December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

chained stego & interfaces to remailers
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Introduction (Skip down to "Chained Stego" if this intro is obvious for you) Some users are in countries where crypto is illegal, and would still like the ability to communicate with others on topics which are considered illegal in their countries (an example being documenting civil rights abuses). For them using encryption is not an option unless they combine with steganography. Also in countries where using crypto is legal, people still would like to have the ability to discuss topics which are considered illegal in their country (an example exporting cryptographic code, perhaps) For these users they do have the option of using encryption. However for some serious users of crypto, they may wish to hide the fact that they are sending encrypted communications to anyone at all, as well as hiding _who_ they are communicating with via mixmaster remailers, and hiding the contents of their communications via the use of encryption. Using remailers and using encryption shows up under traffic analysis even in freer countries, and if you were using steganography, you would be above suspicion, apparently never having sent an encrypted message at all, or at least not having sent one during the time in question. A useful capability to address the needs of these classes of users would be to be able to send messages to a remailer by steganographically encoding them in publically published material, Examples being: messages posted to USENET, messages posted to mailing lists, material made available on web pages (text, images, audio files), CUSeeMe video streams, etc. Such a system would allow a person in a country where crypto is outlawed to participate anonymously in discussions in the remaining free parts of the world without appearing to be using cryptography. The simple approach is to set up stego to remailer gateways which scan newsgroups and mailing lists. (It might be a useful to integrate this function into the Eternity server, as it is already doing quite a bit of scanning of newsgroups, and scanning newsgroups is relatively expensive, so we may as well scan for multiple message types while we are scanning). So, to send an anonymous message, a person PGP encrypts their message, and manipulates the encrypted message to remove the statistical properties identifying it as a PGP message (by removing "-----BEGIN..." headers, the fixed PGP formatting inside that, and the bias caused by the use of RSA), PGP stealth version 2.x would be suitable for this purpose. Next a suitable steganographic encoding is required. A simple method would be perhaps an in-your-face approach, to include a randomly distributed, randomly changing .sig: == Use a random number, go to jail, so lock me up already. QGRjcy5leC5hYy51az4gKEhpZ2ggU2VjdXJpdHkpiQCVAgUQMli+7B98EdWB2LS9 AQFF0gQAjiAOPPCs7s0VCHoFI2IWMEcAeQInmnl2p+6rpsvIxjX1v3wBqqstgBu5 aCLY9Uns+iKjzcnt5DTj6NPhJ8EOlefwgHUssiBLTsw7tOvT9fQwcIXOE5ikGP7j RObTq3a2Vtz4/O/YgN0KQnWcqTDuadeP17cJ2bbaWJpZiGDyWGSJARUDBRAySOsk The stego remailer gateway has to be able to put back together the multiple parts in the correct sequence. The Date: field from the post would be enough information to allow this. Chained Stego However there is another problem: the remailer gateway knows the identity of the stego users. The stego users therefore have to trust the stego gateway not to tell the authorities in their country. They also have to trust that the gateway is not actually be run by their own countries censorship board. The price for misplacing trust and revealing your use of encryption may be death in some of these countries. It would be nice if we could chain the stego function, so that the amount of trust required of each element could be reduced, in a similar way to chaining through remailers acheives this. So (here we get to the actual content of this post, the above having been introduction), we could arrange that the stego user encrypts with a selection of stego gateways public keys. The steps to send to gateways A and then B are: 1. encrypt with B's public key, normalise output (with pgp stealth) 2. encrypt with A's public key, normalise output 3. encode normalised output from 2 into an innocuous looking USENET post The process by which the stego message is recovered is then more complex, and has higher overhead. Each stego gateway has to scan newsgroups for stego messages, and forward it's potential partially decrypted stego messages to the other stego gateways. Then each of those remailers decrypts, and if the result is more stego noise, again forward back to the other stego gateways. The problem here is when do we stop! Remember if we pick a message, and apply our stego decoding method to it we get something which looks indistinguishable to a stego message whether there exists a stego message or not. Also how much of USENET do we scan? The stego gateways will be sending a lot of partially decrypted potential stego messages between themselves. One potential solution to the infinite loop problem is to include with the message a note to the gateway stating how many times this has been decrypted. After a few hops it can be discarded. If the max hops is 2, and there are 3 gateways A, B and C. The messages created by the single encrypted message are: round 1: A, B, and C decrypt and forward to each other round 2: B, and C decrypt C discards the output; B forwards the message to the requested remailer (We presume that multiply encoding to the same remailer is not useful, if A can decode by denormalising and decrypting twice, you may just as well have addressed it to A normalised and encrypted once). B does not know which person's USENET post this came from. He does not know where it is going (to another USENET group via a chain of remailers, or to an indivdual) However B does know that remailer A knows who the message is from. Presume there are n remailers. For hops which go through h remailers, collusion is required by all h remailers to obtain the identity of the poster. If the attacker owns k of those remailers, that is k of the remailers are colluding to discover the identity of the stego user, then the if k < h the attacker will never discover the identity of any posters using chains of length h. If k >= h the attacker will discover the identity of a stego user only in cases where the chain includes all of the hops. (C(n,k) is choose k of n function computed with n!/((n-k)!k!) k!(n-h)! Prob = C(k,h)/C(n,h) = -------- n!(k-h)! Some sample values, n = 8 values of h = hops, and k = no of rogue gateways h= \k| hops\| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 --------------------------------- 1 | .13 .25 .38 .50 .63 .75 .88 2 | .00 .04 .11 .21 .36 .54 .75 3 | .00 .00 .02 .07 .18 .36 .63 4 | .00 .00 .00 .01 .07 .21 .50 5 | .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .11 .38 6 | .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .25 7 | .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .13 Now interestingly it seems to me that this figure is per stego message, so if you chose different gateway chains on each message your cumulative chance of being caught would be worse than if you just chose a chain and stuck to it. You're trying to minimise your cumulative chance of being identified. If you use a chain, and the jack boots don't kick down your door for a few weeks, you hope it is a good chain. Of course there is a chance that gateways could be taken over and your chain would then become a compromised chain. An additional danger if a gateway is compromised and it's key is revealed, the attacker can then go back through it's saved messages and look for messages which came from the newly acquired gateway, or went to it, to see how many more chains this compromises. It would seem like a good idea for the gateways to ensure forward secrecy by re-keying reasonably frequently. To do better than this, we could make the stego gateways to act like middlemen remailers. That is a gateway will always communicate with other gateways via a remailer. Now gateway B does not know which of gateways A or C decoded the message from the newsgroup. So he has to attack them all. Better still, the gateways can be completely hidden. They can use a message pool to communicate. This has higher overhead, but now the fact that gateway B knows either A or C decoded the message does not help much because gateway B can't physically locate A and C. An alternative to the suggestion of including a count of the number of decryptions that have taken place so far to avoid infinite loops, is to do the job probablistically. Say that each remailer says that it will only accept mesages where the low order 3 bits after decryption are "101". This rule doesn't apply to the first hop, which knows that the message hasn't circulated anyway, as it has just pulled it from the newsgroup. So the first gateway decodes, forwards to the other gateways. Each gateway decodes, and if the desired bit pattern comes out, sends the decrypted message to the other remailers. This way we place no restriction on the number of hops, avoid revealing who the first hop is explicitly, but ensure that the messages which are not stego at all die naturally, and don't propogate for ever between the gateways. Also the "101" is likely enough to come up quite by chance, and the number of actual stego messages is small compared to just ordinary USENET posts that seeing a "101" doesn't prove anything conclusive after 1 hop. However after several hops (if an attacker owns several of the gateways), the probability of getting multiple "101"s in a row points increasingly to a stego message, whereas if we relied on a header stating how many hops, no information would be leaked by the attacker handling multiple hops in the middle of the chain. So it's a trade off between lower overall overhead whilst allowing multiple hops, whilst increasing the susceptability of the system to leaked information to an attacker who owns multiple rogue gateways. However these are all very high overhead because they have DC net like overheads, you send a copy to everything to everyone always, so you have a perfect mix. You can trade off this security to obtain lower bandwidth. Here's one suggestion of how to do this. Obviously we can't include with each partial decryption instructions on who to remail it to (because if you found some instructions, that would reveal immediately that it was a stego message). However, we can interpret the random bit patterns as remailer instructions. Say there are n gateways, we can number the gateways consecutively and take the decrypted message mod n - 1 to produce the index number of a gateway to send to next. We can include a count of decryptions so far to reduce overhead. Another way to avoid infinite loops with this variation is to take the decrypted message mod ((n - 1) + j), anything over n-1 gets discarded. Messages naturally die out statistically at a speed determined by the ratio of j / n - 1, after h hops there is probability: (j / n - 1) ^ h that the message will get discarded. Provided the stego users account for a small amount of traffic, their use would likley be lost in the large pool of noise even if they stuck to a particular chain. Or they could themselves use normally distributed selections of random chains. However if they did this, their cumulative chance of sending through only rogue gateways on one post would increase. Interestingly this setup has different properties to mixmaster mixes, with this arrangement traffic analysis gives you nothing, as the inputs are hidden, and the traffic is perfectly normally distributed. (Presuming that the stego users create random chains also). Cover traffic between gateways adds nothing. You probably need cover traffic on output however, so that the gateways send constant, or at least evenly distributed amounts of traffic off into the remailer net, so that one persons posting can not be correlated with exits from the gateway network. Some delay in the gateway network would help also. Random delay is different to mixing in this instance because there is already lots of mixing going on, the point is to ensure that an exit from the gateway network is not observable at fixed time periods after posts from particular suspected stego users. If there are many users this should average out. Note also, that when a message does decode to a message, the gateway should generate a random replacement message and forward that to a random remailer with the same probability as for other non-decoding messages, otherwise receiving a message would skew the statistics. Given that the stego user has an interest in sticking to a chain, this is less secure than sending copies of partially decrypted potential messages to all gateways. Either he doesn't stick to his chain, thus increasing his odds of being detected, or he uses his fixed chain and runs the risk that this statistic shows through. If there are many stego users each with different fixed randonly chosen chains, the fact that chains are fixed would be less likely to reveal information as the random chains would tend to cancel out, and themselves have the same normal distribution as the non-stego traffic. Comments? More efficient ways to get around the weakness of a single remailer gateway hop? Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Re: A new system for anonymity on the web
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back, <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk>, writes: > Hal Finney <hal(a)rain.org> writes: > > Theoretically, at least for long downloads, passing through multiple > > slow links shouldn't slow down the transmission, > > I'm not sure that this is so. > [...] > When Alice and Bob are online, consider that they are actually using > their bandwidth most of the time. I know I do; if I'm not using it I > hang up, with pay per second phone lines, you're likely to. Actually here in the U.S. most people have access to unmetered Internet access these days. Local and national ISP's are almost always that way, and AOL offers that option now as well. I find that I tend to browse in "flurries", paging around a bit, then settling down to read for a while. But you're right, I did not consider the interference among multiple paths running through a jondo. That issue applies to the higher speed links as well. If average path length is n, then on average there will be about n paths going through each jondo (assuming all "home" jondos have set up paths). So the question will be whether the average person uses more than 1/n of the bandwidth available during the time he is connected. This will no doubt depend on the pricing model for Internet service, as you suggest. > > just increase the latency. I don't have a very clear picture about > > how long it would take to snake in and out of a bunch of people's > > modem lines en route to the web server. > > I'm sure it's going to increase the latency too. My ping times are > 200ms from the PPP link alone (ie pinging the PPP server machine > itself). Add to this that the members of the jondo / crowds pool may > not be on the same ISP, and you've got the additional overheads of > whatever latency is added by the cumulative latency between each of > the hops in the chain. Yes, latency would be cumulative, and I just tested mine and found it was 160-220 ms, about the same as what you saw. So running through say 5 jondos at the end of modem paths would add about a second of latency. I think this would be fine if it only happened once per web page, but almost intolerable if it was once per tiny picture. > I wonder if you could improve the security of this by trading off > against some additional bandwidth consumption for the ISP. Say have > split the jondo in half, with two cooperating half-Jondos acting as a > single virtual jondo in such a way that someone with root access on > one machine but not the other, can't extract any useful information by > spying on that half of the jondo. This is an intriguing idea. Secure multiparty calculation protocols allow calculations to be made such that neither machine would have access to all the data. It is an interesting question how this could be applied to the anonymous communication problem. In this specific case, if the Crowds system were enhanced so that end-to-end encryption was used (which seems very practical and useful), you could run a jondo on your PC whose only function was to link to the jondo on the ISP and then set up the additional path through the jondo net. The path between your local PC jondo and the end one in the path would be encrypted, so even root on the local ISP could not see the contents of what you send down the jondo path. He might still be able to see when you were sending and when not, but he couldn't tell where it was going. Hal

