December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Palm III proves a hi-tech helper for car thieves
by Richard Fiero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Taken from http://www.theregister.co.uk/981204-000007.html A 3Com Palm III and software that lets the handheld control TVs and VCRs through its infrared port are all you need to nick a car these days, it seems. Danish IT journalist Lars Sorensen made the discovery when testing the sofwtare's legitimate uses. The software samples a TV's remote control signals so it can replicate them -- Sorensen wondered if it would do the same with a car's infrared lock and found that it would. Here in the UK, estimates from the Motor Insurance Repair Research Centre, quoted in New Scientist magazine, suggest that three million of the 22 million cars on the road are vulnerable to Palm-toting thieves. Interestingly, older cars that are more at risk than newer models. Most modern vehicles contain locking systems that change the locking code every time the key is used from sequences of 10 to the power 64 (a one with 64 zeros after it) making it virtually impossible to predict the code at any given instance. That said, Sorensen was able to enter a 1998 model, so no one can be sure they are safe.

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Wassenaar Encryption Agreement
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The United States and 32 other nations that belong to a group called the Wassenaar Arrangement, which coordinates export policies for technologies that have both civilian and military use, have signed an agreement restricting exports of encryption technology from their countries. The Clinton administration, which has already imposed such controls in this country, says the agreement will help American companies compete on a more equal footing with their counterparts abroad. Privacy organizations are critical of the agreement, and a counsel for the advocacy group Americans for Computer Privacy says there will still be enormous differences in how the countries put the agreement into practice. (Washington Post 4 Dec 98) #!/usr/local/bin/perl -0777-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RC4-3-lines-PERL @k=unpack('C*',pack('H*',shift));for(@t=@s=0..255){$y=($k[$_%@k]+$s[$x=$_ ]+$y)%256;&S}$x=$y=0;for(unpack('C*',<>)){$x++;$y=($s[$x%=256]+$y)%256; &S;print pack(C,$_^=$s[($s[$x]+$s[$y])%256])}sub S{@s[$x,$y]=@s[$y,$x]}

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Crypto deterrents
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

White men traded as 'sex slaves' of black prisoners By Fergal Keane, in Illinois WHITE male prisoners in American jails are being "sold as sex slaves" by black fellow inmates for money, tobacco, drugs and alcohol, according to campaigners who are urging action to end widespread homosexual rape behind bars. Damaging claims of complicity by prison guards are also emerging. Five wardens at a Californian maximum security jail are facing charges relating to the rape of an inmate by a notorious sexual predator. The wardens allegedly forced a troublesome prisoner to share a cell with a black gang leader, who was rewarded with extra food and clothes for imposing "discipline" on the man. According to the campaigners, the sex attacks often carry ugly racial overtones, with many white prisoners claiming that they were sexually abused after being placed in cells with black inmates. Most victims are too scared to complain, it is claimed, and those that do say they have been ignored by the authorities. The scale of the scandal has been uncovered by the pressure group Human Rights Watch, which next year will publish a report documenting the "staggering prevalence" of prison rape. The situation is not just provoking concern among civil liberties groups. In the state of Illinois, a prominent conservative figure, Republican legislator Cal Skinner, is also pushing for tougher government action. He claims that many of the rape victims have been infected with the HIV virus and that American prisons are becoming a breeding ground for Aids. Mr Skinner said: "There are sexual slaves in too many prisons. People are being given a death sentence." He wants to see the mandatory Aids testing of all prisoners with the segregation of those found to be HIV positive. He believes it is one of the few ways of protecting vulnerable inmates from the potentially fatal effect of prison rape. The renewed concern over rape in prisons has come too late for Michael Blucker, 29, a white man from Crystal Lake in Illinois, who was repeatedly gang-raped while serving a sentence for burglary. Blucker's ordeal is almost too horrific to contemplate: he was forced to become a sex slave to black prisoners at Menard State Penitentiary in Illinois. Prison rape is not confined to white victims but they are particularly vulnerable as black gang members make up such a large part of the American prison population. Blucker said: "I was the only white man in a gallery [wing] of more than 100 prisoners. Most of the guys were in for very serious crimes; they were people who weren't going to be getting out of there any time in the next 30 years." The first attack came when Blucker had been in jail just two weeks. He was set upon by three black prisoners, stripped, beaten and raped. "They would have killed me if I had refused. Killing means nothing to these people," he said. Once it became known that he had been raped, Blucker's life became even more of a nightmare. In the violent world of American prisons, an inmate who "allows" himself to be raped is regarded as fair game for every other inmate and is used as a sex slave, normally under the direction of a senior gang leader. In Blucker's case, one of the black prisoners sold him to other inmates on a daily basis. "He would physically threaten me and threaten to have harm done to my wife outside prison. Every day, I would be sold as a sex object while he was given money and cigarettes and marijuana and alcohol in return." When the threats of violence did not cow Blucker, his tormentor would beat him into submission. While filming in Butner prison in North Carolina, I met Ivory Rhodes, a black prisoner, who was attacked within days of being placed in the cell of a known rapist. The pattern he described was almost exactly the same as that experienced by Blucker. A violent attack and the threat of death followed by brutal rape. Rhodes's solution was to try to spend long periods in solitary confinement, a deprivation he preferred to risking his life in the main cells. Rhodes managed to avoid being raped again, but whenever he was transferred from one prison to another, the stigma of "rape victim" went with him. After his rape, Rhodes never moved out of his cell without carrying a knife. He described a world in which any weakness is preyed upon by the tougher and older inmates. The young, the first-time offenders, the middle class are especially vulnerable to attack. Blucker said: "There are people who say that if somebody attacked them in prison they would kill themselves or kill other people. That is bull. It just doesn't happen that way." What was almost certainly his worst experience occurred in the showers when he was set upon by a large gang of prisoners. "They pulled bricks out of the wall and they hit me in the nose and the eye and then on the back of the head, which knocked me out." Then he was repeatedly raped. "I couldn't tell you if it was one, three, 10 or 15 people. All I know is that I felt very unwell." At first, Blucker said, he was too frightened to report the rapes for fear of being killed by the other inmates, but after the shower incident he spoke to prison officials. The result, he claimed, was indifference. "I spoke to officers and medical people and no one believed me." Blucker subsequently took a court action against several prison guards and the prison psychiatrist but was unable to prove his claims. What is not disputed is that he needed extensive surgery for injuries sustained in the attack and that while in prison he contracted the HIV virus. Blucker was eventually transferred from Menard after lobbying a local politician. Now a free man, he is looking for a job and is actively involved in his church. God, he says, will save him from Aids. Fergal Keane is a BBC Special Correspondent

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SHANGHAI ENTREPRENEUR TRIED IN CHINA
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Chinese government has put 30-year-old Shanghai computer software businessman Lin Hai on trial for "inciting the overthrow of state power" by providing 30,000 e-mail addresses to a U.S. Internet magazine called "Big Reference" published by Chinese dissidents. Chinese authorities closed the four-hour trial for what it said were "national security" reasons, and "persuaded" one member of Lin's legal team not to attend the trial. Lin's wife Xu Hong, who was questioned by the police for six hours, has indicated that Lin's lawyer "said he didn't have a very good feeling -- that things won't be good for Lin and he will probably be found guilty." (Washington Post 5 Dec 98) #!/usr/local/bin/perl -0777-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RC4-3-lines-PERL @k=unpack('C*',pack('H*',shift));for(@t=@s=0..255){$y=($k[$_%@k]+$s[$x=$_ ]+$y)%256;&S}$x=$y=0;for(unpack('C*',<>)){$x++;$y=($s[$x%=256]+$y)%256; &S;print pack(C,$_^=$s[($s[$x]+$s[$y])%256])}sub S{@s[$x,$y]=@s[$y,$x]}

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MITNICK TRIAL POSTPONED AGAIN
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The long-awaited trial of Kevin Mitnick, the accused computer hacker indicted on 25 counts of "stealing, copying, and misappropriating proprietary computer software" from a number of cellular and computer companies, has been postponed until April 20 after Mitnick's lawyer asked for more time to prepare his case. The trial was slated to begin on January 19. Mitnick has been in jail in Los Angeles awaiting trial since February 1995. - Los Angeles Times 4 Dec 98 #!/usr/local/bin/perl -0777-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RC4-3-lines-PERL @k=unpack('C*',pack('H*',shift));for(@t=@s=0..255){$y=($k[$_%@k]+$s[$x=$_ ]+$y)%256;&S}$x=$y=0;for(unpack('C*',<>)){$x++;$y=($s[$x%=256]+$y)%256; &S;print pack(C,$_^=$s[($s[$x]+$s[$y])%256])}sub S{@s[$x,$y]=@s[$y,$x]}

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Aharonov-Bohm Effect
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone (other than Jim Choate) explain the mechanism behind the Aharonov-Bohm effect, where a quantum field propagating via two distinct paths finds its wavefunction phase shifted by the amount of magnetic flux enclosed, even if it is completely shielded from the magnetic field, and traverses only regions of space where B=0. This has apparently been experimentally verified, and is a leading candidate for reading the state of quantum dots. -- Sponsor the DES Analytic Crack Project http://www.cyberspace.org/~enoch/crakfaq.html

