December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Cypherpunk Enquirer
by Ted Garrett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Man, I wish I knew who was writing this! No matter what mood I start out in, once I've waded through the noise and get to the Enquirer, I always feel better.

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Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:24 1/26/96, Johnathan Corgan wrote: >On Fri, 26 Jan 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > >> One wonders why people spend so much time arguing about the V-chip, telecoms >> dereg, sex on the net, Trade Policy, or Immigration when it's intuitively >> obvious that these things are (or soon will be) no longer subject to central >> control of any kind. > >It is absolutely fascinating to observe the widely differing views held >by you and Lucky Green on the same subjects. > >The two of you seem to represent opposite ends of the spectrum of >cypherpunks thought, to the extent that there is such a thing. Its been like that for a long time :-) Just for the record, I hope that Duncan's view will prove to be correct. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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OFFSHORE RESOURCES
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, There has been sporadic interest on this list with regard to offshore incorporation, banking, etc. While ads for offshore services are common in the international press, until now, none of these companies has an Internet presence. THE ECONOMIST has an ad for OCRA, a group that specializes in offshore company services. What's new is that they have a Web page. It includes a good primer on the benifits from going offshore and on selected offshore jurisdictions. I've never done business with these folks, but they have good info. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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DUH
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, In my OFFSHORE RESOURCES post I left out the URL, which is: http://www.ocra.com/ S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Nym use in the real world
by Eric Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With the coming Internet restrictions and growing use of the net by LEAs, it's become obvious to me that I shouldn't post messages with my real name. But I have some problems/questions about using a nym: 1. reputation. My nym will need to build it's own reputation, I know. But I currently get offers of work based on my reputation and posts. I would like this to continue. When it comes time to do the work and collect the pay, I need to tie my nym to me. Reasons: only the most adventurous firms would hire someone to do work without knowing their real name. I also need to have the proper forms (1099 etc) filed. I know that a lot of people on the list would say that I shouldn't file taxes, but I am (currently) willing to pay the price to stay out of jail. The other problem (tying the nym to RealName) for employers is more severe. A nym is only good when no one can tie it to your real name. If I have to tell everyone I do work for what my real name and nym is, soon enough people will be able to tie the two that the nym becomes nearly useless. 2. does it (a nym) really help? Police and governments are used to dealing with people who change their names, use fake names, etc. I get the impression that having multiple/fake names is considered by police to be evidence or at least indication of guilt. "If you're not guilty why're you hiding?". Using a nym would at least help with the problem of police or other parties searching through Dejanews/Altavista for my posts for incriminating evidence. But if my nym is investigated for some future crime (fuck Exon) and my nym isn't secure enough to protect my RealName, it will be a liability. Thoughts?

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Doctor Denning
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just read the new and improved Dorothy Denning essay at http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/crypto/Future.html and I must say that I am impressed to see that our august little group has managed to define most of the issues Dr. Denning addresses. She even uses the Gospel According to Tim as her first bibliography entry. One should realize, of course, that whether Crypto Anarchy prevails depends not upon the varied philosophical leanings of citizen-units May and Denning, but rather upon whether our mathematics is more powerful than their jackbooted thugs. Success also depends upon the implementation of widely distributed comunications systems which are not vulnerable to attacks launched against any particular set of nodes, and which obfuscate which processing elements are responsible for providing any specified instance of a service. Crypto Anarchy running on the World Wide Crypto-Mesh. Your guarantee of a government-free future, Denning and friends notwithstanding. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: OFFSHORE RESOURCES
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:46 PM 1/26/96, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >There has been sporadic interest on this list with regard to >offshore incorporation, banking, etc. While ads for offshore >services are common in the international press, until now, none >of these companies has an Internet presence. ??? I've been tracking offshore banks with Internet presences for more than a year...I figure only those with Net savvy are worth looking at. An Alta Vista query of "offshore AND banking" just revealed 2000 hits, suggesting a lot of activity. Some of these hits are for banks, some for services catering to offshore bankers, some are reviews of what's out there, and some are of course just plain accidental hits. But you get the point. --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: "Concryption" Prior Art
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 19:04 1/26/96, pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: >However the Con-cryption patent covers first compressing, then >encrypting. Isn't that how PGP does its thing (first compress the data and then feed it into the Encryption Stage)? PGP is prior art in-and-of-itself.

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Re: Microsoft's CryptoAPI - thoughts?
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:24 PM 1/26/96 GMT, John Lull wrote: >On Fri, 26 Jan 1996 03:02:56 -0500 (EST), Futplex wrote: > >> Has someone here managed to extract PostScript hardcopy of the CAPI from this >> Web page? I tried earlier this evening and wound up with a miniature >> ecological disaster on my hands. The page says: > >No problem on a LaserJet 4M. > > > >> "For ease of online reading and printing, we've provided copies of this >> lengthy document in Microsoft Word and Postscript formats." > >I tried printing the Word version from WordView, also, and ran into >major problems. It absolutely insisted on setting the printer to >manual feed, and when I tried to print the odd-numbered pages, >WordView crashed complletely. > >> Worse still, it appears that the >> capiapp.ps file is actually a catenation of many PostScript files (one per >> chapter?), each beginning with a version of this ensnarling line. > >Maybe that's why I couldn't extract odd & even-numbered pages. > > > The odd command line in the postscript file is specific to HP laserjet's. It is a command that tells the printer to switch to postscript mode. The Microsoft print drivers are bad about this. One option is to strip all occurances of this line from the file or load and print the file from GhostScript, a postscript processor. Hope this helps. Lou Z. Lou Zirko (615)851-1057 Zystems lzirko(a)isdn.net "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzBLJocAAAEEAMlDzYJPYq0pvfMuSiKU0Y65L2nJql+qEJHYGjO5Pys4prDw YW1ooPWaqrPQAy/eyqrM7I9KNFDCtmaPxtgcPw2oEDfc/w6cPkrVzvovKLfHQvtg V/hHUekptSf6j525omrVAoM9MxVL3sEGCjn9VrTeC3h9upkfntHOJeL88i2NAAUR tB5Mb3UgWmlya28gPHppcmtvbEBkYXRhdGVrLmNvbT4= =Qlxm -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 20:18 1/25/96, jim bell wrote: >Now, I was born in 1958 and thus can't claim personal knowledge of the time, >but it's truly amazing how UNPERCEPTIVE the public must have been in the >late 40's and early '50s about "intelligence" realities. Let me give you a >specific example: The classic movie, "The Man who Never Was," relates the >(true) story of a counter-intelligence mission done by the British to (I >think) mislead the Germans into believing that the attack on Sicily would be >substantially LATER than it actually was. The code name for the project was "Operation Mincemeat" and the intent was to get the defences at Normandy ("Operation Torch" - ie: D-Day) away from there and transferred to Sicily (which was NOT a D-Day objective) not as you say to fool them on when the attack was coming. It did its job and much of the mobile coastal defences were moved out of the area.

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Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:13 AM 1/26/96 -0500, Duncan Frissell wrote: >At 01:58 PM 1/25/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: > >>The big problem is how are the labels attached to the programs. I >>agree with Tim that it is probably imposible for individual Usenet >>postings. However is should be possible for TV programs, and whole >>newsgroups. > >Since TV programs will soon *be* "individual Usenet postings," it will not >be possible to rate them. Even the Earth doesn't have that much time. The >economic "drag" involved would be too great. I think you have a very different view of rating than I do. For example, I would be comfortable rating all the Sesame Street shows for sex and violence without seeing any more than I have seen, just based on the reputation of the show's producers. Based on reviews in the newspaper (since the net has replaced TV for me), most of the current network shows can also be rated for all their episodes. Remember also, there is an "unrated" catagory. Some people will refuse to access unrated material. Others, (I suspect you and I) may seek it out. >Once we have high-speed connections to the nets, the amount of video out >there will explode. There will be more to watch than watchers (remember >video archives). Search engines will help people find what they want and >avoid what they don't want. "Sex and Drugs and Rock and Roll" (Wine, Women, >and Song) will be like any other available subject -- some will want to find >it and some will want to avoid it. Just another problem of how to extract >the content you want from all the mess. Search engines won't be all that >perfect but they will be all we have. One possible addition to search engines would be to give the people who have actually viewed the video/web page etc. an opportunity to rate it on any of several criteria including whether they thought it was worth their time. Other people could then use these ratings as they wanted (including ignoring them). The big problem I see would be making the system easy enough to use to get a reasonable response. Bill

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Re: Signing nyms' keys (Was: Report on Portland Cpunks...)
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:42 PM 1/24/96 PST, janzen(a)idacom.hp.com wrote: >Furthermore, by signing a nym's key you place yourself at risk. If you >sign the nym's key with your own key -- or sign using the key of your >own nym, and that nym is subsequently "outed" -- then anyone wishing to >find the individual(s) behind any nym whose key you've signed can >attempt to coerce you into revealing this information, since you have >claimed to know it. This is the real problem, one which doesn't (to me) have a ready solution. If others can demonstrate that there [is|is not] some fairly straightforward way around it, I'd be happy to read it. Bruce Baugh bruceab(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab

