December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Secure Phone: Making man in the middle audible.
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a method to render Man in the Middle audible on a telephone connection. Before speech can be encrypted, it is digitized and compressed. It is turned into digital packets. There is some choice in the size and other properties of the digital packets. Suppose that Bob's computer from time to time formulates a plan to do groups of a particular size and form, and sends Ann's computer a hash of that plan and the DH negotiated shared secret. Malloc (the man in the middle) cannot send this hash to Ann's computer for Ann would discover the shared secret she is using is not the same as the shared Bob is using. So his computer must formulate its own plan, and send its own hash, which will not agree with Bob's plan, because Bob's computer does not reveal the plan except by actually sending the packets. So malloc must decompress Bob's speech packets, repacketize them, and recompress them, Often he will not be able to send off a packet, until he has received two of Bob's packets. So this triples the delay, and increases the speech degradation. This should quite noticeable, noticeable enough to provoke Bob and Ann into verifying their connection by reading the hash digits of their shared secret. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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RE: EU Rejects GAK
by Phillip Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Before people get carried away it is important to realise that the EU institutions do not map onto US ones. The EU Commission does not have an analogue in the US system. It is an unelected group of beureacrats whose purpose is (roughly speaking) to harmonize EU law. It does not have legislative powers in its own right, nor does it necessarily have much influence. The EU lawmaking process is essentially that the Commision drafts some suggestions and passes them onto the council of ministers which accepts, rejects or ammends them. If there is unanimous agreement in the concil of ministers (majority vote on a restricted number of issues) then a directive is issued which the national parliaments must then enact into law. The limited scope of EU laws is critical, the EU is much like the US prior to the civil war, the member states are sovereign. Thus there is nothing the EU Commission can do to prevent member states outlawing crypto, nor for that matter can they force them to allow it. They can assist in forming EU wide regulations either way however. The real importance of the EU report is probably that it denies the statements made by the Freeh et. al. claiming that US alies in Europe are in favour of GAK. Despite the fact that there has never been any public demonstration of a commitment the administration has disingenuously claimed that it has the support of and indeed is being pressured to take its stance on export controls by other countries. Needless to say it is unconvincing to be told 'trust me' by someone who is clearly peddling a lie. Few people can prove it is a lie because few people can claim to have the personal access to European politicians the administration can. I know UK politics well enough to know that the current parliament is not going to back any increase of powers for a security service that many members of the government was used politically by the Conservatives. It would be like the nation of Islam calling for arbitrary arrest powers for the police. Phill