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tyranny of corporations
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Date: Sun, 06 Dec 1998 16:11:08 -0700 From: Robert Weissman <rob(a)essential.org> To: Multiple recipients of list CORP-FOCUS <corp-focus(a)essential.org> Subject: corporation nation Exxon merges with Mobil. Citicorp marries Travelers. Daimler Benz gobbles up Chrysler. BankAmerica takes over NationsBank. WorldCom eats MCI. Corporations are getting bigger and bigger, and their influence over our lives continues to grow. America is in an era of corporate ascendancy, the likes of which we haven't seen since the Gilded Age. Charles Derber, a professor of sociology at Boston College, believes that, contrary to the lessons our civics teacher taught us, it is undemocratic corporations, not governments, that are dominating and controlling society. In his most recent book, Corporation Nation (St. Martin's Press, 1998), Derber argues that the consequence of the growing power of giant corporate multinationals is increased disparity in wealth, rampant downsizing and million dollar CEOs making billion dollar decisions with little regard for average American. A couple of years ago, Derber wrote The Wilding of America (St. Martin's Press, 1996) in which he argued that the American Dream had transmuted into a semi-criminal, semi-violent virus that is afflicting large parts of the elites of the country. That book tried to call attention to the extent to which violent behavior could be understood as a product of oversocialization. "The problem was not that they had been underexposed to American values, but that they could not buffer themselves from those values," Derber told us. "They had lost the ability to constrain any kind of anti-social behavior -- because of obsessions with success -- the American Dream." By anti-social behavior, Derber means the epitome of Reaganism -- "a kind of warping of the more healthy forms of individualism in our culture into a hyperindividualism in which people asserted their own interests without regard to its impact on others." At the time, Derber was interviewed on a Geraldo show about paid assassins - - -- people who killed for money. "It was scary to be around young people who confessed to killing for relatively small amounts of money -- a few thousand dollars," Derber said. "They said things like -- 'you have to understand, this is just a business, everybody has to make money.' I pointed out on the show that this was the language that business usually uses." At the same time, Newsweek ran a cover story titled "Corporate Killers." On the cover, Newsweek ran the mug shots of four CEOs who had downsized in profitable periods and upped their own salaries. "These corporate executives tended to use the same language as the paid assassins on the Geraldo show, 'I feel fine about this because I'm just doing what the market requires,'" Derber explains. "I develop an analogy between paid assassins on the street and those in the suites. In the most general sense, these corporate executives are paid hitmen who use very much the same language and rationalization. I argue that corporations are exemplifying a form of anti-social behavior which is undermining a great deal of the social fabric and civilized values that we would hope to sustain." With the hitmen parallel fresh in his mind, Derber began writing Corporation Nation. In it, Derber points to the parallels between today and the age of the robber barons 100 years ago -- the wave of corporate mergers, the widening gulf between rich and poor (Bill Gates' net worth (well over $50 billion) is more than that of the bottom 100 million Americans), the enormous influence of corporations over democratic institutions, both major parties bought off by big business, and a Democratic President closely aligned with big business (Grover Cleveland then, Bill Clinton today). One big difference between then and now: back then, a real grassroots populist movement rose up to challenge corporate power, though it did not succeed in attaining its core goals. Today, while there are many isolated movements challenging individual corporate crimes, there is no mass movement attacking the corporation as the cause of the wealth disparity, destruction of the environment, and all the many other corporate driven ills afflicting society. Derber, a professor of sociology at Boston College, says that when he asks his students, "Have you ever thought about the question of whether corporations in general have too much power," they uniformly say they have never had that question raised. Derber says that one good way to again build a populist movement to attack corporate power is to study the language and tactics of the populists of 100 years ago. He has, and he makes clear in his book that the original conception of the corporation was one of a public -- not private -- entity. We the people created the corporation to build roads, and bridges, and deliver the goods. If the corporation didn't do as we said, we yanked their charter. The corporate lawyers quickly got their hands around that idea, smashed it, and replaced it with the current conception of the corporation, a private person under the law, with the rights and privileges of any other living and breathing citizen. Thus, a quick transformation from "we decide" to "they decide." Derber is a bit too modest to say it, so we will: perhaps the best way to rebuild a strong, vibrant and populist movement is to get this book into the hands of people who care about democracy. The corporations have us on the run, but we should pause for a moment or two, find a quiet place, and read this book. Russell Mokhiber is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Corporate Crime Reporter. Robert Weissman is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Multinational Monitor. (c) Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman Focus on the Corporation is a weekly column written by Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman. Please feel free to forward the column to friends or repost the column on other lists. If you would like to post the column on a web site or publish it in print format, we ask that you first contact us (russell(a)essential.org or rob(a)essential.org) Focus on the Corporation is distributed to individuals on the listserve corp-focus(a)essential.org. To subscribe to corp-focus, send an e-mail message to listproc(a)essential.org with the following all in one line: subscribe corp-focus <your name> (no period). Focus on the Corporation columns are posted on the Multinational Monitor web site <www.essential.org/monitor>. Postings on corp-focus are limited to the columns. If you would like to comment on the columns, send a message to russell(a)essential.org or rob(a)essential.org. - - ------=_NextPart_000_0027_01BE20F3.6E8982C0-- - - --------------81265CC28DD038A0DC2CB928-- - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: What was the quid pro quo for Wassenaar countries?
by Joel O'Connor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As Karl Marx said also, "Democracy is a slow form of communism." That's why the forfathers decided to make us a republic, something many have forgotten. ---HyperReal-Anon <nobody(a)sind.hyperreal.art.pl> wrote: > > "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam(a)ai.mit.edu> writes > > John Gilmore may be right, but remember folks that in Europe we > have this thing the Greeks invented called democracy. One of the > ideas of democracy is that decisions are not made in secret closed > meetings. > > Yes, and people democratically demand government enforcement of the > majority will, something made more difficult if the subjects have > strong cryptography. > > As Donn Parker observed several years ago, strong cryptography is > inconsistent with democracy. (Published in Scientific American --- > reference on request.) > > John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> writes > > Some countries actually seem to care what their citizens think > about their crypto laws, unlike the shining example of democracy, > the USSA. And when we educate the citizens, they tend to make the > right choices. Let's keep trying. > > But don't educate them too much, or they will understand that > cryptography can set people free, and if people were free there would > be no political government, and if there were no political government > their social security checks would stop coming, along with all their > other government ``benefits''. > > == Ogre bounces like sonar. . .Peace. Ogre _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 13:02:59 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu, dcsb-announce(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Cc: Ira Heffan <heffan(a)tht.com>, Mike Schmelzer <schmelze(a)tht.com>, Roland Mueller <roland(a)secunet.com>, "Jonathan J. Rusch" <rusch1(a)erols.com> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Tuesday, January 5th, 1999 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Although the very idea of patenting software seems to be an anathema to much of the programming community, patents on software continue to stream out of the U.S. Patent Office. Everyone involved in digital commerce applications, which are by definition software-based, probably has heard about recent events: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided "State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group," which explicitly ratified patenting methods of doing business, and a spate of well-publicized patents have issued claiming to cover such concepts as the virtual shopping cart and the reverse auction. As a prerequisite to discussing these recent developments, the first part of our talk will provide an introduction to patents. We will explain what patents are and what they are not, and describe the business goals that a patent can serve. Then we will talk about current events, and attempt to put the _State Street_ case in context. We will present a survey of recently-issued patents (suggestions welcome) related to digital commerce, and conclude with some speculation about current trends, including a novel form of software patent with potentially huge implications. Ira Heffan (heffan(a)tht.com) and Mike Schmelzer (schmelze(a)tht.com) are patent attorneys at Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP (http://www.tht.com) We will be presenting our own personal views on this topic, and not the views of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP or its clients. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, January 5, 1999, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $32.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and the speakers' lunch. The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business attire" (whatever that means), for women. Fair warning: since we purchase these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, January 2nd, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", in the amount of $32.50. Please include your e-mail address, so that we can send you a confirmation If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Upcoming speakers for DCSB are: February Roland Mueller European Privacy Directive March Jonathan Rusch Internet Fraud We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>. For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQEVAwUBNmwX/8UCGwxmWcHhAQFfjgf+IBe01g9XCldZYT+GRDI5ho1sOPgL6W7q zLDQToz0GGM/NZzv44SMTSGpDFx80R1yautvy4xHMnYQy2UnvO2WGsfrjuwSdQte 8qxoRAFkihyP/mi/83As2TwWdp6QhwbjI02hyP6elsdSzsspflwwonOB4I+8E/xX UDsGdQH4AHaWrK1S5XYfJSHSRGOBpk2+cqboiGvbcbC1z0vDRGrnztf8GADoPVC3 6vw4M00f+cgIuoaqqO4ol62Os6D+WPVw2NMop20OD62EGzYO2pyQjboPvBLxyRD7 smLz/4S598uLZF0GX+GO/8rCjAORask/Qt3SFIU2HMMPj9nKIvVtJw== =gz6w -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: tyranny of corporations (was: Corporate Nations)
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The hitman image certainly rings true for some top execs I've met. I recall a session with a corporate sociologist many years ago (the company was going through one of those team-building bullshit affairs). I had completed a psychological profile tests and we were reviewing the results. She was given to occasional black humor and on this particular occasion told me she has some good news and some bad news, asking which I prefered hearing first. I selected the good news, whereupon she said that my profile was an exact match with those who reach the highest levels of the corporate world. Then the bad news, its also the profile of a master criminal. I kid you not. As to hyperindividualism, Robert Bork covered this topic in his recent book Slouching Toward Gamorah. In it he identified two idiological diseases infecting America: radical equality and radical egalitarianism (i.e., hyperindividualism). Both, in his opinion, are a result of a warped evolution of 20th Century liberalism. Since many in our society seek to emulate these hitmen (i.e., get a piece of the rock at any cost) and have no more scruples themselves than those to whom they aspire, anonymous betting pools could harness the more extreme members in a populist fashion to counterbalance our new age robber barrons and politicians. The solution to hyperindividualism isn't regulation (which can be blunted or co-opted by those with the bucks) but allowing those below to profitably advance at the expense of those at the top. Dynamic equilibrium in a new marketplace. Sort of like the way Klingons get field rank advancements. --Steve

