December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Gadget Warfare, from the Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

********* http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1669,00.html The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/) January 6, 1998 Gadget Warfare by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) For a country with no real military rivals, the U.S. still manages to find an amazing number of enemies. Terrorists top the list of anti-American villains, according to a Pentagon report released last month. The 100-page document, called "Responses to Transnational Threats," describes how the military should respond to the threat of saboteurs and bombers aiming for violence, not victory. The solution, according to the Pentagon, is to develop a set of gadgets that would make even James Bond jealous: * STICKY ELECTRONICS Think SpiderMan's spidertracers, only smaller. "Sticky electronics" adhere to a suspected terrorist's clothing, hair, luggage or vehicle and report his location. These almost microscopic gizmos tune in to satellite signals and transmit their exact latitude and longitude. "To conserve battery (and mission life) they would respond only when" activated by a radio signal, the Pentagon says. And if you're the suspicious type, sprinkle some in your spouse's underwear. * DATA MINING If you worried about the FBI's jones for access to your data, wait 'til you find out what the military hopes to do. The Pentagon wants authority to sift through private-sector databases in hopes of tracking down, say, the World Trade Center bombers before they strike. The plan is to incorporate "real-time data on international border crossings, real-time cargo manifests, global financial transactions and the global network carrying international airline ticket manifests." As new private-sector databases are developed, "the baseline system would be augmented so that the correlation and fusion process becomes more automated." But the benefits of invading everyone's privacy are dubious: It's hard to imagine the alleged Unabomber, for instance, showing up in computer files. [...]

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Re: cypherpunks and guns
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:28 AM 1/6/98 -0500, Ryan Lackey wrote: > >I am fairly certain that as an irregular army soldier I could inflict >a substantial amount of damage upon an occupying military. With maybe >$20k in equipment and several hundred hours of training, you could make >life very difficult for any luckless squad that happens your way. Multiply >that by 100 million armed citizens and you see that armed civilian >resistance *can* defeat an occupying army. A distributed decentralized terrorist group can trash almost any country's infrastructure as well. The gov't knows this, but if it were to start happening (or their intelligence indicated it might) guards would be sent to the power stations, transformers, water works, radio relays, NAPs, refineries, etc. These guards would be physical, guarding physical resources against physical threats. They would be able to resist smaller threats. As you say, if outnumbered, they're eventually hosed. The recent gov't interest in 'cyber' threats against infrastructure reflects the fact that the government doesn't dominate the digital domain, and can't protect it with troops, and needs it to run civilization and its armies. ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu "How do you know you are not being deceived?" ---A Compendium of Analytic TradeCraft Notes, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA

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Jim Bell article excerpt (Was: Letter on Jim Bell)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote this last summer: [...] Then Assassination Politics sent the IRS into a tizzy. Jeffrey Gordon, an inspector in the IRS' Internal Security Division, widened the investigation immediately. He detailed in an 10-page affidavit how he traced Bell's use of allegedly fraudulent Social Security Numbers, how he learned that Bell had been arrested in 1989 for "manufacturing a controlled substance," how he found out that Bell possessed the home addresses of a handful of IRS agents. Gordon's conclusion? Bell planned "to overthrow the government." The IRS investigator said in his affidavit that Bell's "essay details an illegal scheme by Bell which involves plans to assassinate IRS and other government officials... I believe that Bell has begun taking steps to carry out his Assassination Politics plan." But for all Gordon's bluster in court documents, he had no proof that Bell broke the law. He didn't even have enough evidence to arrest the prolific essayist -- at least not yet. After the April 1 raid, Gordon and a team of IRS agents worked to assemble a case against Bell. They pored through the hard drives of the three computers they seized. They scrutinized documents from Bell's house. They interrogated his friends. They listened to tape recordings of the "Multnomah County Common Law Court." They scoured the Net for mentions of Assassination Politics. Six weeks later they felt their case was complete. --- IRS agents arrested Bell on May 16 and charged him with obstructing government employees and using false Social Security numbers. Now, this is hardly attempting "to overthrow the government." But government agents insist Bell is far more dangerous than the charges suggest. (The judge seemed to agree: at the time of this writing, Bell is being held without bail.) The latest IRS documents filed with the court label Bell a terrorist. They claim he talked about sabotaging the computers in Portland, Oregon's 911 center, contaminating a local water supply with a botulism toxin, extracting a poison called Ricin from castor beans, and manufacturing Sarin nerve gas. He allegedly bought and tested some of the chemicals. "Bell has taken overt steps to implement his overall plan by devising, obtaining, and testing the materials needed to carry out attacks against the United States, including chemicals, nerve agents, destructive carbon fibers, firearms, and explosives," the complaint says. But what really got the IRS in a stink was what happened a month after they seized Bell's car. The complaint says: "On March 16, 1997, a Sunday, an IRS employee noted a strong odor in the Federal building. On March 17, 1997, several IRS employees had to be placed on leave due to the odor, and another employee reported other ill effects. The odor was traced to a mat and carpeting... just outside the IRS office entrance." The chemical proved to be "mercaptan," with which Bell's friends say he doused an adversary's law office in the early 1980s. Yet if Bell was a crypto-terrorist, he was a singularly idle one. This is a problem with the IRS' accusations: if true, they prove too much. If Bell was bent on toppling the government, and his exploits date back from the early 1980s, why are they such laughably juvenile and ineffectual ones? Stink-bombing offices isn't a Federal felony, nor should it be. "I would've thought this would be 'malicious mischief,' at most," Tim May, one of the founders of the cypherpunks, writes. "People who've done far, far, far worse are left unprosecuted in every major jurisdiction in this country. The meat thrown to the media -- the usual AP stuff, mixed in with 'radical libertarian' descriptions -- is just to make the case more media-interesting... It sure looks like they're trying to throw a bunch of charges against the wall and hope that some of them stick -- or scare Bell into pleading to a lesser charge." Since his arrest, the denizens of the cypherpunks list, where Bell introduced and refined his ideas, have become generally sympathetic. Gone is the snarling derision, the attacks on his ideas as too extreme. Now a sense of solidarity has emerged. One 'punk wrote: "I have decided that I cannot in good conscience allow Jim Bell's persecution for exercising his basic human right to free speech to pass by without taking personal action to support him." --- When I talked to Bell a few days before his arrest, he spoke calmly and with little rancor about the pending investigation. I couldn't tell how he felt after being raided and interrogated by his arch-enemy, the IRS. But imagine continuously railing on the Net against jackbooted thugs, then having real ones bash down your front door. Bell was most interested in talking up Assassination Politics and predicting how it would eventually blossom. He had just published an op-ed in a local newspaper saying "the whole corrupt system" could be stopped. "Whatever my idea is, it's not silly. There are a lot of adjectives you can use, but not silly," he told me. "I feel that the mere fact of having such a debate will cause people to realize that they no longer have to tolerate the governments they previously had to tolerate. At that point I think politicians will slink away like they did in eastern Europe in 1989. They'll have lost the war." He told me why he became convinced that the government needed to be lopped off at the knees. Bell's epiphany came after he ordered a chemical from a supply firm and was arrested when he failed to follow EPA regulations. "That radicalized me," he said. "That pissed me off. I figured I'd get back at them by taking down their entire system. That's how I'd do it."' Moral issues aside, one of the problems plaguing Bell's scheme is that it's not limited to eliminating "government thugs who violate your rights," as he likes to describe it. If it existed, anyone with some spare change could wipe out a nosy neighbor or even an irritating grocery store clerk. After I pointed this out to Bell on the phone, he fired email back a few days later saying, "Assuming a functioning Assassination Politics system, nothing stops you from contributing to my death." He suggested that maybe assassins would develop scruples: "You'd be able to purchase deaths of unworthy people, but it might be only at a dramatically higher price. Doable but not particularly economical." [...] -Declan

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ACM conference on computer-related policy (DC, 5/98)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 11:10:49 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: ACM conference on computer-related policy (DC, 5/98) [The best policy for the Net is probably no policy, or at most a hands-off one. We don't have national "policies" for how we should regulate, for example, newspapers or bookstores, and we don't need such policies for the Net. On universal service, we already have Internet connections that are cheaper than cable TV; on copyright, the safest course is to let federal courts decide; on crypto, most agree that the current "policy" is misguided at best. --Declan] *************** ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING (ACM) ANNUAL CONFERENCE * * * POLICY98 * * * "Shaping Policy in the Information Age" Washington, DC, Renaissance Hotel May 10-12, 1998 Preliminary Notice For Conference and Registration information see: http://www.acm.org/usacm/events/policy98/ The ACM Annual Conference will focus on public policy issues affecting future applications of computing. Our goal is to forge stronger links between computing professionals and policy makers. Attendees will interact with prominent leaders from academia, industry, Congress, and Executive agencies, and participate in debates on policy issues including Universal Access, Electronic Commerce, Intellectual Property, and Education Online. The conference will promote more regular engagement of computing professionals in democratic processes related to productive use of computing and information processing innovations. A blend of technical skills and policy insights are essential to cope with the inherent opportunities and dangers of any transformational technology. Continuing collaborations between computing professionals and policy makers will benefit citizens, consumers, entrepreneurs, researchers, and students. You can make a difference! May 10: Ethical and social impacts papers and panels May 11-12: Public policy panels and featured speakers All Policy98 attendees are invited to the Annual ACM Awards Banquet on Sunday evening May 10th, and a conference reception on Monday evening May 11th. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ PANEL TOPICS AND COORDINATORS =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ Universal Service: Ollie Smoot What can be done to promote widespread access to the benefits of the Internet? What is the role of government and the role of the private sector in wiring schools, libraries, and medical facilities? Electronic Commerce: Jim Horning How much public policy does EComm need? What problems would inadequate, excessive, or misguided policies cause? Can compromises in areas like fair trade practices, fraud prevention, security, privacy, law enforcement, and taxation advance the interests of all stakeholders? Intellectual Property in Cyberspace: Pam Samuelson What will be the impact of the WIPO agreements on copyright in cyberspace? How should intellectual property be protected and what safeguards are necessary to protect libraries and academic institutions? Education Online: Charles N. Brownstein The Internet offers unparalleled opportunities for learning and teaching. What public policy and technical challenges must be met to realize these prospects? +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ CONFERENCE CO-CHAIRS =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ Ben Shneiderman, USACM (U.S. Public Policy Committee) C. Dianne Martin, SIGCAS (ACM Special Interest Group on Computers & Society) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ PROGRAM COMMITTEE CHAIRS =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ Marc Rotenberg, Public Policy Keith Miller, Ethics and Social Impacts +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ REGISTRATION INFORMATION =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ For more information, contact: policy98(a)acm.org or to register electronically, see: http://www.acm.org/usacm/events/policy98/reginfo.html Early registrants and ACM members receive discounts.

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Re: cypherpunks and guns
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)mit.edu> # AOLserver (a nice web server formerly from GNN/navisoft) punted their # 128bit SSL module distribution *EVEN TO US CITIZENS* due to commerce # department fuckedness. Anyone know where I could get a copy? It would # really suck to have to patch the 40bit one into a 128bit version, since # they do not distribute source. I don't know if this is the "module" form of the answer you want: http://www.replay.com/ Download Netscape Communicator 4.04 with 128 bits SSL today on: ftp.replay.com Replay Associates distributes this software so you can safely conduct your E-commerce ---- Tim May wrote: > Final comment: If I find the motivation, I may finish an essay I've been > working on about how we, the Cypherpunks and the World, are *retrogressing* > in crypto areas. Most of the exotic applications are no longer being > discussed, and various mundane commercial products are the main focus. > Yawn. How about moving this list to encrypt its transmissions in the recipient's public keys, just to begin encrypting Net traffic? Obviously not to hide what is being said, but simply to start moving communications into the encrypted realm. That way, we'll build up the software tools for handling this, and try to get other lists to do the same. Maybe encourage all pro-crypto people to use it for all email to as many other people they talk with as possible. (Adopt two others...) Heh: a white-list to allow only encrypted messages through. Encourage Senators to set up public keys. In general, try to get the general flow of traffic encrypted, even if PGP is "mundane" these days. Solving the human factors problem of getting its use wide-spread is _not_ a mundane problem. Encryption ain't gonna be that useful if only a few in-the-know use it. ---guy

