December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Remailer Trivia / Re: Singapore & Freedom (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 12:54:26 -0800 > From: Steve Schear <schear(a)lvdi.net> > Subject: Re: Remailer Trivia / Re: Singapore & Freedom (fwd) > > At 3:43 PM +0000 12/9/1997, jonathon wrote: > >On Mon, 8 Dec 1997, Jim Choate wrote: > > > >> analogous situation you would need to use a *listed* phone number registered > >> to anonymous in such a way that ANI displayed the number but any directory > >> search resulted in anonymous w/ no address or other tracing info even for > >> the phone company. To the best of my knowledge no phone company anywhere > > Third party, anonymous, telephone services are available. One in Las Vegas (at least it used to be) is Private Lines, which is an anonyous re-dialer using 900 number billing for payment. Yeah, and the way it works is that some 3rd party buys a trunk from the local RBOC and then sets up their PBX and then re-sells the lines. Here's your test for them. Buy a line and have them list it in the RBOC directory under 'anonymous'. Not the same thing as going directly to the RBOC and having them list your number under 'anonymous'. THAT is the litmus test for true anonymous phone service *and* to make it equivalent to an anonymous remailer with address persistance. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Clinton in the doghouse (humor)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

LAUGH TRACK The Clintons' new dog -- Bill Maher: "This dog is going to live in the White House, so it's going have to go outside if it's going to make fund raising calls" ("PI," ABC 12/9). David Letterman: "And now they've got him working on training him to dig cemetary plots at Arlington National Cemetery" ("Late Show," CBS 12/9). Jay Leno on VP Gore: "New movie coming out called "Digging to China' It's all about Al Gore's search for campaign donations" ("Tonight," 12/9). For more on the complicated family tree of Mick Jagger and Jerry Hall, who just had a baby (his 6th, her 4th), click Back Bench. TOP TEN COMPLAINTS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S NEW PUPPY 10. Whenever you bury a bone, president digs it up and eats it. 9. Late-night walks always end up at local Hooters. 8. Much too easy to mistake Al Gore for a tree. 7. Keep getting yelled at for "fetching" Sam Donaldson's hairpiece. 6. When the president says "Roll over," he's usually talking to his date. 5. Roger hogs all the best chew-toys. 4. If you so much as look at Janet Reno, you get an assfull of size-13 pump. 3. Leash not as nice as the one Hillary uses on Bill. 2. Unfair having to get "fixed" when Clinton's the one who really needs it. 1. Fighting with Bill over the last snausage (CBS, 12/9). TV SOUNDBITE "This story's not going to die." -- ABC's Cokie Roberts on the fundraising scandals, "GMA," 12/10

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update.350 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From physnews(a)aip.org Wed Dec 10 16:59:59 1997 > Date: Wed, 10 Dec 97 14:35:44 EST > Subject: update.350 > > PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE > The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News > Number 350 December 10, 1997 by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben > Stein > > QUANTUM TELEPORTATION has been experimentally > demonstrated by physicists at the University of Innsbruck (Anton > Zeilinger, 011-43-676-305-8608, anton.zeilinger@ uibk.ac.at; Dik > Bouwmeester, Dik.Bouwmeester(a)uibk.ac.at) First proposed in > 1993 by Charles Bennett of IBM (914-945-3118), quantum > teleportation allow physicists to take a photon (or any other > quantum-scale particle, such as an atom), and transfer its properties > (such as its polarization) to another photon--even if the two photons > are on opposite sides of the galaxy. Note that this scheme > transports the particle's properties to the remote location and not the > particle itself. And as with Star Trek's Captain Kirk, whose body > is destroyed at the teleporter and reconstructed at his destination, > the state of the original photon must be destroyed to create an exact > reconstruction at the other end. In the Innsbruck experiment, the > researchers create a pair of photons A and B that are quantum > mechanically "entangled": the polarization of each photon is in a > fuzzy, undetermined state, yet the two photons have a precisely > defined interrelationship. If one photon is later measured to have, > say, a horizontal polarization, then the other photon must "collapse" > into the complementary state of vertical polarization. In the > experiment, one of the entangled photons A arrives at an optical > device at the exact time as a "message" photon M whose > polarization state is to be teleported. These two photons enter a > device where they become indistinguishable, thus effacing our > knowledge of M's polarization (the equivalent of destroying > Kirk).What the researchers have verified is that by ensuring that > M's polarization is complementary to A's, then B's polarization > would now have to assume the same value as M's. In other words, > although M and B have never been in contact, B has been imprinted > with M's polarization value, across the whole galaxy, > instantaneously. This does not mean that faster-than-light > information transfer has occurred. The people at the sending station > must still convey the fact that teleportation had been successful by > making a phone call or using some other light-speed or > sub-light-speed means of communication. While physicists don't > foresee the possibility of teleporting large-scale objects like humans, > this scheme will have uses in quantum computing and cryptography. > (D. Bouwmeester et al., Nature, 11 Dec 1997; see also > www.aip.org/physnews/graphics) > > DO EARTHQUAKES HAVE ELECTRICAL PRECURSORS? The [material deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Remailer Trivia / Re: Singapore & Freedom (fwd)
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 12/9/97 3:57 PM, Jrbl Pookah (lists(a)castle5.castlec.com) passed this wisdom: >>Jim Choate writes: >>> >>> To the best of my knowledge no phone company anywhere >>> will allow a customer to purchase service without identifying >>> themselves to the phone company. Please let me know if there is >>> such a beast somewhere. > > Hmm. Excuse the interruption into your conversation here, but I've >signed up (in the past) for long-distance service under an assumed >name, on a telephone line that I held in a different assumed name. >At least in Cincinnati, OH, the phone company didn't (doesn't?) >really care, as long as they had a place to send the bills. When >they asked for my SSN, I simply told them I wouldn't give it to >them, and offered my date-of-birth - which I lied about. They >didn't mind. ... hmmmm ... for my .02 ... isn't the entrie arguemnt rather academic/ Thje simple matter is regradless of whose name it is in, its tied to a physical location where sooner or later you can be apprehended/discovered. A more reasonable question might be has anyone secured cellular service without some serious credit/identity queries? If one can work out he details of getting payment to them (they seem to care little about what goes on so long as they are paid!) that preserves anonymity, as well as keeping on the move to defy the cell trackers then maybe there is some anonymity to be achieved. ... hey anybody designed a 'crowds' for cell phones??? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNI8qOD7r4fUXwraZAQF3TQf+PSDf6ZhYd3TQN4fpRWYe2FP1dv5ATrTD 44ENHDDLUplcvcZuTYf4kqM5PoOYQ0qsEfJu/YXRA5Ygpoj2q0yTUvkH194WbXk+ dzplLkc74kjMTVT48Jj3+ax5HlRhl7moQcXHDEYzdAHz1iIKvKWsPDkj0+5quaAb FldkENUU0HRLkyxmh6E7bICDPXUfaBCWzlspwYHK2iP138qpIe7TE1gNUrUrwK3P 8GUzjXr2iCjB6jqgyBEdN52p7iGIMNRfkwhOSB0JLoOaD6egBywHahq3tMB9casF ot3wpGKABsgsCFLDiSFCV9sud7j92lkf+svyJr1ate3VzW94z6mQLw== =zGLX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "The reason worry kills more people than work is that more people worry than work" -- Robert Frost (1874-1963)

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DCSB: Donald Eastlake; "SET and UNSET"
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 09:38:51 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu, dcsb-announce(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Donald Eastlake; "SET and UNSET" Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Donald Eastlake 3rd Cybercash, Inc. SET and UNSET Tuesday, January 6, 1997 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA After great gestational pain, version 1.0 of the complex, heavyweight Secure Electronic Transacation (SET) protocol has been promulgated by the credit card association, is being deployed in pilots, and is continuing to have features added to it in a SET 2.0 design effort. Meanwhile, the environment that lead to SET continues to change and new alternatives for securing card/account based transactions are being suggested. Donald Eastlake 3rd is a Principal Systems Engineer at CyberCash, Inc. before which he was in the Pathworks network group at Digital Equipment Corporation. At CyberCash, he helped design the "CyberCash message format" documented in RFC 2898 and implemented the library routines that support them. He also architected and did the preliminary implementation of CyberCash's SET implementation. He is active in IETF standards efforts and is currently the document editor for the IETF DNS security working group including RFCs 2065 and 2137. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, January 6, 1997, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $32.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business attire" (whatever that means), for women. Fair warning: since we purchase these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code. We will attempt to record this meeting and put it on the web in RealAudio format at some future date We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, January 3rd, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", in the amount of $32.50. Please include your e-mail address, so that we can send you a confirmation If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com> . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5 iQEVAwUBNI/6c8UCGwxmWcHhAQGzGwf/TIIKQv+DlgJUZ5KfQsOLZWw0W0IXvZ4w ouQWDSFfleJFAtNIS4+TX+pT2MnRQ2SdsGDt/t+WDdC/0AHgX/4anOPXC7gKAjIF WNmGzP+DEvFvdFb5EcGCt6I7wYbEQhqIQs6/ULrItY3IqNVMQ4ZWzwknlcRWqVzl dwXX5JXYNRj9Wk5+la2e9BCeW5mKq3vURtr8xm2MIYwq3wdfzp9ydWZ20D7dJedH Z1SQeTae1obbUhTnljNqNtdKHEdTVcHsZVfkYA44JsBMMty9A3R8xqOKPCMGIcoI 65RWZOYmjkKlLAdb0OmmW/O32dnEcir0S4RCmdfiZYB9WXaVKLewQA== =6Lik -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/> For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Back to the drawing board ...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Resent-Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 14:32:10 -0500 X-Authentication-Warning: qnx.com: localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol To: 0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org Subject: Back to the drawing board ... Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 13:19:18 -0500 From: glen mccready <glen(a)qnx.com> Resent-From: 0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org X-Mailing-List: <0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org> archive/latest/2539 X-Loop: 0xdeadbeef(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org Precedence: list Resent-Sender: 0xdeadbeef-request(a)substance.abuse.blackdown.org Forwarded-by: Nev Dull <nev(a)bostic.com> Forwarded-by: "Michael A. Olson" <mao(a)mag.com> Forwarded-by: frew(a)icess.ucsb.edu (Jim Frew) From: simpson(a)alexandria.ucsb.edu This is the new family-friendly filtered search engine put out by the folks at Altavista: http://family.netshepherd.com/ Try the query "fucking porn" and see what you get... exactly what I want my kids to see when they are looking for "fucking porn": fucking porn. I guess we can't expect them to filter just anything with the word fucking in it, it might be an educational site or something. -jason --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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alias.cyberpass.net
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is alias.cyberpass.net down or no longer active? I can send mail but not receive anything not even a confirmation.

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RE: On Air
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "Nightline, News MS" <NITELINE(a)abc.com> >To: "'SMTP:schear@lvdi.net'" <schear(a)lvdi.net> >Subject: RE: On Air >Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 13:32:00 -0500 >X-Priority: 3 >MIME-Version: 1.0 > >ÐÏà¡± > > >====== Your Original Letter Follows ===== > > > >_browser = Mozilla/4.01 (Macintosh; I; PPC) >_script = http://www.abcnews.com/onair/email.html >>from = schear(a)lvdi.net >last_name = Schear >subj = On Air >first_name = Steve >Question = Re: Dec 8, Revolution in a Box, Part 11 > >The number trotted out on your show of 100,000 penetrations, or >attempted penetrations, of Pentagon computers as an indication of poor >security is misleading. If you had taken the time to dig behind these >numbers you would have found that most all of these intrusions, or >attempts, were against DoD computer systems connected to public networks >(e.g., Web sites) containing no secret information and with minimal >security provisions. > >100,000 certainly sounds like a major problem. Suggest you check you >facts first, next time and scale your numbers appropriately. > >Steve Schear >CEO >First ECache Corp. >_cookie = SWID=4E29F2F7-710A-11D1-82AF-00A0C921A5DB >_time = 12/09/97 19:47:40 >_ipaddress = 208.129.55.202 >_user = - - schear(a)lvdi.net >

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Free Live Video Sex!!!
by lisa＠mailwiz.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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A Gas to be Passed Later
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phbbbbbbbbtttttt.

