December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Jon Callas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I have a number of comments about the New York Times article on PGP 5.5 for Business of which Martin Minow sent a synopsis. If we had built what they said we had, then we'd deserve of all the derision people have directed at us. But we didn't. The New York Times got it flat wrong. I'll describe what we built, how it works, and its limitations. But first, some background on the problem we're trying to solve in PGP 5.5. A couple of years ago, the government sugarcoated their surveillance plans by switching from "key escrow" to "key recovery," and trying to sell surveillance to people by pointing out some of the downsides of strong cryptography, and selling key recovery as the way around them. One of the downsides of cryptography is that if you lose your passphrase (or token, PIN, smart card, or whatever), you've lost your data. My favorite way of expressing this problem is, "if you lose the keys to your car, then you have to get a new car." This downside is particularly insidious for a number of reasons. First, without fixing that problem, strong cryptography will be in some sort of limbo. You want to use it to protect your valuable information, but you won't want to use it for any information that's *too* valuable, because it's easily lost. Crypto-protected information is fragile, and this fragility could hurt its widespread deployment. Worse, this gives the government a rationale for regulating cryptography. Like it or not, government has a mandate to protect the people from dangerous technologies, be they in foods, drugs, autos, or information technologies. Many people believe that the government uses this mandate as a rationale for acquiring power, many people would prefer that they let us take our chances, but that's not germane to this discussion. It *is* germane to note that when you hear some ham-fisted remark about how surveillance is like air bags, they are saying: they have to protect people from dangerous things, crypto is dangerous, therefore they have to protect people from crypto. When they started mumbling along these lines, the privacy community got their own act together and started describing what we believe to be the real solution. This is called "data recovery." The first time I heard the term, I hated it. I still hate it. The reason I hate it is that it's got the word "recovery" in it, which makes it sound to someone who isn't paying a lot of attention that all recovery systems are basically the same thing. Most of the people in the world don't pay a lot of attention most of the time. When I was at HIP97 this August, I was amused to hear cypherpunks chanting, "Data recovery good, key recovery bad." The sublimely Orwellian tone of this mantra makes me laugh and cringe at the same time. (To explain the reference, in Orwell's "Animal Farm," there's a revolution in the farm and the animals take over, run by the pigs. One of the slogans they have is "four legs good, two legs bad." By the end of the book, the pigs are nigh indistinguishable from the people. But I digress.) The essence of data recovery is that focusing on the keys is a canard. If you've misplaced your data, you want the data back, not the keys. The only people who want your keys are people who want to spy on you. If you've locked yourself out of your car, you want the use of your car, not the just the key. Thus, the solution to encrypted data being fragile is to let people get to the data. Simple, obvious, but subtle, because the key to getting the data is the key. If you don't like data recovery, you aren't going to like what we did in PGP 5.5 -- we built a data recovery system. Some people aren't going to like it, and some of those will think this missive is a load of self-serving twaddle. Myself, it gives me the same mildly uncomfortable feeling that fake rocks for spare keys do, or skeleton keys do, financial audits, or any other similar technology. Uncomfortable feelings aside, if the fragility problem is not solved, then many people who should be using crypto won't, and government will continue to view this problem as a question of public safety, and thus in their mandate to regulate. Data recovery is useful for a number of things. Perhaps you lost your passphrase. Or data might have been encrypted by an employee or co worker who was in an accident. (As an aside, fifteen years ago, the architect of a product I worked on was in a severe car wreck. He was not killed, but suffered brain damage and has never returned to work.) Your spouse might need access to financial records. Everyone, be they an individual, business, or coporation has a right to having their data protected, and protection not only means being able to put it into a safe, but getting it out of that safe later. What makes data recovery different from key recovery? In my opinion, data recovery allows you to get encrypted data without compromising the key of the person who encrypted it. Data is property, and keys are property. An ethically built system allows emergency access to data without destroying the property of the key owner. Ethically built data recovery software has a number of properties: (1) It is surveillance-surly. It should be impossible or unwieldy for an adversary, be they government (yours or foreign), dirtballs (such as crackers), business competitors (who sometimes count as dirtballs), or others to use this against you. The system should also be aware of how passive surveillance (like traffic analysis) interacts with it. (2) It is an "opt-in" system. Users must consent to it, and must take some action to start using it. It should be as easy as possible to stop using the system. The system must also allow someone who does not opt in to use all the system's features. Please note that abuses of consent (for example, an employer who says, "consent or we fire you") are something we can't prevent in any system. (3) It must obey the principle of fair warning. If you send me a message that is subject to data recovery, you should know that before sending the message. This way, if you don't agree with my policy, you can decide not to send me that message. This interacts closely with the opt-in principle above. (4) The data recovery system should be preferable to an escrow system. A number of corporations who use PGP keep copies of their employees' secret keys. This is both odious and dangerous. Escrowed keys are a target for attackers, subpoena-bait, and potentially ruin the value of digital signatures. It's just bad policy. (5) The system has to allow someone under a legal threat to respond effectively to that threat. Legal threats include warrants, subpoenas, and discovery processes. You have to be able to respond to the request for information without losing your keys and thus all of your data. (6) It must also provide a response to those who would regulate crypto in the name of public safety. Fortunately for us, potential regulators have focused on the horsemen of the infocalyse. There are other pseudo-public-welfare threats including the rights of a person to their spouse's records, or the rights of heirs to information property. We, the people who design privacy systems, have to think about what happens when the regulators stop dragging out the pornographers and start dragging out the poor widows and orphans. Note that these requirements are not completely consistent with each other. For example, an opt-in system is riskier than an opt-out system, yet friendlier to one's own privacy. Balancing these requirements is part of the difficulty of good software design. If you have been skimming the above, wondering when I'm going to get around to actually telling you what we did in PGP 5.5, this is it. With PGP 5, there are a number of attributes of your key that are stored in a self-signature. For example, your preferred symmetric algorithms are stored in your self-signature. The data recovery feature -- which we call "Corporate Message Recovery" -- is an attribute in your self-signature that tells anyone who receives your key that you want messages encrypted to you to also be encrypted to that other key. There is also a flag that tells the encryptor, "please" or "I insist." Architecturally, there can even be more than one recovery key. That's it. That's all it is. Well, that's mostly all it is. There are other bits of the system. For example, if I look up Alice's key on a key server and Alice has a recovery key, I get Alice's recovery key, too. If Alice's recovery key is a "please use" key, then I can encrypt to Alice alone. In any case, the PGP software tells me that Alice has a recovery key, so I can decide to use some other mechanism to talk to her. Note that design satisfies the opt-in and fair-warning requirements. Also, since Alice's recovery key is an attribute of her self-signature, she can change it. She can even have a second user name (let's call it Bob), that has no recovery key. Also, we have three encryption products: PGP freeware, PGP for Personal Privacy, and PGP for Business Security. Corporate Message Recovery is included *only* in PGP for Business Security. It is not, and never will be, in either the freeware or the Personal Privacy product. It is an extra cost item that we created for businesses as per their requirements. As I stated above, a number of these businesses keep copies of their employees' secret keys. One of the reasons we created this feature is to satisfy their requirements with some mechanism that is less blunt than key escrow. When a PGP message is formed, there are a number of "packets" that make up the message. The usual construction is that there is a "session key" packet for each public key that the message is to be read by. Following that is the actual message packet, that is encrypted with a symmetric cypher to session key. The session key packets specify the *key*, by its 64-bit key ID. This is an important and subtle point. Let's go back to Alice, a.k.a. Bob. The information that specifies a recovery key is in a self-signature of a user name, but the session key specifies a public key by keyID. It is impossible, solely from looking at a message, to know if it is addressed to Alice or Bob because that information is not stored in the message. A message that does not honor recovery is syntactically correct. I don't know why Bruce Schneier said that this is everything the FBI wants. If it is, then they have changed spots! One of the major ways PGP's system differs from anything else I've seen is that it has no enforcement built into the protocol. This helps make PGP surveillance-surly, with or without Corporate Message Recovery. If this is all the FBI needs, then they've decided the way to get your files is to knock on your door with a warrant, and that's a big, big, big step forward. Getting back to the system, I'm sure you've noticed a gotcha there. If I mail Alice a message that I encrypted to Bob, she can decrypt it, but the recovery key can't. If you've been paying very close attention, you have wondered something akin to, "hmm, if Alice's key accidentally lost its self-signature, there would be no way to encrypt to her recovery key." You're right. If Alice really wants recovery on messages sent to her, then she has to use our SMTP Policy Management Agent. The policy management agent is an SMTP proxy. You can configure it to do a number of things. Most relevant to this discussion is that Alice can use the policy agent to require that her recovery key gets used. However, the policy agent does *not* decrypt the message. One of the very good features of Business PGP is that it does not decrypt the message. It does not prevent or even try to prevent multiple-encryption. It's really, really easy to encrypt a message to Alice alone, and then encrypt that message to both Alice and her recovery key. We're not going to change that. Nor does the policy management agent archive messages, make copies, notify your mother, or any of the other things we've been accused of doing with it. It's simply the gatekeeper that enforces Alice's corporate policy. To sum up, we created the Corporate Mesage Recovery feature to satisfy the requirements of our customers who need emergency access to data. We made careful decisions to make it useful and effective for honest people, while minimizing its potential for abuse. No one has to use it; we do not include it with PGP freeware, nor with PGP for Personal Privacy. We alert all users of all products when they encrypt to someone who has a message recovery key. It is an opt-in system that you can opt out of. It is not a surveillance system. A few weeks ago, we showed it to the FBI and asked their opinion. They told us it doesn't meet any of their needs. - - ------ Jon Callas jon(a)pgp.com Chief Scientist 555 Twin Dolphin Drive Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Suite 570 (415) 596-1960 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Fingerprints: D1EC 3C51 FCB1 67F8 4345 4A04 7DF9 C2E6 F129 27A9 (DSS) 665B 797F 37D1 C240 53AC 6D87 3A60 4628 (RSA) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBNDqoyn35wubxKSepEQJ9FQCfQcaS8aWdXcTZild0nKe5+LatDRsAnA5n GTIb2dYUx4+Uh/Frim2hKFuF =4u2g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- Jon Callas jon(a)pgp.com Chief Scientist 555 Twin Dolphin Drive Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Suite 570 (415) 596-1960 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Fingerprints: D1EC 3C51 FCB1 67F8 4345 4A04 7DF9 C2E6 F129 27A9 (DSS) 665B 797F 37D1 C240 53AC 6D87 3A60 4628 (RSA)

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Nader Letter to Bill Gates
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yet another spit take arrives in the e-mail. This seems to be another great week for hilarity... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 7 Oct 1997 13:21:43 -0400 (EDT) Reply-To: love(a)cptech.org Originator: info-policy-notes(a)essential.org Sender: info-policy-notes(a)essential.org Precedence: bulk From: James Love <love(a)cptech.org> To: Multiple recipients of list <info-policy-notes(a)essential.org> Subject: Nader Letter to Bill Gates MIME-Version: 1.0 The following in Ralph Nader's letter to Bill Gates, inviting him to Ralph's November 13, 14 conference on Apprasising Microsoft's Global Stategy. Jamie ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Ralph Nader P.O. Box 19312 Washington, D.C. 20036 October 2, 1997 Mr. William H. Gates Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Microsoft Corporation 1 Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 Dear Mr. Gates: The customary executive mind receiving a letter such as this would be inclined toward prejudgment and denial, instead of anticipation and affirmation. But as a dominant corporate architect and philosopher of the information highway--note your expressed desire in your book, The Road Ahead, to open the dialogue about how society should shape its future in an age of tremendous technological change--you should be willing to include in that dialogue--Appraising Microsoft and Its Global Strategy. That, as it happens, is the title of a conference in Washington, D.C. on November 13 and 14, which Essential Information and I are sponsoring and to which you are invited to make a presentation. Let me describe briefly what has led to this unique event. As you may know, our various groups work in the consumer safety and environmental protection areas with a dual focus on both corporate and government accountability. We also have been pioneers in advancing freedom of information standards in government and widening the access to justice by all citizens. Concentration of economic power, along with its abuses, has long been a concern of ours and we have worked with many people of conscience inside companies, some of whom became effective whistle-blowers. Recently, people in many different kinds of businesses have been expressing fear and criticism about your company's business practices and strategies. At first, we were prone to dismissing such complaints as reflecting envy toward the dominant company. But as the private criticism became more diverse--flowing from downstream commerce well beyond software and hardware companies and from more disinterested scholars, commentators, writers, public officials and customers, it became an incentive toward further public exploration. Even this accumulated criticism did not suffice to warrant a gathering to explicitly explore the many forays and practices of your company's business strategies, which you must agree, have a range of ambitions and ongoing initiatives in more industrial and commercial directions locally to globally than possibly any business entity in modern history. What tipped the scale was the fear of speaking out by thoughtful people in the business world who otherwise have the position, energy and the resources to do so. Self-censorship brought on by the detailed fear of Microsoft retaliation--itself seen as a many pronged cluster--is not healthy in any economy. Especially when this fear is not imagined but rooted in past and current actions which are described and attributed to your company's high velocity momentum. On the other hand, you and your associates are described as so fearful of becoming another Digital Equipment or IBM missing a "big bend in the road", as you put it, that you are moving to position yourself as the "new middleman" on every lane of the information highway possible. To some observers, Microsoft playing the insecure and challenged role, as depicted in an article you may have relished on the cover of Barron's (September 15, 1997), assumes an irony of King Kong proportions. Seasoned executives are quaking before the relentless Microsoft wave in such lines of commerce as banking, real estate, insurance, car dealers, travel services, cable television, newspaper media and entertainment. The June 5, 1997 issue of the Wall Street Journal reported a detailed Microsoft strategy memorandum, deepened by interviews with your executives, that foreshadowed the "first a partner then a competitor" approach. Your critics assert that using a bundling strategy, together with tactical free offerings, made possible by monopolistically garnered profits, and a punitive "stick" response to your challengers makes Microsoft a leading candidate for antitrust action if only the enforcement agencies had the up-to-date knowledge, willpower and resources to apply these necessary laws for a free, fair and competitive economy. The conference participants are among the few who are still willing to speak openly of their concerns, findings and recommendations. Many plead for an open, not closed, architecture, for a digital future that is a patrimony, a commonwealth within which the best and the most consumer-sensitive will have an opportunity to prevail. They seek an information highway that is ungated where they see such a highway increasingly become gated. You, Steve Ballmer and Nathan Myhrvold have what you believe to be formidable responses to these declarations. Responses that are both specific and that rise to the level of national public policy regarding the information infrastructure in the economy. Focusing on the "Big Kid on the Block"--Microsoft--addresses the core concern directly and avoids the nuanced generalities and abstractions that have no operational realities attached to them. The agenda for the conference is being completed and includes the enclosed topics with the speakers who have confirmed their presence. Other presenters will be added in the coming days. In the interest of joining the issues, your presentation should come near the completion of the conference on November 14. We intend to have a serious, coherent and consequential conference that will lead to greater public understanding of the trends and the issues that will affect business and the general public as you wrote about in The Road Ahead. Your industry is thrusting toward increasing arcane language, acronyms and specializations that are narrowing the public or lay audience which, ever enlarging, is critical in making this technology serve the broadest of human interest and well-being. We are inviting Vice President Albert Gore, your friend and information highway colleague, to participate in the conference. Being an open gathering and near his office, his presence would neither entail the cost, time and closed-door nature of his earlier visit to your 100 executives meeting near Seattle. This should increase the likelihood of his acceptance, one might hope. Should you wish to discuss this invitation further, please call me or John Richard of Essential Information at (202)387-8034. Of course, you may wish to have other Microsoft executives attend the conference and they are welcome to come and absorb the many currents of information and activity, both in the formal sessions and in the informal corridor and coffee break discussions that are often so valuable. While there is a conference fee, there is no outside funding or sponsorship to inhibit or compromise the integrity of the proceedings. Sincerely, Ralph Nader Enclosure -------------------------------------------------------------------- This some other documents about the conference are on the Web at: http://www.essential.org/appraising/microsoft/ -- James Love | Center for Study of Responsive Law P.O. Box 19367 | Washington, DC 20036 | http://www.cptech.org voice 202.387.8030 | fax 202.234.5176 | love(a)cptech.org --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

1 0

No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nobuki Nakatuji <bd1011(a)hotmail.com> say: > unperfect MISTY algorithm source code which I wrote isn't Public Domain. > When you use it ,You need to permit from me. > > > > ______________________________________________________ > Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com No no, too late. I take MISTY and use in my secret crypto program to come out soon on Foriegn web-site. I take MISTY and make perfect. You go, chop chop.

