December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: CHALLENGE? Toto/signature attack w. unpublished public key
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous writes: > > So next we would like to solve: > > > > s ^ e mod n = m > > > > or in other words find e, k and n st: > > > > s ^ e - m = k * n > > In addition it has to be that n is the right length based on the "s" > padding. This limits it to an 8 bit range, in this case 1024-1031 > bits. The constraint I gave was that log(n) = 1024. Bear in mind that the msbyte of s = 0x08, so we know that n > s, and I think we know that n < 2^1024 also based on the s padding from the signature. So based on this n would be in the range 1020 - 1024 bits, right? > If you make n be a product of a bunch of small primes, so that you > can make signatures with it, then a third party can detect this and > know it is bogus. He has to factor your n to determine that it is bogus though? This would imply that he had more compute than you do. (Not unreasonable threat model mind). > Also, this approach won't match the keyid of the original signature. Agree. Weak counterpoint is that the keyid is not authenticated, though if IRS have a key, they know it's keyid, and if that keyid is the one posted (unauthenticated inside the armor 0xCE56A4072541C535), this tips the probability of authorship towards the key they have. This though is perhaps not incontroverible proof, if one posits that Toto or unknown others were trying to create a complicated mess for people to confuse themselves analysing. Evidence suggests that this was/is the case: there are other messages, for example one with a signature with what is perhaps a 0xdeadbeef attack against a key on the keyservers, with the same 32 bit keyid, but a 64 bit key id differing by 1 bit. Another key which almost but not quite makes sense to PGP (a few bits twiddled). Plus lots of still undecrypted encrypted messages posted to the list, plus possibly stegoed images posted (one image was posted together with a password which was also publically posted together with instructions for recovering using S-TOOLS4.ZIP (a stego package for windows), and lots of other anonymously and pseudonymously posted images.) (One of the encrypted keys which passphrases were forwarded to the list for just today had been posted to the list over a year ago -- Carl Johnson couldn't have posted the passphrase because he is incarcerated). > Another approach is to generate an n such that the discrete logarithm > is solvable mod n. Then you can solve for e in s^e = m mod n, with > the base of the discrete log being s. Doing this you can match the > keyid and size of n without too much difficulty. Yes! Excellent. This construct (discrete logs over composite modulus to allow the same operation) is used by the identity based crypto people. The trap door is not that good, because 512 bit discrete logs are as you suggest rather expensive to compute. > Unfortunately e will not be small; it will be about the same size as n. > There are one or two keys on the public keyring which have large e's, > apparently generated by hacked versions of pgp. Some people feel > safer with random e than a small e. So this could perhaps be accepted. It's not a hacked version of PGP, I've generated such keys myself also: it is just a lesser documented feature of pgp2.x, (pgp -kg 1024 768) would give you a 1024 bit n and a 768 bit e). > (OTOH given two keys that both sign the same message, one with a small > e and one with a large one, it is obvious that the first is the legit > one and the second is the cloned one.) Not so obvious with the other key tinkering which has been going on here. It seems likely that Toto et al were purposefully trying to sow confusion, and seem to delight in leaving little clues to people trying to understand it looks like this strategy has been operational for over a year now (some of the encrypted messages which passphrases were forwarded to the list for just today had been posted to the list over a year ago -- Carl Johnson couldn't have posted the passphrase because he is incarcerated). > Unfortunately with a 1024 bit RSA modulus it is not going to be > feasible to solve 512 bit discrete logs using a reasonable amount > of effort. However by using more factors in the RSA modulus it should > become practical. The number of factors needed will depend on how much > resources you have to work on the discrete log. Resources available: one low end pentium based linux PC? :-) Just that the attack is clearly feasible is interesting though a demonstration would be perhaps more convincing to less technically aware IRS people. The biggest resource overhead is implementing that lot though, unless there exist packages or libraries which already do most of it for you. > Once you have your n and e you can sign other messages with the key. > The n looks OK from outside because the fact that it has more than two > factors is not detectable, as long as its factors are not too small. > Actually there may be a way of distinguishing n's with two factors from > n's with more, check into this. > > Also check into whether n's of this form can be factored via a p-1 > factoring attack. It may be that making the discrete log easy also makes > the modulus factorable. I think the answer to that is yes. In connection with previous discussions of implementing forward secrecy using identity based crypto (search archives for cypherpunks / coderpunks /cryptography for posts with Subject: non-interactive forward secrecy / identity based crypto ) another Anonymous describes some of the identity based crypto papers on this topic, which suggests another method of being able to compute discrete logs mod composite n. : Maurer describes an alternative set of parameters as well. Rather than : choosing small primes for the discrete logs, larger primes with a : special form are used which make the problem easy. This is based on the : Pohlig-Hellman discrete log algorithm, which applies when p-1 has all small : factors. The problem is that there also exists a p-1 factoring algorithm : which works when p-1 has all small factors. However the former algorithm : costs the square root of the size of the factors, while the later takes : work proportional to the size of the factors themselves. This gives a : window where the discrete log can be done but the factoring will fail. : : For this embodiment, Maurer suggests a modulus which is the product of : two primes, each 100 digits (333 bits) in length. This will produce : a 666 bit modulus. Have each of the primes be such that (p-1)/2 is a : product of several 13-15 digit (43-50 bit) primes. So it could be done, I think, and in such a way that you have lower cpu overhead than the attacker trying to prove one key more likely than the other. Adam

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Questions for Magaziner? // taxing crypto
by Ron Rivest 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Bob -- I feel mis-quoted and/or mis-represented in your note (below) stating that "Magaziner mirrored Rivest's offer to tax encryption products to pay for increased law enforcement technology support". While I do feel that some measure of appropriate balance may be accomplished by increasing the budget of the FBI and other law-enforcement to help them compensate for whatever increased difficulties they encounter because of the widespread use of encryption, I do not recall ever suggesting that the revenues for such increased budgets be raised by specifically taxing encryption products, and I don't really think that is a sensible approach. We don't tax glove manufacturers to raise funds for the FBI fingerprint lab! Any such funding should come out of general revenues, not by further complicating the tax code. Cheers, Ron ------- Start of forwarded message ------- Return-Path: <cryptography-owner(a)c2.net> X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net In-Reply-To: <v03130304b227b7401a3a(a)[24.128.118.53]> Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 16:44:07 -0400 To: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold(a)world.std.com>, cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net, cryptography(a)c2.net, dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Re: Questions for Magaziner? Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net Okay, so the short precis on Magaziner's answer to my question about encryption controls, foriegn or domestic, is he's agin it. He says that controlling foriegn encryption is impossible, and controlling domestic encryption is, at the very least, unconstitutional. He says that the reason the administration's encryption policy is so convoluted is that the law enforcement and the "economic" encryption camps, anti, and pro, evidently, is that the two sides are at loggerheads. Magaziner mirrored Rivest's offer to tax encryption products to pay for increased law enforcement technology support, but, hey, he's a liberal democrat, he's supposed to tax us to death without thinking about the economic, and, of course privacy consequences of raising the price of encryption. So, all in all, he got a round of foot-stomping applause from this bunch on his pro-encryption stance, because, evidently, being a payments technology forum, he was preaching to the choir. Something I found out when I was doing my own speech yesterday. I should realize that anyone building a payment system knows that digital commerce is financial cryptography, after all. :-) Cheers, Bob Hettinga - ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' ------- End of forwarded message -------

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A personal response to your email to sixdegrees
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BW1015 DEC 05,1997 4:06 PACIFIC 07:06 EASTERN ( BW)(PROFILE/MACROVIEW-COMM) Corporate Profile for Macroview Communications Corp., dated Dec. 5, 1997 Business Editors NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Dec. 5, 1997--The following Corporate Profile is available for inclusion in your files. News releases for this client are distributed by Business Wire and also become part of the leading databases and online services, including all of the leading Internet-based services. Published Date: December 5, 1997 Company Name: MacroView Communications Corp/sixdegrees Address: 90 William Street, 3rd Floor New York, N.Y. 10038 Main Telephone Number: 212-583-1234 Internet Home Page Address (URL): www.sixdegrees.com Chief Executive Officer: Andrew Weinreich Investor Relations Contact: Shoshana Zilberberg Business number: 212-583-1234 X628 Public Relations Contact: Shoshana Zilberberg Business number: 212-583-1234 X628 Industry: Internet/WWW Company description: MacroView Communications Corp., developer of sixdegrees, is in the business of creating Web-based products which help individuals build their own virtual communities based on their personal and professional relationships. sixdegrees, located on the Web at http://www.sixdegrees.com, allows members to uncover the power of their greatest natural resource - the people they know. Inspired by the theory that every person in the world is connected to every other person through a path of no more than six relationships, sixdegrees offers several proprietary applications, all of which help members leverage their own trusted network of contacts. Since its launch in January of 1997, sixdegrees members have been able to make new contacts quickly and easily, gain valuable help and information and communicate directly with their own growing virtual community, all within the confines of the sixdegrees property. As of December 1997, there were over 250,000 sixdegrees members who had listed over 930,000 contacts in the sixdegrees database. --30--cvw/ny* CONTACT: Macroview Communications Corp. Shoshana Zilberberg Director of Marketing & Communciations shoshana(a)sixdegrees.com KEYWORD: NEW YORK INDUSTRY KEYWORD: COMPUTERS/ELECTRONICS COMED INTERACTIVE/MULTIMEDIA/INTERNET PROFILE: YES URL: http://www.sixdegrees.com <http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.120597/550028.htm>

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Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 19 Sep 1998, Anonymous wrote: > > nobody(a)remailer.ch wrote: > > > Subject: Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd) > > > > > Presumably he should lie to protect the state. > > > > Then don't take the oath: > > > > To tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. > > > ... > > > > So lieing per se isn't the problem. > > > > No, it's the fact that he took an oath to tell the truth and didn't. > > > > > Murky water > > > for impeachment, methinks. > > > > Then you don't think very well. > > > > What? To tell a lie is one thing, but if you preface it with "I'm telling the truth", > then that is really really bad? I still think you're drawing a very fine line. Well, kind of. If some public figure comes up before the nation and says quietly "I did not have sex with Brenda the Barber," that's one thing. If the same public figure goes under oath and then lies, it's another. In the first case, he's exercising freedom of speech, though there could be some argument as to whether somebody in a public office has the right to lie like that. In the second case, he's trying to throw a wrench in the justice system. It wouldn't be as bad if somebody like Jim or I lied under oath, but this guy is the chief executive of the United States. He's basically Top Cop, and his administration doesn't hesitate to press charges against people who commit all sorts of victimless crimes. > I'm honoured to draw an ad hominem before revealing that I'm on AOL. > > -- an anonymous aol32 user. Actually, the amazing thing is that you're from AOL. You're coherent, you quote, and you know how to use a remailer. One in a million. ;)

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Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From adam(a)rpini.com Sat Sep 19 16:40:18 1998 > Date: 19 Sep 1998 21:21:26 -0000 > Message-ID: <19980919212126.20210.qmail(a)hades.rpini.com> > From: Anonymous <nobody(a)remailer.ch> > Subject: Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd) > > Then don't take the oath: > > > > To tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. > What? To tell a lie is one thing, but if you preface it with "I'm telling the truth", > then that is really really bad? I still think you're drawing a very fine line. Of course it's different if you preface your lie with "I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth". The oath is voluntary and therefore if broken no claim for duress, only intentional misdirection, can explain such actions. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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A personal response to your email to sixdegrees
by Pallas Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BW1015 DEC 05,1997 4:06 PACIFIC 07:06 EASTERN ( BW)(PROFILE/MACROVIEW-COMM) Corporate Profile for Macroview Communications Corp., dated Dec. 5, 1997 Business Editors NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Dec. 5, 1997--The following Corporate Profile is available for inclusion in your files. News releases for this client are distributed by Business Wire and also become part of the leading databases and online services, including all of the leading Internet-based services. Published Date: December 5, 1997 Company Name: MacroView Communications Corp/sixdegrees Address: 90 William Street, 3rd Floor New York, N.Y. 10038 Main Telephone Number: 212-583-1234 Internet Home Page Address (URL): www.sixdegrees.com Chief Executive Officer: Andrew Weinreich Investor Relations Contact: Shoshana Zilberberg Business number: 212-583-1234 X628 Public Relations Contact: Shoshana Zilberberg Business number: 212-583-1234 X628 Industry: Internet/WWW Company description: MacroView Communications Corp., developer of sixdegrees, is in the business of creating Web-based products which help individuals build their own virtual communities based on their personal and professional relationships. sixdegrees, located on the Web at http://www.sixdegrees.com, allows members to uncover the power of their greatest natural resource - the people they know. Inspired by the theory that every person in the world is connected to every other person through a path of no more than six relationships, sixdegrees offers several proprietary applications, all of which help members leverage their own trusted network of contacts. Since its launch in January of 1997, sixdegrees members have been able to make new contacts quickly and easily, gain valuable help and information and communicate directly with their own growing virtual community, all within the confines of the sixdegrees property. As of December 1997, there were over 250,000 sixdegrees members who had listed over 930,000 contacts in the sixdegrees database. --30--cvw/ny* CONTACT: Macroview Communications Corp. Shoshana Zilberberg Director of Marketing & Communciations shoshana(a)sixdegrees.com KEYWORD: NEW YORK INDUSTRY KEYWORD: COMPUTERS/ELECTRONICS COMED INTERACTIVE/MULTIMEDIA/INTERNET PROFILE: YES URL: http://www.sixdegrees.com <http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.120597/550028.htm>