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At a Comic Shop near you...
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may or may not be of interest... Spy v.s. Spy action figures are now available! There is a black spy and a white spy (sorry, no grey spy). Each comes with lots of gadgets (knives, blackjacks, saws and a bomb). Each spy has "bomb throwing action". They are distributed through comic shops at the moment. They sold out pretty quick where I got mine, so you will not want to wait if you want one. --- | Bill Clinton - Bringing back the Sixties one Nixon at a time! | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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DSA for encryption
by Bennett Haselton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I'm working on an enhancement to a Web-based program that allows you to circumvent proxy server censorship by sending a request for a Web page to a computer in the outside world that is not blocked by the proxy, and having that computer re-send a copy of the banned page back to you. The current version of the software, written by Brian Ristuccia this past summer, is at http://ians.ml.org:8801 where you type a URL into the form, submit it, and the resulting page has a URL like: http://ians.ml.org:8801/aHR0cDovL3d3dy55YWhvby5jb20= instead of http://anon.free.anonymizer.com/http://www.yahoo.com/ which is what Anonymizer gives you, which makes it obvious what you were looking at to anyone who looks through the proxy server logs. Of course, any manufacturer of Internet censorship proxy server software could easily add ians.ml.org to their list of blocked sites (as they have all already done with Anonymizer), so the idea would be for people to get their friends to set up port-forwarding programs on computers that were not blocked by the censoring proxy, and those could be set up to relay requests between the IANS server and the computer behind the proxy server. The general outline for this scheme is at http://www.peacefire.org/bypass/Proxy/ and the current version of IANS ("Internet Alternate Name Space") is part of the way towards implementing this (theoretically) bulletproof solution. The major pending improvements to the IANS software are (1) the URL is not truly encrypted; the garbled characters in the URL above just represent some basic scrambling to evade detection by people who sweep their proxy server log files for keywords, (2) even if the URL were really encrypted, when you first fill out the form, the URL is submitted to IANS in the clear, so it could be detected by any censoring proxy server that logs data submitted by GET or POST. One Internet censorship proxy server called SmartFilter already does this and blocks you from submitting *any* banned URL's using GET or POST, so IANS does not work with SmartFilter, for example. I am working on a JavaScript form that could be used on the client side to solve this problem. We would like to use DSA to encrypt the requests sent using IANS, since I've heard DSA can be used for encryption without royalties, unlike, for example, RSA. Does anybody know of a Web page that explains how the DSA algorithm can be used for encryption, as opposed to message signing and authentication? I found a page at http://www1.shore.net/~ws/Extras/Security-Notes/lectures/authent.html that describes the DSA algorithm for signature verification. I have looked very hard but have been unable to find a page about how to use DSA for encryption. Can anyone help? I know there is software like GNU Privacy Guard that implements DSA for encryption, but the source code is 3 megabytes and I was hoping there was a page that explains the process more simply than that. -Bennett bennett(a)peacefire.org (615) 421 5432 http://www.peacefire.org

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Re: What was the quid pro quo for Wassenaar countries?
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One thing which came to me recently when I was trying to figure out what sort of gun the US held to the rest of the world's head to get them to agree to this: Could the Wassenaar outcome have been a sign of Echelon in action? Consider this: Delegates from each country have been travelling to Vienna for some months now to negotiate their countries position. During the negotiations, they'll be contacting their governments via phonecalls carried over microwave trunks, satellite links, or undersea cables to discuss the progress of the negotiations and what position they should take. Just like the negotiations which lead to the Five-Power Treaty in 1921, if one country had the ability to intercept all the other countries communications it would know how far they could be pushed, and where the most resistance was likely to come from, allowing greater amounts of "persuasion" to be concentrated on them. I can't think of a more appropriate application of Echelon (use worldwide surveillance technology to perpetuate the usefulness of worldwide surveillance technology), and it would go some way towards explaining the very peculiar agreement which was reached. Peter.

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FWD: Read this. Now. And *act* on it. (was re: Building cryptoarchives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's time, folks. They can't win if we do anything at all, but they *will* win if we do nothing. Robert Hettinga --- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for publishing PGP on his web page. Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto tools that we use daily. Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! (I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten except you.) I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. (Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend on a single site.) Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. John Gilmore --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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NEW Reuters story (fwd)
by Jukka E Isosaari 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 5 Dec 1998 23:50:55 +0000 From: Dave Bird <dave(a)xemu.demon.co.uk> Reply-To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: NEW Reuters story In article <896C7C3540C3D111AB9F00805FA78CE2013F85F3@MSX11002>, Brown, R Ken <brownrk1(a)texaco.com> writes >r [sent to crytpo list, and to CIV LIBS DISCUSS] Yahoo! News http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/wr/story.html?s=v/nm/19981203/wr/ privacy_1.html Thursday 3 December 1998 12:38 PM ET Europe readies police techno-surveillance law By Niall McKay SAN FRANCISCO (Wired) - The European Union is quietly getting ready to approve legislation that will allow the police to eavesdrop both on Internet conversations and Iridium satellite telephone calls without obtaining court authorization. The legislation is part of a much wider memorandum of understanding between the EU, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway, a nonmember European nation. That agreement allows authorities to conduct telecom surveillance across international borders, according to a Europol document leaked to members of the European Parliament. ``Security measures are often necessary in the cases of terrorism or organized crime,'' said Glyn Ford, a member of the European Parliament for the British Labour Party and a director of the EU's Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs Committee. ''But what we need is some sort of democratic control. It seems to me that many security services are a law unto themselves.'' That will presumably be a topic of discussion when the European Council of Ministers meets behind closed doors Thursday to update a 1995 wiretap agreement known as the Legal Interception of Telecommunications Resolution. If approved, it would permit real-time, remote monitoring of email, as well as of calls placed on satellite telephone networks such as those maintained by Iridium and Globalstar. Unlike most laws in Europe, the agreement will allow law enforcement to listen in without a court order. ``This is a US export,'' said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. ``It's a European version of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.'' The act, passed in 1984, was intended to allow law enforcers to tap the digital lines of tomorrow, just as they tap analog phone lines now. Ironically, in September, the European Parliament called for account- ability of Echelon, the US National Security Agency's spying network that is reportedly able to intercept, record, and translate any electronic communication-telephone, data, cellular, fax, email, or telex. Under European law, representatives of each member nation can pass legally binding resolutions. Further, the resolutions don't require the approval of either the European Parliament or the individual parliaments of EU members. Many European Parliament members are outraged that the Council of Ministers has been acting in secret. They are especially concerned about the inclusion of non-EU nations in the agreement. Patricia McKenna, a representative for Britain's Green Party, will raise the issue in Parliament this week. She also intends to ask Europe's Justice and Internal Affairs Council to ''justify the secrecy and lack of consultation surrounding these initiatives.'' McKenna is requesting what she described as an ``open debate on the crucial and far-reaching measures, with enormous potential impact in the realm of privacy.'' Another member of the European Parliament believes that the so-called ``update resolutions'' will have staggering implications for personal privacy. ``This legislation is not just a technical update,'' said Johannes Voggenhuber, an Austrian representative for the European Parliament. ``It places the onus on the telecommunications carrier to provide a watertight back door to police.'' The European Council for General Security prepared the amendment with technical assistance from the FBI, according to the Europol document leaked. The four major satellite telephone operators-Iridium, Globalstar, Odyssey, and ICO-will be required by the law to provide access to European law enforcement through ground stations in France, Italy, England, and Germany. Iridium officials could not be reached for comment. It is unclear how the memorandum of understanding will affect US citizens. ``I find it very hard to believe that a foreign nation-any foreign nation-could eavesdrop on US citizens,'' said John Pike, a security analyst with the Federation of American Scientists. ``It's one thing for the FBI to try and track terrorists across international borders, but it's entirely another to let Europeans tap US citizens' telephones.'' The FBI would neither confirm nor deny any relationship between the United States and the other nations involved in the memorandum of understanding. However, Rotenberg said such provisions are already in place under the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. While the new European law is being sold to EU member states as a means of combating what the legislation calls ``serious and organized'' crime, there is no clear definition of this phrase. ``It simply concerns any punishable offense,'' said Tony Bunyan, director of Statewatch, a European civil liberties group. (Reuters/Wired) |~/ |~/ ~~|;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;||';-._.-;'^';||_.-;'^'0-|~~ P | Woof Woof, Glug Glug ||____________|| 0 | P O | Who Drowned the Judge's Dog? | . . . . . . . '----. 0 | O O | answers on *---|_______________ @__o0 | O L |{a href="news:alt.religion.scientology"}{/a}_____________|/_______| L and{a href="http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/clam/lynx/q0.html"}{/a}XemuSP4(:)

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AU Wassenaar Wassenaar changes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[OK to repost to crypto lists and Cryptome - dant] I spoke this afternoon with one of the Australian delegates at the Wassenaar meeting, an official from the Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Speaking off the record, they confirmed the changes at Wassenaar are pretty much as we know already: - NEW CONTROLS on mass market crypto products (hardware and software); - DEREGULATING all weak encryption products using key lengths up to 56 bits; - EXEMPTING mass market software where the key length is 64 bits or less; - EXTENDING the same mass market exemption to hardware for the first time; - EXCLUDING encryption products that protect intellectual property, such as digital watermarking; - NO DECISION was made about regulating 'intangible' distribution of technology, including Internet downloads. Apparently in the short term the intangibles issue is being considered in other fora (including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which includes Australia thanks to Filthy Jabilucre et al). It is still not clear whether the new restrictions are intended to stop public domain software such as PGP*. The DFAT contact said there was no discussion about an intention to stop public domain packages like PGP. They did not think public domain was being restricted. Yet apparently the Australian DoD has expressed the David Aaron view that public domain is subject to the same restrictions as mass market. * PGP is "in the public domain" for the purposes of Wassenaar/DSGL, since the definition states: "in the public domain" (GTN NTN GSN), as it applies herein, means "technology" or "software" which has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination (copyright restrictions do not remove "technology" or "software" from being "in the public domain") Note: there is no equivalent definition for "mass market", but the General Software Note (GSN) states it thus: Generally available to the public by being: 1. Sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of: a. Over-the-counter transactions; b. Mail order transactions; or c. Telephone order transactions; and 2. Designed for installation by the user without substantial support by the supplier; Dan ===== Dan Tebbutt, Technology Journalist, Melbourne Australia Australian Personal Computer (http://www.apcmag.com) LAN Corporate IT (http://www.lanlive.com) The Australian (http://www.newsit.com.au) Ph: +61-3-9347-8893 Fax:+61-2-9264-6320 Email: dant(a)acp.com.au "The revolution will be televised ... on pay-per-view."

