December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Another Anti-Privacy Bigot Heard From (was: The Guilmette/Burnore deba
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Joe "We are Borg" Foster <joe(a)bftsi0.UUCP> wrote: > > That was an impressive tantrum that you and Belinda just staged. I > > suppose you thought it would distract attention from the fact that > > you still refuse to reveal what your motive was for harassing Jeff > > Burchell this summer in a failed attempt to get him to turn over the > > logs containing the names and e-mail addresses of everyone who > > either sent or received an anonymous message through his remailer. > > Et tu, dumbass? Have you forgotten the existence of the "old" Deja News > database? That won't work for two reasons: First, Gary is now "cloaking" his posts with an "X-No-Archive" header to keep them from being archived by neutral parties such as DejaNews. In addition, if you do a search on his name as author in the old database, you get a bunch of matches that say "article not available", indicating that he's requested that such articles be removed from the archives. Second, how does one search for something that was never posted? The only thing I see in the Deja News archives is Jeff Burchell's explanation of Burnore's $cientology-esque attack on his remailer: -> Subject: Re: DataBasix vs. the Remailers -- Gary Burnore's -> Dirty Tricks Exposed (was: Jeff's Side of the Story.) -> From: toxic(a)hotwired.com (Jeff Burchell) -> Date: 1997/07/02 -> Message-ID: <5pc9mb$omg$1(a)re.hotwired.com> -> -> [...] -> -> : > Mr. Burnore requested a copy of my (non-existant) logs. -> : > I told him to get me something in writing, signed by his lawyer that -> : > stipulated that the logs were confidential, and not to be revealed to -> : > anyone outside of the lawyer's office. -> : -> : He requested the logs of the messages of *EVERYONE* using Huge -> : Cajones? What was his rationale for such a fishing expedition? -> : (Cases like this are a good reason for remailers to NOT keep logs.) -> -> I have no idea of his rationale. And I don't know of any remailer -> operator who keeps logs that would identify a user. I had my machine -> configured to log in a fairly standard way, but I used a different -> sendmail configuration for the remailer, that had all logging (except -> for certain error conditions) turned off. -> -> Part of me thinks he wanted the logs so he could tell if I was going -> to be able to identify him when he started his attacks. Thus far, that's the best explanation I've seen for Gary Burnore's threats and harassment. > > If posts from "anon assholes" really offend your sensitive feelings, > > then you might want to stay away from most of the NGs where you've > > been posting your blather. SUGGESTION: stick with "safe" groups > > like comp.org.cauce where anonymous posts are banned and content is > > censo^h^h^h^h^hmoderated to ensure an appropriate level of political > > correctness. > > Posts from assholes definitely offend me, whether they're anon or not! True, but the chance that somone might be offensive is not sufficient reason to censor it. (If that were true, Usenet references to Whitewater might be declared "pornographic" by the Clinton administration.) Gary Burnore keeps whining about posts from "ANON assholes" not just "assholes" in general. That definitely reveals something about him. If he were to gripe about posts from "black assholes", one might (rightly) conclude that he was a racist. If he were flaming posts from "gay assholes", you'd probably figure that he was a homophobe, right? The fact that he doesn't flame the CONTENT but some characteristic about the author marks him as a bigot. > Well, if you really think about it, just about any news post might be > "anonymous". After all, how do you know that whoever typed all this is > really named "Joe Foster"? You don't! Remember "Mahmud al-Hijazi"? You've got a point there. <g> I don't place much faith in what I see in the From: line, even if it appears to be a valid e-mail address.

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Spammernomicon
by Spam Man 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Selected passages from Spam-Bot: A Technical Manual for Independent Spammers. It is my opinion that the professional spammer fills a need in society and is, at times, the only alternative for "personal" anonymity. Moreover, if my advice and the proven methods in this book are followed, certainly no one will ever discover your identity. Almost every man harbors a fantasy of living the life of Dimitri Vulis or some other fictional hero who spams for fun and profit. They dream of living by their knee-jerk reflexes, of doing whatever is necessary without regard to moral or legal restrictions. But few have the courage or knowledge to make that dream a reality. You might be like my friends -- interested but unsure, standing on the sidelines afraid to play the game because you don't know the rules. [But] within the pages of this book you will learn one of the most successful methods of remailer operation used by an independent spam-bot operator. You will follow the procedures of a man who works alone, without backing of organized crime or on a personal vendetta. Step by step you will be taken from research to equipment selection to job preparation to successful job completion. You will learn where to find employment, how much to charge, and what you can, and cannot, do with the money you earn. But deny your urge to skip about, looking for the "good" parts. Start where any amateur who is serious about turning professional will start -- at the beginning. [And when] [y]ou've read all the suggested material, you [will have] honed your mind, body and reflexes into a precision piece of spamming machinery. You [will have] assembled the necessary tools and learned to use them efficiently. Your knowledge of dealing spam [will have] increased to the point where you have a choice of methods. [After you spammed your first victim,] you felt absolutely nothing. And you are shocked by the nothingness. You had expected this moment to be a spectacular point in your life. You had wondered if you would feel compassion for the victim, immediate guilt, or even experience direct intervention by the hand of God. But you weren't even feeling sickened by the sight of the victims pathetic reply. After you have arrived home the events that took place take on a dreamlike quality. You don't dwell on them. You don't worry. You don't have nightmares. You don't fear ghosts. When thoughts of the hit go through your mind, it's almost as though you are recalling some show you saw on television. [E]verything seems to have changed. The people around you have suddenly become so aggravatingly ordinary. You start to view them as an irritating herd of pathetic sheep, doing as they are told, doing what is expected, following someone, anyone, blindly. You can't believe how dumb your friends have become, and your respect diminishes for people you once held in awe. You too have become different. You recognize that you made some mistakes, but you know what they were, and they will never plague you again. Next time (and you know there will be a next time), there will be no hesitation, no fear. Your experience in facing anti-spammers head-on has taught you about life. You have the power and ability to stand alone. You no longer need a reason to spam.

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Stanford student "blacklisted" from jobs because of his Internet writings
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a good argument for anonymity: New York Observer: November 24, 1997 Salomon Brothers Tattler Gets Famous on the Web by Tinker Spitz Tim Shields, a student at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, spent the summer working as an investment banking summer associate for Salomon Brothers. He didn't like it much. When he got back to Stanford, he wrote two articles about his experiences and published them in The Reporter, a business school publication. No harm done, right? Wrong. Now, through the magic of the Internet, all of Wall Street is aware of Mr. Shields' complaints. Overworked bankers, chained to their desks, often turn to their computers for entertainment to break up the tedium of creating shareholder profiles and whatever other dreary analyses their clients might demand of them. Lately, Mr. Shields' bitter article, making the rounds by e-mail, has been that entertainment. Mr. Shields was merciless in his depiction of Salomon Brothers and the people he encountered from other business schools. Here is a line that nicely sums up his impression of his summer: "The 38 members of my Investment Banking Summer Associate class represented a wide range of personality types, from the merely obnoxious to the moderately narcissistic to the overwhelmingly repugnant." He also makes Salomon Brothers chief executive Deryck Maughan look like either a hypocrite or a fool. In a meeting on Aug. 18 with the investment banking unit, Mr. Shields reports, Mr. Maughan said, "We have absolutely no reason to believe that we are a buyout target, nor that we will be in the near future." Only weeks later, Salomon Brothers was acquired by the Travelers Group Inc. Mr. Shields also remarked on the general climate at Salomon: He writes that a managing director at the firm told him, "Salomon Brothers is just not a culture where anyone says 'please' or 'thank you' or 'good job.'" And, according to the much e-mailed articles, one Salomon vice president told Mr. Shields, "You don't want this job. You really don't want this job. You get sucked in by the money and then find yourself trapped and miserable like I am. Don't be me." Salomon Brothers had no comment on the matter. The writer was at his most cutting in his assessment of his fellow summer associates, classifying them by school. Those from University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School were, in Mr. Shields' estimation, "boorish and dull, and interacting with them was like being locked in a room with a Bloomberg machine, except that the Bloomberg screen has two dimensions." Mr. Shields writes that he amused himself by needling the Columbia Business School students with his own feeling of Stanford superiority: "If I was in a truly nasty mood, I would follow up with a discussion hypothesizing on the quality-of-life differences between Palo Alto and Harlem. As you might guess, I wasn't too popular among the Columbia crowd." His take on those from Northwestern University's J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management? "Not the sharpest Ginsu knives in the set, they were as out of place on Wall Street as you might expect from people who'd spent the prior year intensely debating the merits of Dave Thomas appearing in person in the Wendy's commercials." About those from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Sloan School of Management, Mr. Shields writes, "I think I found Waldo. Every stereotype you ever heard about M.I.T. is true. These guys were such incredible weenies, brilliantly managing to combine both the brainpower and social grace of an HP 19B-II." And the Harvard Business School types? "Floating through the summer like Cinderella at the ball, they expected you to accept their jargon-laced drivel with the same attitude that Moses and his stone tablets received on Sinai." Mr. Shields' articles first drew the attention of Wall Street when they appeared in the on-line version of The Reporter. Someone an incensed first-year Salomon Brothers associate, according to a source downloaded them and attached the following message: "A Stanford student who did not receive an offer from Salomon Brothers was bold enough to put his name in print with these two articles. Maybe he doesn't want a job at all ..." Then the associate started e-mailing like crazy, sending the piece to job recruiters, among others, the source said. Mr. Shields' fame on the Web could not have come at a worse time. Now in the middle of on-campus job interviews, trying to parlay his $80,000 M.B.A. degree into a full-time job, Mr. Shields' only hope is that someone who may well have attended one of the schools he slagged is willing to hire a guy who went gleefully public with a nasty description of life with a previous employer. According to a friend of Mr. Shields, the e-mail has indeed come up in his first four interviews. "They seemed as though they were giving him a chance to explain himself," said the friend, "but when I talked to him, he hadn't heard yet whether he had gotten a call back which would be the ultimate test of whether they were willing to overlook it." Stanford is most certainly not standing behind its student. "That was a real silly thing for him to do, and not in any way appropriate," said George Parker, director of Stanford's M.B.A. program. "It's just arrogant." Other business students are aghast. "No one could believe that he would write this and not realize what the ramifications or consequences might be," said one. Mr. Shields would not comment for this article. People who know him said he's a nice guy despite his sharp edges. One friend, Giles Kavanagh, a Web site producer in New York, described Mr. Shields as "very ambitious" and "extraordinarily hard-working," adding, "He disguises his ambition." The son of a New York City police detective, Mr. Shields, now in his mid-20's, attended Regis High School (a Jesuit school on the Upper West Side) and received his undergraduate degree from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Before going for his M.B.A. at Stanford in 1996, he spent three years in the financial division at J.P. Morgan & Company. "He's always had an interest in making money," Mr. Kavanagh said. But that may be more difficult now, since the e-mail has apparently fallen into the hands of recruiters. One anonymous friend said that, while Mr. Shields has decided that "investment banking wasn't really for him ... he still didn't mean to get himself blacklisted across Wall Street." The friend added that Mr. Shields is trying to get a job in either private client services, a field related to investment banking, or consulting. Given his bitterness, his ambition, his ability to turn a phrase, his lack of respect for authority and his willingness to squawk about people he has met, perhaps Mr. Shields should consider a career in the glorious field of journalism. ============================================================================= --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > At 11:33 PM -0700 11/29/97, Bill Stewart wrote: > > >As for the case of May vs. Reno, 99 US 666 (1999) (:-), I've never > >heard Tim call for the violent overthrow of the US government. > >He's called for a far more dangerous method of getting rid of it > >(rendering it obsolete and letting the public catch on at their own speed), > >and he's also expressed the position that if a bunch of > >black-hooded thugs invade his house some night he'll defend himself > >first and not worry about checking their bodies for stinkin' badges > >or designer logos on their backs until the bullets stop flying. > > > >Not guilty. > > An almost complete summary of my stance. > > But Bill left out the third leg of my tripod, that I expect to wake up some > morning and learn that some major city, perhaps Washington, D.C. has been > nuked or bugged. You've both forgotton the fourth leg of the tripod, the one where Tim May calls for the governor of Florida to be shot (along with other officials). Governor Chiles' capital crime? He refused to allow California wine to be sold in Florida. On Fri, 9 May 1997, Tim May wrote: > Chiles and his co-conspirators should be shot for high crimes against the > Constitution. After Clinton, Freeh, Kerrey, and the other traitors. Everyone likes to overlook this, pretending that May didn't mean it. Well, he never withdrew it, did he? He never apologized for it. He's on the record as explicitly calling for the murder of high officials. And of course May further revealed his true colors with this horror, from the same message: > Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the right thing. > Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken eggs and all that. May's apologists have tried to pretend that he didn't say this, that he said that he was beginning to understand McVeigh, or something. That's not what he says here. He says he is becoming convinced that McVeigh did the right thing in murdering all those people. He callously compares the shattered bodies of the children and other innocent victims to broken eggshells. Monty Cantsin has provided us a moving description of the painful deaths of the children in Waco. Will dying of asphyxiation under pressure too great even to draw a breath be any easier? Again, you will search the archives in vain to find any apology for this, any withdrawal. May hides behind the words of others, as he does above, hoping that their softened interpretations will make people forget the plain facts about what he wrote. If Tim May does not agree with the quotes above, let him say so now.