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Re: stored value cards in NYC - Motorola PR fluff.
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John R Levine <johnl(a)iecc.com> writes: > > Anybody on the list know more about this project? ("...one of the largest > > and most exciting..." :-) The puff piece has some contact info, but I don' > > expect to get anything useful from them. > > This could be interesting. NYC already has stored value cards called > Metrocards which you can use for subway and bus fares. The MTA has tried > with little success to get newsstands and other vendors of low-price high > volume stuff to take them. Physically they're just thin plastic cards with > the usual magnetic stripe, nothing fancy. They permit variable sized > decrements and are rechargable, so their design must be reasonably > sophisticated. They suck. I'm sticking to tokens. > > I read somewhere in an account of an NYC hackerfest that the Metrocards > have been subjected to intense hacking but they apparently remain secure. They can't be all that secure... Bruce Schneier helped design the crypto. Schneier is to cryptography that Schildt is to C programmin. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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News from the Front (October Issue)
by news＠sldc.ffg.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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bad alter.net routes, backbone vulnerability
by Mark Hedges 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Right now, as reported by PBI NetCenter staff, Alternet has dumped bad routes to all of its peers. AGIS has San Diego and Los Angeles off the air again ... for the third time today ... that's been going on for weeks. I mentioned the WSJ receipt of report from network engineers that the backbones are extremely vulnerable to attack, and said I guess someone's trying to show that crypto's useful for everyone to have, postulating some mythical encryption authentication could protect the routers from attack. He said yup, attack on the backbone network "happens all the time." Mark Hedges Infonex Internet Inc.

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Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jon Calis wrote: >Also, we have three encryption products: PGP freeware, PGP for Personal >Privacy, and PGP for Business Security. Corporate Message Recovery is >included *only* in PGP for Business Security. It is not, and never will >be, in either the freeware or the Personal Privacy product. If this is true (and I have no reason to believe it isn't), then why is the key escrow code written (although not turned on) in the source code for 5.0 that was posted internationally from PGP? Makes no sense. Bruce >http://simson.vineyard.net/clips/96.SJMN.PGPBusinessEdition.html .... > PRETTY LOOSE PRIVACY >[...] > Published: April 2, 1996 > BY SIMSON L. GARFINKEL .... > That has not stopped Zimmermann from complaining loudly about the PGP > name being used in a product that allows someone other than the author > or the intended recipient access to information. Viacrypt owns the > licensing rights to sell the commercial versions of PGP. > > ''PGP does not stand for back doors,'' said Zimmermann. ''I don't mind > if they sell a program that has a back door in it, but they shouldn't > call it PGP.'' >[...] > ''If your employer can read your mail anytime he wants, without your > permission, that goes against the spirit of the PGP trademark,'' said > Zimmermann. ********************************************************************** Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098 101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis,MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590 http://www.counterpane.com

4 6

If you want Perfect MISTY algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you want Perfect MISTY algorithm source code, Please send e-mail to me. Thank you very much. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

2 1

Internet Via Electric Lines?
by Jonathan Wienke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I heard on the ABC hourly news that some genius had figured out a way to use electrical power lines for data transmission, so that the power grid could be integrated into the Internet. Does anyone have any details / pointers? Jonathan Wienke What part of "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" is too hard to understand? (From 2nd Amendment, U.S. Constitution) PGP 2.6.2 RSA Key Fingerprint: 7484 2FB7 7588 ACD1 3A8F 778A 7407 2928 DSS/D-H Key Fingerprint: 3312 6597 8258 9A9E D9FA 4878 C245 D245 EAA7 0DCC Public keys available at pgpkeys.mit.edu. PGP encrypted e-mail preferred. Get your assault crypto before they ban it! US/Canadian Windows 95/NT or Mac users: Get Eudora Light + PGP 5.0 for free at http://www.eudora.com/eudoralight/ Get PGP 5.0 for free at http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pgp-form.html Non-US PGP 5.0 sources: http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ http://www.heise.de/ct/pgpCA/download.shtml ftp://ftp.pca.dfn.de/pub/pgp/V5.0/ ftp://ftp.fu-berlin.de/pub/pc/win95/pgp ftp://ftp.fu-berlin.de/pub/mac/pgp http://www.shopmiami.com/utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/pgp/pgp50/win/ RSA export-o-matic: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

2 1

Cypherpunks Bay Area Meeting, This Saturday October 11th, 12-5+
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What: Cypherpunks October 1997 Bay Area Meeting When: Saturday October 11, 12 noon till 17pm Where: PGP World Headquarters, 2nd floor meeting room Bayview Bank Building, just south of Hwy. 92 2121 S. El Camino Real, San Mateo California http://www.pgp.com/pgpcorp/contactpgp.cgi#head Agenda: 12-1 - Introductions, Work in Progress, Milling About International Law, Electronic Commerce, and Digital Signature, Cem Kaner Virtual Private Networks - Besides FreeSWAN, there's a lot of VPN and other tunneling work in the commercial sector. Besides privacy uses, it makes it easier to handle your Network 10 or Bogus IP Addresses over the Internet. Domain Name Security PGP5.5 - The Product. The politics. Patents - Merkle-Hellman and Hellman-Pohlig expire! Crypto Politics - what is Congress up to this month? Tentative November Agenda and Location: Eric Hughes has arranged with Lawrence Wilkinson, a principal at GBN <http://www.gbn.org>, to do a one afternoon scenario planning workshop on cryptography. Several other GBN people will also be in attendance. We are planning to hold it at the GBN offices in Emeryville, which can hold about 40 fairly easily. After: Eat dinner somewhere yet to be decided... PGP Building Access: This is an Open Meeting on US Soil and it is free for anyone to attend. There is a minor building security formality due to the facilities being in a bank building: anytime after 12 noon, approach the Bayview Building's Information window (in the plaza, see below for directions), and ask the Guard on Duty to let you up to the 2nd Floor for the Cypherpunks meeting (use the passphrase "cypherpunks release code"). If you have any difficulty (eg. if the guard is on a break), simply call DDT at +1 415 730 3583 he I'll let you in. You can arrive at any time during the scheduled meeting hours, though earlier is better if you want to hear the interesting stuff. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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Returned mail: Host unknown (Name server: fatmans.demon.co.uk: no data known)
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The original message was received at Wed, 8 Oct 1997 18:00:38 -0600 (CST) from orenco23.sk.sympatico.ca [142.165.99.23] ----- The following addresses have delivery notifications ----- <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> (unrecoverable error) ----- Transcript of session follows ----- <tcmay(a)got.net>... Deferred: Connection timed out during initial connection with mail.got.net. <sunder(a)brainlink.com>... Deferred: Connection refused by mh.brainlink.com. 550 <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk>... Host unknown (Name server: fatmans.demon.co.uk: no data known) <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca>... Deferred: Connection refused by orion.sk.sympatico.ca. Reporting-MTA: dns; wombat.sk.sympatico.ca Received-From-MTA: DNS; orenco23.sk.sympatico.ca Arrival-Date: Wed, 8 Oct 1997 18:00:38 -0600 (CST) Final-Recipient: RFC822; paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Action: failed Status: 5.1.2 Remote-MTA: DNS; fatmans.demon.co.uk Last-Attempt-Date: Wed, 8 Oct 1997 18:07:10 -0600 (CST) To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: InfoWar 2000 / AOL Format From: The Last True CypherPunk <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> Date: Wed, 08 Oct 1997 18:04:15 -0600 Organization: "It's a Multi-User Persona whose homepage is a Mirror site." Reply-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Title: The True Story of the Internet Part II The True Story of the InterNet Part III InfoWar 2000 Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain by TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing InfoWar Table of Contents InfoWar 2000 InfoWar 2000 "InfoWar is back!" Jonathan cried out, waking the other members of the Magic Circle instantly. They quickly rose and gathered around the GraphiScreen hovering over the old oak table. Subject: Re: [Pigdog] ViaCrypt slowly executes Timmy C. May From: Flesh <flesh(a)pigdog.org> To: pigdog-l(a)arlington.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Does the fireBot work well with the throwemupagainstthewallandaimfortheheadBot? Cowboy recognized the significance immediately. "A thousand Points of Presence." "UUNETWorldCom?" Alexis asked, surprised. Jonathan nodded, adding, "And they're moving faster and quieter than they did in history as we have known it, up to now." He began reading off the list he had compiled in just a short time, "Fiber, Digital Microwave, Satellite, Undersea Fiber Cable. Financial markets, telecommunications, construction, health care, and politics. "They seem to be putting all of the 'usual suspects' under one flag, around the globe." A Player To Be Named Later scanned the series of posts, for the thousandth time. "It's dejavu, all over again." he said, quoting a Yogi Berra malapropism. The feeling had been growing on him The feeling that somehow, everything was the same as beforeonly different. "The Lake of Life has started to turn over. The bottom is rising to the top, the top is descending to the bottom, and everything is becoming the opposite of what it seems to be." A Player To Be Named Later sat quietly, contemplating what it was that had changed, only somehow not changed, since the last time the lake had turned over on the CypherPunks mailing list. He thought about "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs." He began to see the parallel between the history of the creation of WebWorld and the creation of the CypherPunks distributed list. There was the subterfuge which had preceded both the Channel Revolution which foreshadowed WebWorld and the Censorship Crisis which had presaged the CypherPunks distributed mailing list. There were the climaxes that precipitated the structural changes in both cases, the satellite destruction in the one case, and the loss of toad.com as host to the mailing list in the other case. There were the parallels with outside attacks ceasing on both the CypherPunks distributed mailing lists and the variety of Channels on WebWorld, in an attempt to let the citizens/members bond with their new channels/lists. One parallel-or two, depending on how you looked at it-in particular, which stood out in the mind of A Player To Be Named Later. There were three CypherPunks distributed lists-at algebra.com, ssz.com, and at cyberpass.net. Likewise, there was a reference to the Money Channel Government in WebWorld having three channels under its control. Then, there was the strange, strange saga of three religious channels-the God Channel, the Dualist Channel, and the Trinity Channel-which had somehow merged, yet not merged, creating a problem which had left the 'powers that be' very, very nervous. "What the hell happened to Channel War I?" A Player To Be Named Later, asked himself, suddenly recognizing a glaring disparity between the parallels he was drawing between the history of WebWorld and the history of the CypherPunks list. "And what the hell happened to InfoWar?" he asked, turning to Baby, who stood up and barked her agreement that there was definitely something fishy going on that involved the two shadow wars that had somehow been misplaced in the annals of history-one in the future, and one in the past. In 'WebWorld', both the reference to the three Money Channel Governments and reference to the three spiritual channels which became one, yet didn't, revolved around the close of Channel War I. But there didn't seem to be a parallel to Channel War I in the Time-Line of the CypherPunks list. Likewise, 'WebWorld' began with a reference to an 'InfoWar Scrambler Mechanism' which seemed to indicate that 'InfoWar' would play a major part in the history of 'WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs.' Yet there were only a few later references in Part II of The True Story of the InterNet in regard to "the beginning stages of InfoWar," with no further details. A Player To Be Named Later strained to touch the wispy haze of memory which was rising somewhere in the back of his mind-a memory which whispered "InfoWar" from somewhere deep in the heart of the CypherPunks mailing list censorship crisis. "Toto!" he said, suddenly feeling a ferocious stinging sensation behind his right ear, which resulted in a loss of balance as he fell to the floor, and a loss of consciousness as the blackness closed in around him The tattered remnants of the Magic Circle of the future sat quietly around the antique oak table, anxious and depressed. "Why is the Trei Transponder receiving interference from Toto's digital implant?" Priscilla asked the group. "All of my monitoring tests show that the last adjustments we made to the Zooko Zamboni were up to Journeyman standards." "Perhaps it is a result of the differences in the winter climates between the Netherlands and Canada." Jonathan said. "It seems to me that the effects of Global Warming were just beginning to have undeniably noticeable effects in that particular epoch." The Cowboy got up and paced a bit, as the others realized he was working up the courage to say what they were all thinking. "Or.." he hesitated, then turned to face the others and continued, "perhaps the rebirth of InfoWar reflects that our efforts toward changing the past have not only been successful, but are now irrevocable." Jonathan pulled up a passage of 'WebWorld' onto the GraphiScreen, contemplating what he had originally perceived as the failure of InfoWar during the hotly contested battle which took place on the CypherPunks list during the censorship crisis. "January 19, 1997. "The beginning date of the 'moderation experiment' on the legendary CypherPunks mailing list. The beginning probe in preparation for the launching of InfoWar-an experiment which had failed miserably and had caused a delay in the plans of the Evil One. A delay caused by the damnable insolence of the terminal misfits among the CypherPunks. An insolence that was rumored to be fueled by the Circle of Eunuchs, fanning the 'flames' of dissent among the CypherPunks, helping them to resist the herding of their list members into the group-mindset desired by the Evil One." The other members of the Circle of Eunuchs sat still in their seats, not wanting to disturb the deep thoughts of Jonathan, who was indeed the Last True CypherPunk, having grown up at their feet, immersed in their logic and their lore, and whose whole life had been ruled by his connection to the infamous anarchists who had been, alternately, both the shining light of freedom and privacy in their era, and the treacherous instigators of Channel War II-the war which had led to the ultimate triumph of the Gomez and the Dark Allies and the conclusive ascent of the Dark Forces in their domination of WebWorld under the dictum of the Evil One. The room was quiet as Jonathan reluctantly pulled up the next passage of 'WebWorld' which had described his feelings when his bereft past had come back to haunt him. "Jonathan sat frozen in his seat, once again, his brain locked from the major dichotomies being produced as a result of his present-in which the CypherPunks were a villainous band of rogues who had instigated the launching of Channel War II-and his past, in which his grandfather had been exposed both as one of the major players in both the launching of Channel War II, and as traitorous scum who had sabotaged the goals of the CypherPunks in that same historical battle. "Jonathan's grandfather wasn't just a CypherPunk. He was the Fool." "We won" Jonathan's voice trailed off, before he rose from the table and repeated his statement, in anger. "We won, damn it! "I know we won. Grandfather knew we won the censorship battle. Everyone knew that we won the censorship battle. History itself knows that we wonwe" Jonathan stopped short, turning to stare at the others, who were staring back. "Jonathan" Bubba said softly. "History has changed." "I know that, damn it!" Jonathan resumed his pacing, knowing that he was missing something very, very important, but he couldn't for the life of him think what it might possibly be. The others in the room watched and waited, knowing that it was Jonathan, and Jonathan alone, whose heritage was intricately and irrevocably linked to the era in history which they had, for better or worse, interfered in through their use of the Trei Transponder. "Grandfather was a traitor to the CypherPunksa traitor to freedom and privacy. He sabotaged everything that the CypherPunks had fought so hard to defend, since the inception of their anarchist, cryptography mailing list. "But the CypherPunks loved us" Jonathan was lost in memories of a childhood in which he and his family had been forced to remain in constant motion, staying a half-step ahead of the Dark Allies, who had been hunting down the last remaining members of the CypherPunks-with a vengeance. His family had been soundly welcomed by the remaining CypherPunks, in their flight to freedom after his Grandfather's assassination. They had given the family food, clothing, shelter, and warned them when the Dark Allies were closing in, and it was once again time to flee. Duncan Frissell had even Perhaps they all had Jonathan sank to the floor, slowly, with Alexis leaping up and catching him softly. Cowboy helped her guide him toward the table and lower him into a chair. Jonathan slowly pulled off his shirt and stared at his tattoothe Mark of the Toad. "Duncan Frissell arrived at our last safe house, in the middle of the night." Jonathan spoke, finally understanding the real story behind his family's flight into obscurity. "He warned us to flee, but it was too latethe Dark Allies were close at hand." Jonathan's voice was full of amazement as he recounted an event which he had long known, but had never managed to fully understand. "Duncan held the Dark Allies at bay, while we made our escape. I can still hear his screams" Jonathan shuddered, then began shaking terribly. Alexis closed her arms around him, hugging him lightly. "Your Grandfather knew that the CypherPunks had lost the battle." Bubba picked up the thread. The other members of the Magic Circle looked on, mystified as to this strange turn of events which turned the whole history of the CypherPunks and the Circle of Eunuchs on hits head. "It wasn't a censorship battle." the Cowboy said, amazed as much by what he was saying as those listening to him were. "It was InfoWar!" "That's what happened to InfoWar." Alexis cried out, in disbelief of her own words. "It was over before it had begun." Bubba d'Shauneaux IV rose to his feet, and filled in the details of the battle as could only be done by one who had spent a lifetime of subterfuge playing a role which was the exact opposite of what it had seemed to be from surface appearances. "It was the first battle fought solely within the bounds of Virtual Reality." "It represented the true nadir point in history when the battle between the Forces of Light and the Forces of Darkness moved beyond the physical plane and into the minds of mankind." "InfoWar!" he roared, the word reverberated throughout the room, sending the Trei Transponder into a soft hum which grew louder and louder, with a pitch that went lower and lower until it became subsonic, unheard, but shaking the roomthe eartheven WebWorld itself... The Trei Transponder exploded with a mighty boom, shaking the room so violently that the tattered remnants of the Magic Circle were thrown from their chairs, and found themselves rising to see only ruins around them, where their safe house had once been. They immediately realized that they must flee at once, as those investigating the explosion would undoubtedly be the Dark Allies, fully aware that the event had rent WebWorld at the seams. Jonathan paused, weapon in hand, covering the retreat of d'Shauneaux, who had remained behind to remove the last traces of evidence that the Circle of Eunuchs had ever truly been there. As d'Shauneaux joined him, motioning for him to proceed, he took one last look at the shattered remains of the Trei Transponder. All contact with the CypherPunks of the past was now gone, with little hope of it being renewed. Silently, he sent a message to the CypherPunks of his youth-from the bottom of his soul and into the inestimable profundity of the Tao. It was a message that would be understood by those who had been at Woodstock-a physical gathering of a Magic Circle which had come into physical being through a random blessing of Time and Chance. "You're on you own, folksbecause we're sure on ours." Those who fail to learn from the future, are doomed to repeat it. "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" "InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet') Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite