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Re: 6502 ML programming
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you guys are still doing 6502 work, maybe you can make use of this. -- * RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm * * *********************************************************************** * ** Message-digest routines: ** * ** To form the message digest for a message M ** * ** (1) Initialize a context buffer mdContext using MD5Init ** * ** (2) Call MD5Update on mdContext and M ** * ** (3) Call MD5Final on mdContext ** * ** The message digest is now in the bugffer passed to MD5Final ** * *********************************************************************** * ORG $2000 * Jump Table JMP MD5INIT JMP MD5UPD JMP MD5FINAL DIGEST HEX 00000000 ;Message digest ends up here. HEX 00000000 HEX 00000000 HEX 00000000 MD5INITV HEX 01234567 ;MD5 initialization values HEX 89ABCDEF HEX FEDCBA98 HEX 76543210 MD5BYTES DS 8 ;Counts bytes in message digest so far MD5BUFRP HEX 00 ;Pointer to current byte in partially full buffer MD5BUFR DS 64 ;64-byte buffer for current MD5 block * Initialize MD5 - start new message digest MD5INIT LDX #15 ;Load initialization constants ]LOOP LDA MD5INITV,X STA DIGEST,X DEX BPL ]LOOP LDA #0 ;Reset byte count to zero LDX #7 ]LOOP STA MD5BYTES,X DEX BPL ]LOOP STA MD5BUFRP ;Reset buffer to empty ]RTS RTS * MD5UPD - add a byte to the message digest MD5UPD LDX MD5BUFRP STA MD5BUFR,X INX STX MD5BUFRP JSR INCBYTES CPX #64 BCC ]RTS LDX #0 STX MD5BUFRP JSR MD5DOBLK RTS INCBYTES INC MD5BYTES BNE ]RTS INC MD5BYTES+1 BNE ]RTS INC MD5BYTES+2 BNE ]RTS HEX 0000 * MD5FINAL - do last block and compute final digest MD5FINAL LDA #$80 LDX MD5BUFRP STA MD5BUFR,X INX STX MD5BUFRP ]LOOP CPX #64 BCC MD5FA LDX #0 STX MD5BUFRP JSR MD5DOBLK MD5FA LDX MD5BUFRP LDA #0 STA MD5BUFR,X INX STX MD5BUFRP CPX #56 BNE ]LOOP LDA MD5BYTES STA MD5BUFR+56 LDA MD5BYTES+1 STA MD5BUFR+57 LDA MD5BYTES+2 STA MD5BUFR+58 LDA MD5BYTES+3 STA MD5BUFR+59 LDA MD5BYTES+4 STA MD5BUFR+60 LDA MD5BYTES+5 STA MD5BUFR+61 LDA MD5BYTES+6 STA MD5BUFR+62 LDA MD5BYTES+7 STA MD5BUFR+63 LUP 3 ;Multiply times 8 LDA MD5BUFR+56 ; to convert number of bytes to number of bits ASL STA MD5BUFR+56 LDA MD5BUFR+57 ROL STA MD5BUFR+57 LDA MD5BUFR+58 ROL STA MD5BUFR+58 LDA MD5BUFR+59 ROL ;Unlikely the message would be over 500 MB STA MD5BUFR+59 ;so we can stop here... --^ JSR MD5DOBLK RTS MD5TEMPB DS 16 ;Temporary buffer for a,b,c,d MD5TEMPV DS 4 ;Temporary 32-bit word storage (used by MD5DOBLK) MD5TEMP2 DS 4 ;Temporary 32-bit variable #2 (used by F,G,H,I fcns) * Block transformation MD5DOBLK LDX #15 ;Copy values into temp buffer ]LOOP LDA DIGEST,X STA MD5TEMPB,X DEX BPL ]LOOP LDA #0 STA MD5TP * Round 1 : F-functions * a = b + ((a + F(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ JSR MD5LOADA ;1 (a,b,c,d) JSR F_BCD JSR NEXT_T ;(D76AA478) LDA #0 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL7 ;Rotate Left 7 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;2 (d,a,b,c) JSR F_ABC JSR NEXT_T ;(E8C7B756) LDA #1 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL12 ;Rotate Left 12 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;3 (c,d,a,b) JSR F_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #2 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL17 ;Rotate left 17 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;4 (b,c,d,a) JSR F_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #3 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL22 ;Rotate left 22 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;5 (a,b,c,d) JSR F_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #4 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL7 ;<<7 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;6 (d,a,b,c) JSR F_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #5 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL12 ;<<12 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;7 (c,d,a,b) JSR F_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #6 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL17 ;<<17 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;8 (b,c,d,a) JSR F_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #7 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL22 ;<<22 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;9 (a,b,c,d) JSR F_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #8 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL7 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;10 (d,a,b,c) JSR F_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #9 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL12 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;11 (c,d,a,b) JSR F_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #10 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL17 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;12 (b,c,d,a) JSR F_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #11 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL22 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;13 (a,b,c,d) JSR F_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #12 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL7 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;14 (d,a,b,c) JSR F_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #13 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL12 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;15 (c,d,a,b) JSR F_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #14 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL17 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;16 (b,c,d,a) JSR F_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #15 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL22 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB * Round 2 : G-functions * a = b + ((a + G(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ JSR MD5LOADA ;17 (a,b,c,d) JSR G_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #1 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL5 ;Rotate Left 5 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;18 (d,a,b,c) JSR G_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #6 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL9 ;Rotate Left 9 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;19 (c,d,a,b) JSR G_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #11 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL14 ;Rotate left 14 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;20 (b,c,d,a) JSR G_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #0 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL20 ;Rotate left 20 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;21 (a,b,c,d) JSR G_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #5 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL5 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;22 (d,a,b,c) JSR G_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #10 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL9 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;23 (c,d,a,b) JSR G_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #15 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL14 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;24 (b,c,d,a) JSR G_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #4 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL20 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;25 (a,b,c,d) JSR G_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #9 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL5 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;26 (d,a,b,c) JSR G_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #14 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL9 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;27 (c,d,a,b) JSR G_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #3 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL14 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;28 (b,c,d,a) JSR G_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #8 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL20 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;29 (a,b,c,d) JSR G_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #13 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL5 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;30 (d,a,b,c) JSR G_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #2 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL9 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;31 (c,d,a,b) JSR G_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #7 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL14 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;32 (b,c,d,a) JSR G_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #12 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL20 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB * Round 3 : H-functions * a = b + ((a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ JSR MD5LOADA ;33 (a,b,c,d) JSR H_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #5 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL4 ;Rotate Left 4 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;34 (d,a,b,c) JSR H_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #8 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL11 ;Rotate Left 11 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;35 (c,d,a,b) JSR H_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #11 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL16 ;Rotate left 16 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;36 (b,c,d,a) JSR H_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #14 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL23 ;Rotate left 23 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;37 (a,b,c,d) JSR H_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #1 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL4 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;38 (d,a,b,c) JSR H_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #4 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL11 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;39 (c,d,a,b) JSR H_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #7 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL16 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;40 (b,c,d,a) JSR H_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #10 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL23 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;41 (a,b,c,d) JSR H_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #13 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL4 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;42 (d,a,b,c) JSR H_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #0 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL11 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;43 (c,d,a,b) JSR H_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #3 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL16 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;44 (b,c,d,a) JSR H_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #6 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL23 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;45 (a,b,c,d) JSR H_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #9 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL4 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;46 (d,a,b,c) JSR H_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #12 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL11 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;47 (c,d,a,b) JSR H_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #15 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL16 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;48 (b,c,d,a) JSR H_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #2 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL23 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB * Round 4 : I-functions * a = b + ((a + I(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ JSR MD5LOADA ;49 (a,b,c,d) JSR I_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #0 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL6 ;Rotate Left 6 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;50 (d,a,b,c) JSR I_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #7 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL10 ;Rotate Left 10 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;51 (c,d,a,b) JSR I_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #14 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL15 ;Rotate left 15 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;52 (b,c,d,a) JSR I_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #5 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL21 ;Rotate left 21 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;53 (a,b,c,d) JSR I_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #12 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL6 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;54 (d,a,b,c) JSR I_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #3 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL10 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;55 (c,d,a,b) JSR I_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #10 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL15 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;56 (b,c,d,a) JSR I_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #1 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL21 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;57 (a,b,c,d) JSR I_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #8 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL6 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;58 (d,a,b,c) JSR I_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #15 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL10 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;59 (c,d,a,b) JSR I_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #6 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL15 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;60 (b,c,d,a) JSR I_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #13 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL21 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB JSR MD5LOADA ;61 (a,b,c,d) JSR I_BCD JSR NEXT_T LDA #4 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL6 JSR MD5ADDB JSR MD5STORA JSR MD5LOADD ;62 (d,a,b,c) JSR I_ABC JSR NEXT_T LDA #11 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL10 JSR MD5ADDA JSR MD5STORD JSR MD5LOADC ;63 (c,d,a,b) JSR I_DAB JSR NEXT_T LDA #2 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL15 JSR MD5ADDD JSR MD5STORC JSR MD5LOADB ;64 (b,c,d,a) JSR I_CDA JSR NEXT_T LDA #9 JSR MD5ADDX JSR MD5RL21 JSR MD5ADDC JSR MD5STORB * Add value to previous digest. * Note that this is four seperate 32-bit additions CLC LDA MD5TEMPB ADC DIGEST STA DIGEST LDA MD5TEMPB+1 ADC DIGEST+1 STA DIGEST+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 ADC DIGEST+2 STA DIGEST+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 ADC DIGEST+3 STA DIGEST+3 CLC LDA MD5TEMPB+4 ADC DIGEST+4 STA DIGEST+4 LDA MD5TEMPB+5 ADC DIGEST+5 STA DIGEST+5 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 ADC DIGEST+6 STA DIGEST+6 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 ADC DIGEST+7 STA DIGEST+7 CLC LDA MD5TEMPB+8 ADC DIGEST+8 STA DIGEST+8 LDA MD5TEMPB+9 ADC DIGEST+9 STA DIGEST+9 LDA MD5TEMPB+10 ADC DIGEST+10 STA DIGEST+10 LDA MD5TEMPB+11 ADC DIGEST+11 STA DIGEST+11 CLC LDA MD5TEMPB+12 ADC DIGEST+12 STA DIGEST+12 LDA MD5TEMPB+13 ADC DIGEST+13 STA DIGEST+13 LDA MD5TEMPB+14 ADC DIGEST+14 STA DIGEST+14 LDA MD5TEMPB+15 ADC DIGEST+15 STA DIGEST+15 RTS * Basic MD5 functions MD5LOADA LDA MD5TEMPB ;Put 'A' into temp variable STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS MD5LOADB LDA MD5TEMPB+4 ;Put 'B' into temp variable STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+5 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS MD5LOADC LDA MD5TEMPB+8 ;Put 'C' into temp variable STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+9 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+10 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+11 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS MD5LOADD LDA MD5TEMPB+12 ;Put 'D' into temp variable STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+13 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+14 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+15 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS MD5STORA LDA MD5TEMPV ;Store temp variable into 'A' in temp buffer STA MD5TEMPB LDA MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPB+1 LDA MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPB+2 LDA MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPB+3 RTS MD5STORB LDA MD5TEMPV ;Store temp variable into 'B' STA MD5TEMPB+4 LDA MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPB+5 LDA MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPB+6 LDA MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPB+7 RTS MD5STORC LDA MD5TEMPV ;Store temp variable into 'C' STA MD5TEMPB+8 LDA MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPB+9 LDA MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPB+10 LDA MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPB+11 RTS MD5STORD LDA MD5TEMPV ;Store temp variable into 'D' STA MD5TEMPB+12 LDA MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPB+13 LDA MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPB+14 LDA MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPB+15 RTS MD5ADDA CLC ;Add 'A' to temp variable LDA MD5TEMPB ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS MD5ADDB CLC ;Add 'B' to temp variable LDA MD5TEMPB+4 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+5 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS MD5ADDC CLC ;Add 'C' to temp variable LDA MD5TEMPB+8 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+9 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+10 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+11 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS MD5ADDD CLC ;Add 'D' to temp variable LDA MD5TEMPB+12 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+13 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+14 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+15 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS * F function: * F(X,Y,Z) = XY v not(X) Z F_BCD LDA MD5TEMPB+4 ;B&C AND MD5TEMPB+8 STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+5 AND MD5TEMPB+9 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 AND MD5TEMPB+10 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 AND MD5TEMPB+11 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(B)&D or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB+4 EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+12 ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+5 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+13 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+14 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+15 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS F_ABC LDA MD5TEMPB ;A&B AND MD5TEMPB+4 STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+1 AND MD5TEMPB+5 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 AND MD5TEMPB+6 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 AND MD5TEMPB+7 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(A)&C or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+8 ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+9 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+10 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+11 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS F_DAB LDA MD5TEMPB+12 ;D&A AND MD5TEMPB STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+13 AND MD5TEMPB+1 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+14 AND MD5TEMPB+2 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+15 AND MD5TEMPB+3 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(D)&B or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB+12 EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+4 ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+13 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+5 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+14 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+6 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+15 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+7 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS F_CDA LDA MD5TEMPB+8 ;C&D AND MD5TEMPB+12 STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+9 AND MD5TEMPB+13 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+10 AND MD5TEMPB+14 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+11 AND MD5TEMPB+15 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(C)&A or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB+8 EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+9 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+1 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+10 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+2 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+11 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+3 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS * G Function: * G(X,Y,Z) = XZ v Y not(Z) G_BCD LDA MD5TEMPB+4 ;B&D AND MD5TEMPB+12 STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+5 AND MD5TEMPB+13 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 AND MD5TEMPB+14 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 AND MD5TEMPB+15 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(D)&C or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB+12 EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+8 ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+13 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+9 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+14 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+10 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+15 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+11 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS G_ABC LDA MD5TEMPB ;A&C AND MD5TEMPB+8 STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+1 AND MD5TEMPB+9 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 AND MD5TEMPB+10 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 AND MD5TEMPB+11 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(C)&B or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB+8 EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+4 ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+9 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+5 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+10 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+6 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+11 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+7 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS G_DAB LDA MD5TEMPB+4 ;B&D AND MD5TEMPB+12 STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+5 AND MD5TEMPB+13 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 AND MD5TEMPB+14 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 AND MD5TEMPB+15 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(B)&A or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB+4 EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+5 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+1 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+2 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+3 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS G_CDA LDA MD5TEMPB ;C&A AND MD5TEMPB+8 STA MD5TEMP2 LDA MD5TEMPB+1 AND MD5TEMPB+9 STA MD5TEMP2+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 AND MD5TEMPB+10 STA MD5TEMP2+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 AND MD5TEMPB+11 STA MD5TEMP2+3 CLC ;not(A)&D or (previous) -> MD5TEMPV+= LDA MD5TEMPB EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+12 ORA MD5TEMP2 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+13 ORA MD5TEMP2+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+14 ORA MD5TEMP2+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 ; EOR #$FF AND MD5TEMPB+15 ORA MD5TEMP2+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS * H function: * H(X,Y,Z) = X xor Y xor Z H_BCD CLC ;BxCxD LDA MD5TEMPB+4 EOR MD5TEMPB+8 EOR MD5TEMPB+12 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+5 EOR MD5TEMPB+9 EOR MD5TEMPB+13 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 EOR MD5TEMPB+10 EOR MD5TEMPB+14 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 EOR MD5TEMPB+11 EOR MD5TEMPB+15 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS H_ABC CLC ;AxBxC LDA MD5TEMPB EOR MD5TEMPB+4 EOR MD5TEMPB+8 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 EOR MD5TEMPB+5 EOR MD5TEMPB+9 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 EOR MD5TEMPB+6 EOR MD5TEMPB+10 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 EOR MD5TEMPB+7 EOR MD5TEMPB+11 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS H_DAB CLC ;AxBxD LDA MD5TEMPB EOR MD5TEMPB+4 EOR MD5TEMPB+12 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 EOR MD5TEMPB+5 EOR MD5TEMPB+13 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 EOR MD5TEMPB+6 EOR MD5TEMPB+14 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 EOR MD5TEMPB+7 EOR MD5TEMPB+15 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS H_CDA CLC ;AxCxD LDA MD5TEMPB EOR MD5TEMPB+8 EOR MD5TEMPB+12 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 EOR MD5TEMPB+9 EOR MD5TEMPB+13 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 EOR MD5TEMPB+10 EOR MD5TEMPB+14 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 EOR MD5TEMPB+11 EOR MD5TEMPB+15 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS * I function * I(X,Y,Z) = Y xor (X v not(Z)) I_BCD CLC ~D|B^C LDA MD5TEMPB+12 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+4 EOR MD5TEMPB+8 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+13 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+5 EOR MD5TEMPB+9 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+14 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+6 EOR MD5TEMPB+10 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+15 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+7 EOR MD5TEMPB+11 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS I_ABC CLC ~C|A^B LDA MD5TEMPB+8 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB EOR MD5TEMPB+4 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+9 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+1 EOR MD5TEMPB+5 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+10 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+2 EOR MD5TEMPB+6 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+11 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+3 EOR MD5TEMPB+7 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS I_DAB CLC ~B|D^A LDA MD5TEMPB+4 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+12 EOR MD5TEMPB ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+5 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+13 EOR MD5TEMPB+1 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+6 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+14 EOR MD5TEMPB+2 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+7 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+15 EOR MD5TEMPB+3 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS I_CDA CLC ~A|C^D LDA MD5TEMPB EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+8 EOR MD5TEMPB+12 ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPB+1 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+9 EOR MD5TEMPB+13 ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPB+2 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+10 EOR MD5TEMPB+14 ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPB+3 EOR #$FF ORA MD5TEMPB+11 EOR MD5TEMPB+15 ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS *Rotate left functions MD5RL LDA MD5TEMPV ;Rotate the 32-bit temp var left by one bit ASL STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5TEMPV+1 ROL STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5TEMPV+2 ROL STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5TEMPV+3 ROL STA MD5TEMPV+3 LDA MD5TEMPV ;Take high bit and wrap around; ADC #0 ; add it to empty position in lowest byte STA MD5TEMPV RTS * This is somewhat sloppy but it works * It should be optimized to use full byte shifts when possible. MD5RL7 LUP 7 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL12 LUP 12 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL17 LUP 17 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL22 LUP 22 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL5 LUP 5 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL9 LUP 9 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL14 LUP 14 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL20 LUP 20 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL4 LUP 4 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL11 LUP 11 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL16 LUP 16 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL23 LUP 23 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL6 LUP 6 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL10 LUP 10 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL15 LUP 15 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS MD5RL21 LUP 21 JSR MD5RL --^ RTS *Get data from input block and add it to temp variable MD5ADDX ASL ASL CLC ;It better not be greater than 16 anyway! TAX LDA MD5BUFR,X ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5BUFR+1,X ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5BUFR+2,X ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5BUFR+3,X ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 RTS *Get next element from table and add it to temp variable NEXT_T LDX MD5TP CLC LDA MD5T+3,X ;reverse byte order ADC MD5TEMPV STA MD5TEMPV LDA MD5T+2,X ADC MD5TEMPV+1 STA MD5TEMPV+1 LDA MD5T+1,X ADC MD5TEMPV+2 STA MD5TEMPV+2 LDA MD5T,X ADC MD5TEMPV+3 STA MD5TEMPV+3 INX INX INX INX STX MD5TP RTS * MD5 Sine Constants * The following is the 64-element MD5 table T[1 ... 64] constructed from * the sine function. Let T[i] denote the i-th element of the table, which * is equal to the integer part of 2^32, or 4294967296, times abs(sin(i)), * where i is in radians. * * Sorry, Colin, no occult messages here. :) * These need to be re-arranged to LSB-first * (which is done by the NEXT_T subroutine) MD5TP HEX 00 ;Pointer to current element in table below MD5T * /* Round 1 */ HEX D76AA478 ; /* 1 */ HEX E8C7B756 ; /* 2 */ HEX 242070DB ; /* 3 */ HEX C1BDCEEE ; /* 4 */ HEX F57C0FAF ; /* 5 */ HEX 4787C62A ; /* 6 */ HEX A8304613 ; /* 7 */ HEX FD469501 ; /* 8 */ HEX 698098D8 ; /* 9 */ HEX 8B44F7AF ; /* 10 */ HEX FFFF5BB1 ; /* 11 */ HEX 895CD7BE ; /* 12 */ HEX 6B901122 ; /* 13 */ HEX FD987193 ; /* 14 */ HEX A679438E ; /* 15 */ HEX 49B40821 ; /* 16 */ * /* Round 2 */ HEX F61E2562 ; /* 17 */ HEX C040B340 ; /* 18 */ HEX 265E5A51 ; /* 19 */ HEX E9B6C7AA ; /* 20 */ HEX D62F105D ; /* 21 */ HEX 02441453 ; /* 22 */ HEX D8A1E681 ; /* 23 */ HEX E7D3FBC8 ; /* 24 */ HEX 21E1CDE6 ; /* 25 */ HEX C33707D6 ; /* 26 */ HEX F4D50D87 ; /* 27 */ HEX 455A14ED ; /* 28 */ HEX A9E3E905 ; /* 29 */ HEX FCEFA3F8 ; /* 30 */ HEX 676F02D9 ; /* 31 */ HEX 8D2A4C8A ; /* 32 */ * /* Round 3 */ HEX FFFA3942 ; /* 33 */ HEX 8771F681 ; /* 34 */ HEX 6D9D6122 ; /* 35 */ HEX FDE5380C ; /* 36 */ HEX A4BEEA44 ; /* 37 */ HEX 4BDECFA9 ; /* 38 */ HEX F6BB4B60 ; /* 39 */ HEX BEBFBC70 ; /* 40 */ HEX 289B7EC6 ; /* 41 */ HEX EAA127FA ; /* 42 */ HEX D4EF3085 ; /* 43 */ HEX 04881D05 ; /* 44 */ HEX D9D4D039 ; /* 45 */ HEX E6DB99E5 ; /* 46 */ HEX 1FA27CF8 ; /* 47 */ HEX C4AC5665 ; /* 48 */ * /* Round 4 */ HEX F4292244 ; /* 49 */ HEX 432AFF97 ; /* 50 */ HEX AB9423A7 ; /* 51 */ HEX FC93A039 ; /* 52 */ HEX 655B59C3 ; /* 53 */ HEX 8F0CCC92 ; /* 54 */ HEX FFEFF47D ; /* 55 */ HEX 85845DD1 ; /* 56 */ HEX 6FA87E4F ; /* 57 */ HEX FE2CE6E0 ; /* 58 */ HEX A3014314 ; /* 59 */ HEX 4E0811A1 ; /* 60 */ HEX F7537E82 ; /* 61 */ HEX BD3AF235 ; /* 62 */ HEX 2AD7D2BB ; /* 63 */ HEX EB86D391 ; /* 64 */