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Censorial leftists (Was: Interesting article)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is nothing new. Honest (self-identified) leftists like my friend Bob Chatelle complain about the censors on the left almost as much as censors on the right. Other fave leftist censorship causes: -- MacKinnonite antiporn laws (she's a self-identified Marxist, I recall) -- "Hate speech" bans -- Sexual harassment "hostile environment" regulations (Give me a break. This is the justification for at least one library censorware installation.) -- Various FCC regulations aside from indecent stuff -- Advertising censorship (check out the Center for Media Education, a leftist group if I ever heard of one. In fact, as I pointed out in my Thanksgiving piece last week, CME's scaremongering Kids and the Net paper was cited by Enough is Enough as justification for the CDA) -- Labeling/compelled speech requirements (Jamie, are you out there?) >bottom line is that most any political orientation is likely to thrash free >speech when it appears to be a threat. Well, at least the libertarians in the audience are consistently opposed to government censorship. -Declan At 06:36 -0500 12/3/97, Jay Holovacs wrote: >Interesting article in Columbia Journalism Review, pointing out that the >political left is becoming more and more a cause censorship. I think the >bottom line is that most any political orientation is likely to thrash free >speech when it appears to be a threat. > >http://www.cjr.org/html/97-11-12-firstamend.html

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Re: Big Brother Is Watching ATMs
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<sigh> My apologies to Jonathan, the boyos in the Hills, and those watching for the Choppers. I wrote: |> Could you please identify this "bank card company" by name, card, nation, |>etc. ? The vendor, Sensar, Inc. <http://www.sensar.com> is planning to unveil the system at the Banking Administration Institute's conference in New Orleans the day after tomorrow. The company's version of the product and its expected use is a little less conspiratorial than Jonathan's post to C'punks -- but it more than suffices to force me to eat crow for my scepticism and unwarranted sarcasm. >> IrisIdent is a biometric identification system that uses the unique >> patterns of the human iris to verify an individual's identity. Using a >> standard video camera, the system takes a picture of an individual's iris >> and compares it with a previously stored iris image. The result is a >>rapid >> validation of the individual's identity. With an empirically determined >> crossover error rate of less than 1 error in 131,578 transactions, iris >> identification is more reliable and less intrusive than fingerprinting or >> retinal scanning. Its security cannot be bypassed or compromised. >> Pilot systems are available on a limited basis, with full production >> scheduled for later in 1997. In addition, Sensar is planning to launch >> follow-on applications for a wide range of financial applications, >>such as >> new account openings, bank wire transfers and government services. >> Smart Camera is a future offering from Sensar. It will combine the same >> technology with a stand-alone (non-PC-based) camera to verify >> customer identification at point-of-sale locations, business >>workstations, >> and home computers. |> Without some explicit cite of a commercial entity -- or a reference to some |>"strip-'em-naked-with-electrons" Police R&D group like the guys at Rome AFB -- this |>report sounds like another of those ID-Implant fantasies circulated by the guys who |>are bolting steel plate to their screen doors and programming their backyard AA to |>auto-target (a) Black Helicopters (b) which are on low-level rapid approach (c) full |>Oriental, Arab, and Hispanic troopers (c) wearing Blue Helmets. The CNN news report (only a little less worrisome than Jonathan's post) is at: http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9711/30/eyeball.id.ap/index.html |> Or, with further checking, could you confirm that is this just another spicy |> rumor crafted to keep the boyos in the hills rubbing garlic into their hollow-points |> with proper militia enthusiasm? (Not that I don't enjoy a good tale to wake up |> sleepy Computer Science undergrads, mind you...) |> Up the Revolution, |> _Vin Jonathan Wienke <JonWienk(a)ix.netcom.com> warned us all: >I just heard that a bank card company has just released a program for using >photos of the iris in people's eyes as a biometric ID to replace people's >PIN codes for ATM / credit cards. What I found really interesting is how >they plan to implement it. As people use the ATM, they are photographed. >(Every ATM has a security camera.) Over time, as people use the ATM, the >security camera images are composited to produce a high-quality image of >their irises, which is coded and placed in their account information. Once >this is accomplished, when a card is inserted into the ATM and the security >camera gets an iris image that matches the account sufficiently closely, >the user can conduct transactions without entering the PIN code. People >affected by this will merely receive a letter that under certain >circumstances, entering the PIN is no longer necessary, but this is not a >security problem. > >This scenario may not be a security problem, but it certainly poses a >privacy problem. Given the frequency that the average Joe Sixpack uses the >ATM, it is only a matter of time before the government mandates a >nationwide eyeprint ID database to catch ATM and credit card theives, money >launderers, tax cheats, and other undesirables. Perhaps the eyeprint could >even replace or supplement the SSN as the unique taxpayer ID key for tax >and other purposes. Of course, given the fact that ATMs have had cameras >from the start, this theoretical eyeprint database could already be under >construction. How's that for paranoia? >:-( > >Of course, there are a few ways to beat this, such as mirror sunglasses, >(which would only be useful while alternative credentials to eyeprint ID >are still available) and contact lenses, (which would have to be carefully >oriented so that the same side of the lens was always up, or the fact that >you are wearing contacts and are therefore a Suspicious Person would >become obvious to the system) and of course intraocular implants of various >types. Of course if the implant's power-on LED gives your eyes a constant >Satanic red glow, you may be flagged as a Suspicious Person anyway. > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 > Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548 -- <@><@> --

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Re: More Government Sanctioned Theft
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This message has also been posted.] In ok.general, Jerry Morgan <jmorgan(a)galstar.com> wrote: * easttom(a)redriverok.com (Chuck Easttom) wrote: * > 2. What the hell legit reason is there for a man to be driving around with * >132 K in a truck?? * > * * The simple possession of any amount of money is not subject to "police * approval", unless of course we are living in a police state. * * As I understand the "story" the police stopped the guy, searched the * car, found the money, seized it and then let the guy go without * charging him with anything. A nice cool 132K profit for a few minutes * work, just like an armed robbery. It would appear that this "cops and * robbers scenario" has the cops playing both roles.S ... ... ... * tactics will have 132K for new police equipment. Too bad they won't * use it to buy copies of the U.S. Constitution for their officers to * read, but after all they wouldn't want them getting any *wrong ideas* That would be a "hate crime". According to a message in the cypherpunks mailing list (which I unfortunately deleted, with references to more details on some websites), there was a conference on "hate crimes" recently. There, they discussed "profiles" and signs of "hate crimes", and among signs there were discussions of the constitution and founding fathers. If someone has any more information on that, please let us know. -- - Igor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- char*p="char*p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}

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"Berman expressed frustration with the ACLU's criticisms"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[More examples of the split within the "cyber-rights" community. --Declan] ===================== Chicago Tribue, November 30, 1997 HEADLINE: MANY VIEWS COULD SNARL 3-DAY WEB CONFERENCE; HOW TO SHIELD CHILDREN THE BIGGEST ISSUE BYLINE: By Frank James and Shirley Brice, Washington Bureau. DATELINE: WASHINGTON BODY: [...] One of the conference's main themes will be educating parents about how filtering software can help them "keep their children out of the red-light district," Berman said. The emphasis on the use of filtering software and expected talk about Internet ratings systems has prompted the American Civil Liberties Union to dub the event the "censorware summit." The ACLU, which played a major role in opposing the decency act, doesn't oppose filtering software in principle, but it asserts that parents who buy it should be able to learn exactly what sites the software blocks and what criteria were used in deciding to block those sites. [...] Barry Steinhardt, associate director of the ACLU, fears that eventually there would be "one or two centralized ratings systems that will reflect particular moral values and have the effect of limiting the breadth and variety of speech on the Internet." "The way these rating systems are going to work," he said "is that parties other than (consumers) are going to decide whether to employ the ratings systems. Sites that are rated unfavorably are going to be blocked out, rendered invisible to the average user." Berman expressed frustration with the ACLU's criticisms. "The court said there were less restrictive ways than government censorship, and they pointed at these filtering tools. It was endorsed by the Supreme Court 9-0. If you take those tools away, what do parents do?" The conference's organizers, Berman said, also want to let parents know about the efforts of companies with major Internet presences to make the Web more family-friendly. [...]

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Solveig Singleton on "Brave New Partners in Net censorship"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 01 Dec 1997 16:26:03 -0500 From: Solveig Singleton <solveig(a)cato.org> To: declan(a)well.com Op-ed: Brave New Partners In Internet Censorship by Solveig Singleton (solveig(a)cato.org) Solveig Singleton is the director of information studies at the Cato Institute. A few short months ago, the Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment protects the Internet just as it protects booksellers, newspapers and books when it found the Communications Decency Act (CDA) unconstitutional. That critical ruling signaled censorious governments in countries like Argentina, China, Germany and Zambia that the United States would not provide a precedent for blocking undesirable Internet content. Yet now the computer industry flirts with technologies of "self-censorship" at a December Internet summit under the guiding hand of the Clinton administration. The summit, called Focus on Children, poses subtle new dangers to free speech on the Internet. The First Amendment keeps the government out of the business of controlling media content. Private citizens are free to follow their consciences in choosing their own reading material and guiding their children to seek out or avoid certain information. There's no First Amendment objection when a newspaper editor refuses to print an article or when parents take books away from their children, or use a "censorware" program like SurfWatch in their own homes. The private sector is allowed to edit, to exclude and to silence speech). The public sector is not. But the summit's organizers call for "partnership" between industry and government in keeping "inappropriate" material from children. President Clinton is expected to attend. The summit emerged from a July meeting of President Clinton, Vice President Gore and some of the groups involved in the lawsuit against the Communications Decency Act. As it blurs the line between public and private, the Focus on Children summit becomes government action disguised as parental action. Filtering software like SurfWatch and the Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) -- a computer language standard that allows labels to be attached to Internet content -- are fine as long as they stay in the private sector, driven by customer demand and free choice. There's no need for a summit to make that happen. With nothing better to do, politicians and sensationalists are likely to use the occasion to shine a media spotlight on the dangers of the Internet. Government pressure will make it all the more likely that the computer industry will be unable to resist calls for mandatory PICS or universal filters built into the fabric of the Internet itself. Disturbingly, the summit's program suggests that free speech rights do not necessarily rank high in the sponsors' priorities. Its sponsors include, for example, the conservative group Enough is Enough; the summit's Web site links to their pro-CDA arguments but not to anti-CDA sites. While some opponents of the CDA are involved, defenders of free speech such as the American Civil Liberties Union are conspicuously absent. Documents promoting the summit describe the CDA as "well intentioned" and note that "supporters and opponents of the CDA agree that children should not have access to inappropriate material on the Internet or in any other medium. The real question is, how best to do it." The right question is whether government has any proper place at the table discussing any of these issues -- and especially in determining what is "inappropriate." The answer is a resounding no. Furthermore, government involvement is not necessary. The vendors of filtering programs have reason enough to ensure that parents are aware of their products. Government involvement promotes political, centralized solutions to what should be private problems. The V-chip is a prime example. Before lawmakers chose to mandate V-chips, entrepreneurs and private groups competed to help parents monitor their children's viewing habits, offering dozens of different blocking technologies as well as ratings and reviews of programs from diverse perspectives. Now the monopoly V-chip threatens to shoulder those offerings out of the picture. Freedom of speech on the Internet offers hope to millions of people around the world who live under political regimes that stifle their access to information. But the Internet's freedom depends on its technology. Politicians should be ashamed to set a precedent in this country by pressuring the industry to engineer this freedom out. We do not need a V-chip for the Internet any more than we need a rating system for libraries or bookstores. ### Solveig Singleton (202) 789-5274 (202) 842-3490 (fax) Director of Information Studies Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001