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No Subject
by gorkab＠sanchez.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was leafing through the new terms of service from my ISP, and lookie what I came up with: .... stuff deleted * Posting private e-mail to any newsgroup or mailing list without the explicit approval of the sender is strictly prohibited. * Impersonating another user or otherwise falsifying one's user name in e-mail or any post to any newsgroup or mailing list is strictly prohibited. * We reserve the right to take whatever actions we deem appropriate in enforcing these policies, including the ones below. We also reserve the right to change these policies without prior notice at any time. ... stuff deleted The actions we take may include account suspension or termination. We do not issue any credits for accounts cancelled due to policy violations. The second point make me wonder if NymServers are logal to use with my service (PSInet, Interramp) ---------- Brian Gorka Key fingerprint = ED 7D 78 7E 95 E8 05 01 27 01 A1 74 FA 4B 86 53

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Re: "Concryption" Prior Art
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I believe the patent applies to simultaneous compression and encryption. The simultaneity supposedly saves time. That's the big advance. -Peter

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Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:57 AM 1/26/96 -0600, Mike McNally wrote: >Bill Frantz writes: > > An unmoderated group or list carries a higher risk of seeing inappropriate > > material. However even unmoderated lists have standards and those people > > who enforce those standards. > >Enforce? Enforce? Exsqueeze me? On cypherpunks, Perry is the principle enforcer, although others frequently join in. > > > This kind of enforcement is an example of > > communitarian as opposed to authoritarian control. It all depends on just > > how vital it is to the consumer (and rating group) that NO inappropriate > > material appear. > >And of course, it doesn't work. There's an unlimited amount of >mindless dreck floating around every unmoderated nesgroup; I've been >reading news long enough (and NN makes it easy enough) that I avoid it >without a second thought. I assure you, however, that no attempts at >"nettiquette enforcement" are effective in a general sense. Of course it works. Cypherpunks stays much more on the topic than it would without Perry. Since Perry has no way of directly enforcing his opinions, they can be overridden by any other posters, but his "moral suasion" does have an effect on many of us. Bill

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Re: John Doe
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:07 AM 1/26/96 -0500, tallpaul(a)pipeline.com wrote: >On Jan 25, 1996 20:58:48, 'jdoe-0007(a)alpha.c2.org' wrote: >>The John Doe NYM/Remailer interface for Windows is a most excellent >>program that will allow even the most cypher-illiterate to make use of >>the technology that has been the exclusive domain of those in the >>"techno-know". It was a piece of cake to set up, obtain a NYM and select >>inbound and outbound remailers with options to chain as many as your >>paranoia deemed appropriate. >>$25.00 seemed a little steep but they will get my $$$. Nice Job. >>John Doe 0007 >(Unlike jdoe-0007 I think $25 is a very low price to pay for the new >capacity. What the hell! We're not gonna' pay for it out of our own lazy >pockets. We'll raise the tax on hot tubs and get other people to buy it for >us.) I haven't DL'ed/pirated/bought it yet, but what does it do that Joel McNamara's Private Idaho doesn't do? (BTW, PI is _freeware_ as in $25 less than $25.) dave (dsmith(a)alpha.c2.org - see, it doesn't have to be anonymous after all) --- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1210 Towers South, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63701-4745 +1(573)339-3814, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0x961D2B09 Do not use old PGP keys 0x92732139 and 0xFF829C15. http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/

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Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:50 PM 1/26/96, Mike McNally wrote: >The "enforcement" is always a reactive thing. I don't think you'd get >far with a parent explaining that the material they consider indecent >which somehow showed up on alt.kids.only would be dealt with by >blistering flames. ... >So you think those who want a "controlled cyberspace" would be happy >with newsgroups that stay "mostly decent"? I strongly doubt it, and I >will also add that such "enforcement" is far, far less effective on >newsgroups than on mailing lists. By the way, we should always be ready to would-be censors/moderators of Usenet that "kid-friendly" alternatives either exist, or could be created by those interested in screening stuff. What many of us object to is the notion that legislators in some particular country can cause the 12,000+ Usenet groups, or the accesses via the Net and Web, to be turned into something safe for all children, or all Muslims, or all women, or all vegans. AOL and its ilk are used by parents I know as a "kinder and gentler" introduction to the Net for their impressionable ankle-biters. There are a zillion special interest groups that want their members protected from various kinds of stuff out there in the world. I don't have to list them here. We as Cypherpunks should strenuously point out that the speech of adults on forums like Usenet should not be reduced to the level of what all children should hear. Nor should we endorse "voluntary self-ratings" proposals, for the many reasons discussed here recently. I for one will not slow down my speech, slow down my postings to Usenet, by carefully reviewing my words to see if they are offensive to children, their parents, their grandparents, Mormons, Jews, Boy Scouts, schizophrenics, high-strung neurotics, Muslims, animal rights advocates, queers, Rosicrucians, persons of color, persons of no color, or persons of poundage. Fortunately, the technological trends strongly mitigate against the Net and the Web ever being controlled by the censors of any one country. "Not even speed bumps." --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:50 PM 1/26/96 -0600, Mike McNally wrote: >Bill Frantz writes: > > >Enforce? Enforce? Exsqueeze me? > > > > On cypherpunks, Perry is the principle enforcer, although others frequently > > join in. > >Oh, right. I remember now. All the off-topic junk I see on this >list is just my imagination. All the billions of "UNSUBSCRIBE" and >"SIGNOFF" and "SET NO-MAIL" messages I see on the mailing lists I'm on >are just bits of lint that slip by. Absolutely correct. What we don't have is general firewall discussions and general conspiricy discussions (which are directed elsewhere). Perry performs a needed function. >The "enforcement" is always a reactive thing. I don't think you'd get >far with a parent explaining that the material they consider indecent >which somehow showed up on alt.kids.only would be dealt with by >blistering flames. Such parents would not let their children read unmoderated/unrated newsgroups. I think they are failing their children, but they would certainly disagree. >So you think those who want a "controlled cyberspace" would be happy >with newsgroups that stay "mostly decent"? I strongly doubt it, and I >will also add that such "enforcement" is far, far less effective on >newsgroups than on mailing lists. The people who want a "controlled cyberspace" will not be happy. I want explore the consiquences, both technical and social, of taking the control away from them by putting in the hands of individuals and minor children's parents. This approach would destroy their principle argument and make it less likely that they will succeed. However, unlike the motion picture precedent, I think multiple rating agencies will not only be desirable, but necessary. I assume that in addition to the Christian Coalition's rating service there would be a Hottest Pics of the Net service. Bill

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Re: Crypto Exports, Europe, and Conspiracy Theories
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:06 PM 1/26/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >Why aren't foreign companies flooding America with strong crypto? Well, >there are clearly pressures of the sort Tim described at work. But there >are other factors as well: Let me emphasize that I was raising the issue as food for thought, as an obvious question. Put another way, there are a lot of non-U.S. cryptographers, Cypherpunks, and programmers. They should be looking at the (putative) $60 billion a year cost of the ITARS as evidence that a market for strong crypto probably exists. (I will be interested to see what non-U.S. code gets developed over the next year or two, and how the U.S. government reacts to its importation into the U.S. The main RSA patents will soon be expiring, those that don't get thrown out in the wake of the RSA-Cylink-MIT-Stanford-PKP-Schlafly-etc. brouhaha, that is.) >o Crypto isn't at the top of the list of factors when people pick > software. Do most of use use 40-bit downloadable Netscape's ... Maybe not important for casual users, but there's that $60 billion a year figure again, so somebody cares. And digital commerce is front page news almost every day, with security a major hot topic. >o Most foreign countries aren't wired as well as we in the US are. > Most people in Switzerland don't have cheap easy access to the net, Though of course many countries are extremely well-wired. The Scandinavian countries, for example. And the U.K. (e.g., demon, one of the earliest full-service ISPs). But I don't want to get into a debate about numbers of subscribers, etc. My main point was that crypto tool development has traditionally been possible with fairly small teams...so I wonder why more development has not happened in Europe and Asia, given the apparently compelling advantages of not having to worry about the U.S. ITARs! (That this "apparently" may not actually be so real is of course my main "food for thought.") > for example. That's one reason that the web, a good Swiss idea, has > been developed primarily in this country. America has more people > thinking about the net than other countries do, and it's not > surprising that we're out in front in net software. A minor correction. Tim Berners-Lee is British, and was only working at CERN, which effectively straddles the French-Swiss border, near Geneva. And he is now, or was recently, working in New York. I would have a hard time calling his work "a Swiss idea." Obviously many of the ideas that go into the Web (hypertext, a la Bush and Nelson, connectivity, ISPs, etc.) are heavily American-based or -influenced. >Digicash is probably the first significant crypto product to be exported >to America. It's not very popular yet, but I think that most of us here >agree that it is, in potential at least, as significant as >Mosaic/Netscape. It's important to note that this extremely important >product couldn't have been produced here, patents aside. Transaction >systems need to be international, and our rules make America an unsuitable >place from which to launch tranaction software. I agree about Digicash (and I cited it as an example in my first article). However, the lack of available crypto for export, and the cloudy situation about Chaum's patents (*) has made Digicash almost a footnote in the race for digital commerce, with a dozen other more visible product announcements in the news. (* I wrote up my views on the problems with software patents, having to do with the inability to "meter usage," in contrast with physical objects such as microprocessors.) --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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[rant] A thought on filters and the V-Chip
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Not Perry(tm) approved -- Skip of this offends you] I am waiting for someone to come out with a product that will modify the v-ship (or the various internet "protection" tools) in such a way that it scans *FOR* pornography. Porn is big business. You would think that people would pay for a way to sort through all of that non-smuttiness and just "get to the good stuff". I also imagine that as soon as such a product appears, the censors will scream bloody murder. The purpose of all the ratings, and the filters and all the other stuff is not to "protect kids". It is to protect the prejudices of the adults. They do not want to see it anywhere in the world, not just inflicting some sort of imaginary harm on their children. I expect the first people to use the "reversed filters" will be the kids themselves. (Behind the parents back, of course.) I have known too many adults that believe that by restricting their kids access to information, they can prevent them from growing up. In these parent's minds, such information is what makes them want to hump their little brains out. Biology has nothing to do with it in their limited way of thinking. Cluelessness does not just cover computers with these people. It also covers any other topic that required more than two brain cells to understand. But censorship alone will not solve the problems that these people see in the world. They are afraid that somone, somewhere, is commiting "sin". They will do what it takes to stamp out all this immorality, no matter who gets hurt or what it takes. A good description of what is next is at http://www.cum.net/cnextstep.html . You have to realize that these people are busybodies who believe that they have the right to define what is right and what is wrong. In order to enforce these beliefs, they will need access to every means of communication in existance. Anything that prevents this enforcement will be seen as a threat and thus must be banned. Encryption will be one of the first things to go. Double entendres, sarcasm, and wordplay will be next. Fiction dealing with anything that would offend an eight year old (because that is where they stopped their intelectual growth) must be stamped out as well. More will follow as the demons appear in more and more forms. And they will never succeed... No matter how hard the censors have tried in the past to outlaw "smut", it has always existed in one form or another. All they do is drive it underground. If they stamp out crypto, they will just drive it underground. And in the process they will have stamped any freedoms you or I have underground as well... Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ National Security uber alles!