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Kallstrom calls it quits
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

- ------- Forwarded Message Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 09:23:12 -0700 Subject: FBI Kallstrom (TWA investigation) will retire.... 12/10/97 -- 5:44 AM Leader of TWA criminal investigation retires from FBI BALTIMORE (AP) - New York FBI chief James Kallstrom will retire at the end of the month, ending his 28-year law enforcement career only after wrapping up the bureau's investigation into the crash of TWA Flight 800. ``It was not in my character to leave before the TWA Flight 800 investigation was concluded,'' Kallstrom, 54, said Tuesday. ``I thought I owed it not only to the bureau but to the victims' families and to the American citizens.'' FBI Director Louis Freeh said Kallstrom was his supervisor when he joined the FBI in the 1970s and ``was one of my models.'' Freeh, who appointed Kallstrom as one of six assistant directors in 1995, tried to persuade him to remain in office. ``I love him,'' Freeh said in a telephone interview with The Associated Press. ``But on the other hand I understand that he was a dedicated and loyal FBI agent who has sacrificed a lot. I also think TWA took its toll on him both emotionally and physically.'' Last month, Kallstrom suspended the FBI's search for a criminal cause into the July 17, 1996, disaster that claimed 230 lives, saying no evidence of a bomb or missile was found. The National Transportation Safety Board is continuing an investigation into mechanical failure and is holding hearings this week in Baltimore on its findings. Kallstrom, who has two young daughters, told the AP that he will take a job as senior executive vice-president at MBNA Inc., an international bank and credit card company based in Wilmington, Del. ``I have to take care of my family and make sure my daughters are educated properly. I don't leave because I want to leave but it is time for me to think about other responsibilities. My time has come.'' Kallstrom, who is two years short of the FBI's mandatory retirement age, said he was ``honored to run the flagship office of the FBI and I leave it in good hands.'' Kallstrom has found friends among the families of those who died in the TWA explosion. ``I love this man,'' said Michel Breistroff of Paris, who lost his adult son in the explosion. Breistroff said he had grown to trust Kallstrom despite his own doubts at times about the openness of the U.S. investigation. ``He has shown me such compassion. We are so connected now,'' he said. Part of Kallstrom's blunt, get-it-done style was formed in the jungles of Vietnam, where he fought as a Marine and developed a hatred for hypocrisy after what he believed was the misrepresentation of the war to the American people. He joined the FBI in Baltimore shortly after leaving the Marines in 1969. Within the year, he was in New York City, following pizza trucks alone in the middle of the night because he suspected they were part of a drug conspiracy. The case developed into a major mob-drug prosecution headed by Freeh, then a prosecutor. Soon Kallstrom was leading teams of agents as they planted microphones in rooms where mobsters met. The tapes captured notorious New York mob boss John Gotti, who was later sent to prison for life. Before the end of the 1980s, Kallstrom helped put behind bars scores of mobsters from every major crime family in New York. Kallstrom said he will miss the FBI. ``The day I walk out the door for the last time, it will be one of the saddest days of my life,'' he said. - - ------- End of Forwarded Message - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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some interesting news...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: pete(a)loshin.com Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 16:43:29 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: some interesting news... Status: U Bob, you can forward this if you like to any appropriate newsgroups (but only if it hasn't already been mentioned). If it isn't entirely clear, let me know. According to Netscape's press release of 12/10/97, their new Mission Control software solution includes an LDAP directory server and a certificate server. That certificate server boasts an interesting new feature: the ability for the server to generate not just certs but also the keys, and install them on remotely managed browsers. They are positioning this as a feature for organizations that want to use keys but don't want to lose access to corporate data. -pl --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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PGP 5.0i Manual translation released
by Maksim Otstavnov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Updates: * Russian translation of PGP 5.0 for Windows User's Guide is released: ftp.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/5.0/manual/win95nt/russian/pgp50manual-ru.pdf * The following PGP Russian Homepage documents are updated: http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/1059/pgp-ru.html http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/1059/pgp50-ru-toc.html http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/1059/pgp-project-ru.html as well as http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/1059/pubs-ru.html -- -- Maksim Otstavnov <maksim(a)volga.net> http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/1059/ -- -maintainer of The Russian PGP HomePage -- (http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/1059/pgp-ru.html)

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A new first for Reno/Justice! Encryption not even on the agenda!
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- December 11, 1997, NYTimes: Reno Says Plan Will "Match Wits" With Technological Criminals By JERI CLAUSING >>> A new first for Reno/Justice! Encryption not even on the agenda! absolutely unreal --of course, being cynical at heart (and having watched the snakes and other assorted vermin inside the Beltway, encryption control will be back... http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/121197crime.html WASHINGTON Justice officials from the world's largest industrial countries met here on Wednesday to draft an international plan that Attorney General Janet Reno said was designed to catch cybercriminals and ensure no safe haven exists for them. ... "Today is an important day in fighting computer crime, and in laying the groundwork for the next century of crime fighting," ... cover the following principles: 1. Ensuring that a sufficient number of trained and equipped law enforcement personnel are enlisted to fight high-tech crime. 2. Creating contacts available on a 24-hour basis to allow countries to move quickly in tracking down computer criminals. 3. Developing faster ways to trace attacks on computer networks and identify hackers. 4. Carrying out a criminal prosecution in the country a suspect flees to, if extradition is impossible. 5. Taking steps to preserve important information on computer networks to help prevent tampering. 6. Reviewing the respective legal systems in each nation to make sure there are appropriate crimes for computer wrongdoing and to make it easier to investigate the crimes. 7. Working with the industry to come up with new ways to detect and prevent computer crimes. 8. Stepping up efforts to use new technologies, such as so-called video links, which would allow obtaining testimony from witnesses in other countries. ... Reno said the contentious topic of encryption regulation was not a focus of the meeting. ..."We were here to discuss a framework," she said. "Encryption was not a topic. Although it was alluded to, it generally was not a topic." ... Asked what the biggest dangers are from technological criminals, Reno gave the example of a hacker who can "sit in his room in Washington, D.C., and steal from a bank in another country," or sabotage the computer networks of companies or governments anywhere in the world. ... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQBVAwUBNI/M3LR8UA6T6u61AQGLaAH/QnLL+qfrlPR3U+08+GVNX6Fh6g1KyvkT uxawQXMeZKva9c6miAgSRSftgVbueIeHNtjTZBL9npbnzwPl9ASL2g== =xrMG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Diffie-Hellman
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy `C' May is another loser who pays for got.net because he lacks the mental capacity to gain net access as a perk of either employment or academic achievment. 0 \/|/\ Timothy `C' May | / \/\ \/

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Improved RealAudio and RealVideo with New RealPlayer 5.0
by RealNetworks News 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear RealPlayer User, We are pleased to announce that the final version of the free RealPlayer 5.0 has been released and is now available for download. You can upgrade to RealPlayer 5.0 by visiting: http://www.real.com/50/index.html WHAT'S NEW IN REALPLAYER 5.0 RealPlayer 5.0 features improved RealAudio and RealVideo quality and other benefits, including: - Smoother, sharper RealVideo - Near CD-quality voice at 28.8 - Streaming cartoon-style animations using RealFlash, co-developed with Macromedia - 2x larger video screen - Full-screen video above 100kbps on Windows 95/NT THE ENHANCED REALPLAYER PLUS 5.0 RealPlayer Plus 5.0, the premium version of RealPlayer, is now available for purchase and immediate download at: http://www.real.com/50/plus.html RealPlayer Plus 5.0 delivers lots of great additional benefits, including: - The best-quality RealAudio and RealVideo at 28.8 - One-button scanning for LIVE audio and video sites - Instant access to content with programmable preset buttons - Ability to record selected clips - Packaged CD-ROM and manual - Free telephone technical support - Just $29.99 with 30-day money back guarantee And for a limited time, if you order and download RealPlayer Plus, you can get a FREE music CD from Sony Music (continental U.S. only). Thank you for using RealNetworks products, Maria Cantwell Senior Vice President RealNetworks, Inc. Seattle, WA USA --------------------------------------------- ABOUT THIS E-MAIL This e-mail was sent to users of RealPlayer software who indicated a preference during the download or installation process to receive notification of new RealNetworks products or services via e-mail. For information about subscribing to or unsubscribing from future announcements, visit http://www.real.com/mailinglist/index.html.

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Teach if you know it.
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who is the Organiz of Cypherpunks-j and Cypherpunks-e ? Teach if you know it. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Same old shit from Gary L. Burnore / DataBasix
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) > X-No-Archive: yes > :Your paranoid conspiracy theories remind me of the kid who blamed the mess in > :his bedroom on an invisible herd of stampeding elephants. ("Well of course > :you didn't see them, dad. They're INVISIBLE.") In your case, you speculate > :that there's a single "anonymous asshole" who's responsible for everything > :that you CLAIM has occurred. > > > Nope, I'm saying that the anonymous asshole (you) keeps posting lies with no > proof and still hasn't explained why. How is asking you a QUESTION a LIE? Why won't you answer the question about why you wanted the sendmail logs from the Huge Cajones Remailer? What purpose did you have in mind for all those names and e-mail addresses? > First you said it was because of rfg > then because of burchell yet you were attacking me long before either. I trust that you have proof for that accusation. Are you now saying that your previous accusation that rfg was your so-called "anon-asshole" was a lie? Or your accusation that Scott Dentice was this person? Remember, it's YOUR theory that there's only ONE such person, yet you've accused three different people of being this individual. > So come on anonasshole, what's your reason? If you don't like my answer, then stop asking the question. As one of the former users of Jeff Burchell's now-defunct remailer, please explain why you wanted him to turn over his logs to you and Belinda Bryan which, had they existed, would have listed the identities of everyone who either sent or received anonymous mail through that remailer. > : The problem is, you haven't proven that 90% of > :the stuff you *CLAIM* occurred even happened, let alone was the work of your > :imaginary lone "spam-baiting/forging/child-molesting/cyber-stalking/libeling" > :(did I miss anything?) so-called "anon asshole". > > > Blah Blah Blah Blah Blah. You still haven't posted proof of your claims. They're YOUR claims, Gary. You're the one who keeps claiming that you're the victim of "forgery", "libel", "spam baiting", etc. You are the one that made the unsubstantiated claim that a remailer user sent a harassing letter to an unnamed "teenage girl" with a web page at DataBasix. You are the one who needs to prove them. > :How about some proof of your wild charges, Gary? > > > You're posting anonymously. You're lying about me. Those are the charges. I'm posting anonymously? Well cry me a river. Deal with it! If that's your charge, then it says more about you than it does about me. If posting anonymously upsets you, then that alone is reason enough to do it. I'm lying about you? How? By asking you why you wanted to violate the privacy of all of the users of Jeff Burchell's remailer? It was Jeff's post that revealed your attempt to violate the privacy of his users. I only referred to it. How does that make me a liar? > :" Only one of us even USES > :remailers (or at least admits to it). You, OTOH, have never had a civil word > :to say about ANY anonymous poster. > > You're the one who keeps ranting on and on that I'm agaist remailers and I say > I'm not. You've yet to do anything other than prove that you really do want to > shut them down. Then why did you harass Jeff Burchell by demanding that he turn over his logs to you that would have identified all of his remailer's users and effectively shut it down by destroying confidence in its integrity. Did you really think that the remailer would have remained viable after it was revealed that its operator turned over its logs to DataBasix or the Church of Scientology? Or were you hoping that your attempted end run on privacy would remain your own dirty little secret? > : If remailers were shut down, I'd lose my > :ability to post. What would you lose, Gary? > > The same thing you'd lose. How so? You claim that you don't use remailers. > : Is being able to identify your > :critics and single them out for harassment really that important to you? > > You mean like you single me out for harassment? Your disinformation is getting old. You've posted no evidence: * No evidence that this so called "harassment" even occurred. * No evidence that it originated from someone other than a DataBasix staffer fabricating evidence for a smear campaign. * No evidence that I did it. * No evidence, period. Typical DataBasix big lie technique. How about the evidence, BurnFUD? HINT: Unsupported allegations that an UNNAMED user at DataBasix was "harassed" by an UNDISCLOSED e-mail from an UNNAMED person using an UNNAMED remailer are not evidence. I've posted a URL to my evidence, posted by a NON-anonymous, firsthand witness to your abuse, that NAMED you, Belinda Bryan, and William J. McClatchie. You are invited to do likewise, if you have any such evidence.

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- POWERFUL HOME BASED MONEY MAKER -
by CallNow＠1-800-811-2141 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

******************************** We will personally close the sales for you and generate weekly checks! Anyone can do this! Our sales team provides the fastest, easiest money making system ever!! My sponsor earned $10,750 in his first five weeks just by referring people to our 800 number! If you can give out an 800 number, you can make serious money with this program. Our professional staff will handle all your recruit- ing calls and close all your sales for you.......... it's just that easy! We pay $100.00 per sale each week. It is very easy to generate a $5000 check your first week. Our powerful postcards or fliers are the best marketing tools (we provide them) I want you to call this toll-free number, get your questions answered and ask about our dynamic product. *** Call 1-800-811-2141 and give Code # 23913. *** Keep calling until you get through to a live person. Please be patient; it's worth it to find out about this program. Our live representatives will answer your calls. These represent- atives will talk to your prospects, mail the materials, and close them for you. After you call 1-800-811-2141 (Code # 23913), listen to an overview at (415) 273-6019 or pull a F.O.D. at (415) 273-6020. **** 8 am- 10 pm CT Mon.- Sat. I URGE YOU TO CALL 1-800-811-2141 AND GET ALL THE DETAILS! **** **************************************************************** TO BE REMOVED FROM OUR MAILING LIST, TYPE: DogHouse-2(a)juno.com in the (TO:) area and (REMOVE) in the subject area of a new E-mail and send. ****************************************************************

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Re: FCPUNX:Elliptic Curve Tidbit
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:01 PM 12/9/97 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: > Certicom estimates the difficulty of the warmup exercises thus: > > > Using a network of 3000 computers, it is expected that the > > 79-bit exercise could be solved in a matter of hours, the > > 89-bit in a matter of days, and the 97-bit in a matter of > > weeks. > > Harley and Baisley applied 6 computers to ECCp-79 and solved it in a > bit under 10 days, which would have amounted to less than half an hour > had they had 3000 machines to throw at the problem. In that case, 240 bit keys, as used by Pegwit and Kong, should take 70 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 years on a network of three thousand computers, assuming that the scaling law claimed by Certicom holds true. --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/

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Re: 'Off' the parking pigs! (fwd)
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 12/10/97 2:45 PM, Eric Seggebruch - NYC SE (eric.seggebruch(a)East.Sun.COM) passed this wisdom: >Actually it is possible for the government to get more than one shot at >a defendant through the doctrine of dual sovereignty (state and >federal). That is how they got the police officers involved in the >Rodney King incident. When the state court (California) jury let them >off, the feds prosecuted them for civil rights violations in federal >court. TRhey also got the guys who murdered the civil rights workers in the 60's, after being acquitted in state court of murder. They were convicted of the federal crime of violating the victims civil rights also. Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "The 2nd amendment guarantees all the rest."

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Teach if you know it.
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who is the Organization of Cypherpunks-j and Cypherpunks-e ? Teach if you know it. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Phoenix Area cypherpunks CFIL (Call for Interest-level)
by Steve＠AZTech.Net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I keep seeing periodic announcements for crypto-related gatherings in various metro-areas in other parts of the country. I haven't noticed any from Phoenix (nor the rest of Arizona) so, I thought I'd take it apon myself to take a CFIL. If (say) 10 people respond, I'll begin organizing a periodic get-together, along the lines of what some other localities have already done. Note to other organizers: I'd appreciate helpful hints on how to make things work. I'm more of a techie than a socialite, and don't understand all of the niceties of getting people together, finding cheap laces to meat, and finding people willing to get up in front of a crowd and talk, much less getting people that don't know each other to talk to each other. Prospective participants: Please respond with at least general coordinates for your preferred meeting place, and your preferred days/dates/times for meeting. I'd _really_ like to see this get off of the ground. I _know_ that Phoenix/AZ has enough high-tech/security-interested people to get things going. I'll be really dissapointed in my home-state if I can't get at least 10 responses. -- Steve P.S. If there is strong objection to the distribution list that I am currently using, I apologize. The initial announcement was meant to reach as many people interested in cryptography located in PHX/AZ as possible. Future announcements will probably be sent to a new majordomo list and other selected lists, as appropriate. (List managers: If you don't appreciate my efforts, please let me know.) P.P.S. If your MUA doesn't honor Reply-to: headers, please CC: sgibbo(a)amex-trs.com for a prompt response.