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PGP Inc Sold for $35M - News Flash
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<News Alert, from C/Net's News.Com> "PGP acquired by merged security software firm. "Pretty Good Privacy, an encryption company foundered by crypto pioneer Phil Zimmermann, has been acquired by Network Associates, the result of the merger of McAfee Associates and Network General, which closed today. "Network Associates will pay $35 million in cash for PGP. " -- No confirmation or further information available on the PGP, McAfee, or Network General web pages. _Vin Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548 -- <@><@> --

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Re: Pasting in From:
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:50 PM 12/01/1997 +0100, Amad3us <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net> wrote: >Then it has to allow you to put headers back in otherwise you can't >interoperate with software. Eg pasting in References:, Subject: Pasting those in isn't controversial, and is generally supported; you could be using Subject: pasting today with most remailers, using the ## syntax. >(I would like to see Cc: and Bcc: being allowed to be pasted in also). At minimum, addresses in Cc: and Bcc: need to be checked against blocking lists, and it's probably worth checking the number of names in the list against some threshold - especialy Bcc:s, which tend to be popularly used by spamware. >I would also like to see From: pasted in. In fact I can see no >purpose to restrict what can be pasted in, other than to reduce >complaints to the remailer operator possibly. Too easy to be abused by forgers, as are Reply-To: and Sender:. >My software shows be all headers. I am not sure what other software >would do, probably, only display the first From field (the remailers). MSMail and other closed systems are generally quite arrogant about only showing you the mail headers they "know" you want to see, and discarding the rest, whether that's what you want or not. Lots of mail clients only show you one From:, either discarding others or making them available in a "Show all headers" mode. >However you'll notice that my address is: > Amad3us <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net> >which means that I would like it to be pasted in as it is replyable >(for encrypted mail) even though not being a nymserver account. Which is a bit annoying, by the way, for cypherpunks who don't want to read your mail :-) On the other hand, alt.anonymous.messages is a fine place for people to send replies, and you can do things like alt.anonymous.messages(a)mail2news.some-relay-server.com At one time, there was a message-pool service on the extropia remailer which forwarded anything retrieved to all its subscribers; if the list is small it's not much protection, but it's one way to obscure mail sent to middleman remailers. There are other remailer-like systems that provide mailboxes for anonymous retrieval; I think Jenaer does something like that. And then of course there are hotmail and juno :-) Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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PGP Inc Sold for $35M - News Flash
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Network Associates Acquires Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 04:46 p.m Dec 01, 1997 Eastern Standard Time SANTA CLARA, Calif., Dec. 1 /PRNewswire/ -- Network Associates, Inc. (Nasdaq: NETA, commencing Dec. 2), formerly McAfee Associates (Nasdaq: MCAF), announced today that it has a signed a definitive agreement to acquire privately-held Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. (PGP). The PGP acquisition extends Network Associates' network security and management software products with the leading applied cryptographic security solutions for protecting corporate assets and enabling secure electronic communication. According to an Ernst and Young study, top threats to network security include virus attack, sabotage from inside the firewall and sabotage from outside the firewall. The combination of PGP and Network Associates unites leaders in addressing these corporate security threats. Network Associates' McAfee anti-virus security software is used by over 25 million users and more than 80% of the Fortune 500. With more than four million users in 50 countries, PGP is the worldwide de facto standard for Internet email and file encryption. "The synergy across our product lines is phenomenal," said Bill Larson, chairman and CEO of Network Associates. "We will now be able to provide an integrated software solution for securing both corporate networks and enterprise data." "There is a pressing need for comprehensive, integrated security solutions," said Phil Dunkelberger, general manager of Network Associates' Total Network Security Division, (formerly president and CEO of PGP.) "The combination of resources and talent of the respective companies will provide customers with a premier enterprise-scale security solution." Network Associates leads the way in providing large corporate customers with integrated network security and management suites. Network Associates' Total Virus Defense Suite incorporates client, server and gateway protection against computer viruses, and is a leading offering in its class. The PGP encryption and management products, including the PGP Business Security Suite, will be the cornerstone for a complementary suite offered by Network Associates called the Total Network Security Suite. By combining Network Associates' intrusion and virus detection products with Business Security Suite's desktop encryption software, and key server and policy management tools, the Total Network Security Suite will address, in a single solution, the needs of network administrators and corporate security officers. PGP has long been a pioneer in the security industry, contributing significantly to many of the principles that have driven the industry. Network Associates will continue to support the guiding principles that have made PGP a successful technology. These principles include a commitment to strong encryption and open standards. Network Associates will build on the progress made with the Internet Engineering Task Force, including RFC2015 and the Open PGP working group, to develop standards for security designed to unify industry practice. The acquisition, which is expected to close on or about December 15, 1997, is subject to PGP stockholder approval and other customary closing conditions. Members of PGP's board of directors and management, and certain other major PGP stockholders have agreed separately with Network Associates to vote their PGP shares in favor of the acquisition. The aggregate consideration payable in the acquisition is approximately $36 million (payable at closing in cash and the assumption of certain liabilities) and warrants to acquire a specified number of shares of Network Associates common stock. The acquisition will be accounted for under the purchase method of accounting. In accordance with generally accepted accounting principle, Network Associates expects to incur a significant charge to earnings for the Dec. 31, 1997 quarter related to the purchase of in-process research and development. With headquarters in Santa Clara, Calif., Network Associates, Inc., formerly McAfee Associates, is a leading supplier of enterprise network security and management solutions. Network Associates' product offering includes four individual software suites, Total Virus Defense, Total Network Security, Total Network Visibility and Total ServiceDesk, which can be centrally managed from within the Network Associates' NetTools unified management environment. For more information, Network Associates can be reached at 408-988-3832 or on the Web at http://www.networkassociates.com. This news release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Because such statements apply to future events, they are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause the actual results to differ materially, including without limitation, integration risks related to the proposed transaction and the risk that the proposed transaction will not be consummated. Important factors which could cause actual results to differ materially are described in Network Associates' reports on Form 10-K and 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. SOURCE Network Associates, Inc. Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548 -- <@><@> --

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Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a fallacy which is quite common on this list, especially among members whose positions are otherwise indefensible. It's surprising in a way because this fallacy is more common among statists. There, the fallacy goes like this: if it is immoral, then it must be illegal. We see this all the time. People think of the government as their way of expressing moral values. Drugs are wrong, so they must be made illegal. Discrimination in employment is wrong, so it also must be illegal. We have countless bad laws based on this false premise. On this list we see the same fallacy, turned around: if it is legal, it must be moral. Someone is attacked for posting some vicious, hateful, immoral rant, and they respond that what they said was legal, because of freedom of speech and the First Amendment. Their critic must be opposed to free speech if he objects to their words. Confusing what is legal and what is moral is a dangerous game. It leads to the false reasoning of the statists. We must remember that there is a clear distinction between morality and legality. We all agree with freedom of speech. People should be able to say whatever they like without fear of legal consequences. Cypherpunk technologies can play a major part in assuring this freedom. But this does not mean that all speech is equally valid. If someone calls for murder and they are attacked for it, it does no good for them to hide behind the First Amendment. Their words are wrong - they will have harmful consequences if followed. They cheapen life, and work against the goals we share of a future based on cooperation rather than cooercion. Cypherpunks are intelligent enough not to be fooled by this attempt to use the principle of free speech to justify calls for violence and murder. It's no wonder, really, that people like May and Vulis attempt to confuse the issue by pretending that their critics are opposed to freedom of speech. They know that if they are judged by their own words, their character is revealed for all to see. Any smokescreen is welcome if it helps conceal their vicious, hateful nature.

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Panel names released for Bernstein hrg on 12/8
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just spoke with someone in the clerk's office at the Ninth Circuit - the composition of the panel of judges for next Monday's hearing in the Bernstein case has been released. The judges are Bright, Fletcher, and (Thomas) Nelson. I haven't been able to find information about Judge Bright, but found pages of (meager) ratings/discussion about Fletcher and Nelson at: <http://www.appellate-counsellor.com/profiles/fletchb.htm> and <http://www.appellate-counsellor.com/profiles/nelsontg.htm> I think that Judge Bright may be Myron H. Bright, a senior justice on the 8th Circuit, who sometimes sits on 9th circuit cases by designation. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | Export jobs, not crypto. http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | http://www.parrhesia.com

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PGP bought by McAfee
by steve 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"Network Associates, Inc. >(Nasdaq: NETA, commencing Dec. 2), formerly McAfee Associates >(Nasdaq: MCAF), announced today that it has a signed a definitive >agreement to acquire privately-held Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. (PGP)." Varous Questions, comments rants, etc.: Does anyone know how this will affect PGP's: security, commitment to no-GAK, Founder (P. Zimmerman), the continuation of the PGP product line? I heard that McAfee's PCCrypto product will still be sold by NETA as a retail product, (are they considering incorperating the 2 together and just using PGP's team for R&D?) steve -- A picture tells a thousand words. Stego

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California
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Mon, 1 Dec 1997 11:45:58 -0500 Reply-To: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> Sender: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> From: Ben Wright <Ben_Wright(a)COMPUSERVE.COM> Subject: California Comments: To: digsig-post <digsig(a)lists.state.tx.us> To: DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU The California Secretary of State has published the final draft of his digital signature regulations at <http://ss.ca.gov/digsig/digsig.htm>. The final draft contemplates both dual-key signatures and signature dynamics like PenOp. --Ben Wright <http://infohaus.com/access/by-seller/Benjamin_Wright. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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by 20145708＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Fwd: Japs and the UN
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >Return-Path: <Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net> >Received: from falcon.adelaide.on.net by cti02.citenet.net (4.1/SMI-4.1) > id AA11267; Sun, 30 Nov 97 17:19:02 EST >Resent-Date: Mon, 01 Dec 1997 08:45:53 +1030 >Resent-From: Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net >Resent-Message-Id: <9711302219.AA11267(a)cti02.citenet.net> >Received: from default (ppp253.adelaide.on.net.au) > by adelaide.on.net (PMDF V5.1-10 #25974) > with SMTP id <01IQNJH3VW8Q00CE9B(a)adelaide.on.net> > (original mail from ssa(a)adelaide.on.net) for jf_avon(a)citenet.net; Mon, > 1 Dec 1997 08:46:02 +0930 >Date: Mon, 01 Dec 1997 08:45:53 +1030 >From: ALERT <Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net> >Subject: Japs and the UN >To: ssaa-alerts(a)adelaide.on.net >Resent-Reply-To: Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net >Reply-To: Sporting.Shooters.Association(a)adelaide.on.net >Message-Id: <3481E599.D57(a)adelaide.on.net> >Organization: Sporting Shooters Association of Australia >Mime-Version: 1.0 >X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01 (Win95; I) >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Comments: Sporting Shooters Association ALERTS mailing list >X-UIDL: 6ab40261c41b93db3a6bd1fed4a9e264 > "Japan paid salaries to officials on loan to U.N." .c Kyodo News Service TOKYO, Nov. 30 (Kyodo) - The Japanese government has paid salaries to its officials on loan to the United Nations for the past 27 years in violation of the U.N. Charter, a national daily reported Sunday. Officials from Japanese ministries and agencies on loan to the world body receive salaries from the U.N. as well as salaries from the Japanese government, the Mainichi Shimbun said in a report from Geneva. The government has paid billions of yen for more than 1,000 officials from Japan's ministries and agencies after a law, stipulating government officials dispatched to international institutions be paid 70 to 100% of the salaries paid in Japan, took effect in 1971, the Mainichi said. The U.N. Charter and U.N. staff regulations ban receiving payment from any government to maintain its independence. An official at the National Personnel Authority was quoted as saying half the Japanese officials on U.N. assignments are paid 100 % of their home salary amount. Tsukasa Kawada, director of the Foreign Ministry's U.N. Administration Division, was quoted as telling the Mainichi the payments are aimed at guaranteeing the status of officials on loan by continuing their pension and insurance fees' benefit and are not rewards for their duties in the U.N. AP-NY-11-29-97 2338EST ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== -- Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds(Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Re: PGP bought by McAfee (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Identities removed to protect the innocent] Forwarded message: > >Does anyone know how this will affect PGP's: > >security, commitment to no-GAK, Founder (P. Zimmerman), the continuation > >of the PGP product line? > > > >I heard that McAfee's PCCrypto product will still be sold by NETA as a > >retail product, (are they considering > >incorperating the 2 together and just using PGP's team for R&D?) > > > Even more basic questions: Will NETA release source code? Will they > continue to develop freeware versions of PGP? What conections does NETA > have to S/MIME? What happens to licensing of things like PGPsdk and the > freeware versions of PGP? Will PGP be seen as a "dead-end" product by > potential new users. What will happen to Open-PGP email encryption > standard? > > This is not good. What's the matter? Finding a free market economy monopolize right in front of your eyes just a tad uncomfortable? Cyber-anarchy in action... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Cypherpunks, PGP Buyout, & Writing Code...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perhaps the buy-out of PGP is a good thing. Consider that now there is a clear and present motive for Cypherpunks to start writing the next wave of world-class crypto...it really is the *only* shure way that the process doesn't get subverted...we're no longer able to rely on a single commen source of crypto tools. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: More Government Sanctioned Theft
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:16 PM -0700 12/1/97, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >[This message has also been posted.] >In ok.general, Jerry Morgan <jmorgan(a)galstar.com> wrote: >* easttom(a)redriverok.com (Chuck Easttom) wrote: >* > 2. What the hell legit reason is there for a man to be driving >around with >* >132 K in a truck?? >* > >* >* The simple possession of any amount of money is not subject to "police >* approval", unless of course we are living in a police state. >* >* As I understand the "story" the police stopped the guy, searched the >* car, found the money, seized it and then let the guy go without >* charging him with anything. A nice cool 132K profit for a few minutes >* work, just like an armed robbery. It would appear that this "cops and >* robbers scenario" has the cops playing both roles.S This is becoming all too common (cf. online reports, and some good t.v. investigative shows which detailed how this shakedown operation works in many states). As to the question above, "2. What the hell legit reason is there for a man to be driving around with * >132 K in a truck??," this shows the dire state we are in today. After all, what the hell business is it of government/police to tell a person what they may do with their money? If I want to push my money around in a wheel barrow, it may be stupid, but if cops seize it then they are just thieves, plain and simple. (Arguments that the money "must have" been stolen, or to be used for an illegal transaction, or whatever, are meaningless. Unless the money can be shown to be stolen, or unless the person being stopped is actually shown to be in an illegal transaction (not that I support such laws, mind you), the cops can do nothing.) However, cash is on the way toward being outlawed. De facto, if not de jure. --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Kashpureff stuff online
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know of any low S/N lists out there for "Crackerpunks"?? > > > So what did Kashpureff do? Who is Kashpureff? Is he the guy at > > Alternic who did some advanced DNS hacking to get Internic DNS root to > > point to him? Or something else? > > Yup, that's him. > > IIRC, he exploited Bind's failure to check input in certain cases: > He set his DNS server to be the delegating authority for .com, > say; then sent a recursive query to his victim's DNS server to get > the victim to query _his_ server; his server mixed the bogus info > into its response to the query, thus poisoning the victim's DNS. > > Cypherpunks write code. > Crackerpunks read code. > > > > > Ng Pheng Siong > <ngpsstoi(a)pacific.net.sg> >