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Silly Shrinkwrapped Encryption
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone poke through Lotus Notes with a debugger and see exactly how this "giving 24 bits to the government" is implemented? Most commercial software simply introduces redundancy in order to limit the keyspace to 40 bits, regardless of the advertised length of the key. This claim that they deliver 64 bits of key to the customer seems a bit bogus. Of course, they could have done something clever, like generating a completely random 64 bit key, and then encrypting 24 bits of it with a giant government-owned RSA public key, and including this additional information with each message. However, it seems unlikely that they would employ such strong encryption for message recovery, while offering only 64 bits for message encryption. Is Lotus Notes encryption documented anywhere? Are the differences between the export and domestic versions disclosed to overseas customers? -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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Governments want to change Net architecture, from Comm Daily
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 07:44:57 -0800 (PST) >From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> >To: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Subject: FC: Governments want to change Net architecture, from Comm Daily >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Sender: owner-politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Reply-To: declan(a)well.com >X-Loop: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >X-URL: Politech is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ > >[Apologies to Art for not forwarding this earlier. --Declan] > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 10:28:49 -0500 >From: Art Brodsky <arb(a)well.com> >To: declan(a)smtp.well.com >Subject: comm daily story > >Declan, > Here's the story from Comm Daily, Dec. 17 > >'Optimistic and Damned Silly' > > INTERNET CHANGE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT > > Law enforcement officials of U.S. and 7 other industrialized >countries want to make fundamental changes in Internet technology >in order to aid in their ability to track and catch criminals, >Justice Dept. sources said. > > Program to consider changes in Internet architectures comes as >part of agreement announced last week by Attorney Gen. Janet Reno >and Justice ministers from around world after meeting in Washington >(CD Dec 11 p10). However, one leading Internet authority, MCI >Senior Vp Vinton Cerf, said international group's plan wouldn't >work. > > Justice ministers are considering approach similar to that of >Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) program in >U.S., which would make traffic from advanced telecom networks more >accessible to law enforcement entities. Representatives of Canada, >France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and U.K., as well as U.S., >agreed as part of "statement of principles" issued in communique >following 2-day session that: "To the extent practicable, >information and telecommunications systems should be designed to >help prevent and detect network abuse, and should also facilitate >the tracing of criminals and the collection of evidence." Several >items on "action plan" issued in support of those principles refer >to working with new technologies to collect critical evidence, >developing standards for authenticating electronic data for use in >investigations and encouraging standards-making bodies to provide >public and private sectors "with standards for reliable and secure >telecommunications and data processing technologies." > > DoJ officials said Dept. may want to talk later with telephone >industry on trap and trace issues, but it's premature to involve >them now in follow-up to international summit. Instead, they said, >they are looking at broader picture of telecom networks that >haven't worked as closely with law enforcement as they could, and >have begun thinking about Internet protocols. Internet operates >globally with common protocols, currently Internet Protocol version >4. Internet engineers are working on next iteration, version IPv6 >(Internet Protocol version 6 -- 5 was experimental attempt that was >dropped). Justice official said that one problem now is that it's >easy to send and receive e-mail with false address, called >"spoofing." > > It would be helpful to law enforcement if information sent >over Internet were tagged, and packets would transmit information >reliably as to where they came from, including user and service >provider, officials said. Loose analogy would be to compare e-mail >messages to tagging of explosives, so law enforcement can track >explosive material to its source. DoJ said new protocols could be >designed to make it easier to authenticate messages and to make >system more reliable. Law enforcement wants to work with industry >to accomplish goal, saying it would help "keep people who are >abusing information technologies from continuing to do it." > > There will be substantial obstacles to law enforcement >concept, however. Not least of them is that IPv6 will include >sophisticated encryption capabilities as part of protocols. Such >security isn't built in to Internet now, one of reasons why >electronic commerce has yet to take off, said Mark McFadden, >communications dir. for Commercial Internet eXchange Assn. (CIX). >That feature will make it harder for law enforcement to gain access >to information, he said. > > Cerf, co-inventor of Internet protocols, said in interview >that law enforcement's concept of tagging e-mail messages wouldn't >work: "To imagine that we would instantly create the >infrastructure for that throughout the entire Internet strikes me >as optimistic and damned silly, at least in the short term. Anyone >who anticipates using tools to guarantee that everything will be >traceable is not going to have a successful outcome." Technically, >such project could be accomplished, Cerf said, but having >administrative infrastructure to administer it is quite different >issue. > > It's possible to have digital signature for every packet of >data, but it would take "an enormous amount of processing, and it's >not clear we have any network computers and routers that could do >that and maintain the traffic flow that's required," Cerf said. It >also would require that each sender affix digital signature to each >piece of mail, idea that Cerf said couldn't be enforced: "Frankly, >the idea of trying to guarantee traceability of that kind is far >from implementable." He said he didn't want to be misunderstood >that his objections were "an argument in favor of criminality." >But Cerf said he worries that "someone relies on what they think is >a technical solution without recognizing all of the administrative >mechanics that need to be put in place." > > Law enforcement has some time to work with Internet community. >McFadden said IPv6 isn't scheduled to be implemented at consumer >level for at least 5 years, possibly as much as 10. There was some >urgency when it appeared that reservoir of Internet addresses would >dry up, but with progress being made to protect addresses as scarce >resource there's less pressure for new set of protocols, he said. > > >posted with permission Warren Publishing > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology >To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: >subscribe politech >More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >

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Re: Silly Shrinkwrapped Encryption
by jim＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Cordian says: > Could someone poke through Lotus Notes with a debugger and see exactly how > this "giving 24 bits to the government" is implemented? Lotus produced a "backgrounder" called "Differential Workfactor Cryptography" when they first promulgated the 64/40 stuff. It says (in part): We do that by encrypting 24 of the 64 bits under a public RSA key provided by the U.S. government and binding the encrypted partial key to the encrypted data. I haven't seen the USG RSA key -- if it's 512 bits, that would be a humorous next factoring target. Jim Gillogly 15 Afteryule S.R. 1998, 20:02 12.19.4.14.15, 12 Men 13 Kankin, Seventh Lord of Night

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Seeking Environmentally Friendly People ?
by tozumi44＠msn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Rep. Sonny Bono (R-California) dies at 62
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************ http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/afternoon/0,1012,1670,00.html The Netly News / Afternoon Line January 6, 1998 When Sonny Turns to Blue Rep. Sonny Bono, a Congressman better known for his songwriting than his lawmaking, died yesterday in a skiing accident. He was 62. Bono built his show-biz career on being the butt of Cher's jokes and found that he played a similar role in Washington, a town where self-deprecation is reviled, not admired. Washingtonian magazine once dubbed him the dumbest member of Congress, and commentators criticized his informal approach to lawmaking on the buttoned-down House Judiciary committee, on which the California Republican tackled Internet legislation. Early last year he staunchly opposed the FBI's demands for increased government snooping power but then backed down. He told me in September that at first he had not been "aware" of the details surrounding the encryption debate and there are others "we have to be concerned about." Bono also sponsored H.R. 1621 and H.R. 2589, two copyright extension bills currently being considered by Congress. --Declan McCullagh/Washington

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UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS-ANNOUNCE
by Brian＠HyperSoft.Net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS-ANNOUNCE

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YAIPC (Yet Another Internet Policy Conference, 2/98)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 14:30:57 -0500 From: Ben Isaacson <ben(a)interactivehq.org> To: "'declan(a)well.com'" <declan(a)well.com> Subject: Would you consider forwarding this as well? --> WashingtonWeb Internet Policy Forum More info at http://www.washingtonweb.org and http://www.interactivehq.org Interactive Industry Leaders and Top Policy Makers to Meet at WashingtonWeb Internet Policy Forum Washington, DC -- With the mounting interest of Washington in the Internet, key policy makers and Internet industry executives will come together for a strategic discussion about the impact of politics on the Internet. Sponsored by the Association for Interactive Media, the WashingtonWeb Internet Policy Forum, February 9 and 10, 1998, is the premier top-level meeting between the Washington policy community and the leaders of the new media industry. "Internet executives and government officials come from very different backgrounds. There needs to be an on- going dialogue between the users and regulators of this powerful medium in order to ensure that businesses may continue to grow and serve the public. The WashingtonWeb Internet Policy Forum is designed to facilitate this discussion," said Andy Sernovitz, President of the Association for Interactive Media. Currently, over 300 Members of Congress have co- sponsored bills regulating interactive businesses. Federal regulatory agencies including the FCC, FTC, NTIA, Treasury, Federal Reserve, White House Office of Technology Assessment, and the Patent and Trademark Office, are considering new legislation and regulation. Commerce on the Net will be forever shaped by the dozens of bills, regulations, and policy directives that are already on the table. Participants will have the opportunity to interact with the very legislators and regulators who will make these decisions. A partial list of topics to be discussed at WashingtonWeb include: Pending Legislation and Regulation: The Industry Response; Potential Expansion of FTC and FCC Jurisdictions; Taxing the Internet; Beltway Wonks vs. Web Gurus; Consumer Concerns and Industry Self-Regulation. Speakers (to date) include: Representative Rick Boucher; Adam Theirer, Heritage Foundation; Adam Clayton Powell III, The Freedom Forum; Pete DuPont, IntellectualCapital.com.; Robin Raskin, Editor & Publisher, Family PC Magazine; Kenneth Dotson, CBS Sportsline; and Gordon Ross, NetNanny. Sponsors include: Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Policy.com, CNN/Time All Politics, Net Nanny, IntellectualCapital.com, and Exodus Communications. The WashingtonWeb Internet Policy Forum will be held February 9 and 10, 1998, at the Willard intercontinental Hotel in Washington, DC. CONTACT: Andy Dotson Association for Interactive Media 202-408-0008 andy(a)interactivehq.org http://www.washingtonweb.org ___________________________________________________ This message was sent to you because your company is a member of the Association for Interactive Media. Visit our web site: http://www.interactivehq.org AIM never releases email addresses to third parties. To SUBSCRIBE or CHANGE YOUR ADDRESS, email a note to yasha(a)interactivehq.org To UNSUBSCRIBE, forward this message to: unsubscribe-members(a)lists.interactivehq.org [staff(a)interactivehq.org] ___END____________________________________________ List server provided by Lyris -- http://www.lyris.com

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Question on U.S. Postal Service and crypto
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is for a story for Time on the "new" U.S .Postal Service. I vaguely recall the USPS trying to set digital signature standards and/or serve as a CA. I'd like to mention this. Can't remember the details, though. Does anyone have 'em (or a pointer to them) handy? -Declan

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The Digital Society Group
by jalonz＠openworld.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Openworld, Inc. is a company which sets up free enterprise zones around the world. The "free zones" are akin to Hong Kong and Singapore and are self-governing, independent entities as recognized by the parent country. Free zones usually have the ability to issue citizenship, business licenses and incorporation status to entities as well as have their own police force and arbitration structure. A lot of them are not nearly big enough to need that kind of independence, but there are a few. Free zones rarely have bureacracy, taxes, etc. because the idea is to create an environment for the rapid creation and deployment of new businesses. Land is leased for 50-100 years with a parent entity buy-back at the end of the term. Can anyone say corporate state? Basically, free zones are corporations (or groups of) leasing land from a country in order to make it valuable enough to sell back at a large profit in 100 years. Notice that the emphasis is on very long-term results. The free zone only makes money if the residents are happy, educated and making money. Environmental issues are addressed immediately. There is no bureacracy to hold things back. I'll be the first to agree that a corporate state is very easy to abuse (soon the world could end up being a Microsoft corporate state <joke>). But you have to start somewhere. Most of these zones are created in third world countries and poorly developed areas. Free zones are exempt from telecommunications monopolies so the bandwidth and connection fees are at regular US wholesale market rates. When you consider that the economy is moving to be information and bandwidth dependent, and the main thing holding a new country back is the cost of a satellite feed, a free zone has enormous impact on the growth of an area. It is a bit mind-boggling to realize what the marriage of a free economic zone and the Internet can accomplish. Openworld, Inc. is developing drop-in modules for health, education, business and governance functions for free zones as well as Internet connectivity and infrastructures. A division of Openworld, Inc., The Digital Society Group, has been formed to apply technology to the infrastructure of the free zones and essentially mirror them in cyberspace <argh, the cyber word again>. Without getting into too much detail, The Digital Society Group is constructing a pure-technology infrastructure to provide for the operation, governance and existence of a complete digital society within a free enterprise zone. My priorities are: 1. encryption for all 2. anonymity for all 3. digital currency for all 4. the ability for the creation of ad-hoc micro-communities by citizens more or less on-the-fly 5. the ability for any entity - hardware, software, etc. to be a citizen and be entitled to certain rights such as property ownership, incorporation,etc. (the legislation is being written right now) 6. do it very, very cheaply and give it to the end-user (the world) for free. Check out: http://www.openworld.com/digitalsociety Sorry about the sparse web pages and the crappy graphics, but there is no money for a graphics designer. Locations are planned for Africa, Southeast Asia, Russia, etc. We are already coding... :) Jalon --------------------------------------------------------------- Jalon Q. Zimmerman, Director The Digital Society Group A division of Openworld, Inc. http://www.openworld.com/digitalsociety jalonz(a)openworld.com --------------------------------------------------------------- The government is not your mommy. ---------------------------------------------------------------

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Digital Societies, Guns, and AP
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The conversations on guns, Wei Dai's statement "if we can defend ourselves with guns, why would we need crypto?", and this idea on Digital Societies, brings up a consideration: in the new digital age of anonymity, independent psyops ("psychological operations"; never heard of "psychops"), potential AP arrangements, etc., when governments are made obsolete sometime Real Soon, and people have to depend more and more upon their own resources, how will individuals defend themselves from _immediate_ physical aggression, if not by having their own personal stock pile of weapons and ammo, since they can't call upon the Centralized Gun & Ammo Depot? I remember an article in a book by Ayn Rand, on "Competing Governments", where she said that having services provided by more than one such defense service would create many problems, and provided arguments against the feasability of such arrangements. I know there have been references on the list in the past about some civilization along time ago which existed in Iceland which dealt with this, but I haven't got around to reading about it (can someone provide a book reference?). .. Blanc