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Alpha Options Newsletter
by feedback＠telescan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: What was the quid pro quo for Wassenaar countries? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 08:21:21 -0500 > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Subject: Re: What was the quid pro quo for Wassenaar countries? > More interesting to Americans, maybe, is that there also appears to be > an effort to boost domestic militia, particularly the religious brand, as the > homefront Bin Laden. The rise of religion-based terrorism is explored at > length in Bruce Hoffman's recent "Inside Terrorism." Hoffman claims that > religious terrorists may be the worst enemies ever, for they do not > believe in political compromise: they want to kill every single opponent, > and have no reservations about using WMD. 5,000 years of human history bears this thesis out. > If this theory is correct (and Hoffman has worked with RAND for years on > the issue) then the menace of terrorism is worse than that hawked during > the Cold War. The enemy is not distant, not even ICBM seconds away, > but rather it lives amongst us, it's our neighbors readying Armageddon not > merely a familiar commie takeover. This is also their biggest weakness. It's one reason the US has never been host to a large movement in the 20th century, outside the racist, anti-communist, and pro-lifers (and the first two are pretty much dead) because your neighbor probably doesn't go to the same church you do, probably not from the same part of the country. The chances of an individual opening up to their neighbor and getting a warm reception for bombing someplace is pretty low. Realisticaly, the only reason the pro-lifers get as warm a reception as they do is so many people see it as hypocritical. It's ok to kill a killer is their thinking, it is after all a form of pre-partum assissted self-defence. > Hoffman says to expect more OKCs around the globe. To be sure, that's > his business to say that. Considering the rate at which they occur now there is zero rational reason to believe these groups will cease any time in the near future. ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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US attorney notified
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michell was notified that we are in the process of initiating legal action to get the lien removed. Let's hope she has the sense to do what we ask. This matter should have been settled. It is getting WORSE.

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Wassenaar News
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We spoke with Igor at the WA today to ask about the implementation report Caspar Bowden said would be coming shortly. It seems that Dirk Weicke, the person preparing it (whom Caspar queried), is out sick and won't return to work until Thursday. Another person working on the report, a Mr. Sidbitt (?) is also out sick but should be back at work tomorrow. At the moment there is no plan to offer the report on the WA Web site. Each member will decide how to publicize it. Igor, a friendly, reminded that the WA staff has no authority, indeed has an evanescent existence, and is subject to vanishing without explanation. The paranoid WA members, my words, cut no slack, cut-throat control of perfidious news is their modus operandi. Still, Igor chuckled at my reporting that the perfidious USG will not anwser my inquiries, being unable to trust its terrifying citizenry. He refused my plea to send a purloined report, a report which, on the evidence, appears to be quite sickening.

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RE: What was the quid pro quo for Wassenaar countries?
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young talked about the way the TLAs are whipping up the War Against Drugs and the threat od terrorists, WMDs and bogies (in English slang "bogies" are little bits of partially dried snot that plug up your nose... but that's by-the-by) and concludes with: [... If Bruce Hoffman is right ...] > then the menace of terrorism is worse than that hawked during > the Cold War. The enemy is not distant, not even ICBM seconds > away, but rather it lives amongst us, it's our neighbors readying > Armageddon not merely a familiar commie takeover. Ambulance Driver: "Yeah, Doc, there was a nasty accident out on the interstate." Dr. Bassett: "Bad one, eh?" Ambulance Driver: "Yeah, a truck and a car collided. Ya know, it was kinda funny... the truck was carrying a load of the strangest-looking seed pods." Ken Brown

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Re: y2k/gary north delusions
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a former New Yorker, I find this whole thread majorly uninformed. Most of New York's water moves from the Catskills to the tap (or toilet) via gravity, without encountering a pump at any point during the way. Even if all power and automated controls failed, most of the city would continue to get water (remember - the system was designed long before computers, or even widespread electricity). The only areas with major problems would be the high spots - Washington Heights/ Spanish Harlem, some parts of the Bronx, and the upper floors of some highrises. Even assuming that somehow every toilet in the city became unusable, the decidedly lowtech solid waste disposal system (trucks to landfills in Staten Island and New Jersey, or barges to the Atlantic), would still operate. The solid volume of people's excrement is miniscule compared to the volume of material already handled. (If you think no crap goes into the system, you clearly have not spent time near in infant in the age of Pampers). I suspect that Los Angeles, and other cities which have grown recently in arid areas, would have a lot more trouble. Peter Trei

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Re: Commerce Hacked?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Sun, 6 Dec 1998 23:14:13 -0500 (EST) From: Somebody To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Re: Commerce Hacked? Mime-Version: 1.0 Looks like he [Aaron] has been successful. No one is talking about the extortive quality of sending out the commerce minister to argue for crypto controls. Why don't they send an air force general who giggles about radiated cities between bites of rumaki. <Somebody's .sig> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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ATTENTION SMOKERS STOP SMOKING IMMEDIATELY
by franghjk＠skynet.be 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Anguilla attached to Wassenar Agr?
by Jim Burnes - Denver 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since Anguilla is a UK protectorate, is it subject to Wassenar Agreement rules if the UK is a signatory? Anyone care to predict the next big crypto exporter? Brazil? Chile? Argentina? Columbia? Tonga? ;-) jim

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RE: tyranny of corporations (was: Corporate Nations)
by Albert P. Franco, II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>> From: "Blanc" Also, this image of hyperindividualism doesn't seem right. I would think such an extreme degree of individualism would exclude much involvement with others, meaning they could not run corporations, because for a business to exist requires involvement in providing a service/product to the largest numbers of the population as possible, and they can only do this if this large mass of people see the value of, and accept, in preference to the offerings of the competition, what that particular corporation offers. I imagine a hyperindividual more as an independent contractor working "alone". There are dozens of examples of the Executive that comes to a new position, cuts jobs and makes other changes that make the bottom line look good in the short term. Since the sales of a very large company are not likely to "crash", this person looks good for a couple of years, then hops to a new job and the next guy catches the fallout of the short-term vision. The independent contractor on the other hand will probably never have the sales base to get away with screwing over his/her employees and clients. The independent contractor, that is not an out and out criminal, generally has to be very careful not to alienate the customers. A big corporation on the other hand can afford to lose a few thousand customers without too much trouble. A scoundrel has a much better chance of fucking over people in his/her rise to the top in a corporation than in a small company. The fly-by-night companies that are obviously rip-offs are not quite the same thing since very few people aspire to be like these folks. But the original authors point is correct in that a very large part of the population want to be able to emulate the big time self-interest seekers. APF

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Votes
by Richard.Bragg＠ssa.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wonder how the good 'ol Beeb will handle loads of votes from non-uk people. Especially how will they cope with anonymous remailers. I know this is off-topic cypherpunks but lets indulge in a little gentle humour. ---------------------- Forwarded by Richard Bragg/UK/SSA_EUROPE on 08/12/98 10:27 --------------------------- Hilary Davidson 08/12/98 10:24 To: UK BEC, UK Contractors BEC, Workfun cc: Subject: Votes This has to be done!! ---------------------- Forwarded by Hilary Davidson/UK/SSA_EUROPE on 08-12-98 10:23 AM --------------------------- "Ashley Lane" <adlane(a)fizzbang.demon.co.uk> on 07-12-98 10:00:39 PM To: "Andy Randerson" <andy(a)andyran.demon.co.uk>, "Marcus Lane" <marcus.lane(a)Drives.Eurotherm.com>, Hilary Davidson/UK/SSA_EUROPE, "Jonathan Cory" <jonathan_cory(a)phoenix.com>, "Jason Boxall" <JBoxall(a)lonza.co.uk> cc: Subject: Votes All, We are going to try to influence the result of the voting for BBC Sports Personality of the year. It has been decided that David Beckham would provide most embarrassment to the organisers if winning, so could you all e-mail your vote to the following address: sports.review(a)bbc.co.uk More importantly, can you forward this mail to all your mates & acquaintances asap in the hope that they will participate. Your co-operation in this matter is greatly appreciated ________________________________ The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential. It is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and others authorised to receive it. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, copying, dissemination or disclosure of this information is strictly prohibited. ________________________________