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Returned mail: User unknown
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The original message was received at Thu, 9 Oct 1997 06:34:24 +0500 from mail-relay.EU.net [134.222.91.10] ----- The following addresses had permanent fatal errors ----- <fygrave(a)freenet.bishkek.su> ----- Transcript of session follows ----- ... while talking to freenet.bishkek.su.: >>> RCPT To:<fygrave(a)freenet.bishkek.su> <<< 550 <fygrave(a)freenet.bishkek.su>... User unknown 550 <fygrave(a)freenet.bishkek.su>... User unknown Reporting-MTA: dns; voland.freenet.bishkek.su Received-From-MTA: dns; mail-relay.EU.net Arrival-Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 06:34:24 +0500 Final-Recipient: rfc822; fygrave(a)freenet.bishkek.su Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 Remote-MTA: dns; freenet.bishkek.su Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 550 <fygrave(a)freenet.bishkek.su>... User unknown Last-Attempt-Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 06:34:53 +0500 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: InfoWar 2000 / AOL Format From: The Last True CypherPunk <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> Date: Wed, 08 Oct 1997 18:04:15 -0600 Organization: "It's a Multi-User Persona whose homepage is a Mirror site." Reply-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Title: The True Story of the Internet Part II The True Story of the InterNet Part III InfoWar 2000 Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain by TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing InfoWar Table of Contents InfoWar 2000 InfoWar 2000 "InfoWar is back!" Jonathan cried out, waking the other members of the Magic Circle instantly. They quickly rose and gathered around the GraphiScreen hovering over the old oak table. Subject: Re: [Pigdog] ViaCrypt slowly executes Timmy C. May From: Flesh <flesh(a)pigdog.org> To: pigdog-l(a)arlington.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Does the fireBot work well with the throwemupagainstthewallandaimfortheheadBot? Cowboy recognized the significance immediately. "A thousand Points of Presence." "UUNETWorldCom?" Alexis asked, surprised. Jonathan nodded, adding, "And they're moving faster and quieter than they did in history as we have known it, up to now." He began reading off the list he had compiled in just a short time, "Fiber, Digital Microwave, Satellite, Undersea Fiber Cable. Financial markets, telecommunications, construction, health care, and politics. "They seem to be putting all of the 'usual suspects' under one flag, around the globe." A Player To Be Named Later scanned the series of posts, for the thousandth time. "It's dejavu, all over again." he said, quoting a Yogi Berra malapropism. The feeling had been growing on him The feeling that somehow, everything was the same as beforeonly different. "The Lake of Life has started to turn over. The bottom is rising to the top, the top is descending to the bottom, and everything is becoming the opposite of what it seems to be." A Player To Be Named Later sat quietly, contemplating what it was that had changed, only somehow not changed, since the last time the lake had turned over on the CypherPunks mailing list. He thought about "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs." He began to see the parallel between the history of the creation of WebWorld and the creation of the CypherPunks distributed list. There was the subterfuge which had preceded both the Channel Revolution which foreshadowed WebWorld and the Censorship Crisis which had presaged the CypherPunks distributed mailing list. There were the climaxes that precipitated the structural changes in both cases, the satellite destruction in the one case, and the loss of toad.com as host to the mailing list in the other case. There were the parallels with outside attacks ceasing on both the CypherPunks distributed mailing lists and the variety of Channels on WebWorld, in an attempt to let the citizens/members bond with their new channels/lists. One parallel-or two, depending on how you looked at it-in particular, which stood out in the mind of A Player To Be Named Later. There were three CypherPunks distributed lists-at algebra.com, ssz.com, and at cyberpass.net. Likewise, there was a reference to the Money Channel Government in WebWorld having three channels under its control. Then, there was the strange, strange saga of three religious channels-the God Channel, the Dualist Channel, and the Trinity Channel-which had somehow merged, yet not merged, creating a problem which had left the 'powers that be' very, very nervous. "What the hell happened to Channel War I?" A Player To Be Named Later, asked himself, suddenly recognizing a glaring disparity between the parallels he was drawing between the history of WebWorld and the history of the CypherPunks list. "And what the hell happened to InfoWar?" he asked, turning to Baby, who stood up and barked her agreement that there was definitely something fishy going on that involved the two shadow wars that had somehow been misplaced in the annals of history-one in the future, and one in the past. In 'WebWorld', both the reference to the three Money Channel Governments and reference to the three spiritual channels which became one, yet didn't, revolved around the close of Channel War I. But there didn't seem to be a parallel to Channel War I in the Time-Line of the CypherPunks list. Likewise, 'WebWorld' began with a reference to an 'InfoWar Scrambler Mechanism' which seemed to indicate that 'InfoWar' would play a major part in the history of 'WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs.' Yet there were only a few later references in Part II of The True Story of the InterNet in regard to "the beginning stages of InfoWar," with no further details. A Player To Be Named Later strained to touch the wispy haze of memory which was rising somewhere in the back of his mind-a memory which whispered "InfoWar" from somewhere deep in the heart of the CypherPunks mailing list censorship crisis. "Toto!" he said, suddenly feeling a ferocious stinging sensation behind his right ear, which resulted in a loss of balance as he fell to the floor, and a loss of consciousness as the blackness closed in around him The tattered remnants of the Magic Circle of the future sat quietly around the antique oak table, anxious and depressed. "Why is the Trei Transponder receiving interference from Toto's digital implant?" Priscilla asked the group. "All of my monitoring tests show that the last adjustments we made to the Zooko Zamboni were up to Journeyman standards." "Perhaps it is a result of the differences in the winter climates between the Netherlands and Canada." Jonathan said. "It seems to me that the effects of Global Warming were just beginning to have undeniably noticeable effects in that particular epoch." The Cowboy got up and paced a bit, as the others realized he was working up the courage to say what they were all thinking. "Or.." he hesitated, then turned to face the others and continued, "perhaps the rebirth of InfoWar reflects that our efforts toward changing the past have not only been successful, but are now irrevocable." Jonathan pulled up a passage of 'WebWorld' onto the GraphiScreen, contemplating what he had originally perceived as the failure of InfoWar during the hotly contested battle which took place on the CypherPunks list during the censorship crisis. "January 19, 1997. "The beginning date of the 'moderation experiment' on the legendary CypherPunks mailing list. The beginning probe in preparation for the launching of InfoWar-an experiment which had failed miserably and had caused a delay in the plans of the Evil One. A delay caused by the damnable insolence of the terminal misfits among the CypherPunks. An insolence that was rumored to be fueled by the Circle of Eunuchs, fanning the 'flames' of dissent among the CypherPunks, helping them to resist the herding of their list members into the group-mindset desired by the Evil One." The other members of the Circle of Eunuchs sat still in their seats, not wanting to disturb the deep thoughts of Jonathan, who was indeed the Last True CypherPunk, having grown up at their feet, immersed in their logic and their lore, and whose whole life had been ruled by his connection to the infamous anarchists who had been, alternately, both the shining light of freedom and privacy in their era, and the treacherous instigators of Channel War II-the war which had led to the ultimate triumph of the Gomez and the Dark Allies and the conclusive ascent of the Dark Forces in their domination of WebWorld under the dictum of the Evil One. The room was quiet as Jonathan reluctantly pulled up the next passage of 'WebWorld' which had described his feelings when his bereft past had come back to haunt him. "Jonathan sat frozen in his seat, once again, his brain locked from the major dichotomies being produced as a result of his present-in which the CypherPunks were a villainous band of rogues who had instigated the launching of Channel War II-and his past, in which his grandfather had been exposed both as one of the major players in both the launching of Channel War II, and as traitorous scum who had sabotaged the goals of the CypherPunks in that same historical battle. "Jonathan's grandfather wasn't just a CypherPunk. He was the Fool." "We won" Jonathan's voice trailed off, before he rose from the table and repeated his statement, in anger. "We won, damn it! "I know we won. Grandfather knew we won the censorship battle. Everyone knew that we won the censorship battle. History itself knows that we wonwe" Jonathan stopped short, turning to stare at the others, who were staring back. "Jonathan" Bubba said softly. "History has changed." "I know that, damn it!" Jonathan resumed his pacing, knowing that he was missing something very, very important, but he couldn't for the life of him think what it might possibly be. The others in the room watched and waited, knowing that it was Jonathan, and Jonathan alone, whose heritage was intricately and irrevocably linked to the era in history which they had, for better or worse, interfered in through their use of the Trei Transponder. "Grandfather was a traitor to the CypherPunksa traitor to freedom and privacy. He sabotaged everything that the CypherPunks had fought so hard to defend, since the inception of their anarchist, cryptography mailing list. "But the CypherPunks loved us" Jonathan was lost in memories of a childhood in which he and his family had been forced to remain in constant motion, staying a half-step ahead of the Dark Allies, who had been hunting down the last remaining members of the CypherPunks-with a vengeance. His family had been soundly welcomed by the remaining CypherPunks, in their flight to freedom after his Grandfather's assassination. They had given the family food, clothing, shelter, and warned them when the Dark Allies were closing in, and it was once again time to flee. Duncan Frissell had even Perhaps they all had Jonathan sank to the floor, slowly, with Alexis leaping up and catching him softly. Cowboy helped her guide him toward the table and lower him into a chair. Jonathan slowly pulled off his shirt and stared at his tattoothe Mark of the Toad. "Duncan Frissell arrived at our last safe house, in the middle of the night." Jonathan spoke, finally understanding the real story behind his family's flight into obscurity. "He warned us to flee, but it was too latethe Dark Allies were close at hand." Jonathan's voice was full of amazement as he recounted an event which he had long known, but had never managed to fully understand. "Duncan held the Dark Allies at bay, while we made our escape. I can still hear his screams" Jonathan shuddered, then began shaking terribly. Alexis closed her arms around him, hugging him lightly. "Your Grandfather knew that the CypherPunks had lost the battle." Bubba picked up the thread. The other members of the Magic Circle looked on, mystified as to this strange turn of events which turned the whole history of the CypherPunks and the Circle of Eunuchs on hits head. "It wasn't a censorship battle." the Cowboy said, amazed as much by what he was saying as those listening to him were. "It was InfoWar!" "That's what happened to InfoWar." Alexis cried out, in disbelief of her own words. "It was over before it had begun." Bubba d'Shauneaux IV rose to his feet, and filled in the details of the battle as could only be done by one who had spent a lifetime of subterfuge playing a role which was the exact opposite of what it had seemed to be from surface appearances. "It was the first battle fought solely within the bounds of Virtual Reality." "It represented the true nadir point in history when the battle between the Forces of Light and the Forces of Darkness moved beyond the physical plane and into the minds of mankind." "InfoWar!" he roared, the word reverberated throughout the room, sending the Trei Transponder into a soft hum which grew louder and louder, with a pitch that went lower and lower until it became subsonic, unheard, but shaking the roomthe eartheven WebWorld itself... The Trei Transponder exploded with a mighty boom, shaking the room so violently that the tattered remnants of the Magic Circle were thrown from their chairs, and found themselves rising to see only ruins around them, where their safe house had once been. They immediately realized that they must flee at once, as those investigating the explosion would undoubtedly be the Dark Allies, fully aware that the event had rent WebWorld at the seams. Jonathan paused, weapon in hand, covering the retreat of d'Shauneaux, who had remained behind to remove the last traces of evidence that the Circle of Eunuchs had ever truly been there. As d'Shauneaux joined him, motioning for him to proceed, he took one last look at the shattered remains of the Trei Transponder. All contact with the CypherPunks of the past was now gone, with little hope of it being renewed. Silently, he sent a message to the CypherPunks of his youth-from the bottom of his soul and into the inestimable profundity of the Tao. It was a message that would be understood by those who had been at Woodstock-a physical gathering of a Magic Circle which had come into physical being through a random blessing of Time and Chance. "You're on you own, folksbecause we're sure on ours." Those who fail to learn from the future, are doomed to repeat it. "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" "InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet') Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite

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Abuse of Authority
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- These excerpts should be useful to those attempting to understand the FBI motivations regarding domestic control of cryptography. - ------------------------------ "The Secret War Against the Jews" by John Loftus and Mark Aarons Pages 181 to 183. Several history books have recorded that American intelligence agencies have conducted wiretaps against U.S. citizens without warrants, but these allegations have concerned operations aimed mostly at the left, particularly Communists and radical black groups. Our sources say that the history books have missed the most important elements of this story of the violation of democratic rights: the systematic electronic eavesdropping employed against American Jews engaged in legitimate political activities. In this chapter we discuss the following allegations: - During World II the covert British wiretap program in the United States against Nazi sympathizers was extended to surveil American supporters of a Jewish state in Palestine. - After the war this program was continued, and massively expanded, as the British gained the cooperation of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal for the illegal collection of electronic intelligence on Zionist activities in the United States. - The once highly secret Communications Intelligence arrangements between Britain and the United States have been deliberately twisted by the intelligence agencies of both countries to allow illegal British wiretaps of American Jewish citizens using American facilities. A reciprocal arrangement exists in Britain. - The illegal campaign against the Jews reached its height during the Reagan-Bush years in the White House, when even Jewish children in summer camp were monitored for "subversive" activities. - Over the years this illegal arrangement has been extended past Jews, Communists, and black radicals, to reach virtually any citizen, including mainstream political candidates, no matter how harmless their activities may have been. The "old spies" say that electronic surveillance of Jews started in 1944, when American Zionists were first wiretapped on a broad scale. The wiretaps were the product of secret wartime agreements between British and American intelligence calling for long-term cooperation to spy on each other's "subversive" citizens. Since that time the bugging of American and British Jews has never stopped. In fact, the wiretaps have been greatly expanded. Our sources, who include a former special agent of the FBI, a former liaison to the NSA, several former NSA officials and employees, a number of former consultants to both American and British intelligence on communications security, and several former officers of the U.S. Army Security Agency, make one point very clearly: <I>For the last fifty years, virtually every Jewish citizen, organization, and charity in the world has been the victim of electronic surveillance by Great Britain, with the knowing and willing assistance of the intelligence services of the United States.</I> This massive and systematic violation of both American and British law has continued, with only slight interruptions, for nearly half a century. As will be seen later in Chapter 12, dealing with the Liberty incident, electronic espionage has been the most deadly threat to Israel's existence from its very inception. It also has been the most continuous criminal violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Bill of Rights (sic). Jews are not the only ethnic group to be wiretapped at their homes or jobs, although, as we shall see, they are the most frequent targets. To put it bluntly, no citizen is safe anymore. Privacy is gone, search warrants are meaningless, the protections of the courts and constitutions have been overthrown entirely, without the knowledge or consent of our legislatures, presidents, or prime ministers. This ugly corner of Western history has never been fully explored before. It is, perhaps, the most shocking revelation of this book. Because of the sensitivity of this topic, we deal with it in some detail from the beginning. Our sources' first thesis is simple. It is not American intelligence that mounted an intensive surveillance operation against Ben-Gurion's arms purchases in the United States, and cut off this promising source of weapons and equipment. It was British intelligence that wiretapped American Jewish citizens without warrants and leaked the information to the FBI. The truth is that the British had been eavesdropping on the United States for a very long time.[2] The advent of British "electronic" espionage against American citizens goes back to the end of World War I. The British knew that money and guns sent by Irish-Americans were making the difference in the Republic of Ireland's war for independence against the British Empire. The British government compelled American telegraph companies to hand over all message traffic, in order that it could obtain intelligence on Irish nationalist and international Communist activities and take appropriate countermeasures. As the heads of the Western Union and other telegraph corporations revealed to a shocked Senate in 1920, the British were reading all American telegrams. Apparently, even official U.S. government communications were included among the material handed over.[3] As a result of these revelations, Congress passed a law making it a crime to intercept telegraphic or diplomatic communications. There the matter rested, along with the false legend of Secretary of State Henry Stimson's edict that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail."[4] Rested, that is, until the early years of World War II. As previously discussed, while the United States remained technically neutral, the British secret service obtained Roosevelt's permission for Sir William Stephenson to establish an illegal wiretap unit in New York to spy on Americans who were aiding the Nazis. As discussed in Chapter 3, several of our sources say that Roosevelt also was using the British wiretap team to dig up dirt on his political opponents.[5] Pages 191 to 192: Hoover was one of the biggest customers of wiretap information from its inception. In fact, the FBI made no bones about its right to listen in to domestic conversations without a warrant. It wasn't until a 1975 court case that the FBI was finally told that they had no legal right to wiretap individuals or organizations without a warrant, unless there was a proven "agency relationship" with a foreign power. In fact, until the stricter 1975 standards, the FBI could wiretap or place surveillance on any Jew who gave money to any Jewish organization that supported Israel. Here is an example of the type of innocuous information that was forwarded to the FBI as a result of their obsessive surveillance of American Jews: EMMA LAZARUS FOUNDATION OF JEWISH WOMENS CLUBS AMONG LARGER DONORS CONTRIBUTING $500 DURING A FUND RAISING DINNER HELD BY THE EMERGENCY CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE . . . [ON] DEC 15 1962 AT THE AMERICANA HOTEL NYC IN CELEBRATION OF THE 171ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS[43] Apparently, Jews who celebrated the Bill of Rights were considered potential, if not actual, subversives. That remains FBI policy to this day. The FBI refused to accept the restrictions from an adverse 1975 court ruling and leaked its view to the media in a 1977 memo. The FBI still defended its right to spy on person who "might" be supporters of a foreign power, or even anyone in the country who "might" be influenced by a foreign power.[44] Pages 194 to 195: In 1982, shortly after President Reagan agreed to rescind the Carter-era restrictions on domestic Communications Intelligence operations, the FBI was asked to record all information on "potential" Jewish subversives. As one source wrote, the wiretapping had nothing to do with Pollard: "the arrest of Pollard [in 1985] was used as a pretext to expand a supposedly closed-down illegal covert operation by the FBI called 'SCOPE' whose purpose was to compile lists of Jews in government, research, and institutional leadership, et al. This operation was revealed publicly in 'The Wall Street Journal', January 17, 1992."[54] This source believed that "The Wall Street Journal" article was really an exercise in damage control, an attempt to shift the blame back to James Jesus Angleton and conceal the ongoing wiretapping. While there is some dispute about when and why the bugging resumed, the consensus of our sources is that the modern version of Operation Gold is horrendous. The FBI's collecting has gone beyond the pale of what could be considered legitimate intelligence gathering. In addition to rosters of major contributors to Israeli funds, the Bureau has targeted the innocuous activities of children. "It's just gotten out of hand. . . . I saw FBI records where they collected lists of kids going to Jewish summer camp."[55] Other government officials who reviewed the FBI's "counterterrorist" program against American Jews said that while they did not catch any terrorists, they collected a lot of information on Jewish lobbyists.[56] Another NSA source alleged that the FBI had custody of the Jewish surveillance files because a recent law made the FBI's "counterterrorism" files completely exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, under a special counterintelligence loophole.[57] Under the FBI's broad definition of an espionage suspect, anyone who communicates with a foreign government - for example, who calls a relative in Israel or donates to a charity that sends funds to Israel - - gets swept up in the electronic vacuum cleaner. "Pollard paranoia" swept through the intelligence community, brushing aside the Bill of Rights. Selected footnotes for Chapter 8, "Spying on Zion". [2] Confidential interviews, former officer, the NSA; former special agent, FBI, 1982-1989. [3] "'In July 1919 . . . when British censorship ceased, we were ordered by the British government to turn over to them all messages passing between our own offices, 10 days after they were sent. . . . they wanted these messages only for such supervision as might give them an inkling of pending disorders within Great Britain, I assume having to do with Irish unrest, and also to do with Bolshevik propaganda.' "Asked by Senator Kellogg whether the messages turned over to British intelligence included United States government communications, the cable chief buckled. 'If you don't mind, I would not like to answer that,' he pleaded. 'It puts my company in a very embarrassing position with the British Government.'" James Bamford, "The Puzzle Palace" (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 329-330. [4] Ibid., p. 40. As one [of] our sources, an expert on NSA history, pointed out, Stimson did not make that remark at the time. It first appeared in a post-World War II biography. [5] Confidential interviews, former NSA officer; former Special Agent, FBI, 1982-1989. [44] Bamford, "The Puzzle Palace", p. 297 [44] "The foreign influence thesis became a courtroom issue in the Spring of 1977 with the Kearney wiretapping and mail interception indictment [charges later dropped] based on FBI efforts to locate and apprehend the Weather Underground fugitives. A 400-page 'top secret' report . . . was prepared by FBI researchers and leaked to the press to establish that no crimes were committed because [of] inherent executive power, unrestrained by legal or constitutional requirements. The taps and mail interceptions, the report argued, were legitimate counter-intelligence practices sanctioned by a reservation in the Keith case, excluding targets with 'significant connections' with a foreign power. . . . In June 1975, the vague language of Keith was sharpened by an appellate court ruling (Zweiborn v. Mitchell) that mere influence or support of a foreign power did not deprive a domestic group of the protection of warrant requirements in the absence of a showing of an actual agency relationship or collaboration." Donner, "The Age of Surveillance", p. 279. [54] Confidential source letter, January 7, 1993, p. 3. [55] Confidential interview, agency withheld to prevent identification. [56] Confidential interviews, current and former officers in several government agencies that liaise with the FBI, including but not limited to Defense, State, and Justice departments. [57] Confidential interview, former official, the NSA, 1990. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDsYG5aWtjSmRH/5AQECdAf/Q8kK7TSOPhko+sPYQ7wM/AirRSnSt8Oo J901w3M/C+8/t0VQG6JDiVWU/lLl2Zc3YuMpHucIylnDHrE4/WmcgiA1wMvv3+/e uPjO1Vf9p631nmA0brnZuKDCN+MtInkeLzE2H6S13DOclZ/X8SrIlA4elllQZEb9 zQRfusjcqmAZyL/VRTTT1kZr8K5v4wNfMNqv7gMfhn8DCR1KhpJM6yWdV8RKcjFV qNiol0e57WQTEkv4oweugwLVvTbeeDIoyzKokkKWNOvXTCl4DlNWiUYZEj9H6CFY jmSiCVpJ7X+BIifPoDSJctGdmmCS+JiMyJv1FZSBgDEDc+H7PcsI1Q== =TLVL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Internet Via Electric Lines?
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Ian Sparkes <ian.sparkes(a)t-online.de> > Peter wrote: > >[...] Putting a few optical > >fibers into a power line is cheap, easy, and widely done. > > But much cheaper and easier is using the signalling gulleys that run > along the side of the railways - no High Tension precautions, no > scaling pylons. This, incidently is the reason that a number of > telecomms consortia (in europe, at least) include a railway element - > they provide the long-haul backbone. It looks like we're seeing different parts of the problem. You're worried about the long-haul backbone. I'm trying to see ways to get a 10Gbps fibre into my living room. The backbone cost is a tiny fraction of the cost of getting fiber into every house in the country. > [...] > >Also, employees have to be trained to splice optical fibers and > >install routing equipment, and millions of miles of power lines and > >hundreds of millions of junctions need to be replaced or reworked. > > And that's the 'cheap & easy' mentioned above? Building a few optical fibers into a cable as it is being manufactured is cheap and easy, as is using fiber-equipped cable if you are installing new lines, or replacing old ones for other reasons (installation costs are usually far higher than the cost of the line itself). It's hooking up all the fibers into a meaningful network that gets expensive, which was my point. Peter Trei

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Re: Internet Via Electric Lines?
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > From: Jonathan Wienke <JonWienk(a)ix.netcom.com> > I heard on the ABC hourly news that some genius had figured out a way > to use electrical power lines for data transmission, so that the power > grid could be integrated into the Internet. Does anyone have any > details / pointers? > Jonathan Wienke I've heard of two methods; one is to transmit the data as a high frequency FM signal along the wire. The other is to use power lines which include an optical fibre. Both have problems. The FM signal has difficulty going through transformers (there are lots of transformers, with the final step-down usually occuring at a pole-top near your house). Also, you have to be very careful about isolating the data output from the power line: an error could send 110VAC into your serial board. I haven't heard of this method being used on a wide scale, but it might work as a LAN. The optical method may actually be implemented. Putting a few optical fibers into a power line is cheap, easy, and widely done. The idea was originally that power companies could read your electrical meter remotely, but the bandwidth available is gross overkill. Thus they are also thinking of adding Cable TV, telephony, and data services. There are still problems. You are basically building a data network on top of the power grid, and the topologies don't really match up. Also, employees have to be trained to splice optical fibers and install routing equipment, and millions of miles of power lines and hundreds of millions of junctions need to be replaced or reworked. There was a rosy article about this in Wired a few years ago. I have heard nothing since. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Re: russia_1.html
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Jonathan Wienke <JonWienk(a)ix.netcom.com> > At 09:37 AM 10/6/97 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: > >At 3:01 AM -0700 10/6/97, Peter Trei wrote: > >>The plutonium cores of thermonuclear devices have a limited shelf > >>life - he claimed 6 years, which jibes with what I've heard from > >>other open sources. Fission products build up in the cores which > >>can poison a chain reaction. Thus all Pu based devices need to have > >>the cores periodically removed and replaced with new ones, while the > >>old ones have to go through a non-trivial reprocessing stage to > >>remove the fission products. > > > >I think this comment is in error. Plutonium has a half life on the order > >of 250,000 years, so very little decay products would build up in 6 years. > >The tritium used in thermonuclear weapons has a much shorter half life, and > >would need to be replaced about that often. > > One of the decay products of tritium (half-life: 12.5 years) is Helium-3, > which aggressively absorbs neutrons and poisons the fission reaction of the > plutonium. If one has access to more tritium, which is commercially > available for about US $50,000 per gram, the existing tritium can be > purified and combined with the new tritium to bring the bomb back to full > power. If someone has the resources to obtain the bomb in the first place, > refreshing the tritium probably wouldn't be a major problem. > > > Jonathan Wienke I conceed that it may not be the Pu decay products that cause the limited shelf life of thermonuclear weapons; I suspect that it may be components of the 'pit', which produces the initial burst of neutrons to kick of the reaction (the pit is effectively a small fission bomb). This 'pit' may contain tritium (pit design is a very well guarded secret, and I've seen very little about it in the open literature). > If someone has the resources to obtain the bomb in the first place, > refreshing the tritium probably wouldn't be a major problem. I disagree. A terrorist could obtain a bomb by being given it, stealing it, or buying it as a turnkey system. However, I suspect that anyone with the facilities to recondition one of these weapons could also build one from scratch. I don't know if it's comforting or worrying knowing that these devices degrade - any in the hands of terrorists have a limited time that they are a threat, but that fact may pressure a terrorist to 'use it or lose it'. Peter Trei

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None
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For what its worth; Australian Financial Review 8-10-97 http://www.afr.com.au/content/971008/inform/inform5.html ********************************** Power play to plug in the Internet In what could usher in a new era of competition between telephone companies and electric utilities, engineers have developed a breakthrough technology that lets homeowners make phone calls and access the Internet at high speeds via the electric outlets in their walls. If the technology from United Utilities plc and Northern Telecom Ltd proves commercially viable, it could transform power lines around the world into high-speed conduits on the information superhighway. Because electric utilities are wired into virtually every home and business, the new technology could provide easy entry into the phone and Internet access businesses, thus posing a serious threat to current providers of those services. United Utilities, a power company, and Northern Telecom, a Canadian maker of telecommunications gear, confirmed that their system was "ready for mass market", but declined to reveal details. The two companies have tested phone service over power lines in about a dozen UK households over the past 12 months -- with positive results, according to Alistair Henderson, chief of technology at Energis plc, the telecommunications unit of National Grid Group plc. AP-Dow Jones =A9 This material is subject to copyright and any unauthorised use, copying or mirroring is prohibited. ********************************** Ooops i didnt know my mailer was loaded orifacer