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BAY AREA CYPHERPUNKS MEETING, SATURDAY 12/13, 1PM, MOUNTAIN VIEW
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The December Bay Area Cypherpunks Meeting will be held 12/13 at 1pm at Printer's Ink on Castro Street in Mountain View. Depending on the weather and the size of the crowd, we'll either stay there or move to the Java Something across the street. Many of the usual suspects have been at the IETF meeting this week, so there isn't a precise agenda, but there's been a lot of activity to discuss: - Dan Bernstein Hearing Dec. 8th - PGP acquired by McAfee / NA - OpenPGP standards committee - we've reached some probable conclusions on handling the CMR Additional Recipient Request, and there's an OpenPGP track at the IETF meeting. - Any new hacks from Berkeley? - Lucky Green's Latest Smartcard Tricks Directions: Printer's Ink. is on Castro St. at the corner of Dana, about two blocks south of the Central Expressway. Parking lots are behind the stores. From 101, Take Moffett Blvd Exit to Mountain View Moffett becomes Castro St. as it crosses the Central Expressway. From El Camino, take Castro St. about two blocks north. By Caltrain, take the Mountain View Castro Street stop, about 1 hour south of San Francisco or 20 min north of San Jose. By ICBM or GPS, it's about 37.39395N 122.07791W. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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htp.org (cypherpunks-e dist)
by Joichi Ito 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies for error messages. htp.org has been down for a few days due to ISP problems. It is running again. - Joi -- PGP Key: http://pgp.ai.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x2D9461F1 PGP Fingerprint: 58F3 CA9A EFB8 EB9D DF18 6B16 E48D AF2A 2D94 61F1 Home Page: http://domino.garage.co.jp/jito/joihome.nsf To subscribe to my personal mailing list send mailto:friends-subscribe@ji.to

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santa is bringing $$
by waujia84＠msn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Email will be severly restricted, very, very soon.Up until now,this type of program is 100% legal and has no laws governing it. Soon this will change. ******************* 2.Internet service providers ,usch as AOL and Compuserve are really trying their best to end unsolicited Emailing. ******************* 3. Once you have seen a certain program that has "flooded" the internet lines, it is already too late. The People who have made money are on to bigger and brighter things, and the majority of people will just delete the Email because they have seen it hundreds of times already. ******************** 4. OTHER PROGRAMS HAVE PRODUCTS AND REPORTS THAT ARE THERE SPECIFICALLY TO JUSTIFY THE PROGRAM( make them legal). This program has a great product that can change peoples lives and help others around them $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ IF YOU EVER THOUGHT OF TRYING A PROGRAM , NOW IS THE TIME AND THIS IS THE PROGRAM! $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ THIS PROGRAM CAN ENABLE YOU TO MAKE $1,000,000 IN 6 MONTHS! Here is what happenned to me, Hi my name is Stephen Haughten, I am 34 yrs old and have been employed in the retail industry for 12 years working for someone else ,barely making enough to pay the bills and at a dead end . I have always tried new ideas and different investment stategies with little if any success. In Sept of 96' , While "surfing the web" on AOL , I received a Email from some one showing how I could make "$50,000 in 90 days" It seemed like some" get rich quick scheme ", but what the hell , my out of the pocket expense was $20 and a little time. I can spend $20 in seconds on meaningless items, so why not spend it on something that may help my current financial situation. After I emailed A few thousand people the program , I started receiving $5 bills in the mail. I was quite surprised to say the least. I sent out more Emails and before I knew it I had to switch to a P.O box because my mailbox couldn't fit all e letters. Within 11 weeks I had made $42 000.00 ! It was like I saw the light at the end of the tunnel. I paid off the $19000.00 that I owed in credit card bills and it was like I was a new person. I couldn't wait to check the P.O. Box each day! After the letters started to trickle down, I did the program again along with this other similer program that I saw. By March 97' I quit my job, paid off all my debt and saw my money market acct grow from $1,500 to over $100,000 ! ,in little over 7 months! True story! I was now a "full time" computer Emailer. When I say full time , I say that I spend a few hours a day Email,sorting through the mail and mailing out the programs' letters to the people who sent me e $5.The rest of the time I spent with my wife and my two sons . It was great to finally be able to spend time with them, as I have always felt that I never was able to give them the quality time they needed. Best of all, My wife enjoyed helping me open the letters and mailing out the programs!My wife was working as a secretary while trying to raise our children. Now she was able to quit her job and the change in her was unbelievable! We were finally beginning to live the life we so deserved. ************************* On October 30th,1997 I decided to launch my new ,improved and faster program. This program has all of the key positive points from the several different programs that I have used. And most importantly it is new and easy to use. ************************* But the absolute best part is the reports that you send and receive actually are are ALL NEW! and can show people how to take control of and improve their lives in every shape and form ! ************************* Prior reports from similer programs , were basically there only to justify the program. These NEW reports are - PRICELESS! The reports are unbelivable! The information in the programs alone may change your life; financially,emotionally,spiritually, in every way! If you have tried other Email programs and had limited success, it was because of three things ; 1. EFFORT 2. TIMING 3. PRODUCT ************************ THIS PROGRAM TAKES CARE OF ISSUES #2 AND #3 . THE EFFORT IS UP TO YOU. I can not stress how much of the success of a program depends on the product and ease of use. Here is your chance , I do not know how long you will have this opportunity, only the goverment can decide. IT IS A CAN'T LOSE - "WIN-WIN" OPPORTUNITY!! ******************************************************************** THIS PROGRAM ,UNLIKE THE OTHERS , HAS A GREAT PRODUCT AND IT WILL SUCCEED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF PEOPLE TRYING TO HELP OTHERS LIVE AND ENJOY LIFE TO THE FULLEST ********************************************************************* THIS IS THE PROGRAM TO TRY ! YOU MAY NOT GET ANOTHER CHANCE! 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This is what you do ............................ 1.Order all 4 reports that are listed below. For each report you send $10.00 cash, your e-mail address, return postal address (in case of mail errors) to each person listed below. When you order, be sure to list the specific report you need. You will need all 4 reports to save on your computer for reselling them. 2. IMPORTANT Do not alter the names, or the sequence that they are in or you will not profit the way you should.THIS IS A KEY TO MAKING THE PROGRAM WORK. It is not fair to the others in the program if you do not follow the program exactly. DO UNTO OTHERS AS YOU WOULD LIKE THEM TO DO UNTO YOU! -the golden rule of life . 3. Replace the name and address under REPORT #1 with your name and move the name that was there down to REPORT #2. Move the name on REPORT #2 to REPORT #3 and so on eliminating the name on report #4. They are well on their way to financial independance by now so don't worry . Copy the names and addresses accurately and do not remove the Report/Product positions. Take this entire text and save it on your computer. Now your ready to start selling your product on the web. Start your campaign as soon as you can!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ***********ALWAYS PROVIDE SAME DAY SERVICE******************* ALWAYS SEND $10.00 CASH FOR EACH ORDER (CONCEALED) FOR EACH ORDER REQUESTING THE SPECIFIC REPORT BY NAME AND NUMBER. ALWAYS SEND MAIL FIRST CLASS AND PROVIDE YOUR E MAIL ADDRESS FOR QUICK DELIVERY. THIS MAY BE THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISION OF YOUR LIFE, BUT IT'S UP TO YOU... I AM GIVING YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN YOUR MIND, VISUALIZE YOUR GOALS AND YOUR DREAMS, AND TAKE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD THEM. THE INFORMATION I HAVE PROVIDED HERE WILL ALLOW YOU TO ACHIEVE YOUR GOALS AND REALIZE YOUR DREAMS. YOUR INCOME DOES NOT HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO AN HOURLY WAGE OR A SALARY. TAKE THE INITIATIVE! ... IT MAY CHANGE YOUR LIFE! ____________________________________________________ REPORT #1 "EMAIL MILLIONAIRES-THE ROAD TO INDEPENDANCE" ORDER REPORT #1 FROM: A&L INC. 113 MT. HERMON WAY OCEAN GROVE , N.J. 07756 _____________________________________________________ REPORT #2 "REAL ESTATE -'THE ART OF THE FLIP'" ORDER REPORT #2 FROM: SMITH & CO. P.O. BOX 678 KEYPORT N.J. 07735 _____________________________________________________ REPORT #3 "MAKE 10-20% A MONTH IN STOCKS" ORDER REPORT #3 FROM: MS INC. 46 W. SHORE ST KEANSBURG N.J. 07734 ______________________________________________________ REPORT #4 "THE STRANGEST SECRET " ORDER REPORT #4 FROM: McCollough 504 13th ave Belmar N.J. 07719 ______________________________________________________ HERE'S HOW THIS AMAZING PLAN WILL EARN YOU MONEY Let's say you decide to start small just to see how it goes. Assume your goal is to get only 20 people to participate on your first level. (Placing FREE ads on the internet could get a better response.) Also assume that everyone else in YOUR BUILDING ORGANIZATION gets only 20 downline members. Follow this example for the STAGGERING results below: 1st level -- your 20 members with 10 ($10 x 20) $200 (position 1) 2nd level --20 members from those 20 ($10 x 400) $4000 (position 2) 3rd level -- 20 members from those 400 ($10 x 8,000) $80,000 (position 3) 4th level -- 20 members from those 8,000 ($10 x 160,000) $1,600,000 (position 4) THIS TOTALS-----------> $1,684,200.00 !!!!!!!!! Remember friends, this is assuming that the people who participate only recruit 20 people each. Imagine what the response would be if you only got 10 more people to participate! Some people get 100's of recruits! STOP AND THINK ABOUT IT! By the way, your cost to participate in this is practically nothing. You obviously already have an internet connection and e-mail is FREE!!! REMEMBER: Approx. 50,000 new people get online monthly! ORDER YOUR REPORTS NOW!!! *******TIPS FOR SUCCESS******* TREAT THIS AS YOUR BUSINESS! Send for the four reports IMMEDIATELY, so you will have them when the orders start coming in because: When you receive a $10 order, you MUST send out the requested product/report to comply with the U.S. Postal & Lottery Laws, Title 18, Sections 1302 and 1341 or Title 18, Section 3005 in the U.S. Code, also Code of Federal Regs. vol. 16, Sections 255 and 436, which state that: "a product or service must be exchanged for money received." * ALWAYS PROVIDE SAME-DAY SERVICE ON THE ORDERS YOU RECEIVE. * Be patient and persistent with this program. If you follow the instructions EXACTLY the results WILL undoubtedly be SUCCESS! * ABOVE ALL, HAVE FAITH IN YOURSELF THAT YOU CAN SUCCEED! *******YOUR SUCCESS GUIDELINE******* The check point that guarantees your success is simply this: You MUST receive 10 to 20 orders for REPORT #1! THIS IS A MUST! If you don't within two weeks, advertise more and send out more programs until you do. Then, a couple of weeks later you should receive at least 100 orders for REPORT #2. If you don't, advertise more and send out more programs until you do. Once you have received 100 or more orders for REPORT #2, YOU CAN RELAX, because you will be on your way to the BANK! Or, you can DOUBLE your efforts! REMEMBER: Every time your name is moved down on the list you are in front of a DIFFERENT report, so you can KEEP TRACK of your PROGRESS by what report people are ordering from you. IT'S THAT EASY!!! ==================================================== ORDER TODAY AND GET STARTED ON THE PATH TO YOUR FINANCIAL FREEDOM!!! Very few people reach financial independence, because when opportunity knocks, they choose to ignore it. It is much easier to say "NO" than "YES", and this is the question that you must answer. Will YOU ignore this amazing opportunity or will you take advantage of it? If you do nothing, you have indeed missed something and nothing will change. Please re-read this material, this is a special opportunity. My method is simple. I sell thousands of people a product for $10 that costs me pennies to produce and e-mail. I should also point out this program is legal and everyone who participates WILL make money. This is not a chain letter or pyramid scam. This is a business! You are offering a awesome product to your people. After they purchase the product from you, they reproduce more and resell them. The information contained in these REPORTS IS UNBELIEVABLE! They will not only help you in making your participation in this program more rewarding, but THEY MAY CHANGE YOUR LIFE AND HELP THOSE YOU LOVE AND CARE ABOUT! . You are also buying the rights to reprint all of the REPORTS, which will be ordered from you by those to whom you mail this program. The concise REPORTS you will be buying are easy to duplicate for your entrepreneurial endeavor. Thank you for your attention. Now make the decision that's right for you. </PRE></H

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Warning: if you fuck Tim Mayflower in the ass, a rabid tapeworm might bite your penis. ,,, (o-o) -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Tim Mayflower

2 1

How about a Bay Area meeting 1/17/98?
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill wrote: > The December Bay Area Cypherpunks Meeting will be held 12/13 at 1pm at > Printer's Ink on Castro Street in Mountain View. It would be nice if the January meeting were held the 17th. This is the day following the RSA Data Security Conference, and a lot of out-of-towners will be in the area over that weekend. Peter Trei

6 5

Free Password
by Sexappeal＠idsweb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

**Must Be 18 or older to view my site** This e-mail is being sent to you because your address was shown as visiting my site. If someone else has used your account and you wish to be removed e-mail me with the words REMOVE in the subject line and I will delete you**:- ) Thank you for visiting my site!! http://www.tracywest.com You are really going to unload now!!! Not only have I posted new photos but there is a Excellent service that I am a BIG part of and I want you to : TRY IT WITH A ONE WEEK FREE PASSWORD!!!!!!!! http://www.tracywest.com As you know.I really work hard at this business and I know great content when I see it! There is nothing to loseYou will love this service: Access ALL MONTH LONG!!! NO PER MINUTE Charges!!! -Tons of MOVIES!!! [Featuring Movies of ME too] -More LIVE Feeds than you could ever want access to!! -Tons PHOTOS! -E-ZINE and VAVOOM! [On Line Magazines that are really hot!] All of the stuff and MORE that you would expect from a Las Vegas XXX Super Star!!!! GO GET YOUR FREE PASSWORD NOW!! xoxox, Tracy West http://www.tracywest.com

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Choosing to not become a member of the collective society/mindset the government has put in place will soon become illegal. Money laundering is illegal for a very simple reason everything is becoming illegal: Control. Money laundering prevents the government to "control" your money. When they could not take your money in the interest of national/public/child safety for such wasteful ventures like the perpetual war on drugs ,and when you thought for yourself and realized how wasteful it all was and that you would not willing give your money the government made it illegal to hide your money. Then they came up with asset forfeiture laws to legally take your vaporware, commonly referred to as 'money'.