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Re: OFFSHORE RESOURCES
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You sez: : There has been sporadic interest on this list with regard to : offshore incorporation, banking, etc. While ads for offshore : services are common in the international press, until now, none : of these companies has an Internet presence. : THE ECONOMIST has an ad for OCRA, a group that specializes in : offshore company services. What's new is that they have a Web : page. It includes a good primer on the benifits from going : offshore and on selected offshore jurisdictions. I've never done : business with these folks, but they have good info. I maintain a small page with offshore resources at: URL: http://www.replay.com/offshore bEST Regards, -AJ-

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UK newspaper names Zimmermann a "neo-Nazi sympathiser"
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)well.com> Subject: Re: UK newspaper names Zimmermann a "neo-Nazi sympathiser" To: Declan McCullagh Date: Wed, 24 Jan 1996 18:13:11 -0800 (PST) Cc: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu Zimmermann stands to recover a lot if he sues the Telegraph under British libel laws. --Mike [...] > > Subject: "PRZ a nazi" to be retracted > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com (Cypherpunks) > Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 21:58:48 -0700 (MST) > Cc: prz(a)acm.org (Philip Zimmermann) > From: Philip Zimmermann <prz(a)acm.org> > Reply-To: Philip Zimmermann <prz(a)acm.org> > X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL22] > Content-Type: text > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > The Sunday Telegraph of London printed a story last Sunday about neo-nazis > using PGP to encrypt their communications. The story said that PGP was > devised by an American neo-nazi sympathizer. As the creator of PGP, and > a human rights activist, I was outraged by such a defamation from a major > newspaper. I called my lawyer Phil Dubois, who seemed to look forward to > having some fun with this newspaper. > > Not wanting to wait around till the morning, and slow lawyers, I called > Robin Gedye, the reporter in Bonn who wrote the story, at 7am Monday morning > Bonn time, and woke him up at home. I introduced myself and told him how I > felt about it. He had never heard of me, the Clipper chip, the controversies > of cryptography, and knew nothing about PGP outside of the couple of > sentences in his story that mentioned PGP. He said it wasn't really so bad, > because he didn't specifically identify me by name. One can imagine the > effectiveness of that excuse with me. I then went into some detail with him > to bring him up to speed. I also called his editor in London, who also had > never heard of me or PGP. > > After some checking, they discovered that the Daily Telegraph, a related > newspaper, had run an article about my case just a week before. They also > found about 20 recent articles on me in the UK press. The editor said that > my story "checks out". It was good to know that they now believed that I > was not a neo-nazi after all. > > Anyway, Mr. Gedye says that the Sunday Telegraph will print a retraction > next Sunday. Not just a little retraction, but a whole article on the > subject, written by Mr. Gedye himself. I'm glad to see that this probably > means that he will dig into the subject more, in order to write such an > article. > > I guess this means maybe I'll find some other things to occupy Phil Dubois's > time. > > -Philip Zimmermann > 23 Jan 96 > > > // declan(a)eff.org // My opinions are not in any way those of the EFF // > >

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Re: Doctor Denning
by Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 26 Jan 1996, Peter Monta wrote: > It seemed to boil > down to the vacuous "if everyone could just agree that key > escrow is a good thing, there would be no problem". Actually, I think that's "if everyone could just agree that key escrow is a good thing, there would be no problem. And if they don't, then we'll just ban everything else..." Mark

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Re: Doctor Denning
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Monta pmonta(a)qualcomm.com wrote: >What I found interesting was the lack of meat behind >"Crypto Anarchy is Not Inevitable". It seemed to boil >down to the vacuous "if everyone could just agree that key >escrow is a good thing, there would be no problem". If found this interesting too. I was waiting for the reason it wasn't inevitable but it never came. Denning seems willing to predict a future where there are no more technical advances in fields like steganography and dc nets. Besides, won't the penalty for communicating using non-government approved methods be life in prison? What you are hiding *may* be evidence of a murder or that you are a drug kingpin. Unless the penalty is worse than that for being convicted of the crime you commited, criminals will use non-approved crypto and benefit greatly from it. I don't think the public will buy this type of sentencing. Remailer operators will be sentenced to life once unapproved crypto goes through their system, even stego. ISP managers will have to go to jail too if they let 1 non-government approved message slip though. If this is the way it is enforced it will be too easy to set up ISPs and remailer operators. All the big on-line services could be targetted too. You don't like AOL? Just sign up using one of their handy disks and the CC# you just scammed out of a dumpseter. Don't forget to use a payphone! Post non-GAKed crypto messages to usenet from AOL with cool subjects like, "Here is where to leave the money." and "#43r5637 to #4847d66". I don't see how enforcement is workable. Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/ L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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Doctor Denning's URL
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I screwed up and mistyped the URL in my prior message referencing Dorothy Denning's updated article on "The Future of Cyptography." The correct URL, pasted directly from my browser which is now displaying the article, is... http://guru.cosc.georgetown.edu/~denning/crypto/Future.html Sorry about that. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: Crypto Exports, Europe, and Conspiracy Theories
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:06 PM 1/26/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >A minor correction. Tim Berners-Lee is British, and was only working at >CERN, which effectively straddles the French-Swiss border, near Geneva. Wouldn't it be awful for CERN if they had to get export/import licenses for PROTONS? Each pass? Sorry, couldn't resist.

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Re: Denning's Crypto Archy
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 09:45 AM 1/26/96 -0500, Duncan Frissell wrote: >At 02:14 PM 1/26/96 +0100, Anonymous wrote: >> >>Cypherptoady's updatest unscratchable crypto itch and salve: >> >> >>http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/~denning/crypto/Future.html >> >> > >A good read. You know you're making progress when they start to address >your arguments. > >"Although May limply asserts that anarchy does not mean lawlessness and >social disorder, the absence of government would lead to exactly these >states of chaos." >I've never known Tim to offer limp assertations. >DCF While this would normally be my cue to offer up my "Assassination Politics" idea, which (if presumed to be correct) would stabilize "anarchy" and prevent "lawlessness and social disorder" (at least as normally seen by the average reader) I think that under the circumstances that would be redundant here. Jim Bell Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQk/JfqHVDBboB2dAQHQJAP/aMz9v2iXudFrdiayCTNvgWP7y3u4Qr78 gDGGZt+O5ODrcZuBJTE+CuYBvuhRq/nidtIWrmkIhonBC4+ahP/ryxxLDaJ7usvK BWXgIR5rsEIPjGQsZsH00qlaOZ8fQLeQJ710F0bTpbUuKNIkvpFrXq4vY4kgaIT+ wGLKWFizNnQ= =LOcz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 09:04 AM 1/26/96 -0600, Mike Tighe wrote: >Perry E. Metzger writes: > >>I am a funny sort of person. I don't believe that governments should >>be able to do anything that individuals cannot. If it is bad for me to >>steal, it is also bad for a government official to steal. If it is bad >>for me to listen in on my neighbor's phone calls, it is bad for the >>government, too. > >I do not see anything funny, but you are at odds with the Constitution, >where the people have granted the government certain rights that they have >not granted to themselves. But it seems we may be making progress at >getting those rights ourselves. It isn't clear to me that the Constitution grants "rights" to the government that aren't already possessed by the people themselves. Would that even be possible? "Powers" maybe, "rights," maybe not. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQk/8vqHVDBboB2dAQHTywP/aw9I8woDyjTIGgiUc3AB4S9bCGnRsIUo Ggrpc6PCpeIb+irflrffSpopiTJa+PQlMJUG0eXi3Bldi6mBVNCWeW1n1dOzwM9L lWV70S6Zw/CuRfvwH6byw01XdUbIq6egiVTis6/QVo727Q1k03nqeXdmnRo+lt9Q YAHdaDYWVZM= =a6qT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:28 PM 1/26/96 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >jim bell writes: >> (For the historically-impaired: Coventry was/is an English town (small >> city?) perhaps most famous from the Lady Godiva legend...but I digress... >> British found out, I guess through Ultra, that it was going to be bombed. >> Telling the inhabitants would have saved many lives, but (possibly) alerted >> the Germans that Enigma had been broken. British made the correct choice: >> Let the city get bombed without (much?) warning. The value of keeping the >> broken-ness of Ultra a secret far outweighed the value of Coventry.) > >The current claim is that, in fact, there was no advance warning about >Coventry and that the claims that there was are unsubstantiated. Extremely odd! Why distribute the claim, if it were false?!? Hmmmmm..... And/or if the claim was falsely made by some non-governmental organization, why not an immediate and forceful denial? Color me confused.