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Jonathan Wienke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 At 12:03 PM 12/1/97 -0800, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: >Besides Usenet, other popular tactics for retribution are >sending death threats to politicians, sending child pornography >to mailing lists, forging messages _from_ politicians, etc. >Disclaimer/warning headers help, but can't stop it all. > >At 10:07 AM 12/01/1997 -0500, Andy Dustman wrote: >>Two basic points also about "forgeries". First, you can forge headers >>pretty easily without any programs other than telnet. Second, if this > >This was before Gary Burnore's attacks on the remailer networks, >but it's also an obvious tactic for either flamers or Feds to use >for getting remailers shut down. If somebody forges a Usenet posting >with telnet, it's not _your_ problem (usually). If they use your remailer, >it is your problem. And if they get remailers closed down a lot, >it's all of our problems. > >>2) Whenever a From: line is pasted, a disclaimer will be inserted at the >>top of the body, stating that the original sender has set the From: line, >>and that the identification cannot be verified. The fact that it is up at >>the top of the body should mean people should actually see it before >>reacting. > >It's worth also repeating it at the bottom. Putting it in the headers >is invisible with most newsreaders, though. > >By the way, one technical risk with From:-pasting is that you need to >parse or substitute special characters including parens and anglebrackets. >Otherwise it's easy for people to paste in syntactically incorrect headers, >which really annoy some gateways and mail clients - nested parens are >a particular problem. > >Basically, I think you're getting yourself in for excitement >and adventure and really wild stuff by supporting this :-) Sounds like a good reason for remailers to use throwaway email accounts at Juno, MailExcite, Yahoo, etc. as their exit points. Wasn't somebody working on this? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBNIOSQcJF0kXqpw3MEQKcHACg+nSiTVlonZCH3hUhRQ2+DXYTtIcAoOTf DVa/LBltFF527mdtcs3adDsR =6WNy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Jonathan Wienke PGP Key Fingerprints: 7484 2FB7 7588 ACD1 3A8F 778A 7407 2928 3312 6597 8258 9A9E D9FA 4878 C245 D245 EAA7 0DCC "If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you. May your chains set lightly upon you; and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams "Stupidity is the one arena of of human achievement where most people fulfill their potential." -- Jonathan Wienke Never sign a contract that contains the phrase "first-born child." RSA export-o-matic: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

2 1

TEST
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TEST ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Public Venture Capital Alert: Sandbox Entertainment available through Wit Capital
by gunther＠witcapital.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wit Capital Corporation is pleased to announce that we are able to provide first-come first-serve participation in the following public offering as described below: Issuer: Sandbox Entertainment is a Phoenix-based software development company that uses proprietary technology to provide games and simulations on the World Wide Web. Sandbox's flagship products are CNN/SI's SportSim (sm), an online fantasy sports game, and CNNfn's Final Bell (sm), an online stock market simulation. Security: Series B Convertible Preferred Stock Expected Size of Offering: 654,000 shares Expected Price Range: $6.75 to $8.50 Lead Underwriter: Wit Capital Corporation If you think you may be interested in this Public Offering available through Wit Capital, please visit http://www.witcapital.com/sand1.html or call (888) 4-WIT-CAP. You can view, print or download the Preliminary Prospectus from the New Issues Section of our website. To purchase shares, you must first open an account, which you can do online. Investing in public offerings is speculative, involves a high degree of risk and may not be appropriate for every investor. As with all of your investments with Wit Capital, you must make your own determination of whether an investment in this offering is consistent with your investment objectives and risk tolerance. To learn more about the risks of investing in public offerings please visit the New Issues Section of our website. A REGISTRATION STATEMENT RELATING TO THESE SECURITIES HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION BUT HAS NOT YET BECOME EFFECTIVE. THESE SECURITIES MAY NOT BE SOLD NOR MAY OFFERS TO BUY BE ACCEPTED PRIOR TO THE TIME THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT BECOMES EFFECTIVE. THIS COMMUNICATION SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR THE SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY, NOR SHALL THERE BE ANY SALE OF THESE SECURITIES IN ANY JURISDICTION IN WHICH SUCH OFFER, SOLICITATION OR SALE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL PRIOR TO REGISTRATION OR QUALIFICATION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF SUCH JURISDICTION. NO OFFER TO BUY THE SECURITIES CAN BE ACCEPTED AND NO PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE CAN BE RECEIVED UNTIL THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT BECOMES EFFECTIVE, AND ANY SUCH OFFER MAY BE WITHDRAWN AND REVOKED WITHOUT OBLIGATION OR COMMITMENT OF ANY KIND, AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO NOTICE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE GIVEN AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE. AN INDICATION OF INTEREST IN RESPONSE TO THIS RESPONSE TO THIS ADVERTISEMENT WILL INVOLVE NO OBLIGATION OR COMMITMENT OF ANY KIND. A broker dealer or its agent may only transact business in a state after licensure or satisfying qualification requirements of that state. If you reside in a particular state that Wit Capital is not registered in as a broker dealer or has registered agents in, this message is not directed to you. Wit Capital will not open a brokerage account or sell securities to you until such time registration requirements in your home state are fulfilled. Thank you. Wit Capital Corporation Member NASD/SIPC

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by 47058560＠compuserve.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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PGP User's Guide 2.6.2
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can I find a copy?

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RSA
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: More Government Sanctioned Theft
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 12/1/97 4:16 PM, Igor Chudov @ home (ichudov(a)www.video-collage.com) passed this wisdom: >In ok.general, Jerry Morgan <jmorgan(a)galstar.com> wrote: >* easttom(a)redriverok.com (Chuck Easttom) wrote: >* > 2. What the hell legit reason is there for a man to be driving >* around with 132 K in a truck?? >* >* The simple possession of any amount of money is not subject to "police >* approval", unless of course we are living in a police state. I am not sure, but it seems to me that there is some sort of currency control laws that say that you cannot have 10K or mor ein oyur possession unless you show there is a good reason, like on your way to the bank, being abusiness heading for the bank atthe end of the day etc, and of course banks report deposits of 10K or more. I know of two different people who were not 'in business' who did perfectly legal transactions that left them with 32K and 47K in cash each instead of big checks and who simply deposited it. One recieved a phone call and the other a visit by IRS asking 'what, why, where' etc within two weeks of depositing money. Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel" -- Samuel Johnson "With all due respect to an enlightened but inferior lexicographer I beg to submit that it is the first." -- Ambrose Bierce's commentary on Johnson's definition.

2 1

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by janey＠wannaplay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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[Fwd: [cpj:279] Re: PGP 5.0i for Windows95/NT] [cpj:279] Re: PGP 5.0i for Windows95/NT
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

