December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

pgp 6 src out
by Steve Mynott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hmmm pgp 6 source books have been released .. I wonder if there will be a pgp 6i unix version now? -- 1024/D9C69DF9 steve mynott steve(a)tightrope.demon.co.uk http://www.pineal.com/ i was gratified to be able to answer promptly, and i did. i said i didn't know. -- mark twain

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RE: DNA (fwd)
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mathew James Gering wrote: >Monozygotic [maternal] twins do have the same DNA. Hence they >are identical. Genetically identical that is, there are non-genetic >variations. Dizygotic [fraternal] twins do not. Fraternal twins can >be visually nearly identical, but they are not genetically identical. That's right. "Monozygotic". I'd forgotten the word. >Clones on the otherhand and have identical nuclear DNA, but >are notnecessarily identical because some early development >processes rely on maternal genome material and not nuclear >DNA, and depending on the cloning process they may have >different mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Yep - if you mean Dolly-style clones derived from nuclear transplants into eggs. there was an interesting article in this week's "New Scientist" magazine (http://www.newscientist.com/ns/981010/contents.html) about the changing popular meaning of the word "clone". It was originally used for a group of plants produced vegetatively, like by cuttings or runners. Then it was extended to other organisms that can reproduce by division, like so-called protozoa Then to DNA replicated from one ancestor. And now to artificially cloned things like Dolly. If you got a Dolly-style clone made from you he or she wouldn't be your child, but your sibling and wouldn't be identical to you for all the reasons Matt pointed out. And of course because of different education/experience/upbringing et.c nto to mention the knowledge that they had been got in such a different way, which must do *something* to the psyche. (Anyone read "Cyteen" by CJ Cherryh?) Identical twins of course are a clone in the original sense, just as much as a variety of apples or a colony of bacteria are a clone. Really genetically identical, right down to the maternal contribution, because they drive from division at an early embryo stage (Sea-urchins can do it as well but insects can't...) If it were possible to re-potentiate adult cells and transform them into embryos (it works in plants - but then it has to because they can't move cells from one organ to another so any shoot tip has to be able to produce any kind of plant tissue) then we could make "real" twin-like clones of humans. If the search for the mysterious foetal stem cells pays off that might be possible (though why anyone would want to clone a human foetus is beyond me. Assume all the crude jokes about it being more fun to make another one using the traditional method). Ken Brown

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Springfield poxmarked 9 October 1998: Subject: Springfield CypherPunks Physical Meeting FPP 10-5-98 Date: Every Saturday thru Thursday (except when it rains) Time: During 'REC' Hour. Place: Recreation Cages/The Hole (TM) Nuthouse Number Nine Looney Level 'Leven Springfield, Missouri Directions: Walk to the Cell Door. Turn around, squat down and put your hands behind you, and through the Slot In The Door. Stand up after Handcuffs are in place, turn around and wait for Guard to open Door. Step into hallway and wait for Pat-Down. (Smiling, Wisecracks & Hard-Ons not advised.) Follow first Inmate & Guard. There will be a short period for everyone to cop a few butts (cigarettes only, please), if they don't have any, light them and Shoot the Shit or Settle Old Scores before the Speakers begin to Rant & Rave or Blather Aimlessly. This Weeks Topics/Speakers Saturday: Where Are Everybody's Shoes? ~ MAY, T.C. Sunday: Does Anybody Remember What We Talked About Yesterday? ~ FroomNOSPAMkin, M. Monday: I *TOLD* You They (TM) Were Out To Get Us! ~ replay.com, N@ Tuesday: If They're So Certain This Prison is Secure, Then Why Won't They Provide Us With Blue Prints? ~ Geiger, Wm III Wednesday: This Isn't What I Had In Mind When I Helped Set the Prison Standards ~ Hallam-Baker, P. I'm Sure Glad I Put In A Side Door ~ Sameer, P. I Broke Out! (But I Can't Provide You With Any Details) ~ Zimmermann, P. How many Beatings Does It Take To Change A Prison Cell Light Bulb? ~ Costner, R. I Bet Bill Gates *Stole* Everyone's Shoes! ~ Hun, A.T. I *Love* This Prison! ~ Hettinga, R. Thursday: Prisoner #7-9-12-13-15-18-5, J. is a COCK SUCKER! ~ Warden Vulis, D. (KOTM) (DON'T FORGET YOUR SHOES!)

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Springfield porkmarked 9 October 1998: Subject: Virtual Heist -- FPP #6 "I put Six Million into Hog Futures first thing this morning." Yesterday's Power Suit told his lunch companion, hoping to impress her. "Silicon Valley." Today's Power Skirt replied, almost leaning over to whisper, as if speaking loud enough for the Differently Dressed Deviate at the next table to hear would make E.F. Hutton roll over in His or Her grave. "That's where the Smart Money's going again." she continued, glancing nervously at the Differently Dressed Deviate whose Well-Tailored Suit seemed so out of place and ... well, Threatening ... in this Chicago Mercantile Exchange Lunch Room. Today's Power Skirt crossed her legs and casually admired her new Rolex as she told Yesterday's Power Suit, with a hint of disdain in her voice, "I just put *Twenty-Six Million Dollars* into ..." "Everybody Freeze!" screamed the Differently Dressed Deviate as i jumped to His or Her feet, pulling a Digital Uzi out of His or Her Well-Tailored Suit, which was a Cammo Montage of Colors Weaves & Cuts of the Power Suits of a wide span of Time & Generations. "Army of Dog!" Cammo Monty continued, sending a Shiver of Terror down the spines of the Lunch Crowd gathered today, as they were everyday, discussing (over their bag lunches) their movement of Other People's Millions into and out of various Money Market Accounts, et al. Cammo Monty pointed the Digital Uzi at the breast pocket of Yesterday's Power suit. "Let's see your Bank Book, Dick Face." Horrified, Yesterday's Power Suit shakily withdrew the Bank Book from his pocket, opened it and placed it on the table in front of him. "Just over three hundred bucks." the Army of Dog Digital Terrorist told the Lunch Crowd, causing much chuckling and snickering throughout the room. "Let's have it, Twat Face." Cammo Monty spun around pointing the Digital Uzi directly at the Bank Book of Today's Power Skirt, as she was trying to slip it out of her Briefcase, unnoticed. Reluctantly, she opened it and lay it on the table. "A hundred and twenty-eight dollars ..." Cammo Monty announced to the tittering Lunch Crowd, "and seventeen cents." i finished to a chorus of guffaws. Cammo Monty leapt onto his chair, and placed one foot on the table, waving His or Her Digital Uzi around the room, seeing the Fear (TM) in the Eyes of each Wanna Be Money Kontroller in the room - thinking that they might be the next to have their finances exposed. "Today's Power Skirt," Cammo Monty told the Lunch Crowd, "bought her Rolex on a Payment Plan," a shudder went through the room, "with a *ten percent*," i spit out the words as she began to moan, "down-payment." Today's Power skirt collapsed in tears ... "You Fucking Morons (TM)!" Cammo Monty screamed at the group, causing them to cringe in shame. "You are handling Other People's Money. It's not *your* money, you idiots, so Wake The Fuck Up (TM) and stop pretending that it is ... to yourself and to each other." <J <J Across town, one of Cammo Monty's A0D Non-Conspirators was making a similar speech to a Lunch Crowd of Federal BureauCraps. "Sunshine is the best disinfectant." the Beautiful Army of Bitch Terrorist nagged the whimpering BureauCraps, for the hundredth times, as i laid yet another Digital Printout on the Overhead Projector. "This is the amount of National Debt that is a result of you Fuck Wads holding meetings to discuss the agendas of future meetings." Beautiful Bitch snarled at the Group. "This," i continued, slapping down a picture of a Family With 2.5 Children onto the Overhead Projector, "is who is *paying* for your Incompetence & Departmental Squabbling." "Don't look away!" the Beautiful Bitch screamed, using the Zoom Feature to Highlite the Child with no arms or legs in the picture. "It's NOT YOUR MONEY you Dumb Assholes!" i continued to nag at the BureauCraps. "But you're not content to force the Taxpayers to pay An Arm & A Leg to support your Wasteful Spending - now you want *Two Arms & Two Legs* ..." "CHILDREN'S LEGS!" the Beautiful Bitch raged at the terrified BureauCraps.

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RE: INTERNET STOCKWATCH! I S M R
by stockadvisory79658ddlw＠gte.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Company: Internet Stock Market Resources Symbol: I S M R Price: 2 1/4 ($2.25/share) " I S M R is evolving into one of the internet's main financial web portals not unlike E*Trade in its future potential." As a featured stock in both Success and Opportunist magazines and as a content partner with Time Warner's Web TV I S M R is rated a "VERY STRONG BUY". For more information on I S M R go to: http://quicken.excite.com/investments/quotes plxII7.

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Re: What it's like to get a subpoena (re Toto) (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1998 18:25:01 -0400 > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Subject: Re: What it's like to get a subpoena (re Toto) (fwd) > It's tough being the earliest ones contacted, having to decide > as Tom and Jim have had to do about whether to go public > or deal with the inquiries in private and hope that nothing worse > develops. That's what worries me, once the snowball gets rolling... I mean jeesh, I run a program that handles email. This sort of stuff is exactly why I don't like interacting with people via private email unless I know them personaly (ie via non-electronic means). The software is publicly available and certainly doesn't need me to explain it. While I can see some interest in wanting to know what CJ/Toto/aka said to me that night on the phone and the next day at the physical meet, it makes me wonder exactly what am I *supposed* to know about... > It's that switch from friendly and couterous to the other that > none of want to think about, eh? "You're under arrest. Anything > you say can and will be used against you." Hmm, what was I > saying, posting, here. Ahmen. Though a more insidous threat is the 'network' that gets built out of it. I wonder if this means every time some bozo I happen to run across goes postal I'm going to be 'investigated'? I wonder how long a name stays on those (probably) non-existant lists? > Makes a more convincing case to have a live body telling the > facts of the matter, explaining how things work, somewhat eager > to instruct and please, in self-preservation, to keep the cops and > court friendly and courteous. What was told to the investigators > in private, that's what hung Jim Bell and CJ. That was the ultimate reason that I went ahead and posted it. That way somebody *besides* me knew about it. > Then the friendly folks came for you and me, working a list. Which is the reason I'm talking to a lawyer to find out specificaly what is going on. I mean in my own self interest and the continued existance of TAG:SSZ it seems to be the thing to do. As far as I know I won't have access to council once I'm in there. ____________________________________________________________________ To know what is right and not to do it is the worst cowardice. Confucius The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Who is next? (re Jim's subpoena)
by William J. Hartwell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This ran through my mind this morning before I was totally awake. Maybe somebody can help me with the original author of this.... When they came for Kevin Mitnick I said nothing. After all he was a big time hacker and I wasn't a hacker so I did not speak up. When they came for Jim Bell I said nothing. He was a criminal and I am not a criminal so I didn't speak up. When they came for Toto I said nothing. Surely he was nuts and I am completely sane so I didn't speak up. When they came for Jim Choate I said nothing. He runs a cypherpunks mailing list and I don't manage any lists so I didn't speak up. When they come for me who will be left to speak up? This is a poor paraphrase of the original but I wonder if it is something that we may be saying here in the U.S. soon? -- William J. Hartwell (602)987-8436 Queencreek, Az. billh(a)ibag.com billh(a)interdem.com billh(a)hartwell.net