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Returned mail: Delivery problems with your mail
by The Post Office 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A copy of your message is being returned to you due to difficulties encountered while attempting to deliver your mail. The following errors occurred during message delivery processing: <local ewanchuk(a)direct.ca ewanchuk 38>: user "ewanchuk" doesn't exist Reporting-MTA: dns; orb.direct.ca Arrival-Date: Fri, 26 Jan 1996 13:20:00 -0800 Final-Recipient: X-LOCAL; ewanchuk Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 (User does not exist) Diagnostic-Code: 550 (User does not exist) To: hal9001(a)panix.com, pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz Subject: Re: "Concryption" Prior Art From: Peter Wayner <pcw(a)access.digex.net> Date: Fri, 26 Jan 1996 13:55:07 -0500 Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com I believe the patent applies to simultaneous compression and encryption. The simultaneity supposedly saves time. That's the big advance. -Peter

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Re: Secrecy of NSA Affiliation
by dan＠milliways.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 25 Jan 1996 15:50:38 -6 you wrote: > >Datapoint: My 1967 HB copy of The Codebreakers discusses the >agency, and includes a photo of the HQ. > > >Peter Trei Speaking of which, The Codebreakers is "indefinitely unavailable" according to the publisher. Anyone have a spare copy they'd be willing to part with? Replies via email, TIA. Dan -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAzEJBEkAAAEEALMsQx6/x+hls0nYThyJnnc3oYl2TaUhH7eUWcC73PeG6oxN UHlizO/jTmLUNWTj1BSqYfsyXleK0RiETpyyrSycTQE2n+91xJu3kXyWfLOug6K2 Gy0MM/XzV8hwHRYJjugww2hVB6D+C3zDjVo14BvRKmg3d5EowjxHFNui9bAlAAUR tB5EYW4gQmFpbGV5IDxkYW5AbWlsbGl3YXlzLm9yZz4= =aNNf -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- *************************************************************** #define private public dan(a)milliways.org Worcester Polytechnic Institute and The Restaurant at the End of the Universe ***************************************************************

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Re: [rant] A thought on filters and the V-Chip
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:56 PM 1/26/96, Alan Olsen wrote: >More will follow as the demons appear in more and more forms. > Just a minor correction, here. You mention "demons." Under the "C" heading inside the V-chip, C for Christian, any use of such Satanic-related language must be labelled for filtering by all right-thinking Christians. Terms considered to be Satanic-inspired: demon, daemon, sprite, troll, Goddess, witch, Wicca, Cthulhu, Crowley, and about 73 other words which the V-chip is programmed to recognize. (The V-chip had originally been programmed to reject "pixel," but we convinced them that pixels have nothing to do with pixies, which of course are on the list of banned words to be filtered.) --Klaus! Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Doctor Denning
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:33 PM 1/26/96, Peter Monta wrote: >> I just read the new and improved Dorothy Denning essay at >> >> http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/crypto/Future.html > >This can be found at > http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/~denning/crypto/Future.html > >> One should realize, of course, that whether Crypto Anarchy >> prevails depends not upon the varied philosophical leanings of >> citizen-units May and Denning, but rather upon whether our >> mathematics is more powerful than their jackbooted thugs. > >What I found interesting was the lack of meat behind >"Crypto Anarchy is Not Inevitable". It seemed to boil >down to the vacuous "if everyone could just agree that key >escrow is a good thing, there would be no problem". This is the main reason I haven't bothered to rebut her points: there were essentially none to rebut. (There are substantive criticisms of my points that can be made, including discussions of what might be done to delay or even head off crypto anarchy completely. I had dinner a few nights ago with David Friedman, author of "The Machinery of Freedom," and he made some incisive comments about how the State might go about heading off this future. I'm glad he's on our side, and not the government's.) Two other reasons I have not sought to rebut her analysis: First, I doubt many people saw either my original article (available on Bob Hettinga's page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/anarchy.html) or Denning's reaction article. Second, I stated my views, she stated her views, not much more to say. Especially as she has not had an active presence on the Net, either in talk.politics.crypto or in other forums I have seen, and thus a real debate on the Net has not been possible. Mostly I know I can't change her views, so why bother? Other people may have their views affected by what I say, and for these people I have certainly written enough. --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Bernie S. Sentencing
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:02 PM 1/26/96 -36000, Matt Miszewski wrote: >On Thu, 25 Jan 1996, Ed Carp, KHIJOL SysAdmin wrote: > >(snip) >> The last thing one of the "suits" said was something like "they know >> about the hole in RSA we found with the quantum computer" - or that's >> what was reportedly said. Something like that. > >The AP line came down that the matchbook contained the algorithm for >easily factoring large primes. As I heard it, their algorithm factored large composite numbers in ((log(n))**(-1)) time, meaning that the larger the composite number got the faster it was to factor. Yep, that's it.

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Re: Crypto Exports, Europe, and Conspiracy Theories
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I believe that one minor reason is the PKP chokehold on public-key patents. It has slowed down adoption within the US, and the RSA licenses for example tend to get very "interesting" when it involves places where their patents don't hold. Last year, how many COTS products had strong crypto? There are very few software imports into the US. I don't think crypto is particularly slighted. There might be pressure, and there might be dummy front firms, but with tongue in cheek to emphasize the point, I just think those ferriners can't code fer shit. /r$

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Re: Nym use in the real world
by dmandl＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:01 AM 1/26/96, Eric Murray wrote: >With the coming Internet restrictions and growing use of the >net by LEAs, it's become obvious to me that I shouldn't post >messages with my real name. But I have some problems/questions about >using a nym: [...] Very good points. Just saying "use anonymity" is often a gross oversimplification for several reasons. One of the problems I've been thinking about recently is that I may want only a special group of people, and no one else, to know that I'm responsible for a post. A nym won't work in this case. As has been pointed out here before, a lot of people are going to be getting in trouble for things they posted to obscure newsgroups or mailing lists four years ago. How do I make sure that I get credit for something I've posted, but avoid the Alta Vista police? There are a few feeble solutions, like: h w t w s t c b s f w A V i o h a o h a e e o i l i d r i y e n a r t t s i d s y ' r h a t n s t c a g h e d o.r..l.i.k.e..t.h.i.s ...but someone will undoubtedly find a way to search for these things eventually, or they can just subscribe to the list! Anonymity is a pain in the ass, frankly, which is why I've never used it. True, I've never needed to post anything really sensitive, but going through life as "Black Unicorn" (no offence, BU) is just an unacceptable inconvenience as far as I'm concerned. Sort of like having to live on the lam, which I'm sure is no party. It seems there are more and more situations where encryption and anonymity aren't enough. One obvious case is the web, where I may want to put something of questionable legality on my home page. There's no way that crypto will render the laws irrelevant in this case. Can I get an offshore account and post the offending graphic there? Yes, but it's a pain. And when the big net crackdown comes, I wonder whether the U.S. will pressure other countries to participate and help them wipe out these data and gif havens? The net is moving farther and farther away from being a "Temporary Autonomous Zone," meaning there are fewer and fewer pockets to hide or get lost in. --Dave. -- Dave Mandl dmandl(a)panix.com http://www.wfmu.org/~davem

