral problem of ends justifying the means; I do not regard this difficulty as solvable in any provable manner. >> To believe otherwise is to believe that the government has some sort of >> special dispensation to violate the law. I don't believe this; it wouldn't >> surprise me to hear that you do, however. Which is it? >I don't believe anyone has any special dispensation. It's all a question >of who can get away with it. For all your moaning and whining, you are [irrelevant material deleted] Essentially, can we stop _everybody_ from getting away with it, as you put it, or just some people? And if the latter, who should we stop? -Allen

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Enemies R Us
by cpunk＠remail.ecafe.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York Times, 14 April 1996 Private Groups Lead Charge in War on Far Right By Michael Janofsky Washington. In the year since the worst terrorist act on American soil, the bombing of a Federal building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people, the number of right-wing groups harboring anti-government sentiments has been estimated at mnre than 800, by some counts, and they now operate in every state. These are organized groups of militias, white supremacists, neo-Nazis- skinheads, survivalists and constitutionalists who are connected to each other with increasing frequency by the Internet, fax machines and a shared belief in Christian Identity, a renegade religious concept that. proclaims whites to be God's chosen people, Jews to be descendants of Satan and blacks to be subhuman. At the same time, however, as Federal agencies proceed with traditional means of intelligence gathering (as in the Unabomber case), and Congress ponders a new anti-terrorism bill (stalled by the gun lobby and civil libertarians), efforts to fight domestic terrorism are being supplemented more than ever by private human rights organizations that track the fringe right with their own networks. They willingly share information with law enforcement agencies, branches of the military and reporters. Federal law enforcement agencies, which were heavily criticized for their actions in fatal controntations in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Tex., appear to be trying a new, more patient approach in waiting for a peaceful solution to the current standoff with the anti-government group called the Freemen in eastern Montana. They have been criticized this time, largely by neighbors of the Freeman and local officials, for waiting so long to get involved, and for waiting at all. Undercover Work Most of the human rights organizations were actively campaigning against racism and anti-Semitism long before the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 and the arrest of two suspects with links to militia groups. And with many of the right-wing groups now hiding racist views beyond a more acceptable veneer of anti-government oratory, the human rights groups say the need to collect information has become that much more critical. At least two of them -- the Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Ala., and the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles -- use undercover operatives. Both organizations had spies attend a convention last weekend in Lake Tahoe that attracted hundreds of Christian Identity followers to hear a speech by Randy Weaver, the white separatist whose wife and son were killed three years ago in a siege by Federal agents in Ruby Ridge. The Southern Poverty Law Center has computer files of more than 12,000 people identified as members of a far-right group. The Wiesenthal Center operates an extensive electronic tracking station, where researchers monitor television, cable and radio shows all over the world for racist and anti-Semitic content. When the Army recently conducted an internal investigation to learn how many soldiers were involved with skinhead groups, senior officers at the Pentagon twice conferred with Wiesenthal Center officials, and when Patrick J. Buchanan was running for the Republican Presidential nomination, they produced names of Buchanan supporters who once worked for David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan member, or had affiliation with the National Association for the Advancement of White People. Law enforcement agencies have credited the human rights groups with helping the public become more aware of the beliefs, factions and heroes of the far-right fringe. The human rights groups see their efforts as a necessary antidote to the sympathetic treatment of far-right groups on conservative talk radio programs, and to the reluctance of some conservative politicians to criticize the extremists. But the work may have also produced some unintended consequences. Writing in The Jubilee, a publication of the Christian Identity movement, a former militia leader from Alabama, Jeff Randall, said the drumbeat of concern over domestic terrorism has served as a welcome recruiting device for militias and other right-wing groups. "Throughout all this," he wrote, "the militias became stronger and better organized. "Many people are wondering if the militia movement is still alive and well," he added. "The answer to that question is a resounding 'yes.' " ----- Full page ad: "False Patriots: The Threat of Antigovernment Extremists" Fast-Growing "Patriot" Movement Poses Danger of Domestic Terrorism Early Warnings In October 1994, Morris Dees warned Attorney General Reno that white supremacists were infiltrating the "Patriot" militia movement. He called the development "a recipe for disaster." Six months later, a powerful bomb destroyed a federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. The country soon learned that Tim McVeigh, the prime suspect in the attack, had neo-Nazi ties and connections to the "Patriot" network, the combination that Dees had seen as so explosive before the bombing. Now, Dees and his colleagues at the Southern Poverty Law Center have again warned the Attorney General about the danger posed by the antigovernment "Patriot" movement. In an April 9, 1996 letter, Dees urged Reno to take concrete steps to counter the threat of further domestic terrorism. He also provided her with a copy of *False Patriots*, the Center's new report on the "Patriot" movement. This 72-page expose is the culmination of a Center investigation into the "Patriot" movement conducted since the Oklahoma City bombing. United By Hate The "Patriot" movement encompasses numerous elements of the American right, from certain Christian fundamentalists to the Ku Klux Klan. It includes tax protesters, survivalists and neo-Nazis, as well as radical anti-environmentalists and gun enthusiasts. The tie that binds those in the movement, estimated by some at five million strong, is a virulent hatred of the federal government. This hatred has been fueled in recent years by the passage of gun control legislation, the deaths of Randy Weaver's wife and son at the hands of federal agents on Ruby Ridge in Idaho, and the disastrous federal assault on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco. The False Patriots report reveals the people behind the "Patriot" movement, people like Louis Beam, a key Aryan Nations leader, and Pete Peters, a pastor of the bizarre Christian Identity faith. It identifies over 800 antigovernment "Patriot" organizations, including 441 unauthorized militia groups. It describes how "Patriot" paramilitary units are preparing for war with the federal government. It offers an inside look at guerrilla literature and the tools of terrorism. It documents crimes linked to the "Patriot" movement, including plots to blow up other federal buildings. It demonstrates that the "Patriot" movement poses "a clear and present danger" to the nation. Expect More Bombs Immediately after the Oklahoma City disaster, a spokesperson for the Militia of Montana predicted more antigovernment violence. "Patriot" groups flooded the underground book market and the Internet with manuals on bomb-making, railroad sabotage and the production of deadly chemicals. "Patriot" leaders openly suggested the need to kill government officials. Since the Oklahoma City tragedy, numerous "Patriot" terrorist plots have been discovered, including plans to poison federal employees in Minnesota and conspiracies to blow up a federal courthouse in Spokane and an IRS building in Reno. An AmTrak train was derailed by a group calling itself "Sons of the Gestapo." Over ten tons of explosives have been stolen from various locations around the country in the past year. Authorities suspect a large quantity has made its way into the "Patriot" movement. In December, a survivalist was arrested in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas and charged with terrorism. He had produced 130 grams of the deadly poison ricin, enough to kill thousands. Secret Cells Formed >From California to Florida, "Patriots" are forming cells of five to ten men skilled in explosives, sniper fire, sabotage and terrorism. These secret cells operate without a chain of command to avoid compromising the larger movement. One cell recently uncovered in Idaho is financed by a wealthy businessman. These cells, like the one McVeigh is suspected of forming, are difficult to monitor and can strike when least expected. ____________________________________________________________ What You Can Do To Help Stop Domestic Terrorism You can take a number of steps to fight against domestic terrorists. + Contact your state attorney general's office Find out if your state has anti-militia and anti-paramilitary training statutes. If the answer is "Yes," insist that the laws be enforced. If "No," urge the attorney general's office to work for passage of such laws. + Support federal legislation to outlaw militia groups that are not authorized by state law These groups operate as a springboard for dangerous antigovernment activity. + Learn about the "Patriot" movement and share your knowledge with others The "Patriot" movement thrives on secrecy and citizen apathy. The *False Patriots* report offers the most complete way for concerned individuals to learn the full story of the "Patriot" movement. It was created by the Militia Task Force, a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, and is available to those who support the Center's work with a tax-decutible gift of $15 or more. The Militia Task Force is leading the fight to expose the "Patriot" movement and protect those injured in hate crimes. The Center's Militia Task Force and its Klanwatch Project monitor "Patriot" groups, especially those with racist ties. Computerized investigative files contain over 11,000 photos and videos as well as data on 3,200 groups, 14,000 individuals and over 61,000 incidents. A quarterly "Intelligence Report" is provided free to law enforcement agencies and the media. This work has not been done without costs. In 1983, the Center's Montgomery, Alabama, offices were burned by the Klan. Its lawyers have received serious death threats. Just this past November, three members of the Oklahoma Constituional Militia were arrested in a plot to bomb the Center's offices. ____________________________________________________________ Support the Center and its Militia Task Force and Recieve *False Patriots* Militia Task Force A Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue, Montgomery, AL 36104 Yes, send me a copy of the 72-page *False Patriots*. Enclosed is my tax-deductible gist to help expose the "Patriot" movement and protect innocent people from hate crimes and injustice [ ]$15 [ ]$25 [ ]$50 [ ]$100 [ ]Other $_____________ Name _______________________________________________________ Address ____________________________________________________ City ____________________________ State _____ Zip __________ ____________________________________________________________ A copy of the latest official registration statement and financial report filed by the Souther Poverty Law Center may be obtained by contacting Office of Charities Registration, 162 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12231. Y9604NYT