2 1

State Department Advisory Committee Meeting
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: aboss(a)vm.temple.edu Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Tue, 2 Dec 1997 08:19:51 -0500 Reply-To: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> Sender: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> From: Amelia Boss <ABOSS(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> Subject: State Department Advisory Committee Meeting To: DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU I previously posted an announcement concerning a meeting of the State Department's Advisory Committeee on Private International Law on the digital signatures. There have been two changes. First, the location has changed. It will now be held at the Department of commerce, Conference Room 5855 beginning at 9:30 on Monday, December 15 (until 4:40pm). Second, it will be a *one* day only meeting. If you are planning to attend, please notify Rosie Gonzales at the State Department: (202) 776-8420; fax 202-776-8482; email at pildb(a)his.com. Or, call Brian Hengesbaugh at the Department of Commerce: 202-482-4620, fax 202-482-4076. In order to register for the meeting, they will need your name and government agency identification (if any), or affiliation and address, as well as phone, fax, and email address if available. Entry to the Commerce Department should be through the main entrance on 14th Street between Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues. Hotel Accommodations: There are two hotels that have agreed to offer, on a space-available basis, rooms at the government rate ($108/single; 128/double). However, you must advise the hotel when making arrangements that you are a State Department invitee and that the government rate should be applied. They, in turn, will contact the L/PIL to verify (authenticate?) that you are on the list of attendees, so please make sure that you have followed the procedures in the previous paragraph. The two hotels are the Windham Bristol Hotel at 2430 Pennsylvania Avenue NW (walking distance to State and two blocks from Foggy Bottom metro) [202-955-6400; fax 202-955-5765] and the State Plaza Hotel at 2117 E Street NW (across from the State Department) [phone 202-861-8200; fax 202-659-8601]. Hope to see many of you there. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: > >(I would like to see Cc: and Bcc: being allowed to be pasted in also). > > At minimum, addresses in Cc: and Bcc: need to be checked against > blocking lists, and it's probably worth checking the number of > names in the list against some threshold - especialy Bcc:s, > which tend to be popularly used by spamware. As long as blocking requests are authenticated with some sort of "cookie" token scheme, that would be acceptable. That goes for INDIVIDUAL blocking requests. Somewhat more discretion ought to be used for requests to block an entire domain. That should probably only be done upon request from the "postmaster" at that domain, and when an entire domain is blocked, that fact should probably be announced in advance, publicly, in alt.privacy.anon-server to inform users in that domain who might not have been made aware of the action and who might need to recreate 'nym reply blocks, etc., before their incoming mail gets embargoed. For example, if I had a 'nym with a reply block that directed replies to my e-mail account at work (I don't, BTW), and my employer decided that it no longer wanted its employees to be able to receive anonymous e-mail, then it would only be polite for the employer to notify the employees well in advance of that policy change. But in case the employer failed to do so, a public notice should also be made. In fact, I'd say that domain-wide blocking requests should only be accepted from "postmaster" or one of the contact addresses listed with InterNIC for that domain. One large ISP, for example, allowed a user (who was not an employee nor a representative of the ISP) to sign up for the user ID "abuse". > >I would also like to see From: pasted in. In fact I can see no > >purpose to restrict what can be pasted in, other than to reduce > >complaints to the remailer operator possibly. > > Too easy to be abused by forgers, as are Reply-To: and Sender:. I'm not sure what the actual use of a "Sender:" header is, but pasting in a "Reply-To:" header is not technically forgery, since it does not imply where a message came From:. It is only a suggestion where replies should be directed. When the From: and Reply-To: lines both exist, but differ, most software gives the user an option of which address to reply to. Thus, in the final analysis the person replying makes and is responsible for the decision as to where to send his reply. > >My software shows be all headers. I am not sure what other software > >would do, probably, only display the first From field (the remailers). > > > MSMail and other closed systems are generally quite arrogant > about only showing you the mail headers they "know" you want to see, > and discarding the rest, whether that's what you want or not. > Lots of mail clients only show you one From:, either discarding > others or making them available in a "Show all headers" mode. All the more reason to only allow pasting in the replacement mode. > There are other remailer-like systems that provide mailboxes > for anonymous retrieval; I think Jenaer does something like that. > And then of course there are hotmail and juno :-) That doesn't solve the problem of how to post with a NON-replyable pseudonym, though. It has been suggested that the practice of pasting in a From: header should not be allowed because it is subject to abuse and that this can better be accomplished through a 'nym server. But if the person doesn't want e-mail replies, why should a 'nym server be burdened with maintaining a reply mechanism that the 'nym owner doesn't want to use? Even if the reply block is redirected to /dev/null(a)somedomain.com, handling replies, incoming mail bombs, etc. is unnecessary work. The fact that the remailer net has implemented source-level blocking upon request means it already has more safeguards in place against "forgery" than 90% of the ISPs have. It's quite ironic to see people like Gary Burnore complain that allowing a remailer user to set an arbitrary From: is "abusive" when the ISP he (and you) post from, Netcom, allows that very thing. There are actually two valid reasons I can think of to paste in a From: header: One is to post "from" a pseudonym without having to go through the 'nymserver. For example, to make posts and send correspondence when the 'nym server is down or to be able to post from a non-secure site without having to compromise security by making one's PGP secret keyring accessible at that site. The second reason would be to post using a non-replyable pseudonym. Many newsreaders gather only the headers of Usenet messages and list them by their Subject: and From: lines. Without the ability to set a From: line, one's posts to a thread are indistinguishable from all the other ones from "nobody(a)replay.com". If I want to call myself "Santa Claus", it's far easier to paste in a "From: Santa Claus <sclaus(a)northpole.gov>" than to go to the trouble of creating a replyable 'nym at a 'nym server just to put something recognizeable in the From: header. The problem with eliminating any feature that gets abused is that it's an open invitation for someone to deliberately abuse it just to get it eliminated. Whenever possible, a solution should be sought which eliminates abuse while still allowing legitimate use. - - -- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNIQzwwbp0h8ZvosNAQFLpgf+LS9VIGvUV3JKRHp+/ZtoRUkhNgH0h2Jg tr/5gazeo+k0EHnaA/jvdnZ2HKSSkKguXaAnzejBnTtfvfQa38GcWBZsve/4fC9e YAv80++wGj/0RhgwNEp8ovm57u5KQmybOqxmfeQ8H/cc8jyfhZEBGb2sxIbqvze5 NvzMGUHpKfUfduxo+kGeoOPOO+CkpM1sd5RmFSPojd6DgG3gNELjLD1jWLpZT7BC YlBOJFh39ibssjQQO1lcLokdgqlDLQZWx1Lar9fyuWHlO5z+2wKkI+MICMkF32YE dd3sPuhZxEGZGHyV+gybqm961G/7VctAXWrKlXuELb1HYUpsSkU+GA== =Q+h9 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ~~~ This PGP signature only certifies the sender and date of the message. It implies no approval from the administrators of nym.alias.net. Date: Tue Dec 2 17:00:03 1997 GMT From: comsec(a)nym.alias.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEUAwUBNIQ+mE5NDhYLYPHNAQHVxQf3Y3DTPTUfLoQ/4qMM4Dxn58WS3zGQQpG3 +R6nVXONkQ5NpkSEdhoJDA8ANU9Xf/Bd0o1WtVhoTzutqULMUQjKKPKUtda/rxHh IkhgeFHuTq8jYfLso0MQkWFDGusd3BKacChKF83Rp0s6lOUZw0gr+ejVQNK6jLR6 PCzu5arH+X5y/4kRL12mLk/q72wW6ghN28b/9ogL+P8dWVfQjpSkJBA77OX4bQqE 2EixaU9xOwUOcBWnvmukXaPZF2PQ99MGOVQ9xZrdP6TSpWcmgbW1gg0xBPn6uCkl VD/TWTnCGMF86n0La85nx8/ypR6GxpyrcSrBpdkUdhgU61xmNXyS =aLBH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

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by M4f7mtcED＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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USA Today editorial opposing criminal copyright bill
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An opposing view from Rep. Goodlatte also appears at the URL below. My article on this unprecedented criminal copyright bill is: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1588,00.html -Declan ====== http://www.usatoday.com/news/comment/nceditf.htm USA Today Editorial 12/01/97- Updated 11:14 PM ET Law limits use of Net In 1994, Massachusetts Institute of Technology student David LaMacchia invited on-line users to download $1 million worth of copyrighted computer software that he'd put on the Internet. In spite of his antics, charges against LaMacchia were dismissed. Thanks to a legal loophole, hackers who break copyrights just for fun can't be criminally prosecuted. LaMacchia's case is just the most notorious example of how the growth of the Internet has strained the nation's copyright laws. Duplicating materials in cyberspace is as easy as clicking a mouse. The market for pirated goods is as infinite as the World Wide Web. And under copyright laws from the 1800s, infringement occurs only if a person makes money from the illegal act. Determined to deter the hackers, Congress passed a bill last month making it a felony to duplicate copyrighted materials on line, including computer software, recordings, books and articles. But the bill awaiting President Clinton's signature puts more than hackers at risk. It threatens the actions of scientists, academics and Web users, exposing them to criminal penalties of up to six years in jail. Researchers frequently use the Internet to distribute articles that they write but that other publications copyright. And the Internet now plays an important role in peer review. Scientists post their published research on a Web site in hope of encouraging the exchange of scientific information. Until now, copyright infringement wasn't a worry for these folks. Courts recognized the "fair use" of copyrighted works for noncommercial purposes, including teaching, research and criticism. To bar the use of all copyrighted material would be like telling film critics they couldn't quote dialogue in their movie reviews. Yet under its new law, Congress makes it a crime to duplicate copyrighted materials on line but neglects to include specific "fair use" legal protections allowing the duplication of copyrighted materials that doesn't hurt a work's commercial value. Lawmakers argue that protections aren't needed because the bill calls for the prosecution only of those who "willfully" violate copyrights. Their argument overlooks all the people who know they're using copyrighted material but do so without criminal intent: the researchers, students, writers and Web surfers who duplicate copyrighted materials as a way to communicate. Unless a clear exemption is written into law, all risk becoming targets for overly aggressive prosecutors. There are compelling reasons to revise copyright laws for our digital age. But without guaranteeing researchers the same protections on line as they have off, Congress risks limiting the Internet's legitimate uses. ###

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GLAAD report on filtering software: "Access Denied"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

======= Date: Tue, 2 Dec 1997 14:16:07 -0500 From: Cathy Renna <CathyR(a)twbg.com> To: "'Declan McCullagh'" <declan(a)well.com> Hi Declan-- I am greatly appreciating your comments and articles about the summit (Loren Javier and I are attending right now. Here is our release about the filtering software report. Cathy Renna Washington, DC Media Resource Center Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) (202) 986-1360 fax: (202) 667-0902 renna(a)glaad.org VISIT THE GLAAD WEB SITE AT http://www.glaad.org! ALERT LINE 1-800-GAY-MEDIA "GLAAD" and "Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation" are registered trademarks of the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, Inc. MEDIA RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Liz Tracey, GLAAD (212) 807-1700 pgr. (800) 946-4646 pin# 1423527 e-mail: tracey(a)glaad.org GLAAD RELEASES GROUNDBREAKING INTERNET FILTERING SOFTWARE REPORT NATION'S ONLY LESBIAN & GAY MEDIA ADVOCACY GROUP EXAMINES COMPLEX ISSUES IN "ACCESS DENIED" NEW YORK, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1997-The Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) today announced from the historic Internet Summit the release of their comprehensive and groundbreaking report on Internet Filtering Software and ratings systems, "Access Denied: The Impact of Internet Filtering Software on the Lesbian and Gay Community." In the wake of the Communications Decency Act decision, Reno v. ACLU, and with the Internet Summit: Focus on Children being held through tomorrow in the nation's capital, GLAAD has completed an exhaustive survey of how Internet filtering software, and future proposed ratings systems affect the lesbian and gay community. The findings mark the first time a lesbian and gay media advocacy organization has produced research and analysis of such depth on the issue of Internet access. "The majority of software currently on the market, as well as new products in development, place informational Web sites serving the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community in the same categories as sexually explicit sites," the executive summary reports. "The software developers are either unable or unwilling to consider that information about sexual orientation and identity (e.g., a gay square dancing site) has nothing to do with sexual behavior, and everything to do with culture and identity." "Access Denied" contains sections analyzing the legal, political and social implications of enforced invisibility on the Web. It also includes overviews written by members of groups such as Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition International (GLPCI) and Peacefire (an entirely youth-run cyberliberties group), as well as testimonials from lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender youth, who, as seen in the report, are those most directly affected by the lack of access to important information via the Web or Internet newsgroups. "I urge everyone who uses the Interent to read this report, and learn the troubling implications of the widespread use of filtering software," states Joan M. Garry, GLAAD Executive Director. "As a mother, I can assure you that while GLAAD has examined the disturbing aspects of filtering, we never lost sight of the youngest users of the Internet-our children. Whether it is through the testimonials of lesbian and gay youth, or an essay written by a gay father, the voices in this report must be heard now-perhaps soon, they will be much harder to find." The report also includes a thorough review of the currently available software, ratings systems and search engines, recommendations for industry leaders on how to make the Internet both friendly and fair, as well as a proposal for a future ratings system, FAIRsite, which would measure the accessibility and accuracy of various ratings systems and software. GLAAD is a national organization that promotes fair, accurate and inclusive representation of individuals and events in the media as a means of combating homophobia and all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation or identity. -30-

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> wrote: > >But you don't need a special anonymity server to do that; > >a keyserver plus either a personna certificate or some archiving mechanism is enough. > >The certificate shows that you're the first+only person at that > >certificate issuer to use the name you've chosen; the archive > >shows that the first poster using the name <nym> used PGP Key <key>. > >I have a PGP key I use for signing pseudonyms which performs > >the personna certificate function - I'll verify uniqueness > >of keys that I've signed. > > I was thinking of remailers sending out anon messages with a distinct from > line that has zero connection (in the nym database) to any email address. > Is this possible? To establish a nym only through one way communication? I can think of a couple of ways this could be implemented. You could either allow the user to select an e-mail address to use, then do an nslookup to verify that the domain does not exist, or else choose a domain that's actually nothing but a bit bucket. The cleanest implementation might be to create a "bitbucket.efga.org", alias all incoming mail (except for perhaps "postmaster") to /dev/null, then assign non-replyable 'nyms off of that. That would eliminate the need for managing reply blocks and confirmation cookies. This is much more preferable to these people you see who post with a From: address of "nobody(a)nowhere.com", probably not realizing that nowhere.com is actually a real domain. But implementing such a server is still a lot more work than simply allowing From: headers to be pasted and allowing source blocking for anyone who is worried about being the victim of abuse of such a scheme. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNIRgZwbp0h8ZvosNAQGC7gf+PRUB+6Zuxns3E+BWZoM3kkzn4MD9vcip 1MvQRFRvTTdvGM4vFySYcZByv7SQJdIiVZItyzMe4qMz+Ft/xpbWUYmz3mOpws9H RW3sbsFywNzp4pCxolKhMJ8QTQI/tHb3CHT6thHkbgjpzr4bJlL6trLKn+btY2d/ MdNq61oPCTq4YYdj9kC8WebngjfJZOvcvQhX1OLtUaagrpL8DiGxivGSz/Rdl6ZC Yr8m8m0V/l6WA4HG3ZKTDoBz6OBxI7VROZRZdJkCRHKgScQP9/4+UYnSbew1rAhE apoUG3Ds7kiIUoZ9gLz01sYvRRaWelIjIZLp+RfnMPvtwXexP2uA8Q== =+uAL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

anon remailer
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This guy has the IQ of a turnip... relevant to anon remailers & society thread... Tuesday December 2 12:07 PM EST Hate e-mail case to be retried SANTA ANA, Calif., Dec. 2 (UPI) _ Saying the case has national importance, federal prosecutors will retry a 20-year-old man accused of sending threatening electronic mail to Asian students at UC Irvine. Prosecutors announced their decision while opposing a bail request for Richard Machado of Los Angeles, the first person in the United States to be tried on charges of committing a hate crime over the Internet. His first trial on those charges ended with a deadlocked jury in November. Jurors voted 9 to 3 to acquit the former UC Irvine student. Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Genaco told Judge Alicemarie H. Stotler that it is important that the case be resolved because other similar cases are certain to occur. Stotler denied bail for Machado, noting that he fled to Mexico when he was first charged. Machado's retrial is scheduled to begin Jan. 27. _- David Honig honig(a)alum.mit.edu --------------------------------------------------- If we can prevent the government from wasting the labours of the people under the pretense of caring for them, they will be happy. -TJ