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Soccer Moms?
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the middle of an interesting article about digital cash, forwarded here by Bob Hettinga, there was the line: > After all, the kind of soccer moms who elected Bill Clinton "Divided by a common language" as I am I genuinly don't know what that means. And I can't even guess from context. I'd have expected a dig at liberals or feminists or welfare recipients at that point; and I can't work out what soccer has to do with it. Do mothers play soccer much in the USA? Football (as the 95% of the world's population that aren't either English-speaking North Americans or else Rugby fans call the Beautiful Game) is associated in my mind with young men, specifically working class men. It's connotations are entirely macho, even violent. When a big match is on men gather in pubs and bars and shout at TVs whilst knocking back the lager. You avoid the centre of town if you don't want to risk getting involved in a fight. People get *killed* at football matches. That's pretty much true in every big city inthe world outside North America (and Japan where the fans are polite). This honestly isn't a troll - I am in fact bewildered by the phrase. Ken Brown

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"It's a Hardware Problem..."
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com X-Sender: believer(a)telepath.com Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1998 06:33:46 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Sandia Labs: Foiling Hackers: World's Smallest Combination Lock Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: EurekAlert! http://www.eurekalert.org/releases/snl-wsclpt.html EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE: 12 OCTOBER 1998 AT 02:00:00 ET US Contact: Chris Burroughs coburro(a)sandia.go 505-844-0948 Sandia National Laboratories "World's Smallest Combination Lock" Promises To Foil The Best Computer Hacker, Say Sandia Developers ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. -- The "world's smallest combination lock," a minuscule mechanical device developed at Sandia National Laboratories, promises to build a virtually impenetrable computer firewall that even the best hacker can't beat. The Recodable Locking Device, which uses microelectromechanical system (MEMS) technology so small that it takes a microscope to see it, is a series of tiny notched gears that move to the unlocked position only when the right code is entered. It's the first known mechanical hardware designed to keep unwanted guests from breaking codes and illegally entering computer and other secure systems. "Computer firewalls have always been dependent on software, which means they are 'soft' and subject to manipulations," says Larry Dalton, manager of Sandia's High Integrity Software Systems Engineering Department. "Our device is hardware and is extremely difficult to break into. You have one and only one chance in a million of picking exactly the right code compared to a one in 10,000 chance, with many additional chances, in most software firewalls. After one failed try, this new device mechanically shuts down and can't be reset and reopened except by the owner." Patent filed Sandia, a Department of Energy (DOE) national security lab, recently filed for a patent for the mechanism. The first working units were fabricated in July. The Sandia team, which is refining the device and doing reliability tests, expects to have it ready for commercialization in about two years. Once it is perfected, a commercial partner will be tapped to produce and sell it. "The Recodable Locking Device should be of great interest to businesses and individuals who have computer networks, have sites on the Web, or require secure computers," says Frank Peter, engineer who designed the device. "It would make it virtually impossible for break-ins to Web sites, like what occurred with The New York Times in September." (Hackers broke into the Times' electronic edition in mid-September and shut it down for several hours.) Computer crime is a growing problem nationwide. The Computer Security Institute together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently surveyed 520 security practitioners in US corporations, government agencies, financial institutions, and universities. Results showed that 64 percent of the respondents reported computer security breaches within the last 12 months. And although 72 percent said they suffered financial losses from these breaches, only 42 percent were able to quantify their losses -- estimating them to be more than $136.8 million. Dalton says he 'had the notion' of the device for three years, calling it the 'digital isolation and incompatibility' project. Digital was for the digital world, and isolation and incompatibility are important concepts in stronglinks, which are mechanical locks used as safety devices in weapons. He turned to Sandia's Electromechanical Engineering Department, headed by David Plummer, to do the design because of that group's expertise in stronglinks as well as its ability to design using the new MEMS technology. Simple system "It took about three months to go from concept to the final design," Peter says. "Based on a code storage scheme used successfully in existing weapon surety subsystems, we were able to design a very simple device -- and it's the simplicity of the device that makes it easy to analyze from a vulnerability standpoint." The Sandia Microelectronics Development Laboratory used Peter's design to build a working device, which consists of a series of six code wheels, each less than 300 microns in diameter, driven by electrostatic comb drives that turn electrical impulses into mechanical motion. The 'lock owner' sets a lock combination to any value from one to one million. The entire device is about 9.4 millimeters by 4.7 millimeters, about the size of a button on a dress shirt. The Recodable Locking Device consists of two sides -- the user side and the secure side. To unlock the device, a user must enter a code that identically matches the code stored mechanically in the six code wheels. If the user makes even one wrong entry -- and close doesn't count -- the device mechanically 'locks up' and does not allow any further tries until the owner resets it from the secure side. The six gears and the comb drives would be put on a small chip that could be incorporated into any computer, computer network, or security system. Because the chip is built using integrated circuit fabricating techniques, hundreds can be constructed on a single six-inch silicon wafer. The end result is that the device will be very inexpensive to produce. Plummer says Sandia is the only place where development of such a mechanism could have occurred. "That's due to the unique multilevel polysilicon fabrication process developed by Sandia and our heritage of designing mechanical locking devices," he says. Besides being a deterrent to hackers, the device has other security applications, Peter says. For example, controlled information could be made available only in a window of opportunity. The information owner could tell the party needing the data that he or she has five minutes to enter in a specific code and gain access. Then, after five minutes, the code would be reset and access denied. A variety of potential safety applications are also possible with the Recodable Locking Device. The mechanism can confirm that a critical system is operating as expected. And if it detects a problem, it will not permit execution of a function. In this safety capacity, the device could be used, for example, to ensure that a radiation therapy machine delivers the correct radiation dosage. "This device has a powerful potential -- one that is readily understood by most everyone," Dalton says. "I've been told by Department of Defense people that this is the first real technical advancement in information security that they've seen in a long time." Sandia is a multiprogram DOE laboratory, operated by a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corp. With main facilities in Albuquerque, N.M., and Livermore, Calif., Sandia has major research and development responsibilities in national security, energy, and environmental technologies and economic competitiveness. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the governments encryption policy
by nospam＠freedom.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I especially like the part about DEEPCRACK and how because EFF knew that the message was in English that it doesn't really prove that the FBI can break 56bit DES encryption. --------------------------------------------------- http://www.infosecuritymag.com/sept/q%26a.htm Q & A WITH WILLIAM REINSCH Cryptos Key Man Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the governments encryption export policyeven though it puts him "in the hot seat." BY ANDY BRINEY Q: How would you characterize current U.S. cryptographic export policies? A: The President has consistently articulated a policy of balancebetween privacy, electronic commerce, law enforcement and national security. We believe all four elements are important, and were trying to produce a policy that takes all of them into account. But is it really possible to balance all these issues at the same time? We think so. Im not sure the industry agrees with us, and its not easy. The privacy issues involved have been discussed for 50 years in debates about wiretaps and law enforcement devices for intercepting phone conversations. Encryption poses some of the same issues: privacy vs. law enforcement. The country has come to terms with wiretaps over the years, and people still use phoneseven though, with proper court orders, theres the possibility that law enforcement could be listening in. We think well be able to arrive at the same common public understanding with encryption. But theres no question that getting there will be difficult. What kind of time frame are we looking at? Is the administration looking at releasing a "final" crypto export policy within the next three months? Six months? A year? The policy I articulatedone of balanceis based on implementations in the marketplace. We expect the market to develop the products we like, and we expect that there will be a demand for the products. We want to work through the market. What that means is, if the market turns in unexpected directions, we have to be ready to re-evaluate our policy. So I dont think youre going to see a "final" versionever. As long as the market moves and changes, our policy will be tweaked to accommodate whats happening. In the short run, however, the policy we are currently operating under expires January 1. Weve told industry we expect to revisit that policy this fall, and make judgments about whats going to happen after January 1. So weve committed to trying to come out with the next update, hopefully by Labor Day, although my expectation is it may take a little longer than that. Can you be more explicit about what this policy might entail? No. Because were not there yet. What has been the industrys reaction to current policy? Industry has been quite active, particularly with submitting key-recovery plans. We provide more liberalized export controls for companies that provide plans by which they will build key-recovery products. Weve approved some 55 plans nowwith a few more pending. I dont think theyre doing it just because the government asked them to; theyre doing it because they see a market. In addition, in the spring the FBI and the Justice Department asked companies to come in to see if a technical solution could be found to deal with these issues. Companies have done that, too. At the same time, of all the economic sectors in the country, this ones moving the fastest. Theres a real danger that, if we cant get our policy together and out there in the marketplace soon, we could be overtaken by events overseas. Recently, a panel was charged with developing a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS). One of this groups directives was to design a federal computer security system that includes back doorswhich they failed to do. Whats next for this panel, and for this issue? My understanding is that, at the request of a majority of the panels members, the Secretary [of Commerce] has extended their charter to the end of the year. The Secretary received a letter from the panel in which the majority felt they would be able to complete their work with additional time. However, they also said they werent entirely confident that at the end of the day it would be unanimous product. Even if it were possible to do key escrow on the scale the government is asking, would anyone willingly buy such a product knowing that stronger encryption products without back doors are available? To prevent this, wouldnt it be necessary to criminalize the domestic possession of stronger crypto? First of all, we havent supported the latter. Second, I think you need to look at this problem in pieces, not as a unitary problem. The pieces are: stored data, data in transit (such as e-mail) and voice communications. I would argue that with the first two of those pieces, theres going to be substantial demand in the market for the kinds of products that are helpful from our standpoint. For stored data, we see a demand for key recoverywere not using the term "key escrow" much anymore. Particularly in business and financial institutions, theres a demand for recovery products, because people want to be able to access employees data in the event of accidents or other such things. As for e-mail, the most significant development there was the announcement nine companies made in early July. Each of these companies submitted an application for a so-called "door bell" technology, which connotes a variety of means of recovery at the server level. What we see developing here is growing use of network encryptionas opposed to encryption at the PCfor secure transmission of messages. Employers will want that, for employee control purposes. From the standpoint of law enforcement, thats a happy development, because it creates two "third point" locationsthe senders server and the recipients serverthat are physically separate from the sender and recipient of the message. These points are often controlled by third parties, namely contractors running the system. So, with the proper court order, law enforcement could go to those third points and obtain plain-text access. What was your reaction to the Electronic Frontier Foundations cracking of DES in July? I think you have to contrast that situation, which was reasonably artificial, with the reality of law enforcement. In this case, it took a decent amount of resources to crack a specific message that, I believe, the people doing the crack knew was in English, and knew was one message. Now, if youre the FBI, think about that. From their standpoint, were talking about traffic that isnt so easily identifiable. It might be a long stream of encrypted material that theyre trying to intercept in real time; they dont necessarily know what language its in; they dont necessarily know what part of the message is of interest to them; and they dont know whether its words or text or graphics or what it might be. Telling the FBI that, under those circumstances, you can buy an expensive computer and crack one message in 56 hoursthats not a lot of comfort to the FBI. And it doesnt seem to me that it should make anybody in the private sector nervous about the security of 56-bit products. If thats the best were going to get56 hours for a single message decrypted by equipment most people dont have and arent ever going to havethat doesnt exactly mean that its an unsecured product. But it does illustrate a trend. As time passes, its taking fewer and fewer resources and less and less time to crack the same algorithm. In 1997, it took three months. In February, it took 39 days. Now, its one $250,000 computer and 56 hours. Whos to say in two more months it wont be cracked in an even shorter amount of time with even fewer resources? You can project that curve, and maybe youll be right. The immediate effect of that is that its going to accelerate a trend thats already begun anyway, which is toward 128-bit products. I think thats a trend that would have occurred regardless of this particular event. The technical people Ive talked to say that once you get beyond 90 or 100 bits, it doesnt make all that much difference because youre talking about brute-force cracking times that are beyond any real time that you can imagine. Obviously, the faster you can crack 56 bits, the faster you can crack 90 or 100. But since each successive bit doubles your time, by the time you get to 90, I think youre into thousands of years... But the question is, assuming that 90 is safe, wouldnt it then be prudent to have a policy that allows uniform export of 90-bit products without special dispensation? I dont think we expect to set bit-length requirements. We believe in the marketplace deciding what is secure and what is not. The government is not going to say that 90 is good or 128 is good But right now its saying 56 is sufficient. No, the government is saying that 56 can be exported under certain circumstances. What the government has also said is that if its a key-recovery product, it can be exported with any bit length without constraint. And thats what we would prefer to focus onto tell people, if youre product has recovery features, bit length doesnt matter. Thats the incentive. What happens if a key-recovery standard cannot be agreed upon? Is there a fallback plan? We are doing everything we can to encourage people to find it acceptable and to get the market to move in that direction. We think thats whats happening. So I dont think weve developed a Plan B in that sense. Can you discuss progress on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)? No. Im not particularly involved in that. I think you need to talk to some NIST or NSA people about that. ALSO Q: You seem to be the governments point man on encryption policy issues. Is that a function of your office, your background, or what? A: "Designated victim" is the term we use [laughs]. Actually, its a function of the office. An integral component of our policy involves export controls, and the BXA [Bureau of Export Administration] administers export controls of dual-use items for the government. So I end up in the hot seat. EDITORS NOTE: Next month, Bruce Schneier, author of the definitive text Applied Cryptography, will respond to Undersecretary Reinschs comments in a special Word in Edgewise article.