2 1

Identical Password and Member ID
by Travel Group Email Account 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Joe, Our records show that your Expedia account contains a member ID and password that are identical. While we understand that this makes it simpler for you to remember them, we are now asking our members to create passwords that do not match their member ID's. We appreciate your assistance in this small change, which increases the security of your account. You can change your password by following these steps: 1. Access your Expedia Member Information http://expedia.msn.com/pub/signup.dll?qscr=uupd 2. Click Continue on the Expedia sign in screen. 3. If prompted, enter current member ID and password, and then click Continue. 4. Click Continue on the secure sign in screen. 5. Follow instructions for section labeled 3 of 6: Password. 6. Click Continue. Thank you for using Expedia. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions.

1 0

ANY OF YOUR ANSWERS YES?
by BIZ-BEST＠profits.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I read your profile and thought that the following would be of interest to you. You are not on a mailing list so if this does not interest you there is no need to reply. Any of Your Answers Yes? Want to: >Legally slash your business/personal taxes drastically? >Protect any & all assets from any form of judgement? >Learn how to preserve your personal privacy? >Create a 6 figure income in the next 4-6 months? Any of Your Answers No? >Do you know how to make your "nest egg" work 3-5 times harder for you? >Do you know how to set up off shore trusts and protect your owned property from liens & levies? >Can you legally shelter all assets from all Taxes? Find out more and learn how to accomplish all of these by calling: 1-800-497-1799 (24 hr. recorded message)

1 0

export jobs not crypto
by Jim Burnes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this is probably like preaching to the choir, but I remember Freeh recently saying that there were no significant losses of software exportation to foreign software companies. Well he is obviously ignorant or lying through his teeth. I'm about to recommend a software purchase from a foreign software company that might exceed #300k. Is that on Freeh's radar yet? Mind you, I don't care where people get their software, but if Freeh is trying to calm the America Firsters by saying that crypto imports aren't important I think someone is congress ought to be informed. Declan? You're still out there in the pit of vipers. Why don't you tell them. My congressman doesn't seem to listen to me. "How do you explain school to higher intelligence?" Elliot to his brother in ET

3 2

Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:27 PM 10/7/97 -0700, Jon Callas wrote: [Explaining PGP's rather alarming "data recovery" features.] > Well, that's mostly all it is. There are other bits of the system. For > example, if I look up Alice's key on a key server and Alice has a recovery > key, I get Alice's recovery key, too. If Alice's recovery key is a "please > use" key, then I can encrypt to Alice alone. In any case, the PGP software > tells me that Alice has a recovery key, so I can decide to use some other > mechanism to talk to her. Sending a copy to the boss of everything Alice sends is OK. If Alice wants to send something her boss should not read, perhaps she should use her private account, rather than a company paid account. Sending a copy of everything Alice receives to the boss or HR is not OK. Alice should get to control it. It would be acceptable for the company system to keep track of what Alice has received, and flag "Alice received something, and has not yet filed the cleartext copy with us" It is not acceptable to just plain snoop on what Alice receives. > Note that design satisfies the opt-in and fair-warning requirements. Also, > since Alice's recovery key is an attribute of her self-signature, she can > change it. She can even have a second user name (let's call it Bob), that > has no recovery key. Alice needs finer granuality of control. The leakage to her boss primarily affects her, rather than the sender. Furthermore any auto-snoop feature sets a very dangerous precedent. It is politically a lot more difficult for the FBI to mandate that they can recover your data, if such a mandate leads to the message flashing up, "now sending a copy to the FBI" every time you decrypt something. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

3 2

Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 10/9/97 12:42 PM, Anonymous (anon(a)anon.efga.org) passed this wisdom: >It still satisfies the government's requirement to get routine >access to most email communications, and to allow criminals who >use standard email packages to be watched. This sums up the stupidity of the whole thing. The *only* thing the government achieves is invasion of honest people's privacy and catching a few stupid crooks who would most likely fuck up anyway and get caught if they are actually stupid enough to think government escrowed encryption is gonna hide their communications. Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "He's mad that trusts in the tameness of a wolf ... or a whore's oath." -- SHAKESPEARE, "King Lear," III, 6

1 0

Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Martin Minow claiming to be Martin Minow wrote: >Anonymous, claiming to be Monty Cantsin, writes about PGP 5.5: I beg your pardon! >>Decrypting files and decrypting messages are not the same problem. >>The PGP product has SMTP support - it is explicitly designed to >>weaken transmitted messages. Just like Clipper. > >No, it isn't "just like Clipper." Messages encrypted with PGP 5.5 >can be decrypted or verified by PGP 5.0 or other implementations that >can decode the PGP message and encryption format. Also, PGP 5.0 or other >complient implementations can send encrypted and signed messages to >PGP 5.5 users. Next you'll be telling us that PGP doesn't really use Skipjack. ;-) _Of course_ it isn't Clipper. But, it's like Clipper in the most important way: it is surveillance friendly. The use of Clipper was not compelled. We hated it because if it were used to any degree at all, its use would become mandatory. PGP Inc.'s Big Brother line of products play the same role Clipper did, only they are wrapped up in PGP Inc.'s "Good Guy" image. PGP Inc. may succeed where William Clinton and The Spooks failed. Were we to behave consistently, we would treat the company with the same level of trust and respect the present administration receives. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBND1+KpaWtjSmRH/5AQFTTwf7B6QO8I0yqQobsoUlW5AZxxXH4Tya/pwd 3hAZs//Y1gKyVEX6nW9dE3sDVAW8GBK489S4TMWemdbtfgeq7EaiV0D5QcLcAXst Iqz/WIKxpXjJ5+DjPV2CP6v6zd2XGIa7y3G0BKXglLZh5X7EkiRbJ6c8aixgAk6n 2nFKDqyp53mpmqTPm7xQbpYni5CtQ8Ljq/m+m4LP1hN05OYR8ZWJRz7hqrWvU+5A zw0xagCgPOKZZMZNS7sW+xGwVezsLis9KMZvsB1Paq4s8+geNlFr73vDwlM9SROI KxCfJnpr/sLG3x3Mtbv8Y0vhErTsZ2Pu4HnazVdjelh+r6O67v3TQQ== =JUfQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: America as a Shake Down Extortion State
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: >The debate over crypto almost certainly fits this pattern. If and when a >domestic ban on crypto is likely to pass and be signed, companies like RSA >and PGP will face extinction. This will then "incentivize" executives of >these companies to release funds, in the form of campaign >contributions--either directly or through back channels--to the Republican >and Democratic parties. Then a "compromise" will be found which lets RSA >and PGP, as examples, survive. And they may also be given government >business, with suitable GAK features made mandatory. Netscape has just been awarded a major contract with the Department of Defense for "secure" browsers, with options for "annual renewals." One of the best ever for NSCP. This is a public deal, as distinguished from the secret others pointed to in mandatory public notices in the Federal Register of meetings closed for national security by the Defense Science Boards, the National Defense Panel, and a welter of mil/gov advisory groups composed of members from industry, education and policy orgs eager to get advance word of market and contribution opportunities.

1 0

Re: Applying ``Crowds'' idea to anonymous e-cash.
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >On Thu, 9 Oct 1997, John Kelsey wrote: >> Crowds, for those who haven't seen it, is a way of giving web users >> partial anonymity by making it impossible to determine which member >> of some ``crowd'' of users did some action (such as requesting a >> document). (This is a very rough summary--read the paper for the >> real analysis.) > >Some people from MSFT proposed a similar concept at FC'97. As for its >real life value, the legal term for such a system is "conspiracy". Almost everything we do could be called "conspiracy". John has a good idea here. Let's give it room to grow.

1 0

Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- My apologies if this has already been discussed, but wouldn't this be a straightforward solution? Alice and Bob use PGP as a secure, identified channel to exchange a random 6 digit hex number. For example, 0xC926D0. When they establish their Comsec connection, they read 0x5F92E4 off their units. Alice takes the digits C, 9, and 2, and adds them mod 16 to 5, F, and 9 to get the digits 1, 8, and B, which she reads to Bob who confirms them. (Adding just the digits instead of larger numbers means that Alice and Bob can do the computation in their heads.) Bob takes the digits 6, D, and 0 and adds them mod 16 to the digits 2, E, and 4 to get 8, B, and 4. Bob reads them to Alice who confirms them. Any flaws? Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBND2EZ5aWtjSmRH/5AQGBnQf/QRMe/66ge+M/zHzzrZ7zc3g9wFKESsjA alzeGfUulzp+18JyUy1RHNOtM+4bXZUaiYAN7FnxKkAkY+IzW5m7nDHMnC18e+bD IZpO626Ze+pumokhXVTYW0JHWF4OfCol4qmYNSTjM+n4RO0DcmecOuQYuwnscJvb 808rsuin09dhY3UV5uyDWrCwuATIRjwSRTewBinuTGZo/QtMurXJlPc45WtF07oC 9Tg3ebnnq0NtbxWmsX7WT/tjFHoniS5sPoBusrlZT+1z+PT0SzqtSR1JmWKGVQQC xubaghabXvNj9nZZPsEGCG4rMbJw8Qtoh9J6I+aQJ0TVK4hHuanJXw== =Ooh/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: mhahn(a)tivoli.com (Mike Hahn) > Subject: Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux > Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 21:57:22 -0500 (CDT) > > > > As for as the "getting old" thread of Kenny Z's: > > > > Speaking of Kenny Z, did you know that Kenny G was majority > > stockholder of Starbucks? > > Man, you would think with all that coffee, he could play something better > than the crap he plays...Heck, Miles Davis and Charlie Parker survived on > Folgers for all we know... How about Robert Johnson....Terraplane Blues rules....;) Ravage Black Leather Monster