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SafePassage Web Proxy follow-up
by SafePassage Sales 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear SafePassage Evaluator: It's been a while since you downloaded the evaluation version of SafePassage, and we just wanted to check in to see how things were going. If you have problems installing SafePassage, using SafePassage with your current browser, or any other questions about our SafePassage product line, please email: safepassage-sales(a)c2.net or safepassage(a)ukweb.com If applicable, please include some recent samples of your log files, and detailed information on your platform and the version of SafePassage you're using. If you have sales or ordering questions, please feel free to give us a call at 510 986 8770. Our hours are 10 am to 6 pm, Pacific Daylight Time. You can also contact UKWeb, our European partner and master distributor, at +44 113 222 0046. -- Join our Early Adopter Program: For the following applications, we are offering a flat-fee license of $45,000 per year, provided payment is received by May 15, 1997: (a) Banks, for distribution to their customers. (b) Internet Service Providers, for distribution to their customers. (c) Companies, for internal use.

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Artikel about XS4ALL in New York Times (fwd)
by cpunks＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from tank ----- >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Fri May 2 05:04:57 1997 From: tank <tank(a)xs4all.nl> Message-Id: <199705020912.LAA11297(a)xs1.xs4all.nl> Subject: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York Times To: tank(a)xs4all.nl Date: Fri, 2 May 1997 11:12:37 +0200 (MET DST) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL25] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk THE NEW YORK TIMES/CYBERTIMES www.nytimes.com April 29, 1997 By BRUNO GIUSSANI For an ISP in the Netherlands, Controversy Is an Old Friend AMSTERDAM -- April has meant business as usual at XS4ALL (access-for-all), the third-largest Internet service provider in the Netherlands. The month started off with the XS4ALL Web site being out of reach for a substantial portion of the European online population, and it is ending with the provider's adding a notch to its track record as a champion of freedom of speech. On April 11 the Dutch Web site was blocked by the German academic network, Deutsche Forschungsnetz (DFN), which serves about 400 universities and research organizations and provides Internet access to a half million people. DFN acted under pressure from the Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau pointing out the illegal -- in Germany, though not in the Netherlands -- content of Radikal Magazine, which is housed on the XS4ALL server. Radikal, a left-wing underground magazine, advocates "militant and armed interventions" to overthrow the government, and has published a "Short guide to hindering railway transports of all kinds" -- a handbook describing how to attack and damage tracks. Since selectively barring single home pages is technically impossible, the DNF action cut off all 6,000 pages on the XS4ALL servers, including those of Serbian opposition radio station B-92 and several scientific databases. Thus, while blocking illegal material, the German network was also hampering scientific work -- which DFN has been established to nurture. Not to mention that skilled Internet users could route around the obstacle by using a remailing system or a proxy server located abroad. What's more, Radikal Magazine can be found on several dozen "mirror sites" around the world. Ten days later -- after being flooded by protests -- the German network lifted the ban on XS4ALL. "An effective blockage of illegal information has not been within the realms of possibility," Klaus-Eckart Maass, a DFN spokesman, conceded in an interview with The Associated Press. Now, this happened the very same week as the indictment of a German manager of CompuServe, a leading international online service, for the transmission of allegedly illegal materials over the Internet and as the German Parliament opened discussions on a new multimedia law. The new bill would place the responsibility for content on the supplier of the data, thus Internet service providers would not be held liable for illegal information that could pass over their wires unless they have been alerted and "have the technical ability" to delete or block it -- the very same scheme the German academic network found impossible to enforce. It was not the first time XS4ALL had been at the forefront of an Internet skirmish. Last September, most German ISPs blocked XS4ALL for a month after complaints by a regional prosecutor about Radikal. (In January Angela Marquardt, a Bavarian socialist politician, was indicted for linking to the banned magazine from her personal home page). "After a couple of weeks, the censored information was mirrored on some 50 Web sites around the world and voluntarily removed by our user from the XS4ALL server," the company's founder, Felipe Rodriquez, 28, explained. "After the block had ended, our user put the documents back on his page." Along with German prosecutors, the Amsterdam-based provider has lined up a fair list of other adversaries: the McDonald's fast-food chain, the Serbian government and the Church of Scientology, just to name a few. XS4ALL's roots reach into the hacker movement. The venture started out in 1993 "to give anyone the possibility to access the Internet." At that time there were no commercial access providers in Holland. It has grown into a respectable and very successful business in less than four years, yet the principles on which it was created have not changed: "Internet for the masses" is still its motto. XS4ALL currently has 55 employees, boasts 21,000 subscribers and hosts some 6,000 home pages. "A few years ago, we would have been portrayed as a band of dangerous anarchists, bent on disrupting society," Rodriquez told the Dutch daily Trouw. "But now they have come to see that we are nice and quiet people really." The company was instrumental in the creation of the Amsterdam Digital City project, a community networking initiative backed by taxpayer's money, and Rodriquez himself played a key role in setting up the Dutch anti-child-pornography hotline, the first of its kind, last year. "Before we started the hotline, Holland had a reputation of being a kid-porn freehaven," he said in an interview last week. "We designed it as a non-censoring form of self-regulation." The hotline is run by Internet users and providers. Unlike Britain's Internet Watch Foundation, the Dutch hotline doesn't censor any information nor does it ask the provider to do so. Hotline operators contact the author of the information and ask him to remove the offending content. "If the author does not comply, we report him to the police, and he'll be prosecuted," said Rodriquez, who also is chairman of the Dutch Providers Association. "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider." That's why XS4ALL didn't take any steps against the customer who posted Radikal Magazine on its server. "Our policy is that as a provider we are not in the position to judge whether this magazine is illegal in the Netherlands, therefore we do not interfere with our users' freedom of speech," Rodriquez stated. "If there is any doubt about the legality of the publication in Holland, a Dutch court of law would be the proper place to remove these doubts," he added. This was the case when, in September 1995, the Religious Technology Center -- better known as the Church of Scientology -- filed for the seizure of all the XS4ALL computer equipment "because one of our users had put on his home page some information to which Scientology said it owned the copyright." The document -- the now famous "Fishman affidavit" -- is the actual transcript of a testimony given by Steven Fishman in a Los Angeles Court in which he accused the church of having forced him to act illegally. "We denied any responsibility for the content on our users' pages; they decide for themselves what they will publish," Rodriquez recalled. "We won the litigation." The user preferred to take down the controversial document. Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in Holland and abroad. The company's commitment to support free expression and democratization of the Internet doesn't stop here. Last fall when the Serbian government censored radio station B-92, XS4ALL helped design an Internet campaign and started to carry news broadcasts (in RealAudio format) that kept the rare opposition voice alive and the international public informed through independent accounts of the events occurring during the mass demonstrations in Belgrade. "They gave us disk space, donated network traffic and helped in training people," said Frank Tiggelaar, a Dutch activist for democratization in former Yugoslavia. "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL," Rodriquez commented. The campaign of Helen Steel and Dave Morris is among the projects XS4ALL's old hackers do like. The two British environmentalists are the main characters of a civil case that started in 1990 when the McDonald's restaurant chain sued them for distributing flyers pointing at what they called the company's economic and ecological "ravages." The trial is not over yet -- but it has spawned a large Internet-based support network and fed a huge anti-McDonald's Web site called McSpotlight hosted, not surprisingly, by XS4ALL. EUROBYTES is published weekly, on Tuesdays. Click here for a list of links to other columns in the series. Related Sites Following are links to the external Web sites mentioned in this article. These sites are not part of The New York Times on the Web, and The Times has no control over their content or availability. When you have finished visiting any of these sites, you will be able to return to this page by clicking on your Web browser's "Back" button or icon until this page reappears. Bruno Giussani at eurobytes(a)nytimes.com welcomes your comments and suggestions. Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company -- XS4ALL Internet BV - Felipe Rodriquez-Svensson - finger felipe(a)xs4all.nl for Managing Director - - pub pgp-key 1024/A07C02F9 ----- End of forwarded message from tank -----

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Re: FCPUNX:Layoffs at PGP
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> [arrow] PGP Pretty Good on Privacy of Layoff Details > by Kristi Coale > > [...] > > > "Internet Fast-Forward is not as closely related to the tools we > develop for individuals for privacy," he said. And the fact that > Fast-Forward filters ads which are an "inimical part of some of > the emerging Web commerce models ... we don't want to hinder this > development." I think this tells us everything we need to know about the management of PGP inc. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Cyberstrike
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- May be of interest... In> From: cleacy(a)execulink.com (Chris Leacy) In> Newsgroups: comp.infosystems.www.announce In> Subject: SOFTWARE: CyberStrike 1.13a Ad filtering/Cookie cutting Proxy In> Date: 30 Apr 1997 23:28:43 -0400 In> CyberStrike: Version 1.13a First Public Release In> The first public alpha of CyberStrike was released today. In> It can be found at <URL:http://www.execulink.com/~cleacy> In> CyberStrike is a banner ad filtering, cookie cutting, HTTP In> header overriding proxy of a program. In> Whether for privacy concerns, or just to speed up your In> browsing, CyberStrike performs admirably well at it's task. In> Chris Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBM2mQeTltEBIEF0MBAQEbUAf+NQOMPrml38ijLwv8MIPSkTUbtbNQebJy R4LaeYhXI6Z/OzJdX6AQC2GisxMyPiz3QWWBoAqxGkunWDHbQzDfZVWW6nZa4zLY do2r11CEWFPba1igX+8JtCm9gd11S8Zlff5Pw5eTYOMcsVSHf6Z/+iAT5aqnIdcb YU26JswL1MofhWlNhbNXYc/9wQ3uUn1hU3lin+Lujfa5+cXXlTyfz6eFcJlwD7ZY KdK7UfPMuCeZnUX/VJqBdJ1idXfC5YOlwVMBNIyQK7PgCy59FvP5CiiXhpui7uSj WijKBSMUsz2HuQIuQJf6zvW/bi5DGWr6PerTXnuVaUkjNHr4Fp13Mg== =5TtH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Re: Bombs Away, from The Netly News Network
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:50 PM 5/1/97, Jeff Barber wrote: >Declan McCullagh writes: >> "A >> member of the DoJ committee accessed a single web site >> on the World Wide Web and obtained the titles of 110 >> different bomb-making texts." > >I wonder if this was a bookstore. I did a search for "explosives" >on amazon.com and came up with at least that many titles. Only a >handful were of the Anarchist's Cookbook ilk. Most were academic or >industrial studies; a few were from US Govt or Govt-affiliated >organizations. Probably Paladin Press. Publisher of such notables, as Hit Man: A technical manual for independent contractors, a semi-fictional work with lots of details (written by an anonymous woman, BTW). See http://www.paladin-press.com PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."

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Re: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>How do you hack a camera? Physically damaging the camera works, but can get you jail time. A better solution, if you have a nearby office window facing the cameras, is to use a near-infrared laser (<$100) and blind camera. A strong IR signal will easily overwhelm the AGC circuit and cause the camera to behave as if its pointed into the sun. All video cameras contain an IR block, but it generally isn't sharp enough to cut off an 850 nm diode laser. --Steve PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."

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Re: SAFE Bill discussion
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Administration hates this bill, because it threatens their ability to roll out Key Recovery. They've said as much in the letter Declan forwarded: "The bill could be read as prohibiting the United States government from using appropriate incentives to support a key management infrastructure and KEY RECOVERY." [emphasis added] Do you think that if this bill helped the Administration, that they'd be out there urging the subcommittee chairman to stop it? I think not. I'm also puzzled by the fact that CDT is being criticized pretty much solely, even though the entire Internet Privacy Coalition, and several other groups all wrote a letter of support of the bill with only a criticism of one provision. However the overall statement was of support. (see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) As far as I can tell, everyone criticizing the bill either thinks that: a) CDT actually runs all these groups behind the scenes, or b) pretty much all of the Internet advocates believe that this bill is needed and are doing the best they can with what Congress has written. You're pretty hard on CDT, but EFF, EPIC, the ACLU, VTW, Americans for Tax Reform, the Association for Computing Machinery, Computer Professionals for Social Responsiblity, Eagle Forum, the National Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers, and PGP Inc all signed this letter. Can you consider, perhaps, for a second, that critics of SAFE are being unreasonable? I would think so, as critics of SAFE include the Clinton Administration. Is that the kind of company that cypherpunks keep? Here's a great excerpt from the Internet Privacy Coalition letter: The pending bill provides a positive framework for the reforms that are long overdue in this critical area. It makes clear that the sale or use of encryption, a vital technique to promote network security and individual privacy, should not be restricted in the United States. This is the view widely shared by users of the Internet and the computer and communications industry. It was also a central recommendation of the report of the National Research Council last year. Looks like widespread support from people who study this issue for living. I'm glad to be counted among them. -S -Shabbir