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RE: tyranny of corporations (was: Corporate Nations)
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In <3.0.3.32.19981207161424.006ae900(a)209.204.247.83>, on 12/07/98 at 12:17 PM, "Albert P. Franco, II" <apf2(a)apf2.com> said: ><fontfamily><param>Arial</param><color><param>0000,0000,ffff</param><smaller> Please set Eudora so it does not output this junk in your messages. tks, -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html ---------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Corporate Mandarins and The Tyranny of *Hierarchy*
by Michael Motyka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> This "sociological" analysis probably went over really well at a > touchy-feely corporate navel-gazing camp because it's more the way > some grey-flannel men *wish* they were, than the way they actually > are. > Take a look at the history of the Love Canal in Buffalo, NY or the tobacco industry and think about these as models of corporate behavior when you hire the exterminator to come onto your property to take care of some pesky ants and horribly nasty, dangerous spiders using "safe, environmentally sound" insecticides. The burden of proof is backwards all too often in evaluating the manner in which corporations treat their customers and their community. It sure looks like the corporate world has more than its fair share of major criminals to me: some of them firmly and respectably in place in Congress. They just don't hack little girls to pieces and bury them in the woods; they kill tens of thousands, slowly, and hide behind the finest suits and the sharpest lawyers. The quest for economic gain coupled with the blatant disregard for the health and safety of those around you is what is meant by hyperindividualism. It's simply greed coupled with sociopathy. Describing this as an offshoot of 20th century liberalism is way beyond me. > or even "criminals" like Rockefeller ... > This is well off-thread but I saw a movie clip of John D. from the mid 40's where he was at a podium being fingerprinted as a publicity bit to promote the FBI's policy of trying to fingerprint all Americans. Nothing new under the sun eh? Mike

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Export of PGP Illegal in Denmark. Threatened w. jail (fwd)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 08:05:05 -0800 (PST) From: "Jay D. Dyson" <jdyson(a)techreports.jpl.nasa.gov> To: Cryptography List <cryptography(a)c2.net> Subject: Export of PGP Illegal in Denmark. Threatened w. jail (fwd) Organization: NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory X-No-Archive: yes X-PGP-Notice: E-mail me for my PGP Public Key. X-Disclaimer: Opinions expressed here are not necessarily those of NASA/JPL/Caltech. X-To-Spammer: Spamming a U.S. Government institution will only get you a $500 per incident fine. MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Courtesy of Defcon Stuff. (Do I hear jackboots in the night? 'Deed I do!) Sorry, Uncle Sam. I'm a fan of cryptography, not crippletography. - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 13:45:17 +0100 From: "boo(a)datashopper.dk" <boo(a)Datashopper.Dk> To: dc-stuff(a)dis.org Subject: Export of PGP Illegal in Denmark. Threatened w. jail Hi This is a true story. Denmark now - along with the whole EU - has assimilated US-crypto laws. I just had a phone conversation with the danish ministry of commerce, the export control division. The kind lady I spoke to threatened me with fines or jail for up to two years. For having PGP for free download on my homepage! I called the division to hear about the Wassenaar arrangement on export-restrictions on strong crypto and its consequences. So I ask this lady something like: I have this strong crypto program called PGP on my homepage. What should I do. Does this Wassenaar arrangement concern me? 'It sure does', she replies, and start to ask a lot of questions about my homepage - does it have unlimited global access etc. And then she says: 'You better take it down', and starts to reiterate the legal aspects, e.g. two laws from EU on export restrictions. Specifically she points out the penal code: Fines. Jail. So... I'm _not_ going to take down PGP voluntarily. Otoh I'm going to SHOUT this out loud. (I have already contacted two members of parliament and will start calling all 179 later today.) Lets see what happens... - -- Boo PI = int a=10000,b,c=2800,d,e,f[2801],g;main(){for(;b-c;)f[b++]=a/5; for(;d=0,g=c*2;c-=14,printf("%.4d",e+d/a),e=d%a)for(b=c;d+=f[b]*a, f[b]=d%--g,d/=g--,--b;d*=b);} -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNmv8uLl5qZylQQm1AQGYPQQAhDs8XfKRLD0ECTO5LuF1iA+0Yr7B9Yon CAnKwZYAk07BYG2u/xuFEsU/xdoNTap+lVmWEwciREPL+wjF/hSWeq+/YP6uwpCb 9pkoXkMst2NnFQ6744GTYiRJMQPc4no6aaDzWwO4FnMjyIzUpD4kBPkh0MHutCAF PyXXbstG1z8= =ByGn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:53 AM 12/8/98 +0200, Tim Griffiths wrote: > >x wrote: >> >> This brings to mind again a method of distribution that I've thought for >> some time and has probably been discussed on this list before... >> For (a trivial) example take the image of PGP zipped up for download. >> Three different sites create a unique portion of that image for >> themselves, for example, each site takes every third byte, and throw >> in some additional obfuscation...It then is trivial to reconstruct >> the desired image from the independent sources, while none of the >> sources themselves can be subject to controls without having to go >> down the rat hole of having to define what really constitutes the >> restricted material... > >1. What is the point of the obfuscation? If it's not legal to do it >openly, then it's certainly not legal to hide the fact your doing it. >"The accused did it in such a way as to demonstrate that he was aware >of it's illegality". the point is not to hide anything; the point is to expand, arbitrarily (and this was a trivial example), the f() that takes bits from a controllable image to one that is not. > >2. By your example, you could also take a cruise missile apart, and >ship each part separately. After all, none of it is actually a missile. in a cruise missle, there will be certain parts -- e.g. the warhead explosives? -- that are still identifiable as controlled. taking apart the missle by n people where n is the number of 'parts' will result in some subset of participants possessing components that implicate them in an illegal act. this is simply not true of bits. What is the bit sequence that defines "munition"-ness? My point is that there is no hard point at which that can be defined, when you start talking about mappings from a controlled image to some other images which cannot be controlled. > >However I 'export' PGP from the US, I'm exporting it, even if I have a >web site for each bit, 0 or 1 being determined by whether Clinton has >a cigar or not in a posted picture. You're just asserting the assumptions I am trying to examine, and this is not helpful. You're also assuming a single participant, with accountability. I am assuming multiple participants, and that they're acting independently; let's expand this to say that one individual provides the 'algorithm' for the mapping, and any other participants are free to obtain their image out of band legally, and implement this algorithm on some portion of the image, publishing the result. Whom do you arrest? Where is the culpability? If the algorithm defines that there be 256K subimages of the original, one for each byte, say...can I be arrested for choosing to post f(byte 123,456)? Or do I get arrested for publishing f(byte 123,456) PLUS the information that identifies this byte as corresponding to byte 123,456 in the reconstruction of the original? I honestly don't know where this goes, but to just make a blanket statement like you did doesn't really add anything. >Yes, the law is inconsistent (let alone stupid). Not, I wouldn't want >to try this and expect to be immune from prosecution. > >Tim G > >-- >Tim Griffiths griffith(a)wis.weizmann.ac.il >Center for Submicron Research http://tim01.ex.ac.uk >Weizmann Institute of Science (972)-8-934-2736 >Rehovot 76100 Israel > > 'I have sat and listened to the arguments of men, > and I tell you they are shallow movements in space > tied to reality only by the ego of their minds.' -DF > > >

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RE: y2k/gary north delusions
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sure he did. However, geography was not accomodating, and there is at least one point where a major aqueduct is pumped over a ridge. Peter > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Hettinga [SMTP:rah@shipwright.com] > At 11:07 AM -0500 on 12/7/98, Trei, Peter wrote: > > I suspect that Los Angeles, and other cities > > which have grown recently in arid areas, would > > have a lot more trouble. > > Actually, Mulholland knew what gravity was, as well. :-). > > Cheers, > Robert Hettinga >