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Re: Where is _my_ blowjob?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Cordian wrote: >His parents and the cops then tried to have him declared insane and >institutionalized, which didn't work. They also immediately arrested >his friend. The cops working on his case then phoned the team >investigating the murder of the younger boy, and gave his name to >them as a suspect. He was then arrested and jailed for that murder, >although no direct evidence linking him to the murder has been >released. A little confused here. Let's call the older man "Victor" and his fifteen year old friend "Harold". Neither of them were murdered, right? Let's call the murder victim "Norbert". "Harold" refused to rat out "Victor" and now the police are charging "Harold" with the murder of "Norbert". What is the relationship between "Harold" and "Norbert"? You say there is no direct evidence connecting them. What evidence does connect them? Did they at least know each other? >The press continues to harp on the "murder suspect was abused" and >"parents rights foiled by the system" aspects of the case, to the >exclusion of the possibility that he is only in jail because the >police wanted to screw him, or that the murder was committed in a >blind fit of rage as a result of his manipulation at the hands of >various authority figures. While "Harold" may not be guilty of the murder, if he did kill "Norbert" then he should probably be treated as a murderer. While the police should not harrass gays, such harrassment does not seem to make a good excuse for murdering an unrelated completely innocent third party. JusticeMonger

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The Sovereign Individual - ignorant authors
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Finaly getting back to reading some more of the book [1], Chpt. 9 in particular. This chapter deals with various aspects of social issues (eg rise of national languages) and how they led to the growth of nationalism in general. Toward the end of the chapter (pp. 265 in the hardback) these idiots (don't know a better term) actualy have the audactity to claim that Stephen Jay Gould is a neo-creationist, in short they claim that Gould holds there is a 'higher power' (ie transcendance) directing evolution and the impact of inhereted traits on society. The author of this section has apparently never read a word that Gould has written. Gould is known as a leading supporter of Punctuated Equilibria and its various spawn, and with Ernst Meyr lead the battle against creationist theories and others of that ilk. Gould and Meyr's theories flatly reject transcendance as a force in evolutionary theory. Considering that no supporter of transcendance in evolutionary theory has ever succesfuly weathered a reasoned attack I simply stand in awe of the authors expectation of the readers ignorance. The more I read of this book the less respect I have for either author. I previously recommended this book as an intellectual challenge at least, I retract that recommendation. Don't waste your money on this drivel from a couple of snake oil salesmen who continously contradict themselves and pose flawed theory after flawed theory. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| [1] The Sovereign Individual: How to survive and thrive during the collapse of the welfare state J.D. Davidson, Lord W. Rees-Mogg ISBN 0-684-81007-7

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Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux (fwd) [oops]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> > Subject: Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux (fwd) > Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 22:53:50 -0500 (CDT) Sorry, that was meant for a completely different set of readers. I hit the wrong key. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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hey!
by wealthy＠profit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Roofing "Don't Be Ripped Off"
by adzam67＠concentric.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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New Rule
by The New Dictator 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From now on, no one can drink coffee out of yellow cups, ok? The reason for this is because there are child molesters. Thank you for your cooperation, or I will kill you. The New Dictator "I have a suitcase, and I'm not afraid to use it."

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The more things change...
by TruthMangler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sampler-request(a)lmboyd.com wrote: > ====================================================== > Q. Why do some countries make it a crime to commit > suicide? > A. Maybe so governments legally can confiscate the > property of the deceased. That's how it worked in ancient > Rome. Laws are made of money, it's said. > ============================================== > LMBoyd Web Site / U. S. Newspapers / Start Email / Stop Email > http://www.LMBoyd.com/postscript.htm

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Re: do NOT escrow communications keys
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > I'm arguing that you should not backup, or escrow communications keys, > and that you should backup storage keys. Euphemism alert: when we are talking about the kind of data recovery we like, we call it "backup". When we are talking about the kind we don't like, we call it "escrow". Schneier did the same thing: Bruce Schneier: > Key escrow = someone other than the author or the intended recipient of the > message being able to decrypt it. > > There are valid reasons for data backup, but they have nothing to do with > crypto key recovery. You don't actually mean that you should backup storage keys, you mean you should provide a means for someone other than the user to decrypt that stored data. Schneier means the same thing with regard to "data backup". > (forward secrecy) This could be a good idea, particularly in terms of old keys leaking out, but it needs more work. It's not clear that any of the forward secrecy methods will work for email. You can't easily do a DH key exchange via email because of the multiple messages. Maybe you could piggyback on ordinary messages, and after a few have been exchanged, you can get a DH key for the next message, but this is very complicated. Synchronization isn't guaranteed with email, neither is reliable delivery. > (untransferable signatures) This is also a good idea, but it needs more work, too. There is a big education problem here. People barely understand the implications of regular digital signatures. Now you are throwing this new kind in, which guarantee the message came from another person, but aren't binding. What happens when an employee receives a message from a supplier signed with that kind of signature? Can he make a decision on that basis, or not? In paper business correspondence, there is no such distinction. A signed letter is transferable. Go beyond this and business will be scratching its heads. It's a solution looking for a problem. There may be patents on these technologies, too. > (re-encrypting email with an escrowed key for archival) This is going to require special archival software and special actions on the part of users. You won't be able to do it as a transparent plugin. The user can't save his mail the regular way (with some email packages), he has to remember to (also?) save it to the business access archive. If he forgets, the business owner has lost access. There will be extra training costs, and people will have to change their habits. Besides being more complex to design and implement, it will be harder to sell to customers.

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BXA RFC on Export Controls
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) is reviewing the foreign policy-based export controls in the Export Administration Regulations to determine whether they should be modified, rescinded or extended. To help make these determinations, BXA is seeking comments on how existing foreign policy-based export controls have affected exporters and the general public." http://jya.com/bxa100897.txt

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Freeh Replaced! / Re: New Rule
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New Dictator wrote: >From now on, no one can drink coffee out of yellow cups, ok? > > The reason for this is because there are child molesters. > > Thank you for your cooperation, or I will kill you. Must have been embarassing for Freeh to have gotten replaced by a child. Guess it has something to do with the new 'Truth in Tyranny' laws...

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The Globalization of Chile, from The Netly News (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 10 Oct 1997 08:51:15 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: The Globalization of Chile, from The Netly News ************* http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1484,00.html The Netly News Network (http://netlynews.com/) October 10, 1997 The Globalization of Chile By Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) The wires are clogged again in Chile, a country with no shortage of Net-enthusiasm but little way to express it. Bandwidth is so limited in this remote country, which stretches almost to Antarctica, that local netizens wake up early or stay up late to log in (this report had to be filed via fax). Chile's connections to the outside world total about 9 Mb/sec, the same size pipe that a small U.S. Internet provider uses to connect to the Net. Chileans intend to change this. By next summer, fiber optic cables will gird the country on the east and west, snaking south from Brazil and Peru. The country's connectivity will jump to 200 times its current bandwidth. Even now, though, there's plenty of excitement about the Net in the capital, Santiago. Apple Chile, H.P. and the Cafe Internet Cybercenter line the Avenue Andres Bello. The REUNA Internet World Conference, which ends today, attracted hundreds of local businessmen. Companies such as Business News Americas email (for a fee) daily economic reports from Chile to American investors and analysts. But even if younger Chileans are cyber-savvy, the country remains staunchly conservative. Nearly 90 percent of Chileans are Roman Catholic (it was once the state religion) and Chile remains the only Western country where both divorce and abortion are illegal. Geography, too, has an effect. The South American country is ringed by deserts to the north, the Pacific Ocean to the west and the lofty Andes mountains to the east. [...]

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Re: Thanks Peter! / Re: russia_1.html
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed. Oct 8, Human Gus-Peter wrote: > Tell Declan that he should probably go visit his mom, or something, > like next Friday, until at least Monday (because that's when my mom > leaves Washington, 'you know where.'--{boy, is *she* going to be > sorry she grounded me on my uncle's weekend away from the 'Home'.}) > > My uncle's going to be mad when he finds out I took his suitcase, > but he couldn't even get his Heathkit radio to work, and I *almost* > did. Besides, you should never trust anyone over fifteen, eh? > (And these things are dangerous in the wrong hands, eh?) On Fri, Oct 10, Declan wrote: > The Netly News Network (http://netlynews.com/) > October 10, 1997 > > The Globalization of Chile > By Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) > > The wires are clogged again in Chile, a country with no shortage > of Net-enthusiasm but little way to express it. Bandwidth is so > limited in this remote country, which stretches almost to Antarctica, > that local netizens wake up early or stay up late to log in (this > report had to be filed via fax). Staying until Monday, Declan? Little Peter

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CAK as a really bad form of corporate networking
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been scratching my head, trying to figure out what the market for PGP's new recovery program is for. After all, if employees have local disks and these disks are on a company network or backup plan, then the corporation has access to the plaintext of memos, reports, and plaintext sent and received e-mail. (The purpose of Alice encrypting to Bob being _in-transit_ security, and nothing more.) It seems to me that the CAK (Corporate Access to Keys) approach being talked about, where Alice encrypts to Bob and _also_ encrypts to Eve, is a poor solution to the "archiving" problem. As Adam Back and others have noted, if Alice stores her Eudora or whatever e-mail files on her systems, presumably in plaintext (as the purpose of encrypting with Bob is for _in-transit_ security, not storage security), then the corporation can insist that she make her plaintext files archivable on the company's backup system. One way to look at the market for CAK is that a company is too flaky to have a corporate network or backup strategy and is using CAK as a kind of crude networking scheme. E-mail, with cc:ing of the company crypto czar, is a way to archive or pool company traffic. A rather back-assed approach, it seems to me. Meaning no insult to PGP, Inc. or its fine programmers, it's as if this message was sent out: --begin internal Giant Corporation memorandum-- From: Cakbert, Evil PR and Security Administrator To: All Droids Subject: Mandatory Voluntary CAK System It has come to my attention that our attempts to get a corporate-wide network working have failed, and that we are using a mishmash of intranets, local LANs, and direct dial-out systems. This is thwarting our efforts to read what you people are writing to each other. Henceforth, to solve this network problem we must insist that you adopt a mandatory voluntary system of cc:ing me, Cakbert, on all of your messages. Encrypted messages must be voluntarily encrypted with PPP (Pretty Poor Privacy). Thank you for your attention. --end internal Giant Corporation memorandum-- --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: America as a Shake Down Extortion State
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Ryan Anderson wrote: >Tim May wrote: >>The debate over crypto almost certainly fits this pattern. If and when a >>domestic ban on crypto is likely to pass and be signed, companies like RSA >>and PGP will face extinction. This will then "incentivize" executives of >>these companies to release funds, in the form of campaign > >Actually, I think it's a little more likely that they'll get disgusted with >Congress, and collect some money for the ACLU to use to pay their lawyers in >the instant filing of the consitutionality challenge. > >Seems to be a much more productive way to spend your money (long-term). Bullshit! Fuck the lawyers! By wasting time and money in the courts bickering about the stupid laws that buffoons in Congress pass in order to justify their existence, we are only ignoring the real issue: you cannot use the system to change the system. What amazes me is the amount of time and energy well-intentioned folks piss away trying to convince legislators to "do the right thing". By paying attention to these idiots, we are in effect legitimatizing their actions. If enough people come to their senses and ignored this bogus legislation, we will all be much better off in much less time. Tim May wrote elsewhere: >Face it, Amerika is basically a Mafia shake-down operation, with the power >of the State used to shake down protection money. > >This is why I favor crypto anarchy: by concentrating on ignoring laws and >deploying technology, this extortion state system is bypassed. Exactly. Spend the money on deploying the technology. Don't waste it lining the pockets of scum legislators and their litigious brethren. The big question is do PGP, RSA, Netscape et al have the balls to stand up for themselves and tell the DC politcos to fuck off? We can only hope... [ Imastun ] - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzQ+SNwAAAEEANhUVaFtM+8ZLhEhur55LhN0m/aUyemwVExEq96RUXkQlvBw H45ZcEMYzml7k2hM84rQiJEd/BPi18dhtXykz0vYqmke6BKDiAsR95ik+Jm3XXMU OQgHo0+asRJ85BOG+jm3424e4vY5/eTFaExNISW5T8XD+qgRgnC/ZQW0eQF1AAUR tBZJbWFzdHVuIDxsaWJlcnR5QHJpc2s+iQCVAwUQND5KIXC/ZQW0eQF1AQESOwP+ MPNlXlv/hzqoAaqXu4RpNR02XcMLOB5DwhG1pLij3Tt6uYfRqZul8eJ9LxvQ0R/R eT7g+j3dNpjcOSdCci4VYAPfdBK78esgDIn61cOiN29fGRwjJOO5rup9RvXBQt+T +Sf7D1gYlr/aDUGKMiBGGZhx2git7zpL7uqnvQn0WY8= =bXK7 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBND5M5HC/ZQW0eQF1AQE4HwP+JJ1eiIFGVguO5PwRsRl0gAiVxYiSGpHP 6h8le1QAgNJTlCz7C/ObNjVmtHnw6vjcYewLXSsnF59cRPakAD/Y4NLSLP/vPzWk gbx6t9X8hb0vC2LWOA/UcXZQBoqfLEXexm4LehKU0LpDL7ggy6SBw8PDEOr3InSh f15W51XTv/0= =OBNd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 2