9 13

Re: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robert Hettinga, <rah(a)shipwright.com>, writes: > Again, it's using the right business model, and not necessarily > cryptography, which makes a market happen. Blind signatures and hash > collisions are necessary, but not sufficient, for the market to exist. Bob, if I understand you correctly, you've suggested that digital bearer instruments will in the long run actually be more efficient than conventional book entry based transaction models. Anonymity will be cheaper than identified transactions. But, if digital bearer certificates of all kinds are, as you suggest, cheaper and more efficient than conventional ones, why can't we just use ordinary non-blinded digital instruments and ignore the identifying information? For example, XYZ Co. could issue a signed note saying "Serial number 12345, worth 100 shares of XYZ Co.". A bank could issue a signed note saying "Serial number 54321, worth $100 at DigiBank". These can be done with ordinary digital signatures. No blinding or patent issues arise (by the end of this year, when the patents expire!). These are not blinded, so they are in principle traceable. They have to have unique serial numbers to solve the double spending problem, and those could be used to track them. This makes them less attractive from the privacy perspective, but what about from the point of view of the financial markets? Can they just ignore the serial numbers and treat them as the bearer certificates you have been talking about? (Don't real bearer certificates often have serial numbers on them?) Maybe this geodesic market you're talking about (which I don't understand at all) could work with current technology? Hal

3 2

Re: Chaum steps down as CEO of Digicash
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:53 pm -0400 on 4/28/97, Hal Finney wrote: > Chaum's orientation towards privacy has not been well accepted by the > conservative banking community (a similar point was made by Peter Swire > in his article about payments and anonymity). Again, financial privacy is like flight. To the people who invented it, flight was an inherent good. People died trying to create it. However, the thing which made flight commonplace was commerce. Flying is not only the fastest way for people and other important things to get somewhere, but, over great distances, it is simply the cheapest way for people to travel. People don't purchase "wow, we can fly". They purchase economy seats to Cleveland. :-). The same thing with financial cryptography, and, by extension, strong cryptography in general. What will sell financial cryptography is not financial privacy per se. What will sell financial cryptography is the fact that digital bearer certificate protocols will prove, by virtue of their very *anonymity*, to be many orders of magnitude cheaper to use than any internet transaction method of equal security. Or any transaction method at all, for that matter. Including, of course, the book-entry transaction settlement methods (like checks, credit cards, securities clearinghouses, interbank settlement) we use today. It is under *that* proposition alone, the potential for radical cost reduction in *all* transaction settlement processes -- and the prospect for radical economic transformation that that brings -- that the blind signature patent should be marketed and licensed. Notice I said "licensed". Cryptographers -- and that is who Digicash is, nothing else, no matter how hard they try to be otherwise -- should invent, license, and validate the use of cryptographic protocols. And, clearly, there is no better financial cryptographer in the world than David Chaum, the man who created, from whole cloth, everything we consider to be modern financial cryptography. Digicash should not try to be a financial trustee, or a certificate underwriter, or even a software developer. All three things Digicash, BV, has tried to be in its many previous incarnations. Now, it appears, Digicash, Inc., is going to try to become the internet equivalent of a credit card association. However, once you understand what Digicash's strengths really are, you can see why this current strategy is just the next progression in, I'm sorry to say, the fool's market that Digicash, Inc., has become in terms of investment return. So, you can understand how, sometimes, I'm very much afraid we'll have to wait until this round of funding is burned through -- say 3 to 5 years -- before we see any progress in the market for digital bearer certificates. And, if Digicash keeps finding a "greater fool" when the money runs out, we'll end up waiting until 2007, the expiration date on the blind signature patent, in order for anything to happen at all. Yet, most of rest of the time, however, I'm not so pessimistic. I'm convinced that if Digicash starts non-exclusive licensing of the blind signature patent, and the other relevant Chaum patents it now controls, even as an experiment, I expect that they would very soon find that their profit margins on those licenses would dwarf the profits on all their other projects. Maybe then they'll realize they should stop trying to be something else, and be what they what they have been all along: the very best financial cryptographers in the world. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

6 13

Re: Artikel about XS4ALL in New York
by Paul Bradley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 2 May 1997, tank wrote: > "A few years ago, we would have been portrayed as a band of dangerous > anarchists, bent on disrupting society," Rodriquez told the Dutch daily > Trouw. "But now they have come to see that we are nice and quiet people > really." The only "nice people" are dangerous anarchists bent on destroying governments and buggering poloticians to death. (last part a personal preference of course, the author is totally straight but would nonetheless be distinctly amused to see any government official butt-raped to death) > The company was instrumental in the creation of the Amsterdam Digital > The hotline is run by Internet users and providers. Unlike Britain's > Internet Watch Foundation, the Dutch hotline doesn't censor any > information nor does it ask the provider to do so. Hotline operators > contact the author of the information and ask him to remove the > offending content. "If the author does not comply, we report him to > the police, and he'll be prosecuted," said Rodriquez, who also is > chairman of the Dutch Providers Association. How very benevolent. Its nice to know that instead of censoring your pages they send in the jackbooted thugs to do it for them, then throw you in a nice 6x9 cell for the henious crime of displaying some .gifs or similar. > "The Internet Watch Foundation forces the provider to remove the > illegal content," he added. "This is a fundamentally different approach > to responsibilities on the Internet. We think the author of the > information is responsible for his own actions, not the provider." And if he chooses not to remove the content you happen to find offensive? If you truly believed in the rights of the author and publisher of the information you would think about it before sending in your own particular brand of thugs to "crush the mutiny". > Yet when violation of the law is flagrant, XS4ALL doesn't hesitate to > comply, as it did a few weeks ago when it shut down a customer's home > page called Neuroroom, which sold marijuana and other soft drugs in > Holland and abroad. Sometimes one really wonders why we bother to set up mirrors to allow freedom of information to users, when the owners of these servers, supposedly in favour of free speech, do not even have the strength of character or conviction to decide for themselves what they will allow on their servers rather than bending over for the long cock of the law... > The company's commitment to support free expression and democratization > of the Internet doesn't stop here. As far as I can see it hasn`t even started yet. > Last fall when the Serbian > government censored radio station B-92, XS4ALL helped design an > Internet campaign and started to carry news broadcasts (in RealAudio > format) that kept the rare opposition voice alive and the international > public informed through independent accounts of the events occurring > during the mass demonstrations in Belgrade. I presume B-92 fell into line and matched the "requirements under law for obtaining a free-speech permit" before XS4ALL allowed this/ > "Basically any project we like gets free resources from XS4ALL," > Rodriquez commented. And anyone who guarantees to publicly lick the boots of the benevolent owners in thanks for their support gets as much free space as they like? Of course I believe in the right to free expression of anyone and if these thugs choose not to allow material they don`t like on their servers they have every right to remove it. I just don`t see that setting up mirrors to defeat blocks on sites that refuse to carry certain content is of any value in the fight for free speech. Sure, create a mirror of Radikal, but giving any credit or attribution to XS4ALL seems to be a poor choice. Paul "Still messing with mail apps so totally .sig-less" Bradley

3 3

Conference on UK Crypto Initiative 19 May 1997
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SCRAMBLING FOR SAFETY Privacy, security and commercial implications of the DTI's proposed encryption policy May 19, 1997 Computer Security Research Centre The London School of Economics Organised by: Privacy International Global Internet Liberty Campaign Chairman: Prof. Ian Angell, London School of Economics On May 19, the Computer Security Research Centre of the London School of Economics will host a one day meeting on the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry's policy paper "Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services," The event is being jointly organised by Privacy International and the Global Internet Liberty Campaign. The LSE meeting - the only public meeting during the consultation phase - will comprehensively assess all aspects of the governments proposal. Security specialists, academics cryptographers, legal experts, cyber-rights groups, ISP's and other commercial organisations will participate. The DTI and representatives from other agencies will be in attendance for the entire day. There will be no cost for members of the public to attend. An interactive audiocast on the Internet will also be available. DRAFT AGENDA: Introduction to cryptography Welcome and opening remarks - Dr James Backhouse Keynote - Geoffrey Robertson QC (invited) The DTI proposals - presented by the DTI Perspectives: * Legal and Commercial - Peter Sommer (LSE) and Alistair Kelman (LSE) * Architectural and Technical - Dr. Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems - Phil Zimmermann, PGP Inc. - Dr Ross Anderson, University of Cambridge - Dr. Carl Ellison, Cybercash * Civil Rights and Privacy - Simon Davies, Privacy International * International - OECD (invited) Section by Section analysis of the document. Wrapup (Around 3:30) MORE INFORMATION More information on the conference and the DTI initiative is available from http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/dti/. REGISTRATION To register for the conference, email Simon Davies at davies(a)privacy.org. ABOUT PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL Privacy International was formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance by governments and corporations. With members in more than 40 countries, it has created an international movement that has helped to counter abuses of privacy by way of information technology. Privacy International has conducted campaigns in Europe, Asia and North America to raise awareness about the dangers of ID card systems, military surveillance, data matching, police information systems, and credit reporting. It is based in London, UK, and is administered by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, D.C. Privacy International publishes a quarterly newsletter (the International Privacy Bulletin) and organizes conferences each year on privacy and technology. More information is available at http://www.privacy.org/ ABOUT THE GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN The Global Internet Liberty Campaign is an international coalition of 28 human rights, free speech, cyber-liberties and privacy groups that has come together to promote free speech and privacy on the Internet. More information is available at http://www.gilc.org/ ------- David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * PGP Key http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html

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Re: Layoffs at PGP
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First ECache is seeking a qualified individual to head e-cash related development. Company is headquarted in Las Vegas, but candidate would ideally be located in SV. --Steve PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."