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Evans on tradition, common law & Hayek
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 11:43:25 EDT Reply-To: Hayek Related Research <HAYEK-L(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU> Sender: Hayek Related Research <HAYEK-L(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU> From: Stephen Carson <SWCarson(a)AOL.COM> Subject: Evans on tradition, common law & Hayek To: HAYEK-L(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU M. Stanton Evans has an excellent discussion of tradition & common law as it relates to liberty & consent in his _The Theme is Freedom: Religion, Politics, and the American Tradition_, (1994, Regnery). Chapter 5 of that book, "The Uses of Tradition", is particularly helpful. From that chapter... [emphases his] "The reason for this libertarian effect is that the common law created a tremendous obstacle to the *workings of unchecked power in the state*. For if the law grew up by way of custom and tradition, over great intervals of time, then it was not the work of any individual and could not be changed at anyone's discretion. It was outside the ordinary workings of the process, pre-existed the powers of the day, and would survive them. This made it superior to the will of any king, or group of legislators, and gave it independent status." -p. 80 "...the common law cannot be made over by the decree of any given individual, group, or even generation. It consists instead of the accretion, over time, of ways of thinking and acting that many generations have accepted. When you think about it - and the common lawyers did - this is a *species of consent*. It means that people are *voluntarily choosing to do things in a certain way, without any central direction or design*. Another common lawyer of the Stuart era, John Davies, put it as follows: 'The common law of England is nothing else but the common law and custom of the realm... A custom taketh beginning and groweth to perfection in this manner; when a reasonable act once done is found to be good and beneficial to the people, and agreeable to their nature and disposition, then they do use and practice it again and again, and so by often iteration and multiplication of the act it becometh a custom... customary law is the most perfect and most excellent, and without comparison the best, to make and preserve a commonwealth. For the written laws that are made by either the edict of princes, or by council of estates [i.e., Parliament] are imposed on the subject before any trial or probation made, whether the same be fit and agreeable to the nature and disposition of the people, or whether they will breed any inconvenience or no. But a custom doth never become a law to bind the people, until it had been tried time out of mind...'" -p. 88 "This notion of *custom as consent*, in contrast to top-down command, is among the key ideas of the free society. With the statements of Davies and Wilson, in fact, we approach the modern exposition of this point by Hayek, who devotes a series of penetrating essays to the subject. The distinctive features of a libertarian regime, Hayek argues, is that it permits the organization of society by free decision, and that this results in an ordered system that no single person or even group of people has designed, and that could not have been created by top-down methods. An obvious example is the development of language - a structure that has grown up over a considerable course of time, invented by nobody in particular, but used conveniently by many." -p. 89-90 I had never quite connected this aspect of consent in with the common law. This makes the connection between spontaneous order, custom, time & consent much clearer to me. Stephen W. Carson <mailto:SWCarson@aol.com> "Premature optimization is the root of all evil" -Donald Knuth --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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FW: IAB statement on "private doorbell" encryption
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: The IAB[SMTP:iab@ietf.org] > Sent: Thursday, October 15, 1998 9:35 AM > Subject: IAB statement on "private doorbell" encryption > > > > The IAB and IESG are concerned by published descriptions of the > "private doorbell" approach to resolving the encryption controversy. > Essentially, the private doorbell requires that encryption and > decryption be done at a gateway, rather than at an end system; see > http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/govtaff/policy/paper/paper_index.html > for one description. This is in conflict with the "end-to-end" > principle, a fundamental tenet of the Internet architecture. While > there is certainly a place for gateway-based encryption in some > circumstances, to require it in all places (and to exclude end-to-end > encryption) would warp the protocol structure. Furthermore, it > offers a significantly lower level of security, in that there is > no longer protection against inside attacks, which by all accounts > are a serious threat. > > In addition, putting all security at the gateway ignores the need > for different levels of protection in different situations. For > some applications, encryption to the gateway may suffice. Others > may require encryption and cryptographic authentication of the > individual machine or even user. Should a strong encryption > algorithm be used, or a very efficient one? It is very difficult > to make these decisions anywhere but the end-system. But the > "private doorbell" scheme would block deployment of such fine-grained > protection. > > ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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FW: Protocol Action: OpenPGP Message Format to Proposed Standard
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: The IESG[SMTP:iesg-secretary@ietf.org] > Sent: Thursday, October 15, 1998 10:27 AM > Cc: RFC Editor; Internet Architecture Board; ietf-open-pgp(a)imc.org > Subject: Protocol Action: OpenPGP Message Format to Proposed Standard > > > > The IESG has approved the Internet-Draft 'OpenPGP Message Format' > <draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard. This > document is the product of the An Open Specification for Pretty Good > Privacy Working Group. > > The IESG contact persons are Jeffrey Schiller and Marcus Leech. > > > > Technical Summary > > This document defines the formats used by "Phil's Pretty Good > Privacy" otherwise known as PGP. > > Working Group Summary > > After serious discussion the working group came to consensus on this > document. > > Protocol Quality > > The formats used here are the result of a second generation > engineering effort to define an efficient, one pass format for > representing information encrypted or signed with PGP. They were > reviewed by Jeffrey I. Schiller for the IESG. > > > Note to RFC Editor: Please add the following as an IESG Note: > > This document defines many tag values, yet it doesn't describe a > mechanism for adding new tags (for new features). Traditionally the > Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) handles the allocation of > new values for future expansion and RFCs usually define the procedure > to be used by the IANA. However there are subtle (and not so subtle) > interactions that may occur in this protocol between new features and > existing features which result in a significant reduction in over all > security. Therefore this document does not define an extension > procedure. Instead requests to define new tag values (say for new > encryption algorithms for example) should be forwarded to the IESG > Security Area Directors for consideration or forwarding to the > appropriate IETF Working Group for consideration. > > ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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Re: Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the government's encryption policy
by HyperReal-Anon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nospam(a)freedom.net wrote: > > http://www.infosecuritymag.com/sept/q%26a.htm > Q & A WITH WILLIAM REINSCH > > Reinsch: What the government has also said is that if it's a > key-recovery product, it can be exported with any bit length > without constraint. And that's what we would prefer to focus > on -- to tell people, if you're product has recovery features, > bit length doesn't matter. Ah, something we can finally agree upon: "if your product has recovery features, bit length doesn't matter" (it's insecure).

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DCSB: Risk Management is Where the Money Is; Trust in Digital Commerce
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 11:01:58 -0400 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu, dcsb-announce(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Risk Management is Where the Money Is; Trust in Digital Commerce Cc: Dan Geer <geer(a)world.std.com>, Terry Symula <symula(a)ma.ultranet.com>, "Heffan, Ira" <HEFFAN(a)tht.com>, Roland Mueller <roland(a)secunet.com> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Dan Geer Senior Strategist and VP, CertCo, Inc. Risk Management is Where the Money Is Tuesday, November 3rd, 1998 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA The focus of "security" research today is the study of "trust management," i.e., the study of how trust is created, propagated, circumscribed, stored, exchanged, accounted for, recalled and adjudicated in an electronic world. This is both natural and mature -- natural because security is a means and not an end, mature because security technology must differentiate along cost-benefit lines. All the security technology that you can buy today enables some aspect of trust management and the academic and entrepreneurial segments alike are busy supplying many novel ways to propagate trust. They have it all wrong. Trust management is definitely exciting, but like most exciting ideas it is not important. What is important is risk management, the sister, the dual of trust management. And it is risk management that is the part of financial services that will drive the security world from here on out whether you realize it or not. Dan Geer is VP and Senior Strategist for CertCo, Inc., market leader in digital certification for electronic commerce. Dan has been at a number of security oriented startups in the Boston area since leaving academia where he was Manager of Systems Development for MIT's Project Athena. He holds a S.B. in EE/CS from MIT, and a Sc.D. in Biostatistics from Harvard. He was deeply involved in medical computing for fifteen years. A frequent speaker, popular teacher and member of several professional societies, he has been active in USENIX for some years at the Board level. His recent publications include "The Web Security Sourcebook" (Wiley, 1997) and the security chapter in Leebaert's "The Future of the Electronic Marketplace" (MIT, 1998). This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, November 3, 1998, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $32.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business attire" (whatever that means), for women. Fair warning: since we purchase these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, October 31st, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", in the amount of $32.50. Please include your e-mail address, so that we can send you a confirmation If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Upcoming speakers for DCSB are: December Joseph DeFeo TBA January Ira Heffan Internet Software and Business Process Patents February Roland Mueller European Privacy Directive We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>. For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQEVAwUBNiYOVsUCGwxmWcHhAQFxUggAjVPIS2STdjusV7TZJd/VrrA9NOzw12al 9k9wFsEcWwvknad85QCiTY1Vkwa7hCakuH9YkU9BZlWLgNhpm0tBTZ/nkMjGRaaX 3V8d89CfjaXoMfxYEmL95Cm0HEND5hUFoSmlWPQUjvThcQwrbWzXubzsmPn0Jd7M kqUrp/oFmqv4XYjgFWQxIz6va4dB772fTKCCmGJankNYh/ho+/HWm0pasymTzl/b akPKYSnTgCNQrUqHy6zSJJiinrAWQkPYcEinWktnT/TJGU1DFuxciJzQhu1c1eVr 8xtkgPn86Rmz4HXKnLRRm+lTWOKAo6+IDR4N1vR38pCiHx4ySIQ+PQ== =/Xht -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the governments encryption policy
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> We want to work through the market. What that means is, if the market > turns in unexpected directions, we have to be ready to re-evaluate our > policy. So I don't think you're going to see a "final" version > ever. As long as the market moves and changes, our policy will be > tweaked to accommodate what's happening. In other words ... If we don't approve, it's time to go back to ITAR and 40-bits. > I don't think they're doing it just because the government asked them > to; they're doing it because they see a market. In addition, in the > spring the FBI and the Justice Department asked companies to come in > to see if a technical solution could be found to deal with these > issues. Companies have done that, too. It must be nice to be able to pressure and threaten companies behind the scenes and then come out to the public to say that they are "cooperating" or "volunteering". > At the same time, of all the economic sectors in the country, this > one's moving the fastest. There's a real danger that, if we can't get > our policy together and out there in the marketplace soon, we could be > overtaken by events overseas. In other words, "all this time we've been denying that there was overseas competition, well, we were lying through our teeth." "And that thing with the EU complaining about Echelon and the Germans trying to head up the Europeans to bust ITAR/EAR ..." Oops! Can't say the "E" word in public because "nobody" knows about that! > I think you have to contrast that situation, which was reasonably > artificial, with the reality of law enforcement. In this case, it took > a decent amount of resources to crack a specific message that, I > believe, the people doing the crack knew was in English, and knew was > one message. Must be nice not having real technologists pointing out blatant flaws/lies in your public statments. > Now, if you're the FBI, think about that. From their standpoint, we're > talking about traffic that isn't so easily identifiable. It might be a > long stream of encrypted material that they're trying to intercept in > real time; they don't necessarily know what language it's in; they > don't necessarily know what Sure ... if the FBI were really stupid ... and the FBI didn't really want to do any homework, but instead, would rather have NSA's dictionaries do the walking ... encryption would be a real bitch, wouldn't it? Even 40-bit. Ern