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Repost in text: IDEA(tm) weakness
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[INLINE] Privacy [INLINE] How private is your electronic communication ? [taken from the PGP FAQ] You should encrypt your e-mail for the same reason that you don't write all of your correspondence on the back of a post card. E-mail is actually far less secure than the postal system. With the post office, you at least put your letter inside an envelope to hide it from casual snooping. Take a look at the header area of any e-mail message that you receive and you will see that it has passed through a number of nodes on its way to you. Every one of these nodes presents the opportunity for snooping. Encryption in no way should imply illegal activity. It is simply intended to keep personal thoughts personal. Do you trust your mail servers/gateways/virtual redirects ? With the increasing use of virtual email accounts which allow you to keep the same email address no matter if you change jobs, ISPs, etc, the opportunity for snooping increases. Is PGP secure ? PGP uses acombination of IDEA, RSA and MD5. RSA is used to allow the transfer of session keys and MD5 is used to generate a unique message digest from the passphrase for generating the IDEA key and signatures. IDEA is the core algorithm used to encrypt the actual message. Thus the security of IDEA is also means the security of PGP <read the section 'is IDEA secure'>. Is IDEA secure ? The IDEA algorithm (patented by ASCOM) is the core algorithmm used in PGP. It is based on a rotating 128 bit key split into 16 bit segments. The algorthm converts 64 bits of data at a time using the following operations '+', '^' (exclusive-or) and '*'. The formulas are : 64 bit data => D1, D2, D3 and D4 (all 16 bits) => K1,K2,K3....rotating extra 25 bits after all 128 bits are used There are 2 phases in each round and 8 rounds in total + 1 final round of just phase 1. Phase 1: R1 = D1 * K1 R2 = D2 + K2 R3 = D3 + K3 R4 = D4 * K4 Phase 2: E1 = R1 xor (((R2 xor R4) + ((R3 xor R1) * K5)) * K6) E2 = R3 xor (((R2 xor R4) + ((R3 xor R1) * K5)) * K6) E3 = R2 xor ((((R2 xor R4) + ((R3 xor R1) * K5)) * K6) + ((R3 xor R1) * K5)) E4 = R4 xor ((((R2 xor R4) + ((R3 xor R1) * K5)) * K6) + ((R3 xor R1) * K5)) Given a large random data message (ie 1000 samples - 64*1000 = 8Kb file). The distribution of the above operations can be used to break the key. ie both the '+' and the '^' operations give an even distribution but the '*' operator gives a biased distribution towards '0'. Distribution (where '*' has a bias towards 1 of a) R1 = a R2 = even R3 = even R4 = a (a5 & a6 are the bias for K5 and K6) E1 = (bias a5) * (bias a6) E2 = (bias a5) * (bias a6) E3 = (bias a5) - (2 * (bias a5) * (bias a5) * (bias a6)) + ((bias a5) * (bias a6)) = (bias a5) * (1 + (bias a6) - (2*(bias a5)*(bias a6))) E4 = (bias a5) - (2 * (bias a5) * (bias a5) * (bias a6)) + ((bias a5) * (bias a6)) = (bias a5) * (1 + (bias a6) - (2*(bias a5)*(bias a6))) Also as the '*' operator is biased towards its own bit for the result '1' - approx (60% to 100% depending on bit position). [Working from the low bit upwards will provide an even greater approximation as then you would have the relevant Key bits against a random data. ie for 1st bit, it is 100% dependant on the bit for a '1',...] eg using a simple 3x3 matrix on second bit, gives (only demonstrating the ratio): if K bit is 1 => bias a ~ (2/8), if K bit is 0 => bias a ~(1/8) ==> We can determine when : K5=0 and K6=0 as (bias a5) and (bias a6) will be at their highest ==> E1 & E2 are highest K5=1 and K6=1 as (bias a5) and (bias a6) are at their lowest ==> E1 & E2 are Lowest To determine between K5=0,K6=1 and K5=1,K6=0. K5 can be determined by check with E3 & E4 as they are both equal to : (bias a5) * (1 + (bias a6) - (2*(bias a5)*(bias a6))) => directly relate to (bias a5) => K5 =>When K5=0, both E3 & E4 will be low. => When K5=1, both E3 & E4 will be high. The Key rotation start bits are : Phase K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 1 0 16 32 48 64 80 2 96 112 25 41 57 73 3 89 105 121 9 50 66 4 82 98 114 2 18 34 5 75 91 107 123 11 27 6 43 59 100 116 4 20 7 36 52 68 84 125 13 8 29 45 61 77 93 109 final 22 38 54 70 n/a n/a Working backwards with these distributions you can deduce the key. ie work out K5 (93..108) and K6 (109..124) from its distribution pattern [using just the distributions for E2 & E3, as E1 & E4 have had the '*' operation applied in the final phase], then with K5 and K6 work out K1..K4 (22..85). You now have the key values for K1 to K6 !!!. Modify the Samples such they are back a phase and repeat (ie for each sample work backwards using known K1..K6 to find the E1..4 values). MAJOR ASSUMPTION : Assume that a large random sample provides a close to even distribution at the end of each phase (For E2 & E3) such that the bias (ie a5 & a6) used to determine E2 and E3 are the only significant factors. Reasoning : If the distribution is not even, then it is very much easier to break (ie only the key values can cause the change in distribution pattern => know the pattern, know the key). I have developed a program which does just this (NOTE: not tested with real PGP data, as I have not had the time to investigate how the PGP file is structured, ie where the IDEA code starts and ends). It is available under a copyleft license similar to GNU. The Java Source code can be found at : [Application will not be released until beginning of 1999 when enough people are aware of the potential problem, and solutions are widely available - thus the threat to the general users privacy is kept to a minimal. Software houses which would like a delay in the release of this application so as to provide a solution should email: SGOSHA33(a)mailexcite.com with their request] What can we do ? The above crack works because there is a large sample involved. If however you pre-encrypted the file such that you got your pre-encrypted file and a key file, where this key file is small and contains only the key required to open the pre-encrypt file. You then PGP the two files, this would make it much harder to break as the key file cannot be broken from the sampling technique descibed above. I have developed an application which does just that. It is available under a copyleft license similar to GNU. The Java source code can be found here : kiss.zip To run the application you will need Java installed on your machine. Place the files in a directory named KISS. The command line is : java KISS.kiss e <filename> - encrypt java KISS.kiss d <filename> - decrypt (do not add the kiss extension to the filename) After encryption you will get 2 files. The '.kiss' file is the encrypted file and the '.lips' file contains the key used to encrypt the file. You should then encrypt both files with PGP. What is in the pipeline for the future ? Task 1 The above 'kiss' pre-encryption is not 100% safe from non-bruteforce cracking !! As the majority of files encrypted are text messages which are based mainly on the characters 'a' to 'z' thus the Ascii codes of the characters are of the form 011xxxxx. From this you can see that the rotating distribution as used above will tend toward '1'. Thus with enough samples they can deduce the key with the simple equation. KeyValue xor 1 = CommonValue ==> KeyValue = !CommonValue To prevent this my next application (codename Stable) will be a stabiliser program which will ensure that the distribution of the data has an even distribution. Target Release Date : 30/9/98. Task 2 The integration of both 'kiss' and 'stable'. Target Release Date : 15/10/98. Task 3 Port of both kiss and stable to C/C++ (for speed and also for Task 4). [Wrote Kiss and Stable in Java to test the speed of Java and also how it handled bit manipulation operations]. Target Release Date : 31/10/98. Task 4 Integration with PGP to provide uses with a much easier encryption method. Target Release Date : 31/11/98. Author : SGOSHA33 Return to Albert's Home Page. [INLINE]

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Re: Going Cashless: Bank ends ECash trial period
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thomas Junker writes: > Fagen also cited the changing climate in the U.S. for Internet > payments. When the trial was started in 1995, she said, "people > were more fearful of using credit cards to pay for things over > the Internet. Now that seems to have disappeared." > >Had Ms. D'Amico understood the nature of Digicash, she may have >questioned Ms. Fagen about the apparent non sequitur. If Digicash >had nothing to do with making credit transactions "safer," why would >decreasing public fear of using credit cards on the Internet have >anything to do with Mercantile's decision to abruptly discontinue the >Digicash program? This seems clear enough. Digicash was competing with credit cards as a payment system. One of its advantages was that you didn't have to send your credit card number across the net. As fear of transferring credit card numbers declined, Digicash lost this advantage.

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CJ Update
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Alia Johnson <lodi(a)well.com>, CJ's sister, today: I'm writing to say that CJ has arrived at the Springfield Medical Referral Center, where he will be held for a month or more (the phone says U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners) for "examination". Here is the address: Carl E. Johnson Register # 05987-196 U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners P.O. Box 4000 Springfield, Missouri 65801 Also, to my delight, I received a letter from him today. He sounds okay. CJ in his letter asks for physical mailing addresses for some of the cypherpunks (no one specifically) so that he can send you things to post since I will be travelling. [End Alia] --------- We'll be happy to digitize and/or post any mail from CJ folks want to share, anonymous and/or encrypted always welcome: Fax: 212-799-4003 Vox: 212-873-8700 Snail: John Young 251 West 89th Steet, Suite 6E New York, NY 10024 We've put all our PGP keys at: http://jya.com/jya-keys.txt And a bunch of keys for the wild bunch of Totos: http://jya.com/totos-keys.htm

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Please Verify to Complete Your eGroups.com Registration
by eGroups.com Help 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you for requesting an eGroups.com account. To complete your registration, you MUST ENTER the following number into the Web form at http://www.egroups.com/register?email=cypherpunks%40cyberpass.net&vid=22118… (equivalent to the form on your browser). Number: 22118666 This step ensures that only you can control your e-mail subscriptions. If you have any questions, please visit http://www.egroups.com/info/help.html Thanks! Sincerely, The eGroups.com Team