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Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by m5＠dev.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dan Weinstein writes: > m5(a)dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) Wrote: > > Dan Weinstein writes: > > > >By the way, I really think Netscape should simply ship Jeff and other > > > >people to the Amsterdam office... > > > > > > Wrong, this would be a violation of ITAR. > > > > I don't understand; are you saying Jeff's brain is a munition under > > the ITAR? > > I forget how it is termed in ITAR, but expertise can't be exported > either. Uhh, I'd like a second opinion please doc. Are you suggesting that whenever anybody with cryptographic expertise (like, maybe, anybody on this mailing list) leaves the country we're in violation of munitions export laws? Is somebody who knows how to build a rocket in the same boat? > like I suggested before any programers who gained their knowledge of > crypto programing in the U.S. and then went abroad and developed > crypto software would be in danger of prosecution under ITAR if they > ever returned to the U.S.. This sounds fishy to me. I don't recall reading anything to suggest that export of cryptographic software (or any other munition) requires that the stuff be *used* outside the US for an offense to be committed; why should export of a cryptographer's wetware be any different? Either the expertise leaves the country or it doesn't, I'd think. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Nobody's going to listen to you if you just | Mike McNally (m5(a)tivoli.com) | | stand there and flap your arms like a fish. | Tivoli Systems, Austin TX | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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re: Assassination Politics
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Notice that I've added two areas to the list above, nwlibertarians(a)teleport.com and dnowch2(a)teleport.com ; the areas on which "Assassination Politics" is commonly discussed. I've also sent a copy to Cypherpunks(a)toad.com, for its obviously ob crypto (encryption, digital cash, etc) aspects. At 10:09 AM 1/24/96 -0500, Robert Vincent wrote: >So what's to keep the powers-that-be from successfully assassinating the >would-be directors of any such organization Technically, "nothing." Nothing unusual, anyway. Except that if you follow my logic carefully, you will see that I believe that the developments I describe are tantamount to being technologically "inevitable." The mere existence of good encryption, Internet-type worldwide networking, and untraceable digital cash will "automatically" allow/cause such systems to arise. And development of such an organization ANYWHERE, plus the Internet, means that it can operate EVERYWHERE. Further, here is my speculation: Let's assume I have this Internet soapbox, and I manage to convince you and your friends (and their friends, etc) that: 1. My system, if allowed to work, will replace the current political system with one that is far more "attractive," on the average. In other words, it will do approximately what I claim it will: Eliminate all governments, militaries, taxes, yet maintain a reasonable degree of freedom for all citizens, rich and poor, strong and weak, etc. It'll even punish criminals. Real criminals, like murderers, rapists, thieves, etc. Furthermore, that it won't have any _likely_ "horror scenarios" associated with it (such as the ones some people (wrongly) think exist), or at least it will be no worse than the status quo. In fact, it will be a VAST improvement over the status quo. It will produce, I believe, an essentially perfectly libertarian (and _stably_ anarchistic, yet it has protections for rights.) society. and 2. The system is just about technologically inevitable, given the technical developments which already exist and I forsee. and 3. The only thing that's preventing such a system from being adopted is the fact that this system would eliminate the control of the current political system by those few who now control it. Segue to near the end of the 1964 movie, Dr. Strangelove, where the title character (the scientific advisor to the President) is asked by the President whether enormous buried cobalt bombs can be built, and controlled by computer to detonate automatically on nuclear attack. He said, "It requires only the _will_ to do it." Similarly, I would argue that the implementation and rollout of an "Assassination Politics" scenario is almost even today within the technical capability in common usage, lacking only the common acceptance of "digital cash". At some point, "it requires only the _will_ to do it." At that point, I argue that we will have a scenario reminiscent of the day the East German citizens broke down the Berlin Wall. Enough people wanted it done, and nobody was going to stand up and try to stop it. It HAPPENED. It was "illegal" by the standards of East Germany that day, but it HAPPENED. The odd thing, however, is that despite my publicizing the idea of "Assassination Politics" to what by now has probably been thousands of people and (statistically) dozens of lawyers, I haven't heard a serious, defensible argument that the implementation of this system would even be ILLEGAL by black-letter US law. True, any underlying killings might be, and probably would be, murder. But the system as I described it is quite carefully structured to prevent anyone but the self-motivated murderer from doing the murder, knowing that it will occur in the future, or (for that matter) knowing for sure that it actually WAS a murder, or let alone who did it, even after it occurs. While I won't claim I've "thought of everything," I _will_ say that I think I've demonstrated that current law would be vastly inadequate to deal with such a scenario. I suspect that a lawyer familiar with the concept of "Assassination Politics" and who follows proposed legislation in Congress ought to scan for laws designed to preclude the development of such a system. Whether or not this could even be accomplished is in serious question, since it would probably require banning all remnants of freedom in this country. In other words, we are coming to a fork in the road: One choice leads to perfect freedom, the other to absolute tyranny. Well, at least you have been warned. > and squelching any public mention of it? Well, YOU heard about it, didn't you, and I'm not dead. (yet?) True, the system doesn't actually exist and operate, but that's merely a matter of implementation, not of technical capability. Microsoft could write the whole thing into Windows 97 as a "Killer App." (This joke was to somebody else's credit, sigh! Can't recollect who... Maybe Tim May?) (I now believe that the US government's decision to develop the Internet was a case of slow-motion governmental suicide. The trigger was pulled in the 1960's, and the death will occur about 40 years later. "Jim Bell" (myself) will be one of the first to notice the "bullet" flying towards its mark. For making that observation, I will be severely criticized, and probably even BLAMED.) In a sense, it is arguable that I am worthy of neither the credit nor the blame. >Don't forget that the real controllers have the press and >the media in their pocket, not just your Congressman! I predict that if >anybody actually does set up an organization to reward "predictors", that >person or person will be quickly and quietly put out of business, whether >by legal means or otherwise. Follow the technological development of "nyms" on Cypherpunks. It is possible that this system could be set up, totally anonymously, and perhaps even in a totally decentralized way, so that (for example) 1000 anonymous individuals (anonymous even from each other) run it according to agreed-upon rules. >Which is too bad. It's a beautiful idea, otherwise. Hey! Glad you think so! One guy called it "atrocious." Some people would have you believe that I'm a raving lunatic. (Well, technically I can't prove to you I'm NOT a "raving lunatic," but at least to you, believing in this system isn't evidence to the contrary.) Another guy said that if this system were ever implemented, I would have become "the Antichrist." Even though I'm an atheist myself, I know enough about religion in general, and Christianity in particular, to realize that statement wasn't intended as a complement. Jim Bell Klaatu Burada Nikto. Remember this. It'll become important...soon. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQbBYPqHVDBboB2dAQHBIgQAlK69QFvjS4QaG+RVYHPZ13FqhqxHezqS hpQqXQDunqRmfP4nYLaYcy2xOowHEEl+4w+H/6SP70vs+gMgi9ouW0kEGbHQSljF OvOYRSq+xg1MRvDN6ZLCGYBODs7K0iM5bv6X8c7zzja1RH3WGEIYfp+ZzQXT7LV7 6PKHVslWKFk= =guZo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Denning's Crypto Archy [LONG]
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Future of Cryptography Dorothy E. Denning Georgetown University Revised January 6, 1996 [Responses by Duncan Frissell in square brackets] Although May limply asserts that anarchy does not mean lawlessness and social disorder, the absence of government would lead to exactly these states of chaos. [Tim is rarely given to limp assertions. I haven't seen him spend much time arguing about the exact social arrangements of a free society following the crypto revolution. He has merely pointed out the results of the technology.] I do not want to live in an anarchistic society -- if such could be called a society at all -- and I doubt many would. [Whatever happens, there will always be plenty of cults around (perhaps even one called the Government of the United States of America) to which anyone will be free to belong and at the altars of which one will be free to worship. In fact the deregulation of human interaction will make it easier for more oppressive cults to exist than is possible today as long as they keep to themselves. There will be no shortage of people willing to tell their followers what to do. Nothing will stop anyone from joining such a society.] A growing number of people are attracted to the market liberalism envisioned by Jefferson, Hayek, and many others, but not to anarchy. Thus, the crypto anarchists' claims come close to asserting that the technology will take us to an outcome that most of us would not choose. [Still up for negotiation is how liberal a market we will want. The growing power of markets and (traditional) liberal ideas is the result of the growing wealth and power of individuals around the world. Crypto anarchists merely point out that the shape of future market societies is no longer in the hands of "The Authorities" but is rather in the hands of those trading on the market; i.e., everyone on Earth."] This is the claim that I want to address here. I do not accept crypto anarchy as the inevitable outcome. A new paradigm of cryptography, key escrow, is emerging and gaining acceptance in industry. [That is what remains to be seen.] The drawbacks of cryptography are frequently overlooked as well. The widespread availability of unbreakable encryption coupled with anonymous services could lead to a situation where practically all communications are immune from lawful interception (wiretaps) [My thoughts are immune from 'lawful interception' as are everyone else's and yet the world survives. Thought is communication within the brain. Communication is 'thought' between brains. The world which has survived private thoughts can survive private communications. The whole concept of controlling communications is a bit obsolete in any case. In past eras, the only social threat came from large masses of men (hence the desire to intercept and control communications) whereas today any individual can do more damage than a large group in the past.] and documents from lawful search and seizure, and where all electronic transactions are beyond the reach of any government regulation or oversight. The consequences of this to public safety and social and economic stability could be devastating. [See the recent joint study by the Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and 9 other think tanks world wide showing that there is a strong positive correlation between nations with free economies and nations with wealth. There seems little doubt that total economic deregulation is a good thing. We shall certainly have the chance to test that hypothesis in coming years. I haven't seen any nation harmed so far by having too free an economy.] With the government essentially locked out, computers and telecommunications systems would become safe havens for criminal activity. Even May himself acknowledges that crypto anarchy provides a means for tax evasion, money laundering, espionage (with digital dead drops), [That is, keeping your own money, transferring funds, and research. Sounds like activities that should not be the concern of others.] contract killings, [These may be easier although *government* killings will be harder since governments may lack the resources to do as much of that sort of thing as they have done before. (From 1917-1989, Communist governments murdered someone every 30 seconds -- a total of some 60 million people.) In addition, those who fear they may be the subject of contract killings can use pseudonyms, locational ambiguity, and untraceable communications to make themselves harder to find and thus to kill.] and implementation of data havens for storing and marketing illegal or controversial material. [Last time I looked, controversial material was legal to possess and transmit. Illegal information will no longer be illegal if its transmission can't be stopped since utterly unenforceable laws tend to go away (see Sodomy).] Encryption also threatens national security by interfering with foreign intelligence operations. The United States, along with many other countries, imposes export controls on encryption technology to lessen this threat. [Of course if the US is weakened by the growth of (really) free markets, its enemies will be as well so foreign threats will automatically diminish.] Cryptography poses a threat to organizations and individuals too. With encryption, an employee of a company can sell proprietary electronic information to a competitor without the need to photocopy and handle physical documents. [This is a threat from digitization, not from encryption.] The keys that unlock a corporation's files may be lost, corrupted, or held hostage for ransom, thus rendering valuable information inaccessible. [Or the computers can not be backed up, can crash, can be blown up, can be flooded, can experience disk failures, etc. This is not a problem unique to encryption. Backups and scattered sites are always necessary. High-speed networks, secure communications, and encryption make it easier to back up your systems at different locations all over the world. They help you avoid data loss, they don't contribute to it. Key splitting and private key escrow can easily protect keys.] When considering the threats posed by cryptography, it is important to recognize that only the use of encryption for confidentiality, including anonymity, presents a problem. [Of course confidentiality is the reason codes were invented in the first place. Additionally, the Supreme court has recognized that anonymity has First Amendment protection. We have already made the social decision that anonymity is OK in many circumstances. I'm sure that all of us engage in many anonymous transactions on a daily basis and yet the world survives.] Crypto anarchy can be viewed as the proliferation of cryptography that provides the benefits of confidentiality protection but does nothing about its harms. It is government-proof encryption which denies access to the government even under a court order or other legal order. [In countries that don't regularly practice torture, we have the power to disobey court orders in any case. Modern technology merely makes it easier and reduces the likelihood of punishment. Court orders are rare in any case. Seems like much ado about nothing.] It has no safeguards to protect users and their organizations from accidents and abuse. [This is the job of those who write software, not philosophers.] The crypto anarchist position is that cyberspace is on a non-stop drift toward crypto anarchy. [I usually argue that the spread of markets is driven more by cheap telecoms and the growth of a very efficient market infrastructure. Cryptography hasn't had much of an impact yet. I think that even without crypto, markets will swamp attempts to regulate them and since people can move as well, they are becoming harder to control even before any crypto revolution.] In addition to the free encryption programs being distributed on the net, encryption is becoming a basic service integrated into commercial applications packages and network products. The IP Security Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force has written a document that calls for all compliant IPv6 (Internet Protocol, version 6) implementations to incorporate DES cryptography. [The net belongs to its customers and as owners they will probably decide to secure their property. Sounds enormously democratic to me.] The potential harms of cryptography have already begun to appear. As the result of interviews I conducted in May, 1995, I found numerous cases where investigative agencies had encountered encrypted communications and computer files. These cases involved child pornography, [Possession of a bunch of zeros and ones.] customs violations [free trade] drugs [the retail pharmaceutical trade] espionage [research] embezzlement [finally a crime] murder [Another crime. Can you give us the details of a murder investigation blocked by cryptography? We don't need any names.] obstruction of justice [Refusal to make things easy for prosecutors. A *real* crime. This wasn't Hillary by any chance, was it?] tax protesters [You mean tax evaders, don't you? Far as I know, protesting taxes is a legal activity.] and terrorism. [State-sponsored or private?] At the International Cryptography Institute held in Washington in September, 1995, FBI Director Louis Freeh reported that encryption had been encountered in a terrorism investigation in the Philippines involving an alleged plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II and bomb a U.S. airliner [4]. [But the perp was caught anyway. Is this the same Louis Freeh who thinks that the loss (by him) of a government cellphone is just as bad as the FBI issuing shoot-to-kill orders against American citizens before even trying to arrest them (since he punished both with a letter of reprimand)?] AccessData Corp., a company in Orem, Utah which specializes in providing software and services to help law enforcement agencies and companies recover data that has been locked out through encryption, reports receiving about a dozen and a half calls a day from companies with inaccessible data. [Sounds like poor system design. I'm not sure that advising others how to safely store their business records has anything to do with law enforcement, however.] The idea is to combine strong encryption with an emergency decryption capability. This is accomplished by linking encrypted data to a data recovery key which facilitates decryption. This key need not be (and typically is not) the one used for normal decryption, but it must provide access to that key. The data recovery key is held by a trusted fiduciary, which could conceivably be a governmental agency, court, or trusted and bonded private organization. A key might be split among several such agencies. [Why would a government agency or a court be the best entity to provide business services? If I'm looking for someone to install a LAN in my office, I don't immediately think to call the Post Office and get them to bid on the job. Business services like data backup and recovery are much more likely to be efficiently accomplished by a private contractor.] Organizations registered with an escrow agent can acquire their own keys for emergency decryption. An investigative or intelligence agency seeking access to communications or stored files makes application through appropriate procedures (which normally includes getting a court order) and, upon compliance, is issued the key. [But what if it turns out that my chosen escrow agent is located outside the jurisdiction of the court. Surely you don't want to cause any NAFTA or GATT problems here. The WTO might declare your encryption policy to be an unfair trade practice.] Legitimate privacy interests are protected through access procedures, auditing, and other safeguards. [But what if some of us want better protection than bureaucratic promises and procedures. Some people in the past who relied on government promises and procedures ended up in crowded "shower" rooms trying to extract oxygen from diesel exhaust.]. In April, 1993, as response to a rising need for and use of encryption products, the Clinton Administration announced a new initiative to promote encryption in a way that would not prohibit lawful decryption when investigative agencies are authorized to intercept communications or search computer files [6]. [And a rousing success it was.] The IBAG principles acknowledge the right of businesses and individuals to protect their information and the right of law-abiding governments to intercept and lawfully seize information when there is no practical alternative. [Is a communist dictatorship a "law abiding government?"] The principles call for industry to develop open voluntary, consensus, international standards and for governments, businesses, and individuals to work together to define the requirements for those standards. The standards would allow choices about algorithm, mode of operation, key length, and implementation in hardware or software. Products conforming to the standards would not be subject to restrictions on import or use and would be generally exportable. [Gee, I thought that was what we were doing.] It is conceivable that domestic and international efforts will be sufficient to avoid crypto anarchy, particularly with support from the international business community. However, it is possible that they will not be enough. Many companies are developing products with strong encryption that do not accommodate government access, standards groups are adopting non-key escrow standards, and software encryption packages such as PGP are rapidly proliferating on the Internet, which is due, in part, to the crypto anarchists whose goal is to lock out the government. Since key escrow adds to the development and operation costs of encryption products, the price advantage of unescrowed encryption products could also be a factor which might undermine the success of a completely voluntary approach. [Sounds like the voluntary cooperation of human beings in international markets is just humming right along isn't it? It seems that a lot of market participants are "voting with their feet" for strong crypto. The System is the Solution.] Under this licensing program, commercial encryption products, including programs distributed through public network servers, would comply with government regulations. [Isn't a "public network server" just a server that is made world readable? Since there will be (conservatively) 100 million "public network servers" online in a few years, won't enforcement be a trifle difficult?] Such an approach would not prevent the use of government-proof encryption products by criminals and terrorists. They could develop their own or acquire the products illegally. But an approach of this type would make it considerably more difficult than it is at present. Had such controls been adopted several years ago -- before programs such as DES and PGP were posted on the Internet -- the encryption products on the market today would support key escrow or some other method for government access. [As I recall, wasn't public key encryption developed in spite of the fact that the NSA had in place an unofficial ban on cryptographic research? The NSA's ban failed. Since you are not proposing outlawing such research, what makes you think that mere distribution controls will work? ] It would not be possible to acquire strong, government-proof encryption from reputable vendors or network file servers. The encryption products available through underground servers and the black market would most likely not possess as high a quality as products developed through the legitimate market. [The Internet itself runs primarily on software developed on the open market from non-commercial sources without slick packaging. It seems to have met with some market acceptance in spite of the lack of shrink-wrap packaging.] Crypto anarchy is an international threat which has been stimulated by international communications systems including telephones and the Internet. Addressing this threat requires an international approach that provides for both secure international communications crossing national boundaries and electronic surveillance by governments of criminal and terrorist activity taking place within their jurisdictions. [It's nice to be noticed. How, exactly, is this voluntary, international, standards regime going to deal with the desire of different governments to control different communications. Look at the problems, some governments want to ban American movies, the Asian Wall Street Journal, books on the health of former heads of state, public records of sensational murder trials, phone calls made using callback services, financial wire services, novels by leftist co-religionists living in England, email containing the English word for sexual intercourse (if readable by children), directions on where to obtain an abortion in London, etc. And all these governments will want to crack private transmissions in order to find those responsible for these "crimes." This is going to be a hell of a challenge for a voluntary, international standards regime. I think it is probably beyond the capabilities of such an institution to mediate among all of these competing desires to control the communications of others.] DCF "BTW if one spellchecks the word unescrowed (as in unescrowed encryption) one is likely to encounter the suggested replacement "unscrewed" (as in unscrewed encryption).