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Re: carrick, Blowfish & the NSA
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Blowfish has not been broken in my opinion. I wonder if Perry is thinking of MacGuffin, the block cipher by Schneier and Matt Blaze based on an asymmetrical Feistel network. It was broken, and I think it was at Eurocrypt. Here is a message from sci.crypt a month ago where Bruce discusses the status of Blowfish. A weak key attack is known against a weakened version, but I think the weak keys are rare. > From: schneier(a)parka.winternet.com (Bruce Schneier) > Date: 1996/03/14 > MessageID: 4i907g$9lj(a)blackice.winternet.com#1/1 > > The most successful attack against Blowfish to date has been against the > weak keys (two identical entries in an S-box). These can be detected in > a 12-round variant, but not in the full 16 rounds. I still believe that > random S-boxes are better than chosen ones, and think that more rounds > is better than fewer rounds with better S-boxes. There are a few > things I would do differently if I was to write the algorithm from scratch > right now, but on the whole I am still pleased with the results. > > Bruce Hal

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Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:58 AM 4/14/96 -0500, Mike McNally wrote: >s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >> > Look, very carefully, at the last paragraph quoted above. Mr. Safdar >> > says, "No reasonable person is objecting to the FBI's right to conduct >> > a wiretap." >> >> That's right. Because no reasonable person thinks they can convince Congress >> or the Supremes otherwise. It isn't impossible, but energies are best spent >> elsewhere, like getting the Burns bill passed. > >The choice of words was exceedlingly poor if that's what he really meant. >Though I agree that it's unlikely any LEA will give up capabilities it's >grown to imagine is has a "right" to have, I haven't stopped objecting. > Exactly! I think the issue is important enough so that we really ought to develop new wording, something that far more accurately reflects the bulk of our opinion towards wiretapping. For years, I've looked at it this way: Before the telephone era, "all" search warrants were probably issued for a specific address, and had to be served for a limited time period, a few hours or less. The owners of the location being searched were aware, at the time the search was going on, that the search was occuring. Moreover, once that search ended it was no more and those searched were aware of it. Unlike this, and quite unlike any warrants which preceded it, wiretaps: 1. Take an almost unlimited time period, compared to a 1-hour search. (Yes, they do come to an end, but...) 2. The users of the telephone line are not informed, while the search (wiretap) is being done. 3. To my knowledge, albeit limited, targets of wiretaps are NOT informed, subsequent to the tap, that they have been wiretapped. Therefore they are denied the opportunity to complain, even after the fact. I see no legal reason why wiretaps should have the "features" listed above. There is a certain practical reason they can: Due to the nature of wiretapping, it is not physically necessary to show up to do the tap, or tell those targeted, or tell them after the tap has been disconnected. However, it seems very unlikely that the mere fact that an invention allows a kind of search that was possible before, should automatically change the interpretation of the Constitution to allow that search. If a new invention allowed the cops to walk through walls untraceably, would that automatically mean that the normal protections that search warrants are supposed to provide are no longer valid? I don't think so! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Anybody know of a WinNT Remailer?
by Daniel Bender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not sure if this is really the right place to ask this, but... Does anyone know of a remailer that will work on Windows NT??? Dan

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Blowfish ain't broken
by Jerry Whiting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Jerry Whiting writes: > > One reason we chose to use Blowfish as the basis for carrick is that > > it _is_ a new algorithm. One has to assume that the NSA et al. has > > tools optimized to crack DES and possibly IDEA/RSA. At least let's > > give them something else to sweat over. > > Perry writes: > They won't sweat over it long. Blowfish was broken. My understanding is that Blowfish using only 3 rounds, not the full 16, has been broken. And yes, duplicate entries in an S-box are weak keys. carrick uses the full 16 rounds and we check for weak keys. I'll sleep at night. Jerry Whiting

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Re: washington post notices archives
by medea＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Andrew K. Bressen wrote: >we here at HKS.net have today received a cease and desist >letter from the washington post regarding editorial copy >of theirs that was evidently posted to c'punks and then >abosrbed into our c'punk archives. IMO, if you didn't remove the material from your archives, the Washington Post wouldn't be able to press the issue any further. Email posted to a listserv enters into and becomes the possession of the public domain. If they ran a search looking for their material, then obviously credit was appropriately given to the quote. The Unabomber's Manifesto was posted on the Net. Since the Post published it in its entirety, then they have a right to tell me to remove it if I had downloaded it? Personally, I think the letter is full of the stuff one would step into out on the range where the deer and the antelope play. Medea ============================================================ +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + |---------------------------------------------| + + | The mind is its own place, and of itself | + + | Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven | + + |---------------------------------------------| + +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

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math patents
by tien＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In reply to the message excerpted below: I believe Jim's not looked back far enough. My recollection from law school is that the law was friendly to math patents in the period before the Supreme Court weighed in. There were some PTO denials, which courts reversed (I think the Court of Claims heard these back then). So I think the trend was toward patenting processes even if mathematical until Gottschalk v. Benson. It's a conceptually messy area because "processes" have long been patentable (like the Morse telegraphy/Bell telephony patents) but the Supreme Court saw the Benson application as violating the doctrine against patenting "laws of nature." Lee From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Date: Sat, 06 Apr 1996 14:52:12 -0800 Subject: Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary? At 01:07 PM 4/6/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >> I contend that had he talked to Phillip Zimmermann in 1990 or so, he would >> have told Zimmermann that "It's illegal to write an encryption program using >> RSA, because it's patented! You'll never get away with it!" > >I would have indicated that "you're going to face the prospect of >intellectual property litigation, and that can get nasty in the extreme." One thing I've never heard is an explanation of how computer software and especially mathematics went from "extremely not patentable" in the early and middle 1970's, to "patentable" once Messr's Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman invented a piece of mathematics that the government wanted to deny to the public. How convenient.

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Re: carrick, Blowfish & the NSA
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:12 4/13/96, Jerry Whiting wrote: >Our marketing tag ("Encryption software so good, the Feds won't let us >export it.") may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy. But that's OK >because having others adopt carrick is our real goal. Building up a >strong U.S. user base is OK while we wrestle with the NSA over how big a >key length we can export. Their initial response was that 40-bit keys >were specific to RC2 and RC4 and that Blowfish was another kettle of fish >(bad pun intended). > >Either way we're going to publish an extensive FAQ on carrick that should >allow someone to not only work with carick but perhaps clone our efforts. >IANAL but my understanding is that publishing such a document, with or >without source code, and making it publicly available to non-U.S. citizens >is perfectly legal. I hope you are still going to publish source for US citicens? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: [Political Rant] Was: examples of mandatory content rating?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 14-APR-1996 00:37:25.93 >I tend to disagree. Ratings are generally consumed by parents and >otherwise custodial entities. The largest and richest market anywhere >has always been the 18-25 range, or 18-30 depending on who you talk to. >I don't have figures, but I think that internet users probably >prodominantely fall into 18-25/18-30. This age group generally could >care less. It's much easier to search by subject or key word than by >paying attention to ratings in any event. There is no real market for >ratings. If there were a strong market incentive for it, there would be >no need for government intervention, which there clearly is. Sure some >schools will purchase the services, maybe some parents, but this is a >long leap from major market and industry making entities. I'm not sure if the major use for ratings may not be searching for material that the raters don't like. I'd be interested in many things the fundys don't like, for instance. One could even do this via one of the "services" that mails out listings of places to be locked from kids - just sign up one of your anonymous employees, and get the data and put it on your anonymous web access site. Doing so - if you don't admit you've done it - may be cheaper than doing the research yourself. Of course, you'll need to check out each such site to make sure that it isn't a decoy that they've inserted. -Allen

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key bit lengths
by Jack Mott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In Applied Crypto, it talks about thermodynamic limitations of brute force attacks. I did some calculations and it looks like it will take, given a perfectly effecient computer, the combined energy of 509,485,193 average supernovas to brute force a 256 bit key. I was just wondering if there are any theoretical ways around this. I am just talking about plain brute force here, not attacking other weaknesses. -- thecrow(a)iconn.net "It can't rain all the time" RSA ENCRYPTION IN 3 LINES OF PERL --------------------------------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)

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Re: Blowfish ain't broken
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:28 AM 4/14/96 -0700, Jerry Whiting wrote: >> Perry writes: >> They won't sweat over it long. Blowfish was broken. > >My understanding is that Blowfish using only 3 rounds, not the full 16, has been >broken. And yes, duplicate entries in an S-box are weak keys. > >carrick uses the full 16 rounds and we check for weak keys. I thought there was a variant of Blowfish that fixed the problems that had been found with the algorythm. I believe it was called "Blowfish-SK". (I need to check my archives for further details.) Are you using the original Blowfish or the improved version? --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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NOS_tal
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