1 0

employment opportunity
by Mark Hedges 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Is FEAL developed by NTT safe?
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >In article <19980105070034.3946.qmail(a)hotmail.com> you write: >> Is FEAL developed by NTT safe? Where isn't safe if it is here because it >> isn't safe? > >FEAL is dead; I wouldn't ever use it in any new product. >Use triple-DES instead. > What kind of method was FEAL decoded in? ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

2 1

Police Report Stirs Up Militia Groups
by ichudov＠Algebra.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Police Report Stirs Up Militia Groups (MARTINSVILLE) -- A confidential state police report... which looked at the dangers of right-wing militia groups in Indiana... is causing a stir among elected officials and militia members in Morgan County. While the report discounts any immediate threat of terrorist attacks from Indiana militias, it does suggest that militia members are getting involved in local politics and may have too much influence in some areas. Morgan County commissioners think they're the ones referred to in the report... and they say they're offended at the implication they're controlled by any special interest group. reuters

1 0

Sentencing for Electronic Copyright Infringement
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The United States Sentencing Commission published in the Federal Register today an RFC on changes in sentencing guidelines. Here's an excerpt on electronic copyright infringement: . . . Legislative Amendments Electronic Copyright Infringement 9. Issue for Comment The No Electronic Theft Act, Public Law 105-147, was recently enacted to provide a statutory basis to prosecute and punish persons who, without authorization and without realizing financial gain or commercial advantage, electronically access copyrighted materials or encourage others to do so. The Act includes a directive to the Commission to (A) ensure that the applicable guideline range for a crime committed against intellectual property (including offenses set forth at section 506(a) of title 17, United States Code, and sections 2319, 2319A, and 2320 of title 18, United States Code) is sufficiently stringent to deter such a crime; and (B) ensure that the guidelines provide for consideration of the retail value and quantity of the items with respect to which the crime against intellectual property was committed. Each of the statutes mentioned in the congressional directive currently are referenced to Sec. 2B5.3 (Criminal Infringement of Copyright or Trademark). That guideline provides for incrementally greater punishment when the retail value of the infringing items exceeded $2,000. However, when copyrighted materials are infringed upon by electronic means, there is no ``infringing item'', as would be the case with counterfeited goods. Therefore, the Commission must determine how to value the infringed upon items in order to implement the congressional directive to take into account the retail value and quantity of the items with respect to which the offense was committed. The Commission invites comment on how Sec. 2B5.3 (Criminal Infringement of Copyright or Trademark) should be amended to best effectuate the congressional directives. An approach suggested by the Department of Justice is set forth below. The Commission invites comment on this and alternative proposals. Department of Justice Proposed Amendments to Sec. 2B5.3: The text of Sec. 2B5.3 is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Base offense level: [6] (b) Specific Offense Characteristic (1) If the loss to the copyright or trademark exceeded $2,000, increase by the corresponding number of levels from the table in Sec. 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit).''. The Commentary to Sec. 2B5.3 captioned ``Application Note'' is amended in Note 1 by striking: `` `Infringing items' means the items that violate the copyright or trademark laws (not the legitimate items that are infringed upon).'', and inserting: ``A court may calculate the `loss to the copyright or trademark owner' in any reasonable manner. In determining `loss to the copyright or trademark owner,' the court may consider lost profits, the value of the infringed upon items, the value of the infringing items, the injury to the copyright or trademark owner's reputation, and other associated harms.''. The Commentary to Sec. 2B5.3 captioned ``Application Note'' is amended by striking ``Note'' and inserting ``Notes''; and by adding at the end the following new note: ``2. In some cases, the calculable loss to the victim understates the true harm caused by the offense. For example, a defendant may post copyrighted material to an electronic bulletin board or similar online facility, making it easy for others to illegally obtain and further distribute the material. In such an instance, it may not be possible to determine or even estimate how many copies were downloaded, or how much damage the defendant's conduct ultimately caused. In such cases, an upward departure may be warranted. See Chapter Five, Part K (Departures).''. The Commentary to Sec. 2B5.3 captioned ``Background'' is amended in the first paragraph by striking ``value of the infringing items'' and inserting ``loss to the copyright or trademark owner''; and by striking ``loss or''. [End excerpt] For the full RFC: http://jya.com/ussc010698.txt (254K)

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Hi-tech anti-terrorism... [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > GADGET WARFARE: HIGH-TECH ANTI-TERRORISM > > January 6, 1998 > Web posted at: 9:34 p.m. EST (0234 GMT) > > From Netly News Writer Declan McCullagh > > For a country with no real military rivals, the U.S. still manages > to find an amazing number of enemies. Terrorists top the list of > anti-American villains, according to a Pentagon report released last > month. > > The 100-page document, called "Responses to Transnational Threats," > describes how the military should respond to the threat of saboteurs > and bombers aiming for violence, not victory. The solution, > according to the Pentagon, is to develop a set of gadgets that would > make even James Bond jealous. > > Micro-robots > > A spy camera scuttling through the underbrush? Yes, disguised as "an > insect, a small pebble, or a stick." The report calls for the > development of "micro-robots" that walk or fly and can beam video, > audio and infrared signals back to their operators: "These sensors [deleted text] > Sticky electronics > > Think SpiderMan's spidertracers, only smaller. "Sticky electronics" > adhere to a suspected terrorist's clothing, hair, luggage or vehicle > and report his location. These almost microscopic gizmos tune in to > satellite signals and transmit their exact latitude and longitude. [deleted text] > Bio-sniffers > > Go lie down, Fido. Soon drug-sniffing dogs may be replaced by even > more sensitive, digital noses. If suspects have been handling nukes, > biological weapons or high explosives, the military hopes to be able > to sniff substance traces from items like passports. "As future [text deleted] > technology is improved, antigens might then be detected at national > entry portals as trace contamination on emigration documents or > passports, by urine analysis or by other means." Look for companies > to use this as a more sensitive (if not more reliable) type of drug > testing. > > The Internet > > The Net shouldn't be viewed as "a vulnerability." That view "loses > sight of many potential benefits," the Pentagon explains. To the > spooks, the Net "is an underexploited information-acquisition > resource" that "allows for remote and anonymous participation in > online 'chat' forums that might provide insight into dissident group > activities." (Look out, alt.fan.militia!) The military also wants to > create a "secure, transnational threat information infrastructure" > -- at a cost of a mere $300 million. > > Data mining > > If you worried about the FBI's jones for access to your data, wait > 'til you find out what the military hopes to do. The Pentagon wants > authority to sift through private-sector databases in hopes of > tracking down, say, the World Trade Center bombers before they > strike. The plan is to incorporate "real-time data on international > border crossings, real-time cargo manifests, global financial [deleted text] > Smart software > > Once you've got the databases, how do you use 'em? The military says > the answer is "groupware" and "intelligent software agents" that > "can be focused to search for a confluence of events in multiple > databases or for goals over time." Consumer marketers will finally > be able to determine the commonalities between the Hajj, Promise > Keeper gatherings and Burning Man. > > So would military budgets. In a world where even the Pentagon admits > that the U.S. is the only remaining superpower, the defense > community argues that terrorism threats justify their budgets. > "Nothing will be more challenging to the protection of our citizens, > soldiers and our way of life than the threats of weapons of mass > destruction and terrorism," General John Shalikashvili, chairman of [text deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

RE: Location Escrow anyone ?
by Pearson Shane 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey guys, I wasn't suggesting that they do record exactly where everyone is at the highest resolution possible. Just suggesting that should they want to investigate an individual, they could do it with pretty high detail. Though I'm sure they'd record when and where you switch your phone on, switch off / loose signal, switch cells and make and receive calls and messages. That wouldn't be all that much data. Bye for now.

1 0

RE: [Humor] Kennedy's New Legislation
by Kurt Buff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 It balances, or more accurately, they don't. A second politician died today on the ski slope - Sonny Bono. - -----Original Message----- From: Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM [SMTP:dlv@bwalk.dm.com] Sent: Monday, January 05, 1998 4:19 PM To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: [Humor] Kennedy's New Legislation Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> writes: > We have a good story in this week's Time that talks about how the ski > resort had repeatedly asked the Kennedys to knock it off. Including the > night before the accident. Even on the "fateful" afternoon, the ski patrol > had told the Kennedys -- the last on the slopes -- it was time to quit. > "Nevertheless, 36 members of the Kennedy party prepared to play." "Evolution in action." Thank you, Michael Kennedy, for improving humanity's gene pool. - --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNLMtJw3xegzLXcRmEQKeCwCgsElXKkUb2dzM+N0d2nn8I7fresoAn2yF fsizimZ5xfume+xLbPvpQCWL =ZhY3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: best body armor for cypherpunks [serious]
by Kurt Buff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Nice shot! :) However, Second Chance is probably the leader of that particular pack. - -----Original Message----- From: Trei, Peter [SMTP:ptrei@securitydynamics.com] Sent: Monday, January 05, 1998 8:32 AM To: 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' Subject: RE: best body armor for cypherpunks [serious] > ---------- > From: Mix[SMTP:mixmaster@remail.obscura.com] > Reply To: Mix > Sent: Sunday, January 04, 1998 10:44 PM > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: best body armor for cypherpunks [serious] > > What is, in your opinion, the best (price and performance-wise) > body armor for cypherpunks? > After a few years on this list, one develops such a thick skin that extra protection is superfluos Peter Trei ptrei(a)securitydynamics.c -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNLMsmw3xegzLXcRmEQKJ4gCg9Fr8/XXJFUsB9UaPaZ4zymdc5GoAn3YS u46oyeNLel8/+nYbBs7Xb49R =EqQY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS-ANNOUNCE
by bRIAN＠4qsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS-ANNOUNCE

2 1

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by pads＠mouse.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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1 0

Ruby Ridge FBI sniper to stand trial [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > FBI SNIPER TO STAND TRIAL IN RUBY RIDGE CASE > > FBI seal January 7, 1998 > Web posted at: 6:32 p.m. EST (2332 GMT) > > BONNERS FERRY, Idaho (AP) -- A judge Wednesday ordered an FBI > sharpshooter to stand trial on a state manslaughter charge for the > death of white separatist Randy Weaver's wife in the 1992 siege at > Ruby Ridge. > > The U.S. Justice Department decided in 1994 against prosecuting Lon > Horiuchi and upheld the decision last year after a long review. But > in August, Boundary County Prosecutor Denise Woodbury filed a charge > of involuntary manslaughter. > > Magistrate Judge Quentin Harden decided there was probable cause to > bring Horiuchi to trial on the state charge. Harden scheduled a > February 13 arraignment before state Judge James Michaud. > > A federal judge is to hear arguments Monday from Horiuchi's lawyers > in Boise that the case should be transferred to federal court. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

1998 - the year we must make a stand.
by Global Web Builders 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- PLEASE NOTE: No unsolicited email is sent. If you do not want to be on the mailing list please say "REMOVE" in the subject line and return the message in the body of this email (so that we can track your state). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear One Nation Supporter in New South Wales, As Australia moves towards the year 2000 we Australians move into a critical stage of our history. A stage which is the culmination of years of deception by the Labor and Coalition parties leading to the undermining of our democracy. With a Federal Election in the wind 1998 provides a chance for Australians to rectify the wrongs of the past. Voting for the major parties will provide no solutions - only more of the same. However, expect the major parties to claim that voting for Pauline Hanson's One Nation will be a wasted vote. They are wrong - tell your friends and make a stand for your children's future by voting for Pauline Hanson's One Nation. I am going to cite just one example of many on how you, as an Australian voter, are being misled by the mainstream political parties. In a word the subject is 'MAI' an international agreement to which Australia will be a signatory. MAI is being debated more and more on the Internet through the World Wide Web. Here are some web site links on the subject. Please take the time to visit these sites because they demonstrate how the transnational companies, through MAI (the multilateral agreement on investment), are bargaining away your future with senior Canberra-based bureaucrats. 1) ABC interview - full transcript: http://www.gwb.com.au/gwb/news/onenation/press/maiabc.html Extract: 'Sadly there's no catch title for this trade deal. It's called the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, or MAI. But what it promises holds more drama. It aims to grant multinational corporations unprecedented powers over governments. And it's not getting many good reviews.' and 'In effect, the MAI is a bill of rights for international giants like Shell, Lockheed, Du Pont, and Arthur Andersen. It prevents governments asking more of those multinationals than they ask of their own domestic companies. And any laws that discriminate in favour of locals, such as Australian media ownership laws, don't fit.' 2) MAI Information Centre (Canada): http://www.islandnet.com/~ncfs/maisite/homepage.htm Extract: 'It incorporates a powerful dispute resolution system which would allow any investor to sue the government of its host nation if it considers laws or regulations to be discriminatory and detrimental to immediate or projected profits. The Agreement would therefore disable regional development and national measures to protect the well-being of people, create employment, safeguard small business, conserve resources and protect the environment. Once signed, the MAI cannot be denounced for five years. Investments under the MAI would remain protected for a further fifteen years.' The MAI debate is being discussed openly in Canada and New Zealand while in Australia we are being closeted from this debate by the duopoly which runs this country's media. It is a very real issue. An issue that the major parties refuse to bring out into the open. An issue, amongst many, many others that Pauline Hanson's One Nation is trying to expose. BUT we cannot do that without your support. Your vote and those of your friends will be critical to ensure that issues such as MAI are heard, are questioned, can be rejected by you and I - the Australian people. Clearly the major political parties have failed in drawing issues like this out into the public arena for discussion. Pauline Hanson PS. If you are able to help with donations to help us fund our candidates in state and federal elections this year please visit: http://www.gwb.com.au/pledge.html