FREE HEALING SECRETS FROM THE BIBLE
by 13993666＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An Amazing Rediscovery! For over 6,000 years we've had FIFTY of the MOST POWERFUL NATURAL HEALING AGENTS on the planet right in front of us and we didn't even know it!! NO, this information is not about herbs, minerals, enzymes, or anything else that you are familiar with. FIND OUT ..What was uncovered in KING TUT'S TOMB. ..What is mentioned in the BIBLE 188 TIMES? ..What deals with over 500 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL PROBLEMS? ..What is the "MISSING LINK" IN NATURAL HEALING? ..What 8-year-old company recently began bringing these healing secrets to the public through networking? ..What was voted "MOST POWERFUL AUDIOTAPE" for 1997? Are you looking for a health and nutrition company that is TRULY COMMITTED to YOU for health in BODY, MIND, AND SPIRIT? IF SO CALL (800) 953-9234 Extension 10. LIVE OPERATORS ARE STANDING BY 24 HOURS A DAY! WE'LL RUSH YOU OUR FREE INFORMATION PACK. Your pack will include the life-changing audiotape "The Missing link" by international health expert, Dr. Gary Young. BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES are still available, including your own FREE website with autoresponders. CALL TODAY! This very unusual WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY won't stay open very long. YOU'VE NEVER SEEN ANYTHING LIKE THIS!!! CALL FOR YOUR FREE PACK TODAY!

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Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Adam Back wrote: >Monty Cantsin writes: >> My apologies if this has already been discussed, but wouldn't this be >> a straightforward solution? > >John Kelsey described the same system. > >[adding hex passphrase digits exchanged via PGP to display digits] > >> Any flaws? > >See my other recent post in this thread... I think it doesn't work >because Mallet can recover the passphrase. You must remember that >when Mallet is actively doing a MITM attack he knows the digits on >the display of each party. With that info he can recover the >passphrase by subtracting. Then he can give Alice the correct >checksum for the link A<->M and Bob the correct checksum for the link >M<->B. Oh, I get it. Thanks. And now I get why people want to assign passwords to each digit. Mallory has no way of knowing all the mappings, even when one is revealed. Just to get a feel for what this looks like, a table like this one could be exchanged in advance of each telephone call. (Nothing here is my invention, of course.) The columns are used once successively for each digit. 0: Tientsin bedeviling Menominee bonneted coincides quotation 1: handling Bernadine prouder Navaho fittingly Swinburne 2: degrading Puritanizes allophone acquaint jack renditions 3: clientele homo Verderer diskettes overview surmounts 4: delimiting probes sobering modulating situated jelly 5: bewail reflex multistage plastics stigmata scandal 6: Genoa divider synonym bipeds tale denominators 7: aborts carbons welding amalgam chain innovation 8: salvaging Fargo transitional relishes Ozarks meditations 9: overlapping Tehran desperation initiated intimidate beggars A: whereby muffins Soddy miniatures diagnostic proportionment B: flour pistils aback despatched Rydberg tales C: lifespan sallying Arianist kindness side corporal D: wrongs nervousness minting totaller feather copyrightable E: intoxicated Yukon Boyd response ingredients numismatist F: stairway imitation consulted printably anesthetizes interval This has about 85 bits of entropy assuming the words are randomly selected from a pool of 20,000. As Mallory only gets one try, those are very good odds. This is completely practical and secure because the table is easy to generate and exchange. (Not that an in-band method wouldn't be way cool!) Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEUAwUBND56bpaWtjSmRH/5AQGcfQf3Y8tpnovD2tVVqUdJwHBg4ZgKfulxP2EH nuXSuvg7eMJ1veHw3ObmsiA+MzPzoBbrEkYM6u5TN3U+ytZbb5A/ogvD3fZepwhW Sns5l0J6y5gK4nRd9AqvU7MBp21iugJy6VEPwQzKwTIj/lkUydKeODluZSOqatyL NHr9qdZQrvvzsmvRL6EGvf2yEmYTeLg5XscLWPIyyA24jEMJNUXyQ5+W6bTx3Pxc aUBiSbVtoYIJDGKdzNGUu7QtlQP0DSQ+81kW4R86CreFx7H8rwRdr7dpwgTMADgZ ps2Nj0M71x9R8W9Jukg1eBw/xoyihldEo4SGrpDECv+Iawu+HSgZ =CEWV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Spammers Plan Backbone
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.zdnet.com/chkpt/adt1010nk/www.anchordesk.com/story/story_1343.ht… Yippie! Spam wars intensify as bulk emailers plan own Internet backbone. AOL, other ISPs threaten to fight back. Spam is FREE SPEECH!!!! =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: (408) 259-2795