4-14-96. TP: "Was McCarthy Right About the Left?" Citing the Venona program decryption "revelations," Nicholas von Hoffman polemicizes about the consequences of the left's refusal to face that McCarthy may have been more truthful about communist infiltration of the USG than he knew. Von Hoffman recounts the high points of the 50-year history of left dissimulation and avenges the right with a nostalgic nukem dead red-under-bedder: As yet unexplored is the possibility that certain features in the political culture of the American left are hand-me-downs from this period. The "elitism" and didacticism that so gall its opponents may be a morphed version of the communist doctrine of vanguard leadership. The liberal penchant for government gigantism, complex bureaucracy and central planning may also have taken root in the liberal admiration of the Soviet system in the 1930s. NOS_tal

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[NOISE] Consolidation of threads ...
by olbon＠dynetics.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK, I have a proposal that consolidates two threads that have been discussed recently. How about proposing legislation that mandates that a byte is now 9 bits instead of 8. This would allow the ninth bit to be the decent/indecent bit, thereby solving all of our problems. Clay --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clay Olbon II | Clay.Olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer | ph: (810) 589-9930 fax 9934 Dynetics, Inc., Ste 302 | http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html 550 Stephenson Hwy | PGP262 public key: on web page Troy, MI 48083-1109 | pgp print: B97397AD50233C77523FD058BD1BB7C0 TANSTAAFL ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: washington post notices archives
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >1. Expect more and more of these sorts of copyright "cease and desist" (or, >as I like to say, "decease and cyst") orders, as newspapers and magazines >use search engines to find their stuff. Expect some "automated searches" to >be done routinely, even offered as services by third parties. ("Find >infringing copies...make $1000 a week in your spare time.") >4. Suppose the HKS archives were actually offshore, in the Cayman Islands >or in some place that doesn't recognize copyright law in the same way most >Western or Berne Convention countries do? In addition, what if the material is edited down to try to conform to fair use, as I do? First, you're still going to find it using the search engines - and will have to filter it out. Second, the hoster of the data, if locatable, will have to decide whether to respond to a legal threat and delete something that may be within such guidelines. Third, such guidelines may vary from country to country. >5. Suppose access to such archives is done via Web remailers, and the >location is not easily determinable? (To be sure, lots of hits means >traffic analysis will reveal the location....the same general problem with >"reply-blocks," of course.) To what degree could a remailer sense that its remailings are getting too predictable (susceptible to traffic analysis)? If it had some means of doing so (without keeping enough information to make subpoenaing it a profitable proposition), then it could do something like the random looping-back remailer chains, on an automatic basis to the degree needed to offset analysis. -Allen

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Infrared photography
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>No, Clay, I did not say that the flesh RADIATED near IR. (it does, but only >a very tiny amount.) The identification system I describe would probably >use 940 nm IRLEDs to illuminate the face, and a silicon CCD detector to pick >up the images. Or it would use ambient near-IR, perhaps from the sun or a >tungsten filament or fluorescent lighting, along with an IR filter to ensure >that the CCD camera picked up only the IR bands of interest. It would be >easy to check out the results: Put such an IR-passing filter in front of a >CCD-based camcorder, and take a picture of somebody. > >Incidentally, this simplicity shows the flaw in using this kind of system as >an identifier: Since people's faces are usually visible, and can be >photographed in the near-IR surreptitiously, it isn't clear how to prevent >faking a face which appears to have the same IR signature and pattern. I remember in a booklet from Kodak on their Ektachrome IR film, there was a picture of a forearm where all the veins were made clearly visible. This film is near infrared (if I remember, the red color on the film corresponds to around 1100 nm). Veins and artery identification might be possible, maybe, since fingerprint identification is possible. A friend of mine developped a quite functionnal algorithm doing just that in the late eighties. OTOH, the blood vessels patterns are probably much more constant, from individual to individual, than fingerprints. Just correct me if I am wrong. JFA PGP 2048 bits key at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID:C58ADD0D 52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Enforcing the CDA improperly may pervert Internet architecture
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"alano(a)teleport.com" "Alan Olsen" 14-APR-1996 00:34:14.24 >What these schemes will do is shield children from anything resembling a >"controversial" discussion. (I expect Cypherpunks to be labeled as "could >cause criminal behaviour" or some such malarky by the more protective and >clueless. (It may be true, but why warn them upfront? ]:> )) You will see >the forces of "good" try and protect the little kidlets from anything that >might get them to think for themselves. It is already happening in some >sectors of public thought, I expect the net to become its next victim. The proposed standard wants to make kid-nonavailable material on "glorifying drug use" and gambling. In both these cases, many political arguments on the subject (i.e., those arguing that the substances or behaviors in question are less harmful than some suppose) would be classified as something that parents should be able to block out. -Allen

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Re: Enemies R Us [Political Rant]
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>These are organized groups of militias, white supremacists, >neo-Nazis- skinheads, survivalists and constitutionalists who >are connected to each other with increasing frequency by the >Internet, fax machines and a shared belief in Christian >Identity, a renegade religious concept that. proclaims whites >to be God's chosen people, Jews to be descendants of Satan and >blacks to be subhuman. These views are shared by only a small minority of the patriot movement. This paragraph is pure propaganda. There are some of these people in the patriot community, but their percentages are not much higher than in the general population. >At the same time, however, as Federal agencies proceed with >traditional means of intelligence gathering (as in the >Unabomber case), and Congress ponders a new anti-terrorism >bill (stalled by the gun lobby and civil libertarians), >efforts to fight domestic terrorism are being supplemented >more than ever by private human rights organizations that >track the fringe right with their own networks. They willingly >share information with law enforcement agencies, branches of >the military and reporters. If Federal LEO's are getting so much help from volunteer snitches, why do we need the anti-terrorism bull? :) >Federal law enforcement agencies, which were heavily >criticized for their actions in fatal controntations in Ruby >Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Tex., appear to be trying a new, more >patient approach in waiting for a peaceful solution to the >current standoff with the anti-government group called the >Freemen in eastern Montana. They have been criticized this >time, largely by neighbors of the Freeman and local officials, >for waiting so long to get involved, and for waiting at all. Don't wait. Act precipitously. Burn all the [insert disliked individuals/groups here]. Oh, wait. Isn't that what Hitler did? >Most of the human rights organizations were actively >campaigning against racism and anti-Semitism long before the >Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 and the arrest of two >suspects with links to militia groups. And with many of the >right-wing groups now hiding racist views beyond a more >acceptable veneer of anti-government oratory, the human rights >groups say the need to collect information has become that >much more critical. There is NO clearly established connection between McVeigh and ANY militia group. This notion is more government propaganda. >At least two of them -- the Southern Poverty Law Center in >Montgomery, Ala., and the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los >Angeles -- use undercover operatives. Both organizations had >spies attend a convention last weekend in Lake Tahoe that >attracted hundreds of Christian Identity followers to hear a >speech by Randy Weaver, the white separatist whose wife and >son were killed three years ago in a siege by Federal agents >in Ruby Ridge. > >The Southern Poverty Law Center has computer files of more >than 12,000 people identified as members of a far-right group. >The Wiesenthal Center operates an extensive electronic >tracking station, where researchers monitor television, cable >and radio shows all over the world for racist and anti-Semitic >content. I find it ironic that the SPLC is run by far-left radicals of the type who did a lot of bitching in the 60's when their ox was being gored. (Does anyone remember COINTELPRO?) The Wiesenthal center is actively supporting legislation (the anti-terror bill, various gun control bills, etc.) that would give our gov't many of the same powers Hitler had, which he eventually used against the Jews. Those who refuse to learn from history will be condemned to repeat it. >When the Army recently conducted an internal investigation to >learn how many soldiers were involved with skinhead groups, >senior officers at the Pentagon twice conferred with >Wiesenthal Center officials, and when Patrick J. Buchanan was >running for the Republican Presidential nomination, they >produced names of Buchanan supporters who once worked for >David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan member, or had affiliation >with the National Association for the Advancement of White >People. About 3 in all, if I recall the news reports correctly. This "KKK people support Buchanan so Buchanan is bad" idea is fatuous liberal propaganda. If one were to poll the members of North American Man-Boy Love Association, a majority of them would probably support Clinton, because of his policy of loosening restrictions on "alternate lifestyles." However, I have yet to see any demonization of Clinton on this basis anywhere. (Not that I think it would be justified, mind you.) BTW, if the "advancement" of people on the basis of skin color is racist, then the NAACP, La Raza, et al, should be put out of business as well as the KKK and the National Association for the Advancement of White People. [B.S. snipped] >Now, Dees and his colleagues at the Southern Poverty Law >Center have again warned the Attorney General about the danger >posed by the antigovernment "Patriot" movement. In an April 9, >1996 letter, Dees urged Reno to take concrete steps to counter >the threat of further domestic terrorism. He also provided her >with a copy of *False Patriots*, the Center's new report on >the "Patriot" movement. This 72-page expose is the culmination >of a Center investigation into the "Patriot" movement >conducted since the Oklahoma City bombing. > >United By Hate > >The "Patriot" movement encompasses numerous elements of the >American right, from certain Christian fundamentalists to the >Ku Klux Klan. It includes tax protesters, survivalists and >neo-Nazis, as well as radical anti-environmentalists and gun >enthusiasts. The tie that binds those in the movement, >estimated by some at five million strong, is a virulent hatred >of the federal government. The 5 million figure is low. The NRA had almost that many members last I heard, and most of them are not survivalists, tax protestors, or neo-Nazis. Gun enthusiast == virulent hatred of government? More propaganda... >This hatred has been fueled in recent years by the passage of >gun control legislation, the deaths of Randy Weaver's wife and >son at the hands of federal agents on Ruby Ridge in Idaho, and >the disastrous federal assault on the Branch Davidian compound >in Waco. Shooting and burning people without a compelling reason for doing so pisses people off, and lowers public confidence in the agencies doing the shooting and burning. What is so radical about that? >The False Patriots report reveals the people behind the >"Patriot" movement, people like Louis Beam, a key Aryan >Nations leader, and Pete Peters, a pastor of the bizarre >Christian Identity faith. Beam may be a poo-bah in the Aryan Nations, but most "partiots" find his views revolting. This is another example of using an atypical aberration as an excuse for demonizing an entire group. I have yet to see a major news organization use the Unabomber to demonize radical leftist environmental extremists in this way, but the comparison would be far more truthful the ones made here. [Anti-patriot B.S. snipped] >Since the Oklahoma City tragedy, numerous "Patriot" terrorist >plots have been discovered, including plans to poison federal >employees in Minnesota and conspiracies to blow up a federal >courthouse in Spokane and an IRS building in Reno. An AmTrak >train was derailed by a group calling itself "Sons of the >Gestapo." Which turned out to have been done by a disgruntled former railroad employee who left the "sons of gestapo" note as a red herring. Could you at least stick to propaganda that has at least some basis in fact? >Over ten tons of explosives have been stolen from various >locations around the country in the past year. Authorities >suspect a large quantity has made its way into the "Patriot" >movement. In December, a survivalist was arrested in the Ozark >Mountains of Arkansas and charged with terrorism. He had >produced 130 grams of the deadly poison ricin, enough to kill >thousands. Explosives thefts are nothing new. Regulation of explosive materials is. Explosives and poisons can be made out of commonly available materials. If this is such a problem, how come this country wasn't bombed and poisoned into oblivion 50 years ago? >Secret Cells Formed > >>From California to Florida, "Patriots" are forming cells of >five to ten men skilled in explosives, sniper fire, sabotage >and terrorism. These secret cells operate without a chain of >command to avoid compromising the larger movement. One cell >recently uncovered in Idaho is financed by a wealthy >businessman. These cells, like the one McVeigh is suspected of >forming, are difficult to monitor and can strike when least >expected. Another unsubstantiated insinuation that McVeigh is a militia/patriot/skinhead type. >What You Can Do To Help Stop Domestic Terrorism [Snip] >Find out if your state has anti-militia and anti-paramilitary >training statutes. If the answer is "Yes," insist that the >laws be enforced. If "No," urge the attorney general's office >to work for passage of such laws. > >+ Support federal legislation to outlaw militia groups that >are not authorized by state law > >These groups operate as a springboard for dangerous >antigovernment activity. Yes, throw out the second amendment. The government can control people much more easily when they are helpless... >+ Learn about the "Patriot" movement and share your knowledge >with others Absolutely, yes, hallelujah, preach it brother! You might want to chesk out other sources than the SPLC, however. The best way to find out what views an organization holds is to directly contact the organization, rather than a member of the opposition with an axe to grind. >The "Patriot" movement thrives on secrecy and citizen apathy. So does government tyranny and oppression. [B.S. deleted] >The Militia Task Force is leading the fight to expose the >"Patriot" movement and protect those injured in hate crimes. >The Center's Militia Task Force and its Klanwatch Project >monitor "Patriot" groups, especially those with racist ties. Yes, concentrate on the skinheads and other kooks. That way, you can tar everyone else with the same stick... [SPLC fund-raising crap deleted] >A copy of the latest official registration statement and >financial report filed by the Souther Poverty Law Center may >be obtained by contacting Office of Charities Registration, >162 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12231. I find it disgusting that a radical left-wing propaganda outlet like the SPLC can legally call itself a "charity." Jonathan Wienke