1 0

Re: cypherpunks and guns
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<daemon(a)ATHENA.MIT.EDU> (Wei Dai) writes: > I don't understand why there is so much talk about guns here lately. > Unless someone comes up with a weapon that has some very unusual economic > properties, individuals cannot hope to compete with governments in the > domain of deadly force. If we have to resort to physical violence, we've > already lost! > > Think about it: if we can defend ourselves with guns, why would we need > crypto? I am fairly certain that as an irregular army soldier I could inflict a substantial amount of damage upon an occupying military. With maybe $20k in equipment and several hundred hours of training, you could make life very difficult for any luckless squad that happens your way. Multiply that by 100 million armed citizens and you see that armed civilian resistance *can* defeat an occupying army. Certainly in times of "peace" information/infrastructure warfare is much more cost effective for the guerilla -- but once they start sending armored patrols around armed with 600 surplus M-16 rifles and having [un]official rules of engagement which include sniper fire on the wives and children of citizens not convicted of any crime, burning tens of people alive for their religious beliefs, forcibly sodomizing suspects with wooden rods, and passing laws which cripple the 1st by making it a crime to read, it's perhaps worth looking at other methods of resistance. (wow, that approached Hettingan length while having little in common with his style :) Plus, I honestly believe certain people who lacked the foresight or desire to use anonymity have increased the chances of illegal unconstitutional government action against them. It'll be a lot harder to quietly kill someone and keep it out of the news if they're prepared to fight back to the extent that I gather Tim May and others are prepared. Even if being armed does nothing more than let the world know they have declared war against the constitution, it's worth it. Me, I still plan to get out before high powered riflery becomes anything other than a sport. The Seychelles are looking remarkably tempting... (I still say steel core ammo is the way to go, especially in 5.56 NATO and 7.62 Soviet. There exist plenty of vests which have rifle hardplate to stop those rounds -- even 7.62 NATO rounds. 7.62 NATO AP/API, though, is a bit tougher, buying you substantial time) Hacking on Eternity DDS, Ryan [Not actually a gun toting lunatic, nor does he play one on TV, but rather keeps them in a safe, and carries knives instead. Yay Massachusetts. I hope this does not spark a discussion of how to stop a government assault force armed with only a knife (hint: the answer is not "in parallel")] [*ObCrypto* (it's getting really hard to do this every time): AOLserver (a nice web server formerly from GNN/navisoft) punted their 128bit SSL module distribution *EVEN TO US CITIZENS* due to commerce department fuckedness. Anyone know where I could get a copy? It would really suck to have to patch the 40bit one into a 128bit version, since they do not distribute source. Sigh. But I've started to use it for insecure stuff because it's cheaper than Stronghold (read: free) and does some cool database stuff easier than apache. And (cool db stuff + free) is more important than (secure) or (secure and easily configured and supported) for this.] -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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1 0

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by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Batch RSA invented by Amos Fiat Described in Crypto 89 and J Cryptology 1997. RSA works as follows. The key owner chooses two secret primes p and q, and forms their product n = p*q. He then chooses a public exponent e relatively prime to p-1 and q-1. His public key is (n, e). To encrypt a message m into cyphertext c, m is raised to the power e, mod n: c = m^e mod n. To decrypt the message, the key holder calculates d as the multiplicative inverse of e mod (p-1)(q-1): d = 1/e mod (p-1)(q-1). He recovers m from m = c^d mod n. For simplicity, below we will write this as m = c^(1/e) mod n, where it is understood that the 1/e is done mod (p-1)(q-1). An RSA signature s on a message m is calculated as for a decryption: s = m^(1/e) mod n. The signature is verified by m ?=? s^e mod n. The time consuming part of an RSA decryption or signature is this exponentiation step. e can be chosen to be small, so encryption and verification is fast, but 1/e will generally be about the same size as n, so many multiplications must be done to raise a number to that power. Amos Fiat describes a method whereby multiple messages can be decrypted or signed using only one full-sized exponentiation. The "catch" is that the messages must all use different exponents with the same n. Here is a concrete example. You want to decrypt or sign two messages, M1 and M2, raising M1 to the 1/3 power and M2 to the 1/5 power. Perform the following steps: M12 = M1^5 * M2^3 I12 = M12 ^ (1/15) This is the only full-sized exponentiation needed. This gives: I12 = M1^(1/3) * M2^(1/5). This is the product of the two values that we want. Fiat uses a trick to disentangle the two values. He raises I12 to the 6th power. The number 6 is chosen so that it is a multiple of one of the two exponents, 3, and is 1 more than a multiple of the other exponent, 5: I12^6 = M1^2 * M2 * M2^(1/5) Therefore: M2^(1/5) = I12^6 / (M1^2 * M2) which is one of the values we need. Since I12 is the product of the two values we want, we can recover the other value just by dividing this into I12: M1^(1/3) = I12 / M2^(1/5) Here is another example. Suppose we want M3^(1/7) and M4^(1/11). (Note that we are using prime numbers for the exponents; the reason will be explained below.) We calculate: M34 = M3^11 * M4^7 I34 = M34 ^ (1/77) This gives us: I34 = M3^(1/7) * M4^(1/11) Again this is the product of the two values we want. As before we will raise this to a power which is 1 more than a multiple of one of the two exponents (7 and 11) and is a multiple of the other one. The smallest such power is 22. I34^22 = M3^3 * M3^(1/7) * M4^2 So we can divide to get M3^(1/7): M3^(1/7) = I34^22 / (M3^3 * M4^2) And we can divide to get the other value needed: M4^(1/11) = I34 / M3^(1/7) This illustrates how to derive two RSA roots using only one full sized exponentiation. A few small exponentiations are also needed, as well as two divisions, but these are much faster than doing the full exponentiation (raising to the 1/15 or 1/77 powers above). Fiat's idea can then be applied recursively. Note that in the examples above we had to take two full-sized exponentiation, M12 to the 1/15 power and M34 to the 1/77 power. We can combine both of these exponentiations into one just as was done above: M14 = M12^77 * M34^15 I14 = M14 ^ (1/1155) Now: I14 = M12^(1/15) * M34^(1/77) the product of the two values we want. We need an exponent which is 1 more than a multiple of 15 while being a multiple of 77, giving 615, or vice versa, giving 540. Choosing the latter since it is smaller we have: I14^540 = M12^36 * M34^7 * M34^(1/77) so: M34^(1/77) = I14^540 / (M12^36 * M34^7) and dividing gives the other factor: M12^(1/15) = I14 / M34^(1/77) These values can then be fed into the expressions above to recover M1^(1/3) and the other three values, all with only one full-sized exponentiation for the four messages. In general, finding the exponent for Ixx can be handled by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. However it requires that the two values be relatively prime. That is why the exponents used in Batch RSA must all be relatively prime, so that there is a solution to the value of the exponent for Ixx. As the number of values in the batch increases, the "small" exponents needed to recover the values increase as well. We saw above that the exponents went from 6 and 22 for the size-two batches to 540 for the size-four batch. This means that you reach a point of diminishing returns where increasing the batch size no longer provides much benefit. Fiat suggests a batch size of n/(log^2 n) messages, where n is the length of the full-sized exponentiation (e.g. 1000 for a 1000 bit modulus). This would correspond to about a 10 message batch for a 1024 bit key. Fiat describes a few situations where it may be appropriate to use different exponents for multiple RSA operations. In the case of a server issuing multiple RSA signatures it could define its public key to be (n, e1, e2, e3,...) and specify that the signature was valid for any exponent in the list. Then it could batch up signatures and use a different exponent for each one. Another case is "pure RSA" encryption, where the message itself is broken into blocks and each one is RSA encrypted. In that case the blocks could use successive exponents from the list, and the receiver could decrypt a batch of blocks using one large exponentiation. There is another case of interest to us, related to the task of searching through messages from a message pool, possibly steganographically hidden. That will be described in another message.

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More on Association for Interactive Media conference
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This is the conference Tim was criticizing yesterday. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 10:49:01 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: FC: More on Association for Interactive Media conference Netly articles on AIM: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1155,00.html http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1464,00.html -Declan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 07 Jan 1998 10:24:20 -0800 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> To: declan(a)well.com, gnu(a)toad.com Subject: Re: FC: Association for Interactive Media conference (DC, 2/98) [for forwarding if you like] Note that AIM, the sponsors of the "WashingtonWeb" conference, are the folks who appear to be paid stooges for Network Solutions in trying to keep their ten million dollar per month monopoly on domain names. AIM's coverage of that issue has been completely false and completely biased ("The Internet is likely to break apart on October 15, 1997"; "you may lose all rights to use your trademark in your Internet address forever". See www.interactivehq.org/oic/) They've been deliberately making false statements to stir up sentiment against the evolution of domain names away from the Network Solutions monopoly. I wouldn't promote or attend their conference. There's something going on there that I don't understand -- but I do recognize slime when I see it. John Gilmore -------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: subscribe politech More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------

4 10

FCC squeezes the ham TV band
by David Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wednesday January 7 10:22 AM EST FCC Reallocates Lightly Used Television Spectrum WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Federal Communications Commission said Tuesday it had reallocated lightly used television frequencies for use by public safety services. Portions of the spectrum between 746 and 806 megahertz that had carried channels 60 to 69 will be given over to police and fire departments and other emergency services. The remainder of the spectrum will be auctioned off for commercial use. The reallocation was required by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The FCC had previously announced it would reallocate the lightly used spectrum in an April, 1997 plan for the transition to digital television. FCC chairman William Kennard said on Tuesday the commission would allow some users of the high channels to continue operations, however. "While recovery of unused spectrum is an integral part of the FCC plan for transition from analog to digital television, I am sensitive to the effects of spectrum recovery on Low Power TV and TV translators," Kennard said in a statement. Such broadcasters may continue operations through the transition to digital television "as long as they do not cause harmful interference to primary services," he said. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright © 1997 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reuters shall not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon

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Re: Sentencing for Electronic Copyright Infringement
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Subject: Re: Sentencing for Electronic Copyright Infringement > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > Date: Wed, 07 Jan 98 08:09:32 EST > > Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: > > When the ninja narc raiders cart our computers off for analysis, I'm sure > > they can find enough violations to send us away for as many years as they > > wish. > > And if Timmy knew a bit more about cryptography than he could learn by browsing > through Bruce Schneier's book, the ninja narc raiders wouldm't be able to find > shit on any of his media. :-) Hey, Vulis, how does it feel to know all your phone lines are being monitored by the FBI? For (among other things): soliciting funds for terrorist groups incl Hamas to kill a couple, and threatening government employees... ---guy Lon T. Horiuchi was indicted for murder today. The DOJ refused to prosecute him: the state will.