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IP: [FP] Ohio gets Computerized Fingerprint System
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ScanThisNews" <mcdonalds(a)airnet.net> Subject: IP: [FP] Ohio gets Computerized Fingerprint System Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 19:34:28 -0500 To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com ====================================================================== SCAN THIS NEWS ------------------------------------------------- http://www.ag.ohio.gov/pressrel/livescan.htm FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 25, 1997 Attorney General Betty Montgomery Brings New Technology to Ohio Law Enforcement Montgomery Gives Computerized Fingerprint Systems Free of Charge to Help in the Fight Against Crime Columbus -- In an effort to assist local law enforcement and improve Ohios criminal history records, Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery today announced that 23 law enforcement agencies in Ohio will be receiving Live-Scan systems at no cost to the agencies. Through federal grants and money from the Attorney Generals budget, Live-Scan computerized fingerprint identification systems have been purchased and are being distributed to law enforcement agencies across the state. The agencies that send the most fingerprint cards to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI) were chosen to receive Live-Scan. Montgomery was joined by representatives from several law enforcement agencies that will be receiving Live-Scan systems and local public officials in announcing this new technology being given to more than 20 law enforcement agencies. "I want to thank the Attorney Generals Office for this modernized equipment, which will help law enforcements advancement in building the bridge to the 21st century, with technology in crime fighting," said Franklin County Sheriff Jim Karnes. Live-Scan provides high-quality electronic fingerprint images through state-of-the-art computer imaging. Most Ohio law enforcement agencies rely on the traditional form of using ink to slowly roll each individual fingerprint onto cards. With Live-Scan, fingers are placed directly onto a scanner without having to use ink. The image is stored electronically, and copies of the card can be printed at any time. This new system will give law enforcement consistently higher quality fingerprints to use for processing and identification. These new systems will also electronically send the fingerprint cards to BCI. This will be an important step in ensuring the quality of Ohios criminal history records. BCI will now be able to receive records in a more timely fashion and virtually eliminate the possibility of records being lost or not sent. The systems will assist local law enforcement by cutting-down on the number of hours needed to process fingerprint cards by eliminating the timely duplicative process of fingerprinting. The Live-Scan systems will be linked late this fall to BCIs Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). AFIS is a computer system that holds the fingerprint images and criminal history records of more than 1.2 million criminals in Ohio. With Live-Scan, law enforcement agencies will be able to quickly search AFIS for matches to their fingerprint cards. This will be extremely useful if someone with a prior record tries to give an alias or refuses to disclose his or her name. The agency can scan the suspects fingerprints and check them against the database at BCI for a match. "Heres the bottom line: This technology will allow police to identify criminals faster and more accurately than anything even dreamed of just years ago," Montgomery said. The Live-Scan systems were purchased for almost $1.1 million from Identix Inc. of California. Ohio is joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the U.S. Marshal, and numerous other federal agencies, states, and cities that have also purchased Live-Scan systems from Identix Inc. Each system retails for $70,000 but the Attorney General was able to negotiate a purchase price for a much lower cost of $44,220. Law enforcement agencies that already have Live-Scan systems and meet requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology will be connected with Ohios AFIS as part of the contract with Identix Inc. The contract also allows any local law enforcement agency to purchase a Live-Scan system within the next year at the same price negotiated by the Attorney General. Attorney General Montgomery also announced that her office plans to purchase additional Live-Scan systems in the beginning of next year to be distributed to more law enforcement agencies across the state. -30- Below is the list of agencies receiving Live-Scan systems: Cleveland Police Department Cuyahoga County Sheriffs Office Clermont County Sheriffs Office Delaware County Sheriffs Office Franklin County Sheriffs Office Clark County Sheriffs Office Pickaway County Sheriffs Office Miami Township Police Department Columbiana County Sheriffs Office Lake County Sheriffs Office Licking County Sheriffs Office Mahoning County Sheriffs Office Highland County Sheriffs Office Boardman Police Department Elyria Police Department Allen County Sheriffs Office Lorain Police Department Coshocton County Sheriffs Office Whitehall Police Department Miamisburg Police Department Springdale Police Department Kent Police Department Medina County Sheriffs Office ======================================================================= Don't believe anything you read on the Net unless: 1) you can confirm it with another source, and/or 2) it is consistent with what you already know to be true. ======================================================================= Reply to: <fingerprint(a)networkusa.org> ======================================================================= To subscribe to the free Scan This News newsletter, send a message to <majordomo(a)efga.org> and type "subscribe scan" in the BODY. Or, to be removed type "unsubscribe scan" in the message BODY. For additional instructions see www.efga.org/about/maillist.html ----------------------------------------------------------------------- "Scan This News" is Sponsored by S.C.A.N. Host of the "FIGHT THE FINGERPRINT!" web page: www.networkusa.org/fingerprint.shtml ======================================================================= ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: [BioWeekly_Email] Announcement
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bioweekly Special Announcement <bioweekly(a)biodigest.com> Subject: IP: [BioWeekly_Email] Announcement Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 18:17:12 -0500 To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com We thought you might be interested in some recent announcements regarding Banking on Biometrics =9298 which is just around the corner. The conference is on October 12-14, 1998 in Dallas, Texas, US. New speakers recently added include: Randall Fowler, CEO, Identix Corp.;=20 Frank Smead, SpeakerKey Marketing Manager, ITT Industries;=20 Other outstanding presenters include:=20 Jim Wayman, US National Biometric Test Center John Woodward, Attorney and Biometric Legal Consultant Jeremy Newman, President, PenOp Corp.=20 Adam Backenroth, Chase Manhattan Bank Dr. Joseph Atick, CEO, Visionics Corp. Colleen Madigan, SafLINK Corp. Gail Koehler, Purdue Empl. Fed. Credit Union James O=92Dell, CUNA Mutual Insurance Group Robert Van Naarden, Sensar, Inc.=20 Michelle Roberts, Texas Bankers Association Ray Findley, Pres., American Card, Inc.=20 Chris Olsen-Potter, Identicator, Inc. Raj Nanavati, International Biometric Group Judith Markowitz, J.Markowitz Consultants Ron Beyner, T-NETIX, Inc.=20 Francis Declercq, Keyware Corp. Mike Grimes, Miros Corp.=20 =3D=3D> GET YOUR FREE REGISTRATION THROUGH OUR GROUP DISCOUNT PROGRAM Connect with Southwest Airlines to get your lowest possible airline rates to Dallas =85.. but better yet, register two of your clients, business associates, customers, prospects, friends or family and attend the conference FREE. You can register three persons for the price of two - and that third person could be YOU. Conference registration is $490. =20 Our group discount is excellent for any company wanting to send a group of employees for an employee training program. Registration fees drop to $350 each for 4-5 persons, $300 each for 6-10 persons and to $260 each for over 10 registrants. =3D=3D> BIOMETRIC VIDEO TAKING SHAPE The first biometric infomercial is taking shape and will be available during and after the conference. If you register NOW, you=92ll get a free copy at the conference. If you want a copy later, we=92ll be glad to sell you one. Suggested cost (still pending) is $125. =3D=3D> NEED MORE INFORMATION ON BIOMETRICS There will be biometric consultants at the conference who will be glad to answer your questions and provide you with more information.=20 =3D=3D> VISIT THE CONFERENCE WEB SITE FOR MORE DETAILS AND RESERVATION INFORMATION -=20 http://www.biodigest.com or call Linda Bikoff - (202) 337-0023, Email - Lbikoff(a)aol.com. ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Hackers-turned-consultants see business boom
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Hackers-turned-consultants see business boom Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 11:53:29 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Fox News - AP On guard now, hackers-turned-consultants see business boom 11.00 a.m. ET (1501 GMT) September 19, 1998 By Chris Allbritton, Associated Press NEW YORK (AP) The hacker calling himself Mudge pushed his long hair back, scratched his beard and stared at the computer screen. He knew there was something wrong with the data traffic he was watching, but what was it? A week earlier, Mudge and his fellow hackers in their hangout known as the L0pht pronounced "loft'' had acquired some software that was supposed to let computers talk to each other in code. But as Mudge watched the data he realized someone else was doing the same and maybe even decoding it, which shouldn't happen. "So you are saying that you're using DES to communicate between the computers?'' Mudge recalled asking representatives of the software maker. Yes, they said, they were using DES, a standard encryption method that for years was considered virtually uncrackable. But this wasn't DES, thought Mudge. It's almost as if... Whoa. He blinked and felt the adrenaline kick in. This wasn't secure at all. In fact, the encoding was only slightly more complex than the simple cyphers kids did in grade school where "A'' is set to 1, "B'' is set to 2, and so on. The company was selling this software as a secure product, charging customers up to $10,000. And yet, it had a security hole big enough to waltz through. Instead of exploiting this knowledge, Mudge confronted the company. "You realize there isn't any secure or 'strong' encoding being used in your communications between the computers, don't you?'' he asked. "Well...'' "And that you claimed you were using DES to encrypt the data,'' he pressed. "That will go in the next revision.'' Mudge is a "real'' hacker one who used to snoop around the nation's electronic infrastructure for the sheer love of knowing how it worked. His kind today are sighted about as often as the timberwolf, and society has attached to them the same level of legend. Like the wolf, they were once considered a scourge. Law enforcement and telecommunication companies investigated and arrested many of them during the late 1980s and early '90s. Today, many elite hackers of the past are making a go at legitimate work, getting paid big bucks by Fortune 500 companies to explore computer networks and find the weak spots. And none too soon. The void left by the old hackers has been filled by a new, more destructive generation. So today, Mudge who uses a pseudonym like others in the hacker community, a world where anonymity keeps you out of trouble wears a white hat. As part of L0pht, the hacker think tank, he and six comrades hole up in a South End loft space in Boston and spend their evenings peeling open software and computer networks to see how they work. When they find vulnerabilities in supposedly secure systems, they publish their findings on the World Wide Web in hopes of embarrassing the companies into fixing the problems. A recent example: They posted notice via the Internet of a problem that makes Lotus Notes vulnerable to malicious hackers. A Lotus spokesman said the company was aware of the flaw but it was extremely technical and unlikely to affect anyone. The hackers at L0pht have made enemies among industry people, but they command respect. They were even called to testify before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in May. Why do they publish what they find? "If that information doesn't get out,'' Mudge replies, "then only the bad guys will have it.'' The "bad guys'' are the hacker cliche: secretive teen-age boys lurking online, stealing credit card numbers, breaking into Pentagon systems, and generally causing trouble. One of L0pht's members, Kingpin, was just such a cad when he was younger, extending his online shenanigans to real-world breaking and entering. Today, L0pht keeps him out of mischief, he said. "We're like midnight basketball for hackers,'' said Weld Pond, another member. Malicious hacking seems to be on the rise. Nearly two out of three companies reported unauthorized use of their computer systems in the past year, according to a study by the Computer Security Institute and the FBI. Another study, from Software AG Americas, said 7 percent of companies reported a "very serious'' security breach, and an additional 16 percent reported "worrisome'' breaches. However, 72 percent said the intrusions were relatively minor with no damage. American companies spent almost $6.3 billion on computer security last year, according to research firm DataQuest. The market is expected to grow to $13 billion by 2000. Government computers are vulnerable, too. The Defense Department suffered almost 250,000 hacks in 1995, the General Accounting Office reported. Most were detected only long after the attack. This is why business booms for good-guy hackers. Jeff Moss, a security expert with Secure Computing Inc., runs a $995-a-ticket professional conference for network administrators, where hackers-cum-consultants mingle with military brass and CEOs. "I don't feel like a sellout,'' said Moss, who wouldn't elaborate on his hacking background. "People used to do this because they were really into it. Now you can be into it and be paid.'' News reports show why such services are needed: Earlier this month, hackers struck the Web site of The New York Times, forcing the company to shutter it for hours. Spokeswoman Nancy Nielsen said the break-in was being treated as a crime, not a prank. The FBI's computer crime unit was investigating. This spring, two California teen-agers were arrested for trying to hack the Pentagon's computers. Israeli teen Ehud Tenebaum, a k a "The Analyzer,'' said he mentored the two on how to do it. The two Cloverdale, Calif., youths pleaded guilty in late July and were placed on probation. Kevin Mitnick, the only hacker to make the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list, was arrested in 1995, accused of stealing 20,000 credit card numbers. He remains in prison. A film called "TakeDown,'' about the electronic sleuthing that led to Mitnick's capture, is in the works. Comments protesting Mitnick's prosecution were left during the hack of the New York Times Web site. In 1994, Vladimir Levin, a graduate of St. Petersburg Tekhnologichesky University, allegedly masterminded a Russian hacker gang and stole $10 million from Citibank computers. A year later, he was arrested by Interpol at Heathrow airport in London. "Lemme tell ya,'' growled Mark Abene one night over Japanese steak skewers. "Kids these days, they got no respect for their elders.'' Abene, known among fellow hackers as Phiber Optik, should know. He was one of those no-account kids in the 1980s when he discovered telephones and computers. For almost 10 years, he wandered freely through the nation's telephone computer systems and, oh, the things he did and saw. Celebrities' credit reports were his for the taking. Unlimited free phone calls from pilfered long-distance calling card numbers. Private phone lines for his buddies, not listed anywhere. And the arcane knowledge of trunk lines, switches, the entire glory of the network that connected New York City to the rest of the world. But Abene's ticket to ride was canceled in January 1994, when, at age 22, he entered Pennsylvania's Schuylkill Prison to begin serving a year-and-a-day sentence for computer trespassing. The FBI and the Secret Service described him as a menace. The sentencing judge said Abene, as a spokesman for the hacking community, would be made an example. © 1998 Associated Press. All rights reserved. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Pentagon curbs Web content
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Pentagon curbs Web content Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 07:43:45 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: ComputerWorld http://www.computerworld.com/home/news.nsf/all/98091838dod (Online News, 09/18/98 01:07 PM) Pentagon curbs Web content By Sharon Machlis Top Pentagon officials are scouring military Web sites to see if too much information is being made public -- data that could potentially help the country's enemies. Some observers fear that listing members of specific military units could help terrorists find revenge targets, for example, particularly after an operation such as the recent missile strikes in Afghanistan and the Sudan. "Basically, the military does stupid things," said Ira Winkler, a former analyst at the National Security Agency and author of the books Corporate Espionage and Through the Eyes of the Enemy. "The military does not exercise good operational security when it comes to their Web sites ... There's no valid reason for a military unit to have a Web site," Winkler said. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre and the military's Joint Staff have been checking for Web postings such as building plans, research and development efforts and "personnel information that could perhaps provide too much information," said Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon, in a statement. A more formal, militarywide policy on what should and shouldn't be put on the Web is in the works, added department spokesman Susan Hansen. Winkler said it is ill-advised to post things such as personnel lists or commanders' biographies -- which often include family information -- on the Web. He also recommended against companies posting similar information about corporate officers. In fact, some companies already restrict the data they post about personnel and even product pricing -- although the concern is less about terrorists and more about competitors. "We're in the process now, as I believe many private companies are, of trying to sort out what the right balance is between providing useful information and providing more information than is necessary," Bacon said. Copyright © 1998 Computerworld, Inc. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Use of SWAT Teams on the Rise
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Use of SWAT Teams on the Rise Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 12:11:32 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Charlotte (N.Carolina) Observer http://www.charlotte.com/observer/local/pub/031225.htm Published Saturday, September 19, 1998 SWAT team approach less risky, police say Use of squads on rise around region, nation By LEIGH DYER Staff Writer Across the country, police departments are using SWAT teams to deal with high-risk situations like the Sept. 4 drug raid that ended with a Charlotte man dead. Court papers said police were looking for evidence of drug dealing, but they found no drugs in the Mayfair Avenue home. Charlotte-Mecklenburg police say the paramilitary-style squad reduces the risks to officers and the public in dangerous situations. But some critics say using the SWAT team for search warrants is too heavy-handed. Records show the Charlotte-Mecklenburg team is used sparingly. Last year, SWAT officers were involved in 14 of the 441 warrants served by Charlotte-Mecklenburg police. Of 251 warrants executed from January to Aug. 31, SWAT team members served 15. Of the 29 raids before Charles Irwin Potts' death, one resulted in minor injuries. Potts' death is the first shooting during a search warrant since the team organized in 1992. It's less clear how often the team succeeds in finding what it's after. In almost every raid, the team reports either an arrest or a seizure of weapons or drugs. But they don't always seize the goods they were looking for. The Sept. 4 raid netted three guns and gambling equipment -- but no evidence of the cocaine dealing an informant told them they'd find. Maj. Piper Charles, who is in charge of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg team, said that when the team is used is not based on the likelihood of finding drugs. Instead, it's based on the likelihood of facing armed resistance. ``The primary purpose is to save lives,'' said Charles. ``A successful mission is one in which absolutely no one gets hurt.'' More scrutiny SWAT calls range from negotiation with hostage-takers to quelling riots to raids for guns, drugs or evidence of other criminal activity. The 42-member Charlotte-Mecklenburg Special Weapons and Tactics team uses special equipment, including heavy body armor and laser-sighted guns. The duty is part time. Team members are also assigned to other regular patrol duties. Nationally, the increased use of SWAT teams has drawn praise from those who say their tactics are safer than traditional law--enforcement methods. But Peter Kraska, a criminology professor at Eastern Kentucky University who has tracked SWAT teams, said they have a downside. ``Often when you see them in a neighborhood piling out of a vehicle . . . it gives the community an impression they're kind of under siege,'' he said. Regionally, SWAT teams have become more active in counties including Gaston, Union and Cabarrus in recent years. Sgt. Jeff Eisenhour, commander of the Gaston County Police SWAT team, said most operations go more smoothly with such a well-trained team, rather than regular patrol officers. ``The biggest advantage is the training,'' he said. ``Everybody knows what everyone is doing.'' The Potts shooting has put the methods and policies of the SWAT team under a microscope, said Charlotte-Mecklenburg's Charles. Those methods include the use of ``flash-bangs,'' a diversionary device thrown into a room to stun and distract occupants with a bang and bright lights while SWAT team members storm in. ``My position is that you're not going to find a safer way to do it,'' Charles said. As SWAT teams grow in popularity, they have encountered more questions about their use. In Fitchburg, Mass., west of Boston, civil libertarians criticized a SWAT team after its members arrested a group of young men in 1993 for lingering on a sidewalk. And in Louisville, Ky., family members of a man killed in a SWAT raid in March 1997 sued, challenging the police procedures. The suit alleges that a flash-bang may have disoriented the man so much he didn't realize he was pointing his gun at police officers. The suit is pending. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, though, officers say the devices may have saved lives many times, including during a raid on Jan. 22 when a suspect dropped a gun after a flash-bang went off. ``I have heard that sometimes people are not properly using their SWAT teams,'' said Roy House, an instructor at Central Piedmont Community College who conducts regional SWAT training. ``That's a leadership problem.'' House, who is also a reserve member of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg team, believes the benefits of the teams outweigh any criticism. ``I would think it's better to go in there and be a little heavy-handed than to go in there and be outnumbered . . . or outgunned,'' he said. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Crypto Controls Threaten Human Rights
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Crypto Controls Threaten Human Rights Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 17:06:43 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: OneWorld Magazine http://www.oneworld.org/news/today/index.html Crypto Controls Threaten Human Rights Vienna conference warned against restricting free expression (New York, September 18, 1998) -- Human Rights Watch today urged an international conference on technology, now meeting in Vienna, not to expand controls on encryption technologies. The organization said that cryptographic products are critical to the ability of human rights defenders around the world to transmit sensitive information without detection by repressive governments. The conference is reviewing the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement, an international agreement signed by 30 countries to govern the proliferation of military technology. Dissidents and human rights organizations under repressive regimes frequently use encryption technologies to share information. Encryption has the power to authenticate the identity of these authors to their partners abroad, while protecting their identity from despots at home. The United States has adopted relatively restrictive encryption policies, which prohibit the global dsitribution of software used to encrypt text. In particular, Washington has outlawed the export of the most popular software among human rights activists, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), although the Wassenaar Arrangement explicitly exempts crypto-software, like PGP, that is widely available in the public domain. Human Rights Watch warned the other participants in the Vienna conference not to incorporate such restrictive policies into the Wassenaar Arrangement, or to further limit the global distribution, development, or use of strong encryption hardware or software. "Encryption is more than a shield for human rights activists," said Jagdish Parikh, associate online researcher at Human Rights Watch. "Coded language is still language, and it must be protected as a basic human right to free expression." Parikh noted that the right to free expression is set forth in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which most members of Wassenaar Arrangement are party. Human Rights Watch said that encryption is also an important bulwark against violations of privacy in an age where computerization and data banks enable the collection of huge amounts of personal information about individuals. Moreover, international law requires states not only to refrain from arbitrary interference with privacy, but to affirmatively protect its citizens from such attacks. "The sorts of countries most eager to ban the use of encryption, such as China and Iran, are not known for respecting freedom of speech," said Parikh. "Using encryption should not subject an individual to criminal sanction, any more than using Pig Latin or Swahili does." Many human rights activists around the world would be spared retaliation and abuse if crypto-software were more widely available, Parikh said. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: "Bioarmageddon"