2 3

A Netly Thanksgiving (guess I should have posted this earlier)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

=========== http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1602,00.html The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/) November 28, 1997 A Netly News Thanksgiving by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Here at the Netly News, we have a feast of things for which we're thankful during this holiday season: Ricochet radio modems. MacOS 8. A Supreme Court that supports free speech online. DVD. Cable companies offering 400 Kbit/sec Net-connections. But we're also grateful to the personalities who made this year an unforgettable one: Heaven's Gate: A special Netly thanks to these suicide cultists for providing us with seemingly unlimited article fodder. From the blinking red alert headline of their celestial home page to the computer-generated painting of a resident of the kingdom of heaven, their web site was a treasure trove for journalists. Buried in the invisible space at the bottom of the home page were hundreds of hidden words: UFO, space alien, extraterrestrial, misinformation, second coming, end times, alien abductions, Yoda, Yoga. Wonderful stuff. Louis Freeh: The butt of a thousand jokes on the Net ("Freedom isn't Freeh"), the FBI director emerged this year as the arch-enemy of strong encryption. We had worried that Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick's departure might mean fewer good stories from the Justice Department. But Freeh came to the rescue, saying publicly that Americans should not be allowed to buy encryption products without a backdoor for law enforcement. [...]

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No Subject
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C[...] May is a slant-eyed, rice-gibbling jap in a redneck disguise. ---._.--- / | \ / * \ ( @@ ) / _/-||-\_ \ / '/ || \` \ / / () \ \ / /| |\ \ / / | | \ \ / / / o o \ \ \ / / ( ) \ \ <_ ' `--`___'`___'--' ` _> / '~~--- / = \ ---~~` \ ,,,/ / ( v ) \ \,,, \ / / @|-' '-|@ \ \ / \__/ ////// \__/ Dave Smith bends over for Gary Burnore, Paul Pomes, and the rest of the Databasix gang. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Censorware Summit 2.0, from The Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[For details on some of the proposals presented, read the full article. --Declan] ============ http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1608,00.html The Netly News Network (http://netlynews.com/) December 2, 1997 Censorware Summit 2.0 by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) If there's one political controversy that promises never to die, it's sex and the Net. There seems to be something about the combination of children and cyberporn that makes otherwise levelheaded adults more than a little worried -- and even a little irrational. Enter the politicans, always happy to pacify parents with soothing rhetoric. Vice President Al Gore is scheduled to speak this morning at a two-day summit dedicated to protecting kids online. Of course, the Communications Decency Act's backers had claimed that that particularly nasty law (which the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional) did just that. They were joined by the White House, which two years ago said "the President firmly supports the Communications Decency Act" to "regulate the exposure of children to computer pornography." This time, however, the White House would like to avoid the same embarrassing mistakes -- and, perhaps more importantly, would like to avoid pissing off high tech firms that could be hefty campaign contributors to Al Gore 2000. Instead of endorsing new federal legislation, the Clinton administration says it'll oppose it as long as industry regulates itself. And, of course, if firms play ball, their CEOs get to share the limelight with the veep [...]

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Re: Pasting in From:
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore+NOspam(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) > :If Gary Burnore is so concerned about "forgery", maybe he ought to > :start using that PGP key he keeps advertising in his .sig to > :actually sign his posts. Unless he does, he's still vulnerable to > :forgery from his fellow Netcom users who are still allowed to insert > :arbitrary From: lines in their Usenet posts. Actually, forging a > :post with Gary Burnore's name and address in the From: line can be > :much more convincingly (no disclaimers) done from a throwaway > :Netcruiser account, and with less effort than learning the proper > :protocol to do it through a remailer. > > > Please specify how PGP signing the inside of a post will stop UCE-Baiting. PGP signing a post is a lot like the new anti-counterfeiting measures in US currency, only a lot more effective. But if some bozo decides to start printing up three dollar bills with a portrait of Mickey Mouse, and others are foolish enough to accept them, what are you going to do? It's hard to protect people from their own stupidity. I'd contend that a $3 bill isn't even a counterfeit or forgery, since there is not genuine equivalent which it seeks to fraudulently duplicate. Maybe it's time that the brain-dead software that mindlessly harvests e-mail addresses from the net was shut down. That sounds like the real problem. > :Munging of addresses is better left to the discretion of the poster. > :Let those who perceive a need for this "capability" use it. At > :least one of the mail2news gateways implements that as an option for > :those desiring it. I'm in favor of leaving that choice with the > :poster. > > Please specify how PGP signing the inside of a post will stop UCE-Baiting. I'm not sure what comment you intended to make about that paragraph, since it appears that you inadvertantly pasted in your comment from the last paragraph again. The text you're supposedly commenting on nowhere mentions PGP. > :Mr. Burnore made a similar "forgery" complaint here several months > :ago and was advised to PGP sign his posts and request source-level > :blocking if he perceived forgery to be a problem. He has evidently > :not taken the trouble to implement the first suggestion and, > :assuming he took the second suggestion, he's posted no evidence to > :suggest that it's not been effective. > > The second has been effective. I've not denied that. Since you've already found a solution to the problem that works, there seems to be no need to do anything more drastic to solve it. > I can see however, that > allowing anon posts with someone elses' address in the from line is a great > tool for UCE-Baiting. I fail to see any other reason for it in an anonymous > post. What other reason would there be for putting a REAL email address in > the from line of an ANONYMOUS post? For one thing, to identify posts as originating from one's pseudonym, which *MIGHT* be a "real" e-mail address. Most times I've seen it used, though, it has been used to place identifying information in the From: field which many newsreaders use to identify posts so that they are recognizeable by the reader. > Again, it's nothing to do with the CONTENT. It has more to do with the ability > to post to an mlm group with someone elses' email address. Oh, and btw, if a > NETCOM customer is caught doing this, his/her account is terminated. The key word there is "caught", and then you'd have to convince Netcom to actually do something about it. It is my understanding that spammers routinely utilize Netcom's OPEN SMTP SERVERS to send out their spam, using whatever From: field they wish, and Netcom doesn't seem to care. Anyone using those same servers to send mail to a mail2news gateway could forge someone's name and e-mail address to a Usenet post, couldn't they? Also, even if a complaint to Netcom got an individual account shut down, that wouldn't stop some other Netcom user from doing the same thing, nor would it stop the first Netcom user from opening another account under a phony name and repeating the process, or even doing it from a non-Netcom account. So if my e-mail address were being forged via Netcom, would they be able to source-block it as the remailers currently can do? If not, doesn't your own ISP have a bigger abuse potential than the remailer net? > AGAIN IT'S NOT FORGERY THAT'S A PROBLEM. IT'S UCE BAITING. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ There's no need to shout. Perhaps you've forgotten two earlier posts you made to this NG in the past couple of weeks in which you said: -> Subject: Re: Controlling the From: line in PIdaho -> -> Hopefully replay has corrected this as others have suggested so that the above -> CAN'T be done. It's a simple way to forge someone else's name. Early last ^^^^^ -> year comes to mind. -> -> [...] -> -> Posting anonymously is a valid thing to do, posting with someone else's name -> in the From line is simply forgery. Try sending your message from a hotmail ^^^^^^^ -> address or other site where you can just make up a name if you want this sort -> of thing. And in another post: -> Subject: Re: 'from' other than anonymous -> -> [...] -> -> Again, a forged from line (Forged as in someone's _REAL_ email address shows ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ -> up) is a BAD THING. You claimed to be concerned about FORGERY back then, now you're saying "IT'S NOT FORGERY THAT'S A PROBLEM". Which is the case? > AGAIN. Please specify how PGP signing a post will stop UCE Baiting based soley > on the from line. But you were given two solutions, so if one of them works, then you don't need the other one. --

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Announcing availability of Crowds 1.1.1 for Win95, WinNT, Unix
by Aviel Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Crowds: A system for anonymous web transactions Top 10 reasons why you might be interested in Crowds 10. The price - crowds is free 9. Easy to install - download the code, untar, and run. Then, simply point your browser proxy settings to it and you can browse anonymously 8. Public service - by running the crowds code, you provide others with anonymity, even if you don't use it all the time. 7. Big brother is on the net - this helps you hide 6. It's nobody's business what you are browsing 5. For this to work, there needs to be a large user community 4. Portable - now works on Windows95, WindowsNT, and all versions of Unix we tried 3. Win Crowds T-shirts and coffee mugs - details to come 2. Take a stand for privacy 1. Don't be the last person on the Internet to obtain privacy More information, including full source code is avilable at http://www.research.att.com/projects/crowds. - Mike Reiter - Avi Rubin ********************************************************************* Aviel D. Rubin rubin(a)research.att.com Secure Systems Research Dept. Adjunct Professor at NYU AT&T Labs - Research 180 Park Avenue http://www.research.att.com/~rubin/ Florham Park, NJ 07932-0971 Voice: +1 973 360-8356 USA FAX: +1 973 360-8809 --> Check out http://www.clark.net/pub/mjr/websec/ for a new book on web security (The Web Security Sourcebook). *********************************************************************

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Re: Pasting in From:
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart) wrote: > At 12:14 AM 12/01/1997 -0500, Robert A. Costner wrote: > >Best I can tell, the only reasonable good purpose for this is to create a > >persistent nym identity without a reply to capability. > > Actually, setting the reply to point to your nymserver address > is the one legitimate use I can see for it, though that > capability probably should be provided by the nymserver. > The reason for chaining through remailers is to gain anonymity. I can think of a couple of scenarios in which pasting in a From: header pointing to a 'nym might be advantageous: 1.) Posts when the nymserver is down, or; 2.) Posts from an insecure location where installation of one's secret keyring is not desirable. (The "newnym" servers require that send requests be PGP-signed with the nym's secret key.) - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNIRnYwbp0h8ZvosNAQE6Xwf/SJQbKnIhFSP2nXd7dBQauf5ygoIrGqOt 6vFW644xxELC37iwW5tWI7Cr0N1Ipk9Py1UDzHSNYEeUGqUxgWGQ8BZhoNRg9i2t pqTr/YIRTjVxPETidpnKhyUgL6lz3bESpdiQLAKm1VwdWV3OhtNTlzL/Wu1hO33W +IxisotkksQ+OsCrfdkBRu6FarS90LGWa7Zqo3xNHZs599P/tVMrc2BYq7znXcZX gG4YwUhL2qWZJDhiWpTVWb/OH0Cq1UCnc/7AgMBjbQFt0ZCHghJXxc4DfmUG9L6J MHmpv82j7th8roMjM3FRGUzaqJxVBSoBKZPyBuRaLMgiaaupWku5EQ== =ZqJJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Transforming Defense
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The National Defense Panel presented yesterday to the Secretary of Defense its 95-page report on the future of US defense: "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century." It's available in PDF format at: http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc.pdf (386K) The report proposes an impressive 30-year overhaul for the military, with a recommendation that the two-major-wars strategy be replaced with that of preparing for one major war and a host of more limited defenses overseas and at home to combat enemies who will not challenge superior conventional armaments but will utilize "asymmetrical" NBC weapons, terrorism, information warfare. We've converted the Executive Summary to HTML: http://jya.com/ndp-pr.htm And a section on "Homeland Defense" which proposes a role for military forces to "protect against all enemies foreign and domestic" by providing intelligence, training, equipment and other aid to justice and law enforcement. http://jya.com/home-def.htm As noted in the NYT today, the report asks for a shakeup in intelligence, with renewed emphasis on training human spies to compensate for what technology cannot do. Along that line, the NYT also reports today on a huge Libyan deeply-buried pipeline system under construction which is suspected of being a distribution system for troops and equipment as well as CB weapons, placed underground to escape satellite spies. The report is based on descriptions of engineers and corporations working on the project. One feature of the NDP report, as well as other closed defense panel meetings, is the need for weapons to attack underground structures -- like those vast catcombs in Lybia and North Korea, and the US for that matter -- Cheyenne Mountain is still being re-hardened regularly, and its electronics re-Tempested, not that the local skinheads will not find a way to hack the bunker as trusted EEs and sys admins.