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Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:49 1/24/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >Big companies like Netscape, Sun, Microsoft, and IBM/Lotus, on the other >hand, will almost certainly achieve their objectives if they win the >political fight. They'll make buckets of money selling crypto software >abroad. And if they lose the fight, they're going to be handing big >opportunities to foreign competitors. The big companies are fighting? Where did you get that idea? IBM/Lotus just gave the feds the keys. Not a single one of the major players has challenged the government in any meaningful way. Sure, they make a lot of noise as to how they dislike the regulations, but they certainly aren't making a sincere effort of trying to change them. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Nym use in the real world
by peer＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > With the coming Internet restrictions and growing use of the > net by LEAs, it's become obvious to me that I shouldn't post > messages with my real name. My reasons for experimenting with nymdom are somewhat different. I have no intentions of using my nym for anything that I would not do using my True Name. I see it more as a tool for segmenting the knowledge the outside world has about me. With the expansion of information ubiquity and easy access to powerful search tools, nyms become a welcome tool to foil the dossier builders. > 1. reputation. My nym will need to build it's own reputation, I > know. But I currently get offers of work based on my reputation > and posts. I would like this to continue. When it comes time to > do the work and collect the pay, I need to tie my nym to me. While certainly useful, nyms have very definite practical limits. I see them as more useful and flexible once one discards the monolithic nym concept (ie my name is xxx and my nym is Peer). When one uses multiple nyms for multiple purposes, discarding the secrecy of one is less troublesome. This also allows the cultivation of positive reputation in diverse reputation markets. Of course, doing this to any great extent may be more trouble than it's worth. > 2. does it (a nym) really help? Police and governments are used to > dealing with people who change their names, use fake names, etc. I > get the impression that having multiple/fake names is considered by > police to be evidence or at least indication of guilt. "If you're > not guilty why're you hiding?". While there is certainly a stigmata associated with nymdom (even occasionally on Cypherpunks, of all places), I don't think it will provide any additional liability (assuming nyms themselves don't become illegal). If your nym is investigated and compromised, then your True Name has already been linked to your actions - they know you're guilty. And while using a nym may attract unwanted attention due to its nature, can it be worse than using your True Name? Perhaps. I keep forgetting about selective enforcement... Peer Aside: How many people here actually check signatures? For those who don't, does seeing a signed message inspire any additional confidence? For those who do, does seeing an incorrectly signed message inspire any less confidence? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQlwCKUvpX8WyJyxAQGUuAP/UZXCUbD9iJdmjOb9QGoZ8lD3j22bbeU0 04ucZ81EBMLB0rrOoaCihW7ywvm54/o5uJIw5QN68bkj5ZlM5MqCHn9j7Cowvyb6 VHY+5dhULDpT6GF5CRcxbYmdyYpbl0nHzO8PeaG0oX46+YJTEhDpXoywBxDcjHnP +YLtJ+7xUx4= =uesQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:06 PM 1/25/96 -0800, Johnathan Corgan <jcorgan(a)aeinet.com> wrote: >This would allow to emerge a free market 'ecology' of ratings agencies, >similar to the system that has emerged in the PC technology >market for product reviews. This seems to me a task of crucial importance, as I listen to the conversations of relatively net-clueless folks. Their first reaction, upon learning about net abuse, is to demand that abusers be tracked down and punished. Privacy-enhancing tools make this more difficult. It seems to me that if we're to avoid a wholescale crusade against net privacy, we _really_ need to have a credible alternative to offer: both the software and the wetware :-) to let individuals screen out offending drek. Having canned solutions is especially important, since many of the people most susceptible to anti-privacy propaganda are precisely those who don't know and likely aren't going to know how to construct their own filters. I see this as a matter of enlightened self-interest, therefore. I can't write code worth squat, but I can write other things. I'm starting in on a Web-based guide to privacy tools, with screen shots and the like. If anyone has useful info to contribute about screening out crud for novices, write me! I need to hear from you! Bruce Baugh bruceab(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab