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Re: The Digital Society Group
by jalonz＠openworld.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Without getting into too much detail, The Digital Society Group is >>constructing a pure-technology infrastructure to provide for the operation, >>governance and existence of a complete digital society within a free >>enterprise zone. >The web site doesn't explain what methods you are using to establish these >zones. Do you have a mailing list set up for discussion? The plan >sounds interesting and ideologically supportable, but I'm skeptical. Blanc, I'm trying to get more docs online ASAP to explain things. The physical free zones are very popular in the interational business world, but I as a computer type had never heard of them other than Hong Kong, etc. When a country wants to set up a free zone, they come to Openworld and its partner companies who do everything from clearing land, construction, setting up businesses, schools, hospitals, etc. One of the soon to be required components of a free zone installation is a digital infrastructure to link all of the things together. We're talking smart cards for physical structure security and personal ID, email, web hosting, net access, all kinds of stuff. Since we are building a "country" from scratch, rather than have to automate paper workflows and do document management, the governance processes are designed to be digital from the start. Thus, to provide incorporation services to its citizens, a free zone allows them to sign up via web browser, and the daily maintenance, processing and management of the corporate records is also done almost exclusively via web browser and email. Its fast, cheap, and requires far less labor than a paper-based system. Another feature is that rather than maintaining the records for the customer, the customer can log in via web browser and update their own corporate record. (similar to Internic) This reduces labor even further and reduces the cost of incorporation to around $100 per year making instant offshore incorporation accessible to the general global public for the first time. That kind of solution applied across an entire governance and communications infrastructure make for some radical things to become possible. Another concept being implemented is that each new free zone (being fully wired) can easily replicate records and data with other free zones (they will actually be required to for certain things) and thus a citizen in one free zone can access banking, etc. services (even physical access) in another. So, we see the emergence of a phsically distributed, digitally cohesive network of "corporate states". This lends to applications like data protection and hiding via distributed storage or data sharing via common dataspaces and replication. The technical methods to perform all of this work are a bit touchy. At the risk of starting endless flame wars, I was looking at Lotus Bloats for its replication and hierarchical security structure as well as easy forms to web publishing and workflow management. That got shot down at the thought of actually administrating the mess and also the costs are fairly significant. The final nail in the coffin was the encryption key escrow fiasco with the Swiss. I was also looking at NT due to the nice database-to-web interface and the fact that IIS 4 isn't too bad. But again software license costs are large and who knows if Microsoft is doing, or will do, a key escrow deal for future products? Who knows what they are doing now with NT on the OS level? You can't run around making structures which allow people around the world to move money and communicate anonymously, incorporate and have software agents be owners of property and bank accounts without someone getting very pissed off. Thus, a good solution seems to be Linux in that its cheap, Unix is good for multi-process routing, and the toolkits and components created by the Digital Society can be easily moved into the public domin in some form or another. Also, the export mess can be gotten around in one way or another. Any comments? Any better alternatives than Linux? The coding being done now is either cross-platform or prototype which will be scrapped as soon as the kinks are worked out and the real fun can begin. The Digital Society is purposefully working cheap and small to enable the tools and communities to be deployed at as close as possible to no cost for the end-user - that is the priority. Most things are being coded from scratch to ensure security and keep the costs low. Labor is cheap - when its your own. :) Jalon --------------------------------------------------------------- Jalon Q. Zimmerman, Director The Digital Society Group A division of Openworld, Inc. http://www.openworld.com/ jalonz(a)openworld.com --------------------------------------------------------------- The government is not your mommy. ---------------------------------------------------------------

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Polycratic government?...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Is anyone aware of research or writings regarding polycratic political systems? Thanks. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C. May's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated cud is completely inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is cross-ruminated. | | | O | Tim C. May (--|--) | / \

3 2

lists
by nobody＠nsm.htp.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone tell me if the toad cypherpunk list gets *all* the cypherpuink traffic? As I understand it there are three possible subscription points -- does one subscription cover all? Thanks in advance...

2 1

Re: Too many "Internet Conferences" in Washington (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 12:30:42 -0800 (PST) > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > Subject: Re: Too many "Internet Conferences" in Washington > Attendance at this conference will be by invitation only. About 35 > individuals will represent a > variety of backgrounds and perspectives including the computing industry > (such as Internet service > providers, network administrators, and providers of "anonymizing" > services) the legal community, > professional societies, academic institutions, law enforcement agencies, > and other agencies of > government. This is the real fault with the conference mentality... How can anyone reasonably expect 35 people, invitation only or not, to have a clue about any aspect of the industry let alone some sort of birds eye view? I would wager that if we took the top 35 ISP's in the US they couldn't come up with a cohesive expression of viewpoint that would have a lifetime measured in anything more than a few weeks. Pure hubris. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Debit-card program cancelled because of fraud [FWD]
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Sun, 28 Dec 1997 09:22:45 -0500 From: Steve Bellovin <smb(a)research.att.com> Subject: Debit-card program cancelled because of fraud According to the AP, Burns National Bank (Durango, CO) is cancelling its debit-card program because of fraud. The article is maddeningly incomplete about technical details. Apparently, the "hackers" (to quote the article) counterfeited plastic cards and "took account number sequences off software that resides on the Internet before encoding them in the magnetic strip on the back of the card." When the fraud was detected, some customers had new cards issued, with some unspecified extra security feature. It didn't work; within a month, the accounts were penetrated again. Three other banks have been victimized by a similar scheme. All four use the same debit card vendor; Burns blames the vendor for inadequate security, in some unspecified form. They're looking for a new supplier; until then, the entire program is being suspended. Losses to date -- which are apparently being absorbed by the banks -- total $300,000.

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UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS-ANNOUNCE
by Daniel K Engdahl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS-ANNOUNCE

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Bruce Schneier, Sandia, FBI and the REAL WORLD
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wednesday 1/7/98 12:57 PM Bruce Schneier wrote and a burglar willing to try all 10,000 is guaranteed to break into your house. This is posted at jya.com. Sandia employees Jack Hudson and Jack Menako, both in my division when Sandia transferred me to break electronic locks for the FBI/ERF [Engineering Research Facility, Quantico, VA], were TRYING to defeat combination locks on file cabinets. Menako built a frame to connect a stepper-motor to the combination dial. The stepper motor was wried to a PC. Hudson wrote the software to try all possible combinations. What happened, IN FACT, was that the combination lock wore-out before the combination which opened the lock was reached. Combinations locks are NOT ENGINEERED for such heavy use. The file safe had to be destroyed to open it! So Schneier's statement may be incorrect. No guarantee. Guys, this is the REAL WORLD. bill Title: Security Pitfalls in Cryptography Security Pitfalls in Cryptography by Bruce Schneier Cryptography Consultant Counterpane Systems e-mail: schneier(a)counterpane.com Magazine articles like to describe cryptography products in terms of algorithms and key length. Algorithms make good sound bites: they can be explained in a few words and they're easy to compare with one another. "128-bit keys mean good security." "Triple-DES means good security." "40-bit keys mean weak security." "2048-bit RSA is better than 1024-bit RSA." But reality isn't that simple. Longer keys don't always mean more security. Compare the cryptographic algorithm to the lock on your front door. Most door locks have four metal pins, each of which can be in one of ten positions. A key sets the pins in a particular configuration. If the key aligns them all correctly, then the lock opens. So there are only 10,000 possible keys, and a burglar willing to try all 10,000 is guaranteed to break into your house. But an improved lock with ten pins, making 10 billion possible keys, probably won't make your house more secure. Burglars don't try every possible key (a brute-force attack); most aren't even clever enough to pick the lock (a cryptographic attack against the algorithm). They smash windows, kick in doors, disguise themselves as policemen, or rob keyholders at gunpoint. One ring of art thieves in California defeated home security systems by taking a chainsaw to the house walls. Better locks don't help against these attacks. Strong cryptography is very powerful when it is done right, but it is not a panacea. Focusing on the cryptographic algorithms while ignoring other aspects of security is like defending your house not by building a fence around it, but by putting an immense stake into the ground and hoping that the adversary runs right into it. Smart attackers will just go around the algorithms. Counterpane Systems has spent years designing, analyzing, and breaking cryptographic systems. While we do research on published algorithms and protocols, most of our work examines actual products. We've designed and analyzed systems that protect privacy, ensure confidentiality, provide fairness, and facilitate commerce. We've worked with software, stand-alone hardware, and everything in between. We've broken our share of algorithms, but we can almost always find attacks that bypass the algorithms altogether. We don't have to try every possible key, or even find flaws in the algorithms. We exploit errors in design, errors in implementation, and errors in installation. Sometimes we invent a new trick to break a system, but most of the time we exploit the same old mistakes that designers make over and over again. Attacks Against Cryptographic Designs A cryptographic system can only be as strong as the encryption algorithms, digital signature algorithms, one-way hash functions, and message authentication codes it relies on. Break any of them, and you've broken the system. And just as it's possible to build a weak structure using strong materials, it's possible to build a weak cryptographic system using strong algorithms and protocols. We often find systems that "void the warranty" of their cryptography by not using it properly: failing to check the size of values, reusing random parameters that should never be reused, and so on. Encryption algorithms don't necessarily provide data integrity. Key exchange protocols don't necessarily ensure that both parties receive the same key. In a recent research project, we found that some--not all--systems using related cryptographic keys could be broken, even though each individual key was secure. Security is a lot more than plugging in an algorithm and expecting the system to work. Even good engineers, well-known companies, and lots of effort are no guarantee of robust implementation; our work on the U.S. digital cellular encryption algorithm illustrated that. Random-number generators are another place where cryptographic systems often break. Good random-number generators are hard to design, because their security often depends on the particulars of the hardware and software. Many products we examine use bad ones. The cryptography may be strong, but if the random-number generator produces weak keys, the system is much easier to break. Other products use secure random-number generators, but they don't use enough randomness to make the cryptography secure. Recently Counterpane Systems has published new classes of attacks against random-number generators, based on our work with commercial designs. One of the most surprising things we've found is that specific random-number generators may be secure for one purpose but insecure for another; generalizing security analyses is dangerous. In another research result, we looked at interactions between individually secure cryptographic protocols. Given a secure protocol, we show how to build another secure protocol that will break the first if both are used with the same keys on the same device. Attacks Against Implementations Many systems fail because of mistakes in implementation. Some systems don't ensure that plaintext is destroyed after it's encrypted. Other systems use temporary files to protect against data loss during a system crash, or virtual memory to increase the available memory; these features can accidentally leave plaintext lying around on the hard drive. In extreme cases, the operating system can leave the keys on the hard drive. One product we've seen used a special window for password input. The password remained in the window's memory even after it was closed. It didn't matter how good that product's cryptography was; it was broken by the user interface. Other systems fall to more subtle problems. Sometimes the same data is encrypted with two different keys, one strong and one weak. Other systems use master keys and then one-time session keys. We've broken systems using partial information about the different keys. We've also seen systems that use inadequate protection mechanisms for the master keys, mistakenly relying on the security of the session keys. It's vital to secure all possible ways to learn a key, not just the most obvious ones. Electronic commerce systems often make implementation trade-offs to enhance usability. We've found subtle vulnerabilities here, when designers don't think through the security implications of their trade-offs. Doing account reconciliation only once per day might be easier, but what kind of damage can an attacker do in a few hours? Can audit mechanisms be flooded to hide the identity of an attacker? Some systems record compromised keys on "hotlists"; attacks against these hotlists can be very fruitful. Other systems can be broken through replay attacks: reusing old messages, or parts of old messages, to fool various parties. Systems that allow old keys to be recovered in an emergency provide another area to attack. Good cryptographic systems are designed so that the keys exist for as short a period of time as possible; key recovery often negates any security benefit by forcing keys to exist long after they are useful. Furthermore, key recovery databases become sources of vulnerability in themselves, and have to be designed and implemented securely. In one product we evaluated, flaws in the key recovery database allowed criminals to commit fraud and then frame legitimate users. Attacks Against Passwords Many systems break because they rely on user-generated passwords. Left to themselves, people don't choose strong passwords. If they're forced to use strong passwords, they can't remember them. If the password becomes a key, it's usually much easier--and faster--to guess the password than it is to brute-force the key; we've seen elaborate security systems fail in this way. Some user interfaces make the problem even worse: limiting the passwords to eight characters, converting everything to lower case, etc. Even passphrases can be weak: searching through 40-character phrases is often much easier than searching through 64-bit random keys. We've also seen key-recovery systems that circumvent strong session keys by using weak passwords for key-recovery. Attacks Against Hardware Some systems, particularly commerce systems, rely on tamper-resistant hardware for security: smart cards, electronic wallets, dongles, etc. These systems may assume public terminals never fall into the wrong hands, or that those "wrong hands" lack the expertise and equipment to attack the hardware. While hardware security is an important component in many secure systems, we distrust systems whose security rests solely on assumptions about tamper resistance. We've rarely seen tamper resistance techniques that work, and tools for defeating tamper resistance are getting better all the time. When we design systems that use tamper resistance, we always build in complementary security mechanisms just in case the tamper resistance fails. The "timing attack" made a big press splash in 1995: RSA private keys could be recovered by measuring the relative times cryptographic operations took. The attack has been successfully implemented against smart cards and other security tokens, and against electronic commerce servers across the Internet. Counterpane Systems and others have generalized these methods to include attacks on a system by measuring power consumption, radiation emissions, and other "side channels," and have implemented them against a variety of public-key and symmetric algorithms in "secure" tokens. We've yet to find a smart card that we can't pull the secret keys out of by looking at side channels. Related research has looked at fault analysis: deliberately introducing faults into cryptographic processors in order to determine the secret keys. The effects of this attack can be devastating. Attacks Against Trust Models Many of our more interesting attacks are against the underlying trust model of the system: who or what in the system is trusted, in what way, and to what extent. Simple systems, like hard-drive encryption programs or telephone privacy products, have simple trust models. Complex systems, like electronic commerce systems or multi-user e-mail security programs, have complex (and subtle) trust models. An e-mail program might use uncrackable cryptography for the messages, but unless the keys are certified by a trusted source (and unless that certification can be verified), the system is still vulnerable. Some commerce systems can be broken by a merchant and a customer colluding, or by two different customers colluding. Other systems make implicit assumptions about security infrastructures, but don't bother to check that those assumptions are actually true. If the trust model isn't documented, then an engineer can unknowingly change it in product development, and compromise security. Many software systems make poor trust assumptions about the computers they run on; they assume the desktop is secure. These programs can often be broken by Trojan horse software that sniffs passwords, reads plaintext, or otherwise circumvents security measures. Systems working across computer networks have to worry about security flaws resulting from the network protocols. Computers that are attached to the Internet can also be vulnerable. Again, the cryptography may be irrelevant if it can be circumvented through network insecurity. And no software is secure against reverse-engineering. Often, a system will be designed with one trust model in mind, and implemented with another. Decisions made in the design process might be completely ignored when it comes time to sell it to customers. A system that is secure when the operators are trusted and the computers are completely under the control of the company using the system may not be secure when the operators are temps hired at just over minimum wage and the computers are untrusted. Good trust models work even if some of the trust assumptions turn out to be wrong. Attacks on the Users Even when a system is secure if used properly, its users can subvert its security by accident--especially if the system isn't designed very well. The classic example of this is the user who gives his password to his co-workers so they can fix some problem when he's out of the office. Users may not report missing smart cards for a few days, in case they are just misplaced. They may not carefully check the name on a digital certificate. They may reuse their secure passwords on other, insecure systems. They may not change their software's default weak security settings. Good system design can't fix all these social problems, but it can help avoid many of them. Attacks Against Failure Recovery Strong systems are designed to keep small security breaks from becoming big ones. Recovering the key to one file should not allow the attacker to read every file on the hard drive. A hacker who reverse-engineers a smart card should only learn the secrets in that smart card, not information that will help him break other smart cards in the system. In a multi-user system, knowing one person's secrets shouldn't compromise everyone else's. Many systems have a "default to insecure mode." If the security feature doesn't work, most people just turn it off and finish their business. If the on-line credit card verification system is down, merchants will default to the less-secure paper system. Similarly, it is sometimes possible to mount a "version rollback attack" against a system after it has been revised to fix a security problem: the need for backwards compatibility allows an attacker to force the protocol into an older, insecure, version. Other systems have no ability to recover from disaster. If the security breaks, there's no way to fix it. For electronic commerce systems, which could have millions of users, this can be particularly damaging. Such systems should plan to respond to attacks, and to upgrade security without having to shut the system down. The phrase "and then the company is screwed" is never something you want to put in your business plan. Good system design considers what will happen when an attack occurs, and works out ways to contain the damage and recover from the attack. Attacks Against the Cryptography Sometimes, products even get the cryptography wrong. Some rely on proprietary encryption algorithms. Invariably, these are very weak. Counterpane Systems has had considerable success breaking published encryption algorithms; our track record against proprietary ones is even better. Keeping the algorithm secret isn't much of an impediment to analysis, anyway--it only takes a couple of days to reverse-engineer the cryptographic algorithm from executable code. One system we analyzed, the S/MIME 2 electronic-mail standard, took a relatively strong design and implemented it with a weak cryptographic algorithm. The system for DVD encryption took a weak algorithm and made it weaker. We've seen many other cryptographic mistakes: implementations that repeat "unique" random values, digital signature algorithms that don't properly verify parameters, hash functions altered to defeat the very properties they're being used for. We've seen cryptographic protocols used in ways that were not intended by the protocols' designers, and protocols "optimized" in seemingly trivial ways that completely break their security. Attack Prevention vs. Attack Detection Most cryptographic systems rely on prevention as their sole means of defense: the cryptography keeps people from cheating, lying, abusing, or whatever. Defense should never be that narrow. A strong system also tries to detect abuse and to contain the effects of any attack. One of our fundamental design principles is that sooner or later, every system will be successfully attacked, probably in a completely unexpected way and with unexpected consequences. It is important to be able to detect such an attack, and then to contain the attack to ensure it does minimal damage. More importantly, once the attack is detected, the system needs to recover: generate and promulgate a new key pair, update the protocol and invalidate the old one, remove an untrusted node from the system, etc. Unfortunately, many systems don't collect enough data to provide an audit trail, or fail to protect the data against modification. Counterpane Systems has done considerable work in securing audit logs in electronic commerce systems, mostly in response to system designs that could fail completely in the event of a successful attack. These systems have to do more than detect an attack: they must also be able to produce evidence that can convince a judge and jury of guilt. Building Secure Cryptographic Systems Security designers occupy what Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz calls "the position of the interior." A good security product must defend against every possible attack, even attacks that haven't been invented yet. Attackers, on the other hand, only need to find one security flaw in order to defeat the system. And they can cheat. They can collude, conspire, and wait for technology to give them additional tools. They can attack the system in ways the system designer never thought of. Building a secure cryptographic system is easy to do badly, and very difficult to do well. Unfortunately, most people can't tell the difference. In other areas of computer science, functionality serves to differentiate the good from the bad: a good compression algorithm will work better than a bad one; a bad compression program will look worse in feature-comparison charts. Cryptography is different. Just because an encryption program works doesn't mean it is secure. What happens with most products is that someone reads Applied Cryptography, chooses an algorithm and protocol, tests it to make sure it works, and thinks he's done. He's not. Functionality does not equal quality, and no amount of beta testing will ever reveal a security flaw. Too many products are merely "buzzword compliant"; they use secure cryptography, but they are not secure. Home page - <a href="http://www.counterpane.com/cpaneinfo.html">Counterpane - Applied Cryptography - E-Mail Security - Crypto Links Bruce Schneier Bio - <a href="http://www.counterpane.com/blowfish.html">Blowfish - Publications - Contact Counterpane Bruce Schneier Copyright 1998 Counterpane Systems.