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Network Associates Announcement!!!
by Network Associates, Inc. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~ NETWORK ASSOCIATES ANNOUNCEMENT ------------------------------- Network Associates, Inc., is proud to announce that we have named TruthMonger<toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> our Chief Director of Security, adding his (or her) immense reputation capital to our already respected corporate image. No communications purporting to be from Network Associates, Inc., should be considered valid unless signed by the key provided below. TruthMonger is also authorized to accept payment, in cash only, of any money due to Network Associates, Inc., and all of our subsiduaries, at the following address: NETA c/o TruthMonger Box 281, Bienfait, Saskatchewan CANADA S0C 0M0 Network Associates, Inc., plans to use TruthMonger's extensive key-forging experience to help make digital signatures basically meaningless, in order to help lessen the potential legal and/or criminal repercussions of any future Key Escrow legislation. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 Comment: "I Broke PGP!" mQGiBDSEmSYRBADgXaNjJkY7NmVjhXJGg0+8Sua4oYJ+tkG959T1lYFsCLVity0V fRH6ygoHaRe/YiXxqQnbXyt3Fo6oF8MdXDWLMTkpR1NZn5kIcUnDrGv6G3Y+bW8j fHy79JjX17OPPJS5FLIaATubngiRNJMwpn34cQIM812iDgUfrdxiFUQSwQCg/6ju lTyy+oFaxBTTUsBlYbkhDpUD/2PxF1JN53oHiCZb62PXoVE/QfN7i+ABpR0PW5jC TiaQwh7jEbVctYnzhSPjccUJSQ+XEwTbjrCS4xYftoIlkRsVSzbFcRIbelDP7kQw GM2UExhsHVNhpsq+benT7LfcFnACYYu6GjMIY+v3CfJYidJ94DN3E5D60Q+UEz/M sTEUBAC8h94Xk1l8IsItOPNbj8k0o7yfll8cqKHbe1CpSUBS6nZ0kwBq5WONkptx O4zBOsxlf/WnVo6C5ojgB2TeFWZoXj98X7S4QaVvHM3YFJuIHLw8gcS3HHahLphh bKGlffWF3FfQCJr2Rd6fk2SeZp2TZoCqLKt8UMwxbGjQa39dD7QvTmV0d29yayBB c3NvY2lhdGVzLCBJbmMuIDx0b3RvQHNrLnN5bXBhdGljby5jYT6JAGMEEBECACMF AjSEmSYXCgARh4SIT1mMRHX7HCWvKiZqcerSJDgECwMBAgAKCRA314vi4fVSmhyZ AJ9M8SPYgr4apBO0PAJwjg2bQDcvrACdF2vW+SsVL4r3EMP2vlHfZ0fSinKJAKAE EAEBAAoFAjSEmqUDBQF4AAoJEJ8TeU28wEKx7rED/2dajEBpvE/KtSUW9CbSPKyr 3rzULey4iBHOcrPqSgD7z6iXAs16O6sBWclrr30IJ/IdJ5kaTsNXjcmny2GpMUSq 1jbf3quenBIN6zkZLx08ZRPyHjdlmS7/PSOkvI7gKe3NLRjJ9QImytY1uLoAIHjO iFXLyTq2kGW/fMK85g4QuQQNBDSEmSsQEAD5GKB+WgZhekOQldwFbIeG7GHszUUf Dtjgo3nGydx6C6zkP+NGlLYwSlPXfAIWSIC1FeUpmamfB3TT/+OhxZYgTphluNgN 7hBdq7YXHFHYUMoiV0MpvpXoVis4eFwL2/hMTdXjqkbM+84X6CqdFGHjhKlP0YOE qHm274+nQ0YIxswdd1ckOErixPDojhNnl06SE2H22+slDhf99pj3yHx5sHIdOHX7 9sFzxIMRJitDYMPj6NYK/aEoJguuqa6zZQ+iAFMBoHzWq6MSHvoPKs4fdIRPyvMX 86RA6dfSd7ZCLQI2wSbLaF6dfJgJCo1+Le3kXXn11JJPmxiO/CqnS3wy9kJXtwh/ CBdyorrWqULzBej5UxE5T7bxbrlLOCDaAadWoxTpj0BV89AHxstDqZSt90xkhkn4 DIO9ZekX1KHTUPj1WV/cdlJPPT2N286Z4VeSWc39uK50T8X8dryDxUcwYc58yWb/ Ffm7/ZFexwGq01uejaClcjrUGvC/RgBYK+X0iP1YTknbzSC0neSRBzZrM2w4DUUd D3yIsxx8Wy2O9vPJI8BD8KVbGI2Ou1WMuF040zT9fBdXQ6MdGGzeMyEstSr/POGx KUAYEY18hKcKctaGxAMZyAcpesqVDNmWn6vQClCbAkbTCD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkm uquiXsNV6z3WFwACAg/+McnUlkw0KkNcBxN0w/mvo7/2QcEWXyfXiqpIcGj/DytA l0nh77hd+RPPqqXQHgkp56hPpp7nK8gAZnkxJcycOYMbPIgKvAGi9gQO7bd2oth7 TWUlfimTIYPrscLJNn/HQ5nA8mU28Ajq/Zlq/0XhpsQiRH5Ygr2IW1tldrrgiOho pYHsdPOkxZaPIHFKIqt6l/GtBnPA6+KYul53pfBt4DTPSk02RYsD9u/pqoJ/oEYW BrO/FzsKXzpIJxWCNvVm8GlakEw2isZ9zT4H5KRqhRLc9+SyeupF5ztosZKNs0dn nGaWVrCjx28G86xVnONi6fntGzL57Pb5JRvyrAbFDEXfL9rUrgLFx78LY4fSavP8 caB3IkQomuXZezQGusy4LMhna0ZYNioHyFzZU2DYU0EcuG8qrz+sKEIaYIpCiBPq IohclEgsA9ygaPjefiTpCEb07gGGD0rh6aRYpaQGCd8sSWIqm8IWql+ePkqwVWR8 WHyZWH6STvUQsZCE1GhJQqyai4i6KnVNrYzYF2UinP7d5AYUsaRGypdHsFDx9Yhg YC5OFsR0BXnz9bm3tn3SSoVDp7b9Xo9V3FpiQ+9ZgjXD2eEbWumv/upoVu2ekbiK CM4Dt3OoBPQBpkFan5FqCSY7255yCPU9YzQ7mmEpFWvfbSNR/Cls+ZT2GR7T1nOJ AEYEGBECAAYFAjSEmSsACgkQN9eL4uH1UpoCiACgnAXXUm5yyak30HJL1FeYdh0B xekAnA/VnnGkzVY1kQRQNpWQXdHdpL5F =3BX/ -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Minsky skeptical of privacy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Monty Cantsin wrote: >>Incidentally, does anybody know what percentage of the research >>funding Marvin Minsky has used in his career was directly or >>indirectly related to the defense establishment? >> >>The interesting thing about the privacy "debate" is that there is an >>exceptionally high correlation between opposition to privacy and the >>consumption of public money. > >Monty's customary reasonableness goes bizarro with these statements. > >In that direct or indirect defense funding implicates just about >every US citizen, even world denizen, not holed up in a treetop for >the last half century of national security octopussing. Sore nerve in a glass house, eh? Charming Minsky still does a Denning. Trillion dollar pork barrel: some gives, some takes. Not both. Every rat pulls the lever, gets the pellet. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Minsky skeptical of privacy To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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Cantsin Protocol No. 2
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> wrote: >Monty Cantsin writes: >> You can't see it up here, but this is a signed message using a >> protocol which is modestly titled "Cantsin Protocol No. 1". >> Suggestions for improvement are most welcome. > >A very interesting idea! Please consider the following suggestions >if you like, or feel free to ignore them. Your suggestions were very helpful. Thank you for making them! I'm calling the latest version "Cantsin Protocol No.2" and its identifying number is "25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3". It is similar to Cantsin Protocol No. 1, but the bug with the hash of the public key is fixed. Instead of concatenating the values p, g, and y, you concatenate "p:<p> g:<g> y:<y>" and compute the hash. p, g, and y should be represented as ASCII hexadecimal digits without leading 0s. The hashes should now be correct SHA1 hashes. >One problem with signatures which have no indication at the top is >that two passes over the data are necessary: the first to scan and >find the start-of-signature indicator, and another to go back and >calculate the hash. Signatures such as S/MIME and PGP have enough >information at the top of the signed message to allow one pass >processing. My thinking on this is that passes are cheap these days. I want the signature to be unobtrusive which probably can't be done if only one pass is required. Incidentally, a nice feature of these signatures is that they can be moved around in the file just by changing the offset. You don't need to control the secret key to do it. >> The first line is "16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin >> Protocol No. 1]". The hexadecimal number was chosen randomly and >> is the indicator that this is a Cantsin Protocol No. 1 signature. >> The number was chosen randomly and it is somewhat unlikely that >> anybody else will accidently choose it. > >You might want to think about what happens if the document itself >contains (maliciously, or perhaps because it is talking about your >signatures) the string in question (as yours does and this one does >as well). This could throw off an automated signature checker. The signature checker should ignore bad or incomplete signatures. I would consider this to be a bug in the software and not a bug in the protocol. A bad signature simply lacks meaning and an error message need not be reported. That might seem a little callous, but actually it's how we should regard signatures. The current model seems to be "computer, check the signature on this file and tell me if it's good", whereas the correct (in my view) model is, "computer, extract all of the material from this file which is properly signed and throw out the rest." (Of course, you could imagine a smart editor which highlighted the areas of a document which were signed by various parties. It seems a little early to implement this.) If it's not authenticated, you shouldn't even look at it. I've taken to putting the To: and Subject: header lines at the bottom of my messages for this purpose. There's really no need to keep any of the header fields. The header fields can be put at the end just as unambiguously as at the beginning, but at the end they can be signed. >> The second line in the signature is an SHA1 hash of the public key. >> The hash is computed on the concatenation of the hexadecimal ASCII >> forms of p, g, and y respectively. There should be no leading zeros. >> (Remember to leave off the newline!) > >Presumably you could use the key hash to look up the key to use for >verifying the message. Strictly speaking it's there to save space. If we put the public key components in every signature it wouldn't be much harder for the key management software to compute a hash on them somehow. This does not have to be standardized. >This has a mild denial of service attack. Someone else could create >a key with different boundaries between p, g, and y but which would >create the same string as this concatenation, and therefore the same >hash. If you left the "p: ", "g: ", and "y: " in place it would >prevent this. PGP's key fingerprints have had the same problem. ACK! I knew about this problem, but I couldn't remember exactly how it worked. So I said, "Monty, let's not be dumb like those PGP guys. Let's concatenate the keys together and compute the hash. Nobody will ever..." Thank you very much for pointing this out. >> The fourth line contains an offset and a length to specify the area >> of the text which is signed. The offset is relative to the >> signature itself. That is, the first character of the Cantsin >> Protocol No. 1 code is at position 0. As signatures are usually >> appended, the offset will usually be the additive inverse of the >> length. > >It is intriguing that this can be used to sign a subset of the text. >Presumably there could be multiple signature blocks each of which >signed different subsets, possibly with different keys. One problem >is that it is not obvious to the human reader what part of the text >is signed. A nice effect with PGP and S/MIME signatures is that even >readers who don't have the tools can have some slight confidence in >signatures, because other readers will often report it when >signatures don't verify. With a signature that only covers a portion >of the text, people might assume that if there are no reports of >failure, more of the text is signed than is the case. This is not a >technical problem but is a social phenomenon which may not interact >well with this signature format. People who want this feature should type something like "BEGIN CANTSIN PROTOCOL NO. 2" and "END CANTSIN PROTOCOL NO. 2" into the text at the right points. >You need to specify a canonical line ending format. Based on the >count values in your document, it appears that you are counting line >terminators as being one character long. Your count value of 1CB9 >corresponds to decimal 7353, there are exactly 7353 characters from >the first character of your message body to the beginning of your >signature magic number, if line ends are one character. > >The specific characters for line endings need to be specified as well >for the hash to be calculated consistently. Your hash appears to be >calculated with LF as the line ending (although the hash program is >broken, see below). Probably CR/LF would be preferable for the line >endings as that is a widely used internet standard as well as being >common on windows. My feeling on this is that this is outside the scope of a signature protocol. The protocol should not make any assumptions about what is being signed nor should it modify what is being signed. I use LF to terminate lines and would recommend this to others, but it is not part of the Cantsin Protocol No. 2 specification. In any event, if we must put in patches to handle the poor fidelity of electronic mail, the patches should go in afterwards. When a signature checking program finds ">From" it should replace it with "From" and see if it can get the right checksum. Likewise, it should try the various line endings until it gets a match. There can't be more than about 12 variants, so this shouldn't create an onerous burden on the machine. (And, I suppose, it would be possible to add a field after the length or after the hash which made a suggestion about the line ending.) >> You also need to be able to compute SHA1 hashes. I've been using >> something called "sha1file" which, I believe, originated at Adam >> Back's web site. > >That program has a bug. The routine SHA1_update in the file sha1.c >is missing a line: > > CENSORED BY THE UNITED ST > A > TES GOVERNMENT CENSORED BY THE UNITED STATES > GOVERNMENT CENSORED B > Y THE UNITED STATES GOVERN > MENT CENSORED BY THE UNITED > STATES GOVERNMEN > T CENSORED BY TH >*** E UNITED STA *** MISSING *** > T > >Correcting this will make your hashes be correct. Another great suggestion. The hashes should be correct now. Incidentally, in another thread I've been talking about partial signatures. The code above is an example of where this would be useful. In some countries we are not allowed to express ourselves freely without persecution. If I wanted to provably quote somebody who included forbidden ideas in their message, it wouldn't be possible without partial signatures. >> El Gamal is simple enough that the signature on this message can be >> checked using standard Unix tools such as dc version 1.1. Let's >> say M is the SHA1 hash of the message. It is checked by verifying >> the truth of this equation: (y^a * a^b) mod p = g^M mod p. > >El Gamal is a rather lengthy signature, although the verification >equation is relatively simple. DSS has a shorter signature. This might be a good thing to add to a later Cantsin Protocol. >There are some subtleties to choosing El Gamal keys, but with the >2048 bit values you have chosen you are pretty safe. Schneier doesn't mention this, although presumably this information will show up in one of his references. Do you know offhand of a published source which covers this? >Also, you can't really justify using 2048 bit keys when your hash is >only 160 bits. The hash becomes the weak link for keys beyond about >1024 bits, and unless you use a stronger hash your key strength is >misleading. This is why DSS is only specified up to 1024 bits. This is just intuition, isn't it? Since we really don't know how hard it is to factor it seems hard to claim we know the ratio of difficulty between breaking SHA1 and El Gamal. Factoring could be broken before SHA1. Not that any great science was applied to the choice of a 2048 bit prime, it just seemed like a good size. ;-) Also, I think it is a mistake for people to communicate the strength of a system by choosing various key lengths based on general popular views. It's probably better to say "I estimate this system requires at least 2^x operations to break." We've seen this with people choosing short keys so nobody will get the idea that it is secure. This just seems all wrong to me. The key length is only one way in which a key could be insecure. Monty Cantsin's authentication key, for example, is not kept very securely. But, the way to communicate that is to say "this key is not kept all that securely." However, in Cantsin Protocol No. 2 the size of the prime chosen is completely unspecified. There doesn't seem to be a reason to restrict the choice other people will make regarding the length of the prime. I could imagine choosing a short key for control over a semi-persistent identity. The advantage is that you can claim somebody else brute forced the key for statements you wish to repudiate. Similarly, I could imagine choosing an obnoxiously long key to make it hard for people who don't have super fast machines to associate with you. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Cantsin Protocol No. 2 To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No. 2] 94C43229A76383D818D39952F7A41ACA0394C6FE C602F22D31BBC6245643E58AD8EB260B58DC1250 -2B49 2B49 CEDDBC793332877C29C3BF084DDD8DE8113E6C80E13995BCAFACE2E7D719194A8CAEB987D2DAC013204F1A2909B1FADCB7EFE39F0F764B140CA5711D057B4EF1EF880ACAF1FF19FB5E92E4A8E4F1CE4B0F18CBB37274629EDACFF412C5A971C20869A956497491F41F3D0E7791F85E18ED638B0552A275CF2F24002646084CB3BCF0AE52A38826D1D986CBE460B793836291326C3636A452B54A79DE949CB6A12FD1852D9FC438D6D7E63989CC031161B8872E1EE60D0C4521FCF7096B98E1DEF560432314258359370763BCE5D3D4610B097DC68C1EDCD1F3D5084069C74191C798383C3BF822EC97DE84531B20ECCB36B13EC9153252C88FFAFE71CD65B197 AFC25A731FAD9BB9A373B7D9972EA9CED870CC6FDACE0B2A2AEAC4F0C33115B15E689CBF943B757F8690C945CC1CB29E4F86276EB0643E215ADB92CEFE1394DD8320DDF703D4212EFEFA59081C21BBD2ED6282304D2DB496735BBCB3E5B802C2B78037EC041DDD8BBC1E4712CF18E56237E5BCDB37127F538BEF1E0038949B42F88140E608F02282570388D07785841069FD76EFC78E170E12DC1CF6570E7D67603707E15717704EBF8DE50014141DC8F8C80432333B5647B176093A45834F4460BDD2465306AE56156EFE1D0686F0FB4F7743CED116F47121EB4970B4CFDBEC6E56E90AADAA97836E95F3723B3216E99EC9FDE324943AFF6F257880423DFCE7