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FBI Affidavit on Ex-NSA Cryptanalyst
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We offer the FBI's 23-page affidavit of charges against David Sheldon Boone, ex-NSA cryptanalyst who allegedly passed top secret SIGINT, EW and nuclear targeting plans to the Soviets: http://jya.com/dsb100998.htm Tantalizing hints on means and methods, quoting the affidavit of the FBI agent in charge: On one occasion, "Igor" [Soviet agent] told BOONE that the KGB/SVRR had access to United States Signals Directive (USSID) Zero, which was an index of all other USSIDs, and from this index IGOR asked BOONE to obtain specific USSIDs. I have ascertained that USSIDs are classified NSA publications for use in providing Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) support to the United States military. BOONE told the OA [FBI Operational Asset posing as Soviet agent to set up Boone] that he had given "Igor" a photocopy of an NSA document entitled "United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) 514," dated May 6, 1988. BOONE told the OA that this USSID was unusual because it was one of few USSIDs to be classified TOP SECRET rather than SECRET. BOONE told the OA that USSID 514 was not widely disseminated but that one copy had been at USAFS Augsburg. And more on Boone's training and duties in cryptanalysis at Fort Meade and in Germany. Bad Ausburg is the location of one of the NSA intercept stations for the Echelon program is it not?

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mail2fax remailer capability?
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am noticing the odd free email2fax "your fax was sent successfully" report in the dud messages sent to (the non-replyable) nobody(a)remailer.ch. Warming to the heart that -- anonymous fax. Now I am wondering what the coverage is like on fax gateways -- it clearly only is going to work in places where there are free local calls, for numbers counting as local to the gateway. Just thinking it would be kind of nice if one could send a message To: +1.234.567.891-mail2fax(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu via mixmaster and have it sort out the delivery if possible to mail2fax gateways operating with local calls in that area code. (Analogously perhaps to the auto USENET posting from those remailers with this option turned on -- that is either direct (remailer posts) or indirect (forwarded to a mail2news gateway)). Has anyone come across any mail2fax site which tries to keep track of other free fax services and forward faxes to one in the right area? ('Course if we could get some damn working ecash, we could fax it anywhere -- sender pays:-) Next stage -- anonymous voice mail delivered via voice modem / soundcard, all via mixmaster, that would be nice! Adam

2 1

Re: Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the governments encryption policy
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michael, Absolutely! But I still really am hoping in desperation that some people in the main stream press would get a clue that this is all double speak, and that they are simply playing a game to buy time for their old system, and buy political wins for the next system. Heck, if I was in FBI/NSA's shoes, and this was the slimy game I see everyday in D.C., it would be the same game I play to get what I need. And I would be very irresponsible if I did not play the game, however slimy it is. The problem is that it seems like most of the public take speeches like the speakers are pretty much honest, when in fact, most of the time, they are playing spin control. I have no doubt the FBI/NSA are in trouble. Echelon (or whatever they call it) is in trouble. They are irresponsible if they did not fight to the end to preserve some of their multi-billion $$$ investment, but they are in dire straits if they are hoping for a second generation centralized scanning intelligence machinery like Echelon. My belief is that they have to gather automated intelligence from far more disparate and heterogenous (and possibly conflicting) sources in the near future, and find ways to make sense out of all of the data. But I think the intelligent observer would see that they have no choice because this technology .. I hate that word because people call some of the most simple and dumb stuff "technology" in order to make money from it .. this technology is impossible to control, which means that precisely the most important target worth going after will have plenty of resources to foil Echelon, but the people made most vulnerable (because of the regulations) are the common folks. THAT is what is pissing me off. If they have some effective way to regulate underground trade of encryption, then they would have a story to tell. However, the fact that most encryption get out of this country so darn fast (we're counting minutes now ...) means they are not even trying. Prosecuting that guy in San Jose is just nuts. Since when does prosecuting a legitimate business man will actually stop people, who firmly believing that they have some natural right to distribute encryption? And I must emphasize that my opinion has NOTHING to do with whether encryption SHOULD, from a social/political/legal view, be exportable or not. Ern

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17 Dec '03

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wtf...
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has this list server died or is it just me? it seems like the list has died or is it just slowly fading into oblivion? It seems as though the only people still posting come from some great spam factory in left field. Have all of the questions been answered? Is everyone happy with the encryption they have? Doesn't anyone have any new thoughts on export restrictions, hash implementations, or the like? I know that I'm still out here, is anyone else? Does this ring a bell? People must come and together deploy these systems for the common good. Privacy only extends so far as the cooperation of one's fellows in society. We the Cypherpunks seek your questions and your concerns and hope we may engage you so that we do not deceive ourselves. We will not, however, be moved out of our course because some may disagree with our goals. Who else is out there?

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mail2fax remailer capability? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 20:14:40 +0100 > From: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> > Subject: mail2fax remailer capability? > Has anyone come across any mail2fax site which tries to keep track of > other free fax services and forward faxes to one in the right area? It wouldn't surprise me any to find that Kinko's and other such chain print shops couldn't do that sort of thing. Now if they'd do it over the web.... > ('Course if we could get some damn working ecash, we could fax it > anywhere -- sender pays:-) Open a laundromat, at least one person here in Austin has begun providing smart-card/no cash services. > Next stage -- anonymous voice mail delivered via voice modem / > soundcard, all via mixmaster, that would be nice! An anonymous remailer which drove a multi-format/media database would be pretty nifty. Might find more than a few niche markets to dabble in as well. In a sense you'd have your own little one machine data-haven. ____________________________________________________________________ To know what is right and not to do it is the worst cowardice. Confucius The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: wtf...
by Mohammed Lazhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hey Guys : I just subscribed to the list. I will be posting stuff soon Mohammed

2 1

RE: FYI: More on WebTV security
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: Pablo Calamera <pablo(a)microsoft.com> To: "'dstoler(a)globalpac.com'" <dstoler(a)globalpac.com>, rah(a)shipwright.com, mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com Cc: jimg(a)mentat.com Subject: RE: FYI: More on WebTV security Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 17:19:11 -0700 comments inserted, extraneous text deleted. > -----Original Message----- > From: dstoler(a)globalpac.com [mailto:dstoler@globalpac.com] > Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 1998 5:39 AM > To: Pablo Calamera; rah(a)shipwright.com; mac-crypto(a)vmeng.com > Cc: jimg(a)mentat.com > Subject: Re: FYI: More on WebTV security > > [stuff deleted] > The press release implies that there is secure end-to-end > email between two WebTV customers. The wording is somewhat ambiguous though it does have more of a bent on the security of the transport layer. Perhaps it could have been clearer and specifically said that messages where encrypted during transport using 128 bit encryption. > Perhaps I am overly cynical, but I am guessing that they are > using SSL (TLS) from a web based email application on the > client to WebTV's servers. I presume email data is decrypted > at the servers, then re-encrypted to the recipient when she > uses the WebTV client to read email. Close. We could not even export SSL (TLS) with 128 encryption in this scenario. We have a proprietary transport protocol that we use that employs 128 bit RC4. > This approach would allow access to private email at the > servers by WebTV employees or law enforcement agencies. > > Note the careful use of the phrases "unauthorized party" and > "without posing undo risks to national security and law > enforcement" in the press release. > > I believe that WebTV's email security is directly coupled to > their ability to establish and enforce good security policy > within their operation and the trustworthiness of the > employees who have access to sensitive data. Partially true. We believe a major component of our security is indeed in the encrypted transport of your email from the service through the internet, through a leased POP to your box. Our Privacy Policy and Terms of Service are available for your viewing. http://webtv.net/home/privacy_text.html http://webtv.net/home/tos_text2.html This level of protection goes beyond email to registration, preferences/setup, "favorites" etc... Virtually all communications with the WebTV service. > I am concerned that carefully constructed wording of > Microsoft's press release implies stronger email security > than really exists. I hope I am wrong. We believe that with the level of encryption and the quality of our network operations that we have the best level of privacy protection for our users of any online service. I agree that the carefully worded press release may imply more than what we got. But we are very happy with this initial step. It has taken a very long time just to get export approval for this architecture and we look forward to further relaxation of export controls so we can compete on even footing with our foreign competitors. Pablo > David Stoler > > > Key paragraphs from Microsoft's press release: > > WebTV Networks has been granted the first export license to > use strong 128-bit encryption for any user and any > application in Japan and the United Kingdom. So, for example, > an e-mail message with personal information sent from a WebTV > subscriber in Japan to a second WebTV subscriber in Japan > will be sent securely because there is no known technology by > which an unauthorized party could intercept and decipher it. > > Therefore, as part of the WebTV Network, the WebTV-based > Internet terminal (starting at under $100) is now the most > secure communications device available from a U.S. company. > > "WebTV Networks' export approval is a significant step for > industry and reflects the U.S. government's commitment to > promoting e-commerce abroad," said William Reinsch, U.S. > undersecretary for export administration. "The WebTV Network > provides secure communications for its customers and partners > without posing undue risks to national security and law enforcement." > > > --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