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Re: Book Review - Coordinating the Internet
by damaged justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- forwarded message -- >From: danny(a)staff.cs.su.oz.au (Danny Yee) Newsgroups: aus.books,usyd.net,rec.arts.books,alt.books.reviews,rec.arts.books.reviews,alt.culture.internet,misc.books.technical,alt.books.technical,aus.computers,aus.org.efa,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.misc Subject: Book Review - Coordinating the Internet Followup-To: alt.culture.internet,talk.politics.misc Date: 12 Dec 1997 11:37:48 GMT Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, Uni of Sydney, Australia Lines: 103 Approved: danny(a)cs.usyd.edu.au Message-ID: <66r7mc$3kk$1(a)crux.cs.su.oz.au> NNTP-Posting-Host: staff.cs.su.oz.au X-Server-Date: 12 Dec 1997 11:37:48 GMT http://www.anatomy.su.oz.au/danny/book-reviews/h/Coordinating_Internet.html title: Coordinating the Internet edited: Brian Kahin + James H. Keller publisher: The MIT Press 1997 other: 491 pages, references, index The superstructural politics and economics of the Internet (such issues as censorship and taxation) have long held centre stage. Increasingly, however, the politics and economics of the low level operation of the Internet have emerged from the shadows. It is these -- the governance and pricing of routing, addressing, and naming services -- which are the subject of _Coordinating the Internet_. The first four essays consider general issues in Internet governance. Gillet and Kapor explain how 99% of the Internet operates without centralised control and suggest that coordination of domain name assignment and IP address allocation will eventually look "a lot more like coordination of the rest of the Internet". Gould provides a UK perspective, suggesting the evolution of English constitutional law and the supranational powers of the European Union as possible models for the Internet. Johnson and Post argue for decentralised governance, highlighting serious problems with alternatives such as extending national sovereignty, international treaties, or governance by international organisations. Rutkowski is less enthusiastic, claiming that "the notion of Internet self-governance is in fact an illusion arising from the relative unfamiliarity of many people associated with the Internet with either its history or the surrounding legal and regulatory constructs in which it exists". The domain name system is probably the most visible area of contention at the moment; it is the subject of seven of the papers in _Coordinating the Internet_. Five of them take different positions on the legal arguments over its interaction with trademark law and the political arguments over which organisations should be involved in its administration: the United Nations, the United States Federal government, InterNIC, and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority just some of the contenders. Taking a step back, Andeen and King compare the DNS with telephony addressing in World Zone 1 (the North American Numbering Plan) and Mitchell, Bradner and Claffy argue that the obsession with the DNS is a red herring, that issues of Internet governance and sustainability are far broader. Moving on to less prominent but probably more fundamental issues, Rekhter, Resnick and Bellovin write about the need to provide financial incentives for route aggregation and efficient use of the address space, and suggest a framework for property rights and contracts that will achieve this. And Hoffman and Claffy evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of metro-based addressing (based on geography rather than provider). There are five papers on interconnection and settlement systems and agreements between service providers. Bailey and McKnight survey the variety of interconnection agreements and argue for the introduction of usage-sensitive pricing in conjunction with integrated services with guaranteed quality of service. Cawley, in contrast, extols "the virtues (and appropriateness) of capacity-based pricing and flat-rate tariffs", but suggests that many kinds of pricing models can coexist and that "interconnection and settlement are best left to market forces". Chinoy and Salo review what the transition from the NSFnet to commercial backbones teaches us about oversight and scaling issues. Farnon and Huddle use theoretical efficiency modelling to argue that the present "sender keeps all" settlement system is flawed. And Mueller, Hui and Cheng recount the history of the Hong Kong Internet Exchange. The final two papers deal with quality of service evaluation, with performance monitoring and statistics. Almes presents an overview of the IETF IP Provider Metrics effort, while Monk and Claffy suggest ways of overcoming practical obstacles -- political and economic as well as technological -- to adequate data acquisition. _Coordinating the Internet_ is moderately technical (though it avoids plumbing the complexities of protocols such as BGP) and on some issues its presentation of so many different viewpoints may be more confusing than clarifying. But it is an accessible and informative collection -- and an important and timely one, given the increasing urgency of some of the issues it debates. -- Disclaimer: I requested and received a review copy of _Coordinating the Internet_ from The MIT Press, but I have no stake, financial or otherwise, in its success. -- %T Coordinating the Internet %E Brian Kahin %E James H. Keller %I The MIT Press %C Cambridge, Massachusetts %D 1997 %O paperback, references, index %G ISBN 0-262-61136-8 %P xviii,491pp %U http://mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=0262611368 %K Internet, politics, economics, law 12 December 1997 --------------------------------------------------- Copyright (c) 1997 Danny Yee (danny(a)cs.usyd.edu.au) http://www.anatomy.usyd.edu.au/danny/book-reviews/ --------------------------------------------------- -- end of forwarded message --

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Only criminals don't support concealed-carry laws
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 08:18:04 -0800 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: Somebody Subject: Only criminals don't support concealed-carry laws >.> > =============================================== > NEWS FROM THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY > 2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 100 > Washington DC 20037 > =============================================== > For release: December 9, 1997 > =============================================== > For additional information: > George Getz, Deputy Director of Communications > Phone: (202) 333-0008 Ext. 222 > E-Mail: 76214.3676(a)CompuServe.com > =============================================== > > > The evidence is clear: Only criminals don't > support concealed-carry laws, say Libertarians > > WASHINGTON, DC -- If you want to reduce crime, allow more > people to carry more concealed guns, the Libertarian Party said today. > > And that opinion is confirmed by a new Cato Institute study, > which found that violent crime rates dropped dramatically in the 24 > states that have passed "concealed-carry" laws -- which allow ordinary > citizens to carry concealed weapons. > > "At this point, the only people who don't support > concealed-carry laws are criminals," said Steve Dasbach, the party's > national chairman. > > In those 24 states, concealed-carry laws force local police to > grant most citizens a concealed weapon permit after meeting certain > qualifications. Usually, that includes getting fingerprinted, passing a > criminal background check, and taking a gun safety course. > > "For years, gun-control advocates claimed that laws allowing > concealed weapons would lead to murder and mayhem," said Steve Dasbach, > chairman of the Libertarian Party. "But the exact opposite is true: > Concealed weapons actually save lives." > > The Cato Institute study, timed to coincide with the 10-year > anniversary of Florida's controversial concealed-carry law, found that > in the 24 states with concealed-carry laws, murders dropped by 7.7%, > rapes fell by 5.2%, robberies decreased by 2.2%, and aggravated > assaults were reduced by 7%. > > And in states where politicians continue to outlaw concealed > weapons? > > "There's blood in the streets," Dasbach said. "After accounting > for all other factors, the study calculated that in 1992 alone, 1,414 > more people were murdered than would have been if concealed-carry laws > were in effect." > > And the carnage doesn't end there: An additional 4,177 people > were raped, 11,898 more were robbed, and 60,363 more assaulted solely > as a result of the increased criminal activity that apparently comes > with concealed weapons bans, the study said. > > "But who is surprised that violent street thugs prefer to prey > on people who can't shoot back?" Dasbach asked. "By refusing to approve > concealed-carry laws, politicians in other states have painted a target > on the back of America's most vulnerable citizens." > > The study also shoots a hole in two other gun-control myths, > Dasbach said. One is that concealed-carry laws will resurrect the "Wild > West," turning ordinary Americans into trigger-happy gunslingers. > > "The study found that the number of concealed-carry > permit-holders convicted of murder committed in public is exactly zero, > and less serious crimes are extremely rare," he said. For example, only > one in 5,000 Floridians have had their permits revoked for crimes > involving a firearm. > > The other myth: That accidental shootings will become > commonplace. > > "The number of accidental deaths increased so slightly (less > than half of 1%) that implementing concealed-carry laws in every > remaining state would result in less than one additional death per year > - -- far less than the number of lives saved because of the reduced > murder rate," said Dasbach. > > "In other words, the real danger comes not from concealed > weapons, but from the lack of them," he said. > > Dasbach emphasized that although concealed-carry laws are a > major step in the right direction, they're not the perfect solution for > Libertarians. > > "Right-to-carry laws are only a partial victory because > Americans shouldn't have to seek government permission to exercise any > Constitutional right. Imagine what would happen if politicians dared to > require every journalist to pass a writing test to get a permit to > cover city hall, or tried to force ministers to demonstrate a basic > knowledge of religion before giving a sermon," he said. > > But requiring a permit is better than the alternative, he said: > Sentencing innocent people to death because they can't legally defend > themselves. > > "Denying terrified Americans the right to carry a gun is like > putting them at the front of the line on Death Row," he said. "At they > very least, politicians should have the decency to stop disarming > America's most vulnerable citizens: Crime victims." > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQCVAwUBNI4ttdCSe1KnQG7RAQGH+wP9E9V7Qz84YFPtuo/ccCLGoYfU5C11G7dD > lr9oHNdd+JtkaBhoDB+NmDpO3lccNueq5Cl4ZxO8uJ67LjeMU4gvFhev8eMUr3Rs > Cj2zuWTEa94Xnl4gR3BBKnlykyIIc5WCpN9ftsmA3zB4bP4rpVNfJgcKPW2BQs+U > dMEaQprF4V8= > =GkYU > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > The Libertarian Party http://www.lp.org/ > 2600 Virginia Ave. NW, Suite 100 voice: 202-333-0008 > Washington DC 20037 fax: 202-333-0072 > __________________________________________________________________________ <somebody's.sig> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Sam" <sam-001(a)dpinc.ml.org> wrote: > > Three examples: Speculation about Wotan and MailMasher, Speculation about > > DataBasix and one of many posts from the anon asshole complaining that ^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > > > Here are selected paragraps from each. The full messages follow: > > [snip] > > I'd rather look at full messages. Good idea. Notice Gary's usage of ad hominem argumention to avoid the issues on the faulty premise that if you hate the messenger then you can safely ignore the message. To Gary Burnore, his constant use of the perjorative "anonymous asshole" is apparently intended in the same manner as "heretic" was in the Middle Ages or "witch" was in 17th century New England. > This is something about warez and remailer, and Burchell discussing the > possible identity of whoever was behind whatever was discussed here. > Nothing is said regarding the issue here of forging databasix addresses > through the remailer, who was doing it, and why. > > I happen to recall that this was what this thread is supposed to be about. The original premise was that since the Mailmasher pseudonym server was allegedly allowing forgeries, it should be shut down. McClatchie's problem was that he mistook Mailmasher for a remailer and sought to prove that it allowed forgeries through the pasting of From: headers when, in fact, Mailmasher never had this capability. (Some of the remailers formerly did, but that was corrected long before the June incident with Gary Burnore, Belinda Bryan, and Jeff Burchell.) The "evidence" that was posted back then in an attempt to implicate Mailmasher in forgery consisted of usenet posts with truncated Path headers which stopped at the mail-to-news gateway from which they were posted. And none of the messages was more recent than 2/97. Mailmasher was a predecessor to Hotmail and the other web-based e-mail providers. The difference was that Mailmasher didn't require you to identify yourself to establish an account, but you could choose a pseudonym and use that instead. It never had any capabilities to specify a From: address. This the forged messages apparently not only had forged "From:" lines, but a forged "Message-ID:" as well, to make it look as if it came from Mailmasher. The forger, however, apparently chose the wrong site to implicate. If you'll reread Jeff's post (the one in the URL that I previously posted), you'll get a little insight into Gary's actions and apparent motives for his later attacks on Jeff's other server, the Huge Cajones Remailer. Let me quote a short excerpt: -> I still don't know what the hell is going on with DataBasix, Wells Fargo -> and Gary Burnore, but I suspect that someone used huge.cajones to say -> something extremely unflattering about Burnore (from what I can tell, -> he had it coming). Burnore then decided that he would make things -> difficult for me. First, he wanted the user who had posted something -> "inflammatory" about him revealed. When I told him that I couldn't -> do that, he carried on about mail logs and identifying the host that -> a message came from (the usual). I didn't explain to him that my -> machine keeps logs, but not anything involving a *(a)cajones.com -> address. He then requested the logs, which I denied (and told him -> to get his lawyer to send a request...) The issue was an "unflattering post", not any sort of forgery or other abuse. The so-called "spam bait" only "conveniently" appeared later when DataBasix was in need of more ammo to use to get the remailer shut down: -> Between the time he first contacted me, and the time I received the -> letter from Belinda Bryan, is when the baiting of databasix addresses -> began (slowly, with just a few posts). Now how would a third party, who was not privy to Gary and Belinda's private dealings with Jeff be able to exploit that timing by initiating the spam baiting at just the "right" time? It was almost as if the abuse appeared right on cue, just in time to bolster the case of DataBasix vs. Huge Cajones. And notice that from Jeff's chronology, the demand by Gary Burnore and Belinda Bryan for Jeff Burchell to turn over his logs to them came BEFORE this alleged "spam baiting" and was based on the unflattering CONTENT of a post, not on any alleged "forgery". None of this can be called speculation. It's a factual, historical account of DataBasix' dealings with Jeff Burchell. Plain and simple, Gary's demand for Jeff's logs was a blatant attempt at censorship through intimidation. IOW, the clear implication was "if you dare to criticize me, I'll hunt you down and you'll be sorry". > Earlier, Anonymous wrote: ``Contrary to your accusations, not all of > Jeff's post was "speculation".'' You took issue with that, in the context > of your disputed attempt to obtain the remailer's logs. > > Well, in this very sizeable post, speculations do, indeed, comprise only a > portion of it. The rest is a detailed narrative of the communications > between the players involved so no, it was not all just a speculation. > > Furthermore, you are disputing the fact that you wanted to obtain the > remailer's logs. I fail to see what facts you have posted which dispute > Jeff Burchell's version of the story. I cannot find the portion that > supposedly supports your claim that you did not seek to violate the > anonymity of the remailer. Burchell accomodated your demands, and put in > place measures that would prevent the alleged abuse from taking place. > Yet, you still demanded the logs. That's precisely my point. And now he refuses to disclose his motives for that demand or what he intended to do with the names and addresses contained in those logs. Every time he's asked the question of why he attempted to violate the privacy of hundreds or perhaps thousands of remailer users, it elicits another tantrum that goes, "Lies! Prove it! Why are you harassing me? What are your demands?" > > Note: I have several more posts like these, if you're interested. > > This one is a fine example of someone (the anonymous asshole, no doubt) > > whining about the "content based censorship" > > because he couldn't spambait us anymore. > > [snip] > > That's fine, but I do not see why this is relevant. It's not relevant. His usage of "anonymous asshole" is apparently generic for anyone who dares to challenge him and who posts anonymously, and is an obvious attempt to demonize all such individuals to divert attention from his own tactics. The whole "spam bait" issue is obviously a smoke screen, since the alleged spam-bait came AFTER the demand for Jeff's logs.