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Time codes for PCs (fromn German Banking)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:11 PM 1/24/96 -0500, Dave Emery wrote: >> >> Was the person in the basement eavesdroping or actuall performing a >> man-in-the-middle attack? >> > Very much the easiest way of doing this is a classic man in the >middle attack with two vanilla off the shelf modems and a vanilla off >the shelf central office simulator. The modems would be tied more or >less back to back through two serial ports and software on a laptop in >the basement, one modem connected to the actual phone line to the central >office and the other connected to the local wires to the targets home >through the central office simulator. This way all traffic in both >directions would go through the modems and software on the laptop >allowing the connection to be taken over cleanly between packets, and >packets to be injected and deleted as needed. I beleive that it would >not be hard to make such a MITM decode the DTMF dialing from the target >and dial the same number on its outgoing modem thus enabling the >MITM to passively relay modem calls it wasn't interested in spoofing. >And incoming modem calls could be similarly handled. A peripheral I've long wanted to see, commonly available: ACCURATE time, broadcast to the millisecond/microsecond/nanosecond, available from sources as varied as TV VIR's, FM subcarriers, and other sources, available as an easy input (via a peripheral card) to a computer. I have a 12-year-old Heathkit "Most Accurate Clock" that I assembled myself, and had the foresight to install it with its computer interface option. (receives 5, 10, or 15 MHz signals broadcast from Boulder, Colorado, containing "exact" time.) While I've never taken the time to connect it to my PC, it provides (through an RS232 jack) correct time with a rated accuracy of about 5 milliseconds, as I vaguely recall. (Even has a dipswitch setup on the bottom to tell it how many 500 mile increments you are away from WWVB... corrects for delay to a first order of magnitude.) (BTW, if anybody knows how to easily connect it to the pc, or has the appropriate software, please tell me The task isn't difficult from a hardware standpoint; it's just RS-232 serial ASCII timecode at about 9600 bps which either continuously retransmits or on request. The problem is the software: How, exactly, do I INTERFACE such a serial input to the existing computer/RTC combination? (Don't tell me to plug it into an unused serial jack! I'm not stupid. I'm not a programmer, and I don't play one on TV! (I know gates, flops, op amps, A/D, D/A, microprocessor hardware design, even some Z-80 assy language, RF, and I've programmed in Fortran, Basic, APL, Algol, PL/1, Pascal, LISP, but not recently and I don't enjoy it!) (Then again, there are those "Receptor" watches which have (at least) similar accuracy, which as I understand it work on FM subcarrier principles.) Technology has now supplanted this old monstrosity: Even with CHEAP GPS receivers, they put out time which is rated in accuracy to well better than 1 microsecond, and probably better than 200 nanoseconds even with S/A turned on, and probably 100 nanoseconds with S/A off. Once GPS receivers contain equally cheap DGPS receivers, they'll be able to tell you your location to about 1 meter and corresponding time accuracy, about 3 nanoseconds. I'm not particularly familiar with TV VIR signals, but I'd imagine they are timecoded, or at least they COULD be without a lot of effort. Resolution would be FAR better than 1 microsecond, and accuracy would be primarily limited by knowledge of your location compared to the xmitter. MITM attacks would be far more difficult if both ends of the data conversation agreed on the "exact" time, and could detect transmission delays and CHANGES in transmission delays. While it would be possible to locally spoof the accurate timecode, a cheap version of a "disciplined oscillator" (which any GPS receiver is going to have, anyway) would detect such short-term spoofing trivially. Occasionally, I've speculated on whether it might be useful to be able to synchronize (or, at least, KNOW) to the PHASE of the 60 Hz power grid. True, I know that the HV grid is 3-phase and most people won't know which phase they're on anyway, but that wouldn't change (at least not frequently!) , and I would imagine that it might be useful. You wouldn't necessarily know which CYCLE you're on, either, but again that might be compensated for somehow. If your computer were talking, locally, to another computer at 4100 baud (? whatever) (7 bits per symbol(?); equals 28.8kbps) you could "easily" agree on a particular cycle relationship, which is going to be essentially constant over a distance of a few tens or even hundreds of miles. What I DON'T know (and some HV transmission engineer will probably be able to tell me, hint hint!) is how STABLE this phase is across the entire country? I realize that this will probably depend on who'se shipping excess power to whom at the moment, But I'd imagine the variability will be distinctly limited. The biggest attraction of such a system is that the interface would probably be trivial: Getting it from the P/S is out because they didn't anticipate such a thing. The easiest interface might be an AC wall xformer with a rectifying limiter and slicer (Okay, maybe just a resistor and a diode, possibly with the addition of a comparator for precision), driving a readable pin on an otherwise-unused RS-232 interface. (Possibly installed similar to a dongle.) Appropriate software (yucch!) would read the square waves, and record the phase at any one time. Such information could be used to verify the relative synchronization between two different computers, although it would be necessary to identify particular phases, as I mentioned before. BTW, if you're read this far, I think it would be appropriate to introduce myself, despite the fact that I've already been posting to this area for a few weeks. I'm James Dalton Bell (yes, THOSE Daltons!) and I'm in Vancouver, Washington, USA. I may talk like a EE, but am not; I have formal and/or informal backgrounds in Chemistry (BS Chemistry MIT 1980), electronics (analog and digital and RF (N7IJS) and uP), physics, and keep an eye on numerous other technical fields. Politically, I'm 120/120 on the Nolan chart (there's some questions they left out (that's a joke)) which means I'm a "extremist libertarian." I'm also rather newly anarchistic, and (with all due modesty) rather inventive. Current employment? None. Well, nothing to speak of. But you'll be hearing more about me. Jim Bell Klaatu Burada Nikto Remember this. It'll become important, soon. "Something is going to happen. Something....wonderful!" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQlyv/qHVDBboB2dAQHZvQP+IKeO508C7ZTA22DSELjvpWTYa0iGtTcX U486t+8P0iC9qxq346wzxm9USae4d8NOM9wBKrio095hrKnzAZQE1BETUKCx3BJv bywqin7Qjb87j6OECJ6S/eAh5t6LXMnDepGdUr7rw+gBxsNg7kzz10/TGh4pXKNu D5PuGPnTY34= =r4JO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Bell writes: >While this would normally be my cue to offer up my "Assassination Politics" >idea, which (if presumed to be correct) would stabilize "anarchy" and >prevent "lawlessness and social disorder" (at least as normally seen by the >average reader) I think that under the circumstances that would be redundant >here. I'm not *sure* that your Assassination Politics trip is the worst piece of tripe I've ever seen on the list, but if it's not, it's right up there. Those of us who are anarchists are often that way because we think the *means* the State uses are evil, not to be excused by any amount of mumbo-jumbo. And you gleefully propose to let us *all* in on the immoral game of murdering those who annoy us sufficiently. I'll pass. You know, if I were constructing an agent provacateur, I'd want a persona who's willing to be loudly clueless with ideas that show minimal or non-existent awareness of basic human hopes and fears, like security from random hit-squads. I'd have him go on and on with his ideas, until eventually they can splashed all over headlines and used to discredit the whole realm of privacy protection. But no, I don't think you're an agent. More fool you, you're willing to do the government's disinformation work for it without even thirty pieces of silver or a 401K. At this point I recommend to you the 12-step program I explained to Vladimir. Signed, A Friend