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Re: math patents
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:08 AM 4/14/96 -0800, Lee Tien wrote: >In reply to the message excerpted below: > >I believe Jim's not looked back far enough. My recollection from law >school is that the law was friendly to math patents in the period before >the Supreme Court weighed in. There were some PTO denials, which courts >reversed (I think the Court of Claims heard these back then). So I think >the trend was toward patenting processes even if mathematical until >Gottschalk v. Benson. It's a conceptually messy area because "processes" >have long been patentable (like the Morse telegraphy/Bell telephony >patents) but the Supreme Court saw the Benson application as violating the >doctrine against patenting "laws of nature." > >Lee I seem to recall reading that one of the breakthrough "algorithm" patents was from the 1970's, in which a rubber-curing/molding process's cure time was determined by a mathematical formula based on heat, pressure, mold shape, and a number of other variables. I don't really object to this, because some engineering tasks are complicated and mathematical formulas are required to solve them optimally. However, I don't see the basis for patenting what is just about pure mathematics, and RSA is very close to pure math. The fact that there is a practical use for it is almost a secondary consideration. If factoring numbers were easy, RSA wouldn't have been useful, even though the math would still have "existed," at least theoretically. Clearly, it is not the math itself which is useful; it is a specific characteristic of that math, its difficult reversibility. A person looking for a mathematical algorithm to apply to public-key cryptography probably doesn't try to do new math; what he tries to do is to find old math that has this characteristic. Had mathematics always been patentable, the patent on that math would have expired at least decades, and possibly centuries ago. In any case, I don't think it's unrealistic to suspect that the government was playing games with the patent system due to RSA. After all, let's get back to basics: What, exactly, does a patent do? A patent on RSA doesn't prevent the EVIL SOVIETS from using it. It doesn't "allow" the USG to use it; if there was no patent on it they'd be able to use it for free. The only thing a patent on RSA might arguably do is to keep other people, mostly Americans, from using it. That's right, the patent system was actuallly denying the public this system.

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DC Cypherpunks meeting report
by Dan Veeneman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, The DC Cypherpunks held their monthly meeting on April 13 at the Digex offices, with about a dozen people attending. The agenda was light, with discussion ranging from ISDN in Virginia and Maryland, a security hole in rlogin, various biometric identification methods and Dorothy Denning's GPS ID plan. Carl Ellison gave an overview of Cybercash, and answered several questions. After the meeting, a smaller group adjourned to a local Chinese restaurant, where most of the discussion focused on getting inexpensive ISDN or IP connectivity between Baltimore and northern Virigina. No meeting date was set for May. Dan -- system(a)decode.com (Dan Veeneman) Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS +1 410 730 6734 Data/FAX