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Re: Freemen and Serfs
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous <nobody(a)REPLAY.COM> wrote: >This model of "sheeple" doomed to slavery while cypherpunks >comfortably live independent of the state is even less plausible than >the original idea of crypto anarchy. It appeals to our elitist >instincts and makes us feel comfortably superior, but it has little >connection to reality. If elitism had been intended, the subject would have been "Lords and Serfs". Freemen are more like people with some rights, some property, and some skills, but who are not serfs. >This idea overlooks the "fax effect", where the value of a technology >rises in proportion to the number of people who use it. Cypherpunks >will have to set up a virtual Galt's Gulch, trading only with >themselves, and unlike in Rand's fantasy the limitations of such an >economy will soon be apparent. Early cypherpunk experiments like >"Magic Money" showed how pointless a virtual cypherpunk bank would >be. Cypherpunks should be able to provide services which slavers and others want. This could be code. It could be expertise. It could be connections. Whatever. The slavers have things to offer cypherpunks, whether it's food, construction work, hardware, etc. Whatever the medium used to trade these services, there is no reason why the slavers would forego the services they may want. Assuming that the Freemen aren't agitating on behalf of the slaves, that is. We don't need all the slavers to deal, nor do all cypherpunks have to deal with all slavers. Just some members of both groups need to get together and trade. >In an increasingly interdependent world economy, the only hope for >cypherpunk technologies to succeed is to extend them as far as >possible throughout society. Standard doctrine, but I no longer believe it is sound. We've been at it for years now. Are the masses using crypto? I didn't think so. It's a waste of time to sell to people who think they "have nothing to hide". Even if they were using crypto, they would accept snoopware if it were accompanied with the right media programming. Which means that instead of proselytizing, it's probably better to develop systems which we can use which are expensive-to-impossible to thwart even in hostile environments. There's no need to turn people away, of course, but begging people to help themselves is a poor investment. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Freemen and Serfs To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A ghost speaking through the medium replay.com communicated: >Everyone likes to overlook this, pretending that May didn't mean it. >Well, he never withdrew it, did he? He never apologized for it. >He's on the record as explicitly calling for the murder of high >officials. > >And of course May further revealed his true colors with this horror, >from the same message: > >> Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the >> right thing. Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken >> eggs and all that. > >May's apologists have tried to pretend that he didn't say this, that >he said that he was beginning to understand McVeigh, or something. >That's not what he says here. He says he is becoming convinced that >McVeigh did the right thing in murdering all those people. Whether we like it or not, many people are sympathetic with McVeigh. Some are considering whether actions like bombing Federal buildings are justified. It's far far better that these issues are raised and discussed. >He callously compares the shattered bodies of the children and other >innocent victims to broken eggshells. Monty Cantsin has provided us >a moving description of the painful deaths of the children in Waco. >Will dying of asphyxiation under pressure too great even to draw a >breath be any easier? You've hit upon something interesting here, Anonymous. Let's consider three groups of children. 1. ~100,000 children harmed in Iraq. 2. ~40 children harmed in Oklahoma City. 3. ~20 children harmed outside Waco. Of these three groups, the third upsets me the most. Why? There are several factors. One is the extent to which the people committing the actions claim to represent me. It is often claimed and widely believed that the Federal government is acting as a representative for and is answerable to the American people. (Allow Monty Cantsin a hollow laugh here.) That being the case, Waco is far more upsetting than Oklahoma City in this regard because McVeigh (or whomever) is not thought to represent a sizeable proportion of the American public. In the case of Iraq, this factor raises my concern well above other places in the world where children are mistreated. Of the three groups of victims, I identify most strongly with the people in Waco. While not strongly religious myself, I respect people who have unusual beliefs and stick to them. And I have sympathy for those who might live in unusual ways. While I share a culture with the victims in Oklahoma City, in general we would have little to say to each other. I don't know anything about people in Iraq. This factor probably governs my feelings on the matter most strongly. The motivations of the people committing the acts are important. I do not believe that McVeigh (accepting the standard paradigm) meant to kill children. He certainly meant to kill people who had no involvement with Waco. I do not approve of his choice. I would maybe even kill somebody to prevent it from happening. But, one feels differently when children die more or less by accident than when it is cold bloodedly premeditated. In the case of Iraq, it is extremely hard to justify killing kids for their oil. The provocation that leads to an act must also be considered. I am extremely sympathetic with McVeigh's desire to do something about Waco, even though I do things less violent and (hopefully) more effective. There was no reason whatsoever for the Waco crime to be committed, likewise people living in the Middle East have not really committed any provocative act more serious than having oil on their land. The mob mentality that seems to have gripped the United States during the Waco atrocity has a particular horror which is absent in the case of Oklahoma City and, right now anyway, mostly absent with Iraq. The blatant misrepresentation of what was occurring and the degree to which people were compliant with it is shocking. There was no serious attempt to investigate the motivation behind the raid, or even what was actually occurring from day to day. The aftermath was even more horrifying. The government attacks and murders ~80 innocent people in the most brutal way for no identifiable reason. And all anybody can seem to do is to try to protect the establishment, instead of finding out exactly what happened, instead of charging the criminals who perpetrated the horror, instead of taking the necessary actions to make sure nothing like this will ever be done again by the Federal government, and instead of telling the truth. The implications of the three situations create varying degrees of alarm. I do not expect to see many more bombings. Bombs are nothing new. They've been around for over 100 years and they are a manageable problem. Every few decades there's been a big explosion. It is unlikely McVeigh will do something like this again. In the case of Iraq, I'm used to governments behaving this way and I do not see it directly affecting me very soon. (Perhaps this is a bit insensitive.) Waco, however, is quite another matter. When you watch the footage it gives you the creeps because what is being reported belongs in the 1940s and the people should be speaking German. Instead, everybody speaks English with an American accent and it's happening right now. When you see an FBI agent justify what happened on the grounds that he goes to a "normal" church and has a "normal" family, and when you see other officials state that they wanted to harm the children to encourage the parents to turn themselves in, the implications are that we have a very serious problem that will not go away by itself. Finally, in the case of Waco, the people in charge had all the time in the world to think very carefully about what they were doing. They apparently decided to kill everybody they could, including particular children whose names they knew, whose pictures they had seen, and some of whom they may have even spoken to on the telephone. This really is hard for me to understand. I can't imagine what kind of person can do something like this. This horror is particular to Waco. In the case of McVeigh and the people making policy regarding Iraq, the victims are at least anonymous. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution? To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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