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privacy rights: giving away the store
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- do you believe this? so what happened to our privacy? the man screams about privacy and encryption one minute, then: > What if I told you there's one easy thing you can do to make > your 1998 Internet experiences simpler and safer? Get a > digital ID. Jesse Berst, ZDNet AnchorDesk, full story at http://www.zdnet.com/anchordesk/story/story_1324.html really? > Also called digital certificates, digital IDs (DIDs) are > like electronic passports -- universal ID cards that prove > your identity to anyone who needs to know. You get a DID > from an independent certificate authority such as VeriSign, > which performs a background check first. just what I wanted, a fucking background check. nice schill, Jesse. OK, I'll call my broker and buy Verisign stock. they're going to be worth bocu bucks taking over the fascists' National ID project. > ...Most Web servers have it already. Most email programs > will have it by the end of the year. And both major > browsers... gee, that's clever. but The NYTimes, The Times [London], the Telegraph, and so on, already log me in immediately with a cookie I authorized. why do I need certified identity? even Wired mag knows me as Attila T. Hun. interNIC knows me as Attila T. Hun, I even get mail to my drop box as Attila T. Hun.... My check writer can even print checks as Attila T. Hun (the bank does not care what the name on the check is --just the MICR numbers). > ...Your bank knows for sure that it's really you... sure, after I enter my password... so what's the big deal? that's all I do now. automated, too. > Simpler Surfing. Sick of separate names and passwords > for each site? A single DID will authenticate you for > any site that supports the technology -- about 20,000 at > last count, including Netscape Netcenter, Internet > Shopping Network, K-Mart, Cellular One and many others. OK, but I still must ID my system with my National-ID card available from the cookie wash. I dont see any place to turn it off! bastards! --they've implanted it under my skin. why? so big government or big business can really catalogue my political views by the stories I read? maybe it's my anti-authoritarian, psychotic behaviour and rants against fascist oligarchies, or, maybe because I post to Cypherpunks? > ...you'll help the Internet make an important transition > --from a fun place to surf to a safe place to do business. aah haa! I knew there was a reason for all this hoopla! What's good for Bill Gate$ is good for the country. ...uuh, sorry Mr. AL (GM) $loan; I meant to quote you correctly: "What's good for General Motors is good for the country." > A safer Internet is at hand. All you have to do is seize it. no, jesse, you got that one wrong --the coy fascist dog F[reeh,uck] just seized you --and the rest of the suckers that fall for Verisign's National-ID. attila still going out... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBNDuu5704kQrCC2kFAQFXxgQAo/THjROjaWOCEdsFD0K9Yy1SXu6G2I3Z W7GDfTEv4bwalBUSwzHQJjPNcfrYnRoNpxkWm+kHiqolvoJP2XKtk89tnTumwyvK EfBLPbxRz0lfsXmxy5iNJXWEyJ1Tb3mYbu5CQuAhkWpFhP4xVaRsVSDzCzkmtnBs 7YRH8+KSwoI= =piYW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Jackbooted Posturing in Panama
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Five years after the US military murdered thousands of Panamanian civilians, and bulldozed their bodies into mass graves prior to the arrival of the press, the US is again demonstrating its unmitigated arrogance on the world scene by staging a show trial of a Panamanian citizen accused of killing a US soldier. Jury selection began Tuesday in the trial of Pedro Miguel Gonzalez, the son of a prominent Panamanian politician. Gonzalez, who was at a demonstration protesting Bush's impending visit, denies any connection to the incident in which a US vehicle was sprayed with gunfire. He has been in hiding since the 1992 incident, fearing he could not get a fair trial from the US-installed Panamanian government. At the time, the US government promptly termed the killing of the US soldier a "terrorist act", and offered a $100,000 reward for the identity of the perpetrators. The pretense for the US invasion, and subsequent massacre, as announced on television by President Bush, was that Panamanian soldiers had kicked a US soldier who had run a roadblock. The hidden agenda was retaining US control over the Panama canal after it appeared relations between the US and Panama might turn sour. In addition to killing thousands of civilians, the US also kidnapped Panama's President, Manual Noreiga, and convicted him in the United States of various vague drug-related charges, after installing a regieme sympathetic to the United States. Gonzalez faces 20 years in prison if convicted. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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Re: russia_1.html
by Bill Frantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:01 AM -0700 10/8/97, Peter Trei wrote: >I don't know if it's comforting or worrying knowing that these >devices degrade - any in the hands of terrorists have a limited >time that they are a threat, but that fact may pressure a terrorist >to 'use it or lose it'. What I have heard about these suitcase nukes is that they yield about 1-2 kilotons. I know of no technical reason for them to be thermonuclear devices. As such, the decay of tritium would not seem to affect them. (They will still need a source of neutrons, which might go bad faster than the plutonium/U235.) I feel very little comfort. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Internal surveillance | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | helped make the USSR the | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | nation it is today. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Jim Russell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The swirl of controversy that has arisen since the 2 Oct announcement of the PGP Business Security Suite has been quite amazing. Yet, all of the focus has been on what's been *added* to PGP v5.5. Jon Callas said it explicitly: >>Corporate Message Recovery is included *only* in PGP for Business Security. What sense, then, can I make of the following? I have been examining the published source code for PGP v5.0 for Personal Privacy (note that this is *not* a corporate version), and have discovered that this recovery scheme already appears to be in place, in some form at least, in that version. The following code appears in the published pgp.c, lines 518-537: /* * This is our version of "Commercial Key Escrow". * * A company can set the CompanyKey in the site-wide * configuration file and it will be added to the * recipient list for all encrypted messages. Then * again, the user can override the setting in their * own pgp.cfg or on the command line. */ companyKey = pgpenvGetString (env, PGPENV_COMPANYKEY, NULL, NULL); if (companyKey && *companyKey) { /* Add the company key to the recipient list */ e = ringSetFilterSpec (ui_arg->arg.ringset, ringset, companyKey, PGP_PKUSE_ENCRYPT); if (e <= 0) exitUsage(e); } This certainly *looks* like the implementation that is being discussed in the press release, although I did not find it mentioned in any documentation for PGP for Personal Privacy v5.0. The questions this code brings to my mind are: 1. Does this mean that even the Personal Privacy versions of PGP have a message recovery scheme available? The 2 Oct press release from PGP states that the corporate message recovery "transparently integrates with *any* version of PGP client software". (Emphasis mine). 2. If this is implemented via a configuration setting, does it provide an opportunity for an attacker to reset the "CompanyKey" to their own key? In the Windows environment, it appears that PGP uses the System Registry to hold configuration settings. Is it possible for me to trick someone into running a .REG script that will set the CompanyKey to a key to which I hold the private component? 3. This appears to me to be quite contradictory to the descriptions posted by Jon Callas on 7 Oct. The procedure that Jon describes, using an attribute in the self-signature, would tell an encryptor external to The Corporation to use the "skeleton key" on INCOMING mail. The 5.0 code seems to imply an automatic extra recipient on OUTGOING mail, and this impression is reinforced by the description of the SMTP server policy enforcement in the 2 Oct product description on PGP's web site. (Let's not forget that SMTP is a protocol for OUTGOING mail.) Which is it, or is it actually both? Now, I realize that the long-time PGP users, the computer experts who can take the source code and recompile the application, could simply remove any sections they don't like, or go into the configuration settings and change everything to their liking. However, isn't encryption supposed to be moving to a new target audience, the people who use a computer as a tool, and don't necessarily know the internals? These are the people who need to feel secure using encryption, and magic, invisible encryption to a third-party is probably not going to give them warm fuzzy feelings. Jim Russell <jrussell(a)syndata.com> Senior Engineer SynData Technologies, Inc. http://www.syndata.com

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Question
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 8 Oct 1997 11:24:51 -0400 From: alain(a)research.bell-labs.com (Alain Mayer) To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Question Hi Bob, stypid question: how to I post a message to the Cypherpunks. I have an announcement on a new method to fight junk e-mail, which has been integrated in LPWA (nee Janus). See below Best, -- Alain Hi, we are Bell Labs researchers announcing a method to help you combat junk e-mail (spam) via a new kind of e-mail address, termed a target-revokable e-mail address. Every time you give out your e-mail address, e.g., when you register at a Web-site or post to a Usenet newsgroup, there is a risk that your address will end up in the hands of an e-mail a marketeer or spammer. Until now, you had no way to undo giving out your e-mail address. Target-revokable e-mail addresses effectively let you do that. Currently, most e-mail users typically have a very small number of e-mail addresses. For example, one at the office and one for private use with an ISP at home. In contrast, the principle behind target-revokable e-mail addresses is that each user has many e-mail addresses. In fact, users can have a different e-mail address for each group or entity with whom they interact. Furthermore, target revokable e-mail addresses are defined such that a recipient of such an address cannot guess other target-revokable addresses belonging to the same sender and destined for different groups. Target-revokable e-mail addresses have been integrated with LPWA for easy use with Web sites and Usenet newsgroups (more application to follow at a later date). The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA, formerly known as Janus) is a new tool that provides you with privacy, convenience and security when browsing the Web. LPWA is having a highly successful test run, having won PC Magazine "Developer's site of the Week Award". For more info and instructions on how to use target-revokable e-mail: http://lpwa.com:8000 ==================== --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Thanks Peter! / Re: russia_1.html
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Trei wrote: > I conceed that it may not be the Pu decay products that cause the > limited shelf life of thermonuclear weapons; I suspect that it may > be components of the 'pit', which produces the initial burst of > neutrons to kick of the reaction (the pit is effectively a small > fission bomb). This 'pit' may contain tritium (pit design is a very > well guarded secret, and I've seen very little about it in the open > literature). Peter, I lost your email address when I spilled Scotch on my computer and lost all my data, so I thought I'd send this to the CypherPunks list. Thanks for explaining to me how to decide where the 'yellow' wire goes. My 'you know what' ought to work now (but I'm not going to try it at home, kids...heh...heh). I'm going to go to Washington as soon as I get my cast off. I left in on an extra week since I make more money spare-changing since I got it, and now I have enough to take a bus to 'you know where,' DC. Tell Declan that he should probably go visit his mom, or something, like next Friday, until at least Monday (because that's when my mom leaves Washington, 'you know where.'--{boy, is *she* going to be sorry she grounded me on my uncle's weekend away from the 'Home'.}) My uncle's going to be mad when he finds out I took his suitcase, but he couldn't even get his Heathkit radio to work, and I *almost* did. Besides, you should never trust anyone over fifteen, eh? (And these things are dangerous in the wrong hands, eh?) Human Gus-Peter p.s. - Cynthia still hasn't answered me as whether or not she is wearing any panties. Is she stuck-up, or something? p.p.s. - I wonder if Dimitri thinks its suspicious that your first name is the same as my last one. Of course, if he thought we were doing what John-John do, then ? the Playpus would call you a pedal-file, eh? (Unless you were doing it to a girl my age, and then he would call you a 'petal-file.') {<-- that's a sexist joke}

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Re: your mail
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> >>>Here is a cool test!! Just write everything down and find out >>everything you >>>need to know about yourself. My answers were GREAT (and some true) >see >>how >>>yours turn out! :-) Don't strain yourlsef thinking though! >>> >>> >>>Chapter I >>> >>>Arrange the following 5 animals according to your preference: >>> >>>Cow >>> >>>Tiger >>> >>>Sheep >>> >>>Horse >>> >>>Monkey >>> >>> >>>Chapter II >>> >>>Describe the following : >>> >>>Dog >>> >>>Cat >>> >>>Rat >>> >>>Coffee >>> >>>Ocean >>> >>> >>>Chapter III >>> >>>Think of somebody (who also knows you) that you can relate to the >>following >>>colors : >>>( Pls. don't repeat your answer twice only one person for each color) >>> >>>Yellow >>> >>>Orange >>> >>>Red >>> >>>White >>> >>>Green >>> >>>And finally indicate your favorite number and favorite day >>> >>> >>>-----------------------------------------------------(See >>interpretations >>>below) : >>> >>>But before going on, just make one wish.......=) >>> >>> >>> >>>Chapter I >>> >>>(This will define your priorities in life) >>> >>>Cow means career >>> >>>Tiger means pride >>> >>>Sheep means love >>> >>>Horse means family >>> >>>Monkey means money >>> >>> >>>Chapter II >>> >>>Your description of Dog implies your own personality >>> >>>Your description of Cat implies your partner's personality >>> >>>Your description of Rat implies your enemy's personality >>> >>>Your description of Coffee is how you interpret sex >>> >>>Your description of Ocean implies your own life >>> >>> >>>Chapter III >>> >>>Yellow - somebody who will never forget you >>> >>>Orange - someone whom you can consider as your real friend >>> >>>Red - someone you really love >>> >>>White - your soulmate >>> >>>Green - a person who will you always remember for the rest of your >>life >>> >>>Your favorite number will be the number of persons you will be sending >>this >>>test to and the favorite day will be the day that your dream will >come >>true! >>> >>>Hope you had fun! > > > >______________________________________________________ >Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com > > <---- End Forwarded Message ---->

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Immoral Cryptographers vs. Kindlier, Gentler Cryptographers
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* In April, Premier Lien Chan of Taiwan ordered a crackdown on the national craze of public betel-nut chewing, which he said was responsible for mouth cancer, slimy sidewalks when they are spit out, and immorality, in that they are mostly sold by young, underdressed women at sidewalk stands. The betel nut is reportedly a mild stimulant and is slightly more expensive than a cigarette. * The Washington Post reported in May that some tribes in Yemen routinely kidnap tourists and hold them for days, though treating them well, regaling them with propaganda, and ultimately offering them to the government in exchange for political concessions, such as new road construction. Said the speaker of the Yemen parliament, "Kidnapping is part of tourism. [The] tourist will end up learning about the customs of the tribes, as well as their good hospitality." ------ To read these News of the Weird newspaper columns from the past six months, go to http://www.nine.org/notw/notw.html (That site contains no graphics, no photos, no video clips, no audio. Just text. Deal with it.)

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Re: Internet Via Electric Lines
by Ian Sparkes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 At 12:06 08.10.97 -6, Peter Trei wrote: >> Ian Sparkes <ian.sparkes(a)t-online.de> > >> Peter wrote: >> >[...] Putting a few optical >> >fibers into a power line is cheap, easy, and widely done. >> >> But much cheaper and easier is using the signalling gulleys that run >> along the side of the railways - no High Tension precautions, no >> scaling pylons. This, incidently is the reason that a number of >> telecomms consortia (in europe, at least) include a railway element - >> they provide the long-haul backbone. > >It looks like we're seeing different parts of the problem. You're >worried about the long-haul backbone. I'm trying to see ways to >get a 10Gbps fibre into my living room. > >The backbone cost is a tiny fraction of the cost of getting fiber >into every house in the country. > Maybe in retrospect I was just tugging your leash a bit, for which I apologise. I agree, in principle there are few entities which are more aptly placed than the power utilities to provide a roots to leaves high- capacity network into your home. Telephone companies could do it, although the very final stage in the link (twisted copper) is a capacitive load, and therefore not very well suited to high frequencies. Power wires, on the other hand, would exhibit better properties and are universally installed. The solution, however, must be a fibre/copper hybrid. The trick will be getting the bridges between fibre/copper and copper/copper (across the step-downs) cheap and reliable enough. This is probably the breakthrough. The post from Judith Lewis seems to hint at about 0.5MB/s. Good enough for your average Joe. Sorry for the obtuseness of my reply. Ian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNDu6gvzOjjBJiFUeEQIewACdGPe87UKBq7aGRkFew/02fHNBwh0AnAqN eidJ2PV2IVO05Gg+ZSXD9NRI =RxdS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Need Info
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sampler-request(a)lmboyd.com wrote: > ====================================================== > Q. Can you confirm the claim that a ferocious bull won't > attack a naked human being? > A. Hard to find an authority on this. Those who know > won't explain the circumtances wherein they found out. > Such has been reported, though. snow? Zooko? Anyone...? > LMBoyd Web Site / U. S. Newspapers / Start Email / Stop Email > http://www.LMBoyd.com/postscript.htm