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Lessig on antitrust and government regulation
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lessig is the special master appointed by the judge in the Microsoft consent decree case. He once wrote: >Whether a regulation is >rational turns on the facts, and what counts as "the facts" turns on the >theory that animates inquiry into the facts. Wow. How do we know what theory is the right one, and when we should change it? -Declan

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a good example of bad crypto hype
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

at http://www.meganet.com/explain.htm you can test your critical thinking skills... ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu "How do you know you are not being deceived?" ---A Compendium of Analytic TradeCraft Notes, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA

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Re: The Digital Society Group
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: jalonz(a)openworld.com > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 18:07:24 -0500 > Subject: The Digital Society Group > > Hi all, Hi, stranger. > Openworld, Inc. is a company which sets up free enterprise zones around the > world. The "free zones" are akin to Hong Kong and Singapore and are > self-governing, independent entities as recognized by the parent country. [snip] > A division of Openworld, Inc., The Digital Society Group, has been formed > to apply technology to the infrastructure of the free zones and essentially > mirror them in cyberspace <argh, the cyber word again>. > > Without getting into too much detail, The Digital Society Group is > constructing a pure-technology infrastructure to provide for the operation, > governance and existence of a complete digital society within a free > enterprise zone. [snip] > Locations are planned for Africa, Southeast Asia, Russia, etc. > > We are already coding... > --------------------------------------------------------------- > Jalon Q. Zimmerman, Director > The Digital Society Group > A division of Openworld, Inc. Firing up the DejaNews traffic analysis tool... Jalon Q. Zimmerman: sneaker(a)powergrid.electriciti.com jalonz(a)compuvar.com jalon(a)ix.netcom.com jalonz(a)datacore.compuvar.com jalonz(a)morava.com jalon(a)hermesnet.net # Subject: I need a challenge!! # From: "Jalon Q. Zimmerman" <sneaker(a)powergrid.electriciti.com> # Date: 1995/06/19 # Newsgroups: misc.jobs.resumes # # I'm bored with the usual run-of-the-mill jobs and am looking for a # challenge. I want to solve problems, find solutions, and create # things with computers. # # My background is in programming/computer security and I have a # strong creative talent. # # My dream is to work in the R&D environment where I can be given # a problem/idea and turned loose. Good boy. Good boy. Stop slobbering on the carpet... % Subject: ENTERTAINMENT: The CyberGuy Project % From: jalonz(a)compuvar.com (Jalon Q. Zimmerman) % Date: 1995/10/23 % Newsgroups: comp.infosystems.www.announce % % Follow the crazed wanderings of a technomad. Announcing the CyberGuy % Project. The first fully functioning guy, with a real job, and a real % life, living with a laptop, a duffel bag full of stuff and the wide, % wide world as his home... % % <URL:http://zgroup.compuvar.com/cyberguy/> [defunct] Word: "Technomad". Like it. # I am moving. 1995/09/27 Moving from San Diego to... # Subject: Columbus, Ohio - webheads netnerds arthackers wanted! # From: jalon(a)ix.netcom.com (Jalon Q. Zimmerman) # Date: 1996/04/08 # Newsgroups: oh.general,alt.cyberpunk,alt.rave,alt.2600 # # I'm looking for webheads, netnerds and arthackers in the Columbus area # to form an unstructured group and get a hangout going somewhere in a # Columbus coffee-house or something like that. # # The idea is to throw a bunch of people and some resources together and # see what happens. # # I have just moved to Columbus from San Diego where this type of thing # is a necessity for modern cyberpeople. Since I can't find anything # here, I thought I'd get it going myself. # # If you are interested, mail me and we'll make it happen. Columbus "4DeadIn" Ohio. % Subject: Looking for investor wishing to start an internet provision company in Columbus % From: "Jalon Q. Zimmerman" <jalon(a)ix.netcom.com> % Date: 1996/01/16 % Newsgroups: cmh.general % % I am looking for an investor wishing to start an Internet presence or % service provision company in the Columbus, Ohio area. I have just % relocated from San Diego, Ca. and am interested in contributing the % "technical" element to a start-up venture. % % Please contact Jalon Zimmerman at: 614-873-4250 % % Serious inquiries only. Mooer. # From: "Jalon Q. Zimmerman" <jalonz(a)morava.com> # Date: 1996/10/20 # Newsgroups: alt.mud.moo # # Hello, # # We are looking to sponsor a moo or some variation thereof as well as a # rather serious Mxx-related website for the sheer coolness of it. Headhunter: Date Scr Subject Newsgroup Author 1. 96/07/19 020 Corporate salespeople wanted sdnet.jobs Jalon Q. Zimmerman 2. 96/07/19 020 Interns wanted - marketing/P sdnet.jobs Jalon Q. Zimmerman 3. 96/07/19 020 Corporate sales - Internet r sdnet.wanted Jalon Q. Zimmerman 4. 96/07/19 020 Corporate salespeople wanted sdnet.jobs.offered Jalon Q. Zimmerman 5. 96/07/19 020 Re: Corporate salespeople wa sdnet.jobs Jalon Q. Zimmerman 6. 96/07/19 020 Re: Corporate salespeople wa sdnet.jobs Jalon Q. Zimmerman 7. 96/07/19 020 Interns wanted - marketing/P sdnet.jobs.offered Jalon Q. Zimmerman ...moved to DC/Maryland... # Subject: Exciting Internet jobs in growing DC & MD business: Programming, # Graphics Design, Web Page Design, Customer Service, and More! # Full-Time and Contractual positions saught. # From: Cool Internet Jobs <jalon(a)hermesnet.net> # Date: 1997/03/13 # Newsgroups: dc.jobs,md.jobs,balt.jobs,misc.jobs.offered,us.jobs.offered, # biz.jobs.offered,prg.jobs,comp.jobs.contract,misc.jobs.contract # # On May 1, 1997, Hermes Internet Service, Inc. will be opening a second # office in Landover, Md., which is located at the intersection of US 50 # and the DC Beltway and walking distance to the New Carrollton Metro # (Orange Line). # # We will continue to use our current location as well, near 7th Street # and Maine Ave., SW, DC, near the waterfront. # # We have openings for four additional people, the first immediately, the # other three on May 1: Resume (snipped): # Subject: html/CGI/db online inet apps - VB/MS Access - Linux/Postgres95 # From: "Jalon Q. Zimmerman" <sneaker(a)powergrid.electriciti.com> # Date: 1995/06/25 # Newsgroups: misc.jobs.resumes # # DIGICOM # # Developing an HTML interface to telephone conferencing hardware for Logicon, a # defense contractor. Group telephone conferencing can be managed from any HTML # browser via a LAN or the internet. The system incorporates user accounting, # document sharing within a conference, graphical icons and elements including # photographs of the group participants, secure html interfacing, support for voice # encrypted lines. Each server handles 32 simultaneous queries and 32 phone lines. # The application is written in Visual Basic using Winsock 1.0 sockets, MS Access # database tables, HTML 3.0, and MS Visual C++ DLLs. # # # CREDIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES # # Designed and implemented an automated credit information retrieval and analysis # solution. The system automated the office workflow, paper trail, billing, and # communications. The final solution utilized an in-house client-server scheme for # communications, a Paradox for Windows database platform, and an automated credit # retrieval and analysis application in C++. Communications servers were run on OS/2, # database platforms on Windows, and high-speed credit analysis under DOS. This was # the second generation of the system developed at Credit Depot earlier. # # SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT # # Designed a statistical analysis solution to track the usage of learning resources on # campus. Authored several encryption and security applications. # # SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. # # Computer Security - Provide computer security assistance in criminal # investigations. Tasks include data decryption, recovering erased data, # password retrieval, data line monitoring, and protected system entry. Isn't that last item special? ---guy And a possible reason for heading the other way.