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Flying - A-10 follow-up
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 01 May 97 08:33:00 CDT From: Corkum D Capt 2OSS/OSTC <corkumd(a)oss2.barksdale.af.mil> Subject: Flying - A-10 follow-up Corkum D Capt 2OSS/OSTC <corkumd(a)oss2.barksdale.af.mil> "Both the A-10's transponder and the autopilot appeared to have been turned off. Perhaps there is a simple technical explanation why no one noticed anything at first." Let me try and fill in a few of the holes for non-flyers: When aircraft fly in close formation typically only the lead aircraft has a transponder turned on. This is due to limitations with Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems. These systems are designed to prevent two aircraft from getting too close together thereby preventing possible midair collisions. Unfortunately the computers can't distinguish between aircraft that are on a collision course and aircraft in formation that are intentionally close together. For this reason ATC operators often request wingmen to turn off their transponders. Once the A-10 dropped back he was not easily visible to the lead aircraft who would be concentrating on entering the bombing range, working coordination with ATC and the range controllers etc. Inside the range ATC no longer maintains operational control of the aircraft and would not be following any of the aircraft directly. The first indication of the aircraft missing would be a failure of the wingman to respond to a radio call. When this happened it would first be assumed that he was on the wrong frequency. The lead aircraft would try to find him on another frequency, then attempt to call him on the emergency frequency "Guard". When this failed the lead would likely assume that the wingman had radio problems and would attempt to locate him visually. Only after he failed to locate him visually would he begin to worry that something happened. His first thought would be that the aircraft had a major malfunction such as complete loss of electrical power, that forced the pilot to abort the mission and return to base, but also prevented him from calling to the lead aircraft. The other possibility would be that the aircraft was down due to pilot error or aircraft malfunction. The idea that the wingman simply took the aircraft would likely never occur to the lead pilot. The lead pilot at this point would abort his mission and attempt to ascertain what happened to his wingman. He would contact ATC and ask if they had transponder track on the aircraft or reports of an aircraft down. He would also perform a visual search of the area and attempt to call back to the home base to see if they knew what happened. By this time the rogue pilot may have been gone for at least 30 minutes and was actually 200 miles away. The reason ATC could not track him is a technical issue. Modern ATC radars rely primarily on the aircraft transponder to provide location and altitude information. The actual radar returns "know as raw data" are only used as a secondary means to track aircraft when their transponders have failed. This must be performed manually since the computer has no way to distinguish one radar return from another without the transponder. This method is only used when an ATC controller knows an aircraft transponder has failed and must be manually tracked. Since the A-10 was not supposed to have his transponder on, no-one would notice when he broke formation. Only after the fact when the FAA reviewed the taped radar returns were they able to piece together the likely course of the A-10. I hope this explained some of the more technical reasons for what happened. David Corkum PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 Key available on BAL server, http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- "I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt."

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ARE YOU BEING INVESTIGATED ????
by investigations.comv＠angel.chico.joshuanet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Conference on UK Crypto Initiative 19 May 1997
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> SCRAMBLING FOR SAFETY > > Privacy, security and commercial implications of > the DTI's proposed encryption policy Didn't the green paper automatically fall since the government which issued it is no longer in office. The DTI does not have the right to make a crypto policy, ministers make policy, nor civil servants. It might be worth seeing if the relevant new junior ministers could attend and turn it into a brainwashing erm briefing session. Phill

2 1

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17 Dec '03

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1 0

Misdirected e-mail
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's no "sdg(a)dm.com". I don't know who this person is, but I hope s/he gets 'eir misdirected message via this mailing list. Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 06:52:58 -0400 Message-Id: <199705031052.GAA06973(a)lillith.anexis.com> From: support(a)freesmut.com (Free Smut Support) Subject: Secret Site Precedence: junk Apparently-To: <sdg(a)dm.com> Thank you, your username and password to our secret hardcore door are: Username: smut12 Password: freesmut This is an automated response to a request made on our web site. This IS NOT a bulk mailing. Our site is located at http://www.fl.freesmut.com/

1 0

Java woes on compatibility
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in a recent "PC Magazine" the story went into the compatibility problems among different vendors versions of the Java language, predicting that the problems may become worse. in short the vendors have a hard time getting all the compliance exactly correct. unfortunately, this same story happened with Unix and C such that the libraries out there did not fully adhere to a standard, even when the standard went into meticulous detail. is it the same insurmountable problem all over again? can there ever really be a totally portable language? java was invented to solve portability problems, but is plagued with the same ones that other languages have. what's the solution? it hasn't been implemented yet, but I believe the solution is an extremely sophisticated verification package for the correctness of the Java language. this type of idea is hinted in the makefiles of some C programs that compile based on complex attempts to avoid/workaround portability glitches. I saw one that did many regression tests on "strcpy" trying to catch all the kinds of things that can go wrong. the idea is that you actually have code that tests all the key implementation aspects of the library and language. it needs to be capable of being fully automated. for example, you might have code that calls the java window kit and then actually verifies that a window is drawn correctly by reading the screen or something like this. if you find that some things are falling through the tests, you just add to your tests. the tests don't need to be efficient-- you run them once and never again. also, I think the solution would involve writing a lot of verification routines for *every* feature of java that is implemented. the vendors simply run the code on their own implementation and it gives a "pass or fail" response. ideally, the java *user* could go through this process-- then the company cannot claim themselves that their implementation pass it's all out in the open for customers to test themselves. I would suggest that anything in the Java language that can't be tested like this, could be modified slightly to support this "testable" property, and that it would really pay off bigtime. in other words, some part of the library that doesn't seem like it could be tested, could have extra little aspects added to its implementation that support regression testing of the feature. (note that this is not necessarily "regression" in the classic sense of software engineering, but is very similar). I've written software that has this property, that its verification routines are built into it and are accessable by the end user. I think it represents a major new and important design consideration. and ultimately I think it saves developers and users time in the long run, but perhaps not the short run. a lot of work? yes, but it's the only way in my opinion, and it can be done in an elegant way. if it isn't I believe that portability problems will *increase* as the article predicted, and the revolutionary possibilities of Java will be forever handicapped and shortchanged. note that some people think that you should have a certification process. I don't like this at all because then the verification tools are caught up inside the Java company when it makes sense to *distribute* these tools so vendors can debug their own software without going through a bureacracy to get the stamp of approval. the verification suite is actually an extremely powerful utility that can test Java conformance and should be available to anyone trying to support the standard. note also that it wouldn't have to be Sun that creates such a package. in fact it might be better if someone not affiliated with the creation of the Java language built such a package. if anyone from Java/Sun is listening, I would be happy to consult on this. <g>

2 1

Re: Privacy news: Oakland Cameras, Levi employee files, FileGate
by geeman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:35 PM 4/30/97 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >It's been a busy day for privacy issues in the Oakland Trib. > >Surveillance Cameras in Oakland >------------------------------- >Bay Alarm is trying to sell the City Council a $500K-$1.5M closed-circuit >TV system for watching people in public places. The three picknickers >didn't litter, but the camera mounted on the public library building could >zoom in enough to that the council could tell a ham sandwich from roast beef, >and whether the two joggers were wearing Nikes or Reeboks. >"Anybody who is a law-abiding citizen is not going to be concerned about >this.. >"When I'm out in a public place.... I don't have an expectation of privacy" >said Councilcritter Nate Miley (East Oakland/Elmhurst), who wants a test run >in his district, where residents have bars on their windows and are afraid >to go out at night. Police Chief Joseph Samuels likes it too. >"This is technology spying on our citizens from camera on light poles" >said John Crew of the ACLU police practices project, speaking against it. >Bay Alarm said that some British cities have dealt with privacy fears by >setting up monitoring centers away from city and police offices, >where tapes are kept in case a crime occurs -- crime victims can call up >the police and ask them to play back tapes, said Mark Demier of Bay Alarm. >The camera systems are also capable of taking pictures in the dark. > Brief radio piece on the red-light cameras in S.F. --- red-light running appears to be down at the 4 intersections where cameras are installed; some well-placed official was quoted as saying "The cameras are definitely having an effect on people's behavior." Yes, a Good Thing. They are continuing to move forward with plans to install more cameras. This is fine for red-light-running. I'm just worried about the day when the cameras have an effect on people's behavior with respect to what they say, whom they associate with, the clothes they wear, the thoughts they think... How do you hack a camera?