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last spam on this subject. The rest is up to you. Cheers, Robert Hettinga --- begin forwarded text X-Sender: jya(a)pop.pipeline.com Date: Tue, 08 Dec 1998 09:09:04 -0500 To: cypherpunks(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> Subject: Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd) Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailing-List: cypherpunks(a)ssz.com X-Loop: ssz.com X-Language: English, Russian, German Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Precedence: first-class Reply-To: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net In response to John Gilmore's call for a foil to US-Wassenaar restrictions acoming, we've put up a preliminary list of international cryptography sources for mirroring: http://jya.com/crypto-free.htm This is a quick starter-kit and is far from comprehensive. Contributions welcome. Ken Williams offers an impressive (177MB) crypto/stego archive: http://www.genocide2600.com/~tattooman/cryptography/ --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Wassenaar and the dumming of New Zealand
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "Blair Anderson" <blair(a)technologist.com> To: "Robert Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Date: Tue, 08 Dec 98 10:13:56 +1300 Reply-To: "Blair Anderson" <blair(a)technologist.com> Priority: Normal MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Wassenaar and the dumming of New Zealand See Peter Gutmens contribution at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/policy/. NZ's very peculiar interpretation of Wassenaar "Export Control Myths and Facts", http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/policy/myths.html. Its a rich source of matter on the subject. Cheers Blair Anderson (Blair(a)technologist.com) International Consultant in Electronic Commerce, Encryption and Electronic Rights Management "Techno Junk and Grey Matter" 50 Wainoni Road, Christchurch, New Zealand phone 64 3 3894065 fax 64 3 3894065 Member Digital Commerce Society of Boston, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, ---------------------------- Caught in the Net for 25 years ---------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 13:02:59 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu, dcsb-announce(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Cc: Ira Heffan <heffan(a)tht.com>, Mike Schmelzer <schmelze(a)tht.com>, Roland Mueller <roland(a)secunet.com>, "Jonathan J. Rusch" <rusch1(a)erols.com> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Tuesday, January 5th, 1999 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Although the very idea of patenting software seems to be an anathema to much of the programming community, patents on software continue to stream out of the U.S. Patent Office. Everyone involved in digital commerce applications, which are by definition software-based, probably has heard about recent events: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided "State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group," which explicitly ratified patenting methods of doing business, and a spate of well-publicized patents have issued claiming to cover such concepts as the virtual shopping cart and the reverse auction. As a prerequisite to discussing these recent developments, the first part of our talk will provide an introduction to patents. We will explain what patents are and what they are not, and describe the business goals that a patent can serve. Then we will talk about current events, and attempt to put the _State Street_ case in context. We will present a survey of recently-issued patents (suggestions welcome) related to digital commerce, and conclude with some speculation about current trends, including a novel form of software patent with potentially huge implications. Ira Heffan (heffan(a)tht.com) and Mike Schmelzer (schmelze(a)tht.com) are patent attorneys at Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP (http://www.tht.com) We will be presenting our own personal views on this topic, and not the views of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP or its clients. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, January 5, 1999, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $32.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and the speakers' lunch. The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business attire" (whatever that means), for women. Fair warning: since we purchase these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, January 2nd, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", in the amount of $32.50. Please include your e-mail address, so that we can send you a confirmation If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Upcoming speakers for DCSB are: February Roland Mueller European Privacy Directive March Jonathan Rusch Internet Fraud We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>. For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQEVAwUBNmwX/8UCGwxmWcHhAQFfjgf+IBe01g9XCldZYT+GRDI5ho1sOPgL6W7q zLDQToz0GGM/NZzv44SMTSGpDFx80R1yautvy4xHMnYQy2UnvO2WGsfrjuwSdQte 8qxoRAFkihyP/mi/83As2TwWdp6QhwbjI02hyP6elsdSzsspflwwonOB4I+8E/xX UDsGdQH4AHaWrK1S5XYfJSHSRGOBpk2+cqboiGvbcbC1z0vDRGrnztf8GADoPVC3 6vw4M00f+cgIuoaqqO4ol62Os6D+WPVw2NMop20OD62EGzYO2pyQjboPvBLxyRD7 smLz/4S598uLZF0GX+GO/8rCjAORask/Qt3SFIU2HMMPj9nKIvVtJw== =gz6w -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: linux-gpib licensing (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From llp-owner(a)obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de Mon Dec 7 17:59:05 1998 X-Authentication-Warning: obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de: majordomo set sender to owner-llp using -f Message-ID: <XFMail.981207090304.danny(a)holstein.tritonetd.com> X-Mailer: XFMail 1.1 [p0] on Linux Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <Pine.SGI.3.91.981201222534.10972B-100000(a)bragg.chemie.fu-berlin.de> Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 08:48:14 -0500 (EST) From: "Danny G. Holstein" <danny(a)holstein.tritonetd.com> To: Claus Schroeter <clausi(a)chemie.fu-berlin.de> Subject: Re: linux-gpib licensing Cc: llp(a)obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de, James Minyard <jminyard(a)lanhopper.com> Sender: owner-llp(a)obelix.chemie.fu-berlin.de Precedence: bulk On 01-Dec-98 Claus Schroeter wrote: >On Tue, 1 Dec 1998, James Minyard wrote: > >> >> I was wondering if you would consider changing the license for the >> libgpib portion of the linux-gpib distribution from GPL to LGPL. >> I'd like to register my thoughts here. I believe the best model to how the GPL can work is how Apache and IBM handled it. IBM wanted to include the server with a system, they were willing to pay but there was no one to pay, in the end, they paid with the only currency that would work, namely, IBM added some code to the Apache server and was allowed to inlude it with their system. Stick with GPL. No one should be able to sell the work of another person as his own, with GPL, one is assured that the cost of using a code is merely that of returning improvements to the code. ...Dan ------- To get more information on the Linux-Lab Project see: http://www.llp.fu-berlin.de/

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Wiretap Operation Sheds Light on LAPD Tactics
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If it is Monday, December 7, 1998, you can go to http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/STATE/topstory.html and read about how Los Angeles police wiretapped a small cellular phone service provider because his policies were too helpful for drug dealers. He didn't try hard enough to verify customer names, he sold cell phones with built in scramblers, he allowed customers to change phones and numbers easily. After years of investigation the company owners were never charged, but a number of their customers were convicted as drug dealers, in many cases never being told about the phone taps. It's an ominous account of how privacy-friendly policies can be used by the police to justify an investigation. If it's after December 7, read the story here: : Los Angeles narcotics officers spent a lot of time spying on John : Lopez and his small storefront telephone company--Atel Cellular : Convinced he was in cahoots with drug dealers by selling secure, : cop-proof phone service--no questions asked--they staked out his : Downey office, tailed his customers and finally wiretapped the : customers' and Atel's phones. : Starting with just his business lines and a handful of customers, : the operation spread like kudzu, eventually covering hundreds of : phones and thousands of conversations and becoming the largest wiretap : operation in the history of Los Angeles County. : When the three-year probe ended in March, police had arrested : dozens of Atel's customers, but not Lopez or any of his employees. : The Atel taps are at the center of the nine-month legal : controversy over whether prosecutors have been improperly concealing : their wiretapping operation and the information derived from it. Also : at issue are charges by defense lawyers representing Atel customers : that the allegations against Atel Cellular are a sham created to win : court orders permitting an electronic fishing expedition against their : clients. : Manager Lopez and Atel's owner, Atil Nath, refused to : comment. Their lawyers say the two men are not involved in drugs. : "The whole concept [of the police wiretap operation] was : preposterous," said Dale Hardeman, a Downey attorney. "How are we : supposed to know if customers are involved in criminal activity?" : Details of the probe--revealed through interviews, police : affidavits, wire monitor logs and volumes of court records--provide a : fascinating inside look at how detectives can mold the legal actions : of a suspect into criminal scenarios and persuade judges to authorize : snooping on people's private conversations. : The probe also raises broader questions, such as whether many of : the reasons given for tapping Atel could just as easily be applied to : other phone companies, and whether wiretaps should be allowed to : continue indefinitely, even when police work for months without : finding enough evidence to arrest the target. : The 4th Amendment protects phone privacy. : : Need for Probable Cause : : To tap a phone, prosecutors have to get a court order by showing : they have sufficient reason, known as probable cause, to believe the : phone subscriber is committing crimes. Even if a subscriber's actions : are legal when considered individually, those actions can amount to : probable cause when viewed as part of a larger picture. : If a tap provides a lead or evidence, prosecutors must reveal the : tap and give transcripts to the defendant before trial. : Though the Atel investigation established strong suspicion among : investigators that Lopez knew he was dealing with drug traffickers, it : fell far short of proving it. But police were getting a steady supply : of leads against his customers as well as new phone numbers of people : they considered suspicious. So they kept going back to court for : extensions and new taps. : Police referred all questions about the case to prosecutors, who : defend the wiretap practice, saying they had sufficient evidence to : suspect Lopez of wrongdoing. : Dist. Atty. Gil Garcetti noted in a prepared statement that the : operation had court approval. He said police targeted Atel because : they believed most of its business was providing phones to drug : dealers without requiring them to provide any personal information. : Superior Court Judge John Ouderkirk, who approved most of the : orders, said he could not discuss pending cases. : Not much is known about Lopez and Nath. Nath lives in a two-story : home in a neat, well-kept neighborhood in Downey. Lopez lives in Pico : Rivera with his wife, Maria, and their children. Both have said in : court papers that they have no criminal record. Their company is one : of about three dozen small phone companies in Los Angeles County that : resell or sublease service and equipment. : Police say the closest they came to showing a direct connection : between Lopez and drugs was during a stakeout at his home when they : saw a man arrive in a pickup truck registered to a member of what they : say is a drug gang. : The investigation grew out of, and, in many ways, was modeled : after a 1994 wiretap of Downey Communications, another small retailer : of phone services. As in the Atel probe, police staked out the : business and collected information for wiretap orders. : During hours of surveillance, they watched customers arrive and : leave. They noticed the types of vehicles they drove. They even took : notes on their manner of dress, eventually deciding that silk floral : shirts, pressed denim, hand-stitched leather belts and expensive : cowboys boots were haute couture on the L.A. drug scene. : Police claimed that Downey leased to drug dealers and was : "heavily involved in the sale and transportation of narcotics." : Officers would later use the same language in Atel affidavits. : The Downey wiretaps lasted a year. They ended in drug and cash : seizures and 12 indictments, including one against the brother of : Downey's owner. But the owners and employees of Downey were not : arrested. The owner said in court papers he was never interviewed by : police, was not aware of the investigation and has never been charged : with a crime. : Police used the Downey Communications probe as a springboard to : Atel. : The connection was tenuous. Downey and Atel customers shared the : same taste in cars and fashion. Downey employees were seen paying : short visits to Delta Tri-Telesis, a now-defunct cellular phone : business owned by Nath and operated by Lopez. : So in September 1995, officers turned their binoculars on Atel, : which had taken Delta's customers. They often saw customers in cars : registered to targets of previous drug probes going to houses once : used as drug "stash" sites and employing what police considered : "counter-surveillance" driving. : : Reports on Surveillance : : Investigators say they saw Lopez use such techniques when they : were tailing him in May 1996, shortly before they started tapping his : business phones. They said they saw him on the freeway changing lanes : erratically and driving "at a high rate of speed in excess of 70 miles : per hour," later making a U-turn on Arrington Avenue and lingering too : long--three minutes--at an intersection. : Police also noted in affidavits that Lopez sold money counters : and phone scramblers; that he apparently didn't care if customers gave : him fictitious names; that he let customers change numbers quickly and : easily. : Drug suspects were frequently found with Atel phones. : Police saw what they considered suspicious calling patterns--too : many calls in a short period of time--among groups of Atel customers. : Although such evidence was far from enough to file charges : against Lopez and Nath, legal experts say it was sufficient as : probable cause for a court order, which was granted in May 1996 for 30 : days. : After a month of wiretapping, Garcetti's prosecutors--armed with : transcripts of tapped phone conversations--were back in court asking : for the first extension of the court order and for permission to tap : new telephone numbers. From then on, requests for extensions built on : previous ones. Police eventually received 19 extensions. : Although the taps provided a mother lode of leads against drug : dealers, they seldom offered much evidence against Atel. There was one : conversation that police described in an affidavit as particularly : damning for Lopez. It was on June 25, 1996, from "Oscar," who had been : under police surveillance. : "Hey John, this number is no good," Oscar tells Lopez. : Lopez: Not good? : Oscar: They're on me again! Right behind. : Lopez: OK, bring it in now! : But most of Lopez's conversations in the affidavits simply : confirmed what police already knew: that customers dealt directly with : Lopez, that Lopez based billing records on phone numbers instead of : names and that he handled billing arrangements by phone. : In contrast, the conversations among customers were : fruitful. Most were cryptic discussions about drug deals, pickup : locations, delivery times, police said. According to investigators, : they never mentioned drugs, using words such as "ladies," "stuff" or : simply a number understood to be an amount of drugs. : For example, in June 1996, police overheard this exchange: : Receiver: How do they look? : Caller: Real good. How many do you have? : Receiver: 40 plus 5 out, plus some lying around. : Caller: OK. I'll hold whatever else I have. : Without interpretation by detectives, there is little indication : that that conversation is about drugs. : By the time the operation ended in March, police had tapped close : to 400 Atel phones. : The wiretap controversy erupted that month because San Diego : attorney Philip DeMassa and two other lawyers discovered that the case : against their clients sprang from information garnered from the Atel : taps and handed off to other officers who were not told of the taps so : they would not have to reveal them to defense lawyers. Later, Deputy : Public Defender Kathy Quant went to court for indigent defendants. : Garcetti acknowledged in June that he withheld tap information in : 58 cases and he agreed to notify defendants about future taps. : Although a judge upheld the wiretap handoff practice last month, with : some qualifications, Quant is considering an appeal. Other defense : lawyers are challenging whether Garcetti has revealed all tap cases. : Whatever the outcome, the probe clearly helped police arrest some : of Atel's customers. It netted large amounts of narcotics, about $8 : million in drug proceeds and dozens of arrests. : Lawyers base their doubts about the investigation of Nath and : Lopez partially on the fact that it lasted three years and police : never tried to interview them. In fact, DeMassa alleges in court : papers that Lopez and Nath are actually police informants or are : perhaps cooperating through a grant of immunity from prosecution, an : assertion prosecutors call absurd. : DeMassa is hoping to show that police misled the courts when they : said they were investigating Lopez and Nath. : If Nath and Lopez were such an integral part of a gigantic drug : trafficking operation, the police should be trying to protect the : public from them, he said. : "Why isn't anything happening to these guys?" he said. : : Acts Were Not Illegal, Critics Say : : None of Atel's acts described in the affidavits was illegal, : Quant and other critics say. Well-known phone companies engage in : many of the same practices, Quant said. If police use the same : standards elsewhere, any companies, especially small retailers, may be : vulnerable to taps. : Many of the actions cited in Atel affidavits are suspicious only : in the eyes of police, Quant said. Money counters are legitimate, and : other firms advertise "no eavesdropping" cell phones because : legitimate businesses need secure communications, she said. : There is nothing suspicious, for example, about high usage of : cell phones, particularly among real estate agents, salespeople, even : news reporters, Quant said. And other small retailers allow people to : change numbers frequently. : Regardless of Atel's guilt or innocence, what police did to Atel : could be done to any legitimate businesses, she said. : Deputy Dist. Atty. Robert Schirn dismissed that notion. : "That's quite a stretch," he said. : "Atel was a facilitator and made it possible for drug dealers to : break the law," he said. : Yet Schirn acknowledged that he could not point to any conclusive : evidence that Nath and Lopez knew that some of their customers were : drug dealers. : He said he didn't know if police tried to persuade defendants to : testify against Nath or Lopez. Even if they did, prosecutors would : need more evidence than the tainted testimony of accomplices to make : an arrest, he said. : As for Atel, Hardeman said his clients had no idea some of their : customers were criminals. : "This investigation has virtually destroyed them," he said.