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Re: Whoever thinks the "word" is censored, post the 'word' fool
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore+NOspam(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :My only guess is that the posting person thinks that Replay censors more > :than one word, and that giveing the word away would tell Replay which > :filter to lift. If I had found something like that, I'd pass the info > :around privately to a bunch of friends first, and make sure that I was not > :the only one expereienceing the prob. > > Some have asked him to email it privately as well, seems he's not done that > either. I'm curious -- how would you know whether he's done so or not? I don't recall you making that invitation to him. Do you even accept incoming e-mail from remailers? > :Or, he could just be trolling. :) > > Doubt it. It really sounds like he believes the word is being censored. Maybe it's time for Alex to join this thread and either say "no, we don't filter on any words at the Replay remailer", or else "yes, here's a list of the words we consider to be objectionable, so please omit them from your posts through the Replay remailer". I'm half expecting that his posts aren't showing up either because he's screwed something up in the message to the remailer (like misspelling the word "Newsgroups" in the header, for example), because the posting gateway is flaky, or because some Net Nazi has taken it upon himself to indiscriminately forge cancels to posts he doesn't like. But some definitive word, one way or the other, would go a long way towards clarifying this situation. I see no rational reason for covertly blocking posts based on content. *IF* he didn't want something posted, then an announcement that the Replay remailer rejects posts containing certain words or phrases would make life simpler for all concerned. And to whoever created the subject line for this message, I'm tempted to either post the word "fool", or say that it's a lousy "Mr. T" impression. :)

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free ACM publications
by VaX#n8 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks readers may be interested in the ACM digital library, which is open free to the public until the end of this year, at which it becomes a rather expensive members-only luxury. Many complete articles are available online in PDF format. Reviews and abstracts will remain free. A search for "encryption", "cryptanalysis" or "cryptography" in the title and abstract reveals some interesting papers. As usual, use but don't abuse; I don't want to regret telling everyone about this, particularly since I haven't started reading yet myself. Information wants to be free: http://www.acm.org/dl -- VaX#n8, Junglist

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Smartcard demo canceled
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I won't be able to make it to tomorrow's meeting. Therefore, my smart card demo has been canceled. Sorry about that, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

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CDT VTW "aces" launch "bold" new Net-firm, by Brock Meeks
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- http://www.msnbc.com/news/129054.asp Noted Net lobbyists form for-profit firm Two non-profit cyberspace advocates now look to market Internet strategies By Brock Meeks WASHINGTON -- This is a story of defection. Two well-known voices on cyberspace advocacy issues Jonah Seiger of the Center for Democracy and Technology and Shabbir Safdar of Voters Telecommunication Watch said Tuesday they're forming a company specializing in "Internet campaign strategies." Spin doctors for fun and profit. And along they way, they hope to help make the Internet safe for Democracy. [...] The move is a dramatic shift for the two. In four years they have been at the forefront of the most contentious issues in cyberspace. They've created and honed their Internet strategies in the bare-knuckle world of Washington politics with incessant digital lobbying. No more. "We aren't going to be walking around the halls of Congress lobbying on behalf of anybody," Seiger said. IS ANYBODY HERE? The move is bold, even brash. Seiger and Safdar are banking that the Internet is, first, a viable medium for "moving an issue" as they call it and, second, that companies or organizations are going to be willing to pony up money to mount an Internet campaign. On second thought, maybe this is simply blind faith. If this defection is born of blind faith in a nascent medium, then Seiger and Safdar are true disciples. Seizer's own currency inside the Center for Democracy and Technology has been on a steady rise; he routinely is quoted on cyberspace issues. Now he's chucked all that for a start-up that depends on a medium that hasn't yet proven it can sustain a commercially viable site. [...] Whether or not the sound bite plays at the bank and with a host of potential clients, is another matter altogether. If Mindshare is going to be successful, it'll have to have an ace up its digital sleeve. It doesn't. It has two: Seiger and Safdar. ###

3 2

Could a Jim Bell do the same thing?
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a news.com feature: Sometimes, Daufenbach notes, a freshly arrested child pornographer facing a long sentence will agree to let his email account "hum" (continue running), with Customs picking up the traffic. A year ago, Daufenbach assumed the identity behind one such account. A molester and child pornographer (Daufenbach declined to reveal the person's name) began emailing Daufenbach's undercover account and then switched to real-time online chat, one of the biggest challenges for any cyberinvestigator. "A lot of people don't like doing it," says the Customs agent. "You have to think on your feet." Molesters often talk graphically about the children they abuse--and expect the same from their confidants. "If you get nervous and flustered," notes Daufenbach, "you'll blow it."

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"24 hour cybercops"
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> Subject: SNET: Re: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 09:59:23 -0900 - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List It has been said that it takes a thief to catch one. Ergo, it must take a murderer to catch one. In both cases Janet Reno fits right into this program described below. H. Ayre - ---------- > From: Das GOAT <DasGOAT(a)aol.com> > To: CTRL(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > Subject: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 > Date: Friday, December 12, 1997 2:54 AM > > HIGH TECH COPS TO PROWL THE NET 24 HRS A DAY > > by Marcia Stepanek, Examiner Washington Bureau > San Francisco Examiner, Dec 11, 1997 > > WASHINGTON -- Top law-enforcement officials from the world's industrial > powers have announced plans to field cyber-SWAT teams to help catch criminals > who use the Internet and other computer technology to commit crimes. > <snip> > At the heart of the pact is a plan in which law enforcement officers with > computer expertise will be available 24 hours a day to assist investigations > of Internet crimes ranging from child pornography to fraud and money > laundering. > In addition, the nations [including the US, under Janet Reno] agreed to > form special police units to track Internet crime and criminals. > They also agreed to review police staffing levels to ensure that law > enforcement is adequately equipped to detect, prevent and punish computer > crimes. > US Attorney General Janet Reno initiated the meeting on computer crime, > the first-ever international gathering of justice ministers from the so-called > G-8 nations, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, germany, France, > italy, Japan and Russia. > > To subsribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SUBSCIBE CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > Om - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Freeh on how his encryption statements must be okayed
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HEARING OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SUBJECT: THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL ACT CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE DAN BURTON (R-IN) WITNESSES: LOUIS FREEH, DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; DONALD SMALTZ, THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S OFFICE 2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 10:05 A.M. EST [...] REP. STEVE HORN (R-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, going back to the Franklin Roosevelt administration, each administration has had a policy on the clearance of testimony, the review of testimony by high-ranking officials before they come up to the Hill. Was your statement cleared by OMB and/or the White House? MR. FREEH: As far as I know it was not. I gave a copy to the attorney general. She gave me a copy of hers. But there was no editing or suggestions done. I don't know if OMB got it or not. Maybe I can find out. (Confers with staff.) REP. HORN: Is that the usual procedure? MR. FREEH: I'm told they did not get a copy. REP. HORN: Yeah. Is that - what is the usual procedure to review MR. FREEH: The usual procedure would be, if I'm talking about counterterrorism or encryption, which I won't talk about today, yeah, we send it up to OMB, they review it. Sometimes they have suggestions, sometimes they have objections. We discuss that. That was not done in this case. [...]