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: "Bioarmageddon" Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 06:56:14 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: New Scientist http://www.newscientist.com/nsplus/insight/bioterrorism/bioarmageddon.html Bioterrorism Special Report: Bioarmageddon By Debora MacKenzie Sooner or later there is going to be a biological attack on a major city. Are we prepared to deal with it? Not a chance, says Debora MacKenzie It begins with a threat. A terrorist group declares that unless its demands are met within 48 hours, it will release anthrax over San Francisco. Two days later, a private plane flies across the Bay, spreading an aerosol cloud that shimmers briefly in the sunlight before disappearing. Scenario one: thousands are killed in the panic as 2 million people flee the city. Another 1·6 million inhale anthrax spores. Antibiotics are rushed in, but the hospitals are overwhelmed and not everyone receives treatment. Most of the country's limited stock of anthrax vaccine has already been given to soldiers. Emergency crews provide little help as there are only four germ-proof suits in the whole city. More than a million of the Bay Area's 6.5 million residents die. Scenario two: in the two days before the attack, citizens seal their doors and windows with germ-proof tape. They listen to the radio for instructions, their gas masks, drugs and disinfectants ready. Few panic. When sensors around the city confirm that the cloud contains anthrax spores, hospitals receive the appropriate antibiotics and vaccines. Trained emergency teams with germ-proof suits and tents set up in the places where automated weather analyses show the deadly cloud will drift. With advance preparation and rapid response only 100,000 people die. A terrorist who plans to drop anthrax over San Francisco tomorrow can count on causing the murder and mayhem described in the first scenario--at least according to the simulation that generated these scenarios last year. The question facing policy makers now is: how do we move toward the second scenario? That terrorists may someday turn to biological weapons is no longer a matter of debate (see "All fall down", New Scientist, 11 May 1996, p 32). "Terrorism has changed," says Brad Roberts of the US government-backed Institute for Defense Analyses in Virginia. "Traditional terrorists wanted political concessions," he says. "But now, some groups say their main aim is mass casualties. That makes biological weapons appealing." Terrorists would have little trouble getting their hands on the technology. Hearings in South Africa in June revealed that the apartheid government produced terrorist weapons containing anthrax, Salmonella and cholera. Soviet scientists who have prepared weapons-grade anthrax and smallpox are known to have emigrated, possibly to well-funded terrorist groups like the one run by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Even small groups such as the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan have been able to cook up vats of Salmonella or botulin, the toxin that causes botulism. With bioweapons so readily available, how can governments protect us from a terrorist armed with anthrax, smallpox or plague? In May, scientists, policy makers and security experts gathered in Stockholm to discuss how to limit the devastation of a biological attack on civilians. Until now, most biological defence strategies have been geared to protecting soldiers on the battlefield rather than ordinary people in cities. The situations are quite different, and novel technologies are needed for civilian defence. Suppose a commuter stumbled across a time bomb filled with anthrax on an underground railway platform. Until this year, no police force in the world had any way to disarm such a device safely. One novel solution that attracted attention at Stockholm was a tent full of antiseptic foam. Researchers at Irvin Aerospace in Fort Erie, Ontario, have developed a dome-shaped tent made of ultratough Mylar that can be filled with a stiff foam--the exact composition of which is a closely guarded secret--that kills germs and also neutralises chemical weapons. Once covered by the foam-filled tent, the bomb can be safely detonated. But what if germs are already in the air? The protective suits and masks used by most emergency services don't have seals tight enough to exclude microorganisms, making them useless against biological attacks, says Jack Sawicki, a former fireman who now works for Geomet Technologies near Washington DC. And the lack of standards for gas masks sold to civilians in most countries makes it as likely that a mask will suffocate you as save you, he says. The suits developed for the military do work--their tight joints and zippers keep bugs out--but they are too pricey for the average fire department. Both Geomet and Irvin Aerospace are about to market civilian bio-suits. In the meantime, other companies are designing protective gear that actually kills pathogens. Molecular Geodesics in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, is developing a suit made of a tough, sponge-like polymer that traps bacteria and viruses, which are then destroyed by disinfectants incorporated into the fabric. Stealthy attack None of this gear will do any good, however, if the emergency services do not know there has been an attack. And an assault may not be obvious. A terrorist might not use a weapon that goes off with a dramatic bang, or even produces an obvious cloud of germs. The first hint of a biological attack may be a sudden cluster of sick people. Even that will be missed unless someone is watching. And few are. In the US, financial cutbacks have crippled programmes to track disease outbreaks, natural or deliberate. Some could be either, such as food poisoning caused by Escherichia coli O157 or Salmonella. Medical agencies fear that the extra money requested by President Bill Clinton this spring as part of an anti-terrorist initiative will not be enough to create an adequate surveillance network. In Europe, disease surveillance is only beginning to be organised on the continent-wide scale needed to track a biological emergency. But in addition to monitoring infected people, Nicholas Staritsyn of the State Research Centre for Applied Microbiology near Moscow says that more effort should be made to find out which bugs live where. For example, a particular variety of anthrax may occur naturally in South Africa, but not in Canada. Having access to such information could help authorities to distinguish between natural outbreaks and deliberate attacks. Even when infected people start turning up at local hospitals, early diagnosis of their illness might not be easy, says Steve Morse, who heads the US programme on new diagnostic technologies run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The first symptoms of anthrax, plague and many other potential agents of bioterrorism resemble those of flu: headaches, fevers, aching muscles, coughing. What's more, some of these symptoms might be brought on by panic attacks, which are likely to be widespread among people who have just been told that they are the victims of a biological attack. One answer discussed in Stockholm would be for hospitals to have the type of high-tech detectors being developed to identify airborne pathogens on the battlefield. With a detector at each bedside, doctors could pick out the volatile molecules released by damaged lung membranes at a very early stage of infection and instantly tell whether a patient was a victim of a biological attack, says Mildred Donlon, head of environmental detection research at DARPA. Eventually, DARPA would like to develop a detector that weighs no more than 2 kilograms, can identify as few as two particles of 20 different biological agents in a sample of air, costs less than $5000 and does not give false negatives. Such detectors could be deployed around cities to give early warning of airborne disease. In the meantime, researchers led by Wayne Bryden at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore are working on revamping the traditional laboratory workhorse, the mass spectrometer, for use in the field or in hospitals. They've reduced this unwieldy piece of equipment to a suitcase-sized machine that can distinguish between, say, Shigella, which causes dysentery, and Salmonella. A shoebox-sized version, says Bryden, could be ready in five years. Other researchers are experimenting with devices that would not seem out of place in an episode of Star Trek: Voyager. Tiny electronic chips that contain living nerve cells may someday warn of the presence of bacterial toxins, many of which are nerve poisons. Like a canary in a coal mine, the neurons on the chip will chatter until something kills them. "Anything that stops it singing is immediate cause for alarm," says Donlon. While the "canary on a chip" could detect a broad range of toxins, other devices are designed to identify specific pathogens. One prototype consists of a fibre-optic tube lined with antibodies coupled to light-emitting molecules. In the presence of plague or anthrax bacteria, or the toxins botulin or ricin, the molecules light up. Outwitting our defences Devices based on antibodies are far from foolproof. First, you need to have the correct antibodies--not easy when you consider the vast number of pathogens you'd need to include, and their ever-changing repertoire of surface proteins. "And even the right antibodies can identify only what is on the outside of a particle," Donlon points out. Bugs can be encapsulated in gels or biological polymers to foil antibodies, or normally harmless bacteria engineered to carry nasty genes. "I want to know what is on the inside," she says. To do this, DARPA-funded researchers are developing identification techniques based on RNA analysis. Unlike DNA, which is now used to identify unknown organisms, RNA is plentiful inside cells and need not be amplified before identification begins. And messenger RNA molecules reveal not only what a microorganism is, but what toxins it is making. Once the biological agent has been identified, how do you combat it? Vaccinating people before they are exposed is one answer. This is the strategy the military is betting on. Last year, the US military launched a programme to develop vaccines against potential biological weapons. It will create jabs for diseases for which none exist, such as Ebola, and improve existing vaccines--including the 30-year-old anthrax vaccine being given to 2·4 million American soldiers. But vaccines are no cure-all. An attacker need only generate a germ that sports different antigens to those used in a vaccine to render that vaccine ineffective. Plus, as bioterrorists get more sophisticated, they will develop novel, possibly artificial, pathogens against which conventional vaccines will be useless, predicts Morse. To get around these problems, DARPA is looking at ways of developing vaccines quickly enough for them to be created, mass-produced and distributed after an attack. The first step, which many researchers including those in the fast-paced field of genomics are now working on, involves speeding up DNA sequencing so that an unknown pathogen's genes could be detailed in a day. The resulting sequences could then be the basis for developing an instant DNA vaccine. Making the vaccine is only half the problem, however. Soldiers can be ordered to take shots, but immunising the rest of the population is another matter. Civilians are unlikely to volunteer for the dozens of vaccinations that would be necessary to protect them against every conceivable biological threat. An attack would make many change their minds, but in such circumstances there might not be enough to go around. Although Clinton has called for the stockpiling of vaccines, the US has only 5 million doses of smallpox vaccine--not enough to contain a hypothetical attack, says Ken Berry, president of the American Academy of Emergency Physicians. Ken Alibek, the former second-in-command of the Soviet germ warfare programme who revealed earlier this year that the Soviets had weaponised tonnes of smallpox, argues that it is short-sighted to put too much effort into developing vaccines. Instead, says Alibek, who is now at the Batelle Institute in Virginia, researchers should concentrate on ways to treat victims of biological weapons. Today's antibiotics may be useless because germs could be equipped with genes for resistance to all of them. Russian scientists have already created such a strain of anthrax (This Week, 28 February, p 4). For any treatment to be effective amid the potential chaos of a bioterrorist attack, speed will be of the essence. At the Stockholm meeting, researchers reported their efforts to develop drugs that work against a wide variety of infections and so can be used even before definitive diagnosis. Some are trying to take advantage of recently identified similarities in the way many pathogens produce disease to develop broad-spectrum drugs. For example, Ebola, anthrax and plague all kill their victims by inducing a widespread inflammatory reaction similar to toxic shock syndrome. A team in Cincinnati is testing an anti-inflammatory drug that could stop all of them. Another gang of bacteria--including plague, Salmonella, Shigella and Pseudomonas aeruginosa (one of the bacteria that can cause pneumonia and meningitis)--relies on very similar proteins to latch onto human cells and inject toxins. Drugs that block this system might save people from all these germs, Åke Forsberg of the Swedish Defence Research Establishment in Umeå told the meeting. The trouble with all these new anti-bioweapon gizmos, gadgets and medicines is that it's far from certain that they would be available in time to shield the first major city targeted for a bioterrorist attack. At the moment, the US is one of the few countries taking the bioterrorist threat seriously. Sweden, France and Israel have trained emergency teams and stockpiled gas masks. Other countries do not seem concerned. "The threat of bioterrorism has not seized our European friends," says Mike Moodie of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, a think-tank near Washington DC. "They feel it's too improbable." Perhaps they should reconsider. Berry, who helped run the doomsday simulations that ravaged San Francisco, says: "Security experts are not asking if a biological attack on a civilian population is going to happen, but when." >From New Scientist, 19 September 1998 © Copyright New Scientist, RBI Limited 1998 ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: IRS official predicts Y2K snafus
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: IRS official predicts Y2K snafus Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 12:20:40 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Government Executive Magazine http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0998/091798n1.htm September 17, 1998 DAILY BRIEFING IRS official predicts Y2K snafus By Nancy Ferris nferris(a)govexec.com The new chief information officer at the IRS is predicting there will be tax processing problems in the upcoming filing season because of the agency's speeded-up program to fix year 2000 bugs in its computer systems. CIO Paul J. Cosgrave, speaking today at a luncheon meeting of the Association for Federal Information Resources Management, said 98 percent of the IRS's software will be fixed by early next year, when the 1998 filing season begins. But, he added, "there will be some problems" because not all of the fixes will be perfect. Asked afterward how serious the problems would be, Cosgrave said it was too early to tell. The agency is working hard to minimize their effect, he added. The good news, he said, is that when the century change actually occurs on Dec. 31, 1999, the IRS will have put its Y2K problems behind it. "We're a year early," he said. The agency is spending close to $1 billion on Y2K fixes. Cosgrave, a well-known consultant, was brought in to help the IRS straighten out its troubled systems modernization program and build new systems to support the reorganized agency. He said the IRS will exercise more central control over information technology and try to standardize the systems environment. "Today we have 17 e-mail systems in the IRS," he said by way of example. The reorganization announced by IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti will replace the service's current regional structure with four new units serving specific groups of customers. That change, combined with the systems modernization program, will lead to new job responsibilities for many IRS employees, Cosgrave said. The agency will move some headquarters functions to field offices and move some back office employees to customer service jobs. But because it can't relocate many of the affected workers, it plans to "use more remote assignment work," where employees in one location work for managers in another, Cosgrave said. The IRS also will dramatically increase its investment in employee training, from $3.5 million this year to $11 million two years from now. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: [Spooks] CIA Losing Its Best Operatives
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bridget973(a)aol.com Subject: IP: [Spooks] CIA Losing Its Best Operatives Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 21:43:13 EDT To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Subject: [Spooks] CIA Losing Its Best Operatives Date: Wed, 16 Sep 1998 22:51:13 -0500 From: Bob Margolis <rttyman(a)wwa.com> To: Spooks <spooks(a)qth.net> WASHINGTON (AP) -- The CIA is pumping money and people into recruiting efforts to battle a trend that the agency's departing inspector general says has sapped the clandestine service of its most experienced hands. Agency officials outlined Tuesday initiatives that CIA Director George Tenet announced internally last month to increase pay, provide hiring bonuses and shorten the waiting time for job offers. ``There are plenty of headhunters out there ready to pounce on strong candidates,'' Tenet told agency employees in his announcement. ``To delay is to lose.'' The program is intended to combat a problem outlined in an op-ed article by outgoing CIA Inspector General Fred Hitz who said the CIA's Directorate of Operations, the clandestine spy service, is losing its best people amid organizational drift and declining morale. ``The picture is not encouraging,'' said Hitz, the CIA's chief watchdog from 1990 until this year. Writing in an op-ed article in The Washington Post, Hitz said the Directorate of Operations ``has been shrinking in size and capability since the end of the Cold War.'' A recent study showed departures from the agency due to attrition ``involved high-quality officers the agency could not afford to lose,'' Hitz wrote. The number of CIA employees is classified, but the Federation of American Scientists, a Washington-based group that follows intelligence matters, estimates it has shrunk from more than 20,000 to about 16,000 since the Cold War. The clandestine service is estimated at several thousand. Agency and congressional officials said the critique may be outdated as the CIA pumps new money and energy into recruiting. But one knowledgeable congressional staffer said the problem got so bad that an entire incoming class of operatives -- perhaps a few dozen recruits -- had to be canceled for lack of money. Hitz pointed to the difficulty of recruiting in a booming economy and to low morale as a result of ``the lack of a clear mission'' at CIA. ``Nobody worth his or her salt is going to join an organization that has lost faith in itself, is confused about its mission and is trapped in the sclerosis of a middle-aged bureaucracy,'' he said. Rep. Porter Goss, R-Fla., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and a former CIA clandestine operative, said an instinct to blame the CIA every time a risky intelligence venture fails is taking its toll. ``With so many unyielding critics, the CIA has become gun-shy,'' Goss said. Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Hitz has been a leading critic of the clandestine service and may himself be partly to blame for low morale. Still, Kerrey agreed recruitment is a serious agency problem. Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., the committee chairman, said the CIA must focus more clearly on defining its mission and outlining how it will use field operatives to combat terrorism, weapons proliferation and drug trafficking. In recent months, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees have pushed for more money for the CIA's so-called human intelligence efforts, including its field operatives. -=-=- AP NEWS The Associated Press News Service Copyright 1998 by The Associated Press All Rights Reserved --- Submissions should be sent to spooks(a)qth.net To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe spooks" to majordomo(a)qth.net -- bridget973(a)aol.com Black Helicopters on the Horizon: http://members.xoom.com/bridget973 ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Killed by Police? Keep it Secret
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Killed by Police? Keep it Secret Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 10:12:07 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Rocky Mountain News http://www.insidedenver.com/news/0919secr1.shtml Secrecy pushed in killings by police But critics say names of officers should always be made public By Kevin Vaughan Rocky Mountain News Staff Writer A move is afoot in Colorado to keep the names of police officers who shoot people secret. A Greeley judge this week ruled that the public has no right to know which officers shot and killed four people over the past two years. "That seems like sort of the ultimate double standard to me, because I can shoot and kill someone in my house in self-defense, and my name will be open as a matter of public record," said Chris Cobler, managing editor of the Greeley Tribune. The paper had sued the Greeley Police Department, the Weld County Sheriff's Department and the district attorney's office to obtain the officers' names. At least one legislator praised Weld District Judge Jonathan Hays' Wednesday ruling. "I am strongly opposed to releasing the names of those officers that have not been found accountable, or found guilty, in a shooting," said state Sen. Ken Arnold, R-Westminster. Arnold spent 28 years with the Colorado State Patrol before becoming a lawmaker. The State Patrol and most other Colorado police agencies release the names of officers involved in shootings -- some agencies immediately, others in weeks or months. But newspaper editors and the American Civil Liberties Union worry that the disclosure practice may soon end because of the ruling. In Aurora, Police Chief Vern Saint Vincent has refused to identify two officers who killed a gunman in a domestic dispute a week ago, citing the same legal provisions the Greeley judge used. Saint Vincent said his decision is temporary, and he plans to identify the officers after investigating threats against them. But he may change his mind. He said he expects his officers to lobby for secrecy and that he'll consider it. "There simply can't be a right to privacy for someone with the full authority of a law enforcement officer who has used deadly force against a citizen," said Tom Kelley, an attorney for the Colorado Press Association. "You could make the argument that anyone accused of a crime has a right to privacy, which I don't think anyone would take very seriously." At issue is the interpretation of two state laws governing the release of public records and criminal-justice documents. The laws spell out what the public has a right to see. Hays ruled that police shootings are not "official actions" as defined by the Criminal Justice Records Act. As such, they fall under an area of the law that allows police and sheriff's departments to withhold information that is "contrary to the public interest." Identifying the officers, Hays wrote, "plays no significant, positive role in the functioning of the criminal-justice process." But one of the state's top cops doesn't see it that way. "I just have this problem with the idea that that should be a blanket policy," said Pat Ahlstrom, executive director of the state Department of Public Safety. "We don't see it that way. They're public officers, and the act of using force and deadly force is subject to public scrutiny." The department oversees the State Patrol and the Colorado Bureau of Investigation. A check of other law enforcement agencies in the Denver area found that all routinely release the names of officers in shootings. "There's really no reason for us not to release the names," said Adams County sheriff's Sgt. Mike Kercheval. Different agencies have different rules about when the names are released. For some, it comes within 24 hours of a shooting. Others wait longer. Lakewood, for example, withholds the name of an officer involved in a shooting until the investigation is finished. "It is the same procedure that is afforded any citizen in Lakewood that is investigated in a shooting," police spokeswoman Lynn Kimbrough said. "For us, it is not a matter of 'if.' It is simply a matter of 'when."' Cobler said the Tribune has no plan to appeal this week's ruling. But others said they expect an effort to change it, either through an appeal or by attempting to change the laws to make them clearer. "Let's change the statute," said Mark Silverstein, legal director of the ACLU of Colorado. Arnold, however, said he trusts police and prosecutors to investigate shootings thoroughly. September 19, 1998 ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: UK: Microchips & Animal Passports for Pets
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: UK: Microchips & Animal Passports for Pets Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 06:40:49 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: London Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?ac=000150689433551&rtmo=gYkgwZZu&atmo=99999 999&P4_FOLLOW_ON=/98/9/19/npets19.html&pg=/et/98/9/19/npets19.html UK News Electronic Telegraph Saturday 19 September 1998 Issue 1212 Passports for pets in new rabies law By David Brown, Agriculture Editor BRITAIN'S stringent anti-rabies quarantine laws are to be swept aside in favour of electronic scanners and animal passports under plans to be published by the Government next week. A scheme relying on microchip implants that can be electronically monitored, together with documentary proof that animals have been immunised against rabies and other diseases, are among a raft of proposals that could mean the demise of mandatory six-months quarantine for all imported animals. Under the proposals, animals travelling between designated "low disease risk" countries in Europe and elsewhere would be allowed entry on condition that they were carefully screened on arrival and possibly subjected to blood tests. The Government is likely to back the proposals for a radical overhaul of the increasingly controversial quarantine system, which has been Britain's main front-line defence against rabies for nearly a century. Currently, imported pets must be held in nominated kennels for six months until vets decide they pose no health risk to people or animals in this country. Diplomats and members of the Armed Forces will be among those who should find life easier - if their overseas posts meet new criteria for assessing potential risks and their animals are properly vaccinated and provided with proposed new movement documents. But quarantine will not disappear completely under the plans drawn up over the past 10 months by a team of independent government advisers headed by Prof Ian Kennedy of University College, London. It will remain as a safety net to screen animals imported from countries that still have a problem with rabies - including many in Eastern Europe, North and South America, Africa and the Far East. "It will not be the free-for-all that some people might expect," Whitehall sources said last night. Nick Brown, the Minister of Agriculture, is expected to call a press conference next Wednesday to publish the report. But before the Government acts, the plans will be circulated for consultation among vets, animal welfare organisations, including the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, dog and cat breed societies, farmers and other groups with an interest in animal health. Britain's last major rabies scare was in 1969. In 1983, an Irish Wolfhound imported from the United States was caught with rabies in a quarantine kennel and in June 1996, at the height of the BSE crisis, a rabid bat that is believed to have crossed the Channel, bit a pregnant woman in Newhaven, Sussex. The Government decided in October last year to review the current quarantine arrangements after coming under mounting pressure from animal welfare groups and pet owners, including Chris Patten, Britain's last Governor of Hong Kong, who complained about difficulties in returning his family's pet dogs to Britain. Those complaints, coupled with the decline of rabies in EU countries, have given added impetus for the reform of the system over the past two years. But many vets remain to be convinced that easing quarantine is a good idea, arguing that veterinary certificates issued abroad may not be valid. The British Veterinary Association said last night: "We have not seen a copy of this report but our position is clear. We will not agree to any changes which do not, in our view, provide the United Kingdom with at least the level of safeguards against disease that the present quarantine system provides." © Copyright Telegraph Group Limited 1998. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Hacker editor rides herd on unruly institution