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Re: "Contempt" charges likely to increase
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:57 AM 4/13/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > >I will not, of course, reply to Bell's reply. That's strange. George Orwell (in the book "1984") said "Freedom is slavery. War is Peace." etc. In 1993 Waco, the FBI said "This is not an attack!" Today, Unicorn says, "I will not, of course, reply to Bell's reply" I would have to agree that yours is not a _good_ reply, but it sure appears to be some kind of reply, despite your silly claim. >On Sat, 13 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> At 07:59 PM 4/12/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > >> >The government of the United States doesn't play "fair" when they want >> >something. >> >> But if the government of the United States does play "fair," then why can we >> not play "fair" and kill their agents who violate what we feel is our >> rights? > >Are you planning on affording them due process rights? There are over 150 nations in this world, today. Each of them probably has a different view of what "due process rights" are. Which nation's "due process rights" are you referring to? And are you referring to the letter of the law (or Constitution) or merely what passes for "due process" in each of these countries? Are you showing your biases by using a term of art such as "due process rights" at all? In any case, not all criminals at not all times are entitled to "due process." Self-defense is legitimate, without trial, in the case of an emergency. I suggest that what constitutes an "emergency" depends on the likelihood of getting assistance and justice if that self-defense and counter-attack is foregone. If you've just managed to tie your attacker to a tree, and the cops are a phone call away, society declares that you shouldn't shoot him, and should let the court system handle it. However, if you're a black in 1955 Mississippi, and the sheriff's brother has just attacked you with a knife out in the woods and you grab a gun and are holding him at bay, I think it is not unreasonable to conclude that the fairest outcome that you can expect is to shoot him dead for his stupidity, then run and hope that nobody figures out who did it. And the whole basis for asking people to forego their own version of justice is simple: Society claims that courts exist to provide justice, and also claims that a criminal who's caught will get a fair trial. But it's obvious that government will not judge its own agents fairly (except in unusual cases where incriminating videotape exists, and sometimes not even then), so there is no presumption that a person victimized by government can expect justice. I think it's clear that whatever "social contract" that you might want to claim exists no longer applies in such a circumstance, and it's reasonable to act entirely outside the current "justice system" in those circumstances. Naturally, government thugs will disagree, but they're PAID to disagree! > What about other >rights generally? At least the U.S. government attempts to do this. More accurately, it occasionally attempts to APPEAR to do this. But since the government, through the SC, claims to be the final arbiter of what those "due process rights" are, you can't expect an unbiased opinion from it in this area. > How about a trial, or does it merely take a single bidder with >money to have someone offed? Sounds like tyrrany of the rich to me. I >might add that if this is the way things were the richest would be the >survivors, able to kill their enemies, protect themselves better, and >deploy their own agents. In fact, to a "rich" person it would look like quite the opposite situation! Even a relatively small number of non-rich people could finance his death, and he wouldn't even know who his enemies are. As usual, you show almost not grasp of the concept. Your opposition is based on your desire to maintain the current tyrannical system, or at least enough of it to allow you to keep your current privileged position. >> After all, the government is merely the representative of the >> people (at least in theory!) and it 'must' follow the rules (laws, >> Constitution, etc). > >I think the U.S. government does a much better job at this than almost >any other sovereign excepting perhaps the U.K., which has still had its >share of self contradiction. Is that relevant? I don't recall ever having stated or implied that the USG is the worst offender, either qualitatively or quantitatively. However, it _is_ an offender. Sounds like you're trying to set up a straw-man again; par for the course for you. >> To whatever extent it exceeds those limits, and to >> whatever extent the public can't get justice to prevent those violations, >> why would the public be obligated to accept them? > >Really Mr. Bell has recognized something important, though I'm not sure >even he realizes it. Unfortunately, I think that Unicorn hasn't recognized anything. > Specifically, that when his allies are so few in >number he must resort to general terrorism and low intensity conflict to >have any hope of success at all. I've never supported "general terrorism." In any case, the term has been abused over the years so that it carries a lot of rhetorical baggage. If you know of a "terrorist" that would prefer to attack innocent civililians (those who are not government employees) instead of the people who are really causing the trouble, please tell me who he is. And "low-intensity conflict", in many cases, exists ONLY because the government maintains it. Much of the warfare in the inner cities, for instance, exists ONLY because of the so-called "war on drugs." I think it's realistic to conclude that this is not simply an accident. >> To believe otherwise is to believe that the government has some sort of >> special dispensation to violate the law. I don't believe this; it wouldn't >> surprise me to hear that you do, however. Which is it? > >I don't believe anyone has any special dispensation. It's all a question >of who can get away with it. For a long time, governments at all levels and in all countries have been "getting away with it." I favor a system that makes this impossible. You don't. > For all your moaning and whining, you are >still less able to get away with it than agents of the CIA and the men on >top. It must be killing you. I can feel the way the knife twists in you >with the realization that you are another small gear in the machine. What gear? which machine? I must be a gear that got away! >You and the Unabomber. Horrified at the thought that you might be >insignificant. Driven by the need to be important, noticed. Having not read his manifesto, I hesitate to comment. However, from what I've read about it, he's long on discussing what he sees as being the problem, short on prescribing a practical solution. And he seemed to select his targets without regard to whether killing them would do any "good." I'm quite the opposite: I don't pretend that my AP essays contain a complete description of what I see as the problem, or even the outline of it. In fact, I carefully avoided the issue in most cases, for that would have increased its length manyfold. (I assumed that most people who read it would already have at least been aware of many problems, whether or not they conclude that my solution is justified by them. I don't claim that my view of the problems is somehow special, merely that everyone knows of enough problems to justify formulating a solution.) My solution, however, despite being distasteful to some people, is frequently if not usually thought of as being not only possible, but in fact practical. >Some people work to change the system by developing structures to work >within it, or around it. I intend to go THROUGH it, every bit of it. But it isn't just me; essentially everthing I've described is merely the unavoidable consequence of the modern developments of networking, good encryption, and digital cash, three facts that no government is going to be able to stop. Some of what I've discussed was considered years ago by others; I've merely extended it. >You call for the assassination of (not even particularly important) >public officials on the whim of the individual who happens to have cash. That's not true. Hey, they can always resign! And I've repeatedly stated that most of them will resign, especially when their paychecks stop coming.

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Re: Is crypt(1) a prohibited export?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:21 PM 4/13/96 -0700, you wrote: >crypt() is a hash function, and hence is not subject to export restriction. >(To my knowledge). >> Is crypt(1) a prohibited export from the US? I thought it was. The >> reason I ask is that it has come to my attention that HP ships that >> overseas too, with HP-UX versions 9 and 10... crypt(3) is a hash function, used for passwords and login, and is exportable. crypt(1) is the rotor-based enigma-like encryption filter, and is not exportable. The Unix versions that support crypt(1) generally also have a -x option for ed and vi to let you edit encrypted files. Crypt Breaker's Workbench works on it. Actually, unless you specifically apply for permission, even rot13 isn't exportable. Unfortunately, this means it's illegal for me to make Rot13-Breaker's Workbench available for ftp :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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RC4 licensening
by Jack Mott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello Cypherworld, Anyone know how much it costs to license RC4 or how RSA has been handling the whole situation? I finally got my Turbo C implementation to work with the DELPHI 2.0 version, I'm pumped. Now I just have to get GCC figured out and I'll make the Linux version work too. yyyeeeeha. -- thecrow(a)iconn.net "It can't rain all the time" RSA ENCRYPTION IN 3 LINES OF PERL --------------------------------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)

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Re: Open Systems, Closed Systems, & Killer Apps
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:14 AM 4/10/96 -0400, you wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Various correspondents have pointed out that X.25 is an "open system" in >that it is not proprietary. I knew that. I was thinking more of >hierarchical vs peer-to-peer. I have been under the impression that >TCP/IP connections are more peer-to-peer between different sorts of >networks (or nodes) than X.25. Isn't X.25 more of a standard for a >single network? Don't X.25 networks need someone more "in charge" than >TCP/IP networks, or am I mixing up different layers on the OSI reference >model? X.25 is an interface between a Data Terminal Equipment and a Data Communications Equipment, rather than a whole-network format like IP and TCP. X.25 networks often have random proprietary internals, and they're designed for a world where there IS only one network, because after all, there's only one Phone Company; the X.75 protocol lets X.25 networks talk to each other. But if you look at the higher levels of the protocols, they're not really that different than TCP applications - you've typically got a listener application waiting around for connections from client programs. It feels a bit less peer-to-peer because usually the service you want is the X.3/X.28/X.29 stuff that's X.25's equivalent to telnet, so the server end is a MainFrame, and the client end is a terminal pad that you've connected your 3270 or dumb terminal to. But you can do other things as well, if your computer environment will support it. Simon Spero wrote: } you can call X.25 a lot of things, but proprietary is not one of them. } X.25 did not fail because it wasn't open; X.25 failed because it was crap It's not dead yet, and you can't even say it's failed, given that it's still in wide use in much of the world. X.25 was design to work on networks with really bad bit loss - we're talking modems on barbed wire here, or whatever the French use instead of barbed wire, and in days when computers were _slow_. Yes, it's bureaucratically designed, and parts of it genuinely are ugly, and it does lots of work at Layer 2 that these days you'd do at a higher layer. And, yes, it's a lousy environment to do full-duplex character echo over. But it works ok for a large fraction of the world's data communications, which are designed for less interactive environments. It's fine for email. It's fine for 3270 fill-in-the-blanks applications. It's fine for pre-Web online service applications like CompuServe. It reeks badly for client-server applications which do a dozen little handshakes per transaction, which are designed assuming they're on a LAN and fail badly when stretched across an ocean, but you'll find they often do badly on frame relay as well. Are the Internet and Frame Relay both better ways to do anything than X.25? Yeah. Would I want to do interactive work on it? Of course not. Would I like to do another project getting vendors to modify their X.25 and CLNP to support a set of seldom-used options that some security consultant once convinced one of my customers they needed? No way. Was I susprised that not only does AT&T still use X.25 in some of its older dialup networks, but that it's still very big overseas? Well, yeah :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: RSA-130 Falls to NFS - Lenstra Posting to sci.crypt.research
by Tim Dierks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:51 AM 4/15/96, Jim Gillogly wrote: >mpd(a)netcom.com (Mike Duvos) writes: >>one? Also, a ballpark guess of how this result extrapolates to >>the MIPS years required to factor a 512 bit PGP key would >>probably be of interest to all. > >I don't have a good guess for this, but Arjen did say that the cost to >break RSA-130 was a fraction of what it cost to break RSA-129 because >of the improved algorithm, so I'd guess we'll find out soon. The next >target of the consortium is planned to be RSA-155, I believe, which is >above 512 bits; that means skipping RSA-140 to go for the one with the >higher psychological value. While 512-bit PGP keys are interesting to >Cypherpunks, other 512-bit RSA keys are vitally important to some banks. Also, note that 512 bits is the current exportable limit for RSA encryption. - Tim Tim Dierks -- timd(a)consensus.com -- www.consensus.com Head of Thing-u-ma-jig Engineering, Consensus Development