8 8

Re: SAFE Bill is a Disaster--"Use a cipher, go to prison"
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:09 AM -0800 5/1/97, Jonah Seiger wrote: >Tim - > >It's too bad we may not see eye-to-eye on this one. > >For what it's worth, CDT shares your concerns about the criminal provision >in the SAFE bill. We believe that as currently written, the provision is >overly broad and could create a chilling effect on the everyday use of >encryption, and unnecessary because it duplicates existing obstruction of >justice law. Indeed. All reasons to withdraw support for the Bill and to actively seek to undermine and sabotage it, as I hope many of us do. Further, it is quite clear that the Bill will *not* allow strong crypto (by "strong" I mean "arbitrarily strong," the only kind most of us support!) to be exported freely. Even for "financial cryptography," as clearly any strong crypto system can--and wiil--be used eventually by some group the Administration deems to be "international terrorists." (I would classify the U.S. government as a supporter of international terrorism, for many reasons. The mining of the harbors in a country with a relatively freely elected government, for example. The support of Kurdish terrorists. The funding and equippers of sappers in Serbia. And so on. Oh, and does the use of PGP by Burmese rebels/freedom fighters/terrorists, so often cited by Phil Zimmermann as a postive example, count as use by terrorists? You get the picture. One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. I support, for example, the use of strong cryptography to undermine the Zionist entity which preys upon the life of the people (TM)...does this make me a supporter of terrorists or of freedom fighters? And why do George Bush and Bill Clinton get to decide?) >We have expressed these concerns both publicly (in a letter to the >committee signed by EPIC, ACLU, EFF, VTW, CDT, and over 20 other >organizations - see http://www.privacy.org/ipc/safe_letter.html) and >privately in conversations with the committee staff. We hope to work with >the authors of SAFE to address these concerns, but, as you know, we are not >running this show and have to work with what the Congress gives us. Yoo're not "running the show," nor am I, or we, but you can withdraw support and actively oppose a bad bill. >However, despite our concerns about the criminal provisions, we believe >strongly that the SAFE bill, and the bills in the Senate sponsored by Burns >and Leahy, are vitally important and should be passed. > >As you know, the debate over encryption policy reform has been going on for >more than 4 years. Despite all of our efforts to promote the use of >encryption, crypto is still not widely used by the public. "Use a cipher, go to prison" will hardly engender more public support for cryptography. More importantly, what the hell does the SAFE bill have to do with Americans using crypto? Crypto is completely unrestricted, at least by law, anywhere in the U.S. for use by American citizens and (most) others. If Americans aren't using crypto, it's for other reasons. "Use a cipher, go to prison" will not help in this process. >The Clinton administration has not backed off from their commitment to a >global key-escrow/key-recovery system with guaranteed law enforcement >access to private keys. And despite the brilliant work of EFF on the >various legal challenges to the export restrictions, we feel this issue >will only be fully resolved through legislation. > >The status quo, in our view, is not good enough. Because of the export >controls and the lack of a coherent US encryption policy, Internet users do >not have access to the privacy protecting encryption products they need. > >Congress needs to stand up to the Administration and say, with a strong >voice, "your policy is a failure - we need a different solution". That's >what SAFE, Pro-CODE, and ECPA II do. Sorry, Johah, but these are just platitudes from a press release. More detailed analysis is called for, not just mouthings about Congress standing up to the Administration, etc. For example, answer this question: Will "unbreakable" (*) cryptography, using full-strength RSA and drop-in 3DES, IDEA, Blowfish, AES, etc., be allowed for unrestricted export? If "yes," then this is indeed a good deal. But the weasel words in nearly every section clearly say it is not. If "no," then crypto is still crippled for export...the details just vary (or maybe they don't, actually, as nothing is spelled out). (* "Unbreakable" is a dangerous term. By "unbreakable" I mean here an algorithm and key distribution mechanism (or no KD, as in PK systems) which surpasses any known breaking attempts by some comfortable margin. Cf. the study by the noted cryptographers, and use keylengths like 128 bits of work factor...that ought to be "unbreakable" by the standards of the next few centuries!) Importantly, the putative goals of the SAFE Bill could be much more simply handled this way: "SAFE -- Security and Freedom Through Encryption: Computer software shall be treated as any other form of speech is. Software shall not be subject to restrictions on dissemination, export, or possession." --Tim May, still a felon, and still using encryption to further prosecutable offenses. Fuck Congress. -- [This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency Act of 1996] And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said: "Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck." So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular Translation, TCM, 1996]

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BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM: Admin request: /^subject:\s*help\b/i (fwd)
by cpunks＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com ----- >From owner-cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Sat May 3 20:52:56 1997 Date: Sat, 3 May 1997 20:52:56 -0500 From: owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com Message-Id: <199705040152.UAA22185(a)manifold.algebra.com> To: owner-cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM: Admin request: /^subject:\s*help\b/i >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Sat May 3 20:52:48 1997 Return-Path: <cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com> Received: (from root@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.3/8.8.2) with UUCP id UAA22154 for cypherpunks+incoming-cyberpass(a)algebra.com; Sat, 3 May 1997 20:52:44 -0500 Received: from sirius.infonex.com (cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com [206.170.114.2]) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.5/8.8.0) with ESMTP id VAA13741 for <cypherpunks+incoming-cyberpass(a)algebra.com>; Sat, 3 May 1997 21:46:45 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.5/8.7.3) id SAA28274; Sat, 3 May 1997 18:49:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rigel.cyberpass.net (root(a)rigel.infonex.com [206.170.114.3]) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id SAA28267 for <cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com>; Sat, 3 May 1997 18:49:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mailhub.amaranth.com (root(a)mailhub.amaranth.com [206.96.254.3]) by rigel.cyberpass.net (8.8.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id SAA08032 for <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net>; Sat, 3 May 1997 18:48:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from amaranth.com (ppp20.pensacola.com [206.96.254.20]) by mailhub.amaranth.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id UAA13493 for <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net>; Sat, 3 May 1997 20:45:59 -0500 Message-Id: <199705040145.UAA13493(a)mailhub.amaranth.com> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)amaranth.com> Date: Sat, 03 May 97 15:28:09 -0500 To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Subject: Help!! X-Mailer: MR/2 Internet Cruiser Edition for OS/2 v1.27c b9 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Do to some problems with my ISP I have lost several days worth of mail. :( Would someone be kind enough to zip up the cypherpunks posts from thursday to today and send them to me. Thanks, - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2uuPo9Co1n+aLhhAQHNMgP/bqjyLYYW9E5ZNU7mvXgt87IBwONabZUG 3UtHOkdn+y0ONDQED8HGRq8Z/1ns8yU9LfR4Y+FHvGp//3CmWwwce0MDTp3O0Mg1 QF0yX8h4qS8HpZUxn2FNnrhn2dj+dBKqZLm8ADLuOrV5lbNLeFuMFbTRGts/QEAD BDJen5/U8ZI= =bDrX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Tag-O-Matic: I smashed a Window and saw... OS/2. ----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com -----