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Hacker editor rides herd on unruly institution Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 11:51:24 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Fox News - AP Hacker editor rides herd on unruly institution 11.01 a.m. ET (1502 GMT) September 19, 1998 By Chris Allbritton, Associated Press SAN FRANCISCO (AP) The lines of text scrolled off the screen quickly, but the bleached-blond hacker snatched quick glances at the visitors' log on his Web page. Lots of visitors using military and government computers. The hacker, who calls himself Route, said he always gets a kick out of the feds' visits. He smiled. The FBI, the CIA and the others "wouldn't be doing their job if they weren't tracking computer information both legitimate and illegitimate,'' Route said. "I guess Phrack falls somewhere in between.'' Phrack is an online publication called a 'zine. It's a digital chimera: written for hackers but read by law enforcement, too. It's been the subject of federal prosecution, yet it still operates in the open. Its name combines "hack'' and "phreak,'' which refers to phone hacking. It's got attitude, technical know-how and in many ways defines today's hacker scene. It first hit the electronic bulletin boards Nov. 17, 1985, ages ago in hacker years. To put its longevity in perspective, Phrack came out two years after the movie "WarGames'' in which actor Matthew Broderick established the cliched image of the hacker as the lonely kid who altered his grades with a computer. Phrack predates the World Wide Web by almost a decade. And Phrack is older than many of its readers, who number about 8,000, said Route, who refuses to give his real name. Route, 24, doesn't look like the scrawny computer nerd with the cathode-ray pallor so many think of when the word hacker is mentioned. Silver earrings dangle from each ear and a bar pierces his tongue. Spidery tattoos creep down his shoulders and over biceps grown solid with hours of iron work. Behind his glower lies a keen mind that cuts through computer network problems like a digital knife, an invaluable skill for his day job at a computer security firm with Fortune 500 companies for clients. Route refused to name his company. Phrack's improbable history begins in 1985 when a hacker with the handle Taran King cobbled together various subversive texts that had been circulating like Soviet-era samizdat on the archipelago of underground electronic bulletin boards. It included all sorts of mischief-making: "How to Pick Master Locks,'' "How to Make an Acetylene Bomb'' and "School/College Computer Dial-Ups.'' But Phrack found itself the focus of federal prosecution in 1990, when editor Craig Neidorf, a k a Knight Lightning, was prosecuted by the Chicago Computer Fraud and Abuse Task Force. His alleged crime? He published a document in Phrack with certain details of the emergency 911 systems in use around the country. It had been given to him by another hacker who had copied it from computers owned by BellSouth, which valued it at almost $80,000. But the task force wanted to prove the document was more than valuable. Assistant U.S. Attorney William J. Cook said it put dangerous information in the hands of hackers. The case fell apart when Neidorf's lawyer proved that more detailed information about the system had appeared in other publications. You could order them from phone company technical catalogs for $13. The charges were dropped. Neidorf's trial was over. If today's Phrack is a bit less confrontational, that's understandable. Like many of the older hackers, Route is shifting his focus away from anarchy texts and phone hacking to computer security. Its "how-to'' days are pretty much over. "Phrack is not meant to be a manual of vulnerabilities,'' he said. As the editor, Route knows that Phrack can still be used for illegal purposes. "But you can't hold people completely liable for just putting information out there.'' He said he has had "blatantly illegal stuff'' sent to him. Once, he said he received the technical specifications for most pager systems used in the country, complete with how to hack those systems. He didn't publish. "It's a judgment call,'' he said. "I have no intention of running up against the law or (upsetting) the military.'' But it's almost guaranteed that something gleaned from Phrack will be used against the computer system of a big and powerful organization or business. "The scene is going to do what the scene is going to do,'' he said. "It's like any clique in society. You have good people and you have bad people.'' © 1998 Associated Press. All rights reserved. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: IRS, White House above the law? by Joseph Farah
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jan <igniting(a)flash.net> Subject: IP: IRS, White House above the law? by Joseph Farah Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 19:54:10 -0500 To: Ignition-Point <ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com> Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 14:31:36 -0600 From: Robert Huddleston <cabhop(a)highfiber.com> Subject: IRS, White House above the law? by Joseph Farah between the lines by Joseph Farah FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 18, 1998 http://www.worldnetdaily.com/btlines/980918_btl_irs_white_house.html IRS, White House above the law? Last week, we had our first court hearing in our $10 million lawsuit against White House and Internal Revenue Service officials we believe conspired to use their government power to harass and intimidate my organization, the Western Journalism Center, for exposing Clinton administration scandals for the last four years. This was a procedural hearing in Sacramento before U.S. Judge Milton Schwartz, a Carter appointee, who seemed to be preparing the Justice Department attorney from Washington and our counsel from Larry Klayman's Judicial Watch for a major trial. Nevertheless, the government is trying to abort this trial on the kind of familiar technical grounds we have come to expect from this administration. Interestingly, the Justice Department has yet to dispute the major claims of our case -- that the center was the victim of a politically motivated audit designed to squelch our First Amendment rights. The Justice Department is claiming the one-year statute of limitations expired before we filed the suit. Not true. By any standard, we filed in plenty of time. The audit of our organization ended in May 1997. We were not officially notified until June of 1997. No tax-exempt organization in its right mind would sue the IRS during an audit. We filed the lawsuit in May of 1998 within one year of the audit being closed. The Justice Department is claiming an argument you've heard before from the administration -- that there is "no controlling legal authority" and, thus, no legislative remedy for organizations victimized by political audits. In other words, the president is free to use the IRS to go after his "enemies" and there is no punitive action the victim can take against him or the agents with whom he conspires. Next week, the Justice Department attorneys will be back in U.S. District Court in Sacramento to ask Judge Schwartz to dismiss the case on these specious grounds. I want to go on record right now as saying that no matter how the judge rules on this motion, the Western Journalism Center will not stop in pressing this matter for adjudication and remedy. This is a case far too important to the future of this country and the rule of law to allow it to be dropped. Let's review the basic facts. In 1994, the center began investigating Clinton administration corruption. By December 1994, memos released to congressional investigators show that the White House counsel's office had begun targeting the center for action of some kind. In 1995, the center was a major focus of a White House counsel's office 331-page report called the Communication Stream of Conspiracy Commerce. I was the only journalist profiled in this mammoth report alleging a wide-ranging media conspiracy against the president. In early 1996, I first began hearing rumors that my organization was being targeted by the IRS. Months later, we were notified that we were under audit and that our tax-exempt status was under scrutiny because of the nature of our investigative work into Clinton administration corruption during an election year. When we questioned the IRS agent about his authority to interfere in our First Amendment-protected activities, he said: "Look, this is a political case, and the decision will be made at the national level." We then exposed this blatant abuse of the IRS against our organization and the pattern of politically motivated audits against other non-profits in the pages of the Wall Street Journal. As a result, Congress began an investigation, and IRS Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson resigned. Ultimately, the agent in charge was removed from the case, investigated internally by the IRS and a new agent assigned. The nine-month audit was then closed within two days. We demanded our case file, which the "Taxpayer Bill of Rights" states is available to any taxpayer following an audit. It was denied. We then filed a Freedom of Information Act request for it. Again it was denied. The IRS stated that the file would be withheld because it had been through the hands of others within the IRS and possibly outside of the agency and was, thus, protected by "governmental privilege." Having exhausted every available means to document our growing conviction that we were targeted for political reasons, we filed suit. If you believe, as I do, that this is a monumentally important case, I ask for your sincere and unceasing intercessory prayers that justice will be done. A daily radio broadcast adaptation of Joseph Farah's commentaries can be heard at http://www.ktkz.com/ Joseph Farah is editor of WorldNetDaily.com and executive director of the Western Journalism Center, an independent group of investigative reporters. <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< SOCIALIST 1. socialism ( Noun ] : social organization based on goverment control of the production and distribution of goods. ***** ************************************************* "But if the watchman sees the sword coming and does not blow the trumpet to warn the people and the sword comes and takes the life of one of them, that man will be taken away because of his sin, but I will hold the watchman accountable for his blood." Ezekiel 33:6 (NIV) ___________________________________________________________ New toll-free hotline to Congress Congress is making a new toll-free number available for citizens who would like to make their voices heard in Washington. 1-800-504-0031 Ask for your Congressman office and let him know what you think............. --------------------------------------------------------------- Join Gun Owners of America [ GOA ] today. Read more about GOA at : http://www.gunowners.org/ -------------------------------------------------------------- Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership (JPFO) Become a JPFO member, go to: http://www.jpfo.org/member.htm There you will see a printable member application, along with info on membership Membership IS open to ALL Law abiding citizens. --------------------------------------------------------------- <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< <@{{>< ******=========================================***** "Among the elementary measures the American Soviet government will adopt to further the cultural revolution are... [a] National Department of Education...the studies will be revolutionized, being cleansed of religious, patriotic, and other features of the bourgeois ideology. The students will be taught the basis of Marxian dialectical materialism, internationalism and the general ethics of the new Socialist society." - William Z. Foster, Toward Soviet America, 1932 "...Stage III...would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. peace force... The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited... All other armaments would be destroyed..." -Department of State publication number 7277 ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Clinton Computer Exports Compromise Nat'l Security
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Clinton Computer Exports Compromise Nat'l Security Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 07:40:35 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/09/biztech/articles/17computer-export s.html September 17, 1998 U.S. Agency Faults Study on Exports of Computers By JEFF GERTH WASHINGTON -- When the Clinton administration relaxed export controls on high-performance computers in 1996, it relied on a flawed report that did not study the national security implications and concluded with scant data that the computers were already easily available around the world, government auditors said Wednesday. The opposite conclusion is true, said the General Accounting Office, the audit arm of Congress. In a report released to a Senate panel, the auditors found that such high-performance computers "are not readily available" to countries of national security concern to the United States, like China, India or Pakistan. The GAO report also said that American manufacturers continue to dominate the overseas market. An important administration argument for loosening export controls was that easing controls was the only way American computer makers could compete against widely available foreign-made technology. The auditors said that "a key element" in the decision to relax the export controls was a Stanford University study, commissioned by the Commerce and Defense departments without any competition, that said some U.S. computer technology was uncontrollable worldwide and efforts to control it would harm the industry. But the auditors said that the study "lacked empirical evidence or analysis regarding its conclusion" of uncontrollability. The GAO also said that the study failed to do one of its assigned tasks: study how countries like China might use the computers for military purposes. Within a year after the export rules were loosened, military installations in Russia and China obtained a few powerful new American computers, prompting criminal investigations and a retightening by Congress of the export controls. The study's authors responded to the GAO, and their responses were presented to the Senate subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services by Harold Johnson, the GAO's associate director. Johnson said that the authors told the accounting office that they did not do a national security threat analysis because the federal government does not have the right information to do such a study. Seymour Goodman, the study's principal author, disputed the GAO's criticism of his report's analysis. "We had a lot of empirical evidence and we did a comprehensive analysis that was different from theirs and that focused on the availability of U.S.-built systems." William Reinsch, the undersecretary of commerce for export administration, defended the administration's relaxation of controls and said the GAO had asked the wrong question in looking at the computer marketplace. "Even though the U.S. today dominates the market for high-performance computers, there is a performance threshold below which we can not realistically expect to maintain control of computers unless we restrict sales to our closest allies," he said. Reinsch went on to argue that the GAO was wrong to rank national security as the top priority for looking at this issue. Instead, he said, the first priority should be the realities of the marketplace, where high-performance computers "are becoming less and less controllable because they are becoming smaller, cheaper, more powerful and more reliable, requiring less vendor support." President Clinton announced the change in policy in late 1995, fulfilling a pledge he made early in his administration to computer executives. The move also helped countries like China, which could now buy more advanced American computers without any federal license as long as the technology was used for civilian purposes. But the new rules made the exporter responsible for deciding whether a license was required, a decision previously made by the federal government. This new responsibility, the GAO report said, was "particularly difficult" for companies selling to countries like China, "where identifying the distinction between a civilian and military end user can be difficult without information that is sometimes available only to the U.S. government." Now, the Clinton administration is weighing whether to further relax the computer export limits. But the administration's critics remain "concerned that the policy is flawed," said Sen. Thad Cochran, R-Miss., who led Wednesday's hearing. Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: ISPI Clips 4.47:Russian Big Brother covets all the E-mail
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ama-gi ISPI" <offshore(a)email.msn.com> Subject: IP: ISPI Clips 4.47:Russian Big Brother covets all the E-mail Date: Sat, 19 Sep 1998 01:18:03 -0700 To: <Undisclosed.Recipients(a)majordomo.pobox.com> ISPI Clips 4.47:Russian Big Brother covets all the E-mail News & Info from the Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) Saturday September 19, 1998 ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This From: US News & World Report, September 14, 1998 http://www.usnews.com Big Brother covets all the E-mail http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/980914/14key.htm By Christian Caryl Believe it or not, there are some areas where Russia leads the world. While other countries from Germany to Singapore ponder the pluses and minuses of government regulation of the Internet, Russia is way ahead. Its State Security Service (FSB), the main successor to the KGB, is planning all-encompassing surveillance of Internet communications. Internet activists say that the proposed regulations are proof of just how far Russia's struggling democracy has to go. "There is no concept of privacy anywhere in Russian legislation," says Andrei Sebrant of GlasNet, one of the country's leading Internet service providers. "So strictly speaking, there's nothing at all illegal about this." The plans, which have never been officially presented or acknowledged by the government, became public a few weeks ago, when they were leaked to critics. The idea is to force each service provider to install a "black box" connecting its network to the local FSB office via fiber-optic cable. That would enable state-sponsored snoopers to collect and examine E-mail, as well as data on addressees and recipients and Web surfing habits. Users, meanwhile, would never have the slightest sign of prying eyes and ears. The cost for the extra equipment would be borne by the providers themselves. Anatoli Levenchuk, an Internet expert who posted the proposed regulations on the Web and is leading the most vocal online protest, says that the requirements would boost providers' costs by 10 to 15 percent. That increase would be passed on to users, who already pay around $35 per month, very expensive by Russian standards. "Right now, we have about 1 million Internet users in Russia," says Levenchuk. "So those price hikes could immediately reduce the Internet community here by hundreds of thousands." Any providers who refuse to comply can expect to have their operating licenses yanked by the all-powerful Ministry of Communications, which has been helping the FSB draft the rules. But the FSB's plans may ultimately serve to prove just how resistant to any kind of centralized control the Internet remains. The new proposal doesn't address encryption, and the drug dealers and terrorists the FSB ostensibly wants to catch will be the first to resort to tough-to-crack encryption systems. Russian Web sites offering encryption technology have been doing a booming business since the first news of the regulations came out. But most Russian Internet users have little familiarity with encryption techniques, according to Maksim Otstavnov, an editor at CompuTerra magazine. For them, this could be the electronic equivalent of the days when the Soviet KGB routinely tapped phones and opened mail. --------------------------------NOTICE:------------------------------ ISPI Clips are news & opinion articles on privacy issues from all points of view; they are clipped from local, national and international newspapers, journals and magazines, etc. Inclusion as an ISPI Clip does not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the content or opinion by ISPI. In compliance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed free without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISPI Clips is a FREE e-mail service from the "Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues" (ISPI). To receive "ISPI Clips" on a daily bases (approx. 3 - 8 clips per day) send the following message "Please enter [Your Name] into the ISPI Clips list: [Your e-mail address]" to: ISPIClips(a)ama-gi.com . The Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) is a small contributor-funded organization based in Victoria, British Columbia (Canada). ISPI operates on a not-for-profit basis, accepts no government funding and takes a global perspective. ISPI's mandate is to conduct & promote interdisciplinary research into electronic, personal and financial privacy with a view toward helping ordinary people understand the degree of privacy they have with respect to government, industry and each other and to likewise inform them about techniques to enhance their privacy. But, none of this can be accomplished without your kind and generous financial support. If you value in the ISPI Clips service or if you are concerned about the erosion of your privacy in general, won't you please help us continue this important work by becoming an "ISPI Clips Supporter" or by taking out an institute Membership? We gratefully accept all contributions: Less than $60 ISPI Clips Supporter $60 - $99 Primary ISPI Membership (1 year) $100 - $300 Senior ISPI Membership (2 years) More than $300 Executive Council Membership (life) Your ISPI "membership" contribution entitles you to receive "The ISPI Privacy Reporter" (our bi-monthly 12 page hard-copy newsletter in multi-contributor format) for the duration of your membership. For a contribution form with postal instructions please send the following message "ISPI Contribution Form" to ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com . We maintain a strict privacy policy. Any information you divulge to ISPI is kept in strict confidence. It will not be sold, lent or given away to any third party. ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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Genocide WAS: Political purges and Bill C-68
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from the Canadian Firearms Digest V2 #596, Sat Sept 19, 1998 Thank you, principal(a)connect.ab.ca for your enlightening commentary. Since you posted it on a public list, I took the permission to re-post it to the original list. Highest regards. Jean-Francois Avon --------------------------- your letter ----------------------------- Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 15:52:46 -0600 From: principal(a)connect.ab.ca Subject: genocide ************** Beginning of Quote ********************** Date: Thu, 17 Sep 1998 14:10:44 -0600 From: "Jean-Francois Avon" <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Subject: Political purges and Bill C-68 Hi to all of you. I know most of you personally, except for the posts to mailing lists and public organisms. - - ------------------ beginning of letter --------------- Yesterday night, around 2am, I was unable to sleep and surfing the TV channels up until I fell on a movie on the ShowCase channel. This channel is devoted to repertoire cinema and less mainstream movies. As I flick to this channel, I see something I can't take my eyes off for it's overwhelming revolting topic: a bunch of corpses are on a dolly, each of one being tied by the feet to a crane cable and quickly, efficiently taken away to a big heap of corpses. <SNIP> ***************** End of Quote ************************** I was in Rwanda during the latter part of the genocide and during the period immediately following the Revolution. I concur with Mr. Avon. I have seen the heaps of corpses. The deaths of these people is tragic and firearms owners and free men and women should know what can happen if we allow ourselves to be cowed by government. It is worthwhile noting that contrary to the lies spewed by anti firearms groups firearms do not kill people. Rarely were the people of Rwanda killed by gunfire. They were killed in the tens of thousands with clubs and machetes. Why did these people go to there deaths like sheep to the slaughter? In my opinion they were so accustomed to unquestioning compliance that even in the face of death they would not rise up and fight. At the dozens of execution sites I encountered there were only two occasions where I saw evidence of gunfire. This was in the form of shotgun casings. I point this out because I questioned survivors about the procedures used by the government forces to round up and execute the mass numbers of people we are talking about here. Consistently, I was told that the government forces, with the assistance of collaborators, would either threaten the village leaders or convince them that they would be spared if they complied. They then moved the group en-mass to a collection point. At this time the villagers still complied with the butchers. Once a sufficient number of people were collected they would be slaughtered. The ratio of killers to victims would be quite small so if they had risen up as a group there could have been mass escape. This did not happen. There were exceptions . . . this is where the shotgun shells come in. There would be a couple of government soldiers with guns to cut down anyone that fled. In the Amahoro stadium in Kigali the bodies were piled one on top of another. Approx. 25,000 Rwandans were slaughtered there over a period of just a few days. In a small church and grounds on the road North from Cyangugu another 10,000 where slaughtered, hacked and bludgeoned to death. Of all the sensory overloads I experienced, one of the most memorable was that of a school in a village near the Eastern town of Byumba. The men and women were separated, which was fairly common, and then slaughtered. As usual they were not JUST killed but were hacked to pieces. Limbs were often chopped off first, brutal torture and emasculation was common before a merciful death was delivered by a fatal blow or machete wound. One of the dead was a young woman, her skull had been crushed with a club, upon examination of the body I saw that she still clutched her infant child to her chest. The skull of the child too was crushed. Drunk on the absolute power given to them by the government the soldiers and Intehamwe collaborators became blood thirsty fiends capable of killing a baby in such a brutal manner. (there were worse things but this has imprinted on my brain) In the center of the hollow square arrangement of huts were 2 twelve gauge casings . . . someone had tried to escape! There may be those who don't feel this information is topical or appropriate for the Digest as it is not directly a firearm issue. I believe there are some lessons. 1. Never have blind trust in the government when it comes to your or your loved ones life(a la Hep C). 2. There will always be collaborators, help your neighbor but never trust them completely. 3. Alone we are vulnerable, it is only through a unified group that you stand a chance against oppression. 4. To find out what a man is, give him power. 5. To murder masses, the mass murder does not need a specific tool. 6. Police and soldiers should never be the only ones with guns. (My credo, re-enforced by my experiences), As a free man I will not die on my knees. I submitted a quote to the list some months back. If the moderator will indulge me I would like to submit it again. "War is an ugly thing but not the ugliest of things; the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feelings which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse. A man who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing which is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself." - John Stuart Mill Jean-Francois Avon, B.Sc. Physics, Montreal, Canada DePompadour, Sociétéd'Importation Ltée Limoges fine porcelain and french crystal JFA Technologies, R&D physicists & engineers Instrumentation & control, LabView programming PGP keys: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html PGP ID:C58ADD0D:529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 PGP ID:5B51964D:152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C Jean-Francois Avon, B.Sc. Physics, Montreal, Canada DePompadour, Société d'Importation Ltée Limoges fine porcelain and french crystal JFA Technologies, R&D physicists & engineers Instrumentation & control, LabView programming PGP keys: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html PGP ID:C58ADD0D:529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 PGP ID:5B51964D:152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In reply to my suggestion that lieing under oath isn't a very good reason for impeachment, Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> wrote: > Of course it's different if you preface your lie with "I swear to tell the > truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth". > > The oath is voluntary and therefore if broken no claim for duress, only > intentional misdirection, can explain such actions. echoed by nobody(a)remailer.ch who wrote: > ...If some public figure ... goes under oath and then lies, ... > he's trying to throw a wrench in the > justice system. It wouldn't be as bad if somebody like Jim or I lied under > oath, but this guy is the chief executive of the United States. He's > basically Top Cop, and his administration doesn't hesitate to press > charges against people who commit all sorts of victimless crimes. > I agree it's bad. I agree it undermines the justice system a little bit. But, ... impeachment? You're not charging him with murder (eg WACO), attacking the 1st ammendment (CDA), the 4th (SSN on driver's licences), the 5th (GAK). You're going after Al Capone for tax evasion. You want to get him because he's a Bad Person not because of the particular crime. This is ironic, because his crimes against our basic rights were committed while pursuing Bad People, but it is also hypocritical. nobody(a)remailer.ch also wrote: > [quoting me] > > I'm honoured to draw an ad hominem before revealing that I'm on AOL. > > > > -- an anonymous aol32 user. > > Actually, the amazing thing is that you're from AOL. You're coherent, you > quote, and you know how to use a remailer. One in a million. ;) Unbelievable, I would have thought. ;-> -- Aol32Monger