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[fwd] Undeliverable Message
by Clemens Stiglechner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It seems that mailer-daemon(a)usafa.af.mil is running amok; it has sent 64 *different* *encrypted* messages to the Hemingway List within 6 hours until now. I just wonder which kind of encryption _they_ might use. Here is the first one: - -----Beginn Forwarded Message----- Sender: owner-heming-l-outgoing(a)mtu.edu Received: from opus.mtu.edu (opus.mtu.edu [141.219.70.3]) by arl-img-4.compuserve.com (8.6.10/5.950515) id KAA06421; Sun, 14 Apr 1996 10:17:40 -0400 Received: from mtu.edu (mtu.edu [141.219.70.1]) by opus.mtu.edu (8.6.13/8.6.10) with ESMTP id KAA18535; Sun, 14 Apr 1996 10:17:37 -0400 Received: (from daemon@localhost) by mtu.edu (8.6.13/8.6.10) id KAA06326 for heming-l-outgoing; Sun, 14 Apr 1996 10:17:15 -0400 Received: from 34trwmail.usafa.af.mil ([128.236.38.1]) by mtu.edu (8.6.13/8.6.10) with SMTP id KAA06314 for <heming-l(a)mtu.edu>; Sun, 14 Apr 1996 10:17:13 -0400 X-Authentication-Warning: mtu.edu: Host [128.236.38.1] claimed to be 34trwmail.usafa.af.mil Received: by 34trwmail.usafa.af.mil; Sun, 14 Apr 96 8:17:03 MDT Date: Sun, 14 Apr 96 8:17:02 MDT Message-ID: <vines.g1Y7+SXEQlA(a)34trwmail.usafa.af.mil> X-Priority: 3 (Normal) To: <heming-l(a)mtu.edu> From: <MAILER-DAEMON(a)usafa.af.mil> Subject: Undeliverable Message X-Incognito-SN: 547 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=2.01 ENCRYPTED=YES Precedence: list Reply-To: heming-l(a)mtu.edu begin 600 attach.Z M'YV0:=R,>7/&31HZ;URTF7,&@,.'$"-*G$BQHL6+&"N"V&@#!@P0`#:"B$&# M!DB1)$V&%"G2A@T:,CC&F`$3!@V:'T?*B,$S)(R,0(,*'4IT8ITY=,+(V0B` MS9LQ8=@4I>@4JM2I6+-JW<JUJU>L5-[H8$E6)`\T9=H$/-."#9`V=.JX*$.F MC@\%0\:,+4M6P90Z8M24&4-G+]DJ;LB489/&3ADY8<2P*0.B29DY<\*<*:-` M@67,FBF[>4,'A&+&CN70!8$0A.HQ:>"D*>.&SAP08A:_N>-B(Q35F$$8B0'" MS)NE:-G``7'G(!H05IPT4?!8SG$0`Q7/Z<V7;^<$T9O,L#ECKV759)PK00*$ MB)$B3HX`J3(EB)$@"AKD5Q!^_$T0+;1061!),"'$$UB`D,04PE7!!!.=B40% M6B"T<5EFFV$7AANCE9:;:8LU]MAJN4%U%&5TH*6`2*_%-EMM)]S61AAIL"'& M&WA@]T9M-+IQ6XJ4S8A'&FW4T08(;AB9VU)OF`'"BAM9"-IF<[``0ABWS5&& MAWFP1N$<>2"5UI5DJ&404I`A)`=W$W+&XF`NTE9:D4B!.!D=E,WQAH457AC: M;;D9I]J5;N0!)0BDH;64E!A>IJ$;N%%VFHCHN7#HH6U6&,:011[):&@@,*96 M:8)>"<*)<L2H:8TWYIC&;8?&``,+'L'`)H6*F1%&'6S,Z6>&HAX$PJLCU=KG ME)=Q=V@090;T*AUI'G<;5)!JZ2NRH1)YT&U'K>4E98<V0:.-.&XTQ99TK'6; M&74(E.Z.5]HQ;F23#0LID$^*)*X;H%:AY:*TU;$1"DW05X04*?06X497H`5I M&*?^J^J,K):K6AACH/4CA<'2826^AZ):X5&EG;9EGGM2UN2WQS8*:!F"@BL2 MOA23FR.U5XXQ1AEPE+9AEVT<1UE``YEY1LM_6JI`@$PW[?33`6[TA!QIG!%0 M5)7]2ID1;[#AU!VW`0CUV$^'95AW()R5UEIMO1777'7=E=?9W?D%F&"$T;T1 M8I.F1B]EGS7:6>"@=F@GI:NUUJ)L<K[\-7>_72@<<:4FMUQS*4(G'75R6+=4 M=LFB7=9W_9%GWHCII;A>>^_%-U]]]^VG7^G_1=T$@08BJ""#1C@((:84?IHA MM89_V#?JD9JHY;>'+OXB'1./VZJ./`:T<9";$FDDDDH^AJB3API_F958@F`M M;EWB"Z:81X;1[)G0AJ'FK6YNY+R<(]=I,I[FIXPTE9&*&:$,)9)$>4]\T]I0 MI`Z7&KI82B3`PQZGMB>^;(VJ.->!&*JB5S%7P0HELZH5_4"D*UY=JU$6%!:Q M9.61_X4N7QMAEIF>%2TY)+!:6W)A"FT3,6^!3%_2*Q<(SD6'=+GA#.MJ%V'2 M`*\PR*M&?[,7R\*UH7[]JT])&EC!IG"PA#WI4`VCC:DV**,@YNAB&7,4OCKV M,0J%[(IT*MEB3M8_/JV,9EI[F0`/13,S/BIG.^O9`"LD-'L5S5L(5!K9%LDT MJ5'-:OQB0]:PQ36O[29LC&2DV42W$;49K6UPD0M=[**?N7$2!/KY2V`&4QB^ M2*$,8T'"VHYXAS#DP4IPF`R6RA`"_>B'<!DRW/'0PYHWN`9.C*N-XW8#.>#< M9C@81,YB+N<<S35!/]6Y#NBV<TJ1^%(!X)&.?\JSD?/013WL<0]\Y$,?^P3A MF[,3)WG$-J`"'2A!"VK0@[XIH>!I[5'%DU2(&DB&Y.UJ>4#2SYM@DTSHE;&# MU$N*]5(a)F).T=*4EM6-+W4!F^/)(O2SD40_J^%"8\M>]]-)3?<>BG4/LA\WGY MD^.=4,8G!`:PD#]K*:*`!#!DW7"!PW2@3G6:J8IV2H<=B^88)?90FPWK-CJ5 M%:T\,L)<[:I72-56:59HK$1N1*<R=!::5&K#/YZO@AWCUAQ\2"&=B@NB0T27 MNHJCQ'<][(ELB&)`6.;6*F;(7P<,F!8-AK#>\)-A#EOJ8SCH5#1JC&5LY.L; M#T(a)R.]%13W9T$AY]>M-!Z;2/$,49Q@+ILT(1<E!$VQ,B\^B";V9RD8ZLVM4D M"<RM=>UKF'SMV+B&'&+)*0V#8HP9*%,$)(``#>XS%1RL(YDQ8>XY9%"M&\KP M&&_=(64/2\RW]&,A2-T!#<9$P5[10*PWR,8@.TK!E2QYA\2AY4BMB:Z9Y%>& MW@PAKZH1"&4V5-`C0&9G^E$*9>#P&.3"X7H@V,QTUWJ;.Y(7I#XJ@Y7$4(>M MEF8@M0E('5:SU]8880I&`($)]*.%Q9`!8BAH[WHEN8;1W.%*-ZHP"(JK*O*> MX3GF=1:\5J:H%)!/NWO=D'X"@B?@&/%HM>S2$1AD`A`$@3$[`P$*:'R;]#"D MLL^-IH6D:9V`4&;)5S)#D?6#+Q%`09?+@\-1P&2EZ+KA!'00@2'3H)C:2%$. M&P:1<"93!SS/P8L-DY^7B!45-G"W#!LJ36N**\4B+V2C:<'2&'@E/R9"2BTW M]M!^D92&*,,A#`1>BJ#T@]DR[*B^W[R""XK@@BGT!@E*F9$;9@=<2*8!8D/8 M4]#<T-ZH9`XQE%HK'?*@'RET&(a)V[)H.5K/#._7SEV=".MK2G3>UJ6_O:V,ZV MMK?-[6Y[^]O@#K>XQTWN<IO[W.A.M[K7S>YVN_O=\(ZWO.=-[WK;^][XSK>^ M]\WO?OO[WP`/N,`'3O""&_S@"$^XPA?.\(8[_.$0C[C$)T[QBEO\XAC/N,8W /SO&.>_SC(`^YR$=.\G@# ` end - -----End Forwarded Message----- - -- Clemens Stiglechner a9401816(a)unet.univie.ac.at compuserve: 100725,3222 0xE7A9BDE5 1024 bit - 1996/03/28 99 EC A6 35 0F 85 4D 0D 14 BA 81 D5 71 37 F8 8A -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMXFzouKiyjznqb3lAQEWpQP/bJ01LVanoLiRAUlotLK2O9zxuN06TAZ9 n4FkJWN7dDcXAPLrlrgVlh//0sUnpgmGYeaP0+jrySv6OchtqGaRg6wlqvIIML6+ M+uxz9ntq1/AtEWEmRoYzI/PaPSWg9LtSGZotRukpXen47mKuQGqXvrusy/zbgzH x9g0ztmOeNM= =/o0z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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instructions for anon.penet.fi? please
by O.C.Winton WN1Z 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wonder if someone here could pls tell me how to go about finding out how to use the anonymous remail services @ anon.penet.fi. On the list please. Thank you. orrin(a)redshift.com http://www.redshift.com/~orrin