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ACLU and EPIC comments on Digital Telephony/wiretapping
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpt: > Before rushing to embrace any proposals to enlarge > the capability of government surveillance of its > citizens, the ACLU and EPIC urge the Commission to > take note of words written nearly 70 years ago -- > that remain true even today. As Justice Louis > Brandeis so aptly stated in Olmstead v. United > States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928): > > The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the > telephone is far greater than that involved in > tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line > is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends > of the line is invaded, and all conversations > between them upon any subject, and although proper, > confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. > Moreover, the tapping of man's telephone line > involves the tapping of the telephone of every other > person whom he may call, or who may call him. As > a means of espionage, writs of assistance and > general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny > and oppression when compared with wiretapping. -Declan ----------- Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) CC Docket No. 97-213 Communications Assistance for ) Law Enforcement Act ) Reply Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union, Electronic Privacy Information Center and Electronic Frontier Foundation Introduction The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") is a non-partisan organization of more than 250,000 members dedicated to preserving the freedoms embodied in the Bill of Rights. The Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") is a non-profit public interest research center that examines the civil liberties and privacy implications of new technologies. The Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") is also a public interest organization devoted to protecting civil liberties in digital media. The ACLU, EPIC and EFF respectfully submit comments in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") on implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") to urge the Commission to exercise its conferred authority by extending the deadline for compliance with the Act to no earlier than October 24, 2000. Law enforcement has derailed the implementation process from the statute's inception, and neither the public, nor the telecommunications industry are in a position to comprehend the scope of the capacity and surveillance requirements sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). We believe that the impasse in the enactment process alone makes the implementation of CALEA impossible under the current statutory deadline of October, 1998. Moreover, we believe that because the most pertinent issues, the actual technical standards that may be adopted by industry, are not addressed in this NPRM, the Commission must extend the deadline for compliance to allow for the public scrutiny contemplated by CALEA. In short, we base our conclusions on the foregoing: I. To date, the FBI has not met its public capacity notice requirements under the Act which require law enforcement to quantify the actual and maximum capacity technical needs, including projections with the number of anticipated interceptions. Industry, the public and the Congress need an accurate assessment of the capacity requirements to provide meaningful oversight and to ensure that they do not exceed the statutory scope. No implementation of CALEA should proceed without compliance with this statutory requirement. II. Law enforcement was not permitted to dictate system design under CALEA, but has placed a choke hold on the process by repeatedly preventing the adoption of industry standards and creating a "wish list" of technically infeasible and costly requirements. In addition, it has become abundantly clear that the FBI is seeking unprecedented surveillance capabilities never envisioned by the Congress. Simply put they have consistently requested that industry provide numerous capabilities for surveillance that go far beyond the current court-authorized electronic surveillance under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and CALEA. Thus, the Commission must engage in detailed review of this process by extending the compliance date. III. Congressional limitations on information subject to interception have been disregarded. CALEA required the strengthening of privacy protections so that carriers do not intercept or disclose any information they are not authorized to. The additional surveillance features sought by the FBI contravene the Congress' intention to maintain current levels of surveillance and not expand them. We also address some incorrect assumptions in the NPRM that would expand CALEA's application. We conclude that these issues preclude "reasonably achievable" implementation of the Act. Background on Surveillance and CALEA Today, the revolutionary development of electronic infrastructures, that make it possible to easily communicate in a variety of ways, also make possible new forms of government intrusion and surveillance. Additionally, the actual use of government surveillance has grown faster in recent years than ever before and in past 10 years, the number of interceptions per year has more than doubled. According to statistics released by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the Department of Justice: the use of electronic surveillance for criminal and national security investigations increased substantially in 1996; court orders for electronic surveillance by state and federal agencies for criminal purposes also increased, from 1058 in 1995 to 1150 in 1996 (a nine percent increase); for the first time in eight years, a court denied a surveillance application; extensions of surveillance orders increased from 834 to 887. In all, interceptions were in effect for a total of 43,635 days in 1996. The report also shows that the vast majority of interceptions continued to occur in drug-related cases: 71.4 percent (821 total) for drug investigations; 9.9 percent (114) for gambling; 9.1 percent (105) for racketeering; 3.5 percent (41) for homicide and assault and a few each for bribery, kidnapping, larceny and theft, and loan sharking. No orders were issued for "arson, explosives, and weapons" investigations. Moreover, the according to the report, electronic surveillance continued to be relatively inefficient. Overall, 2.2 million conversations were captured in 1996. A total of 1.7 million intercepted conversations were deemed not "incriminating" by prosecutors. Each interception resulted in the capture of an average of 1,969 conversations. Prosecutors reported that on average, 422 (21.4 percent) of the conversations were "incriminating." Federal intercepts were particularly efficient, with only 15.6 percent of the intercepted conversations reported as "incriminating." Notwithstanding the increase in government surveillance, in 1994, responding to FBI pressure and allegations that new technology hampers the ability to conduct electronic interceptions, the Congress enacted CALEA. The law was enacted during the final days of the 103d Congress amidst fervent opposition from the ACLU, EPIC, EFF and other concerned organizations that believed that the FBI had not substantiated the need for extraordinary government surveillance capabilities. We adhere to those views even today. Furthermore, the dramatic rise in the number of interceptions conducted rebuts the government claim that new technologies frustrate wiretapping abilities. CALEA requires telephone carriers to ensure continued government interception capabilities despite changes in technologies by October, 1998. The legislative history of CALEA makes clear that the Act was intended "to balance three key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications services and technologies." To maintain that balance, Congress established detailed guidelines on how industry standard setting organizations would accomplish the costly mandate of CALEA and imposed several obligations on law enforcement to facilitate the process as well. Section 107 of CALEA, in pertinent part, provides that an industry association or a standards-setting organization will set the technical standards; the Attorney General must consult with the standards-setting organizations, with representatives of users of telecommunications equipment, facilities, and services, and with State utility commissions, "to ensure the efficient and industry-wide implementation of the assistance capability requirements." Section 107 further provides that if technical requirements are not issued by industry standards-setting organization or if any person believes any standards issued are deficient, the Federal Communications Commission may establish such requirements or standards. The Commission has promulgated the current NPRM in response to an impasse in the implementation process and the failure of law enforcement to effectively cooperate and fulfill its statutory obligation in providing detailed notice of its technical capacity requirements so that industry can promulgate technical standards. Section 50 of the NPRM states that this proceeding is being undertaken irrespective of the actual industry standard requirements to determine whether it is "reasonably achievable" to enact CALEA within its compliance period. The NPRM section 50 specifically states: Because it is not clear whether requests for extension of time of the Section 103 compliance date will be forthcoming, we do not propose to promulgate specific rules regarding requests at this time. We propose to permit carriers to petition the Commission for an extension of time under Section 107, on the basis of the criteria specified in Section 109 to determine whether it is reasonably achievable for the petitioning carrier "with respect to any equipment, facility, or service installed or deployed after January 1, 1995" to comply with the assistance capability requirements of Section 103 within the compliance time period. We seek comment on that proposal. We also seek comment on what factors, other than those specified in Section 109 of CALEA, the Commission should consider in determining whether CALEA's assistance capability requirements are reasonably achievable within the compliance period. The NPRM, section 45, sets out several statutory factors that the Commission may consider in determining whether CALEA's capability requirements are reasonably achievable within the compliance period. The legislative history of CALEA makes clear that the factors provided by Congress were "designed to give the Commission direction so that the following goals are realized: (1) Costs to consumers are kept low, so that 'gold-plating' by the industry is kept in check; (2) the legitimate needs of law enforcement are met, but that law enforcement does not engage in gold-plating of its demands; (3) privacy interests of all Americans are protected; (4) the goal of encouraged competition in all forms of telecommunications is not undermined, and the fact of wiretap compliance is not used as either a sword or a shield in realization of that goal." Our comments address these and other factors in concluding that the FCC should extend the compliance deadlines as permitted by Congress. I. CALEA's Capacity Notice Requirements: Section 104 of CALEA directed the Attorney General to issue a notice of capacity requirement to industry not later than one year after the law's enactment. Hence the deadline for the notice was October 25, 1995. Carriers were provided with a deadline of three years after notification by the Attorney General to install capacity that meets the notification requirements. Under the timetable that Congress proposed, industry's deadline would have been October 1998. Specifically, section 104(a)(2) requires the Attorney General to identify capacity required at specific locations, and to base the notice on the type of equipment or service involved, or by the type of carrier. In addition, it requires the Attorney General to provide a numerical estimate of law enforcement's anticipated use of electronic surveillance for 1998. The statute also defines the maximum capacity as the largest number of intercepts that a particular switch or system must be capable of implementing simultaneously. The initial capacity relates to the number of intercepts the government will need to make on the date that is four years after enactment. By mandating the publication of numerical estimates of law enforcement surveillance activity, Congress intended CALEA's notice requirements to serve as "mechanisms that will allow for Congressional and public oversight. The bill requires the government to estimate its capacity needs and publish them in the Federal Register." Congress made it clear that "[t]he purpose behind the provision is... to ensure that carriers receive adequate and specific notice from the Attorney General about the needs of law enforcement...". a. The First FBI Notice In October, 1995, the FBI, operating under delegated authority by the Attorney General, issued a first proposed capacity notice. The Notice was criticized for; (1) failing to comply with the notification and public accountability provisions mandated in CALEA; and (2) failing to substantiate the proposed capacity requirements with adequate documentation. Ultimately, it was withdrawn by the Bureau for these reasons. The FBI's Federal Register notice failed to identify the "actual number of communications interceptions" that the Bureau estimates will be needed by the end of 1998. Instead, the capacity requirements were "presented as a percentage of the engineered capacity of the equipment, facilities, and services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications." 60 Fed. Reg. 53643. Furthermore, in EPIC's comments on the initial FBI notice, they stated: "[t]he Bureau's "percentage" approach to capacity requirements allows neither telecommunications carriers nor the public to 'know the required level of capacity.'" The percentages contained in the Federal Register notice (e.g., maximum capacity of one percent of "engineered capacity" for geographic areas falling within Category I) also engendered a great deal of public confusion concerning the Bureau's proposed requirements and their impact on the privacy of personal communications. The confusion became readily apparent after an article appearing on the front page of November 2, 1995, New York Times interpreted the Bureau's notice as requiring "the capacity to monitor simultaneously as many as one out of every 100 phone lines." Asked about the issue at a press briefing later that day, Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick said "there appears to be some misunderstanding or miscommunication as to the implications of what is contained in [the Federal Register] notice." In a letter to House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, Director Freeh asserted that, "We have not and are not asking for the ability to monitor one out of every 100 telephone lines or any other ridiculous number like that. ... Information supplied by the FBI was simply applied in a manner not intended to reach erroneous conclusions." b. The Second FBI Notice The FBI offered a revised NPRM in January, 1997, but has yet to publish rules as a result of the proceeding. The second NPRM was also rejected by industry and privacy groups alike for requiring greater capacity for interceptions by carriers than actually required today. The second FBI notice called for substantial increases in surveillance of both landline and wireless communications over the next ten years, with a total maximum capacity of 57,749 simultaneous intercepts to be conducted in the United States. Calculating out the percentages provided by the FBI, by 1998 the FBI anticipates an increase of 33 percent of landline interceptions and 70 percent of wireless phones. By 2004, the Bureau estimates a total increase of 74 percent in interceptions of landline phones and 277 percent in wireless phones. The second notice also implied that every carrier serving a particular region would have to install capacity sufficient to meet the total surveillance needs for that area, even if the carrier only served a portion of the customers in the area. Such a plan would not only be cost prohibitive, but would provide for unauthorized and unnecessary capabilities. Moreover, the second notice failed to make any distinction between the interception of call content and call-identifying information, even though this too was expressly required by Congress. From both constitutional law and privacy perspectives, this distinction is critical since the interception of call content is inherently more intrusive than the interception of call-identifying information. Any number of innocent individuals, conveying private information could be subject to unwarranted invasions by allowing call content information without court authorization. It is for this reason that CALEA limits the type of information that may be intercepted under pen register and trap and trace authority. c. Law Enforcement is Actually Seeking Enhanced Surveillance Capabilities It is now three years since the CALEA's enactment and to date the government has not promulgated final rules. The Bureau's refusal to provide the actual capacity requirements in its Federal Register notice denies any possibility of meaningful public oversight. Recently, the FBI has stated that it intends to promulgate a final notice January, 1998. Even if final regulations are promulgated at this late date, it will be impossible for industry to adopt technical standards accordingly under the current deadline of October 25, 1998. If the Congressional mandate for "public oversight" of the FBI's implementation of CALEA is to be realized, it is incumbent upon the Bureau to make available additional information concerning its proposed capacity requirements and then for the Commission to require sufficient time for public review. Underscoring this point, on October 23, 1997, several representatives from the telecommunications industry testified before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on the implementation of CALEA. The consensus of each of the industry speakers was that the Bureau's failure to provide rules in a timely fashion has prevented CALEA's implementation. Roy Neel, President and CEO of the United States Telephone Association stated, "[t]he FBI's delay in announcing its final capacity notice has been a significant obstacle for industry standard setting organizations. Throughout 1995 and early 1996, industry participants often postponed resolving certain issues pending the release of the capacity regulations and the equally anticipated Electronic Surveillance Interface." Furthermore, it has become clear that the actual requirements that the FBI seeks go well beyond that authorized under CALEA. As we discuss below, we believe that the standards and the petitions submitted by industry and CDT/EFF make clear that the FBI has asked for capabilities not provided for by CALEA. The expanded capabilities sought by the FBI, along with their non-compliance with CALEA's capacity notice requirements warrant a Commission order delaying implementation. Additionally, since this NPRM does not address the actual technical standards being considered for industry adoption, the Commission must extend the deadline for compliance pending public review. It is entirely possible that industry and the FBI may achieve a compromise on the standards, but even if industry is strong-armed by the FBI into complying with their requests, we intend to petition the FCC to engage in through review of the issues not included in this proceeding. II. Law Enforcement Has Prevented Industry Adoption of Authorized Standards By "Gold Plating" its Stated Needs Congress expressly denied law enforcement agencies the authority to dictate the design of telecommunications networks under CALEA by conferring this authority to industry associations. Industry has proposed several standards proposals which may be adopted in the near future. However, industry organizations have publicly acknowledged that law enforcement agencies have played an extensive role in the process and have thwarted the opportunity to adopt reasonable standards. Realizing that industry could not promulgate standards in light of the FBI resistance, on July 16, Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association petitioned the FCC to assume the authority over standards adoption. The petition indicates, the organizations were compelled to adopt FBI requests. More recently, in hearings on the implementation of CALEA before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, October 23, industry groups explained how the FBI has prevented adoption of reasonable standards. Many members of the Committee were critical of both the Act and the FBI. Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA), who chaired part of the hearing, bluntly stated that the legislation would not have passed in the Republican 104th or 105th Congresses. A major area of contention was the FBI's demand for added features not required by the 1994 law. These include an enhanced ability to track geographical locations of cell phones, the ability to monitor conference calls when the targeted party has left, and the ability to separate out content from signaling data of packet-based communications. The FBI's efforts to lobby against the industry designed standards during a vote on the specifications also came under fire. The Bureau organized a campaign to vote down the industry-developed standards, which was described in the hearing as "ballot stuffing." Twenty-eight police agencies filed the same 74-page ballot comments, including a sheriff in Florida who included the FBI's letter requesting that he file the comments. CTIA's Wheeler described the FBI's actions as "rolling a hand grenade under the table." Another controversial issue was the FBI's effort, during its negotiations with the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) over the wiretap standard, to petition the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to revoke the standards-settings authority of TIA after 50 years. The FBI apparently withdrew the request after several months. Jay Kitchen, President of the Personal Communications Industry Association explained that the impasse in the CALEA process was due in large part to FBI interference. He stated: "Unfortunately, a breakdown of monumental proportions has occurred. As of today, final standards have not been set, in large measure due to the actions of law enforcement officials. Initially, the FBI waited almost one and one-half years after the enactment of CALEA to submit its recommendations to standards setting bodies. After the submission of this list, industry representatives and the FBI were able to reach consensus on standards that provided, by PCIA's estimates, 90 percent of the capabilities that the FBI had requested. Since then, however, the FBI has held up the entire standards setting process in order to ensure that every capability on its "wish list" is made part of the standards." Similarly, Matthew J. Flanagan, President of the Telecommunications Industry Association, stated that industry concessions to FBI demands have been rejected by law enforcement and they have been pressured to concede even more: "During these meetings, industry made several concessions to law enforcement, agreeing to include features in the standard that many in industry were convinced were not required under CALEA. For example, law enforcement requested that it be provided with continuous information about the location of an intercept subject's cellular phone, irrespective of whether the phone was being used or not. Industry refused to provide this feature, finding that it greatly exceeded what CALEA permitted. In a compromise, however, industry agreed to provide law enforcement with the location of a cell phone at the beginning and end of each call -- even though many industry participants felt that even this compromise exceeded the scope of CALEA." As a result of all of the concessions, the proposed industry standard goes well beyond a fair reading of CALEA and incorporates several of the additional features and capabilities requested by law enforcement prior to CALEA's passage but which were rejected by the Congress. III Congressional Limitations on Information Subject to Interception Have Been Disregarded Congress stated that CALEA was meant to preserve and not expand government surveillance capabilities. To guarantee that surveillance is not expanded, CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to protect user privacy and security of information they are not authorized to intercept. Section 103 of CALEA, Assistance Capability Requirements, specifically imposes four industry requirements to protect privacy while assisting with law enforcement interceptions. Carriers are required to ensure that their systems are capable of: (1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept, to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service area...; (2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier-- (A) before, during, or immediately after the transmission of a wire or electronic communication...; and (B) in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication to which it pertains, except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title 18, United States Code), such call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number); (3) delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying information to the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, in a format such that they may be transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services procured by the government to a location other than the premises of the carrier; and (4) facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber's telecommunications service and in a manner that protects-- (A) the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying information not authorized to be intercepted; and (B) information regarding the government's interception of communications and access to call-identifying information. (emphasis added) This section makes clear that Congress specifically limited the type of information that could be permissibly provided by industry to the FBI under CALEA by distinguishing between call content and call identifying information. Thus, we disagree with assumptions made in the NPRM that broaden the scope of communications information that may be intercepted. Section 20 states: "We tentatively conclude that providers of exclusively information services, such as electronic mail providers and on-line services providers, are excluded from CALEA's requirements and are therefore not required to modify or design their systems to comply with CALEA....[W]e seek comment on the applicability of CALEA's requirements to information services provided by common carriers. We also note, however, that Congress anticipated that calling features such as call forwarding, call waiting, three-way calling, speed dialing, and the "call redirection portion of voice mail" would be subject to CALEA's requirements. We tentatively conclude that calling features associated with telephone service are classified as telecommunications services for the purposes of CALEA, and carriers offering these services are therefore required to make all necessary network modifications to comply with CALEA." (emphasis added) Congress explicitly rejected any application of CALEA to information services including electronic mail and on-line services recognizing that interception of those communications is the equivalent of "call content" and is therefore, subject to a much higher degree of protection under the Constitution. The NPRM, however, incorrectly assumes there is a distinction between carriers that exclusively provide information services and common carriers that provide information services. There is absolutely no basis for such a distinction under CALEA. Congress did not exclude such services based on the carrier offering the services, but on the nature of the services and a recognition that content of communications has always been accorded greater protections. Furthermore, the tentative conclusion that calling features associated with telephone services are subject to CALEA as "call identifying" information is incorrect. CALEA restricts recording or decoding of electronic impulses to dialing and signaling information that relates to call processing only. Congress explicitly rejected the inclusion of "other dialing tones that may be generated by the sender that are used to signal customer premises equipment of the recipient are not to be treated as call-identifying information." Thus, the addition of these features is an expansion of current surveillance abilities and not permitted. Not addressed in the NPRM are nearly a half-dozen other features that Bureau contends are "call identifying" features and thus subject to CALEA. As the Response Comments on the Petition for Rulemaking of the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, August 11, 1997, correctly point out, the FBI has sought the addition of the following features not considered by Congress: (1) packet switching information (2) wireless telephone call location information (3) packet data content delivery information (4) multi-party monitoring information (5) an expanded definition of call identifying information (6) pen register information (7) feature status messages Instead of addressing these threats to privacy, Section B of the NPRM frames the discussion of privacy protection in solely in terms of the type of record keeping procedures to be used by telecommunications carriers that conduct interceptions on behalf of law enforcement. However, Congress made clear that protecting the privacy of innocent individuals from surreptitious surveillance was of paramount importance and charged the Commission with the task of seeing to the necessary safeguards. The additional surveillance features sought by the FBI contravene Congress' intention that the law would maintain current levels of surveillance and not expand them. These issues must be addressed by the Commission before the implementation of CALEA can be accomplished and before record keeping and industry security procedures are determined. Conclusion Before rushing to embrace any proposals to enlarge the capability of government surveillance of its citizens, the ACLU and EPIC urge the Commission to take note of words written nearly 70 years ago -- that remain true even today. As Justice Louis Brandeis so aptly stated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928): The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping. The expanded capabilities sought by the FBI, along with their non-compliance with CALEA's capacity notice requirements warrant serious Commission response. Congress envisioned the implementation process as an open process to ensure that law enforcement did not surreptitiously gain unprecedented surveillance capabilities. Thus, before the adoption of industry standards, there must be careful scrutinization of law enforcement's capability requirements. We believe the only way to accomplish this task is for the Commission to extend the compliance deadline to October 24, 2000 under the authority provided by the Congress. Respectfully Submitted, Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director A. Cassidy Sehgal, William J. Brennan Fellow American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, N.Y. 10004 (212) 549-2500 Electronic Privacy Information Center 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301 Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 544-9240 Electronic Frontier Foundation 1550 Bryant Street, Suite 725 San Francisco CA 94103-4832 USA (415) 436-9333