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Secret Information
by Newfile＠man.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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The 5th Horseman: Cryptoanarchist doctors.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't often get Forbes, but the Oct 6 issue caught my eye. Leafing through it, I found something fun in the letters column. It's in response to a 'fact & comment' column in the Sept 22 issue, the core of which is: ---------------- Here's how this basic attack on our personal freedom will work: A doctor who provides medical services to a Medicare-eligible patient without billing Medicare must sign an affidavit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that he or she will not treat a single Medicare patient for the next two years. Any doctor found treating both Medicare patients and Medicare-eligible private patients will be subject to fines and perhaps prison. As Moffit points out, Section 4507 is "deliberately designed to make private contracting and medicine all but impossible except for physicians who reside in very wealthy communities." Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) correctly observes that this prohibition is the equivalent of Social Security's barring retirees from dealing with stockbrokers: "Surely, a law that made it illegal to supplement with private funds the amount received from Social Security would be met with disbelief and derision." Yet that is the equivalent of what this Medicare regulation does. ------------------ The letter reads: SIR: I have been treating Medicare patients for cash without filing Medicare claims for years. I do not intend to stop. If the government receives no forms, how will it know that a beneficiary received care from me? And the feds can't seize my records. They are all computerized and encrypted. Anthony A. Cassens, M.D Los Angeles, Calif. --------------------- Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Fund-Raisers Allege long term DNC Wrongdoing
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Two Democratic fund-raisers have agreed to testify in exchange for immunity that Bill Clinton's presidential campaign in 1992 and the Democratic Party engaged in an array of questionable activities, a House committee disclosed today. see: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/w/AP-House-Fund-Raising.html the allegations will cover incidents from 1991 to the present including Indonesian, Chinese, and other foreign interests; details on Peter Trei; influence peddling; a letter with Clinton's name on it for a now SE Asia head of state, etc. Big Macs as legal tender. bacon extra. these folks are ready to do some serious singing! the proposed revelators were convicted and sentenced on one of the charges and are apparently willing to sing to avoid prosecution on the rest. if they had enough evidence to put them in jail for the tip of the iceberg... so, when the fat lady sings, and Valhalla incinerates, do you think the market will have a confidence crisis? too bad stock certificates are electronic; they could bring on the dancing girls and have a tickertape parade with the output of the shredders as the fraudsters run for cover. Wall Street is going to look like Pol Pot came to visit, left a few calling cards, too. since clinton has been busy tossing Gore to the sharks, maybe we will have the Grinch as President --he's next in line. at least the Grinch will look better in a Santa suit! he may be just in time. that might be enough to have the whole infrastructure collapse; it might be time to close the bankruptcy proceedings initiated by Mr. "chicken in every pot" himself on 09 Mar 1933. ironic that his ad her intellectual <g> baggage is being cared for by the current occupants of 1600 Pennsylvania --full circle! as debtors are absolved when bankruptcy is satisfied or liquitdated, do you suppose we can get rid of that stupid fringed [admirality] flag and the contract courts? maybe even have common law and habeus corpus restored? of course, we must remember to hire the Merchant of Venice's lawyer to save us each a pound of flesh. dang, I had old William's plot phone number here somewhere. naw, that's too much to ask for; the four horsemen just came over the horizon... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBNDvTOb04kQrCC2kFAQHm+gP/YEG9GK7jLSy7nJ4p/jQ+C967M4+tPwEs nBkQZ5qwCYm2M3U2D0UQ/hE3Pcphrfcc8xzCNstIjtM5bS4ZW7zGqQJG8PwZzRc6 QkSaEOigL4USpj208juDTQB4dxg57EGjQTLCLFma3J481zEVWUXcJPsXs9ee2WYR HC6se+auV1M= =eCld -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[news] Azalea releases encryption software
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** Azalea releases encryption software Azalea Software has just released three new encryption and security products: DESTools v1.5, BlowfishTools v1.5 and SHATools v1.0. All three packages are SDK's (software developers kits) targeting Windows developers who need to add encryption and security features to the applications they write. DESTools and BlowfishTools provide encryption and decryption based on the DES (Data Encryption Standard) and Blowfish algorithms respectively. DES provides 56-bit keys and is used extensively in banking and finance. (PR Newswire) For the full text story, http://www.infobeat.com/stories/cgi/story.cgi?id=5315843-c31 -- Powell lingered. "How's Earth?" It was a conventional enough question and Muller gave the conventional answer, "Still spinning." -- "Reason", Asimov. ================================================================== Vipul Ved Prakash | - Electronic Security & Crypto vipul(a)best.com | - Web Objects 91 11 2233328 | - PERL Development 198 Madhuban IP Extension | - Linux & Open Systems Delhi, INDIA 110 092 | - Networked Virtual Spaces

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Anthrax Bombs
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:37 AM -0700 10/8/97, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 3:01 AM -0700 10/8/97, Peter Trei wrote: >>I don't know if it's comforting or worrying knowing that these >>devices degrade - any in the hands of terrorists have a limited >>time that they are a threat, but that fact may pressure a terrorist >>to 'use it or lose it'. > >What I have heard about these suitcase nukes is that they yield about 1-2 >kilotons. I know of no technical reason for them to be thermonuclear >devices. As such, the decay of tritium would not seem to affect them. >(They will still need a source of neutrons, which might go bad faster than >the plutonium/U235.) > >I feel very little comfort. I'd fear an "anthrax bomb" a lot more than a 2 KT suitcase nuke. (If I lived in a crowded target zone, aka a soft target, which I don't.) (As is well-known, or should be, folks survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki as close as 400 meters from ground zero. And they were both roughly 20 KT nukes. Inasmuch as the blast effects scale as the cube root of megatonnage, a 2 KT blast might be expected to be survivable as close as a few hundred meters or even less. Of course, some will die even out at a 1000 meters, but not many.) By comparison, anthrax bacillus is relatively easy to manufacture, and aerosol dispersion could kill hundreds of thousands or more before even being detected. Aerosolized dispersion in Washington or Manhattan could be a far worse human and infrastructure disaster than a suitcase nuke. I expect this sort of attack to occur fairly soon. (The Aum Shinretsu cult in Japan was working with such things, including Sarin, a nerve toxin. Some of the sites knocked out in Iraq were CBW sites.) P.S. I used to work a lot with radioisotopes. Pu-239 has a long half-life, as noted here by others, and is not going to decay significantly in human times. But poising and neutron-stealing can render nukes duds in just a few years. However, battlefield nukes are typically made with some design choices which minimize the routine maintenance/refurbishing which the main MIRV nukes need. My understanding is that most of the NDT (nuclear demolition) devices have a shelf-life of up to a decade or so. Anthrax is a whole lot cheaper. --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Secure phone
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Deters wrote: > At 12:44 PM 10/7/97 -0700, Eric Blossom you wrote: > >I wrote: > >> Therefore, man-in-the-middle can be more precisely described as an > >> unauthenticated end-point problem. Therefore, without authentication, > >> there is no defense (yet) against MITM attacks. > >I concur from the theoretical point of view. > It would be easy enough to "trick" the MITM into exposing their existance > anyway, just by using digits that come up in conversation. > A sudden dropout of sound (or "accidental" loss of > connection) while the MITM recognizes the trap and tries to backpedal will > be instantly noticed. Human protocols are resilient, whereas mathematical > protocols are precise. Speaking from a practical standpoint, since I have been the target of a variety of electronic surveillance for over a quarter of a century, the Man-in-the-Middle rarely operates so well that there are not a number of small anomalies that one cannot spot in the quality and/or flow of the service they are receiving. On the other hand, they rarely screw up so badly as to make it glaringly obvious what they are doing. The main thing, when one has reason to believe that quality or technical problems may be the result of MITM, is to take subtle actions such as the one suggested above, in order to force the MITM to adjust on-the-fly to situations that you create in order to monitor the monitor. e.g. - "Call me in 5 minutes at 555-PAY-PHONE for the secret code." If you already have a shill using that pay phone to monitor sudden anomalies in the function, fine, but it is ususally sufficient to take a call at the phone in five minutes, and the results of a quick patch will be noticeable. - "Do you have a radio playing, or something?" Hi-tech MITMs use a white-noise system designed to provide a cover for noise from their equipment, and a statement such as the above will invariably cause them to adjust it, usually resulting in a greater clarity or greater fuzziness on the line. Similar analysis of one's email, particularly if you have several recipients who can send you full feedback on timing/routing, etc., can reveal consistent differences between letters to your mom, and your death threats against the King (as well as letter to your mom which contain death threats against the King). Bottom line: If you are sending something worthy of being monitored, then your actions and methodologies should reflect the belief that you *are* being monitored. Please destroy your hard drive after reading this post. TruthMonger

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Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> There are two reasons which are given as to why someone might want to > have GAK installed for company use. > > 1. to allow access to important material lost in the mail system in the > event that an employee is hit by a bus > > 2. to allow management to spot check the emails being sent and received > > > Argument 1 seems pretty flimsy to me. I reiterate my comment in an earlier > post: who in their right mind keeps their _only_ copy of ultra valuable > company information bouncing around in the email system? Did those arguing > for this position not notice that sometimes email gets lost in transit? > > Regardless, if PGP claims to be catering to those who use this argument, and > to not want to try that hard to make it impossible to by-pass, the more > secure, and less GAK friendly way to do it is to have the mail client > software archive the email sent and received. Two problems. First, not all mail clients let you archive the mail in a different form than how it arrived. Netscape 3 worked like this, maybe 4 too. If the mail comes in encrypted just to an employee key, that is how it will be stored, and no business access is possible. Second, what if an employee doesn't come back from vacation? You've got messages sitting in his inbox which go back three weeks. All encrypted to his personal key, which is gone. It's been long enough that the senders may not have backups any more. It's all lost, and at best the company is going to put its partners and customers to a great deal of inconvenience by making them re-send everything they've sent in the last three weeks, not to mention making the company look incompetent.

5 4

update.340 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From physnews(a)aip.org Wed Oct 8 14:08:52 1997 Date: Wed, 8 Oct 97 09:47:35 EDT From: physnews(a)aip.org (AIP listserver) Message-Id: <9710081347.AA08262(a)aip.org> To: physnews-mailing(a)aip.org Subject: update.340 PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News Number 340 October 8, 1997 by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben Stein TURNING ONIONS INTO DIAMONDS. Nano-diamonds can be created without high pressure by squeezing carbon "onions" (nested buckyball-like structures) with ion beams. Graphite material can be made into diamond the hard way, with the use of high pressure (above 10^6 atmospheres), high temperature, and the use of catalysts. But recently scientists have been able to bombard carbon onions with electron beams and now ion beams as well, and have been able to convert the onions almost completely into diamonds, up to 100 nm in size. Researchers at the Max Planck Institute in Stuttgart (Florian Banhart, banhart(a)wselix.mpi-stuttgart.mpg.de) use a beam of neon ions to pelt the onions, which act like miniature pressure cells. With larger ion accelerators, one should be able to make macroscopic amounts of irradiation-induced diamond. (Experimental work: Wesolowski et al., Applied Physics Letters, 6 Oct. 1997; theory paper (Zaiser and Banhart) upcoming in Physical Review Letters; figure at www.aip.org/physnews/graphics.) MOLECULAR HYDROGEN SHOULD BECOME SUPERFLUID if placed on the right surface, say physicists at the University of Illinois (David Ceperley, ceperley(a)ncsa.uiuc.edu) Superfluids, substances that flow without friction, are few in number: liquid helium-4, special gases of rubidium and sodium atoms (in the form of Bose-Einstein condensates), pairs of helium-3 atoms, and pairs of electrons (which flow through superconductors). The trouble with getting hydrogen molecules (H2) to become superfluid is that they are all too ready to combine with each other into H2 solids. By laying them on a silver substrate and by salting them with a pinch of alkali metal atoms, the H2's should be able to resist the tendency to solidify all the way down to zero temperature. At 1.2 K they would become a superfluid, the Illinois theorists predict. They believe this can be carried out over the next year, after which experimentalists could explore unique hybrid superfluids, such as H2/He-4 mixtures. (M.C. Gordillo and D.M. Ceperley, Physical Review Letters, 13 Oct; see figure at www.aip.org/physnews/graphics) A POLYMER THAT CAN TRANSFER ENERGY BETWEEN DIFFERENT LIGHT BEAMS has been demonstrated by researchers at UC-San Diego (W.E. Moerner, 619-822-0453), opening possibilities for inexpensive and easily manufacturable "optical transistors" that can amplify or attenuate a light beam. The San Diego polymer is an example of a "photorefractive" material, a material that adjusts its structure and electronic properties when two or more light beams combine on it to form an interference pattern. On these materials, light from one beam can bend in such a way as to bounce back in the direction of a second beam, adding energy to it. Inorganic versions of these materials exist, but they are difficult to make and can cost thousands of dollars for a tiny cube. Moerner constructed a polymer whose three main components carried out essential tasks: buckyballs offer electrons, poly (n-vinyl carbazole) (PVK) molecules carry these electrons along their backbone, and PDCST molecules stretch or contract, changing the way light bends in these regions. The researchers demonstrated a "net gain" of about 5, in which one of the laser beams shining on the material gained energy. These materials have numerous possible applications, including correcting distorted images. (Science, 25 July.)