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Re: rant on the morality of confidentiality
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > scientists who agree to government secrecy to develop > their inventions are agreeing to a lot more than > mere secrecy. they are committing to a paradigm that > is at odds with science itself, which only advances through > the open literature. Why limit your annoyance to government scientists? Scientists in private industry are in the same position, developing (e.g.) algorithms and analytical methods protected by trade secrets. Society recognizes this tendency and tries to advance science anyway by offering patent protection. You don't make money by giving away your intellectual capital. Seems to me that schools and independently wealthy scientists/foundations are the only ones who don't merit your censure on this count. -- Jim Gillogly Trewesday, 17 Afteryule S.R. 1998, 13:04 12.19.4.14.17, 1 Caban 15 Kankin, Ninth Lord of Night

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Creative Insecurity The complicated truth behind the rise of Microsoft By Virginia I. Postrel Back in 1983, Forbes ran an article called "If they're so smart, why aren't they rich?" It was about how inventors rarely reap big financial rewards from their creations, and it started like this: "Here are some names you are not likely ever to see in The Forbes Four Hundred [list of the richest Americans]: Franklin Lim. Gary Kildall. Bill Gates...." Oops. The world's richest man wasn't always so. During the last round of high-tech excitement--the personal-computer boom of the early 1980s (which was followed by a traumatic shakeout)--Gates looked like a smart programming geek whose business savvy was dwarfed by the marketing whizzes at Apple: "Their Apple Corp.," wrote the anonymous Forbes author, "has been among the most successful at packaging a product that sells and then selling it at an attractive price." Therein lies a tale. As the Justice Department and a half-dozen state attorneys general push forward antitrust actions against Microsoft, it's worth considering how the company got where it is and what that suggests about the strengths and limitations of markets. There are two main fables told about Microsoft: It has become the dominant, standard-setting software company, and made Gates a multibillionaire, because a) it makes wonderful products and expresses all that is good about a capitalist system or b) it cheats. Both fables turn up especially strongly in statements by people who lack deep knowledge of the industry, and each serves the interests of an industry faction. The truth, however, is more complicated. Considered without regard to price, ubiquity, or compatibility with inexpensive hardware, many Microsoft products are mediocre at best. I am happily writing this article using an obsolete Macintosh operating system and WordPerfect, both of which I find superior to even the latest versions of Windows and Word. Great products did not make Microsoft number one. Good-enough products did. That uncomfortable truth offends moralists on both sides of the Microsoft debate. The company's fans (and its spin doctors) want to tell a simple tale about virtue triumphant--with virtue defined, Atlas Shrugged-style, not only as astute business decision making and fierce competition but also as engineering excellence. Its critics use the same definition. If the products are less than great, they suggest, the only way to explain the company's success is through some sort of sleaze. Or, alternatively, through the innate flaws of the market. So what really happened? How did Microsoft end up ruling PC operating systems and, through them, software in general? At the risk of simplifying a complex story (if only by reducing it to two players), the bottom line is this: Apple acted--and continues to act--like a smug, self-righteous monopolist. Microsoft acted--and continues to act--like a scrambling, sometimes vicious competitor. That pattern shows up most clearly in pricing strategies. Microsoft's approach, throughout its history, has been to charge low prices and sell an enormous amount of software. True to form, the company is currently in trouble with the Justice Department for charging too little--nothing--for its Internet Explorer, by including it in Windows. (The technical legal dispute is over whether Explorer is a "feature" of Windows, as Microsoft maintains, or a separate product that is an illegal "tie-in" and thus violates a consent decree Microsoft signed in 1995.) The low-price strategy makes sense on two levels: First, it approximates marginal-cost pricing, since software, once written, costs very little for each additional copy. Anything above that incremental cost, however small, is profit. Second, and more significantly in this case, lower prices mean more customers. And the more people who use a particular kind of software, the more desirable it is for others to use it too. Although translators help, switching formats is messy and inconvenient. This "network externality" is particularly important for operating systems and Internet browser formats, since software developers and Web site designers have to pick a standard for which to optimize their products. As Gates toldWall Street Journal reporter Jim Carlton in an interview for Carlton's new book Apple: The Inside Story of Intrigue, Egomania, and Business Blunders, "Momentum creates momentum. If you have volume, then people write apps. If people write apps, you have momentum." But if you think you already have a monopoly, you don't worry about momentum. While Apple executives theoretically knew they had competition, they acted as though they didn't. Back in 1983 Apple may have been "selling [its computers] at an attractive price." But the coming of the IBM clones made Apple's prices look downright hideous. In the face of ever-stronger competition, the company insisted on pricing the Macintosh to maintain at least 50 percent profit margins; its "50-50-50 rule" told managers to keep margins up to maintain the stock price. Customers who paid their own personal money for Macs might be able to justify the high price simply because the computers were fun and easy to use. But business managers who paid Apple prices for any but the most specialized applications, notably graphics-intensive work, were either fiscally irresponsible or just plain dumb. Apple's pricing strategy handed the vast business market to computers running Microsoft operating systems, first DOS, then Windows. Microsoft, of course, doesn't sell computers. It's in the software business. You can get its operating system (and run its applications) on all sorts of different machines, whose manufacturers compete intensely. That competition drives down consumer costs, even as machine features get better all the time. Apple didn't want that sort of competition. It not only kept its own prices high but refused to license its software to any other computer maker. That meant even fewer people used its operating system, which further dampened its momentum. Apple, in fact, acted like the ultimate "tie-in" monopolist. You not only couldn't buy parts of its software separately; you couldn't buy them at all without forking over thousands for an Apple-made machine. And Apple has never been particularly good at manufacturing. After the company tepidly began licensing a couple of years ago, Mac clone makers did what Apple had feared: They cut into its revenue. But they also expanded the market, and they made the fastest computers ever to carry the Mac operating system. They gave Apple money for its software, even as they bore the costs of manufacturing and distributing their machines. And they gave consumers more choice, more alternatives to Windows. If I were an antitrust regulator looking for conspiracies, I'd be wondering just how coincidental it was that Microsoft invested $150 million in Apple just about the time Steve Jobs announced that the company was ending the clone program. Such explanations aren't necessary, however. Apple screwed Mac lovers all by itself. Far from the marketing whizzes of 1983 conventional wisdom, its executives were enamored with the cult of the machine, too hung up on the beauty of their product to understand that consumers actually cared about many other things: price, plenty of software, and compatibility with other systems. Quality is not one-dimensional. Apple's arrogance left computer users with less choice than they might have had--or, perhaps, with more. After all, if Apple had slashed prices early on and taken the business market seriously from the start, it could well have ended up in a Microsoft-like position, but without having to share its market with clones. Microsoft would then have been mostly an applications company, selling Excel and Word to Mac users, and we'd be hearing about the evil, anticompetitive actions of Steve Jobs. That seems unlikely, however, and the reason is revealing. Apple's all-in-one-box strategy was inherently brittle. It offered too many margins of error and too few margins of adjustment. The same company wrote the software and made the machines. So if the computers caught on fire, as they sometimes did, or the manufacturing plants couldn't keep up with Christmas demand, there was no alternative outlet for the Mac operating system. Software sales dropped too. No competitive sales force could go after business users while Jobs and company were chasing public schools. All new ideas had to come from within the same closed system. (For a discussion of related issues, see my Forbes ASAP article "Resilience vs. Anticipation". While Apple is based in Silicon Valley, its self-sufficiency strategy more closely resembles those of the minicomputer companies based around Boston.) Microsoft's partner-dependent system proved far more resilient as the industry changed. The company didn't have to do everything itself, and it could reap the benefits of innovations by others, whether in manufacturing, assembly, distribution, or applications software. Instead of the best minds of a single company, it enlisted the best minds of hundreds. And while Microsoft depended on its partners to build the market, in time they came to depend on Microsoft. The irony is that by making alliances and competing furiously--by not acting like a monopolist--Microsoft wound up reaping the benefits of a near-monopoly on its operating system. It is emphatically not true that "when you buy a computer, you already are without any choice as to the operating system," as Microsoft critic Audrie Krause said on Crossfire. Both REASON's production department and I personally will be buying new Macs in the next few months. Translation software makes it relatively easy to go from one operating system to another. Nowadays, it's possible to function reasonably well with an operating system that controls only 5 percent of the new-computer market. The great fear of Microsoft's critics is that the company will wind up controlling everything, foisting mediocre-to-poor products on an unwilling public at ever-higher prices. It's impossible to disprove that hypothetical scenario. But history, and Microsoft's own intense paranoia, cast doubt on it. Just when its quasi-monopoly looks secure, something new--Netscape's Web browsers, Sun Microsystems' Java programming language--pops up and makes Microsoft scramble to maintain its position. So far its resilience has served it well, but the critics' scary scenario relies on more than successful scrambling. It requires absolute security, no future challengers. And that looks unlikely. Consider the smoking gun memo cited by Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein at the press conference announcing the Justice Department suit. An internal Microsoft document, it told marketing managers to "Worry about the browser share as much as Bill Gates does, because we will lose the Internet platform battle if we do not have a significant user-installed base. The industry would simply ignore our standards. At your level, that is at the manager level, if you let customers deploy Netscape Navigator, you lose the leadership on the desktop." I will leave it to the attorneys to divine what it means not to "let customers deploy Netscape Navigator," but one thing is clear: This is not a company that thinks like a monopoly. It is always running scared. There's always the possibility that something new could come along and destroy its franchise. Microsoft didn't get where it is by creating perfect products. It benefited as much from its competitors' mistakes as from its own considerable acumen. And it isn't shy about leaning on suppliers and intermediate customers, such as computer makers, to get its way. In the eyes of its critics, its success is therefore proof that something is amiss in the marketplace. But the market doesn't promise perfection, only a trial-and-error process of discovery and improvement. The fallible human beings who create products make mistakes. They let their egos and preconceptions blind them to what people really want. Or they just don't know enough, or adjust fast enough, to produce the right goods at the right time. That some of Microsoft's strongest current competitors--Sun and Oracle--are gripped by an anti-PC ideology, when customers love the independence and flexibility of personal computers, does not bode well for them. What is striking about the story of Microsoft is how adaptable the company has been. Gates's original vision of "a computer on every desk and in every home, running Microsoft software" didn't specify what sort of software or who would make the computers. It was an open-ended, flexible idea that built a resilient company. What Microsoft has delivered is pretty much what most people want: a way to use computers easily, for many different purposes. Its software isn't always elegant, but that's the criterion of programming elites, not everyday users. And though Microsoft is clearly the big kid on the block, it has enabled, and encouraged, lots of other software developers. Microsoft accounts for a mere 4 percent of industry revenue. As Eamonn Sullivan of PC Week notes, "A lot of companies are making a lot of money on the ubiquity of Windows, providing users with a lot of choice where they want it--on their desktops. That isn't the expected result of a monopoly." From 1969 to 1982, the Justice Department carried on a similar trust-busting crusade against IBM, which had behaved in many ways just like Microsoft. (An earlier antitrust action against IBM had been settled by a consent decree in 1956.) Millions of dollars were transferred from the taxpayers and stockholders to lawyers and expert witnesses. Enormous amounts of brain power were dissipated. Having to monitor every action for possible legal ramifications further constipated IBM's already-centralized culture. The suit was a complete waste. Whatever quasi-monopoly IBM had was broken not by government enforcers but by obscure innovators, working on computer visions neither IBM nor the Justice Department's legions of lawyers had imagined. Big Blue is still big, though it's smaller than it once was. But nobody thinks it could control the world. The world, it seems, is beyond that sort of control.