10 13

Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From adam(a)rpini.com Sat Sep 19 22:43:16 1998 > Date: 20 Sep 1998 03:24:35 -0000 > From: Anonymous <nobody(a)remailer.ch> > Subject: Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd) > I agree it's bad. I agree it undermines the justice system a little bit. > But, ... impeachment? If you can't trust your elected officials to live up to their word, in other words if they will lie under oath on something this immaterial then how do you trust him to live up to the oath he took when he took office? He asked, wasn't drafted, to have the peoples trust placed in him and then he reniged. > You're going after Al Capone > for tax evasion. Did Al Capone evade taxes? If so then what's your point? You want to get him because he's a Bad Person not because of > the particular crime. This is ironic, because his crimes against our basic > rights were committed while pursuing Bad People, but it is also hypocritical. Not at all, it simply recognizes that any public official with a record of lying under oath is not fit to hold office. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd)
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 9/19/98 11:24 PM, Anonymous (nobody(a)remailer.ch) passed this wisdom: > >In reply to my suggestion that lieing under oath isn't >a very good reason for impeachment, > >Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> wrote: >> Of course it's different if you preface your lie with "I swear to tell the >> truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth". >> >> The oath is voluntary and therefore if broken no claim for duress, only >> intentional misdirection, can explain such actions. > >echoed by nobody(a)remailer.ch who wrote: >> ...If some public figure ... goes under oath and then lies, ... >> he's trying to throw a wrench in the >> justice system. It wouldn't be as bad if somebody like Jim or I lied under >> oath, but this guy is the chief executive of the United States. He's >> basically Top Cop, and his administration doesn't hesitate to press >> charges against people who commit all sorts of victimless crimes. >> > >I agree it's bad. I agree it undermines the justice system a little bit. >But, ... impeachment? > >You're not charging him with murder (eg WACO), attacking the 1st >ammendment (CDA), >the 4th (SSN on driver's licences), the 5th (GAK). You're going after Al >Capone >for tax evasion. You want to get him because he's a Bad Person not because of >the particular crime. This is ironic, because his crimes against our basic >rights were committed while pursuing Bad People, but it is also hypocritical. > They couldn't get Capone any other way but on Income Tax Evasion ... we all know how much more guilty of how many more heinous crimes he was ... but we took him the only way we could ... Clinton is no different ... it would be grand and so fitting if we could impeach himt for having committed aggravated assault upon the Bill of Rights, but if we have to get him because he can't keep his pecker zipped up then so be it ... as with case of Al Capone, this country will also be richer without William Jefferson (Thomas must be rolling in his grave!) Klinton! Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "When hell freezes over, grab your ice skates." -- Mark Johnson

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TAKE THE PRESIDENTIAL SEX TOUR/WOMAN WHO TURNED MONICA GREEN
by STUFFED NEWS DAILY 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today we have THREE RealVideo movies showing Clinton closely embracing Lewinsky on occasions spanning many months. See for yourself if the signs were there for all to see... IN TODAY'S ISSUE: 30 NEW EXTRA HOT JPEGS! 5 NEW SIZZLING STORIES TOPLESS DANCER WITH DANGEROUS BOOBS RE-ARRESTED FOR BEING TOO REVEALING PRESIDENTIAL SEX TOUR + VIDEOS THE INFAMOUS DRUDGE REPORT MAY BE IN TROUBLE THE BEST OF EUREKA! THE WOMAN WHO TURNED MONICA GREEN VIRGIN NO LONG-AIR MIND IF I GLUE MY FACE TO YOUR FOOT TOO MUCH HOMEWORK IS BAD FOR YOU RACE CAR MAMA USED TO BE A MAN MUCH MORE! ----> http://stuffed.net/98/9/19/ <---- Welcome to today's issue of Stuffed. To read it you should click on the URL above. If it is not made clickable by your email program you will need to use your mouse to highlight the URL, copy it and then paste it into your browser (then press Return). This email is never sent unsolicited. Stuffed is the supplement for the Eureka newsletter you subscribed to. Full instructions on unsubscribing are in every issue of Eureka! ----> http://stuffed.net/98/9/19/ <----

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Re: CHALLENGE? Toto/signature attack w. unpublished public key
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > In addition it has to be that n is the right length based on the "s" > > padding. This limits it to an 8 bit range, in this case 1024-1031 > > bits. > > The constraint I gave was that log(n) = 1024. Bear in mind that the > msbyte of s = 0x08, so we know that n > s, and I think we know that n > < 2^1024 also based on the s padding from the signature. So based on > this n would be in the range 1020 - 1024 bits, right? Actually there is somewhat more flexibility than this. You made up the padding, it didn't come from the file, did it? You could add perhaps 1 more byte of FF without stretching credibility too extremely. Then n could be 1020 - 1032 bits. It's too bad that s started out so small (assuming the "true" n was 1024 bits). > > If you make n be a product of a bunch of small primes, so that you > > can make signatures with it, then a third party can detect this and > > know it is bogus. > > He has to factor your n to determine that it is bogus though? This > would imply that he had more compute than you do. (Not unreasonable > threat model mind). But didn't YOU have to factor n also? That's what you showed, originally, a large s^e which you factored down to get some small factors and a big one. If you manage to get a prime factorization you can combine factors to get your n. But it won't be any harder for him to factor than it was for you. > Resources available: one low end pentium based linux PC? :-) Just that > the attack is clearly feasible is interesting though a demonstration > would be perhaps more convincing to less technically aware IRS people. > The biggest resource overhead is implementing that lot though, unless > there exist packages or libraries which already do most of it for you. The discrete log algorithm is similar to quadratic sieve and other modern factoring algorithms. You do multiple factorizations of other numbers and combine them to generate the desired relationships. The difference is that the factor base is not just the primes, it uses special numbers. There was a break a few years ago of the discrete log modulus being used by Sun's RPC. This was something like 200-300 bits. Maybe that discrete log code could be obtained from the authors.

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CTIA Daily News from WOW-COM - September 21, 1998
by CTIA Daily News 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

========================================== Welcome to today's edition of the CTIA Daily News from WOW-COM. Please click on the icon / attachment for the most important news in wireless communications today. The Newest Most Comprehensive Tradeshow of Wireless Computing and Communications is Less Than a Month Away. Register TODAY! http://www.wirelessit.com/register.htm Team WOW-COM wowcom(a)ctia.org ===========================================

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Re: Clinton's fake apologies (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 20 Sep 1998, Anonymous wrote: > > In reply to my suggestion that lieing under oath isn't > a very good reason for impeachment, > > Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> wrote: > > Of course it's different if you preface your lie with "I swear to tell the > > truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth". > > > > The oath is voluntary and therefore if broken no claim for duress, only > > intentional misdirection, can explain such actions. > > echoed by nobody(a)remailer.ch who wrote: > > ...If some public figure ... goes under oath and then lies, ... > > he's trying to throw a wrench in the > > justice system. It wouldn't be as bad if somebody like Jim or I lied under > > oath, but this guy is the chief executive of the United States. He's > > basically Top Cop, and his administration doesn't hesitate to press > > charges against people who commit all sorts of victimless crimes. > > > > I agree it's bad. I agree it undermines the justice system a little bit. > But, ... impeachment? Yes. We have some jokester sitting in Washington with full authority over our military forces. The people can't believe a word he says. Congress can't believe a word he says. He rules by executive order. He ignores the Constitution. There is argument over whether he ordered military strikes to divert attention from his scandal and whether he sold the country out to the Red Chinese. Now people like myself are thinking - totally justified - that this guy will do absolutely anything to hold on to his presidency. I don't feel particularly secure with some guy who I can't trust running the military and with his finger on the nuclear button. That itself is a violation of national security.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To my understanding pleading the 5th in response to a court order for your passphrase would work, correct? Or would you be liable under contempt of court?

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Alone (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Bob, Sorry, nothing personal but with an opening like that I couldn't help myself. Please forgive me. Forwarded message: > From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> > Subject: Alone (fwd) > Date: Mon, 21 Sep 1998 18:25:01 -0500 (CDT) > Forwarded message: > > > Date: Mon, 21 Sep 1998 18:38:16 -0400 > > From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > > Subject: Alone > > > > > "...it depends on how you define 'alone'.". > > > > Alone enough to get a blowjob? > > > > That depends Bob, can you bend over that far? > ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Questions for Magaziner? // taxing crypto
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:04 PM -0400 on 9/19/98, Ron Rivest wrote: > I feel mis-quoted and/or mis-represented in your note (below) > stating that "Magaziner mirrored Rivest's offer to tax encryption > products to pay for increased law enforcement technology support". Okay. Cool. Sorry if I mischaracterized it somehow, I wasn't trying to. Or was it Diffie who said something like that? By the way, someone told me that the Crypto "Authors@MIT" talk with you and Diffie, etc., was on CSPAN recently, so if someone *really* wanted to, they could go back, see *exactly* what was said, and say here what the idea was, (and who to attribute it to, of course), that prompted me to make the, um, offending, comment, they could do so. Frankly, I was too hyped from telling the FBI guy he didn't matter anymore, not to mention his dirty look that followed :-), to remember it accurately enough for scientific attribution. "The cost of error on a network full of scientists is bandwidth." -- Hettinga's Law of Network Noise Sorry if I mischaracterized what was surely the right thing to say at the time... :-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Forwarded mail...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 20 Sep 1998 09:35:33 +0200 > From: Anonymous <nobody(a)replay.com> > > To my understanding pleading the 5th in response to a court order for your > passphrase would work, correct? Or would you be liable under contempt of > court? > It should work, though I don't believe it's ever been tested in court. I've been looking at the court forcing one to take immunity and can't find anything that would support such actions. So if you haven't told the court you will cooperate *and* you say nothing more than that you're taking the 5th there shouldn't be much they can do except charge you as an accomplice and hope for a conviction on other material. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Important: RealPlayer G2 Beta Expiration
by RealNetworks News 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear RealPlayer G2 Beta Customer, As part of our ongoing commitment to improve customer service we want to notify you of some important technical information. In some cases our customers have noticed that their RealPlayer G2 Beta has expired. In order to continue using your RealPlayer G2 Beta, please read and follow the simple instructions below. +===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+ If Your RealPlayer G2 Beta Has Expired If you see a message warning you that your RealPlayer has expired, you may correct this problem by visiting RealNetworks Service and Support web site. Just click on the link below and follow the instructions on the page. ---> http://service.real.com/help/expired.html +===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+===+ If Your RealPlayer G2 Beta Has Not Already Expired You may have already received a notification from your RealPlayer G2 Beta indicating that a new update is available. If you installed the update by responding to the notification, your RealPlayer G2 Beta expiration date has been extended and you do not need to take any further action. If you have not installed the update, please do so now by visiting RealNetworks Service and Support web site. Just follow the instructions under the section labeled: "If your G2 RealPlayer Beta has not already expired." ---> http://service.real.com/help/expired.html NOTE: If you have already contacted RealNetworks Support you will not need to take any action. Thank you for supporting RealNetworks products, Maria Cantwell Senior Vice President RealNetworks, Inc. Seattle, WA USA --------------------------------------------- ABOUT THIS E-MAIL Participation in RealNetworks product updates and special offers is voluntary. During the installation of the RealPlayer Plus software you indicated a preference to receive these emails. For information about subscribing to or unsubscribing from future announcements, visit http://www.real.com/mailinglist/index.html