2 1

wtf...
by Edwin E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Let's talk. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 mQGiBDPJm3oRBADUlbn8EX/UCyp3+lwiO8ZQLdG2QXQ8EdZ8+qOffbi5KKun3RVz 4XfU77cK+HWUeYfuVBZm1/8Uwbz/I1Z/FVUgDktMDvg4oeBnVBMBM8r4TPC8H73j 0B+XE6H5U8teixXljQpVsusTygI5R8LJ9Q9XNN9eWW1rxEYk2wG0I/3Z4wCg/+7N X6ayuKoJe8uVRro4USMVsycEAMiF1Kn1HevS2CaQn70xAYfk3/xGYjIj54hhlYQ+ zgvLuBMnfI3FoC875OyFhXUReIIn2HcdZKNcYrM1q33fgmMESZnjGr48qNe3rh4G FvhUHKkN6tOK/L8mCtbs6LAarjR2kE+nYmS2CcYeuhbfnj3O/wQqhsA8i4HCdsDK iHxXA/9aSIRFlB4ImAgDI6CywtCfMkQUdau0d2D+0p/XNtPf+r2kt8s6haeCgseB IQNETTC7PNf9ME0hpBGx2NdVsxsBvinASmkqJpE/yNUrSbzfmrkDf6OstfwtDeum NnF2E98KX+sHm9gCwTogSeXRQfwnZgIUEHgupNcTCm2hIF8JY7QjRWR3aW4gRS4g U21pdGggPGVkc21pdGhASW50TmV0Lm5ldD6JAEsEEBECAAsFAjPJm3oECwMBAgAK CRBJjX+m+ejwLU30AJ0chm6vMGZkSEk8R9Ci2YFbjqj8gACgtfRQLBfyEDLdQ5A6 O7U7VxpxDsGJAD8DBRA0geyVJnBGgNW85eURAnHAAJ9zOR8Z2uLjFdUfcTYfsDHg y7LdRACg3J/LLskk+f7psHBHUTIGlooTsyq5Ag0EM8mbexAIAPZCV7cIfwgXcqK6 1qlC8wXo+VMROU+28W65Szgg2gGnVqMU6Y9AVfPQB8bLQ6mUrfdMZIZJ+AyDvWXp F9Sh01D49Vlf3HZSTz09jdvOmeFXklnN/biudE/F/Ha8g8VHMGHOfMlm/xX5u/2R XscBqtNbno2gpXI61Brwv0YAWCvl9Ij9WE5J280gtJ3kkQc2azNsOA1FHQ98iLMc fFstjvbzySPAQ/ClWxiNjrtVjLhdONM0/XwXV0OjHRhs3jMhLLUq/zzhsSlAGBGN fISnCnLWhsQDGcgHKXrKlQzZlp+r0ApQmwJG0wg9ZqRdQZ+cfL2JSyIZJrqrol7D VekyCzsAAgIH/3SLvO37hk+J1SI6NgYjpivzyMD2E2acTVdpDWILSmlfVrTmoZ9b t+7jPj5cV5gAVD706Rv3h8Je1FsqtnqkV61z1ncx7cmU1gJTrecoLYBXbXbFk613 evI+u9EV1s3BGW4W4FsWp9ljQ1iR5Pb6TkTgeQ1SwI4uTCTkfYO1LvE/Boq1Nh7y 6ZoVBzrf8jvliHAsGw4sEQOtttfKr1SOPwweop6ZfEe4mLDHsNSSobKWU/Ql+JZD cr26Vm+C2tyBpAlYtuKj8WouLOUTa1bOo1LtClD1rgBmsao+8I1K1BfjiNlb+lS1 o8yxwoRjARKqGzrGoCB3x5mri6bHPdkQMWGJAD8DBRgzyZt7SY1/pvno8C0RAsdu AJ9mc0T8wq8viIy+uuFmG/6w1xiMhACg6h1fCtucX3tOAVLKIUgEmss7AJE= =U2JQ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- At 11:27 PM 10/15/98 -0000, you wrote: >Has this list server died or is it just me? > >it seems like the list has died or is it just slowly fading into oblivion? It seems as though the only people still posting come from some great spam factory in left field. Have all of the questions been answered? Is everyone happy with the encryption they have? Doesn't anyone have any new thoughts on export restrictions, hash implementations, or the like? I know that I'm still out here, is anyone else? > >Does this ring a bell? >People must come and together deploy these systems for the common good. Privacy only extends so far as the cooperation of one's fellows in society. We the Cypherpunks seek your questions and your concerns and hope we may engage you so that we do not deceive ourselves. We will not, however, be moved out of our course because some may disagree with our goals. > >Who else is out there? > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNiaSoEmNf6b56PAtEQKOhQCeJchkyv48Ksi+0L+YIKEpv21wHqQAoIwl cK9lvW97mHZmM0aDwzi/IC6l =fUQ7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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IP: HOUSE APPROVES Y2K BILL
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Peter J. Celano" <celano(a)ic.net> Subject: IP: HOUSE APPROVES Y2K BILL Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 13:24:30 -0400 To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com HOUSE APPROVES Y2K BILL The U.S. House of Representative has voted 407-3 to authorize the president's Council on the Year 2000 Conversion to take control of computer systems of critical agencies if they're unlikely to be able to avert a crisis because of the Year 2000 software problem, in which old programs using 2-digit codes for years will be unable to do correct date-based calculations. The Senate has not yet voted on the measure. (AP 13 Oct 98) ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: ISP not liable for customer's messages
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Peter J. Celano" <celano(a)ic.net> Subject: IP: ISP not liable for customer's messages Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 13:25:31 -0400 To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com INTERNET PROVIDER NOT LIABLE FOR MESSAGES OF ITS CUSTOMERS An appeals court in Florida has ruled against a woman who sued America Online because one of its customers, a convicted sex offender, used an AOL chat group to try to sell the woman's 11-year-old son a pornographic video. The court said that federal law protects online services from being held liable for the messages transmitted by their members sell the videotape of the boy. The defeated lawsuit, which is being appealed to the Supreme Court, tried to characterize America Online as "a home shopping network for pedophiles and child pornographers." (AP/Washington Post 15 Oct 98) -- Peter J. Celano petec(a)iname.com pgp key on request <http://ic.net/~celano> member SPECLUSA < >< Ready to DO something? Try <http://ic.net/~celano/ip/> Always remember - LIPS SINK SHIPS!!! ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: ** National ID Alert - Again **
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Patrick Poole <ppoole(a)fcref.org> Subject: IP: ** National ID Alert - Again ** Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 12:08:54 -0400 To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com We have been made aware by concerned staff members on the Hill that the one-year moratorium on implementing the National ID regulations is once again under attack from Rep. Lamar Smith. Not more than a week ago we sent out a similar alert after Smith was successful in convincing Speaker Gingrich to remove the provision from the bill. After our alert, many of you called Speaker Gingrich and told him "No to the National ID". Because of your prompt action and phone calls, he was forced to back down and allow the moratorium provision in the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY99. Now, in the waning hours of the 105th Congress, Gingrich is wavering on the issue and considering pulling the one-year moratorium from the bill at Smith's request. We need your help to stop Lamar Smith's stealth attacks on our freedoms by calling his office and Speaker Gingrich and telling them both, "No National ID for the American people!" The bill will probably come to a vote in the House TODAY. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU * CALL * THEIR OFFICES. With all of the last minute legislative activity occurring today, a phone call will be the only way that your voice is heard on this matter. Lamar Smith 202/225-4236 Speaker Gingrich 202/225-0600 Thanks in advance for your prompt attention. Patrick Poole Coalition for Constitutional Liberties Free Congress Foundation ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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Ooops, didn't save? FlashBack!
by Aladdin Systems 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

********************************************************************* You are currently a member of the Aladdin Information mailing list. Your email address was submitted at the Aladdin web site indicating that you wished to receive information pertaining to Aladdin products. If you would like to be removed from this list please refer to the instructions found at the bottom of this email. ********************************************************************* Dear Valued Aladdin Customer, It's not often that a whole new kind of software gets discovered. These days, it seems like products on the market span numerous technology areas with many different functions without really being helpful at all. The number of really new and exciting software that gets released has just about disappeared. Announcing: Aladdin FlashBack, an easy and fast way to protect your files! Faster than backups, safer and easier than file recovery. Document and data protection has never been as easy or automatic. http://www.digitalriver.com/Aladdin/FBKpc Aladdin introduces the POWER of Unlimited Undos: Use Aladdin FlashBack and discover the power of virtually unlimited Undos. Sound impossible? FlashBack tracks the changes made to a file every time you hit Save. It's easy to recover from accidental changes even after you've quit your application, turned your computer off and gone home. If you FlashBacked your document, at any time in the future, you can retrieve that exact version as fast as you can double-click. (FlashBack keeps up to 999 versions of each file!) This week only! You can purchase Aladdin's electronic version of FlashBack for the amazingly low price of only $9.95 (an incredible SAVINGS OF OVER 80%!!). Don't wait! Easy and safe online ordering and electronic delivery is available through Aladdin's online store, Digital River at: http://www.digitalriver.com/Aladdin/FBKpc FlashBack a file and you're protected against accidental deletion, file corruption, even from hitting the Save key and overwriting your file. Aladdin FlashBack is a whole new way to safeguard your important files. "...as a safety net for your data, it's unique and indispensable." -PC Magazine Online That's right, FlashBack recovers not only lost or damaged files, but also previous versions of files that you changed, even if you made the changes months ago. "FlashBack makes saving and tracking files easy, and makes crashes less painful by reducing the chances of your data getting permanently erased." -CNET Works on any file: FlashBack tracks only the documents you want, and works with any application you use. From word processing to graphics programs, web design, databases and spreadsheets: FlashBack is compatible with any application that Saves documents! Instant file recovery: Restore any file you've protected with FlashBack just by pointing and clicking. With FlashBack you're just seconds away from recovery. Save Disk Space: With FlashBack, you can keep multiple versions of your important files without gobbling up megabytes of disk space. FlashBack makes only one complete copy of your current file. Previous versions are tracked through "diff" files. Diff files are small files that contain just the changes, or differences, between one version and the next. The result? You can save five, ten, twenty or more versions of a file and still take up less room than you would by hitting Save As just a couple of times! Time & Date Stamping: FlashBack time and date stamps every version so you can easily recover the exact version you're looking for. Quick & Easy: To FlashBack a file just drop the file into the FlashBack application. To restore a file, just drag it out of FlashBack or double-click, that's it! FlashBack will instantly recover your file exactly the way it was when you saved it. FlashBack will protect both local and networked documents, and can update files either each time you save or at specified times: by any combination of minutes, hours or days. What would you pay to recover just one document that was lost, damaged, or accidentally overwritten? I know that I have lost days, not hours, recreating work that disappeared when I hit the Save key without thinking. Remember, for ONE WEEK ONLY you can purchase Aladdin's electronic version of FlashBack for the amazingly low price of only $9.95 (regularly $49.95). Don't wait! This is a special introductory price that will expire. Its list price is $99.95, and the price for FlashBack, even for Aladdin customers, will be going up soon. Visit our online store today to get your copy of the best new software of the year. You are, as always, covered by Aladdin's "no questions asked" 30 day money-back guarantee. http://www.digitalriver.com/Aladdin/FBKpc Order Aladdin FlashBack for the insanely low introductory price of $9.95, and give your data the kind of protection you've always wished it could have: easy, automatic and hassle-free. ===================================================================== If you would prefer not to receive our news and special offers in the future do NOT reply to this message, instead: 1. mailto:listserv@listserver.digitalriver.com 2. Put "UNSUBSCRIBE ALADDIN-WIN" (without quotes) in the FIRST LINE of the message BODY ===================================================================== Sincerely, Jonathan Kahn Founder & President Aladdin Systems

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ADfilter 2.1 Registration Code
by cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you for trying ADfilter 2.0 Your email address is: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Your personal ADfilter key is X3KCZ-K9994 Visit our web site at http://www.adfilter.com to purchase the full ADfilter 2.0 Professional for just US$19.95! Installing ADfilter: Run ADFSETUP.EXE. This will install ADfilter on your computer. As soon as installation is complete, ADfilter will show you a registration screen. Enter the e-mail address to which your registration key has been sent (you entered this before you downloaded ADfilter) and the registration code that has been sent to that e-mail address. Remember to include all punctuation when completing these two fields. Check that the ADfilter icon appears in your Windows system tray (bottom right of your screen). The icon is green when ADfilter is on and red when ADfilter is off. Double-clicking the icon opens ADfilter's configuration screens. If you encounter any difficulties you will find additional help on the ADfilter support page or you can contact us at support(a)adfilter.com

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DoT National ID card delayed; CDA II signed soon
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 18:45:12 -0700 (PDT) >From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> >To: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Subject: FC: DoT National ID card delayed; CDA II signed soon >X-No-Archive: Yes >Sender: owner-politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Reply-To: declan(a)well.com >X-Loop: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >X-URL: Politech is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ > >http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15635.html > >Newt Caves on National ID Cards >by Declan McCullagh > > 5:45 p.m. 15.Oct.98.PDT > When the staff at the conservative Free > Congress Foundation learned Thursday > that legislation postponing a federal plan > to standardize US drivers licenses was in > trouble, they turned to the Internet for > help. > > Patrick Poole, deputy director of the > groups Center for Technology Policy, > quickly fired off an email alert to 500 > grassroots conservative and libertarian > groups. He said Representative Lamar > Smith (R-Texas) was trying to preserve > regulations creating de facto national ID > cards, and he urged readers to let > Congress know exactly what middle > America thought about such big > government boondoggles... > > > >http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15638.html > >CDA II Bound for Clinton's Desk >by Declan McCullagh > > 2:45 p.m. 15.Oct.98.PDT > Wielding a potent political bludgeon -- by > accusing Democrats of being soft on > pornography just weeks before the > election -- Republicans on Thursday > inserted the sequel to the > Communications Decency Act into a > sprawling $500 billion spending bill. > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology >To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: >subscribe politech >More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >

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Disk (block device) encryption for Linux and *BSD?
by HyperReal-Anon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies for the interruption, I'm looking for disk / partition encryption for Unix-alikes, especially Linux, OpenBSD and/or NetBSD. My websearch has been less than satisfactory - I found outdated Linux kernel patches for encryption loopback, and I distinctly remember reading about a serious bug in the use (or lack thereof) of key material in this code. Do patches for a current Linux kernel exist, and have all the known bugs been fixed? Also, there seems to be no version of Marutukku about that I can actually get to work on *BSD. Is Marutukku still being developed? Generally, is there a good page that tracks disk encryption for Unix? I'm currently using cfs here and there, and I have a specific question about that package, too: Does the cypherpunks list trust the patches that add Blowfish support to cfs? Questions questions..