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Re: cypherpunks and guns
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 1/7/98 3:16 AM, Kent Crispin (kent(a)songbird.com) passed this wisdom: >On Wed, Jan 07, 1998 at 01:25:45AM -0600, snow wrote: >>I am fairly certain that as an irregular army soldier I could >>inflict a substantial amount of damage upon an occupying military. >>With maybe $20k in equipment and several hundred hours of training, >>you could make >> >> If you were smart, you could do it for a lot less. > >That presumes the enemy is dumb. An amusing fantasy. ... not so .... the US Military has very few really experienced combat soldiers left and most of those are in places where their experience isn't available to the grunt on the line. Most RVN vets are retired ... look just recently at what happened to the Russians troops sent to Chechnya ... all these brand spanking new, highly trained proud young 19 and 20 year old troops went romping off to fight 'a bunch of old men' in the Chechyn Republic ... there was one little problem ... a big hunk of those old men had spent two to seven years in that same Russian Army fighting the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan ... and that 'bunch of old men' kicked their young asses! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNLRAvD7r4fUXwraZAQHv5wf/S8j1et/Rf0LQu8eH4koWLjmSduaxggsY VMGcY7z2OfLdSrtVAGIcLpfPPdrOk0utmH317xwKIL9SIQIqGYvm7pCdYSv0A4Vx KD49W3pQjhvrhTHZldd8EFrd7Z2thfR1EJL9Vowsnyr4QHt5FvXrBs6k5531iNtN TURAhCzVgpKuMruwwaKMVc+P72mYJl7OM2I2j6ZdEkZOPNxoCVS/0xO8UTlWpLUO 9Suxvi+rJSa4k/HKRsGUrRO/LaFK7abTs/AwLioJlyd5ukXjdPuyY2wza8h1GvC2 fowHb8WGYdcwc45FBhpz3bEiS/PU5t2xHQ9p+/mEkLDknfBSNk01zw== =hiEs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "In effect, to follow, not to force the public inclination; to give a direction, a form, a technical dress, and a specific sanction, to the general sense of the community, is the true end of legislature." -- Edmund Burke

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CRACKING DOWN ON MICROSOFT The Justice Department has a long history of mistaking innovators for monopolists BY LAWRENCE J. SISKIND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE has painted its assault on Microsoft Corp. as a campaign against tying. Microsoft, the government says, should not be allowed to force manufacturers who load Windows95 onto their computers to include the Internet Explorer Web browser. Close inspection, however, reveals that the DOJ is not guarding against tying -- it is guarding against change. And while the Justice Department has won the first round against the software giant, the question of whether that change is good or ill should be left to the market to decide, not the government. When the DOJ charged Microsoft with violating their 1995 consent decree, it cited Sec. IV(E)(I), which bars Microsoft from conditioning the licensing of any one product on the licensing of another. Microsoft's Windows95 operating system includes the Internet Explorer -- IE -- Web browser. Microsoft openly forbids PC manufacturers licensed to load Windows95 from removing the browser. To Joel Klein, head of the DOJ's Antitrust Division, this is unlawful tying, plain and simple. "We think the evidence will show unmistakably that these are two separate products," he said. "Everybody knows you have an operating system and you have a browser." Everybody also knows that whenever a lawyer begins a statement with the phrase "everybody knows," the consequent proposition will be questionable at best. Mr. Klein's statement was not flat-out wrong. But it was flat-out nearsighted. The only thing "everybody knows" about operating systems is that they are constantly changing. Mr. Klein's statement was not flat-out wrong. But it was flat-out nearsighted. The only thing 'everybody knows' about operating systems is that they are constantly changing. An operating system program controls the operation of the computer, determining which programs run and when. It also coordinates the interaction between the computer's memory and its attached devices. When the world's first PC, the Altair 8800, appeared in 1975, its operating system didn't have much to operate. The product was a do-it-yourself kit, without display screen or printer. Operating systems became more complex as personal computers became more versatile. FAR-FLUNG PERIPHERALS Contemporary operating systems are as far removed from the early operating systems as Cape Kennedy is from Kitty Hawk. They have evolved to manage a growing array of peripherals: keyboard, monitor, disk drives, printer, fax, modem and more. They have also embraced new features and capabilities: data compression, disk defragmentation, multimedia extensions and data transmission technology. All of these features, by the way, once existed as separate programs. Yet no one views their inclusion in modern operating systems as any kind of tying. Which brings us to the Windows95 operating system. When Microsoft began to develop Windows95, then code-named "Chicago," it decided to build Internet technology into it. The early elements of this technology included a Web browser and were code-named "O'Hare." The very first commercially available versions of Windows95 included Internet Explorer as a component. Since then, IE has been repeatedly upgraded, with each successive version more tightly intertwined with the rest of the operating system. The most recent version, IE 4.0, is ubiquitous, and allows the user to explore World Wide Web sites from anywhere on the computer. One can connect to the Web without even opening the browser, and one can view Web sites (called "channels") without connecting to the Internet. What is true about Windows95 also holds true for rival products. Brit Hume recently observed in the Weekly Standard: "The distinction between browsers and operating systems has blurred to the point where it's not clear where one ends and the other begins." Every major contemporary operating system now contains Internet technology. Designing an operating system to access the Internet represents a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, change. The intermeshing of operating systems with Internet capabilities is eminently logical. These systems have always been designed to access information. In the early days, that meant accessing hard drives and floppy-disk drives. With the advent of the CD-ROM, they were designed to access data from that source. As businesses brought PCs into the office, computers became linked together into networks; operating systems were designed to access information from local area networks. The Internet, for all its unimaginably vast dimensions, is just another repository of information to a computer. Designing an operating system to access the Internet represents a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, change. MICROSOFT SLACKING Ironically, this is not a change sponsored or spearheaded by Microsoft. If anything, Bill Gates has been a laggard in this area. His rivals are far ahead and he is playing catch-up. The great proponents of Internet-driven computers have emerged from Silicon Valley, not from Redmond, Wash. Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle Corp., has long championed the idea of the "network computer." Consider computers as underwater divers. Equipping each diver with his own tanks is wasteful and inefficient. It imposes severe limits on how long and how far the diver can explore. Instead, let every diver be connected to a surface mothership. The connection frees the diver from the limitations and burdens of carrying his own tanks. Similarly, loading millions of PCs with their own copies of software programs is a waste of resources. Instead, let every computer be networked and draw its software needs from the vast store of the Internet. The result, Ellison says, would be high-quality personal computers retailing at about $500. In line with this thinking, Sun Microsystems has developed Java, a language that allows programmers to create Internet-based applications capable of running on any computer, regardless of operating system. Sun's CEO, Scott McNealy, notes that 400,000 programmers (including 2,500 at IBM) are currently writing programs in Java language. The libertarian journalist and futurist George Gilder believes Java will revolutionize personal computing and render proprietary systems like Windows obsolete. If the future of personal computing is indeed linked to the Internet, then weaving Internet technology into Windows95 (and even more intimately and pervasively into Windows98) is not a grab for power. It is a clutch for survival. Which brings us back to the DOJ's decision to prosecute Microsoft for tying. Some have suspected a political bias, noting that in 1992 and 1996 Silicon Valley entrepreneurs were among Clinton's best friends in the business community. Microsoft, on the other hand, has always remained aloof from politics. 'INSTITUTIONAL MYOPIA' But I believe the attack on Microsoft stems from institutional myopia rather than political bias. The DOJ's Antitrust Division may understand the law and may be sincerely dedicated to enforcing it fairly. But it has no way of knowing where the economy is headed or how fast it is heading in that direction. Instead, the division views the economy as static. An operating system will always be an operating system. A browser will always be a browser. Just like timber, coal or oil: Products do not change. Because of this institutional myopia, the DOJ has a history of marching down wrong roads. In 1969, it prosecuted IBM. Fifteen years passed before the department finally understood what every high school techno-geek already knew: The computer industry was dynamic, and Big Blue was not dominant. If the Internet is the future of personal computing, then weaving Internet technology into Windows is not a grab for power. It is a clutch for survival. The hapless campaign against IBM probably did no harm. Other Antitrust Division missteps have. In the 1960s and '70s, long after most Americans had abandoned the neighborhood Mom-and-Pop store for the national chain, the DOJ was prosecuting Topco Associates, a cooperative association of small grocery chains. The DOJ wanted to protect the association's small regional members. It failed to notice the dynamic changes already apparent to the average shopper. The days of the Mom-and-Pop grocer were over. And while the DOJ was successfully squashing Topco, its much more powerful rivals -- The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Inc. (A&P), Safeway Inc., the Kroger Co. -- were assuming dominance over the grocery business. The same myopia underlies the decision to prosecute Microsoft. Enslaved by its institutional myopia, the DOJ simply cannot understand that operating systems change. Thus, it sees tying when in fact there is transmutation. Internet-oriented operating systems may be the wave of the future. Or they may be a detour to nowhere. Not everyone likes or needs the endless waits, the superfluous graphics and the flood of irrelevant and unwanted information that always seem to accompany excursions onto the Internet. Nothing is certain in high tech; business empires rise and fall with stunning rapidity. Confronting this sometimes creative, sometimes destructive turmoil, a wise government would recognize its limitations and restrict its role. Whether Windows95 should include Internet Explorer is a question best left to the millions of jurors who make up the marketplace. AUTHOR LAWRENCE J. SISKIND is a San Francisco attorney who specializes in intellectual property law. Mr. Siskind owns stock in Microsoft Corp. He hopes that his pro-Microsoft opinions, once published, will influence the price of his stock favorably. The expectation of financial gain has colored, if not dictated, the opinions expressed in his article.

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Just Released! 16 Million!
by busadmn＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IT WAS JUST RELEASED!! INTRODUCING...MILLIONS VOL. 1 We took a total of over 92 million email addresses from many of the touted CD's that are out there (bought them all - some were $300+)! We added the millions we had in storage to those. When we combined them all, we had in excess of 100+ million addresses in one huge file. We then ran a super "sort/de-dupe" program against this huge list. It cut the file down to less than 25 million!!! Can you believe that? It seems that most people that are selling CD's are duping the public by putting numerous files of addresses in the CD over and over. This created many duplicate addresses. They also had many program "generated" email addresses like Compuserve, MCI, ANON's, etc. This causes a tremendous amount of undeliverables, and for those that use Stealth programs, clogs up servers quickly with trash, etc. We then ran a program that contained 150+ keywords to remove addresses with vulgarity, profanity, sex-related names, postmaster, webmaster, flamer, abuse, spam, etc., etc. Also eliminated all .edu, .mil, .org, .gov, etc. After that list was run against the remaining list, it reduced it down to near 16 million addresses! So, you see, our list will save people hundreds of dollars buying all others that are out there on CD and otherwise. Using ours will be like using the 100+ million that we started with, but a lot less money and alot less time!! We also purchased Cyber-Promos ($995.00) CD. We received it just prior to finishing production work on the new CD. We had our people take a random sample of 300,000 addresses from the touted 2.9 that they advertised. We used a program that allows us to take a random sample of addresses from any list. We were able to have the program take every 9th address, thus giving us a 300,000 list of Cyber's email addresses from top to bottom. We did not clean these, but we did create 3 seperate files named cyber1.txt, cyber2.txt, & cyber3.txt of 100,000 addresses each. This will give all people that use the list a opportunity to send mail to the list before deciding if their CD is all it's hyped to be. We also included a 2+ million "Remove/Flamer" file broke into seperate files for ease of extracting and adding to your own database of removes. "You can buy from the REST or you can buy from the BEST. Your choice. _____________________________ What others are saying: "I received the CD on Friday evening. Like a kid with a new toy, I immediately started bulking out using the new email addresses. Over the course of the weekend, I emailed out over 500,000 emails and I received less than TWENTY undeliverables!! I am totally satisfied with my purchase!! Thanks Premier!!" Dave Buckley Houston, TX "This list is worth it's weight in gold!! I sent out 100,000 emails for my product and received over 55 orders! Ann Colby New Orleans, LA **************************************** HERE'S THE BOTTOM LINE Here is what you get when you order today! >> 16 Million Email Addresses... 1 per line in simple text format on a CD. Files are in lots of 100,000 (no codes needed to open files). All files are separated by domain name for your convenience. PLUS you receive a tremendous REMOVE list! AND the a sampling of CyberPromo's HOT list. >>> NOW ONLY $149.00! This price is effective for the next seven days, thereafter the price will be $199.00 so ORDER NOW! All lists are completely free of any Duplicates. We also on a continual basis, add New Names and Remove Undeliverables and Remove Requests. The result is the Cleanest Email Addresses Available Anywhere to use over and over again, for a FRACTION of the cost that other companies charge. Typical rates for acquiring email lists are from 1 cent to as high as 3 cents per email address - that's "INFORMATION HIGHWAY" ROBBERY!. Don't even hesitate on this one or you will miss out on the most effective way to market anywhere..PERIOD! If you have any further questions or to place an order by phone, please do not hesitate to call us at: 908-245-1143 To order our email package, simply print out the EZ ORDER FORM below and fax or mail it to our office today. We accept Visa, Mastercard, AMEX, Checks by Fax and Mail. _________________ EZ Order Form _____Yes! I would like to order MILLIONS Vol. 1 email addresses for only $149.00. *Please select one of the following for shipping.. ____I would like to receive my package OVERNIGHT. I'm including $15 for shipping. (outside US add an additional $25 for shipping) ____I would like to receive my package 2 DAY delivery. I'm including $10 for shipping. (outside US add an additional $25 for shipping) DATE_____________________________________________________ NAME____________________________________________________ COMPANY NAME___________________________________________ ADDRESS_________________________________________________ CITY, STATE, ZIP___________________________________________ PHONE NUMBERS__________________________________________ FAX NUMBERS_____________________________________________ EMAIL ADDRESS___________________________________________ TYPE OF CREDIT CARD: ______VISA _____MASTERCARD CREDIT CARD# __________________________________________ EXPIRATION DATE________________________________________ NAME ON CARD___________________________________________ AMOUNT $____________________ (Required) SIGNATURE:x________________________ DATE:x__________________ You may fax your order to us at: 1-908-245-3119 CHECK BY FAX SERVICES! If you would like to fax a check, paste your check below and fax it to our office along with all forms to: 1-908-245-3119 ****************************************************** ***24 HOUR FAX SERVICES*** PLEASE PASTE YOUR CHECK HERE AND FAX IT TO US AT 1-908-245-3119 ******************************************************* If You fax a check, there is no need for you to send the original check. We will draft up a new check, with the exact information from your original check. All checks will be held for bank clearance. If you feel more comfortable sending payment through the mail, please send all forms and Check or Money Order to: Rapture Marketing Inc. P.O. Box 616 Kenilworth, NJ 07033

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