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Re: DoD Asks Me to Stop Quoting From the Congressional Record
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: alt.censorship, alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk,misc.legal) In article <61l7cn$rc$1(a)gail.ripco.com>, glr(a)ripco.com (Glen Roberts) wrote: > I received a letter yesterday from the Office of the Secretary of > Defense. It politely asked me to stop quoting from the U.S. > Congressional on my website, and I presume they are also asking me > not to include such quotes on my radio show or print publications. > > Keep your eye out for a copy of their letter and my response... > I'll be anxious to see it. Certainly they have no legal footing, as the Congressional Record is just that, a record of what our elected Congress is doing and saying. The CR is, as we all know, widely available and meant to be quoted. This is why things, including a lot of nonsense (actually, _mostly_ nonsense) is "read into the Record." Or simply submitted to the CR for inclusion. As for any possible military secrets being disclosed, this is what closed hearings are for. Not that I necessarily approve of how many closed hearings there are, but this is what they're meant for. It would be consistent with trends of the past few decades if the Congressional Record becomes subject to secrecy laws. Hell, if were a Congresscritter I know I'd certainly want some of my stupid remarks stricken from the record and discussion of them banned. Let us know what happens. By the way, if the DoD pushes on this issue, you may find using mirrors of the CR, with pointers, another way to go. Don't actually quote the offending secruts, just give pointers to them. But quoting the CR is almost certainly fully legal. --Tim May -- The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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InfoWar Epilogue 0 (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet')
by A. Hoir 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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InfoWar Epilogue 0 / TEXT
by A. Hoir 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The True Story of the InterNet Part III InfoWar Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain by TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- InfoWar Table of Contents * Epilogue * d'Shauneaux ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Epilogue ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gomez surveyed the wreckage with a discerning eye, before turning toward the mountains in the distance and fixing upon them with a penetrating stare that burned like a laser toward the chief target of his hatred, wherever they might be. "They are finished." he said, with certainty, turning to the Commander of his Dark Forces, and instructing him, "Now finish them!" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- d'Shauneaux Except that you have spent literally a lifetime involved in a world of shadows, where even those things which are not done with mirrors are resonating indeterminately and obliquely, then you have little hope of ever recognizing the true depth to which the world you live in is ruled by secrecy, subterfuge and intrigue. Unless, of course, you are a follower of an ancient sage named Dilbert, and are steeped in the history and lore of Office Politics, in which case you undoubtedly already have all of the tools you need to understand what I am about to tell you. (And could probably even teach an old dog-foot soldier such as myself a few new tricks.) The lineage of the Author, as well as those of d'Shauneaux and Rom Dos, were each given information on a basis, not of 'need to know,' but more along the lines of 'need to figure out.' (That's 'decrypt' or 'decipher' for you CypherPunks.) The reason for this was that, at the time of the formation of the Circle of Eunuchs, the Evil One not only had his tentacles spread throughout society in general, and the computer industry, in particular, but had also made great progress in 'encrypting' Reality, so to speak. Even the Magic Circle did not fully realize the extent or import of this for quite some time, but they did recognize that they were playing 'catch-up' and needed not only to learn from the past, but also to reach toward the future. The Circle of Eunuchs, not being restrained by the need for absolute control and coordination of their efforts, as the Dark Allies were, made an astounding amount of penetration into the highest levels of the computer industry, in a short period of time. The individuals involved, working on their own or in small guerrilla cells, were able to 'move camp' at an instant's notice, changing the direction and focus of their entire career, if need be, which was of great benefit in such a quickly burgeoning technology. Despite their astounding success in placing their ersatz players in the midst of some of the most sensitive arenas of Gomez's grand technological game, the Circle of Eunuchs knew that they lacked possession of the key that would unlock the doors of deceit and allow them to expose the malfeasance underlying the technology that was increasingly ruling both the bodies and minds of all mankind. Then, something extraordinary happened A no-name individual who would have had to raise his station in life in order to become known as a bit-player in the computer arena suddenly became the target of a full-scale attack by the Dark Forces over a seemingly insignificant program called Pretty Good Privacy. Phil Zimmerman ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" "InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet') Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Open 4 new mirror locations ?
by staff＠tnlb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now you can open 4 new locations for your business NEXT WEEK - just in time for the holiday shopping season. This is how one of our Clients DOUBLED Sales in less than four weeks... Is your site really getting enough traffic now? or is your site lost in the crowd.... The solution is simple but powerful. Multiple locations! If a prospective customer is looking for your products or services, who has the best chance of being found - someone with five locations or someone with one...plus you get the added bonus of the "accidental shoppers", people who will find you that didn't know your business existed. International Shopping Complex now averaging over a million hits per month, with shops from 28 different countries, announces mirroring package to business site owners. The first page of your site is copied by our teks and installed in the four mall locations. All links from your first page go back to your site, so you can still update your pages. Businesses (retail, wholesale, mfg, services) can now add their stores to these multiple sites for a special GUARANTEED package rate of $375.00, which includes all set up and a year's rent. Compare that to setting up four stores yourself! Plus, we give you details of a free promotion site which enables you to enter your 4 new URLs and you will automatically get 500 NEW LISTINGS to jump start your new sites. Offer expires October 17th. For Complete details please email: press(a)1stworldwidemedia.com And put "send details" in the subject line. Thank you :) www.1stworldwidemedia.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This mailing is being sent to qualified business owners only. If it has reached you in error, please accept our apologies. If you do not respond, you will automatically be removed from any further mailing. -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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PGP CAKware & IETF controlled Open-PGP standard
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One aspect of PGP's controversial CAK system in pgp5.5 that I have not seen discussed is the standardisation aspects. How does the introduction of corporate access to keys (CAK), and government access to keys (GAK) features fit into the IETF framework? Are PGP Inc's CAK features intended to be part of the now IETF controlled Open-PGP standard? What is the IETF's stance on politics having influence on security? A weakly comparable example might be perhaps the IPSEC standardisation process, and the effect of export regulations on key sizes. Are IPSEC key sizes allowed to be restricted in the standards so that IPSEC products can be exportable? Now some would argue, and with some justification, that emails sent using company equipment are the property of that company. However there are other considerations also. Expectation of privacy is one. The negative aspects of a society in which most companies have become little brother institutions, becoming small versions of what many of us are fighting: mandatory government access to keys, big brother wanting the ability to read all traffic. I would be somewhat concerned if PGP Inc's recently announced the key escrow functionality becomes part of the Open-PGP standard, because it will set a bad precedent, and possibly force others who would otherwise wish to implement to the open-PGP standard to also implement features useful to secret service special interests in enforcing mandatory domestic government access to keys, or implement only partly compatible systems. I need hardly comment that such an eventuality is not in the interests of the internet community. Specific questions relating to the standard are perhaps: - Are the certificate flags informing the recipient that communications to a key is escrowed, and that email which is not encrypted to the escrow key will be bounced expected to be part of the Open PGP standard. - Can a conforming application ignore the key escrow flags? - Or must a conforming application display a suitable warning perhaps such as: WARNING: the person whose key you are using has the misfortune of being forced to use software supplied by a company which has sold out to key escrow, therefore you data may be read by others than your intended recipient. and perhaps a note tacked on to the email for the recipient to read: SAY NO TO KEY ESCROW. Boycot little brother and big brother. Don't buy PGP Inc software. or must conforming applications be more polite. Aside from the snide remarks about key escrow, I am concerned about PGP's actions harming internet privacy, and helping indirectly the introduction of mandatory key escrow which the US administration and UK secret service and department of trade and industry are pushing. A system which implements all the features necessary for mandatory key escrow as a business solution may indirectly help the mandatory key escrow proponents. Plausible events which might happen in such an event might be: - companies encouraged to use (or penalised for not using) open-PGP corporate escrow compatible systems - service providers also encouraged to use such systems - companies legally required to use such systems, and hand copies of corporate master keys to government (corporate escrow then becomes government escrow for business communications) - ISPs and individuals legally required to use such systems, and hand copies of corporate master keys to government (full blown mandatory key escrow) I am concerned about the possibility that the IETF might be steered by PGP Inc into putting features into the Open-PGP standard which are not in the interests of the internet community. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Re: do NOT escrow communications keys (Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Adam Back wrote: >About the only example of email in transit being considered storage >was a USENET article years ago by someone who considered it a kewl >hack that he had some games or something else which was in breach of >policy in his account and rumor went around that the admin was having >a purge. He tarred, gzipped & uuencoded the lot and emailed it to >himself down a _long_ ! fowarding path. It came back to him around 3 >days later after the purge. That's the kind of thing I mean when I >say you don't consider email storage. Sometimes you can use this trick to get around storage limitations at your ISP. Often mail in the spool file doesn't get added up for the disk quota. When you hit your limit, just e-mail yourself a bunch of megabyte messages. Sysadmins tend not to like this. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBND5t8JaWtjSmRH/5AQFf9wf/TQMiQH4wJXO3Xx/borwAobWIlKQCGmVQ BnflPYg5pDvHOc+vppprb/f5HLZ78p1WaOY9l7vc+aJ97NC346UQAzS8kGyr6WP7 YmHmWRx576CV8EsLWjMZFYB6fZXvvMQd6VGUPC9IKC9Zum2BV1GCUSxGIHFpwNDp ElfqFFlFdVqfh30XEi2e/XK7UKh6bzYMHgfHTEjv+FqV1grXpGlwDHQfWvPMv4s8 ZEO8XM7Sh6DOXEMnrZkKJ0dl9cW8FjphEeYbkePV9oPVuCqC8HF6gzFfGLtWMK6E nj7iuv1QoQPagk4nwogHRUjhuuFg0aDcHieDR7T1HivFReB5fZIHYQ== =HCXe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Why Corporate Message Recovery isn't Key Escrow
by Jon Callas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 A number of people have asserted that the Corporate Message Recovery feature is key escrow. From where I sit, the difference is easy to see. My definition of "key escrow" is that another person or organization keeps a copy of the user's secret key. Here's an example, based on actual customers who use key escrow to manage their data: This corporation uses PGP for a number of things. Email, engineering plans, CAD drawings, and so on. They've done so at least since the days when we were Viacrypt, and I believe they even used PGP 2.x. When an employee arrives at this company, they create a key pair for the new employee, hand it to them on a floppy, keeping a duplicate floppy with the keypair on it, which they toss into a safe. Literally. This is key escrow. They do this because they can't afford to lose their files and messages. Their policies require them to keep the secret keys, as if they were the same as keys to offices or file cabinets. I don't know about you, but I'm appalled. Nonetheless, they're our customers. In spite of inheriting them, we have a responsibility as businesspeople to at least listen to their concerns. - From our standpoint, the issue gets even touchier. They don't like what they're doing, and they want us to give them a better way to manage their data. Does anyone really believe that only moral response is to flinch and turn away? I'd like to be in a situation where I didn't have to deal with this. Wanna trade positions? I'll sit over there and cluck my tongue about how adding an extra recipient weakens security while you figure out how to help these folks out of the mess they're in. While you're at it, I'll pen a few lines about how giving clean needles to addicts undermines society, and handing out condoms encourages kids to have sex. Trust me, it's less nerve-wracking than what we have to do to solve this problem, which involves running through hypothetical scenario after hypothetical scenario, balancing the user's privacy against the organizations property rights, the privacy and property rights of one organization against that of another, and so on. Corporate Message Recovery isn't key escrow for a number of reasons. First, it doesn't involve keeping a copy the end-user's secret key. I hope that's obvious now. Second, the system behaves very differently. With a key escrow system, there is a superb McGuffin (which is what Alfred Hitchcock called the crux of a mystery, like the falcon in The Maltese Falcon) - it's the safe. Break into the safe, or lend its contents out, and all Hell breaks loose. Whoever has those keys (which easily fit on a single Zip disk) has the company at its mercy. They can decrypt or sign anything they care to. There is a great thriller to be written here. It isn't so with a CMRK. The worst possible way to use the feature is to have a single, company-wide CMRK. If that gets lost, the thriller you can write isn't nearly as interesting. Yup, you can steal any of the plans, read all the mail, and so on. That's bad. It's deplorable, actually. But it isn't a difference that makes no difference. At least there isn't a gang of keys out there that can sign anything with anyone's ID. This is not the only way to use Corporate Message Recovery, it's just the worst way. Remember, it's just a notation in the self-signature that states, "When you encrypt to me, encrypt to X." That's any X. You can have a different CMRK for every department, every workgroup, or even every user. A sophisticated policy might be that every user sets their supervisor's key to be their CMRK. Another is that everyone in Department X sets their office mate, or lab partner, or other person. You can have anything that suits your group, from Recovery Central, to Recovery Hierarchy, to Recovery Buddy System. The significant improvement that PGP's web of trust has over a traditional hierarchical system is that you can set up a top-down system for validity, but you don't have to (and in our opinion, shouldn't). Analogously, the significant improvement that Corporate Message Recovery has over key escrow is that you can tailor a recovery system to your needs (including and especially deciding it's not for you). Jon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBND6j8H35wubxKSepEQI58gCfQuiMZCyfe7cD1F2nNgFtluQqGXMAoJUh yHFMApAlDjzwRTCspBi7p9t3 =a2Zo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- Jon Callas jon(a)pgp.com Chief Scientist 555 Twin Dolphin Drive Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Suite 570 (415) 596-1960 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Fingerprints: D1EC 3C51 FCB1 67F8 4345 4A04 7DF9 C2E6 F129 27A9 (DSS) 665B 797F 37D1 C240 53AC 6D87 3A60 4628 (RSA)

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1110: Home-Based Email Processors Required....
by emailprofits＠mail3.c-flash.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Earn $14.95 for every email you process for us. GUARANTEED! Dear Sir/Madam, This announcement concerns an online employment opportunity currently available with our company. If the idea of earning an excellent income using your home or office computer appeals to you, then please review this brief article. If you find this article of no benefit to you, we apologize for our intrusion. To be removed, hit reply with 'remove' in the subject. ================================================= Home-Based Email Processors Needed Immediately!! ================================================= Please be assured that this is NOT an invitation to participate in an illegal chain letter scheme. Neither is this an invitation to join a network/multi-level marketing program. We are offering a unique, legitimate home-based employment opportunity. As an Email processor for our company, you'll work out of your home or office using our exclusive FREE, "no-catch" turnkey software package. There's NO personal selling involved. There's NO sending out bulk email. We are in the Software Distribution and Publishing business. Our products have worldwide appeal. In order to expand our business globally in the shortest possible time, we need home-based Email processors all across North America, Europe, Australia and Asia RIGHT NOW!! Our EXCLUSIVE turnkey software package is all you need to do your daily duties. The work can be done full or part time. Your earnings is based on the hours you put in to the work. By devoting few hours a week, you'll be able to add handsomely to your present income. With a full time effort, your income may even exceed your expectations. If you are interested in this position, and would like to find out more about the pay structure, and the duties involved, please link to: http://204.137.223.80/master/email.html OR http://www3.c-flash.net/~emailprofits/email.html If you're having difficulties connecting, you may request a detailed information report and an application form by hitting REPLY with "MORE INFO" in the subject line. Thank you for your attention. Sincerely, Angie Steele Global Marketing Services