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ICANN (New IANA) as a Pawn in an Economic Struggle Between US and
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 17:42:56 -0400 Reply-To: cook(a)cookreport.com Originator: com-priv(a)lists.psi.com Sender: com-priv(a)lists.psi.com Precedence: bulk From: Gordon Cook <cook(a)cookreport.com> To: Multiple recipients of list <com-priv(a)lists.psi.com> Subject: ICANN (New IANA) as a Pawn in an Economic Struggle Between US and X-Comment: Commercialization and Privatization of the Internet I asked the question a few days ago: what could justify Ira's heavy handed tactics. What stakes could be large enough to risk the stability of the net? Here is an informed hypothesis based on a 90 minutes conversation with an expert source in these areas who has a heavy international background. (I have also reality checked this hypothesis with several knowledgable observers.) I am beginning to get an idea of what is at stake in the larger sense. Ira, I fear, is using the internet as a pawn in a far bigger game. The game is is inextricably linked with the privacy statutes of the OECD and the coming October 23th deadline for American companies doing business in Europe and data mining on European citizens as part of their ordinary activities. It is also inextricably linked with the international encryption debate. I have heard credible allegations that the US government is at such loggerheads with the OECD countries over the use of key recovery encryption and over the unwillingness of american big business to change its ways of gathering data on employees, customers, contractors etc that we are coming to the October 23th deadline with billions of dollars at stake and no solution. At the same time Ira has for the past three years focused on his mission with Tom Kalil and working through the National Economic and Security Council to setting up the internet as a mechanism for global economic commerce..... touting the net as a means on which, in a few year's time, the majority of the world's economy will depend. It looks as though Ira's agenda is to do this in such a way that the internet can be controlled by an American based, incorporated, non profit public authority set up under American law with a Board, purposefully established without fiscal restraints and without any oversight or accountability. And with board members who with a smattering of international representation can be made as subserviant as possible to the interests of the large American Corporations. These Board members, through the GIP, will be passing the cup to pay for the expenses of establishing ICANN. Consider Bill Burrington Director of Law and Public Policy and Assistant General Counsel at AOL, a company which huge data holdings. He is the chair of the Washington DC Internetactive Services Association which went on to form the Internet Alliance with membership very simalr to GIP. Burrington is manning the barricades of the companies involved in the privacy dispute with the oecd. (Why should Burrington care? Consider AOL's electronic profiles on its 12 million members) Consider also Andy Sernovitz of AIM whose members have the same general interests and who helped Barb Dooley of the CIX sell out the IFWP process. Did Jon Postel really refuse to attend the Harvard wrap up meeting or did Ira order him not to? So even if Ira looks heavy handed -- for this agenda to be used as the White House intends-- Ira needs to have his ducks in order in time for the OECD meeting in Canada that begins next week. He needs to demonstrate that he has enough power to have rammed through a solution at home. That is why things have turned nasty during the last week and why the iron fist is becoming seen with the incorporation of ICANN even though, by Ira's own allegedly free process, ICANN should not yet be seen as the winner. Ira is determined to confront the OECD next week with an Internet that *HE* and the White House clearly controls and to do so as a bargaining chip to use in getting our way against the Europeans and Asians and Canadians..... on the issues of encryption and privacy statutes. It would be instructive to see the legal basis of the governments arguments being used to get NSI to cave. Could it be that their content might be embarrising? If SAIC doesn't order NSI to sign Ira's demands by the seventh then Ira and the white house will not be as in control of the internet, as they need to demonstrate themselves to be, in order to use the internet as an american dominated global commerce weapon against the other OECD governments. The American view is that with the internet firmly in command of the White House on American corportate terms, the Asians and Europeans will have no choice but to back off their privacy and the American encryption demands. Remember also that Europe is trying to launch the Euro in such a way that it becomes the world's reserve currency. One would like to know whether the White House orders are do what ever is necessary to see that this effort fails. The Europeans and Asians understand perfectly well the power play that Ira is engaged in. They are not surprisingly seething with anger. American arrogance could be doing dangerous things. If we drive Europe and Asia into an economic and political alliance against us, we all will lose. Privacy, and the freedom to live our lives without government and corporate political or economic interference are at stake. *************************************************************************** The COOK Report on Internet White House Corrupts Formation of IANA 431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ 08618 USA Corporation. White Paper a Sham. See (609) 882-2572 (phone & fax) http://www.cookreport.com/sellout cook(a)cookreport.com Index to 6 years of COOK Report, how to subscribe, exec summaries, special reports, gloss at http://www.cookreport.com *************************************************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: ICANN (New IANA) as a Pawn in an Economic Struggle Between USand
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not to disturb your exegetic reverie, here, Gord, but I asked Mr. Magaziner, when he spoke at at the Electronic Payments Forum earlier this month, in front of about 400 or so digital commerce and e$ types, the following question: "Given your administration's, um, success, in banning strong foriegn cryptography, how do you propose to ban it in the United States?" His answer then was that he was absolutely postively against key escrow or limits on cryptography of any kind. Besides stealing all my carefully worded thunder :-), he got a big round of applause. <grumble, grumble goddamn liberals, grumble, grumble> He also said that the major reason for the, um, complexity, of US crypto policy was that the administration's internet commerce types were fighting the law enforcent types tooth and nail about it. I want to smash the state as much as the next crypto-anarchist :-), but I figure this is what is happening. The spooks gave up on this crap long ago, and it's just the cops standing in front of the steamroller now. Money trumps crime-FUD, just like it did spook-FUD. F=MA, and all that. :-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga "There's the conspiracy theory of history, where elites conspire to shape events behind the scenes, the fuck-up theory of history, where elites fuck up and conspire to cover it behind the scenes, and the fucked-up conspiracy theory of history, where elites conspire to shape events, fuck up, and conspire to cover it up behind the scenes. My favorite theory is the latter." -- (An as-yet Unremembered) Mizzou History Prof or, in the spirit of William of Occam, "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." --Jerry Pournelle ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Federal Power Grab Threatens Your Rights
by Gun Owners of America 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Massive New Power Grab By The Feds -- gun owners' constitutional rights in jeopardy Gun Owners of America E-Mail/FAX Alert 8001 Forbes Place, Suite 102, Springfield, VA 22151 Phone: 703-321-8585 / FAX: 703-321-8408 http://www.gunowners.org First, an update on Smith's "Anti-Brady" amendment: The pro-gun Smith amendment that passed the Senate in July is still awaiting action in a House-Senate conference committee. In fact, the House still has yet to pick the House conferees. GOA will keep you updated on this important legislation which would put the brakes on FBI's ability to register and tax gun owners. Keep calling your legislators (202-224-3121) and urge them to oppose the Commerce-Justice-State bill UNLESS it keeps the Smith language 100 percent intact. (Friday, October 2, 1998)-- Rep. Bob Barr has discovered that Janet Reno's Department of Justice (DOJ) is shopping around a legislative "wish list" to further erode our constitutional liberties. They are hoping to take advantage of the chaotic situation in Washington to "load up" an appropriations bill with a number of frightening expansions of federal power: * Enlarged asset forfeiture provisions to allow the FBI to seize personal property in both criminal and civil matters (your entire gun collection would be at risk) * A vastly expanded definition of terrorism to include domestic crimes having no relationship to terrorism (fighting "terrorism" is a new tactic of the gun grabbers, especially since the Supreme Court has stated that the Commerce Clause is no longer sufficient) * The ability to commandeer personnel from other federal agencies without reimbursement (just in case they need more agents for the next Waco) * Authority to force telephone and Internet companies to divulge information on their customers without a warrant (someone posts a message threatening the President to a gun list, and the feds demand the names and addresses of everyone who received the offending message) * Expanded wiretap authority to allow "roving" wiretaps of innocent citizens and gun owners, and wiretaps without any court authority whatsoever (so much for the Fourth Amendment) * Loosening of Posse Comitatus restrictions to allow more military involvement in domestic law enforcement (further blurring the line between police and military, which means destroying targets rather than making arrests) * The establishment of a permanent "FBI Police Force" (one could only speculate as to how bad this would be) * The power to seize commercial transportation assets for federal use (like the rest of the wish list, there is zero constitutional authority for this). In an era in which agencies of the federal government routinely target law-abiding gun owners for persecution, such assaults on our constitutional rights must be stopped. HERE'S WHAT TO DO: Contact your Representative and both Senators. Urge them to oppose any DOJ expansion of power through the appropriations process. Call 202-224-3121 or hit the GOA website at http://www.gunowners.org for phone, fax and e-mail of individual Congressional offices. Tell them to keep Smith in, and to keep the FBI out! **************************************************************** Did someone else forward this to you? To be certain of getting up to date information, please consider subscribing directly to the GOA E-Mail Alert Network. The service is totally free and carries no obligation. Your e-mail address remains confidential, and the volume is quite low, usually one or two messages per week. To subscribe, simply send a message (or forward this notice) to goamail(a)gunowners.org and indicate your state of residence in either the subject or the body. To unsubscribe, reply to any alert and ask to be removed.

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A Number Theory Problem....
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a desert which is 1000 miles across. There is a camel who can carry 1000 bananas maximum. The camel eats 1 banana per mile travelled. The camel has a total of 3000 bananas to begin with. What is the maximum number of bananas that the camel can get across to the other side uneaten? ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- -------------------------------------------------------------------- A: 533

3 2

Re: Why do we need remailers, anyway?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reeza! wrote: > > ... the First Adulterer/Purjurer, you question why I > call him this > No, I'm questioning why you're telling *me* about it. -- an anonymous AOL32 user

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Re: propose: `cypherpunks license' (Re: Wanted: Twofish source code)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Richard, you seem to be missing one of the major reasons behind the little schism developing here. You say that proprietary software developers shouldn't expect the GNU project to help them for nothing in return. Thing is, Cypherpunks *want* to help with crypto -- even if those we help make proprietary software, and even if we get nothing for our help -- and if GNU folks don't do that, well, we just won't be GNU folks. (More generally (and more abrasively), we'd like to make a license suited to our goals -- meaning one promoting placement of easy-to-use cryptography wherever it can be useful (including (gasp) in proprietary software) and discouraging the spread of incompetently-done, weak, or escrowed crypto -- and the GNU GPL just isn't it) By the way, regarding the GNU GPL's interaction with export regs: In general, the fact that action A is illegal does not mean you must include a requirement in your distribution terms not to do A. ... I agree that what you say is correct and, logically, should apply to crypto regs*, but in practice, failing to include the requirement you mention is asking for trouble. Ask Cypherpunks if you want to know more about that, as I believe elaboration in this post would draw <ahem>s from our beloved retromoderator. * Logically, crypto regs shouldn't even exist in a marginally free society, but, again, this is deep in <ahem> territory.