3 2

Re: (fwd) Markus Kuhn on eternity
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Markus Kuhn writes: > The main research aspect of this project is the joint administration of > such distributed archives. For spam protection, you still need people > who decide, which files are allowed on the distributed server > infrastructure, and which are not. This administration is so far the > weak link in the Eternity Service concept, because whoever decides that > something is not spam takes over some responsibility for the content, > and is therefore subject to legal power of national powers. It would seem that it is the provider of the content, not the filterer, who is subject to legal authority. If I set up an open FTP site and allow anyone to post anything there, I can be legally forced to shut down once copyrighted software and child pornography appear. It has nothing to do with my filtering, it is my providing of the material that is objectionable. The Eternity concept has always been vague about exactly who is anonymous. There are many parties involved: the ones who submit material to the Eternity service; the ones who decide what material will go onto the service; the ones who own and maintain the machines which hold the material; the ones who receive requests for the material and supply it in response; the ones who request material and receive it. We need a more careful analysis of Eternity in terms of what levels of anonymity are possible and necessary for each of these roles.

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What freedom means... [Register]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > The Register - http://www.theregister.co.uk > http://www.theregister.co.uk/981207-000006.html > IBM PC martyrs meet untimely end > Chinese smugglers of kit put to death > http://www.theregister.co.uk/981206-000003.html > Eurospook plan for Web and wireless bugs > If Enfopol 98 is genuine, the cops are getting seriously out of control [much deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Ber
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Beroff wrote: >Wait a sec. Maybe I'm confused. I thought you were talking about >mass-mirroring the *content* of key sites, not just the URL pointers. > >I would imagine that a small committee would have to "edit" by >suggesting what should and shouldn't be included; one must realize >that if the final file is too large, people will be discouraged from mirroring. Yes, Gilmore's proposal was to mirror the contents; URLs threaten no reg-makers. Yep, mirrors of everything would be very large. We've heard already that folks would like help in knowing what to mirror if they can't do large archives, or can't easily decide which are most important. My advice so far: mirror whatever you can until better advice comes forth. Prime need: many mirrors of the strongest stuff, especially anything above 40-bits, that is anything that now requires a US export license (which appears to be where Wassenaar wildebeests and the domestic US is being stampeded). What would help is a list from experts on what are the most gov-enraging programs. We'd like to offer a few of those on jya.com, to test BXA's up-and- running crypto-enforcement program, maybe get some jail and trial pleasure, it's been too quiet on Bernstein, Junger, Karn, et al, a deliberate gov-stall, awaiting Wassenaar.

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Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for publishing PGP on his web page. Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto tools that we use daily. Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! (I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten except you.) I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. (Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend on a single site.) Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. John Gilmore --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 21:38:55 -0500 > From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls > Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls > Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 > From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> > The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only > all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As > today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating > bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for > publishing PGP on his web page. And this is different from yesterday how? > Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong > crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they > threaten to erect. Are you offering to put up your monies to provide any and all legal and other support for any such site that participates? When is your site going up? ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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LA Times article on Wiretapping
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a link to the LA Times feature story on the LAPD's use of wiretaps. An interesting read. Expect such things from the rest of the constabulary when examined. http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/STATE/t000111718.html --- | Bill Clinton - Bringing back the Sixties one Nixon at a time! | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: DSA for encryption
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 06 Dec 1998 22:25:57 -0600, Bennett Haselton <bennett(a)peacefire.org> wrote: >I'm working on an enhancement to a Web-based program that allows you to >circumvent proxy server censorship by sending a request for a Web page to a >computer in the outside world that is not blocked by the proxy, and having >that computer re-send a copy of the banned page back to you. Good idea! >Of course, any manufacturer of Internet censorship proxy server software >could easily add ians.ml.org to their list of blocked sites (as they have >all already done with Anonymizer), so the idea would be for people to get >their friends to set up port-forwarding programs on computers that were not >blocked by the censoring proxy, and those could be set up to relay requests >between the IANS server and the computer behind the proxy server. It may not be so easy to get people to set up port-forwarding programs. These could be a target for hackers seeking to cover their tracks as they try break-ins. Also, how many people in this day of commercial ISPs are able to set up port-forwarding programs? It would seem more promising to make your web page script be simple and portable enough that even users of AOL and free webpage hosts like GeoCities would be able to install it. >I am working on a JavaScript form that could be used on the client side to >solve this problem. We would like to use DSA to encrypt the requests sent >using IANS, since I've heard DSA can be used for encryption without >royalties, unlike, for example, RSA. DSA per se is probably not your best choice - unless you already have a DSA implementation which you want to try to use. DSA is a signature algorithm, and while it is sometimes possible to use a DSA implementation to do encryption, it is not particularly convenient. What you want to do is to use the mathematical principle behind DSA, which is the difficulty of solving the discrete log problem, and use an encryption algorithm which relies on that same math problem, namely Diffie-Hellman or ElGamal encryption. If you need to use DSA, Bruce Schneier describes in his book Applied Cryptography how to get the effect of ElGamal encryption. Here is what he writes, on page 490: : ElGamal Encryption with DSA : : There have been allegations that the government likes the DSA because it is : only a digital signature algorithm and can't be used for encryption. It is, : however, possible to use the DSA function call to do ElGamal encryption. : : Assume that the DSA algorithm is implemented with a single function call: : : DSAsign (p, q, g, k, x, h, r, s) : : You supply the numbers p, q, g, k, x, and h, and the function returns the : signature parameters: r and s. : : To do ElGamal encryption of message m with public key y, choose a random : number k, and call : : DSAsign (p, p, g, k, 0, 0, r, s) : : The value of r returned is a in the ElGamal scheme. Throw s away. Then, : call : : DSAsign (p, p, y, k, 0, 0, r, s) : : Rename the value of r to be u; throw s away. Call : : DSAsign (p, p, m, 1, u, 0, r, s) : : Throw r away. The value of s returned is b in the ElGamal scheme. You now : have the ciphertext, a and b. : : Decryption is just as easy. Using secret key x, and ciphertext messages : a and b, call : : DSAsign (p, p, a, x, 0, 0, r, s) : : The value r is a^x mod p. Call that e. Then call : : DSAsign (p, p, 1, e, b, 0, r, s) : : The value s is the plaintext message, m. : : This method will not work with all implementations of DSA. Some may fix : the value sof p and q, or the lengths of some of the other parameters. : Still, if the implementation is general enough, this is a way to encrypt : using nothing more than digital signature function. If you need more information about what the various values mean, or how to create a DSA and/or ElGamal key, just ask. Really, ElGamal is simple enough that if you have access to a large-number math package, writing your own is probably easier than trying to get DSA to do it. It is unlikely that you will find a DSA implementation which allows you to specify all the needed parameters above, particularly h and k. Usually h is forgotten after key generation and not used during signature, and implementions will probably want to choose k themselves since it is a very sensitive parameter.