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uk police and warrents
by Steve Mynott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The UK police are pushing for access to people's email _without_ having a warrent. THey also want the ISPs to store everyone's mail for a week.. -- pgp 1024/D9C69DF9 1997/10/14 steve mynott <steve(a)tightrope.demon.co.uk>

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CJ's Teeth Busted
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded: Relatives report that Jeff Gordon busted CJ's teeth, which is why CJ was picked up, not for his wasted carcass, but for the the cutting edge incisors being hosted and packed around North America like suitcase nukes. The teeth allegedly hold the secrets of why everyone except the FBI wanted CJ. Jeff sent them to a LANL for DNA mouthwash decrypt for whatever CJ did to whoever to social engineer access to Motorola's algorithm's for transmitting DEFCON 1. Which means us .mil Totos got to go to the backup plan for richocheting/encrypting/mixing signals to the sats. Anyone forget where it is, send me a msg with the PK http://calvo.teleco.ulpgc.es/listas/cypherpunks@infonex.com/ Search Heavenly Gate/Cypherpunks/Waco+CJ Parker.. The word on the IC Net (see above URL) is that the teeth are rigged to resist for no more than twenty days under pressure of counterterrorism's bite. Then they bark Semtext: fucking jerks, then go nuclear. Monday is a key tumbler click. More, there's a forwarded report from the alleged CJ that he spit in the eye of the T-man, wrote "Helter Skelter" on the cell mirror with his blood, and then, slow chewing a turd, ostentatiously peeked up the lady magistrate's Victoria Secrets, for which she brazen-hussily ordered him to forthwith gaze up this: MO. Toto(a)AOL.com

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Comercialice su Negocio por Interne
by asesor＠ragnatela.miller.com.mx 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Vimos su anuncio en los Clasificados y pensamos que esta informacion puede ser de su interes. Si usted no desea recibir mas mensajes de este tipo, inserte la palabra "remove" en el Subject/Asunto y automaticamente sera borrado de nuestra lista. //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// Publicite su negocio a miles de personas de forma GRATUITA. Visite nuestra pagina y obtenga GRATIS un programa para diseñar su pagina Web en 10 minutos: http://www.miller.com.mx/biz.html

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Re: "Bioarmageddon"
by Neels Kriek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just read "The Cobra Event"by the author of "The Hot Zone" Although mostly fiction it makes for some very scary reading.

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WARNING: softSENTRY is a SCAM
by qweasd123＠my-dejanews.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Windows developers, DO NOT purchase 20/20 Software's outrageously priced ($695) softSENTRY utility. The package IS A SCAM. Before reading the below document I found on the Web, understand that DLL- and component-based copy protection systems are inherently easy to crack. (softSENTRY incorporates a DLL-based protection as one of its options, in addition to direct .exe "protection".) Also understand that utilities such as Shrinker and WWPack are only useful for compression, NOT protection from reverse engineering. EXE-compressors are notorious for being easy to crack. Do you want me to convince you? http://209.44.62.170/pir8/files/ak.html provides cracks for Vbox, SalesAgent, softSENTRY, TimeLock, and many other copy protection schemes. (Yes, the much overbloated Vbox is now WORTHLESS as a copy protection system.) For cracks of just about any EXE-compressor/encryptor you can think of (including WWPack32, Protect!, and Shrinker), visit http://www.nettaxi.com/citizens/caligo/main.htm. Yes, you can also forget about using Shrinker or WWPack to protect your app's code. They are both absolutely WORTHLESS in that respect as well. Cracks for them are now everywhere on the Web. ----------------------- e-mail: LSD-LSD(a)usa.net ----------------------- Hello out there. I am somewhat of a newbie at cracking (with some knowledge of assembly) but thought I'd try my luck at a commercial protection scheme for one of my first cracks. I will show you how to crack an extremely stupid, ready-made protection scheme, softSENTRY 2.07 from 20/20 Software. Download the trial version (itself extremely easy to crack) from http://www.twenty.com/pgs/dlidx.html. This software allows zombie programmers (who, IMHO, do not deserve to be called programmers if they have fallen for this disgustingly bogus protection) to "automatically" convert their FULL programs to "protected" trial versions. Sounds like a snake oil vendor, right? It is precisely that: bogus commercialism at its very best. (This crappy, $695 piece of junk really is worth only ten bucks. I have encountered far better utilities priced five times less.) Okay, what tools do we need to crack softSENTRY? - Numega's Soft-Ice - a good hex-editor I will not show you how to crack the demo of softSENTRY, because the process is boringly easy to do. (Do it youself! Tip: Delete c:\windows\system\ss.drv and the "magic key" located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\{XXXXXXXXXX} to restore the trial period.) I shall, however, show how to murder its weak protection scheme! (By the way, the fact that softSENTRY's own protection is so weak indicates a lot about the quality of the product itself!!) Prepare a test target by protecting some small program like Notepad in order to disassemble the process and watch how softSENTRY "works". For disassembly, we will utilize SoftIce because W32Dasm89 seemed to crash when I attempted to load the target. The protected file and the original file have different sizes. "Clever", you would have thought, as I did, "Maybe there's some encryption and variable random protection scheme inside the target." Well, you're in for quite a surprise. Now hold your breath; THIS IS THE ENTRY POINT FOR ALL PROTECTED FILES: :004B066F CC int 03 :004B0670 55 push ebp :004B0671 8BEC mov ebp,esp :004B0673 83EC48 sub esp,00000048 :004B0676 53 push ebx :004B0677 56 push esi :004B0678 57 push edi :004B0679 E950000000 jmp 004B06CE ; This is a very strange jump, wouldn't you say? :004B067E 0000 add [eax],al :004B0680 7006 jo 004B0688 All protected files possess the same pattern, with the exact same JMP (coded as E950000000)! This is very fortunate for us; it means that searching any "protected" file for the pattern { 55 8B EC 83 EC 48 53 56 57 E9 50 00 00 00 } will give us the entry point of the program and indicate to us that the program has been "protected" with softSENTRY! (Has your jaw hit the floor yet?) Yes, softSENTRY is very silly. The very insolent JMP 004B06CE points the EIP to the actual protection routine. The routine then jumps depending on the "protection" scheme the programmer specified for use: time limit, splash, etc. Read carefully: 00093C82: 8B4508 mov eax,[ebp][00008] ; 00093C85: 50 push eax ; 00093C86: 68A0324B00 push 004B32A0 ; 00093C8B: FF156C744B00 call [0004B746C] ; 00093C91: E88A000000 call 001279B1 ;THIS CALL LOADS THE RESOURCES OF THE MAIN PROGRAM! 00093C96: E825000000 call 00127956 ;THIS CALL WILL RUN THE MAIN PROGRAM! 00093C9B: 8B45B8 mov eax,[ebp][0FFB8] ; ; 00093C9E: 50 push eax ; 00093C9F: FF15E4734B00 call [0004B73E4] ; (If the protection fails, you will land at 00093C9B.) The two calls at 00093C91 and 00093C96 load the FULL program completely free of all nag, splash, time-limit, etc. functions that have been chosen. If you compare the above source with any other "protected" program, you will see that both calls are ALWAYS coded as: E8 8A 00 00 00 E8 25 00 00 00 1st Call 2nd Call Now we can write a general crack for this amazingly retarded protection scheme. Simply replace the first jump (coded as E950000000) with the code of the two calls, which, again, is always E88A000000 E825000000. 1) Search for: { 55 8B EC 83 EC 48 53 56 57 E9 50 00 00 00 } ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (This is the jump.) 2) Replace it with E8A2040000 E83D040000. Note that the two calls have been recalculated accordingly but remain the same. (Track them with your debugger!) So, cracking a softSENTRY-"protected" application is only a matter of switching a few bytes. I certainly wouldn't pay $695 for some silly "protection" that took me only 10 minutes to crack!

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WARNING: softSENTRY is a SCAM
by qweasd123＠my-dejanews.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Windows developers, DO NOT purchase 20/20 Software's outrageously priced ($695) softSENTRY utility. The package IS A SCAM. Before reading the below document I found on the Web, understand that DLL- and component-based copy protection systems are inherently easy to crack. (softSENTRY incorporates a DLL-based protection as one of its options, in addition to direct .exe "protection".) Also understand that utilities such as Shrinker and WWPack are only useful for compression, NOT protection from reverse engineering. EXE-compressors are notorious for being easy to crack. Do you want me to convince you? http://209.44.62.170/pir8/files/ak.html provides cracks for Vbox, SalesAgent, softSENTRY, TimeLock, and many other copy protection schemes. (Yes, the much overbloated Vbox is now WORTHLESS as a copy protection system.) For cracks of just about any EXE-compressor/encryptor you can think of (including WWPack32, Protect!, and Shrinker), visit http://www.nettaxi.com/citizens/caligo/main.htm. Yes, you can also forget about using Shrinker or WWPack to protect your app's code. They are both absolutely WORTHLESS in that respect as well. Cracks for them are now everywhere on the Web. ----------------------- e-mail: LSD-LSD(a)usa.net ----------------------- Hello out there. I am somewhat of a newbie at cracking (with some knowledge of assembly) but thought I'd try my luck at a commercial protection scheme for one of my first cracks. I will show you how to crack an extremely stupid, ready-made protection scheme, softSENTRY 2.07 from 20/20 Software. Download the trial version (itself extremely easy to crack) from http://www.twenty.com/pgs/dlidx.html. This software allows zombie programmers (who, IMHO, do not deserve to be called programmers if they have fallen for this disgustingly bogus protection) to "automatically" convert their FULL programs to "protected" trial versions. Sounds like a snake oil vendor, right? It is precisely that: bogus commercialism at its very best. (This crappy, $695 piece of junk really is worth only ten bucks. I have encountered far better utilities priced five times less.) Okay, what tools do we need to crack softSENTRY? - Numega's Soft-Ice - a good hex-editor I will not show you how to crack the demo of softSENTRY, because the process is boringly easy to do. (Do it youself! Tip: Delete c:\windows\system\ss.drv and the "magic key" located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\{XXXXXXXXXX} to restore the trial period.) I shall, however, show how to murder its weak protection scheme! (By the way, the fact that softSENTRY's own protection is so weak indicates a lot about the quality of the product itself!!) Prepare a test target by protecting some small program like Notepad in order to disassemble the process and watch how softSENTRY "works". For disassembly, we will utilize SoftIce because W32Dasm89 seemed to crash when I attempted to load the target. The protected file and the original file have different sizes. "Clever", you would have thought, as I did, "Maybe there's some encryption and variable random protection scheme inside the target." Well, you're in for quite a surprise. Now hold your breath; THIS IS THE ENTRY POINT FOR ALL PROTECTED FILES: :004B066F CC int 03 :004B0670 55 push ebp :004B0671 8BEC mov ebp,esp :004B0673 83EC48 sub esp,00000048 :004B0676 53 push ebx :004B0677 56 push esi :004B0678 57 push edi :004B0679 E950000000 jmp 004B06CE ; This is a very strange jump, wouldn't you say? :004B067E 0000 add [eax],al :004B0680 7006 jo 004B0688 All protected files possess the same pattern, with the exact same JMP (coded as E950000000)! This is very fortunate for us; it means that searching any "protected" file for the pattern { 55 8B EC 83 EC 48 53 56 57 E9 50 00 00 00 } will give us the entry point of the program and indicate to us that the program has been "protected" with softSENTRY! (Has your jaw hit the floor yet?) Yes, softSENTRY is very silly. The very insolent JMP 004B06CE points the EIP to the actual protection routine. The routine then jumps depending on the "protection" scheme the programmer specified for use: time limit, splash, etc. Read carefully: 00093C82: 8B4508 mov eax,[ebp][00008] ; 00093C85: 50 push eax ; 00093C86: 68A0324B00 push 004B32A0 ; 00093C8B: FF156C744B00 call [0004B746C] ; 00093C91: E88A000000 call 001279B1 ;THIS CALL LOADS THE RESOURCES OF THE MAIN PROGRAM! 00093C96: E825000000 call 00127956 ;THIS CALL WILL RUN THE MAIN PROGRAM! 00093C9B: 8B45B8 mov eax,[ebp][0FFB8] ; ; 00093C9E: 50 push eax ; 00093C9F: FF15E4734B00 call [0004B73E4] ; (If the protection fails, you will land at 00093C9B.) The two calls at 00093C91 and 00093C96 load the FULL program completely free of all nag, splash, time-limit, etc. functions that have been chosen. If you compare the above source with any other "protected" program, you will see that both calls are ALWAYS coded as: E8 8A 00 00 00 E8 25 00 00 00 1st Call 2nd Call Now we can write a general crack for this amazingly retarded protection scheme. Simply replace the first jump (coded as E950000000) with the code of the two calls, which, again, is always E88A000000 E825000000. 1) Search for: { 55 8B EC 83 EC 48 53 56 57 E9 50 00 00 00 } ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (This is the jump.) 2) Replace it with E8A2040000 E83D040000. Note that the two calls have been recalculated accordingly but remain the same. (Track them with your debugger!) So, cracking a softSENTRY-"protected" application is only a matter of switching a few bytes. I certainly wouldn't pay $695 for some silly "protection" that took me only 10 minutes to crack! -----== Posted via Deja News, The Leader in Internet Discussion ==----- http://www.dejanews.com/rg_mkgrp.xp Create Your Own Free Member Forum

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WHAT'S THE BETTING ON CLINTON?/NO NIBBLES FOR MONICA!
by STUFFED NEWS DAILY 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IN TODAY'S ISSUE: 30 NEW EXTRA HOT JPEGS! 5 NEW SIZZLING STORIES DEALING WITH JEALOUSY MAGIC MISTRESS MATTRESS THE BEST OF EUREKA! DO I LOOK FAT IN THIS? BANGCOCK DISCK CHOP SEX SELLS!!! NO NIBBLES FOR MONICA FROM NUDISM TO BUDDHISM WHAT'S THE BETTING ON CLINTON? MUCH MORE! ----> http://stuffed.net/98/9/20/ <---- Welcome to today's issue of Stuffed. To read it you should click on the URL above. If it is not made clickable by your email program you will need to use your mouse to highlight the URL, copy it and then paste it into your browser (then press Return). This email is never sent unsolicited. Stuffed is the supplement for the Eureka newsletter you subscribed to. Full instructions on unsubscribing are in every issue of Eureka! ----> http://stuffed.net/98/9/20/ <----

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Re: Questions for Magaziner?
by Arnold G. Reinhold 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: >> >> One question I'd like asked is whether the US Gov will approve 56-bit RC-4 >> for export on the same terms as 56-bit DES. That would allow export >> versions of web browsers to be upgraded painlessly, making international >> e-commerce 64 thousand times more secure than existing 40-bit browsers. >> (56-bit DES browsers would require every merchant to upgrade their SSL >> servers and introduce a lot of unneeded complexity.) > >Actually, it wouldn't be any easier to deploy 56-bit RC4 than DES. Either >would require roughly the same changes to both clients and servers. > I was under the impression that 40-bit RC4 was accomplished by revealing 88 bits of the 128-bit key in a header. If a new 56-bit-RC4 browser was implimented by setting16 of those 88 bits to zero, would any existing server know the difference? If not, you would get an immediate improvement in security, at least for browser to server messages, without waiting for the servers to be upgraded. No doubt I am missing something, but what? Arnold