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Ozeafood.com - Update and Special Offer
by Adam Yared 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attention: Seafood Traders _______________________________________________ We would like to introduce the premier Seafood Information Resource for Australian Seafood Importers and Exporters and Seafood Traders from around the world. Over 6 months of extensive R&D has resulted in a simple, usefull online trading system designed specifically for the industry. Ozeafood.com is a searchable database of Australian Seafood Importers and Exporters and their products. The member has full control over their own listing of products via a management section. Advanced features of the service allow members to update their pricing and stock information, and trade seafood online. Take advantage of our special 60 day trial offer. Go to www.ozeafood.com and enter your companies details. For information via autoresponder send Email to options(a)ozeafood.com If you would like to discuss an Internet Marketing Strategy, please call us on 1800 506 516 ( Australian Residents Only ) Ozeafood.com - Australian Seafood Information Resource _____________________________________________ Website - www.ozeafood.com Email - info(a)ozeafood.com Phone Int + 617 5445 8884 Fax Int + 617 5445 8193

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Netsurfer Digest: Vol. 04, #29
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: editor-bounce(a)netsurf.com Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 19:22:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Authentication-Warning: smtp2.zocalo.net: editor set sender to editor-bounce(a)netsurf.com using -f Subject: Netsurfer Digest: Vol. 04, #29 Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk NETSURFER DIGEST More Signal, Less Noise Volume 04, Issue 29 Wednesday, September 30, 1998 <snip> BREAKING SURF Credit Card Data Compromised at Online Auction Sites Mark Dodd owns AuctionWatch, a neat auction site information center. He was running searches on the major search engines and by sheer accident uncovered a security hole in some software used by many of the online auction houses. It's a big one, too. If the auction site misconfigures its software, and apparently many do, the first happy hacker to come along can steal its customers' credit card numbers and addresses. Mark went to CNet with the story, which warned many of the affected sites of the potential havoc and scooped up a good story in the process. Remember, the safety of your credit card data is only as good as the security savvy of the webmaster guarding it. AuctionWatch: <http://www.auctionwatch.com/> http://www.auctionwatch.com/ CNet: <http://www.news.com/SpecialFeatures/0,5,26760,00.html> http://www.news.com/SpecialFeatures/0,5,26760,00.html <http://adex3.flycast.com/server/socket/127.0.0.1:2800/click/NetsurferDigest… ernetnews/123456> New Hacker Tactic: Slow, Coordinated Attacks from Multiple Locations A clever new twist in the evolutionary arms race between hackers and online security forces gives us an excuse to bring you this fascinating Web site. Hackers, it seems, have discovered herding behavior. Their latest tactic is to coordinate probes and attacks against online sites from a large number of separate machines and over a long period of time. By limiting probes to rates as low as two per hour and dispersing their sources, hackers can probe beneath current security software's threshold of detection. The Navy Cooperative Intrusion Detection Evaluation and Response team (CIDER) just released a report on the technique. The CIDER site is also worth visiting for information on security and intrusion detection software projects, notably a database comparing commercial and government tools. Cool spook stuff. CIDER: <http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/> http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/ Report: <http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/co-ordinated_analysis.txt> http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/co-ordinated_analysis.txt <snip> CONTACT AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Netsurfer Digest Home Page: Subscribe, Unsubscribe: Frequently Asked Questions: Submission of Newsworthy Items: Letters to the Editor: Advertiser and Sponsor Inquiries: Netsurfer Communications: <http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/>http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/ <http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/subscribe.html>http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/subscribe. html <http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/ndfaq.html>http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/ndfaq.html <mailto:pressroom@netsurf.com>pressroom(a)netsurf.com <mailto:editor@netsurf.com>editor(a)netsurf.com <mailto:sales@netsurf.com>sales(a)netsurf.com <http://www.netsurf.com/>http://www.netsurf.com/ CREDITS Publisher: Arthur Bebak Editor: Lawrence Nyveen Contributing Editor: Production Manager: Bill Woodcock Copy Editor: Elvi Dalgaard Netsurfer Communications, Inc. President: Arthur Bebak Vice President: S.M. Lieu Writers and Netsurfers: Sue Abbott Regan Avery Kirsty Brooks Judith David Joanne Eglash Lisa Hamilton Jay Mills Elizabeth Rollins Kenneth Schulze NETSURFER DIGEST © 1998 Netsurfer Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. NETSURFER DIGEST is a trademark of Netsurfer Communications, Inc. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: A Number Theory Problem
by Michael Motyka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> There is a desert which is 1000 miles across. There is a camel who can carry > 1000 bananas maximum. The camel eats 1 banana per mile travelled. The camel > has a total of 3000 bananas to begin with. What is the maximum number of > bananas that the camel can get across to the other side uneaten? My camels don't understand/can't eat fractional bananas. My first camel put 2000 bananas at 200 miles then 1001 bananas at 533 miles then left 1 banana at mile 533 and sprinted for home, arriving with 533 bananas My second camel put 2000 bananas at 200 miles then 1001 bananas at 533 miles then ate 1 banana at mile 533 and found the energy to move the 1000 bananas to mile 534 and sprinted for home, arriving with 534 bananas My third camel put 2000 bananas at 200 miles then 1001 bananas at 533 miles then ate 1 banana at mile 533 and found the energy to move the 1000 bananas to mile 534 and sprinted for home, arriving with 535 bananas figuring he'd pay for his last mile with credit. My fourth camel, the biggest strongest camel, was already waiting at the destination and charged each of the other camels a 50% banana tax, rounded up to the nearest banana, plus a 10 banana collection fee and left with 832 bananas and didn't have to do anything but paperwork while the other camels were now short of bananas and had to find a new way to get more bananas. Mike

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2 books of potential interest...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I was in Bookstop a while ago and noticed two books that could be of potential interest. The first I didn't buy, "We were soldiers once....and young", about the Ia Drang valley incident in Nov. of 65 (I had stated it was in '64 in the discussion about "The Best and Brightest"). It is written from notes and interviews with the survivors apparently. For those who are interested in the issues that were involved in the Vietnam War it may be of some use. The Law Enforcement Handbook D. Rowland, J. Bailey ISBN 1-56619-471-7 $6.98 (in the cheap books section) Looks to discuss a majority of police proceedures and details the items of interest to police officers in performing their duty. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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IP: Wired News: Report of military personnel medical records hackis FALSE
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com From: Bridget973(a)aol.com Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 22:10:54 EDT To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Subject: IP: Wired News: Report of military personnel medical records hack is FALSE Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: Bridget973(a)aol.com http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/15372.html Pentagon Takes Back Hack Wired News Report 7:45 p.m. 1.Oct.98.PDT The US Department of Defense said Thursday last week's report of crackers penetrating military Web sites and altering soldiers' medical files were inaccurate. Instead, a "Red Team" of American military computer experts carried out a simulated attack designed to test the security of the Pentagon's computer networks, said a spokeswoman for the Defense Department. "The simulated attack is part of the recent exercises to assess the danger to unclassified material, such as personnel records," Suzan Hansen said Thursday. The confusion arose last week, when Money told the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Conference that crackers had accessed a medical database in the southeastern United States and changed blood types in soldiers' records. Hansen said that Money was merely referring to a Red Team exercise, not a real cyberattack. At the conference, Money reportedly said that the Red Team exercise prompted the Pentagon to develop a more restrictive security policy on the type of information that will be stored in military computers connected to the Internet. -- bridget973(a)aol.com Black Helicopters on the Horizon: http://members.xoom.com/bridget973 ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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IP: Americans for Computer Privacy Call for Action in Congress
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com X-Sender: believer(a)telepath.com Date: Sat, 03 Oct 1998 09:14:11 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Americans for Computer Privacy Call for Action in Congress Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: US Newswire http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/1002-121.txt Americans for Computer Privacy Call for Action in Congress U.S. Newswire 2 Oct 14:30 Americans for Computer Privacy Call for Action in 106th Congress To: Assignment Desk, Daybook Editor, Technology Writer Contact: Sue Richard for Americans for Computer Privacy, 202-625-1256, E-mail: suer(At)dittusgroup.com News Advisory: WHAT: Americans for Computer Privacy (ACP) will issue a coalition letter to House and Senate leaders urging legislation in the next Congress that will build on the reforms in encryption policy recently announced by the Administration. ACP will also report on the coalition's growth and future plans, as well as the response to its on-line advertising initiative. WHO: ACP Executive Director Ed Gillespie; Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.); Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.); Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-Conn.); Rep. Rick White (R-Wash.); Sen. John Ashcroft (R-Mo.); Sen. Conrad Burns (R-Mont.); Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.); Robert Holleyman, Business Software Alliance; Jerry Berman, Center for Democracy and Technology; and Grover Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform. WHEN: Wednesday, Oct. 7, 11 a.m. WHERE: Room HC-7, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C. BACKGROUND: Since its formal launch in March 1998, ACP has worked closely with Congress and the Administration on encryption policy reform. While ACP acknowledges that progress has been made, the coalition believes the encryption issue is far from resolved. Americans for Computer Privacy brings together more than 100 companies and 40 associations representing financial services, manufacturing, telecommunications, high-tech and transportation, as well as law enforcement, civil-liberty, pro-family and taxpayer groups. ACP supports policies that advance the rights of American citizens to encode information without fear of government intrusion, and advocates the lifting of current export restrictions on U.S.-made encryption. For more information on ACP, please visit our website at www.computer privacy.org. A cybercast of the press conference will be available on the site on Thursday, Oct. 8. -0- /U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 10/02 14:30 Copyright 1998, U.S. Newswire ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Internet Sales Tax Killed [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note that I've added a few comments/notes between the supplied quoted sections. As always I've deleted for brevity. Forwarded message: > X-within-URL: http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/10/02/internet.tax.ap/ > By CURT ANDERSON > AP Tax Writer > > WASHINGTON (AP) Legislation allowing states to force mail order and > Internet businesses to collect sales taxes failed in the Senate Friday > as debate began on how to tax cyberspace commerce. > > Senators voted 65-30 to table, or kill, an amendment authorizing any > state to require companies with significant catalog, mail order or > Internet sales to collect their sales tax and send it back to the > state. > > The sponsor, Sen. Dale Bumpers, noted that every business operating in > a state with a sales tax must already collect and remit the revenue. > He said the amendment effectively would reverse a 1992 Supreme Court > decision preventing states from enforcing sales taxes on companies > located outside their borders. Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. (Note that it doesn't say "Congress shall make no law..." but rather is an absolute prohibition of taxes/duties on exports of states. It therefore falls under the "prohibited" clause of the 10th.) > "If they choose to have a sales tax, the federal government should > allow them to enforce it," said Bumpers, D-Ark. > > Opponents, however, called the measure a hidden tax increase and were > able easily to defeat it for the sixth straight year. > > "Since this tax has never been collected, there's only one way to view > it," said Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz. As unconstitutional. [remainder deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Is the .to (Tonga) domain completely rogue and should be removed?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Read RFC 1123, section 5.2.3. 5.2.3 VRFY and EXPN Commands: RFC-821 Section 3.3 A receiver-SMTP MUST implement VRFY and SHOULD implement EXPN (this requirement overrides RFC-821). However, there MAY be configuration information to disable VRFY and EXPN in a particular installation; this might even allow EXPN to be disabled for selected lists. A new reply code is defined for the VRFY command: 252 Cannot VRFY user (e.g., info is not local), but will take message for this user and attempt delivery. DISCUSSION: SMTP users and administrators make regular use of these commands for diagnosing mail delivery problems. With the increasing use of multi-level mailing list expansion (sometimes more than two levels), EXPN has been increasingly important for diagnosing inadvertent mail loops. On the other hand, some feel that EXPN represents a significant privacy, and perhaps even a security, exposure. VRFY is hardly an "incorrect SMTP command." >Your reasoning as to why its responses to incorrect SMTP >commands constitutes evidence that the .TO domain is "negligent", >"mismanaged" and "an attractive resource for criminal activities" >is ironically incorrect. In fact, having an *unsecured* port 25 open to mail >relaying would be negligent. >Best regards, >- Eric Gullichsen > Tonic Corporation > Kingdom of Tonga Network Information Center > http://www.tonic.to > Email: egullich(a)tonic.to