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Why Corporate Message Recovery isn't GAK
by Jon Callas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 There are two things I will discuss in this missive: (1) The assertion that Corporate Message Recovery is "just like Clipper" and why this is not true. (2) The fear a number of people have expressed that Corporate Message Recovery (CMR) could be used by the US government to slide in GAK. I think we're agreed that CMR isn't itself GAK and I'll talk some about why it isn't with (1). CMR isn't like Clipper: * Clipper was a 64-bit key. CMR symmetric keys are full-strength keys (128 bits or more), backed with a full-strength public key. * Clipper's key was set in hardware by the manufacturer, and users were required to use it. A CMR key is a software-enabled key, no user is ever required to use it. There are cases in which a user might "volunteer" to use a CMR because they work for someone who requires it, but that's a problem we'll address with the PGP Secure Resume Server which allows headhunters to securely and anonymously find people who've made bad career decisions. As a corollary of of the previous paragraph, there's no reasonable guarantee with a Clipper device that you haven't been black-bagged with an insecure key. Using a CMR may be unwise, but at least you knowingly did it to yourself. * A CMR key can be revoked, reissued, or changed. You can periodically change it as a matter of policy. You can even stop using it. Clipper's was, again, set in hardware, with no option of not using it. * The Clipper symmetric algorithm was secret; CMR keys use publicly available algorithms. * With Clipper, there was always a concern that an outside agency had the keys. This is true with a number of other systems (the so-called key recovery systems), and is the reason that a number of them are lumped together with the term GAK. Note that the user-organization creates a CMR key, and the end-user enables it. If any government gets access to this key, it is because either (1) they solved the Discrete Logarithm Problem, (2) they broke the public CMR key, (3) they black-bagged your CMR key, or (4) they are using a subpoena, warrant, or discovery to get the key. We're working on a way around (1), we can't do anything about (2) or (3), but these are fine reasons not to use CMR! If you're beset by (4), you need lawyers, not cryptographers. * With Clipper, there was a central repository of all the keys. With CMR, there is not. I discussed that in detail in my message, "Why Corporate Message Recovery isn't Key Escrow." I have noticed that a number of people have the tacit assumption that business people and corporations are in cahoots with the FBI, waiting to hand over everyone's secret key. As in all parts of life, there are many, many businesspeople and corporate execs who are not particularly moral. But I don't think that their immorality takes this form. If we could examine the dark, secret thoughts of a corporate scumwaffle -- the ones that he *really* hopes don't hit the papers -- I sincerely doubt that, "Oh, Louis, I love it when you rummage my drawers" is among them. Now then, the next topic is the fear that CMR will be used in some insidious government plot to slip in GAK everywhere. I worry about this, too. But I don't think it's feasible that CMR can be a stalking horse for GAK. If the government wants to GAK-enable all PGP, they'll have to have a plan similar to this: (1) Buy PGP, Inc. Since our worth is less than the black portion of the Federal Budget, this is not impossible. Would that it were otherwise. Heck, we're probably worth less than the black portion of New Zealand's budget. (2) Fire all the current development staff. This isn't very hard. All the new bosses have to do is round us up in a meeting and announce, "The next version of PGP will have a 40-bit export option." We'll say, "Not while *we're* working for the company!" They'll say, "Fine with us." Keep your eye on the secure resume server for clues of this event. (3) Hire a new staff. This is one of the places that the plan might fall apart. We have such a hard time finding anyone who's qualified to work for us that we have reqs we can't seem to fill. I suppose, though, that they'll be able to find some people willing to relocate from Maryland. (4) Stop the OpenPGP process in the IETF. Some people think that we did this as part of our Evil Plan to Take Over the World by Giving Away Software (hey, it almost worked for Netscape). Other people think it's part of our Evil Plan to Take Over Crypto by Using Unpatented Algorithms. I can neither confirm nor deny these, but I *will* tell you that it's part of our Sniveling Plan To Convince the Feds They Can't Kill PGP by Killing Us, which the source code books also fall into. If OpenPGP succeeds, then anyone can build an interoperable version of PGP, not just us, Highware, Systemics, etc. (5) Wait until bitrot makes all those existing copies of PGP stop working. I could make a few catty remarks about how quickly existing software stops working on new releases of OSes, but you've probably thought of them yourself. There are also a few details left, like shutting down all those international FTP sites, but hey, they're the government, they're omnipotent. Jon - ----- Jon Callas jon(a)pgp.com Chief Scientist 555 Twin Dolphin Drive Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Suite 570 (415) 596-1960 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Fingerprints: D1EC 3C51 FCB1 67F8 4345 4A04 7DF9 C2E6 F129 27A9 (DSS) 665B 797F 37D1 C240 53AC 6D87 3A60 4628 (RSA) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBND6mO335wubxKSepEQKpgQCeNxWHHjIucyzRrQV429PKM0sTykAAnjiz byD3SzToLdfkGq+mIyUHji6M =r8nx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- Jon Callas jon(a)pgp.com Chief Scientist 555 Twin Dolphin Drive Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Suite 570 (415) 596-1960 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Fingerprints: D1EC 3C51 FCB1 67F8 4345 4A04 7DF9 C2E6 F129 27A9 (DSS) 665B 797F 37D1 C240 53AC 6D87 3A60 4628 (RSA)

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Re: FCPUNX:The Sovereign Individual - ignorant authors
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:12 PM 10/9/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: > This chapter deals with various aspects of social issues (eg rise of > national languages) and how they led to the growth of nationalism in > general. Toward the end of the chapter (pp. 265 in the hardback) these > idiots (don't know a better term) actualy have the audactity to claim that > Stephen Jay Gould is a neo-creationist, This appears to me to be an accurate depiction of Stephen Jay Gould's views. He claims that humans are fundamentally different from other animals in this regard, and has frequently been ridiculed on this account. I have read some of his writings, for which he was ridiculed, and the ridicule and contempt appears justified to me. > The author of this section has apparently never read a word that Gould has > written. Gould is known as a leading supporter of Punctuated Equilibria and > its various spawn, I have read a fair bit of Gould. His work on the evolution of non humans is perfectly plausible though controversial. His work on humans is shear crap and is not regarded by the relevant experts in the relevant fields as legitimate science. In his field, he is a innovator. Outside his field, he is a crackpot, similar to the flat earthers and the people who claim that Socrates was black, demonstrating that even trained scientists can degenerate into nuttery when they go beyond their area of expertise. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Fuck You!
by Bianca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found your address, despite your subterfuge, and I am going to fuck up both you and your computer system. I don't like fuckwads sending bullshit to my email. Fuck You (& the horse you rode in on)

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Re: CAK as a really bad form of corporate networking
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May wrote: >My conclusion is that PGP for Business does very little for real >corporate access in "hit by a truck" situations, as most of these >critical files (fill in the blanks , but thinkof chip design files, >source code for programs , lab notebooks , etc .) are simplyNOT ever >e-mailed. And if they are e -mailed , this is completelya tertiary >issue. One should also ask who is managing the company and why. It is never a good policy to leave important components of the company in the hands of particular people for long periods of time. While people die relatively infrequently, they do often become frustrated or angry and leave the company. For instance, one really has to ask what is going on when a programmer doesn't check in his or her code for six months. And one really has to wonder how useful that code is going to be to anyone. My policy has been to discard half completed work when people leave. It's just cheaper to start anew than to clean up and debug undocumented code which nobody understands. In general, the case where "important documents" have to be retrieved from a departed employee's desk or computer are fairly uncommon. And the case where it is necessary to intercept a departed employee's e-mail is pretty much non-existent. >So who is the real customer for PGP for Business and its form of >plaintext recovery? I am looking forward to hearing the precise mechanisms behind PGP, Inc.'s change in tune. Were some of those investors shills? In terms of governmental expenditures, it would cost nothing to flood PGP with great investment deals. It would probably cost less than Clipper itself. And all of the former troublemakers can be quietly ridden down and finally trained to accept the saddle of good stock deals and contractual obligations. If that was the mechanism, it's pretty slick and to be admired by sportsmen everywhere. It is the sense of Monty Cantsin that a number of readers of the list are downplaying PGP Inc.'s actions because they hold the character of certain people involved with the company in high regard. This is probably an error. Character must be judged by actions. The actions are clear. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBND6DcJaWtjSmRH/5AQEDGwf+Pl0xusD2oBzrqOFkBrV92NHswJJ6VbuQ akNVAaBz+gNnXy2Zt7Pfa09nqibW9qbzd3pbJh8v7djOwtqQSJXN7uZA0JVF2mii oLR5jwh9bpNRSvElaJLRmcGMY3RKighl1rcwfxAjbmJjEI6nSjcaELPNpPCMZEfT cEehlxC5R4f9oikQJc4VNg/MVo89P9ckT9wtbdd4S4ZOFArxHvGlw+bW/hwlpDNE fIZBy8BlJqir+BSZGLkSwOOvuAwozMCQSM/VFj6aDNiNTA3bQ8xHGyaapRci7dVX ZleOrYWsdAt25R9yt79T9Mcu8tKuvbfl245gxHSrOReODG89gOT/vw== =FLvb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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GAK, CAP, "escrow", "recovery" -- Minitru has us so confused we fight amongst ourselves
by Zooko Journeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The whole goal of the hijacking of the phrase "key escrow" to camoflage GAK was to obscure the difference between voluntary and involuntary participation. Unfortunately, while Clipper and successors have been policy failures, that initial push to conquer important conceptual ground has been a devastating success. Now good guys from both sides of the PGP CAP debate appear to have forgotten this essential distinction. Jon, I started reading your list of ways that PGP CAP differs from USG GAK, and it was about "software versus hardware" or something. Screw that-- is it voluntary or is it not? Of course it is voluntary. PGP, Inc. has no deal with USG or any other agency to the effect that user's secrets will be involuntarily (by threat, force or secrecy) copied. So forget about all those details and make the point-- PGP helps people control their own data, including voluntarily sharing their data with others. This is almost entirely unrelated to GAK. One more time for the slow folks at home (journalists especially, listen up!): Escrow is when you voluntarily choose to share your property with someone else, especially as part of a business contract that you have with that person to the effect that she won't use your property for anything but will merely hold your property in order to give it back to you or to a third party in response to certain events transpiring. The word "escrow", coined sometime in the 16th or early 17th centuries, has held this meaning and only this meaning throughout the intervening centuries. Someone getting access to your secrets against your will, whether by trickery, threat of force, or burglary is not escrow. At least, not until the USG deliberately chose to abuse that word to throw a mask of legitimacy upon its rotten idea of mandatory wiretapping for all digital communication. Damn, but it is frustrating to see such a bare-faced newspeak gambit succeed so brilliantly against otherwise literate people. Everyone should read George Orwell's paper on (ab)use of language in politics. None of the examples he cites are nearly as worthy of Minitru as is this single conceptual hijacking. Regards, Zooko P.S. Of course there are subtleties that I omitted from this rant. It wouldn't be a good rant if I calmly enumerated the various legitimate perspectives now would it? Maybe PGP CAP is a bad idea. Maybe it will lead to GAK. Maybe corporations are a bad idea. Maybe they will lead to governments. But whether or no, use of PGP and PGP features (including escrow features) is voluntary. GAK is not voluntary. GAK is not escrow. Please help me put a stake through the heart of this vile meme.