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atheism (was: RE: Democracy... (fwd)) (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: pjm(a)spe.com > Date: Sun, 20 Sep 1998 20:13:38 +0200 > Subject: atheism (was: RE: Democracy... (fwd)) (fwd) > Personal philosophies are a superset of personal religious > beliefs. Personal philosophies that include the concept of a god are > clearly religious in nature. Personal philosophies that include the > concept of "faith" are probably religious in nature. Personal > philosophies that include the concepts of empirical evidence, > sceptical inquiry, and willingness to reject previously held positions > due to new evidence or argument are probably not religious in nature. Here is the catch in your distinction, the belief in those empirical positions is fundamentaly based on faith. Critical to those beliefs are at least two (any scientist worth anything could list many more) assumptions that can *only* be taken on faith: The universe and its operation is isotropic and homogenious So clearly a belief in science as a method to describe the relations between individuals and nature (at whatever scale) is fundamentaly based on faith. As to your assertion that such a belief system is not a religion, please take the time to review pantheism. It is clearly a religion in that it addresses the relationship of the individual, society, nature, and God. It does so by abandoning transcendence. You really should read some of Spinoza's work as well as William James'. Everything a person believes, for or against, is fundamentaly based on unprovable axiomatic assumptions whose (in)correctness is based on faith and by extension a belief in the correctness of the holder and the implied fallibility of all other individuals who hold beliefs to the contrary. In a very real sense religion is the epitomy of hubris. > The reason I challenged your assertion is that religious people > often use such statements as a basis for further arguments that end up > equivocating based on the term religion. They first broaden the > definition, by fiat, to be almost meaningless and then later use a > much narrower definition to support their ultimate point. I'm not > suggesting that you were going to do this; I am simply pointing out > why it is something of a sore point. This entire paragraph makes no sense. > No, they are not. The distinction is crucial to the main point I > evidently failed to make in my previous message: Atheism is not a set > of beliefs that constitutes a personal philosophy. There are Buddhist > atheists, Universalist-Unitarian atheists, objectivist atheists, > Wiccan atheists, etc. Atheism isn't even a belief, it is merely the > statement of a lack of one particular belief. No, atheism is the statement that "God could exist, but doesn't". Whether one chooses to hang 'Bhuddism' or 'Wiccan' on is irrelevant. We aren't discussion labels but rather characteristics. Fundamentaly *ALL* atheism states: While it could happen that way, I don't believe it does. Which is identical in meaning to: While it could happen that way, I believe it doesn't. > Getting back to the strong v. weak distinction, the weak atheist > position that one "does not believe god(s) exist" does not constitute > a belief, a set of beliefs, or a personal philosophy, let alone a > religion. The strong atheist position that one "believes god(s) do > not exist" is actually making a knowledge claim and so does constitute > a belief. Try to sell that spin-doctor bullshit to somebody else, and read a book on basic logic. > I'm not trying to prove anything either. I'm simply pointing out > some issues regarding atheism that are too often ignored or confused. Hence you are trying to prove that atheism is confused or ignored and as a result is misundestood. I've got news for you, it isn't either. If anyone is confused (and about to be ignored) it's yourself. > Now this part of the discussion I entered to satisfy my own > curiosity. Since it is so far off-topic for this list I'd be glad to > take it to personal email if you wish. Thanks but I don't generaly exchange private mail with strangers. > When you say "more than the > earthly veil" do you mean that there exist phenomena that cannot, even > in principle, be detected by our five senses or by any physical > mechanism we can create? If so, how do you know and why would it > matter? You didn't understand a single word in that explanation of transcendance. There are many(!) phenomena that occur in nature that are not transcendental that we can't in principle or practice experience with our five senses. Take your Machian view of reality somewhere else. As to knowing if something matters or not, that is the fundamental issue involved in the question: Does God exist? We're back to where we started. Signing off. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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It's Sunday and there's a hurricane coming...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Sun, 20 Sep 1998 15:13:53 -0400 (AST) From: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> To: dbs(a)philodox.com, e$(a)vmeng.com Subject: It's Sunday and there's a hurricane coming... Reply-To: iang(a)systemics.com Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> X-Web-Archive: http://www.philodox.com/dbs-archive/ It's Sunday and there's a hurricane coming. We're prepared with the Pringles and Jamaican ginger beer, and are now just watching the action on screen and out the window. One of the things about living in the Financial Cryptography Capital of the World is that occasionally we get visited by The Powers That Be, and flattened in the process. More nuisance than a TLA hate campaign, noisier than professors' mailing list, and more water than a broken pipe in a Cyber. Hurricane Georges is coming to town. The funny thing is that all along, or at least for many years, we have known how to control hurricanes. It was inevitably one of those cold war US defence contracts, run by the USAF. There was some justification based on annoying naval flotillas at sea, although it wasn't clear whether the fly-boys were intending to annoy the USN or the Ruskies. They kept the whole thing quiet, as nobody needs to know that huge amounts of money can be saved and/or advancing armardas can be sunk without using the other expensive toys developed by the other programs. Trials did occur, but the technology failed to make it into the commercial market. In order to hide the true potential, the brass hats put a strict 56-miles limit on the application for civilian purposes, thus revealing that you could only move the beast around, you couldn't really tame it. The real problem with the technology was that hurricanes still wanted to go in roughly the same direction, and all one could do was to pay the fee to the Air Force to get it moved 56 miles up or down the coast. Needless to say, the Generals were surprised to receive competing bids for services in the first live civilian hurricane. After a lot of confusion and multiple contradictory bids being accepted, the hurricane entered, destroyed, and left. As did the Generals, with the loot. This misuse of what were now public funds was considered sufficient to slap the exec order on the whole deal, conveniently making illegal any class action suits over the misused private funds. Working on this problem for some time has led to a solution. Using an anonymous cash protocol, we have built an Internet-based solution for setting the market-driven price for a hurricane path. Conveniently, we have also contracted delivery services from the specialists, those very same Generals, who are now living in the islands near here under assumed names and ranks. Up until now, the whole idea was received with less than religous fervour. Either nobody believed we could do it, or the locals were simply playing on island time. Just as we were about to give it up and retire to banana growing, Georges showed up and contracts started winding in. Market operators have a duty to track activity and ensure that no insider trading occurs (those pesky Generals). This responsibility has expanded into advice for traders of attractive opportunities for investment, either in the future positions market or in our line of lamps, air-dropped generators, and emergency supplies of Pringles. We've also been able to track geographical trends for governmental statistical purposes. Georges was nominally slated to cross the islands at Guadeloupe, but heavy market pressure backed by church collections on thursday night purchased a shift north in track. Getting in early was profitable for the Guadeloupians. St Martins then bought heavily and shifted it back on a close to due east track. Unfortunately the French fluffed it last night by downgrading their alert to a warning, so all the world knows now. Antigua, being stuck in the middle, then bought in, backed up by Monsterrat (who raised funds by threatening the Brits with another thousand refugees). Since then Georges has been yoyoing across the map and the market has gone to hell in a hand basket. The Generals had been raking in the delivery contracts, but have posted an aircraft maintainance alert and tripled the premium. Antiguan alternate government types, engaged in a power play with their legal counterparts, have traded a mammoth contract to have the hurricane move _towards_ them. Unhappy at the Generals' reluctance to fly, they've issued an options contract of another kind on the market operators, that will be 'in the money' if their other contract is not fulfilled. Meanwhile, a catholic mama in the US virgin islands had a little flutter on the market to help her more easterly daughter. Failing to spot mama's anonymous currency transaction form, the IRS have declared the area in general and hurricanes in particular to be a major money laundering effort, and have a SWOT team flying in. At least, the men in black will fly in once they complete negotiations with the Generals, who previously contracted all airports for the hurricane season, and are prepared to deal in exchange for an amnesty for previous picadillos. The market still goes strong, having at this stage traded 10% of the GDP of the East Caribbean. We're prepared for the long run, with defense in depth by redundant UPS and generators, multiple IP and interlocking 50 cal machine guns. If only we could stop our shareholders from killing each other, we could advance our plans to open trading in Florida. Phew. This Jamaican ginger beer is strong stuff, and we're already out of Pringles. Oh, and there's a hurricane coming. El Generalissimo. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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GILC Campaign to remove crypto restrictions from Wassenaar Arrangement
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-Msmail-Priority: Normal X-Mimeole: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4 Importance: Normal Date: Fri, 18 Sep 1998 04:41:24 -0500 Reply-To: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)LISTSERV.TEMPLE.EDU> Sender: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)LISTSERV.TEMPLE.EDU> From: Richard Hornbeck <rhornbec(a)COUNSEL.COM> Subject: GILC Campaign to remove crypto restrictions from Wassenaar Arrangement To: DIGSIG(a)LISTSERV.TEMPLE.EDU The following excerpt from the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) Web page http://www.efa.org.au/wassenaar/support/ briefly describes its recent issuance of a statement calling for the removal of cryptography export restrictions from the Wassenaar Arrangement. Further background information on this international Arrangement, and on the considerable international support for this statement can be found at Electronic Frontiers Australia (EFA)'s Web Site. Dr. Michael Baker of EFA is the primary author and original sponsor for the GILC statement. Further information is also available at the Wassenaar organization's Web site, http://www.wassenaar.org/ In principle, Wassenaar is the international version of those regulations that currently place restrictions on exporting strong crypto outside the U.S. All of the 33 member countries agree to abide by a set of standards for exporting encryption products from their countries, for the benefit or preventing terrorism, making international law enforcement's job easier, etc. Individuals subscribing to this list may wish to review this material, and add their organization or association's support to this important campaign. It is timed to coincide with the current round of Wassenaar talks in Vienna that begin this month, and continue through November. Richard Hornbeck ============================================================== The major impediment to the wide spread adoption of cryptography, to protect vital infrastructures from attack and electronic commerce from fraud, has been controls on the export of cryptography. The only international agreement on the export of cryptography is the Wassenaar Arrangement, which wrongly classes encryption as a dual-use technology (one that could be used for offensive purposes). On 15th September 1998 Members of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign issued a statement calling for the removal of cryptography export restrictions from the Wassenaar Arrangement. Since then companies and associations have been expressing their support for the statement. If your company or association wishes to "sign" the following support statement: "We, the undersigned companies and associations support the Global Internet Liberty Campaign Member Statement of 15th September 1998 calling for the removal of cryptography export restrictions from the Wassenaar Arrangement." please write to <signon(a)efa.org.au> giving your company or association name, web address and country. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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financial analysis of Canadian gun controll bill ( C-68 )
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpt from: Cdn-Firearms Digest Sunday, September 20 1998 Volume 02 : Number 597 Date: Sun, 20 Sep 1998 05:33:19 -0600 From: Jean Hogue <jean_hogue(a)sympatico.ca> Subject: 360 Millions For What? 1. 360 Millions For What ? background: the CFC finally spit out the revised estimate of registration until the end year 2002: 120 millions in set up costs 240 millions for operation (60 M per year for 4 years). - ------ Reference: canadian firearms digest v. 2 # 595 Date: Thu, 17 Sep 1998 19:26:57 -0600 From: David A Tomlinson <nfadat(a)telusplanet.net> Subject: BOY ARE THEY GONNA BOMB... > If, however, it is an unrestricted rifle or shotgun, then it will NOT have > to be "verified" -- no matter how many times it is transferred and > re-registered -- until 01 Jan 2003. Let me see if I can get this straight now: - -- a) re-arrangement of the data set: In order to justify the National Firearms Registry (and the whole CFC existence), the Canadian Firearms Centre came out with its own statistics, having rejected the actual firearms crime figures from both the RCMP and Statistics Canada. The CFC's point what to "prove" that the "problem" firearms were not the legally registered restricted firearms (these were so easy to ban outright) but the unrestricted rifles and shotguns. - -- b) verification: flavor of the day First, the CFC came out with the dumb "fill-it-in-yourself" postcard, guaranteed to collect essentially trash and hopelessely corrupt the entire National Firearms Registry. Second, the CFC announced that after the registration deadline (Dec. 31, 2002), all the 7 million records would be examined to weed out the trash. An impossible task. Hercules did not pussyfoot around with a shovel in Augias' stables. It means that the registration work would have to be redone entirely and taking a corrupt database as the only source of information. At the end of 2002, the National Firearms Registry would be a collection of trash with absolutely no legal value. The importance of "legal value" ? Let's see ... "A Ruger Mini-14 ? No, I surrendered that newly banned gun years ago. Your records must be wrong. No, I did not keep the stinking receit. I don't have to prove I'm innocent, you have to prove I'm guilty. Get lost !" What they goonna do ? Break down the door at 03:00 with machine guns ? Third, the CFC announced it would do verification on the fly. Stuck with sky-rocketing costs, the best it could come up with was to recruit 6,000, then 3,000 unpaid volunteers -- a few weeks before the law is to take effect on Oct. 1, 1998. Each of them would have to proceed with an average number of 2,300 verifications within a 4-year time frame to ensure the protection of 7 miilion firearm registration records against corruption. Fourth, DAT's posting now clarifes that verification only applies to restricted firearms. This coincides with the last few days left before Oct. 1st and a seeming conclusion that the CFC failed to find in time 3,000 persons dumb enough to come mow their lawn for free. - -- end result : - the CFC's own self-serving estimates of 7 million firearms (a case has been made of an actual number of 20 millions) - registered restricted firearms records with the gov.: 1 million ---> rifles/shotguns outnumber restricted guns by 6:1 1. 86 % of registration applications (rifles and shotguns) will be exempt from verification. Brilliant ! A few days before the Oct. 1st deadline, we are now back at square two: 6 million trash records, to be verified "maniana". (Spanish for either really "tomorrow" or "in the fullness of time", the audience must judge which applies). 2. The remaining 14 % (handguns and other restricteds) already on file were ALREADY verified and need to verified AGAIN (but rifles and shotguns only need to be registered ONCE ever - right !). 3. The principle of the day is that the firearms allegedly most often used in domestic violence do not need no stinking verification but the considerably smaller stock of restricted firearms already verified must be verified. Conclusion: For 360 millions, we will end up with a National Firearms Registry with absolutely no legal value. In 2003, a new round of hundreds of millions will be required again to magically clean up an entirely corrupt Registry. No deadline set. Hey CFC, please don't say it. I do not want to be told again that the enire after-the-fact verification program will only cost 85 millions. It really is not that complicated. Either the registration applications need to be verified or they don't. A rifle/shotgun owner is just as liable as a handgun owner to make a mistake when describing a firearm on a registration form. Arguing that the type of firearm changes the requirement is essentially negociating on the principle. (Clinton: oral sex does not count as a sexual relationship). The sort of people who have not figured out yet that a principle is somehting that is not open to negociation and compromise are the sort of people who have no principles. So, in the end, the registration process will have worthless data on the unrestricted firearms -- allegedly the ones most often used in crime and the emphasis on accurate registration will be placed on the other, considerably smaller lot, of firearms. Odd, I thought this is what the government has been doing since 1934. And failed ever since. Do not pass go, do not collect $ 200, lose a turn and go back to square 0. IS THIS WHAT WE GET FOR 360 MILLIONS ? And Allan Rock, who brought us C-68, now does not have money to compensate hep-C victims. - --------------- 2. Question to the CFC: When are you going to disclose your revised fees ? Announced roughly within the same time frame as the 85 million dollar cost for the entire 7-year gun registry (starting from 1995 until the end of 2002). The following base figures are those of the CFC: registration fee: $ 10 initially for "up to 10 firearms", increasing to $ 18. possession permit: $ 10 initially, increasing to $ 60 near the end. number of gun owners: 3 millions number of firearms: 7 millions proportion of gun owners enticed into early compliance by low initial fee: 30% average number of firearms per gun owner: 2.3 (less than 10) First 30 %: 900,000 gun owners, 2.1 million guns: 18 M$ 0.9 million permits x $ 10/permit = 9 M$ 0.9 million registrations x $ 10 = 9 M$ Last 70 % : 2.1 million gun owners, 4.9 million guns: 164 M$ 2.1 million permits x $ 60/permit = 126 M$ 2.1 million registrations x $ 18 = 38 M$ Total tax grab by Dec. 31st, 2002 182 M $ ------- Note that the number of registration applications is equal to the number of gun permit applications because we are allowed "up to 10 firearms" for the same fee. Now, the following secnarios to consider are : 1- the bureaucrats really believed the 85 million figure -- and they were going to bilk gun owners out of an extra 100 million dollars right from the start, more than twice what they actually "needed"; 2- the bureaucrats have known for a long time that the fee schedule they published covers only half of the actual costs of 360 millions. Just as they stalled and stonewalled and denied for as long as possible the true extent of their spendings, they are also stalling and stonewalling on the real fees they will have to charge to cover their lavish lifestyle. I doubt very much scenario 1 is true -- the bureaucrats could not be so naive, the Surete du Quebec itself will set up a staff of up 200 at the cost of 40 millions, close to half the 85 million total. Scenario 2 shows we cannot believe Ottawa's fee structure anymore than we can believe its total cost estimates nor its crime statistics. In a nutshell: - - The bureaucrats could not do it for 85 mmillions. - - The bureaucrats cannot do it for 360 millions. (at that point, only gone through the motions, unvalidated registry). - ---> The fees cannot remain at the original level promised at the beginning. ------------------------------ Jean-Francois Avon, B.Sc. Physics, Montreal, Canada DePompadour, Société d'Importation Ltée Limoges fine porcelain and french crystal JFA Technologies, R&D physicists & engineers Instrumentation & control, LabView programming PGP keys: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html PGP ID:C58ADD0D:529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 PGP ID:5B51964D:152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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