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hashcash spam prevention & firewalls
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking at writing some hashcash (http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/hashcash/) based spam prevention software. The motivation for writing spam prevention software is that spam is better combatted with technical methods than legal or political (we do not want clueless politicians coming in ham-fisted and requiring "Internet Drivers Licenses" or anti-spam legislation or anything else, such actions will be hazardous for the future of remailers, in my opinion). (Hashcash is a way of proving that the sender has consumed a tunable amount of CPU time. The verification process consumes negligible CPU time. This allows us to require the would be spammer to spend say 20 seconds per mail, which will slow him down considerably, over his current tactics of 1000 long Bcc lists allowing him to hand off spamming tasks to mail servers.) So what we want is a filter to bounce messages without the required hashcash postage, we ideally want this to happen at the ISP or organisational SMTP server end, rather than at the recipients end, because a) it is simpler for 1 service provider to install software than 100,000 neophytes, and b) it reduces bandwidth consumption on dial up users pay per second lines as the spam is killed before they see it. The Right Way to do it perhaps is as an SMTP extension, however I consider this impractical in the short term because as far as I know there is no SMTP extension plug-in mechanism (other than access to the source code, and lots of development time) and because there are a large number of mail servers in use, and it will be expensive in developer (that's me) time to provide patches for them all (exarcebated by the fact that in many cases source will not be available). So these problems leave us scratching around for other more generic approaches. One method is to create a proxy which receives mail on port 25 (as the SMTP server normally does) filters examining for correct hashcash postage, and bounces if the postage is missing, and forwards the mail on to the real SMTP server if the hashcash postage is valid. The real SMTP server would then be set to run on another port... say port 26 which is reserved, and have the mail forwarded to it at that port. (You would want to disable non-local access to port 26 either at firewall or with SMTP server configuration if that is possible). Alternatively run the real SMTP server on another machine inside the local network. A few problems with this approach, firstly it may not be possible to configure some SMTP server software to run at ports other than 25. (I know you can do it with sendmail: OOPort=26 does it.) (If this is not possible with a given SMTP server you can still run a proxy by running the real SMTP server on another machine inside the network). Secondly the proxy approach prevents some of the SMTP server functions from operating properly because the process on the other end of the socket is our hashcash proxy on localhost rather than the remote mail hub (modern sendmails can be configured to perform reverse name lookups on IP addresses, call ident (ident sucks anyway IMO), or block based on IP address or domain, etc.) Is this kind of thing likely to be a big problem? Another approach is to try to hook in a hashcash SMTP proxy filter at the firewall. I am not that familiar with firewalls. Anyone have thoughts on the sorts of filtering you could install at the firewall level, and how portable this would be based on installed base of types of firewall? (ie It is not interesting if you can do nifty proxy functions with foobar firewall software if it is used by <1% of sites, and the function is impossible with other firewall software). The required filter functionality is something like this in order of desirability: Accept the SMTP session. Use an EHLO extension HASHCASH to say that this server expects hashcash. (Extended HELO is a method of specifying SMTP extensions (I think)). Accept the headers, and if a valid hashcash postage is not included, hand off to the real mailserver a site configurable bounce message. If the postage is valid, replay the headers to the real SMTP server (with IP masquerading so that the IP address appears to be coming from the originator, so that the SMTP server will not get upset about reverse DNS look up mismatches etc). Then act as a dumb proxy for the rest of the connection passing data through to the normal hashcash server. This still leaves open the question of the user generating their own hashcash postage. Again this could be problematic for neophytes. One solution is to include a URL for a web page including a javascript hashcash generator -- this means that no new software must be installed, the user cut and pastes the generated hashcash into their message. However things would be a whole lot simpler short term if the mail originators ISP created the hashcash for him at the ISPs SMTP hub where the user hands off his mail for further delivery. The main problem with this is that the SMTP mail hub would be overloaded by the CPU intensive task of generating hashcash. There are a few techniques to reduce the overhead of preventing spam with hashcash. One is to require valid hashcash only on the first message to a given address. (Spammers being hit and run types, and even having to generate hashcash for each spamee once would be expensive for a spam list of 10 million unwilling spam recipients). Better, is to require valid hashcash on all mail, _until_ the recipient replies to a mail. This is good because people rarely reply to spammers. Ordinary users who chit-chat backwards and forwards in mail generate little added overhead for the hand off SMTP server -- the only overhead being to generate say 5 seconds CPU worth of hashcash for each new recipient the user sends to. Then you add some hashcash accounting so that users who overspend (consuming more than say 1 minutes CPU consumption on the server in a 24 hour period have their email bounced with explanation of how to generate their own hashcash as a heavy user). Figures would need tuning to see how they worked out in practice, however it seems that it would be feasible to handle the whole operation entirely at the sending and receiving SMTP servers. Comments? Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

15 40

MEGA RESOURCE Makes MONEY
by freebizz＠simplyads.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Jim Bell's Sentencing?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No news here about Jim Bell's scheduled sentencing today. Oddly, there have been no entries in the publically accessible electronic version of the court docket since October 24, including nothing about the November 21 delay in sentencing which we confirmed from another reporting service in Tacoma. Someone's going to check with the court clerk on Monday. Anyone in the NW see anything in the papers?

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Jim Bell Sentenced: AP Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The Oregonian online: http://www.oregonlive.com/ Bell gets 11 months in prison, 3 years supervised release, fine The Associated Press 12/12/97 7:54 PM Eastern TACOMA (AP) -- A federal judge Friday imposed an 11-month sentence for tax violations on James Dalton Bell, whose 10-part Internet essay, "Assassination Politics," proposed apparent "bounties" on government officials. Federal prosecutors say he was advocating bounties on public officials he considered "miscreants" and "slimeballs." Bell has said he was theorizing, not advocating any killing. The Vancouver, Wash., man pleaded guilty in July to trying to impede Internal Revenue Service agents and to using false Social Security numbers to hide his assets. After his prison term, U.S. District Judge Franklin Burgess ordered Bell to undergo three years of supervised release. He also was ordered to pay $1,359 in restitution for damage caused by a stink bomb he set off at the IRS's Vancouver office. Bell's essay was cited in the indictment as a means by which he sought to intimidate IRS agents, Assistant U.S. Attorney Annmarie Levins said. A news release from federal prosecutors says that as part of his plea agreement, Bell "admitted advocating a scheme called `Assassination Politics' whereby persons would be rewarded with `digital cash' through the Internet for killing undesirable people. "Bell identified government employees, particularly IRS employees, as such undesirable people, and argued that the threat of `Assassination Politics' would intimidate them from enforcing Internal Revenue laws for fear of being assassinated." He also admitted proposing "Assassination Politics" as an enforcement mechanism for the anti-government Oregon extremist group Multnomah County Common Law Court, which purports to try government officials for performance of their duties, the release said. Prosecutors and Bell's public defender sought a sentence of 6 to 12 months as part of a plea bargain. Federal probation officers recommended 27 months, citing the "totality" of Bell's behavior. Bell described "Assassination Politics" as a means for ordinary citizens to take action against public officials they perceived as having violated their rights. "What if they could go to their computers, type in the miscreant's name and select a dollar amount. The amount they, themselves, would be willing to pay to anyone who `predicts' that officeholder's death," he wrote. "That donation would be sent, encrypted and anonymously, to a central registry organization and be totaled, with the total amount available within seconds to any interested individual." He noted that if one person in 1,000 "was willing to pay $1 to see some government slimeball dead, that would be, in effect, a $250,000 bounty on his head." In an April raid on the home Bell shared with his elderly parents, authorities found the home addresses of about 70 IRS employees, as well as three semiautomatic assault rifes, a handgun and potentially deadly chemicals. He was arrested in May.