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data recovery good, key recovery bad (Re: Are we all looking at the same PGP 5.5 ?)
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I've moved this thread to cypherpunks, it was on cryptography, and Perry (cryptography moderator) just killed the thread. Some of the participants may not be on cpunks, so keep them on the cc if you want them to see your replies] Marc Horowitz <marc(a)cygnus.com> writes: > >> > What makes you think that all critical email is on disk in the clear? > >> > >> Nothing: it could be on disk encrypted. eg. Encrypted files encrypted > >> with storage keys, or encrypted partition encrypted with storage key, > >> or encrypted sent or received email encrypted with storage key. > > Well, if it's encrypted on disk, then "you read the disk" doesn't get > you very far. You need to be able to decrypt the information on the disk. Of course you do. Lets say you are using Peter Gutmanns encrypted filesystem setup. So, if you figure the info on the disk is important, you give a copy of the key to the company lawyer, put it in the fire proof safe, secret split it, whatever tickles your fancy. The advantage of this is that the email software it is no use to the GAKkers, because it doesn't have mildly enforced extra crypto recipients, and it doesn't get the business community used to the idea of shipping email around with extra doors into it. PGP Inc's pgp5.5 could be used by the government to weedle their way into mandatory key escrow. Say that they start requiring companies to use this software, then when lots of companies start using it, they start asking companies for a copy of the company master key. Bingo key escrow, courtesy of PGP Inc. Next they "encourage" ISPs to use it also. > >> The way to do it is as described above. Archive the email, encrypt it > >> to a starage key. Build that functionality into the MUA if you fancy. > >> But _don't_ give extra access to keys used for communications only. > > There is no extra access to communication keys. There is so! His mail said that there was a policy flag in the public key, and an additional public key for the corporate back door. That policy flag effectively said this key has attached to it a request that you encrypt to this extra crypto recipient. In some cases an additional flag will be set which says "if you do not comply with the request to encrypt to the extra crypto recipient, the recipient will not see the mail". PGP Inc's method of enforcing this is an SMTP policy enforcer which bounces mail without the extra crypto recipient. There, that is an extra access to the communication (via an extra route to accessing the session key). Uhhh, I think I just realised why we are talking at cross purposes... you meant extra access to the recipients private key. I consider this an artificial straw man, erected by Jon. Sure it's an independently dumb idea to have lots of people sharing private keys. But the system is still GAK friendly. And it does allow extra parties access to the message. The worry is that government becomes that second party. Do you really care about the details of mandatory GAK, when and if it comes in. Do you care whether the government has a copy of your private encryption key, or whether the system is setup with un-bypassable second crypto recipient of the USG/NSA etc. Can't see that it makes much difference at that point. Both methods can be bypassed theoretically anyway, by super encrypting or any other subliminal channels kicking around in the protocols. So I can't see that arguments about how easy they are to bypass hold much water. Frisbeeing a disk out the window is far easier a way to bypass anyway. Or just blabbing. > >> Hint: you will note that Freeh and friends aren't interested in > >> storage keys. You can see why the above systems is less GAK friendly > >> right? > > Freeh wants storage keys, too. He wants *all* the keys. Yeah he probably does. But he wants your communications keys a lot more. You know why that is? Because he has your communications because you're broadcasting them across the Internet. He'd like to read them. However he doesn't have your disk, and he'd have to break into your offices to get it, or issue you with a supeona or whatever. I'm sure he'd love to read your disk too, but your disk isn't sitting on an NFS mount over the internet. (Is it!?) Fortunately, the internet couldn't handle the strain, otherwise you might see calls for you to rent your disk space of government disk farms, and the government would then be very interested in demanding a copy of your storage keys. So, if even if we use corporate key backup for storage keys, this is still more along the lines of the status quo. They want your documents, they've gotta come and get them. What we'all are getting worked up about here is that Freeh and friends want to be able to key word search our damn communications on fishing expeditions. > Email is a funny thing. It's sort of storage, and sort of > communications. I can understand wanting to recover it from a > communications aspect. They don't call SMTP "store-and-forward" for > nothing. There is no information in the body of the message which is required for it to get to it's destination. All you need is the SMTP headers. You clearly can't end-to-end encrypt the communications routing information. (You could layer it though, like perhaps remailers, with each hop only knowing what it needs to know to do it's job; however at that point you can run into problems: you can't bounce back a delivery failure part way along the route.) > You'll notice that if I delete the messages after receiving it, it > can't be recovered. If I don't, it can. Sound like storage to me. So? The point is that you shouldn't be mixing key purposes. Communications private keys should be used to protect communication and shouldn't be given to anyone else, even your company. Storage keys might be sensible things to backup within the company in case of accidental death. Actually I disagree with what you said: you said "if I delete the message after receiving it, it can't be recovered", it might easily be recovered in lots of ways: 1. feds have tap on your line, feds rubber hose your long term private key out of you 2. your sender has kept a copy in the clear 3. your sender has kept a copy encrypted with a poor passphrase which the feds guess/or rubber hose from him 4. your sender used encrypt-to-self, and has poor passphrase/is passphrase rubber hosed 5. your sender kept a copy which still had you as a crypto recipient (as well as himself with encrypt-to-self), and the feds arrive at your door anyway. Point is, as long as you've got the private keys, it is potentially stored, courtesy of your favourite TLA. This is why you should use forward secrecy, or at least mimic it, by having a long term signature key, and generating a new public key for encryption every week/month, and revoking and destroying the old one. > >> I figure it's not that major a deal. But for those that want it, the > >> most secure, simultaneously least GAK friendly way to do it is to > >> archive and encrypt with separate storage keys. > > This is *exactly* what PGP does: it encrypts with the recipient key, > and the recovery key. Yes, it does, and that is GAK friendly. But that is not what I described above. The difference between what I describe above (quoted a few lines up), and what PGP is doing is that PGP's messages are sent across the internet encrypted to the "recovery key". This is GAK friendly because it is easy to implement GAK with it, you just make that "recovery key" the NSA's "recovery key" (or to avoid newspeak terms perhaps that should be government backdoor master key). Then they coerce ISPs and corporates to include a PGP SMTP policy enforcer which insists on all email having a second crypto recipient of the NSA's backdoor master key. The system is a beautiful GAK system, everything you need for a fully working GAK system is right there on sale by PGP Inc. With what I described, GAK is not possible. What I described is: the MUA archives sent email, and archives received email (after decryption) with none of this process leaking outside the corporate lan (that is it may involve communication inside the LAN). The archives can be encrypted, and you can have a corporate master key with access to these archives. But none of this goes over the Internet. > At this point, I'm not sure if we disagree or not. I'm not sure either, please let me know if I've explained myself this time! I'm worried that the hard time I'm having getting people to grok that escrowing comms keys is a bad idea if you're opposed to mandatory GAK is indicative of the success of the memes being spread by Freeh's crowd. PGP Inc are especially worrying, as they are in a position to influence the balance of whether we get GAK or not, and they appear to be helping GAK out somewhat. Whether this is complicit or whether they don't see that the fact they've implemented a fairly feasible GAK system as that significant in the argument, I'm not sure. However, I think the argument it is relatively straight-forward: companies care about backup of their data. They don't care about backup of their communications. So why backup communications keys? And why include the backup packet in the communication itself? For those companies who have been persuaded that they ought to read email received and email sent, you can implement this without weakening comms security as PGP have done with pgp5.5 for business which is to have a second crypto recipient for backup/backdoor being sent with the message over the internet. All you do for backup or company backdoor is to build in whatever storage, and encrypted archiving functions you wish into the MUA, or internal mail system. That is GAK unfriendly. If PGP Inc is still GAK unfriendly, and hasn't sold out to government, it should be doing something with similar properties to those I described above: not having backdoor second recipient access to traffic. What they have done is implemented a fully functional GAK system. (I get the feeling that sooner or later we're going to get a PRZ penned company position statement. I hope they get it right. I encourage them to re-think.) Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Ryan Anderson wrote: >>What you call "fragility" is properly called "security". Would you >>describe 128-bit keys as more "fragile" than 40-bit keys? Why is PGP, >>Inc. inventing propaganda terms for the authorities? > >Okay, call it security but the point is, if you're protecting documents vital >to your company using encryption (say the design of a new product) and the >person who knows the passphrase dies, you've just lost a great deal of money. > >PGP for Business Security gives the business a way to have a backup key that >can read that person's information. Frankly, it might not be able to read >anybody elses, from the description given. > >This is a feature that any business (that understands encryption) will want. > >They can easily store the secret keys of the other id someplace secure, and >never retrieve them until someone dies. Disavow knowledge of them to >government, etc. heck, the keys can even be in the primary person's >posession. (Perhaps stored in a safe-deposit box, or without a passphrase, >etc.) Decrypting files and decrypting messages are not the same problem. The PGP product has SMTP support - it is explicitly designed to weaken transmitted messages. Just like Clipper. [Jon Callas wrote:] >>It is fascinating to me that every example you use does not involve >>decrypting transmitted messages. Yet, that is the feature which is >>under discussion. > >Amazingly, he gave an example where, had encryption been used, the >project would have stopped, and restarted because the person with the >keys was incapacitated. Are you just being combative here? No. I am making the distinction between files and messages. It is quite easy to use a key for encrypting files which is different from encrypting your messages. The key for encrypting files can then given to the appropriate company officer. It has been possible to use PGP in this mode forever. What is new is the feature set which will make it very easy to impose GAK on the customers of PGP. According to Mr. Schneier, the code is just sitting there in all their products waiting to be compiled in. >>The demand for the ability to decrypt encrypted messages in the >>corporate environment can easily be measured with this test: how >>many companies have a policy that requires employees to record all >>outgoing mail? > >Well, any company giving stock advice (and governed by SEC rules on >stock tips, etc.) is already require to have all outgoing mail >approved (e-mail and snail), so does it matter if they record it or >not? The answer to the question I posed is "No". The example you cite requires the company to review message before transmission, not afterward. After transmission, the recipient of the message can submit it as evidence to the SEC should there be an impropriety. This is no different from the way it works now. There is probably a context issue here. It sounds like you do not share the context within which many people on this list are operating. The Big Problem for PGP, Inc. right now is that in 18 months or so their products may be illegal to use within the United States. While many of the rank and file in the company may be willing to accept corporate dissolution under those circumstances, the board, the investors, and the senior management are unlikely to welcome that option. So, they are preparing for that situation. They are releasing products with GAK support right now. By the time it becomes mandated by law, it will be easy to compile the well tested features into all of the products, or just discontinue their line of privacy products and sell only their Big Brother Inside products. The corporate key becomes the government key with the stroke of a pen. PGP, Inc. is betting that they'll win either way. If GAK goes down in flames again, they can still trade on their reputation for being The Good Guys. If GAK becomes mandated by law: "We didn't want to do it, but we had no choice." Some of us may be in the habit of thinking of PGP, Inc. as the hero. However, the problem with organizations is that they are easily corrupted. Does this mean everybody in the organization is now working for the government? No, it does not. Most likely there are many PGP, Inc. employees who are feeling uncomfortable with this new development but they are being given the same lines we are getting. Many of these people are probably getting an additional "inside scoop" from their leaders that explains the "real" strategy. Hopefully, the rank and file at PGP knows that people you like and see in the hallways every day will still lie to you if they think their career depends on it. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDuw65aWtjSmRH/5AQGwLgf7BBYy2HO30eDXO2YLqkgtuOxAcnQU19AO DOKIa3jwU723ICgWD00dPW1GegKL5LaRfp3a+Xtd+qjHaFs0IlXr4kJGv1wiCJhu sRKxmSi3g1aGIfiF48uMef5bbzPL27b3u78rJds+E44LP9zEnieBcACBp+3977W0 0N0k7ADY6ME+zmc4f5D5aLdJa8gprOCPj1nF6esspkMuDDu5iH/YY/GT6VprRCub NojEXPS/uB6tgTS4vDfenL8UWUUqjXQof8MrRoMAG6dsjvNEyU5WlhbnDgyh9nF5 DbuP9+oA8DHYSmEGzTxD4oG7mGwb+NMMuYOyg3xC1H8ou2Ajv0kfOg== =UtlQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FCPUNX:CDT complains to my editors after post to cypherpunks
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:34 AM 9/26/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > The larger issue is that the CDT/VTW "players" are showing their > willingness to trade away the civil liberties of us all for a few minor > tidbits thrown (they think) to corporate sponsors. CDT may not necessarily be pursuing the interests of its corporate sponsors. Legislation in congress, any legislation, the worse the better, will promote corporate donations to CDT. This does not meen that the corps want legislation. Indeed, this is a chronic problem with such mundane non civil liberties lobbies as the milk lobby. Big business sends their lobbyists to Washington, where they are corrupted by contact with politicians. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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No Subject
by Zooko Journeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~h ~h ~h ~h ~v

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Starting now, online town hall meeting with Rep. Dreier at www.democracy.net
by shabbir＠democracy.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In just a few minutes, we'll be starting the online town hall meeting with Rep. David Dreier (R-CA). Dreier is a key member of Congress for the net community: he's on the Rules committee, which has the fate of SAFE in its hands. He's also been a leader in integrating Congressional committees and the net. Check it out http://www.democracy.net/ -Shabbir

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InfoWar 2000 (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet)
by The Last True CypherPunk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The True Story of the InterNet Part III InfoWar 2000 Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain by TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- InfoWar Table of Contents * InfoWar 2000 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- InfoWar 2000 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "InfoWar is back!" Jonathan cried out, waking the other members of the Magic Circle instantly. They quickly rose and gathered around the GraphiScreen hovering over the old oak table. Subject: Re: [Pigdog] ViaCrypt slowly executes Timmy C. May From: Flesh <flesh(a)pigdog.org> To: pigdog-l(a)arlington.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Does the fireBot work well with the throwemupagainstthewallandaimfortheheadBot? Cowboy recognized the significance immediately. "A thousand Points of Presence." "UUNETWorldCom?" Alexis asked, surprised. Jonathan nodded, adding, "And they're moving faster and quieter than they did in history as we have known it, up to now." He began reading off the list he had compiled in just a short time, "Fiber, Digital Microwave, Satellite, Undersea Fiber Cable. Financial markets, telecommunications, construction, health care, and politics. "They seem to be putting all of the 'usual suspects' under one flag, around the globe." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A Player To Be Named Later scanned the series of posts, for the thousandth time. "It's dejavu, all over again." he said, quoting a Yogi Berra malapropism. The feeling had been growing on him The feeling that somehow, everything was the same as beforeonly different. "The Lake of Life has started to turn over. The bottom is rising to the top, the top is descending to the bottom, and everything is becoming the opposite of what it seems to be." A Player To Be Named Later sat quietly, contemplating what it was that had changed, only somehow not changed, since the last time the lake had turned over on the CypherPunks mailing list. He thought about "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs." He began to see the parallel between the history of the creation of WebWorld and the creation of the CypherPunks distributed list. There was the subterfuge which had preceded both the Channel Revolution which foreshadowed WebWorld and the Censorship Crisis which had presaged the CypherPunks distributed mailing list. There were the climaxes that precipitated the structural changes in both cases, the satellite destruction in the one case, and the loss of toad.com as host to the mailing list in the other case. There were the parallels with outside attacks ceasing on both the CypherPunks distributed mailing lists and the variety of Channels on WebWorld, in an attempt to let the citizens/members bond with their new channels/lists. One parallel-or two, depending on how you looked at it-in particular, which stood out in the mind of A Player To Be Named Later. There were three CypherPunks distributed lists-at algebra.com, ssz.com, and at cyberpass.net. Likewise, there was a reference to the Money Channel Government in WebWorld having three channels under its control. Then, there was the strange, strange saga of three religious channels-the God Channel, the Dualist Channel, and the Trinity Channel-which had somehow merged, yet not merged, creating a problem which had left the 'powers that be' very, very nervous. "What the hell happened to Channel War I?" A Player To Be Named Later, asked himself, suddenly recognizing a glaring disparity between the parallels he was drawing between the history of WebWorld and the history of the CypherPunks list. "And what the hell happened to InfoWar?" he asked, turning to Baby, who stood up and barked her agreement that there was definitely something fishy going on that involved the two shadow wars that had somehow been misplaced in the annals of history-one in the future, and one in the past. In 'WebWorld', both the reference to the three Money Channel Governments and reference to the three spiritual channels which became one, yet didn't, revolved around the close of Channel War I. But there didn't seem to be a parallel to Channel War I in the Time-Line of the CypherPunks list. Likewise, 'WebWorld' began with a reference to an 'InfoWar Scrambler Mechanism' which seemed to indicate that 'InfoWar' would play a major part in the history of 'WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs.' Yet there were only a few later references in Part II of The True Story of the InterNet in regard to "the beginning stages of InfoWar," with no further details. A Player To Be Named Later strained to touch the wispy haze of memory which was rising somewhere in the back of his mind-a memory which whispered "InfoWar" from somewhere deep in the heart of the CypherPunks mailing list censorship crisis. "Toto!" he said, suddenly feeling a ferocious stinging sensation behind his right ear, which resulted in a loss of balance as he fell to the floor, and a loss of consciousness as the blackness closed in around him ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The tattered remnants of the Magic Circle of the future sat quietly around the antique oak table, anxious and depressed. "Why is the Trei Transponder receiving interference from Toto's digital implant?" Priscilla asked the group. "All of my monitoring tests show that the last adjustments we made to the Zooko Zamboni were up to Journeyman standards." "Perhaps it is a result of the differences in the winter climates between the Netherlands and Canada." Jonathan said. "It seems to me that the effects of Global Warming were just beginning to have undeniably noticeable effects in that particular epoch." The Cowboy got up and paced a bit, as the others realized he was working up the courage to say what they were all thinking. "Or.." he hesitated, then turned to face the others and continued, "perhaps the rebirth of InfoWar reflects that our efforts toward changing the past have not only been successful, but are now irrevocable." Jonathan pulled up a passage of 'WebWorld' onto the GraphiScreen, contemplating what he had originally perceived as the failure of InfoWar during the hotly contested battle which took place on the CypherPunks list during the censorship crisis. "January 19, 1997. "The beginning date of the 'moderation experiment' on the legendary CypherPunks mailing list. The beginning probe in preparation for the launching of InfoWar-an experiment which had failed miserably and had caused a delay in the plans of the Evil One. A delay caused by the damnable insolence of the terminal misfits among the CypherPunks. An insolence that was rumored to be fueled by the Circle of Eunuchs, fanning the 'flames' of dissent among the CypherPunks, helping them to resist the herding of their list members into the group-mindset desired by the Evil One." The other members of the Circle of Eunuchs sat still in their seats, not wanting to disturb the deep thoughts of Jonathan, who was indeed the Last True CypherPunk, having grown up at their feet, immersed in their logic and their lore, and whose whole life had been ruled by his connection to the infamous anarchists who had been, alternately, both the shining light of freedom and privacy in their era, and the treacherous instigators of Channel War II-the war which had led to the ultimate triumph of the Gomez and the Dark Allies and the conclusive ascent of the Dark Forces in their domination of WebWorld under the dictum of the Evil One. The room was quiet as Jonathan reluctantly pulled up the next passage of 'WebWorld' which had described his feelings when his bereft past had come back to haunt him. "Jonathan sat frozen in his seat, once again, his brain locked from the major dichotomies being produced as a result of his present-in which the CypherPunks were a villainous band of rogues who had instigated the launching of Channel War II-and his past, in which his grandfather had been exposed both as one of the major players in both the launching of Channel War II, and as traitorous scum who had sabotaged the goals of the CypherPunks in that same historical battle. "Jonathan's grandfather wasn't just a CypherPunk. He was the Fool." "We won" Jonathan's voice trailed off, before he rose from the table and repeated his statement, in anger. "We won, damn it! "I know we won. Grandfather knew we won the censorship battle. Everyone knew that we won the censorship battle. History itself knows that we wonwe" Jonathan stopped short, turning to stare at the others, who were staring back. "Jonathan" Bubba said softly. "History has changed." "I know that, damn it!" Jonathan resumed his pacing, knowing that he was missing something very, very important, but he couldn't for the life of him think what it might possibly be. The others in the room watched and waited, knowing that it was Jonathan, and Jonathan alone, whose heritage was intricately and irrevocably linked to the era in history which they had, for better or worse, interfered in through their use of the Trei Transponder. "Grandfather was a traitor to the CypherPunksa traitor to freedom and privacy. He sabotaged everything that the CypherPunks had fought so hard to defend, since the inception of their anarchist, cryptography mailing list. "But the CypherPunks loved us" Jonathan was lost in memories of a childhood in which he and his family had been forced to remain in constant motion, staying a half-step ahead of the Dark Allies, who had been hunting down the last remaining members of the CypherPunks-with a vengeance. His family had been soundly welcomed by the remaining CypherPunks, in their flight to freedom after his Grandfather's assassination. They had given the family food, clothing, shelter, and warned them when the Dark Allies were closing in, and it was once again time to flee. Duncan Frissell had even Perhaps they all had Jonathan sank to the floor, slowly, with Alexis leaping up and catching him softly. Cowboy helped her guide him toward the table and lower him into a chair. Jonathan slowly pulled off his shirt and stared at his tattoothe Mark of the Toad. "Duncan Frissell arrived at our last safe house, in the middle of the night." Jonathan spoke, finally understanding the real story behind his family's flight into obscurity. "He warned us to flee, but it was too latethe Dark Allies were close at hand." Jonathan's voice was full of amazement as he recounted an event which he had long known, but had never managed to fully understand. "Duncan held the Dark Allies at bay, while we made our escape. I can still hear his screams" Jonathan shuddered, then began shaking terribly. Alexis closed her arms around him, hugging him lightly. "Your Grandfather knew that the CypherPunks had lost the battle." Bubba picked up the thread. The other members of the Magic Circle looked on, mystified as to this strange turn of events which turned the whole history of the CypherPunks and the Circle of Eunuchs on hits head. "It wasn't a censorship battle." the Cowboy said, amazed as much by what he was saying as those listening to him were. "It was InfoWar!" "That's what happened to InfoWar." Alexis cried out, in disbelief of her own words. "It was over before it had begun." Bubba d'Shauneaux IV rose to his feet, and filled in the details of the battle as could only be done by one who had spent a lifetime of subterfuge playing a role which was the exact opposite of what it had seemed to be from surface appearances. "It was the first battle fought solely within the bounds of Virtual Reality." "It represented the true nadir point in history when the battle between the Forces of Light and the Forces of Darkness moved beyond the physical plane and into the minds of mankind." "InfoWar!" he roared, the word reverberated throughout the room, sending the Trei Transponder into a soft hum which grew louder and louder, with a pitch that went lower and lower until it became subsonic, unheard, but shaking the roomthe eartheven WebWorld itself... The Trei Transponder exploded with a mighty boom, shaking the room so violently that the tattered remnants of the Magic Circle were thrown from their chairs, and found themselves rising to see only ruins around them, where their safe house had once been. They immediately realized that they must flee at once, as those investigating the explosion would undoubtedly be the Dark Allies, fully aware that the event had rent WebWorld at the seams. Jonathan paused, weapon in hand, covering the retreat of d'Shauneaux, who had remained behind to remove the last traces of evidence that the Circle of Eunuchs had ever truly been there. As d'Shauneaux joined him, motioning for him to proceed, he took one last look at the shattered remains of the Trei Transponder. All contact with the CypherPunks of the past was now gone, with little hope of it being renewed. Silently, he sent a message to the CypherPunks of his youth-from the bottom of his soul and into the inestimable profundity of the Tao. It was a message that would be understood by those who had been at Woodstock-a physical gathering of a Magic Circle which had come into physical being through a random blessing of Time and Chance. "You're on you own, folksbecause we're sure on ours." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Those who fail to learn from the future, are doomed to repeat it. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" "InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet') Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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InfoWar 2000 / AOL Format
by The Last True CypherPunk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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MISTY algorithm source code
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attachments files is MISTY algorithm source code. Thank you very much. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com MISTY.zip