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PUTS MONEY INTO YOUR POCKET -- BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY AD
by jill567＠copacabana.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Information you need
by JCousino＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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knapsack....
by Bernardo B. Terrado 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where could I find the algorithm (per se) for Merkle-Hellman knapsack ? (if it is not for free just say so) :) I've read in Mr. Schneier's book that Chor-Rivest knapsack is secure (unless for some specializerd attack). Is it still as secure today as the latter years? Bernie

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This brings to mind again a method of distribution that I've thought for some time and has probably been discussed on this list before. In this distribution method, as long as there is the opportunity to cooperate ahead of time and out of band, there is the potential for retaining the ability to provide access any binary data that would be subject to unwanted control. The scheme is just a variation of secret sharing and all that is necessary is for several different entities to replicate portions of the desired software, which portions in and of themselves cannot be subject to any control. For (a trivial) example take the image of PGP zipped up for download. Three different sites create a unique portion of that image for themselves, for example, each site takes every third byte, and throw in some additional obfuscation by each site XORing their portion of the image by some additional data available at a fourth site such as a collection of cypherpunk list text. It then is trivial to reconstruct the desired image from the independent sources, while none of the sources themselves can be subject to controls without having to go down the rat hole of having to define what really constitutes the restricted material -- either in all possible forms, or in terms of all possible transforms applicable to the partitioned source material. Otherwise it could be argued that there is a function and that takes the image of an ASCII representation of Herman Melville's Moby Dick into the image of PGP.ZIP and therefore Moby Dick is an export controlled item. Or is the transform the export-controlled item? Or what? Eh? At 09:38 PM 12/7/98 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: > > >--- begin forwarded text > > >X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use >HELO protocol >To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com >Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls >Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 >From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> >Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net > >The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only >all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As >today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating >bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for >publishing PGP on his web page. > >Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong >crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they >threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in >a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, >SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto >tools that we use daily. > >Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for >volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware >organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be >exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from >your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The >Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to >try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) > >And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for >you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the >pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can >get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your >own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the >citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! > >(I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you >own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. >That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten >except you.) > >I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy >to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people >will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. >(Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend >on a single site.) > >Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto >distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase >strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public >that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments >of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. >And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on >smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each >country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when >the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. > > John Gilmore > >--- end forwarded text > > >----------------- >Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> >Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > > >

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Re: Wei Dei's "b-money" protocol
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

there must be something here that I'm missing. At the core of this protocol seems to be the establishment not of crypto anarchy but of a crypto elite. in this scheme only the processors of computing power have economic power. Now I realize that our current economic system is based on economic power being invested in a closed community of powerful elites, and is by no means egalitarian, but this looks to be like simply substituting one group of "haves" for a different group of "haves" I have to admit not being familiar with the Orthodoxy of crypto anarchy, but if the premise is a centerless self organizing system of free agents this protocol seems to miss the mark. or what is it that I am missing here? At 07:37 PM 12/5/98 GMT, you wrote: > > >Wei Dei recently announced (on cypherpunks) his "b-money, a new >protocol for monetary exchange and contract enforcement for >pseudonyms". > >Below is the text of his proposal. > >Comments to follow. > >Adam > >====================================================================== >http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/bmoney.txt >====================================================================== > >I am fascinated by Tim May's crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities >traditionally associated with the word "anarchy", in a crypto-anarchy the >government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and >permanently unnecessary. It's a community where the threat of violence is >impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible >because its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical >locations. > >Until now it's not clear, even theoretically, how such a community could >operate. A community is defined by the cooperation of its participants, >and efficient cooperation requires a medium of exchange (money) and a way >to enforce contracts. Traditionally these services have been provided by >the government or government sponsored institutions and only to legal >entities. In this article I describe a protocol by which these services >can be provided to and by untraceable entities. > >I will actually describe two protocols. The first one is impractical, >because it makes heavy use of a synchronous and unjammable anonymous >broadcast channel. However it will motivate the second, more practical >protocol. In both cases I will assume the existence of an untraceable >network, where senders and receivers are identified only by digital >pseudonyms (i.e. public keys) and every messages is signed by its sender >and encrypted to its receiver. > >In the first protocol, every participant maintains a (seperate) database >of how much money belongs to each pseudonym. These accounts collectively >define the ownership of money, and how these accounts are updated is the >subject of this protocol. > >1. The creation of money. Anyone can create money by broadcasting the >solution to a previously unsolved computational problem. The only >conditions are that it must be easy to determine how much computing effort >it took to solve the problem and the solution must otherwise have no >value, either practical or intellectual. The number of monetary units >created is equal to the cost of the computing effort in terms of a >standard basket of commodities. For example if a problem takes 100 hours >to solve on the computer that solves it most economically, and it takes 3 >standard baskets to purchase 100 hours of computing time on that computer >on the open market, then upon the broadcast of the solution to that >problem everyone credits the broadcaster's account by 3 units. > >2. The transfer of money. If Alice (owner of pseudonym K_A) wishes to >transfer X units of money to Bob (owner of pseudonym K_B), she broadcasts >the message "I give X units of money to K_B" signed by K_A. Upon the >broadcast of this message, everyone debits K_A's account by X units and >credits K_B's account by X units, unless this would create a negative >balance in K_A's account in which case the message is ignored. > >3. The effecting of contracts. A valid contract must include a maximum >reparation in case of default for each participant party to it. It should >also include a party who will perform arbitration should there be a >dispute. All parties to a contract including the arbitrator must broadcast >their signatures of it before it becomes effective. Upon the broadcast of >the contract and all signatures, every participant debits the account of >each party by the amount of his maximum reparation and credits a special >account identified by a secure hash of the contract by the sum the maximum >reparations. The contract becomes effective if the debits succeed for >every party without producing a negative balance, otherwise the contract >is ignored and the accounts are rolled back. A sample contract might look >like this: > >K_A agrees to send K_B the solution to problem P before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. >K_B agrees to pay K_A 100 MU (monetary units) before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. K_C >agrees to perform arbitration in case of dispute. K_A agrees to pay a >maximum of 1000 MU in case of default. K_B agrees to pay a maximum of 200 >MU in case of default. K_C agrees to pay a maximum of 500 MU in case of >default. > >4. The conclusion of contracts. If a contract concludes without dispute, >each party broadcasts a signed message "The contract with SHA-1 hash H >concludes without reparations." or possibly "The contract with SHA-1 hash >H concludes with the following reparations: ..." Upon the broadcast of all >signatures, every participant credits the account of each party by the >amount of his maximum reparation, removes the contract account, then >credits or debits the account of each party according to the reparation >schedule if there is one. > >5. The enforcement of contracts. If the parties to a contract cannot agree >on an appropriate conclusion even with the help of the arbitrator, each >party broadcasts a suggested reparation/fine schedule and any arguments or >evidence in his favor. Each participant makes a determination as to the >actual reparations and/or fines, and modifies his accounts accordingly. > >In the second protocol, the accounts of who has how much money are kept by >a subset of the participants (called servers from now on) instead of >everyone. These servers are linked by a Usenet-style broadcast channel. >The format of transaction messages broadcasted on this channel remain the >same as in the first protocol, but the affected participants of each >transaction should verify that the message has been received and >successfully processed by a randomly selected subset of the servers. > >Since the servers must be trusted to a degree, some mechanism is needed to >keep them honest. Each server is required to deposit a certain amount of >money in a special account to be used as potential fines or rewards for >proof of misconduct. Also, each server must periodically publish and >commit to its current money creation and money ownership databases. Each >participant should verify that his own account balances are correct and >that the sum of the account balances is not greater than the total amount >of money created. This prevents the servers, even in total collusion, from >permanently and costlessly expanding the money supply. New servers can >also use the published databases to synchronize with existing servers. > >The protocol proposed in this article allows untraceable pseudonymous >entities to cooperate with each other more efficiently, by providing them >with a medium of exchange and a method of enforcing contracts. The >protocol can probably be made more efficient and secure, but I hope this >is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a practical as well as theoretical >possibility. > >====================================================================== > > >

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WE RULE!
by wbclinic＠efn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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