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Can't be THAT Fred Cohen :-)
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: gary.schermerhorn(a)nyapps01.gsam.gs.com (Gary Schermerhorn) Date: Fri, 26 Jan 96 08:13:56 EST Message-Id: <960126080515.ZM21151@scherg> Subject: Question Does anybody know a consultant named Fred Cohen? I'm doing some background work. Please get back to me if you know him. -- Gary Schermerhorn (scherg(a)gsam.gs.com) Goldman Sachs Asset Management 1 New York Plaza, 42nd Floor (212) 902-3344 (phone), (212) 428-1008 (fax)

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weak cryptoanarchy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some non-cypherpunks seem afraid of Tim May's cryptoanarchy, which, to quote Dr. Denning's recent paper, "suggest the impending arrival of a Brave New World in which governments, as we know them, have crumbled, disappeared, and been replaced by virtual communities of individuals doing as they wish without interference." Perhaps these people are worrying needlessly. I don't think cryptoanarchy (in this strong form) is a likely scenario for the future. Even if strong cryptography and anonymous transaction systems are used by everyone, governments can continue to control people's physical actions and properties. The physical world will continue to exist, even if it becomes relatively less important. I think a better prediction for the implications of strong crypto is what I would call "weak cryptoanarchy." That is, cryptography will allow virtual communities the option to exist without the possibility of inteference by force. Certainly some virtual communities, such as moderated discussion groups, will opt to have formal or informal governments. The key is that people will have the choice of participating in communities where physical violence will be absolutely powerless. Stated in this form, cryptoanarchy is hardly controversial. Plus, this weak form of cryptoanarchy has a much better chance of being realized, because it does not require the collapse of existing governments, only the creation of new communities without governments.

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Windows PGP mail reader
by jims＠conch.aa.msen.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. Can anyone recommend a Windows based email/POP3 reader that can decrypt content? Please reply via email: Jim Schueler jims(a)msen.com

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Edited Edupage
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"educom(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu" 25-JAN-1996 23:36:37.75 Subj: Edupage, 25 January 1996 >***************************************************************** Edupage, 25 January 1996. Edupage, a summary of news items on information technology, is provided three times each week as a service by Educom, a Washington, D.C.-based consortium of leading colleges and universities seeking to transform education through the use of information technology. ***************************************************************** INSECURITY FEARS A North American study on Internet security by Ernst & Young says that companies fear doing business via the Internet. Companies with a direct Internet connection are concerned that outsiders can gain access to their systems and data bases, and companies that transmit sensitive financial information worry about the security of these transactions. (Toronto Globe & Mail 25 Jan 96 B5) -------------------- If they're actually seriously becoming paranoid about this, it's an opportunity to press cryptography. Anyone seen the original study? -------------------- >TELECOM "GIVEAWAY" CONTROVERSY MAY BE DEFERRED Senate Commerce Committee chair Larry Pressler (R., SD) is suggesting that a controversial provision of the telecommunications legislation be removed from that legislation and addressed in a separate bill. The provision has been attacked by Senator Bob Dole and other Republicans as a "giveaway" of valuable airwaive spectrum to TV broadcasters for uses such as high-definition television. (New York Times 25 Jan 96 C6) --------------------- Looks like another anti-"CDA" campaign may soon be neccessary. -Allen --------------------- Edupage is written by John Gehl (gehl(a)educom.edu) & Suzanne Douglas (douglas(a)educom.edu) Voice: 404-371-1853, Fax: 404-371-8057. *************************************************************** EDUPAGE is what you've just finished reading. (Please note that it's "Edupage" and not "EduPage.") To subscribe to Edupage: send a message to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu and in the body of the message type: subscribe edupage John Lewis (assuming that your name is John Lewis; if it's not, substitute your own name). ... To cancel, send a message to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu and in the body of the message type: unsubscribe edupage. (Subscription problems? Send mail to educom(a)educom.unc.edu.) ARCHIVES & TRANSLATIONS. For archive copies of Edupage or Update, ftp or gopher to educom.edu or see URL: < http://www.educom.edu/>. For the French edition of Edupage, send mail to edupage-fr(a)ijs.com with the subject "subscribe"; or see < http://www.ijs.com >. For the German edition, genugt eine E-Mail an: infomat(a)stern.de mit der Betreff- oder Textzeile "STERN Online Edupage". For the Hebrew edition, send mail to listserv(a)kinetica.co.il containing : SUBSCRIBE Leketnet-Word6 <name> or see < http://www.kinetica.co.il/newsletters/leketnet/ >. For the Hungarian edition, send mail to: send mail to subs.edupage(a)hungary.com. For the Italian edition : < http://dbweb.agora.stm.it/webforum/infotech > or send mail to: b.parrella(a)agora.stm.it. for info. For the Portuguese edition, contact edunews(a)nc-rj.rnp.br with the message SUB EDUPAGE-P Seu Primeiro Nome Seu Sobrenome. For the Spanish edition, send mail edunews(a)nc-rj.rnp.br with the message SUB EDUPAGE-E Su Primer Nombre, Su Apellido.

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Re: weak cryptoanarchy
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:14 AM 1/27/96, Anonymous wrote: >I think a better prediction for the implications of strong >crypto is what I would call "weak cryptoanarchy." That is, >cryptography will allow virtual communities the option to exist ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >without the possibility of inteference by force. Certainly some >virtual communities, such as moderated discussion groups, will >opt to have formal or informal governments. The key is that >people will have the choice of participating in communities >where physical violence will be absolutely powerless. > >Stated in this form, cryptoanarchy is hardly controversial. >Plus, this weak form of cryptoanarchy has a much better chance >of being realized, because it does not require the collapse of >existing governments, only the creation of new communities ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >without governments. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The paper which Prof. Denning was responding to was my paper, "Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities." Seems like I anticipated your point. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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FWD: Internet e-mail
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The following was posted to another list. Has anybody heard about this? [Gee, I _wonder_ if there will be escrowed keys...] ******Begin Forwarded Message********* >I just read in "legal.online" that the Postal Service plans to provide >secure email service. It will include encryption plus offer U.S. mail fraud >protection. Of course there is no estimate on cost. Regards - Lynne -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQmOdj5A4+Z4Wnt9AQGKQQP+KRNFsI7DMk6nJwmWDpZkdX1RAtvJRdMo 38YL44AW4KxMO7SJdtkdAUhmWI6Y6bkWQ1+YXuRkG6wVN724k30vSui5vqO88GNF 0lvXyuJmL0z76yGbZmwf2l06L767MAX6P4hXuaMP67VZ5VRwScoNhlmPnb5L50rD v2ZLWyC0Rvw= =lhVA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ******************************************************* Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; E-mail: | - Survive; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Go to bed." *******************************************************

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