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cyberpass.net down?
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Is cyberpass.net down? I have posted several messages but have not received any of them. - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: If Windows sucked it would be good for something. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM2wNNY9Co1n+aLhhAQELwwQAkpj04nDm0nldgAHpFdfSa4aMa4XqNMWP DDblV3g3QRF/e2+FXk43xl2R611zNIQGchzEiMipPal7NKw1O/RZBlS/QtU7iBeG ScPYxEnom/Nq9xqdlCS0bhP2A6soikaK/SRAdX96w6iUtELbHWSN5GSSAD3LkN5B 0GEFhWgAF1M= =mviw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone, whose reputation is bigger than God, in the hope of sparing me public humiliation from the error of my ways (the very paradigm of a lost cause :-)), wrote to me offline on this topic. I'm posting it here, because frequently people reply to me with stuff which is extremely relevant to the argument at hand, and which should be heard in public. The main consideration I use is that none of the information in the reply can be used to identify the person who sent it, or mess up whatever plans they're laying, something you can clearly see in the following... At 4:48 pm -0400 on 5/3/97, somebody wrote: you write: > > I further claim that the most efficient digital bearer certificate is an > > anonymous one. > > Hal's point is this. There are two types of "anonymity": one where > the bank says "I swear I won't keep any records based on the name > you gave me" (the benign bank), and the other where we use Chaumian > blinding so the bank never even sees the identity information (the > untrusted bank). Right. Let's call the first one the Microsoft model, because I feel especially vicious this evening, and the second one the "Real" Chaum model. > Now, it seems to me that the "benign bank" sort of anonymity can't > cost any more (and in fact will even cost less) than the "untrusted > bank" Chaumian anonymity. Not true. With Chaumian anonymity, all the underwriter does is keep a database of spent digital bearer certificates, which they keep down by expiring certificate issues and the keys which generate them periodically. When someone double-spends a certificate, the underwriter has enough information to reveal their public key, but only when someone double spends and not before. With the Microsoft model, the underwriter knows who's buying your certificates, *and* the shared secret which makes the cash valid, *and* what time the certificate was issued, *and* what your shoe sizes, and the name of your sister's first date, and, and, and,... Anyway, I claim that the very Chaumian inability to *ever* know who bought the certificates you underwrite keeps you from ever *trying* to keep track of any other data, which, of course, is inherently cheaper. > Yet your arguments for anonymity apply > equally to both situations. No they don't. There's a qualitative difference between a system where you can't ever know who some one is, but you can still trust them, and a system where you always know who someone is and they have to trust *you*. :-). I say that one of the additional virtues of the former system is significantly reduced transaction costs, and finally, that that happy side effect will eventually result in a shift away from the latter kind of system, if it ever is useful to begin with. By the way, an additional cost of the system, which is obviously more in line with the privacy concerns of cypherpunks, and possibly less germaine to the transaction cost issue we're discussing, is the cost of the risk of breaking the confidentiality of systems like the Microsoft idea. I have a hunch that all it takes is one big information leak, and such systems will be dropped as a form of digital cash underwriting, but I'm going pretty far out on a limb to make that particular assertion. Should we call this the "Clipper effect", just to rattle peoples' chains? > Therefore, I say your arguments, taken > to their logical conclusion, imply that we'll end up with "benign > bank" anonymity, rather than Chaumian "untrusted bank" anonymity. Again, I don't think so. However, what we really need is some actual estimates and analysis to prove it, barring the existence of any actual transaction cost data, of course. :-). Something I'm not qualified to do, though I bet there are people here who can get those answers. > But "benign bank" anonymity is a very very weak form of anonymity > indeed -- it's not what most cypherpunks (or cryptographers) mean > when they talk about anonymous digital cash. Amen. Only people mired in the book-entry way of looking at things think otherwise. I believe the economics of the marketplace will soon teach them the serious errors of their ways... > "Benign bank" anonymity > is the sort of thing that Cybercash or other traditional systems > provide; "untrusted bank" security is what Digicash provides. And, again, I assert that the paradox of all this is that the cheapest form of commerce is a form where you don't trust anyone, or, better, trust, but verify, everyone. That's the beauty of the blind signature algorithm, it allows you to do all that, and not keep books, which cost money. > So, if I understand your argument correctly, you're saying that > we'll inevitably end up with some weak form of anonymity, but it > will be far weaker than what most cypherpunks want. I hope you can see by now, after I've taken another shot at explaining it better, what I was getting at. > That sounds more like a cause for a call to arms than a reason to > sit around reassuring ourselves that everything will turn out fine > without us! Nah. I don't do calls to arms. It's much better to change the world by making money. An especially important focus to have when you're building transaction systems. :-). I strongly beleive that you can easily knock three, maybe four, decimal places off the cost of any transaction you can care to mention just by using strong financial cryptography and anonymous digital bearer certificates on a ubiquitous geodesic network. That remains to be seen, however. I will say that I'm working as hard as someone with my limited skillset can to prove that hypothesis. :-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Ready for PrimeTime: FUD! The Newsletter of Fear Uncertainty and Doubt
by geeman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See this new exciting venture. Cards and Letters Welcome; use "FUD" in the subject header. www.best.com/~geeman

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Re: Firewalls
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester possesses a rudimentary dick less than one inch long, half the size of his mother's clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries. \|||/ (o o) -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo

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YOU ARE APPROVED!
by YES!＠netcom.es 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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No Subject
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quoting: http://www.msnbc.com/onair/nbc/mtp/default.asp Tune in to Meet the Press with Tim Russert on Sunday... check local listings for details. Sunday: Meet the Press will look at crime, terrorism, national security, and foreign campaign contributions. Moderator Tim Russert will speak with FBI Director Louis Freeh. This week's panelist will be NBC's Pete Williams, and the roundtable guest will be Elizabeth Drew, author of Whatever it Takes. Meet the Press transcripts are usually available three hours after the show airs.

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Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Release May 5, 1997 C2Net Software: Douglas Barnes +1 510 986 8770 UK Web: Dave Williams +44 113 222 0046 Full-Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide C2Net President Sameer Parekh Rejects Weak Keys, Back Doors Oakland, CA - C2Net Software, Inc. annouced today the worldwide availability of Stronghold 2.0, a major upgrade to their secure web server based on Apache. With this release, Stronghold has added more functionality than ever, including uncompromised security, web-based configuration, and new protocol support. "The Stronghold web server -- like all C2Net products -- supports full-sized keys, and will never support government back doors," said C2Net president Sameer Parekh. "We have development teams around the globe working on our products, free from US export control policy. Even if some of these countries cave in to US demands, we'll still be able to produce first-rate, uncompromised security products." Others Use Compromised Security In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?" According to cryptography expert Bruce Schneier, "There is absolutely no business case for key recovery. Any benefit you get from longer key lengths is offset by the enormous security risk of concentrating keys in a few hands." Current "export" versions of Netscape and Microsoft web servers use a weak 40-bit cipher that can be broken in hours by any bored systems administrator or college student with access to a few hundred idle machines. By comparison, all C2Net software can use at least 128-bit keys. To understand this difference, imagine that the hundreds of computers needed to crack a 40 bit key in a few hours were compressed into a cube an inch on a side, and you built a computer the size of the Earth out of these cubes, it would still take this computer more than four times as long to crack a 128 bit key. It's easy to find a few hundred computers idle at any medium-sized business or university; Earth-sized computers are still relatively uncommon. Stronghold Gaining Market Share In several recent surveys, Stronghold has emerged as a leading contender in the web server market. An O'Reilly and Associates/Netcraft survey of secure web servers in use on the Internet found that Stronghold was second only to Netscape. The monthly Netcraft survey of all web servers on the Internet has indicated for some time that Stronghold is also the second most popular commercial web server for the Unix platform. "We've been steadily gaining market share," indicated Parekh, "and to a great extent it's due to our firm stand that we won't sell deliberately weakened security products to our customers." Features in Stronghold 2.0 "We've redesigned the security interfaces and built on the new Apache 1.2 code base," commented Mark Cox, Stronghold product manager at UK Web. "Stronghold has had many productivity and performance enhancements and it is now fully compliant with the new HTTP/1.1 standard." The HTTP/1.1 standard is a significant update to HTTP/1.0, the protocol that governs how web browsers and web servers communicate. HTTP/1.1 brings many new features to the table, including improved content and language negotiation, improved persistent connections, and better recovery from interrupted transfers. (For more information on HTTP/1.1, see http://www.apacheweek.com/features/http11) Stronghold 2.0 also includes a web-based configuration manager, allowing web administrators to securely administer their sites from the web browser of their choice. "We've had a lot of requests for this feature as Stronghold has grown in popularity," said Douglas Barnes, C2Net Vice President. On the security front, the new release includes support for Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) version 3, which provides stronger security and more flexibility in choosing ciphers. Background UK Web Limited is a leading Internet services company specialising in server technology, Internet security, business solutions and effective site design. C2Net is the leading worldwide provider of uncompromised network security software. Netscape Navigator and Netscape Enterprise are trademarks of Netscape Communications Corporation. Microsoft Internet Explorer and Microsoft Internet Information Server are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. Stronghold and SafePassage are trademarks of C2Net Software, Inc. Portions of Stronghold were developed by the Apache Group, and were taken with permission from the Apache Server http://www.apache.org/. Stronghold also includes software developed by Eric Young (eay(a)cryptsoft.com)