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Govt breaks the law. They do it again!
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THIS MESSAGE SENT AND/OR Cc'ed TO: Paul Martin, Finance Minister <Martin.P(a)parl.gc.ca> Anne McLellan, Justice Minister <McLellan.A(a)parl.gc.ca> Gary Breitkreuz, Reform Party MP <Breitkreuz.G(a)parl.gc.ca> Dr. Bernard Patry, Pierrefonds-Dollars MP <Patry.B(a)parl.gc.ca> Le Québecois Libre <libre(a)colba.net> auditoire(a)montreal.src.ca cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net "Donna Ferolie"<teebee(a)sprint.ca> Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 16:26:47 -0600 From: David A Tomlinson <nfadat(a)telusplanet.net> Subject: Re: NEW ILLEGAL REQUIREMENTS >Canadian Firearms@CFC 10/01/98 09:17 AM >Bulletin No. 23 >Registration and the Firearms Identification Number >You will receive a Registration Certificate for each firearm you >register. Each Registration Certificate will have a unique number. >This will be the Firearms Identification Number (FIN) issued by the >Registrar, head of the Canadian Firearms Registry. The FIN is the >file number you will use for all contact with the office of the >Registrar. If your firearm has no serial number, or if the serial >number, combined with other features of the firearm, is not enough >to tell it apart from all other firearms, you will have to put the >FIN on your firearm. The Registrar will tell you if the FIN must >be placed on your firearm. The FIN will be required on nearly all firearms, as few of them have a well-documented system of Serial numbers that is KNOWN and PROVABLE. Many manufacturers -- especially manufacturers of military firearms for export -- duplicate Serial numbers with monotonous regularity. Others recycle the numbers -- as Iver Johnson did, numbering 9,000,000 revolvers with a machine capable of only 99,999 numbers before starting to recycle. Others, particularly Eastern manufacturers, use digits and/or letters that the registration system cannot handle (Cyrillic letters, for example). >Attaching the FIN to Your Firearm >You will have to put the FIN on your firearm only if the firearm >has no serial number or the serial number is not unique. There is no way to tell whether or not a particular Serial number is UNIQUE. The word "unique" designates an absolute -- That is, it is guaranteed that there is NO other firearm of that type with that Serial number. That is a standard that is clearly unreachable. The Serial number is an indicator, but it can never be certified as "unique" because there is always at least the problem of fraud in the factory producing one or more firearms with duplicated Serial numbers. >If you >have to put the FIN on your firearm, you have a choice of how you >apply it in three situations: 1) if you own your firearm on >December 1, 1998; 2) if your firearm was manufactured before >December 1 and imported into Canada on or after December 1, 1998; >or, 3) if you, as a licensed business, specially import the firearm >for a short time only (such as a film company making a movie in >Canada). In these cases, you may attach a FIN using a special >sticker provided by the Registrar or, you may permanently engrave >or stamp the FIN on your firearm. The above is a very muddled paragraph, which I split into two parts. The above section apparently identifies the three classes of firearms which can be identified by the use of a permanent "sticky." It offers the OPTION of stamping of engraving the FIN on the "frame or receiver" of the firearm. > With all other firearms needing >unique identification, you must permanently engrave or stamp the >FIN. In most cases, the FIN must be easy to read and on a visible >part of the frame or receiver (see next CFC Bulletin for further >details). You will have 30 days from the issue date on the >Registration Certificate to attach the special sticker to your >firearm. You will have 90 days from the issue date on the >Registration Certificate to permanently engrave or stamp the FIN >on your firearm. This second half of the paragraph (above) requires engraving or stamping of the FIN on all other classes of firearms, such as all firearms manufactured after 01 Dec 98. >For more information, or for a copy of the Firearms Act, its >regulations and other CFC publications, contact us at: >1-800-731-4000 (Toll Free) >Web site: http://www.cfc-ccaf.gc.ca/ >E-mail: canadian.firearms(a)justice.x400.gc.ca Fortunately, all of this is apparently NULL AND VOID. No such requirements may be demanded by the CFC or CFR/FRAS unless they are: 1. required by the legislation (C-68's Firearms Act or Criminal Code), or 2. the subject of an Order in Council authorized to be made by the legislation. The legislation apparently says nothing whatever about where or how the Serial number must be on the firearm, and does not mention the Firearms Identification Number concept at all; therefore, the above requirements are apparently null and void as far as the legislation is concerned. The legislation does not authorize the making of any regulation regarding markings on firearms, and therefore the above rules apparently cannot be created by Order in Council. Once again, this is apparently a defective attempt to amend defective legislation by false pretences, and an attempt by the CFC and CFR/FRAS to legislate -- but legislation is beyond their power, so this entire set of requirements is apparently null and void. A copy of this is being sent to the CFC and to CFR/FRAS. CFC and CFR/FRAS, this is a demand for an explanation as to why this apparently illegal and misleading information was published and distributed. Please reply to the Canadian Firearms Digest with all possible speed, and either explain why you think you had the authority to publish it -- or publish a retraction. Dave Tomlinson, NFA -- CLOG: all Conservative or Liberal Ottawa Governments ------------------------------ Jean-Francois Avon, B.Sc. Physics, Montreal, Canada DePompadour, Société d'Importation Ltée Limoges fine porcelain and french crystal JFA Technologies, R&D physicists & engineers Instrumentation & control, LabView programming PGP keys: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html PGP ID:C58ADD0D:529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 PGP ID:5B51964D:152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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STUFFED IS NOW FASTER THAN EVER/WE HAVE 1,000S OF NEW MEGA-HOT FREE PICS!
by STUFFED NEWS DAILY 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

+ 30 MEGA HI-RES PICS + 5 SUPER-HORNY SEXY STORIES + I SAW SATAN IN MY BURGER + AMERICANS VERY SLOW IN BED + MMMMM THAT WAS GOOD + THE CULT OF TWINKIE + THE BEST OF EUREKA ----> http://stuffed.net/98/10/3/ <---- Welcome to today's issue of Stuffed. To read it you should click on the URL above. If it is not made clickable by your email program you will need to use your mouse to highlight the URL, copy it and then paste it into your browser (then press Return). This email is never sent unsolicited. Stuffed is the supplement for the Eureka newsletter you subscribed to. Full instructions on unsubscribing are in every issue of Eureka! ----> http://stuffed.net/98/10/3/ <----

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IP: ISPI Clips 5.9: Canada Frees Up Crypto--WIRED
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ama-gi ISPI" <offshore(a)email.msn.com> Subject: IP: ISPI Clips 5.9: Canada Frees Up Crypto--WIRED Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 00:10:43 -0700 To: <Undisclosed.Recipients(a)majordomo.pobox.com> ISPI Clips 5.9: Canada Frees Up Crypto News & Info from the Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) Friday October 2, 1998 ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This From: WIRED News, September 1, 1998 http://www.wired.com Canada Frees Up Crypto http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15362.html by Matt Friedman, mwf(a)total.net In a move that will almost certainly create friction between the US and Canada, the Canadian government has released a new cryptography policy that encourages the proliferation of powerful data-scrambling technologies. The policy, announced Thursday by John Manley, the minister of industry, makes it clear that Canadians will not have to submit to mandatory key recovery, which would give the government access to all scrambled communications. The document also heads off the establishment of a national public key infrastructure. "In terms of domestic policy, it couldn't be better," says David Jones, president of Electronic Frontier Canada. "Industry Canada is essentially saying that, domestically, you can pretty much do whatever you want with cryptography." An American civil liberties advocate was similarly impressed. "It is great. It's a policy for the 21st century, as opposed to the US government's policy update from last week, which is too little, too late," said Susan Landau, a cryptography policy expert and the co-author of Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption. Canada's new policy is a setback to the country's "signals intelligence" spy agencies. Industry Canada had been under considerable pressure from the intelligence and law-enforcement communities, both at home and in the United States, to establish domestic crypto controls. "The US has sent a number of delegations to Canada, a number of times, to try and convince [the Canadian government], to go with a restrictive view," said David Banisar, policy director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, DC. "The Canadians clearly said they were not interested." Last winter, when Ottawa published a public white paper on cryptography and solicited comments from the public and other branches of government, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service said that it was pushing for a public key-recovery plan. The CSIS is concerned both with domestic and foreign intelligence, sort of a combination of the FBI and CIA. "The ability to decrypt messages and data has a significant impact on our ability to monitor security threats to Canadians," said CSIS spokeswoman Marcia Wetherup at the time. Reached for comment Thursday morning, Wetherup said, "That continues to be the service's main concern at this time." While the Canadian government has rejected controls on domestic crypto, it is taking a wait-and-see attitude on exports. In the US, cryptography exports are strictly regulated, on the grounds that the technology might be used to conceal the communications of terrorists or hostile nations. "The Commerce Department is not going to be happy," Landau said. A Commerce Department official declined comment. Under the new policy, Ottawa will continue to work within the framework of the Wassenaar agreement. That document, an international treaty limiting the spread of munitions technologies, is currently being renegotiated. Sunny Handa, a cyberlaw specialist with the Montreal law firm Martineau Walker, points out that the new policy will not alter existing regulations governing the export of Canadian crypto technology or the re-export of technology originating in the United States. "The real issue now is export," he says. "That hasn't changed." The new policy does, however, make the point that the Canadian government will "deter the use [of crypto] in the commission of a crime," and in the concealment of evidence. Moreover, existing search-and-seizure laws will apply to encrypted messages. But Handa says that Industry Canada is simply "throwing a bone to the police." "Our search-and-seizure laws are pretty good right now," he says. "Citizens' rights are protected, and law enforcement officials can do their jobs. If Industry Canada has signaled that it's happy with them, we probably won't see new legislation in this area for years." "One way to view the issue of cryptography is as an issue of crime prevention, rather than crime detection," said Landau. "As we enter the wired world, cryptography will become extremely important to crime prevention, and the Canadians recognize that." Copyright © 1994-98 Wired Digital Inc. --------------------------------NOTICE:------------------------------ ISPI Clips are news & opinion articles on privacy issues from all points of view; they are clipped from local, national and international newspapers, journals and magazines, etc. Inclusion as an ISPI Clip does not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the content or opinion by ISPI. In compliance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed free without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISPI Clips is a FREE e-mail service from the "Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues" (ISPI). To receive "ISPI Clips" on a regular bases (up to 3 - 8 clips per day) send the following message "Please enter [Your Name] into the ISPI Clips list: [Your e-mail address]" to: ISPIClips(a)ama-gi.com . The Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) is a small contributor-funded organization based in Victoria, British Columbia (Canada). ISPI operates on a not-for-profit basis, accepts no government funding and takes a global perspective. ISPI's mandate is to conduct & promote interdisciplinary research into electronic, personal and financial privacy with a view toward helping ordinary people understand the degree of privacy they have with respect to government, industry and each other and to likewise inform them about techniques to enhance their privacy. But, none of this can be accomplished without your kind and generous financial support. 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