3 2

court2.txt
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. C 94-03542 CW Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY v. JUDGMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND REQUESTING STEPHEN P. DUNIFER, FURTHER BRIEFING Defendant. By this action, the United States, on behalf of its agency, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Stephen P. Dunifer for operating a radio station, "Free Radio Berkeley," without a license in violation of 47 U.S.C.S 301 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. S 151 et seq. Several amici curiae have filed a brief supporting the FCC. Mr. Dunifer does not dispute that he is broadcasting without a license and that he has never applied for a license. Mr. Dunifer does not question the constitutionality ot the statute that requires broadcasters to obtain a license. Mr. Dunifer asserts, however, that relief should not be granted to the FCC because he cannot obtain a license to broadcast under the FCC'S regulations, which he claims are unconstitutional. The FCC regulations do not allow for the licensing of micro radio broadcasters, that is, radio broadcasters who, like Mr. Dunifer, use ten watts or less to power their signals.(1) Presently before the Court is the FCC'S motion for summary judgement which Mr. Dunifer and several amici curiae oppose. The matter was heard on April 12, 1996.Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties and oral argument on the motion, the Court DENIES the FCC's motion without prejudice and requests further briefing. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; CelotexCorp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1288- 89(9th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by atfidavits or other evidentiary material.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, --------------------------------------------------------------- Footnote (1) 47 C.F.R.S 73.512(c) states, in relevant part: Except in Alaska, no new Class D [micro radio station] applications nor major change applications by existing Class D stations are acceptable for filing except by existing class D stations seeking to change frequencies. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 47 C.F.R.S 73.506(b) provides, in relevant part: Any noncommercial educational station except Class D may be assigned to any of the channels listed in S 73.501. Section 73.501 lists channels available for assignment. 813 F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). DISCUSSION JURISDICTION The FCC challenges this court'sjurisdiction to entertain Mr. Dunifer's constitutional defenses to this action. The FCC invoked the jurisdictional grant of 47 U.S.C. S 401 (a) in filing the instant action. Section 401(a) provides that: The district courts of the United states shall have jurisdiction, upon application of the Attorney General at the request of the [Federal Communications] Commission, alleginq a failure to comply with or a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter by any person, to issue a writ or writs of mandamus commanding such person to comply with the provisions of this chapter. The court thus has jurisdiction to enjoin any violation by Mr. Dunifer of 47 U.S.C.S 3Ol, which, simply put, prohibits operating a radio station without a license. The FCC argues, however, that the jurisdictional grant of 47 U.S.C.S 401(a) is not broad enough to encompass Mr. Dunifer's constitutional defenses which challenge the regulations that make it impossible for a micro radio broadcaster to obtain a license. The FCC argues that any court challenge to the FCC's regulations regarding licensing must be brought either: (1) as an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under 47 U.S.C.§ 402(b) (1) [2] of the FCC's denial of a request for a waiver of the regulation prohibiting low power stations to apply for a license; or (2) as an appeal to the court of appeals for any circuit of the FCC's denial of a petition for rule-making under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) [3] and 28 U.S.C. § 2342[4]. In support or its position, the FCC principally relies on Sable Communications of Californiav. FCC, 827 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1987). In Sable Communications, the plaintiff provider of sexually suggestive telephone services sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the FCC claiming that a statute and the FCC regulation implementing that statute violated its First Amendment rights.Id. at 641. Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2342, the Ninth circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's challenge to the regulation, finding that the court or appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over claims regarding the -------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnotes [2] section 402(b) (1) provides: Appeals may be taken from decisions and orders of the Commission to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in any of the following cases: (1)By any applicant for a construction permit or station license, whose application is denied by the Commission. [3]Section 402 (a) provides: Any proceeding to enjoin, set aside. annul, or suspend any order of the commission under this chapter (except those appealable under subsection (b) of this section) shall be brought as providea by and in the manner prescribed in chapter l58 cf Title 28 [28 U.S.C. § 2342J] [4] section 2342(1) provides: The court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of-- (1) all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402 (a) of title 47. ------------------------------------------------------------------ constitutionality of regulations made reviewable by 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a). Id. at 642-43. The FCC also relies on Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995). In Moser, the FCC questioned the district court's jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's challenge to a statute on the ground that the plaintiff was actually challenging FCC regulations. Id. at 973. The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff's challenge did not reach the regulations. Id. The Ninth circuit noted in dicta that a challenge to the regulations would have been outside the jurisdiction of the district court. Id. Both of these cases were brought by plaintiffs who arguably sought to challenge FCC regulations in a district court. Neither involved a situation like that here, in which a defendant seeks to defend himself against a claim brought against him by the FCC in a district court. [5] Mr. Dunifer argues that while 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a) establishes the general rule that FCC actions are to be reviewed in the court of appeals, 47 U.S.C. 5 401(a) trumps this statute by specifically providing that the district courts have jurisdiction over writ proceedings filed by the FCC. He argues that this section grants jurisdiction to the district court to consider any defenses to such proceedings as well. For support, Mr. Dunifer cites Dougan v. FCC, 21 F.3d 1488 (9th cir. 1994). ---------------------------------------------------------------- Footnote [5] Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393 (9th Cir. 1996), a recent Ninth Circuit case cited by the FCC, likewise did not involve a defendant's attempt to defend itself in district court by challenging an FCC action. ------------------------------------------------------------------- In Dougan, the petitioner, an unlicensed operator of a micro radio station, sought review in the Ninth circuit of an FCC notice of forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 504 (a) [6]. Id. at 1489. The FCC had issued the notice of forfeiture after it found that Mr. Dougan had violated 47 U.S.C. S 301 by operating a radio station without a license and had violated 47 C.F.R. S l5.29 by refusing to permit an FCC representative to inspect his station. [7] Id. Mr. Dougan disputed that he had violated 47 C.F.R. S 15.29 and challenged "the jurisdiction of the FCC over his intrastate broadcasts and the constitutionality of the licensing regulations." Id. at 1489- 90. Mr. Dougan's complaint apparently challenged the constitutionality of the same FCC regulation, prohibiting the issuance of a license to micro radio broadcasters, that is challenged here by Mr. Dunifer. Id. at 1489. Because a notice of forfeiture is a final order of the FCC, under 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a) and 28 U.S.C. 5 2342 such a proceeding would properly he brought in a court of appeals. At the FCC's urging, however, the court dismissed Mr. Dougan's case in favor of district court jurisdiction. Id. at 1489, 1491. The court of appeals did not retain its jurisdiction over the constitutional defenses that it ------------------------------------------------------------------ Footnotes [6]Section 504 (a) provides in pertinent part: The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable, . . ., in a civil suit in the name of the United States brouqht in the district where the person or carrier has its principal operating office.... Provided, that any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of the chapter shall be a trial de novo. [7] Section 15.29 provides, in relevant part, that any equipment or device subject to FCC regulations must be made available for inspection by a Commission representative upon reasonable request. ----------------------------------------------------------------- specifically noted Mr. Dougan had raised. Id. Following the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "Congress did not intend to give petitioners two bites at the apple by allowing them to challenge the forfeiture in the appellate court, and if they lost, to sit back and await an enforcement action, at which time they would be entitled to a trial de novo in the district court."Dougan, 21 F.3d at 1491. The court concluded that 47 U.S.C. S 504 (a) is a special review statute which vests jurisdiction over forfeiture actions in the district courts. Id. The court held that this special review statute cuts off the simultaneous jurisdiction created in the court of appeals by 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a), the general review provision. Id. The FCC argued, and the court found, that this jurisdictional grant encompasses both actions filed by the government to enforce a forfeiture and those filed by individuals seeking to avoid enforcement. The instant case was brought under 47 U.S.C. S 401 (a) rather than 47 U.S.C. S 504 (a). Unlike The situation in Dougan, in this case Mr. Dunifer has not filed a complaint to avoid enforcement of the FCC's forfeiture order, nor hasthe FCC filed an action to enforce its forfeiture order.[8]Thus, There is no final order of the FCC before this court that is also reviewable by the appellate ---------------------------------------------------------------- Footnote: [8] In 1995, the FCC assessed a forfeiture against Mr. Dunifer in the amount of $10,000. See In the Matter of Stephen Paul Dunifer, FCC 95-333, August 2, 1995. Mr. Dunifer requests, in a footnote in his opposition, that the Court stay these proceeding for two weeks to permit him to file a complaint for declaratory relief seeking review of the FCC's forfeiture order. The Court will not stay these proceedings. Mr. Dunifer may file the complaint to which he refers at any time, if he wishes to do so. ------------------------------------------------------------------ court under 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a). This means that only the district court has jurisdiction over this action; this is not a situation where two courts have simultaneous jurisdiction. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's concern in Dougan about Mr. Dougan having two bites of the apple is not applicable. However, like 47 U.S.C. S 504(a), 47 U.S.C. S 401(a) provides that the FCC may initiate a specific type of enforcement action in the district court. The Ninth Circuit in Dougan determined that 47 U.S.C.S 504 (a) required Mr. Dougan to bring his lawsuit, including his constitutional challenges to the FCC regulation, in the district court. By analogy, it would appear that 47 U.S.C. S 401 (a) provides the district court with jurisdiction to hear not only the FCC's charge of broadcasting without a license, but also any valid defense to the charge. If the unconstitutionality of the FCC regulatory scheme that does not permit Mr. Dunifer to obtain a license would be a valid defense to a charge of broadcasting without a license, then that defense would be encompassed within the grant of jurisdictionto the district court provided in 47 U.S.C. S 401(a). The FCC has submitted a recent case decided in the District of Minnesota which, under facts similar to those in the case at bar, held that district courts do not have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to FCC regulations raised as defenses in an FCC action to enforce a forfeiture order. United States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, et al., _ F. Supp. _, 1997 WL 591127 (D. Minn.) ("Transmission Equipment"). In Transmission Eqipment, the FCC filed suit in district court to enforce a forfeiture order against a micro radio station on the ground that it was broadcasting without a license. Id. at *1. The defendant admitted to broadcasting without a license but raised affirmative defenses challenging the constitutionality of the FCC regulatory scheme that did not allow the licensing of micro radio stations. Id. at *2. The court distinguished Pleasant Broadcasting on the grounds that the petitioners there disputed that they had violated a statute or regulation; the relevant language required "repeated" violations and both petitioners admitted to one, but not to repeated violations. Id. at *3. The court concluded that Pleasant Broadcasting did not apply to the facts before it because the defendant in Transmission Equipment did not dispute that he violated the statute prohibiting broadcasting without a license, but instead raised constitutional challenges to the FCC's regulatory scheme as affirmative defenses. Id. The court could not distinguish Dougan on the same ground because Mr. Dougan admitted that he had broadcast without a license, as did the defendant in Transmission Equipment. Id.at *4. Instead, the court interpreted Dougan as involving only a dispute over whether Mr. Dougan had violated 47 C.F.R. S 15.29 by refusing to permit FCC engineers to inspect his radio station. Id. The court distinguished Dougan on the ground that Mr. Dougan challenged the FCC's forfeiture order and did not challenge the FCC's prohibition against low power broadcasting. Id. However, as discussed above, in Dougan, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that Mr. Dougan had raised constitutional defenses to the FCC's licensing regulations in addition to a defense based on 47 C.F.R. S 15.29. Dougan, 21 F.3d at 1489. Moreover, in ruling that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear Mr. Dougan's action to avoid enforcement, the Ninth Circuit neither explicitly stated nor implied that the district court could only hear Mr. Dougan's defense based on 47 C.F.R.§ 15~29, and not his constitutional defenses. The court did not retain jurisdiction over Mr. Dougan's constitutional challenge to the regulation. A case cited by neitner party, United States v. Evergreen Media Corp of Chicago, involved an action brought by the government in district court to enforce a forfeiture order issued by the FCC. 832 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1933). The forfeiture order was issued as a result of the FCC's determination that Evergreen Media, a radio station, had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464, a criminal statute imposing a fine or imprisonment as punishment for uttering obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication. Id. at 1184. The defendant filed a counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of IS U.S.C. § 1464. Id. The counterclaim alleged that 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was facially unconstitutional both for vagueness and for overbreadth, and that 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was unconstitutional as applied, on the ground that the FCC's interpretation of the statute was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the goals of the statute.Id. The defendant also alleged that the FCC's enforcement of the statute constituted a violation of substantive due process and of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The FCC argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear any claims raised by the defendant which attacked the FCC's policies, practices or regulations. Id. at 1186. The court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the defendant's constitutional challenges to the FCC'S regulations interpreting 18 U.S.C. S 1464. Id. at 1184-86. Citing Pleasant Broadcasting, the court found that 47 U.S.C!. § 504(a), which gives district courts jurisdiction to hear forfeiture actions, provides an exception to the general rule that challenges to regulations must be heard in a court of appeal. Id. Evergreen Media provides additional support for the conclusion that this Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Dunifer's constitutional claims. Although the FCC and Mr. Dunifer address the issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Dunifer'sconstitutional challenges to tho FCC'S regulations, neither party has adequately briefed whether the alleged unconstitutionality of the licensing regulations is a valid defense to a request for an injunction against broadcasting without a license. That is, assuming arguendothat the regulations were unconstitutional, would this justify Mr. Dunifer's action of broadcasting without having, or even attempting to obtain, a license and prevent the FCCfrom obtaining an injuction? Dougan does not address this question. Mr. Dunifer asumes that the alleged unconstitutionality of the regulations would be a valid defense. While it criticizes Mr. Dunifer for failing to seak a license, the FCC largely confines its argument to its view that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear the unconstitutionality defense at all. If the unconstitutionality of the regulations would be a defense under these circumstances, this Court would be reguired to determine whether the regulations are in fact unconstitutional. Otherwise, the Court need not consider the constitutional issue. In support of hts argument, Mr. Dunifer analogizes his situation to that of a criminal defendant seeking to defend himself on the ground that the regulation under which he was being prosecuted was unconstitutional. The FCC responds that in United states v.Alloy, 755 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the court precluded the defendant from raising constitutional challenges to a regulation he was accused of violating. In Alley, however, the defendant did not argue that the regulation was unconstitutional. Rather the defendant argued that the regulation was unlawful because the administrative agency, in promulgating the regulation, had acted outside the scope of authority granted to it by Congress. Id.The court, moreover, noted that the statutory scheme specifically forbade judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement of the regulation under which the defendant was charged. Id. The FCC has not pointed to any provision of the Communications Act which specifically prohibits judicial review cf a licensing regulation in an enforcement proceeding. Furthermore, even if Alley were applicable here, a single district court case from another circuit is slim authority on which to base this decision. Therefore, the Court requests that the parties provide further briefing on the issue of whether the unconstitutionality of the FCC regulatory scheme would be a valid defense in an action brought by the FCC to enjoin broadcasting without a license. The FCC shall file with the Court and serve on Mr. Dunifer its brief on this issue 14 days from the date of this order. Mr. Dunifer's opposition is due 7 days thereafter. If the FCC wishes to file a reply, it may due so 7 days after the opposition is served. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the FCC's motion for summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties are ordered to comply with the briefing schedule indicated above. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated November 12, 1997 Claudia Wilken UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Where is the c-p traffic?
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Am I the only one to notice that traffic has dropped from about 100 messages/day to only a few? Does anyone know what is broken? Does anyone care? Is the whole c-p list a giant MITM being run against a very few of us who are the only human participants? Oh dear! I just realized that c-p _could_ be subject to an interesting MITM attack: By subtlely modifiying the text of c-p messages arriving at certain key recipients, the bad guys could then correlate the quoted text in resulting anonymous replies to the list with individuals, and could probably also shave a layer or two off the remailer chains through which those messages were sent. The determination of individual's usage patterns of remailers would also benefit from this, and the info would go into a growing database which could then be used at some point down the road to nail key people and remove them as irritants and agitators. Isn't it odd that many key contributors to the list coincidentally live near nondescript neighborhood houses that bristle with antennae and are regularly visited by black helicopters and large unmarked vans? No, I didn't think so either. That's probably an unrelated operation. TrafficMongerII

2 1

Where is the c-p traffic? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 00:30:30 GMT > From: bureau42 Anonymous Remailer <nobody(a)bureau42.ml.org> > Subject: Where is the c-p traffic? > > Am I the only one to notice that traffic has dropped from about 100 > messages/day to only a few? You are getting *lots* of bounces if you were getting anything like 100 messages per day. > Does anyone know what is broken? At this point either your arithmetic or your memory. Either way, it sounds like a personal problem. > Does anyone care? Is the whole c-p list a giant MITM being run > against a very few of us who are the only human participants? Damn, found out. > Isn't it odd that many key contributors to the list coincidentally > live near nondescript neighborhood houses that bristle with > antennae and are regularly visited by black helicopters and large > unmarked vans? No, I didn't think so either. That's probably an > unrelated operation. Just exactly what kind of drugs are you taking? There is a house rule you *must* bring enough for everyone. No helicopters, vans, jack-booted thugs, or anything else around here dude. Don't know about an opinion, a paranoia induced hallucination for sure. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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You can take it with you
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Last year, when a major financial columnist suggested that people should buy stocks and hold them until the day they died, we figured expectations had hit the ceiling. We were wrong. Apparently, in a mania of this magnitude, even the bounds of mortality can be sur- passed. The Luxemborg-based Prometh Societé is offering "reincarnation accounts" to people who are not willing to let death stand in the way of their financial planning (minimum account size is $30,000). When the claimant returns in the next life and provides a few key facts, he can claim the account, which will presumably have grown to quite a size at the generally-expected 30% per annum compounded." The Elliott Wave Theorist -- December 5, 1997

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GETS THE CREDIT CARD YOU DESERVE- GUARANTEED!
by hellen＠east.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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