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Re: What can the judge do to me?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:51 PM 4/15/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Mon, 15 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> At 10:21 AM 4/15/96 -0700, Hal wrote: >> >From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> > >[...] > >> >I didn't understand what distinguishes civil and criminal sanctions. Is >> >it the nature of the proceedings, whether it is a civil or criminal case >> >that is before the judge? Or is it the nature of the contempt charge >> >itself, where not doing what the judge wants, in broad terms, is civil >> >contempt? And in that case, what would be criminal contempt? >> >> He may answer those questions, but I don't think he'll dare answer the >> question about if there is a constituional justification for a difference >> between "civil" and "criminal" in most things the government's courts do. > >Mr. Bell amuses me because he can never decide if he's a constitutional >formalist, as above (all things the government does must be explicitly >justified in the constitution) or a pragmatist, Above, I merely asked a question that you still can't answer. The fact that courts claim that there is a difference between "civil" and "criminal" does not mean that any such difference is constitutionally mandated, or for that matter even allowed. Nothing in your response showed otherwise. >(a) A criminal contempt fine is punitive and can be imposed only through >criminal proceedings, including the right to jury trial. Does that mean that it would have been constitutionally impermissible to take the different position that ALL fines are ultimately "punitive"? That position is apparently not _excluded_ by the constituion, which means that at best, you might try to argue that your position is _allowed_ by the constitution. But since the Constitution is, indeed, the statement of the government's authority, not its limits, that would be a contradiction. The obvious conclusion is that your sentence above is simply unsupported by the Constitution, as are many of your statements below. I'm not claiming that you are, necessarily, the source of the contradiction: Obviously, most of it is simply governmental misbehavior that you are reporting. >A contempt fine is >considered civil and remedial if it either coerces a defendant into >compliance with a court order You do love those circular arguments, don't you! Maybe it's pointless to ask you why anybody has to "comply with a court order." I've already asked this before: What, in the Constitution, gives judges authority over non-defendant citizens? >(b) Most contempt sanctions share punitive and coercive characteristics, and >the fundamental question underlying the distinction between civil and >criminal contempts is what process is due for the imposition of any >particular contempt sanction. Direct contempts can be penalized summarily >in light of the court's substantial interest in maintaining order and >because the need for extensive factfinding and the likelihood of an >erroneous deprivation are reduced. Greater procedural protections are >afforded for sanctions of indirect contempts. Certain indirect contempts >are particularly appropriate for imposition through civil proceedings, >including contempts impeding the court's ability to adjudicate the >proceedings before it and those contempts involving discrete, readily >ascertainable acts. For contempts of more complex injunctions, >however, criminal procedures may be required. Id. A paragraph which is delightfully free of constitutional justification. It apparently merely parrots the decisions of courts, it doesn't explain them. Typical Unicorn behavior. >Because civil contempt sanctions are viewed as nonpunitive and avoidable, >fewer procedural protections for such sanctions have been required. Hmmm... I wonder why? I mean, would it have been impossible for the SC to have declared that regardless of those assertions, ALL such sanctions require those "procedural protections." Unicorn has no answer, as usual. Hint: If the position you support is true, then you should be able to show me evidence that no other alternative position is consistent with the Constitution. As long as you cannot show that one PARTICULAR interpretation is uniquely supported, you haven't supported this particular claim. >To the extent that such contempts take on a punitive character, however, >and are not justified by other considerations central to the contempt >power, criminal procedural protections may be in order. International Union. No constitutional justification, again. Ho hum. >The justification for the contempt charges are on the >proper administration of justice, to which every citizen is entitled. Unicorn fails to show that "Proper administration of justice" requires contempt charges. And the most obvious problem with the "to which every citizen is entitled" argument is that it is vastly overbroad: If it could be used in this instance, it could be used to justify beating confessions out of prisoners, shooting unarmed suspects, and practically every other act that somebody claimed was necessary for "the proper administration of justice." After all, consider how "justice" was administered 300 years ago. I'm sure those people did a lot of things, based on a claim that it was necessary for "the proper administration of justice." Was it really? What, BTW, is "proper"? >While I'm sure Mr. Bell would like it if he could just flip off a court, >as with most self centered types, I don't think he has considered the >ramifications of this kind of impunity in the aggregatre. Is that a satisfactory justication for your position? > >Mr. Bell claims this is a new tyrranical development. Mr. Bell is incorrect. Where, EXACTLY, did I claim that it was a "new" development? I've carefully re-read my statements, and I see nothing that states or even implies this. Continuing to knock down that straw man, huh? >Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 19 Wall. 505, 510, 22 L. Ed. 205 (1874) >(contempt authority is vital to the administration of justice). >(122 years ago). In 1860, slavery was considered vital to the running of much of the US. So? [a couple other old decisions excised because they are irrelevant, and they are irrelevant because I didn't claim this was a "new" development."] >One might also remember where the term "pressing the defendant for a >plea" originated. Contempt sanctions are nearly 500-600 years old and >are a response to the need to effect compliance with orders and summons. Which simply means that what a court thinks it "needs" is frequently wrong. If courts "needed" pressing, why do they no longer do it? Hmmmmm? Apparently, it wasn't really necessary, and thus, any justifications based on the claim that it was necessary were dishonest. As are your justifications today, on a somewhat different issue. I've long pointed out that your own arguments self-destruct, and perhaps that was the most laughable example. >> We also won't get a straight answer about the constitutional justification >> for "contempt of court" penalties at all! The Constitution defines the >> powers of government; it does not restrict those of the people. > >I suppose you don't think anyone need serve on juries? Generally in a non-slavery society, if you want people to do something for you, you hire them at a wage they will accept, and they'll happily do what you want. It's called "capitalism." Too bad courts still believe in slavery. >Or appear before a court when summoned? Tell me, if _I_ "summon" somebody, do they have to show as well? If not, why should a "court" have any such authority. > Or testify if its inconvenient? If it's testimony in favor of the prosecution, and I don't want to give that testimony, I see no constitutional justification for forcing me to do so. You'll probably try to claim that this testimony is "necessary." Let's suppose I was out of the country and was unavailable for subpoena. The trial would go on, anyway, so obviously my testimony was not "necessary" by any logical definition. It was merely desirable, by somebody's opinion. Sure, the prosecution may lose the case, but the prosecution doesn't have a "right" to win the trial, now does it? At best, it only has the "right" (arguably; but even that "right" is conditional) to have a trial. The outcome is not guaranteed! >> The idea >> that a judge can punish someone, especially someone not present in court, is >> bizarre. It is even more odd when such punishment appears to exceed what >> the government is allowed to do absent any kind of jury decision and >> conviction. > >Huh? Ever hear of late filing fees? Administrative fines? Taxes? I said it was "bizarre." I did not say it was "uncommon." BTW, note that "late filing fees" assumes that somebody is obligated to file something, and likewise "Administrative fines" assumes that somebody is entitled to levy them, etc. We won't get into taxes, that would take FAR too long. > How >many examples do you want where government can impose costs on persons >without a fully jury trial? Even contracts are in the end enforced by >government in the United States. But they apparently don't have to be. Arbitration is an option. >> If you're willing to accept NON-Constitutional "justifications," I'm sure >> you'll get plenty of that. >> >> The only hint of a Constitutional obligation to testify comes from an >> amendment which states that defendants have a right to compel testimony >> favorable to them; it does not say that prosecution has the right to compel >> testimony from a third party that incriminates a defendant. > >Look, Mr. Bell. I don't know where you get this stuff, I notice that you failed to address the point. You're unable to find any Constitutional justification for compelling prosecution testimony. There is no constitutionally-defined mechanism for it, either. That's because none exists. > but you really >need to take a few classes in jurisprudence. I am well aware of the misbehavior of government. The issue is constitutional justifications for it. They seem to be, well, practically nonexistent. > You need to learn what life >would really be like if the strict reading of the constitutional you urge 5>was followed, and you need to transcend your political Yaddaing into a set >of criteria which resemble something like earthbound possibilities. I'm working on it. But you won't like the outcome; there will be no "kings", either stated or implied, in the system I am crafting. No centralizations of power at all. It will be a system you can't understand. > >> If his >> response is, "Oh, but we've ALWAYS done it that way!", you need to remember >> that until the American Civil war, slavery was legal in southern states, and >> until 1920 women weren't allowed to vote, and until 1955 "separate but >> equal" was the law of the land, until 1972 or so the death penalty was >> constitutional...and then it wasn't...and then it was again...and so on. >> Government is never willing to admit it's wrong until it's good and ready. > >By 'wrong' you mean doesn't agree with you. I'm sure precident and it's >rationale means little to you. That's spelled "precedent." But why am I telling you this?