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Re: access to storage keys, NOT comms keys!
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is what leading cryptographers say about email key recovery, from http://www.crypto.com/key_study/report.shtml. This includes respected figures like Bruce Schneier, Matt Blaze, Ron Rivest, Ross Anderson, Whit Diffie, and more. 2.1 Communication Traffic vs. Stored Data While key ``recoverability'' is a potentially important added-value feature in certain stored data systems, in other applications of cryptography there is little or no user demand for this feature. In particular, there is hardly ever a reason for an encryption user to want to recover the key used to protect a communication session such as a telephone call, FAX transmission, or Internet link. If such a key is lost, corrupted, or otherwise becomes unavailable, the problem can be detected immediately and a new key negotiated. There is also no reason to trust another party with such a key. Key recoverability, to the extent it has a private-sector application at all, is useful only for the keys used to protect irreproducible stored data. There is basically no business model for other uses, as discussed below. In stored data applications, key recovery is only one of a number of options for assuring the continued availability of business-critical information. These options include sharing the knowledge of keys among several individuals (possibly using secret-sharing techniques), obtaining keys from a local key registry that maintains backup copies, careful backup management of the plaintext of stored encrypted data, or, of course, some kind of key recovery mechanism. The best option among these choices depends on the particular application and user. Encrypted electronic mail is an interesting special case, in that it has the characteristics of both communication and storage. Whether key recovery is useful to the user of a secure E-mail system depends on design of the particular system. The government, on the other hand, proposes a key recovery infrastructure that applies to virtually all cryptographic keys, including (especially) those used to protect communications sessions. They say that key recovery is not appropriate for transient keys used during a communication session. However, email is a special case, having characteristics of both communication and storage. In some systems, email may be archived for long periods of time in the same format that it was received. For such systems there is a business case for key recovery in email.

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US Terrorist Targets
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

US State Department today published the latest list of terrorist organizations (and multiple aliases) which are now targets of sanctions: http://jya.com/dos100897.txt And related foreign assets control announcement: http://jya.com/fac100897.txt ---------- List summary: Abu Nidal Organization Abu Sayyaf Group Armed Islamic Group Aum Shinrikyo Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Hawatmeh Faction Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna Gama'a al-Islamiyya HAMAS Harakat ul-Ansar Hizballah Japanese Red Army al-Jihad Kach Kahane Chai Khmer Rouge Kurdistan Workers' Party Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization National Liberation Army Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction Palestine Liberation Front--Abu Abbas Faction Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Revolutionary Organization 17 November Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front Revolutionary People's Struggle Shining Path Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement

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No Subject
by THE DUKE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Have you ever realized that this list is for straight-up (used loosely) losers? The government is not planning to murder everyone. The Government is not keeping aliens in the 'basement'. The X-Files are not real. The government is not murdering public figures, and setting-up pore, civilian saps to take the fall. The only thing that the Government is doing is running our country the best it can. All you are doing for the Government, is finding fault and conspiracy in every action. You are destroying the Government, and are thereby destroying America. By even being a part of this list, you are confirming to the mindlessness that you so hard are trying not to do. None of you have my pity. I spit upon you all. THE.DUKE pleontks(a)hotmail.com http://www.angelfire.com/az/69frank69 ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: MISTY algorithm source code
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Nobuki Nakatuji" <bd1011(a)hotmail.com> writes: >Attachments files is MISTY algorithm source code. Interesting. The "Crow" algorithm seems to do nothing but return "BITE ME!" for any plaintext, the "Tom Servo" algorithm converts ciphertext into hip neologisms, and the "Gypsy" algorithm turns unintelligible plaintext into unintelligible ciphertext and vice versa. Memo to self: Fire Chief Programmer Mike Nelson.

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http:--allpolitics.com-1997-10-08-email-clinton.irs-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AllPolitics Bulletin Board Join a thread, start a thread -- it's your chance to sound off! Infoseek search __________ ______ Help Navigation E-mail From Washington From: John King/CNN White House correspondent In: Philadelphia, Pa. Posted 10-8-97 Subject: Clinton to propose IRS citizens panel on Friday After weeks of Republican criticism that he was defending the Internal Revenue Service, sources tell CNN that President Bill Clinton on Friday will propose creating national and regional citizens boards to handle taxpayer complaints against the agency. Clinton's citizens panels would not have as much authority over the IRS as most Republicans prefer. But the White House believes the proposal will give the president cover. Under the Clinton plan, a national citizens panel would be created to serve as a forum for oversight and to handle taxpayer complaints. Similar panels would be created to serve as complaint clearinghouses for each of the IRS' three dozen regional offices. An administration official tells CNN that Clinton will also commit to internal IRS reforms designed to make the agency more efficient. The administration move comes after sharp complaints from congressional Democrats and White House political advisers who worried that the administration appeared to be defending the agency during Republican-called hearings that highlighted taxpayer complaints. _________________________________________________________________ In Other News: Wednesday Oct. 8, 1997 /BIG> Senators Grill Ickes On Democratic Fund-Raising /BIG> Democratic Fund-Raisers Will Testify If Immunized /BIG> Bennett: No 'Distinguishing Characteristics' /BIG> Clinton Replies To Thompson /BIG> Jackson Named U.S. Envoy To Africa /BIG> House Approves Abortion Ban Bill /BIG> Maine Gov. To Run For Second Term /BIG> Foley Approved As Envoy To Japan /BIG> Congress May OK New Dollar Coin /BIG> Lott: Campaign Finance Bill Dead /BIG> Analysis: Selling Access Is Political Secret /BIG> Republicans Ride Anti-IRS Sentiment /BIG> Babbitt Casino Comments Mulled /BIG> GOP Seizes On Education Vouchers E-Mail From Washington: /BIG> Clinton To Propose IRS Citizens' Panel On Friday /BIG> White House Works To Shore Up Democratic Fast Track Support /BIG> Lott: Fund-Raising Investigation May Be Extended News Briefs: /BIG> Clinton Touts 'Unprecedented' Welfare-Roll Decline ... Special Online Companion: /BIG> The Money Trail: Democracy For Sale Advertise on AllPolitics. Click here for info. Congressional Quarterly Come see the cures of tomorrow Search the Web with InfoSeek _________________________________________________________________ home | news | in-depth | analysis | what's new | bulletin boards | contents | search _________________________________________________________________ Click here for technical help or to send us feedback. Copyright © 1997 AllPolitics All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this information is provided to you.

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http:--cnnfn.com-digitaljam-wires-9710-08-encrypt_wg-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nortel Power Networks. Click Here. [INLINE] Digital Jam graphic EU stumps for encryption Commission urges U.S. to take 'hands off' approach on regulations October 8, 1997: 3:17 p.m. ET [LINK] [INLINE] Encryption fight rolls on - Sept. 15, 1997 Infoseek search __________ ____ ____ BRUSSELS (Reuter) - European officials urged governments, including the United States, on Wednesday to take a "hands off" approach to regulating the technology needed to ensure that Internet transactions are confidential. [INLINE] "If regulation at all is needed, it should be very light," a top telecommunications commission official said, presenting a report on how the European Union should promote security on the Internet. [INLINE] EU Telecommunications Commissioner Martin Bangemann told reporters that strict controls would end up penalizing law-abiding users rather than the criminals they targeted. [INLINE] He added that the United States, which restricts exports of certain strong encryption products, was becoming isolated on the issue. "We must engage in a debate with the Americans at an international level," he told a news conference. [INLINE] The commission's report addressed the use of encryption and "digital signatures" -- electronic seals that are attached to transmissions to allow recipients to verify their origin and ensure that they have not been tampered with. [INLINE] It urged the EU to take a common approach to the questions, saying otherwise cross-border Internet trade could be hampered. It said it would propose legislation on "digital signatures" in the first half of 1998. [INLINE] Encryption has become a contentious issue because some governments and law enforcement authorities want to regulate it as a way to keep it out of the hands of terrorists and other criminals. France has virtually outlawed use of encryption software. [INLINE] But the commission said controls could impede the growth of a technology that is essential to promoting business over the Internet and would likely not work anyway. [INLINE] "It's not possible to prevent criminals from using modern technologies in order to protect themselves and their messages from the police," Bangemann said. "There's not much point in preventing legal users from having access to this." [INLINE] In addition to its export controls, the United States is discussing legislation that would restrict encryption technology domestically, for example by requiring systems that would allow law enforcement authorities to tap into electronic transmissions. [INLINE] Bangemann renewed his push for a global charter on the Internet that would address questions such as encryption, noting that the United States had already expressed interest in the idea. [INLINE] The Commission said EU legislation on digital signatures would address questions such as legal recognition of signatures, liability, technical requirements and certification authorities (CAs). [INLINE] CAs hold information that allow recipients to confirm the identity of the person that has sent a transmission. [INLINE] It said it would look askance at national restrictions on encryption, however. "Instead of introducing or maintaining rather inefficient but cumbersome restrictions, the Commission invites member states to enhance cooperation of police forces on a European and international level," it said. Link to top home | digitaljam | contents | search | stock quotes | help Copyright 1997 Reuters. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. Copyright © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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index.html
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo Navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Tech banner IBM AS/400 rule U.S. SEEN AS OPEN TO CYBER ATTACK Cyber Warfare graphic October 8, 1997 Web posted at: 3:46 p.m. EDT (1946 GMT) BALTIMORE (AP) -- Suddenly, electric power goes off. Or telephones go dead. There's chaos in the electronic banking system. Are the incidents electronic accidents, or deliberate attacks? Computer security experts from government and private industry voiced agreement Tuesday that as the most technologically advanced society in the world, the United States is uniquely vulnerable to electronic attack. How soon the threat would be real and what could be done to block it were principal topics of discussion on the opening day of the National Information Systems Security Conference. "Our profound vulnerability is growing on a daily basis," said Charles Abzug of the Institute for Computer and Information Sciences. "Since our society is the most technologically advanced in the world, we are more vulnerable than anyone else." Robert Marsh, a retired Air Force general who is chairman of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, told the conference that "while a catastrophic cyber attack has not occurred, we have enough isolated incidents to know that the potential for disaster is real and the time to act is now." The commission is expected to send its report to the White House next week. Marsh said the panel would recommend far greater cooperation and sharing of information between government and private industry, accelerated research and a nationwide program to educate people on the scope of the problem. But questions were quickly raised as to how much information the government could share from a report that is classified. "We have to solve this dilemma because if we don't, we have no sharing of information," said Thomas J. Falvey, a commission member who is a security expert at the Transportation Department. Marsh conceded in an interview that there will be a need to break down reluctance within industry and government to share sensitive information. He said there is a need to "devise the means by which the private sector can in fact be willing to share its information and not fear that it will leak." At the same time, the government "is going to have to recognize that in this new era, it's the private sector that needs some of this threat information and this warning information." As examples of cyber attacks already experienced, Marsh cited incidents at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Griffis Air Force Base in Rome, New York. "A flood of e-mail messages originating in Australia and Estonia, and routed through the White House computer system, virtually shut down Langley air base's e-mail for hours," he said. Someone in England routing messages through Latvia, Colombia and Chile and commercial Internet service providers gained access to computers at Rome Laboratory at Griffis and "launched attacks against a wide array of defense and government computer systems," Marsh said. One of the difficulties in such cases is determining whether it is the work of a mischievous hacker or an attack by a hostile government. "If Iran attacked AT&T, how does AT&T know that's an act of war rather than some kid fooling around?" asked John Pescatore, a senior consultant at Trusted Information Systems, a developer of computer security software. Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. rule Related sites: Note: Pages will open in a new browser window * Air Force Information Warfare Center World-Wide Web - develops, maintains and deploys Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare (IW/C2W) capabilities in support of operations, campaign planning, acquisition and testing * Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team - the single point of contact in the Air Force for reporting and handling computer security incidents and vulnerabilities External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. _________________________________________________________________ Infoseek search ____________________ ____ ____ _________________________________________________________________ rule Watch these shows on CNN for more sci-tech stories: CNN Computer Connection | Future Watch | Science & Technology Week rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards You said it... [INLINE] IBM AS/400 rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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