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Attitude and Assumptions
by Jon Callas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In the course of all the discussion here, I have seen a number of implicit attitudes and assumptions that irritate me. This is a short rant to air my irritation. The first thing that bugs me is what I'm calling Crypto-Correctness. I don't know a single person on cypherpunks who is against privacy, or is against the notion that in the information society, keeping and bearing crypto is an inalienable human right. Politically, I'm a Lockeian, and put privacy up there with Locke's basic trio of life, liberty, and property. As part of this, I fight the stupid notion that because there are bad people out there, rights should be abridged. Crypto is a tool, and nigh any useful tool can be misused. If we let that fact stop us from making tools, we'd be using nerf axes and dressing in bubble wrap. If we let the fact that bad guys are using our stuff bother us too much, we'd be against privacy. Here at PGP, we like to make hay out of the fact Burmese freedom fighters use PGP. A while ago, Tim May sent out something in which he stated that Hamas uses PGP, making the very valid point that one person's freedom fighters are another person's terrorists. He implied that they're not using just to tell each other where the best hummous shops are, and I don't doubt it. I like to say (now that I'm no longer an arms maker) that we are like the Red Cross in that the Red Cross gives medical attention to everyone, regardless of their moral worth; we supply privacy software to everyone, regardless of their moral worth. In the days when crypto was a munition, I used Winchester as a metaphor, complete with Sarah's cute bungalow. In its milder forms, Crypto-Correctness thinks that if a bad guy is using crypto, then it's a mitigating factor on what they're doing. I can see that it might come from not liking tack-on laws like the clause in the present bill that makes using crypto to hide a crime illegal. This is deplorable. But using crypto doesn't make something good. In some of its other forms, it pushes into what I perceive as Crypto-Socialism. We just shrug if suicide bombers or paparazzi are using crypto, but if a property-owner wants to use it, you can just hear the sharp intake of breath. If that property-owner is Big Business, there are howls of indignation. I get the impression that some people think crypto should only be produced by non-profit organizations for the use of non-profit organizations, or those that had the common decency to get their profits illegally. The next thing that bugs me is that the government has us so scared of our shadows that we look askance at anything that might make crypto mass-market. Right now, crypto is rocket science. Many of the people who need it most are only going to understand it after years of acclimatization. The sorts who inhabit the nightmares of tech-support people are going to take at least one more turn of the wheel of Maya to get it. I think a lot of people here think that blade guards on crypto in any form is stark moral evil. You lost your data? Good. Shows you're not worthy. You shouldn't have data anyway. Information is property, and property is theft. In the crypto-anarchist future, after the withering away of the state, you won't need property anyway. I suppose we'll all just eat e-cash. I really believe that this panicked, bunker-mentality fear of anything that might complicate the system with blade guards is doing the cause of freedom a sever disservice. Business people are subjected to a lot of the asinine annoyances and minor evils that government brings, too. If we get them on our side, they will be a powerful ally. I believe that the central thesis of crypto-freedom is that it doesn't matter if a document is on paper or in a text file; it doesn't matter if a conversation is on the phone or in a restaurant. The medium doesn't matter. My papers and effects have the same protection on a disk as on paper itself. We all know that deployment is the key. But real deployment means deploying to people who don't know how their toaster works, too. If we don't solve this problem, we'll get hit with the backlash. Just you wait, once crypto becomes trendy, there will be a Time cover story with some headline like, "How Much Privacy is Enough? Who's Really After You, Anyway?" and in it will be sob stories about how people lost their passphrases, were blackmailed by employees (ask me, I have real-world tales of this), or can't decrypt their backups. Congress will have hearings, and they aren't going to be fun to watch. Is trying to head this eventuality off (yes, I believe it's inevitable) really the work of Satan? The last thing that really, really bugs me is the hostility that's directed towards PGP Inc. because now we're an Inc. The core group of people who are here are the same people they always were, they're just being paid now. I'd love to be independently wealthy and do this for the crypto-anarchist, non-profit joy of it, really I would. But you know, as the great crypto-socialist Balzac said, "behind every great fortune, there is a great crime" so I suppose we must be up to no good. This is a blues riff, so let me tell you how we've paid our dues before I get to the chorus: We published our source code. One of our potential partners said and I quote, "Are you mad?" We stand firm on the issue of No Weak Crypto. A noted GAK proponent asked me at a conference, "Aren't you folks going to do an export version?" I replied, "Sure we are." This person asked, "When?" I said, "The day after the law changes." We put out a freeware product, hoping people will upgrade to the for-pay version. If you're thinking of your own startup, let me give you some investment advice: the crowd who thinks the X-files is a documentary doesn't upgrade to the for-pay version. We started an IETF working group that will take our core technology and put it out for anyone to use. They will own change control. We won't be able to use any patents or intellectual property to enhance our business position. We won't be able upgrade the protocol without a vote. The only thing we offer as a selling point is our superb engineering and our good name. The business version is funding the rest of the ball of wax. Are you afraid we'll make a deal with the devil? I have two comments on that: (1) I work in Silicon Valley. I tell headhunters, "no thank you" every week. I took a pay cut to come here. I can get a 20% raise by going to WebFoo any time I want. My options aren't worth what I would have gotten as a layoff package had I stayed at Apple. If I send out an email message that provides "technical support" to furriners, I could land in jail. I'm here because I care. Ask the people here who left behind Cisco options at 40 if they care. (2) There's one surefire way to make sure we don't make any deals with the devil. Buy the product. Encourage your friends, your mother to buy the product. If you see someone who is using the freeware version, send them a polite message to buy the product. Buy one and send it to your congresscritter. If you don't, what you're saying is, "crypto-freedom is very important to me, as long as I don't have to spend $49 on it." Convince your employer that $119 isn't too much to pay for meta-introducers. Make the crypto market so hot that someone competes with us by being badder than us. Oh, yeah, baby, I got them crypto-startup blues. Jon - ----- Jon Callas jon(a)pgp.com Chief Scientist 555 Twin Dolphin Drive Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Suite 570 (415) 596-1960 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Fingerprints: D1EC 3C51 FCB1 67F8 4345 4A04 7DF9 C2E6 F129 27A9 (DSS) 665B 797F 37D1 C240 53AC 6D87 3A60 4628 (RSA) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBND7PCH35wubxKSepEQKD9QCgwPoRbXSHyueb9U4fLztaQkAKLlQAoNdC kX1gOsFsBZ6YDtC9AX5X/VU9 =IiAC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FCPUNX:The Sovereign Individual - ignorant authors (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 10 Oct 1997 15:28:31 -0700 (PDT) > From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> > Subject: Re: FCPUNX:The Sovereign Individual - ignorant authors > At 11:12 PM 10/9/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: > > This chapter deals with various aspects of social issues (eg rise of > > national languages) and how they led to the growth of nationalism in > > general. Toward the end of the chapter (pp. 265 in the hardback) these > > idiots (don't know a better term) actualy have the audactity to claim that > > Stephen Jay Gould is a neo-creationist, > > This appears to me to be an accurate depiction of Stephen Jay Gould's > views. He claims that humans are fundamentally different from other > animals in this regard, and has frequently been ridiculed on this account. > > I have read some of his writings, for which he was ridiculed, and the > ridicule and contempt appears justified to me. Well apparently you didn't comprehend what he was saying any better than the authors of the book or your experts. However, I have no intention of bringing this discussion onto the list past this responce. If you, or anybody else, would like to see Gould's refutation of this claim in his own words then refer to: Scientist Confront Creationism ed. L.R. Godfrey ISBN 0-393-30154-0 Chpt. 8. Darwin's Untimely Burial - Again! pp. 139 This volume is a collection of articles by 15 of the top evolutionary theorist (not all biologist) in the field. Worth the $7.95 this little book costs. You might also want to read "The Mismeasure of Man" (again). > I have read a fair bit of Gould. His work on the evolution of non humans is > perfectly plausible though controversial. > > His work on humans is shear crap and is not regarded by the relevant experts > in the relevant fields as legitimate science. [rhetorical questions, please don't send responces] So your premise is that the evolutionary processes which form non-humans are not the same forces acting on humans? You seriously mis-understand not only Gould but modern evolutionary theory in toto. Sounds like you and not Gould have embraced neo-creationism. What relevant experts? THE relevent expert in evolutionary biology is Ernst Meyr. Are you claiming that Meyr doesn't know what he is talking about? Gould's premise, supported by Meyr and most other evolutionary biologist, is that the human being is in fact a radicaly different animal than all others. Not because of some magical force of transcendance but rather a easily understand mechanism. The increase of cerebral capacity in concert with exo-cerebral capacity (ie memory outside the brain), abstract thinking, and language provide humans the tools to escape the purely evolutionary process. Gould's claim, and what pisses so many people off, is that man has reached a point where the major force in future development is NOT evolutionary processes. It is quite similar to what happens when you have 10 computers sitting in a room and what happens when those 10 computers are networked and given large hard-drives. You don't get evolution, you get revolution. [that's as close to relevancy to this list as I can manage] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Attitude and Assumptions (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 10 Oct 1997 18:00:24 -0700 > From: Jon Callas <jon(a)pgp.com> > Subject: Attitude and Assumptions > Crypto is a tool, and nigh any useful tool can be misused. If we let that > fact stop us from making tools, we'd be using nerf axes and dressing in > bubble wrap. If we let the fact that bad guys are using our stuff bother us > too much, we'd be against privacy. Tis better to let 10 guilty men go free than to imprison a single innocent man. > the Red Cross in that the Red Cross gives medical attention to everyone, The Red Cross is a non-profit organization that supplies support and aid to both sides. PGP Inc. does not - you don't make tools that crack crypto. Bad analogy. > The next thing that bugs me is that the government has us so scared of our > shadows that we look askance at anything that might make crypto > mass-market. Can't say that I am motivated by this particular meme. I am ecstatic that the company I work for in my day job (Tivoli Inc.) is coming out with a series of security and crypto related products to be implimented by our customers on a global enterprise level. None of which support GAK or backdoors. Now whether our parent company IBM will have the cajones to carry through on it is another question entirely. Exactly how we are going to sell these products over-seas does concern me, especialy since our product is used by many large corporations for enterprise managment in other countries besides Canada or the US and they regularly use our Courier product to distribute data across national borders (not to mention some pretty big ponds). > The sorts who inhabit the nightmares of tech-support > people are going to take at least one more turn of the wheel of Maya to get > it. There are at least 10-12 people at Tivoli tech-support who 'have got it'. > I think a lot of people here think that blade guards on crypto in any form > is stark moral evil. If those blade guards keep me from getting a close shave then they shouldn't be there. > I believe that the central thesis of crypto-freedom is that it doesn't > matter if a document is on paper or in a text file; it doesn't matter if a > conversation is on the phone or in a restaurant. The medium doesn't matter. > My papers and effects have the same protection on a disk as on paper itself. Exactly, it's the message that is protected NOT the media. > The last thing that really, really bugs me is the hostility that's directed > towards PGP Inc. because now we're an Inc. Congratulations and best wishes on your future. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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No Subject
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Play Misty for me.

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SSZ & T1 upgrade
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Just a quick note to update you on the status of the T1 upgrade. It's going to take us a few weeks longer to get resources in place than we expected but there is some good news. It turns out that SWBT can provide us a 2-year contract on a full T1 for <$1500 setup and $350 a month. If we go for 5 years there is no install fee and the fee is $250 a month. We are currently discussing various issues with our current customers, examining our personal finances, and our market share potential in our area for which contract to go for. I currently have a 2-year contract on the present equipment location. The potential for purchasing the property will also be discussed. We can purchase a T1/T3 Linux compliant card that will mimic a NIC for less than $700. So, it looks like we can do a complete upgrade to a T1 for less than $3k. Provided we don't get in some sort of grid lock we hope to have something setup and going within the next few weeks. It is my personal desire to have something in place and fully functioning no later than Thanksgiving. But then again, I would have already signed the contract in order to get it going by Halloween. Alas, I am not the last word anymore - the down side to business partners. Even if both my current business partners decide they want out I can say that I will have resources in place by Christmas to have us to a T1. So, irrespective of what is decided the T1 will happen. We will be keeping the ISDN as a backup and transient dial-in for users. If you have any questions please direct them to 'consulting(a)ssz.com'. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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index.html
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo Navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Main banner Reservation Desk rule FORMER FBI OFFICIAL SENTENCED IN RUBY RIDGE PROBE October 10, 1997 Web posted at: 3:07 p.m. EDT (1907 GMT) Kahoe WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A former FBI official was sentenced Friday to 18 months in prison and fined $4,000 after pleading guilty to the destruction of a report criticizing the FBI's role in the deadly 1992 shootout at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. E. Michael Kahoe, a former head of the FBI's violent crime and major offenders section, told the court he was sorry for his actions. "I must live every day with the realism of what I've done," he said tearfully. "I will always be known as the agent who plead guilty to obstruction of justice in the Ruby Ridge case." Kahoe was sentenced by Judge Ricardo Urbina, who could have given him two years. The judge also ordered him placed on probation for two years after his release from federal prison. Kahoe's lawyers said his 26 years of unblemished law enforcement experience should be taken into account. Federal prosecutors urged the maximum sentence. In 1992, the wife and son of white separatist Randy Weaver were killed during a standoff with the FBI. A deputy U.S. marshal was also killed in the siege. As head of the FBI's major crimes section, Kahoe was responsible for preparing a critique of the FBI's performance at Ruby Ridge. Federal prosecutors said he repeatedly refused to hand over documents and later destroyed the report, which they were able to recreate from computer files. rule Related stories: * Both sides decry new Ruby Ridge charges - August 21, 1997 * FBI senior officials won't be charged in Ruby Ridge siege - August 15, 1997 * Former FBI section chief pleads guilty, admits destroying Ruby Ridge report - October 30, 1996 * FBI official charged with obstruction after concealing Ruby Ridge report - October 22, 1996 Related sites: Note: Pages will open in a new browser window * United States Department of Justice Home Page * Federal Bureau of Investigation External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. _________________________________________________________________ Infoseek search ____________________ ____ ____ _________________________________________________________________ rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards You said it... [INLINE] Reservation Desk rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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cypherpunks-e list problem - blank subject lines
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, The remailer software used for the cypherpunks-j and cypherpunks-e mailing lists does not accept empty subject: lines. Until they can arrange a work-around it would behoove authors to be shure to include something in the subject: line of the header. FYI. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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