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Rot-weiler (Re: Is crypt(1) a prohibited export?)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:45 PM 4/14/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >Actually, unless you specifically apply for permission, even rot13 isn't >exportable. >Unfortunately, this means it's illegal for me to make Rot13-Breaker's Workbench >available for ftp :-) S.Boxx made this available a couple of years ago--it was called "Rot-weiler." But it was bit of a dog. --Klaus

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Re: key bit lengths
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:59 PM 4/14/96, Jack Mott wrote: >In Applied Crypto, it talks about thermodynamic limitations of brute >force attacks. I did some calculations and it looks like it will take, >given a perfectly effecient computer, the combined energy of 509,485,193 >average supernovas to brute force a 256 bit key. I was just wondering if >there are any theoretical ways around this. I am just talking about >plain brute force here, not attacking other weaknesses. By "perfectly efficient" do you mean a computer which dissipates (uses) a kT per logical operation? If so, then calculations are easy to do. However, there are two theorized alternative approaches. First, disssipationless or "reversible" computing, a la Landauer, Bennett, Toffoli, Fredkin, Merkle, et. al. If actually feasible (and some of us are skeptical), then computation could be done with much less energy per logical operation than kT. Second, quantum computation, a la Deutsch, Shor, Bennett, et. al. (Yes, some of the same players.) See the work on quantum factoring. As with reversible computing, the energy consumption may be vastly less than the kT per logical operation usually considered to be the lower bound on energy needed. As I said, I am skeptical. Interested readers may want to track down several references: -- "Workshop on Physics and Computation," Proceedings, 1992, put out by the IEEE. -- a Santa Fe Institute publication, "Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information," ed. W. Zurek. I have more references and discussion in my Cyphernomicon. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: washington post notices archives
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:38 PM 4/14/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > In addition, what if the material is edited down to try to conform to >fair use, as I do? First, you're still going to find it using the search >engines - and will have to filter it out. Second, the hoster of the data, if >locatable, will have to decide whether to respond to a legal threat and delete >something that may be within such guidelines. Third, such guidelines may vary >from country to country. "Fair use" is very tricky. The Church of Scientology files lawsuits against even those that mention that Saint Ron believed the Key to Becoming Clear lay in communicating with plants. And if the editors of a newspaper want to file suit, they can. In fact, newspapers don't necessarily have more copyright rights than others do. What if a person like me demands that an archive site remove articles by me? I have not signed any waivers authorizing an archive site to distribute, sell, trade, or otherwise disperse my articles! (Recall the controversy some years back when a compilation of jokes from rec.humor.* was sold, without compensation to the joke authors. Changes are being proposed in copyright law. Maybe good, maybe bad. I don't follow the controversy. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: RC4 licensening
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:08 4/14/96, Jack Mott wrote: >Hello Cypherworld, > Anyone know how much it costs to license RC4 or how RSA has been >handling the whole situation? Who cares how much it costs to license RC4. Just use the fully compatible freeware RS4 (I believe?) code. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: [fwd] Undeliverable Message
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's not encrypted - it's just Unix :-) The "begin 600 attach.Z" tells you it's uuencoded, which is a way of representing binary data in ASCII to make it safe for mailing, and that the resulting file is named "attach.Z". This looks very much like something compressed with the Unix compress program, so you can use uncompress or gunzip to uncompress it. Inside that is a binary file, starting off with characters that look like a Unix "tar" archive format; there are some headers including filenames and nulls, followed by ASCII files. So use a tar program to unpack it. Bill At 11:59 PM 4/14/96 +0200, Clemens Stiglechner <a9401816(a)unet.univie.ac.at> wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >It seems that mailer-daemon(a)usafa.af.mil is running amok; it has >sent 64 *different* *encrypted* messages to the Hemingway List within >6 hours until now. I just wonder which kind of encryption _they_ might >use. Here is the first one: .... >begin 600 attach.Z >M'YV0:=R,>7/&31HZ;URTF7,&@,.'$"-*G$BQHL6+&"N"V&@#!@P0`#:"B$&# # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-04-14 15:10:21 EDT, you write: >I see no legal reason why wiretaps should have the "features" listed above. >There is a certain practical reason they can: Due to the nature of >wiretapping, it is not physically necessary to show up to do the tap, or >tell those targeted, or tell them after the tap has been disconnected. >However, it seems very unlikely that the mere fact that an invention allows >a kind of search that was possible before, should automatically change the >interpretation of the Constitution to allow that search. > >If a new invention allowed the cops to walk through walls untraceably, would >that automatically mean that the normal protections that search warrants are >supposed to provide are no longer valid? I don't think so! Mandating that phone companies allow wiretaps is analogous to mandating that all houses be constructed of Plexiglas, with the shades on the outside, so the gov't can look in at their leisure.

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PGPCrack
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ I tried sending this a couple days ago, but apparently no mail I sent that day ever got delivered. My apologies if any one has already received this. -- Mark ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have written a UNIX program that will brute-force crack a PGP conventionally encrypted file using a dictionary of passphrases. I am working on making it possible to break secret keys also. If you have any suggestions or bug reports, feel free to e-mail them to me. The URL is: http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/pgpcrack5b.tar.gz The MD5 hash of this file is 46aa9e37020ac2efce73d870fe1acbdc. - -- Mark =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= markm(a)voicenet.com | finger -l for PGP key 0xf9b22ba5 http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ | bd24d08e3cbb53472054fa56002258d5 "The concept of normalcy is just a conspiracy of the majority" -me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMW6j0LZc+sv5siulAQETGAQAnKr1n/OnWS6CpQqTQSRAJhTTCkq1zP8N l0QZYKrvO9i3EE0uXYF88EIXludrXq2mzEZCOeh4vjF0Ym8KEc82gUdRwAfxPxTU YxHylDI56PdvgLwRBAoBiGTaUZwajM+sEtvJaH1fYshPR7neTF+Aw3YL+cMQ/iQt PMFKXEM9GWQ= =fgA8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: X.25 [NOISE]
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:45 PM 4/14/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >And, yes, it's [X.25] a lousy environment to do full-duplex character >echo over. I implemented and have been supporting a system with full-duplex character echo over X.25. I can only agree with Bill Stewart's assessment, but you hold your nose and do it. I have learned that an X.25 "standard" network is about as standard as a K&R C compiler. Sure you can talk to the network, but each network is different in what you have to do to get it to send you the ASCII characters so you can echo them. Many times you have to use non-standard, network specific extensions. I am also responsible for getting Zmodem style data transfers to work. To make it work means the network must be fully 8-bit transparent, AND send the last chunk of data eventually (within a few seconds) to complete the transfer. Don't even ask about getting Zmodem transfers working thru X.25 to various "Unix" systems. Now you know why I claimed the title, "Wizard of Trailing Edge Technology" in Dogbert's New World Order. Regards - Bill [To be complete, I also do work in electronic commerce, Java and other things you see on this list.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: key bit lengths
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:21 PM 4/14/96, Mark M. wrote: >I doubt it. This calculation is based on the minimum amount of energy >needed to invert a bit. The amount of energy is a function of the temperature, >so a brute force attack might take much less energy several billion years >hence, since the universe will cooled off more. There only way for there to >be any way around this, is if a way was found to lower the termperature to >near absolute zero consuming a very little amount of energy, or if some way >was found to invert a bit using less energy than is currently believed (very >doubtfull). Of course, if P=NP, then brute-force attacks will be pointless. A late April Fool's joke, methinks? Arguing that in "several billion years" the "temperature" of the universe will have anything to do with computation....well, your physics is all wrong. The approximate figure, kT, for the minimum energy in a conventional bit flip, can be reduced by simple cooling. Not a problem. And what the so-called "average temperature" of the Universe may be in, say, 10 billion years, will not affect computation. Fusion will still occur, stars will still burn, sunshine will still produce heat. And so on. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Heat death of the universe
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 14 Apr 1996 21:19:27 -0700 > X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net > Subject: Re: key bit lengths > > A late April Fool's joke, methinks? Arguing that in "several billion years" > the "temperature" of the universe will have anything to do with > computation....well, your physics is all wrong. > > The approximate figure, kT, for the minimum energy in a conventional bit > flip, can be reduced by simple cooling. Not a problem. And what the > so-called "average temperature" of the Universe may be in, say, 10 billion > years, will not affect computation. Fusion will still occur, stars will > still burn, sunshine will still produce heat. And so on. > True, but there will be considerably fewer of them doing it. Jim Choate

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