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Ebonics: The Finale
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oakland school officials drop ebonics references Associated Press OAKLAND, Calif.-The Oakland public schools African American Task Force has dropped all references to ebonies in a final report about improving education for black students. The district caused a national controversy four months ago when it suggested that ebonies, or black English, was a second language that is "genetically based." The final report, obtained by The Oakland Tribune, still emphasizes improving black students' language skills, but it makes no reference to ebonies. There is also no reference to black students speaking a separate language. And provisions suggesting the district pursue federal bilingual funding for black students, as it does for children who speak Spanish or Chinese at home, have been deleted. The U S. Department of Education quickly dismissed the latter idea when it was raised in December. Instead, the 17-page report calls for better language and reading programs, additional tests to measure the language skills of students who speak black English, and expansion of the Standard English Proficiency program. The task force says the district should aggressively recruit black teachers and offer help to black teachers who have not passed the state teaching exam. The task force also recommends hiring a coordinator specifically to improve the education of black students and a budget of nearly $2 million over five years to achieve the goals. The task force's work is an attempt to improve the dismal record of Oakland's black students. Black students, who represent 53 percent of the district, make up 71 percent of special education classes, 37 percent of gifted classes and 80 percent of suspensions. --end PGP encrypted mail PREFERRED (See MIT/BAL servers for my PK) PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear (N7ZEZ) | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com 7075 West Gowan Road | Voice: 1-702-658-2654 Suite 2148 | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; The courage to change the things I can; The weapons that make the difference; And the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people that got in my way;-) "Surveilence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." --G. Beato "Without censorship, things can get terribly confused in the public mind." -General William Westmoreland

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[STEGO] One-time pads
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. Mayonnaise sexually molests little children, farm animals, and inanimate objects. < > < > V )_.._( V Timmy C. Mayonnaise \\ <____> // ~ <______> ~ > /~\______/~\ // /~\_____/~\ /_\ /~\____/~\ /_\ /~\___/\~\ _/_\/ \___/\__/__\/ \___/__\/

2 1

Thanks for signing up!
by The Dilbert Trivia Game 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi from Yoyodyne! This message is to let you know that you're signed up for The Dilbert Trivia Game. Welcome! You'll get questions e-mailed to you on Tuesdays, your answers are due back by 11 p.m. Eastern Time on Sundays, and you'll get your scoring messages on Mondays. It's that simple. When your questions come, you'll be asked to send your answers to dogbert(a)yoyo.com in this format: * Make sure your Player ID -- which looks like this (123456di) -- is on the Subject line of the message you send back with your answers. * Each answer must be preceded by one of these symbols # and each answer must be on its own line. * Each answer must be the letter of the multiple choice answer you like best. Let's repeat. The answer is the letter of the multiple choice selection you like best. It works like this: If one of the questions asks for the name of the evil human resources director, we'll say: "What is the name of the evil human resources director?" Then we'll list these choices: A -- Catbert B -- Ratbert C -- Dogbert You know that Catbert is the evil human resources director, so you'll send back e-mail with your Player ID in the Subject line, and a multiple choice selection in the body of the message that look like this: # A That's pretty much all there is to it. For all the fine print on how to play, the schedule, etc., e-mail these addresses for the autoreply of your choice: How to Play -- dogberthow(a)yoyo.com Official Rules -- dogbertrules(a)yoyo.com FAQ -- dogbertfaq(a)yoyo.com Talk to you soon! P.S. We promised you an answer to this sample question when you signed up: * * * Dilbert is worried that if head count is reduced by 50 percent, all the smart people will leave The boss says: A -- Would that be a bad thing? B -- If only half the people go, how could that be all the smart people? C -- Could you organize a goodbye potluck lunch for them The correct answer is #C. --- Yoyodyne Entertainment "Where the future begins...tomorrow." win(a)yoyo.com

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http:--www.cnn.com-TECH-9705-04-web.libel.ap-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Tech banner Puzzled about doing real business on the Web? rule CAUTION: ANYTHING YOU POST MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU Libel May 4, 1997 Web posted at: 9:51 p.m. EDT (0151 GMT) In this story: * When slander becomes libel * Privacy issues * E-mail can make it a federal issue * The wrath of large corporations (AP) -- When the Founding Fathers wrote the First Amendment protectingfreedom of the press, they never imagined millions of Americanswould someday have their own version of one sitting in their backrooms. But with the advent of the World Wide Web, that's exactly whathas happened. And from this revolution has emerged a new legalquandary: Just what standards are private individuals to be held towhen it comes to what they "publish" on the millions of Web pagesand other online forums that serve as the world's soapbox? To a great extent, the answer thus far is this: No one knows.With the Web revolution less than 3 years old, a body of case lawhasn't yet been built up. But lawyers who study online issues dohave some observations -- and advice. When slander becomes libel First off, they note, the line between slander, once the realmof individuals, and libel, the bane of publishers, has beenblurred. It used to be that spreading malicious gossip aboutsomeone down at the barbershop could lead to charges of slander.But slander, by definition spoken, was hard to prove and generallydidn't reach enough people to do any major harm. Post that same information where it can be read by millionsonline, however, and you've suddenly entered the realm of libel --governed by stricter laws originally written to cover printpublications. "Let's face it," says Mark Rasch, director of informationsecurity law and policy at the Center for Information Protection atScience Applications International Corp. in McLean, Virginia. "If I wereto print up a handbill saying bad things about my neighbor thatwere false, at most I could distribute a couple of hundred of them.With the Web, I can now damage his reputation worldwide." The law is clear: Libel consists of publishing a false anddefamatory statement about an identifiable person, causing injuryto the subject's reputation. Often tied to it is the legal notionof defamation, defined as that which exposes a person to hatred,ridicule or contempt, causing them to be shunned or injuring theirbusiness or calling. Truth is always a defense against libel, so if your Web pagesays someone has two heads and they do, you're fine. But saythey're a murderer and you can expect someone to come asking forsome proof -- and possibly a bill for damages if you don't have any. Privacy issues Then, there's invasion of privacy. It's one thing to pass alonga juicy bit of gossip to a friend. It's quite another to post it tothe Web. "Let's say, for instance, you disclose some private fact aboutsomebody -- say, their medical records. Or you snuck into theirhouse and took a nudie photo of them and put it up on the Net. Thatwould be a no-no under civil law and they could sue for damages,"says David Banisar, staff counsel for the Electronic PrivacyInformation Center in Washington, D.C. Although few of these cases have actually gone to court, lawyersoften are called in when things get ugly. "I know of a few cases where the ex-husband and ex-wife havegone after each other on the Net," Banisar says. "In oneinstance, the ex-wife put up a diatribe page on what a scumbag hewas and how he wasn't paying his child support -- and gave out hisphone number so suitably angry women could take it up with him." Remember, too, that the Internet's reach magnifies everything inthe eyes of the law. E-mail can make it a federal issue Shouting "You jerk, I'm gonna belt you one!" at a carelessdriver who runs over your mailbox won't get you into trouble. Butposting the threat on the Internet is dangerous. It's all aquestion of reach: Anything done over a telecommunications deviceis automatically an interstate communication. "This suddenly makes it a federal issue if you e-mail,"Banisar warns. State statutes vary, but when federal laws come into effect, anycommunication containing a threat to kidnap or injure a personcarries with it the possibility of imprisonment up to five years ora fine of up to $1,000. And an entirely different level of concern pops up when theobject of the threat is an elected official. Like the "no jokes"signs posted by airport metal detectors, the FBI has no sense ofhumor when it comes to threatening officeholders. "We can't forget all those idiots arrested for sending threatsto the president. So don't send threats to the president overe-mail. It's a federal crime," Banisar says. Fraud is another sticking point. It's illegal everywhere, ofcourse. But the Federal Trade Commission has taken an especiallyhard line against fraud on the Net. Send a snail-mail chain letterasking for money and you might get a call from postal authorities.Try it on the Web, however, and you'll be investigated by the FTCforces who track online scammers. The wrath of large corporations But in the end, the biggest vulnerability of any self-publisheron the Web is probably the wrath of large corporations. You can say their logos are ugly and their presidents are jerksand they don't flinch. But try using any variety of a heavilytrademarked name or image on your site and watch the injunctionsflow. Generally speaking, it's other businesses who get into trouble.But, once in a while, an individual will set out to make a point --and get a legally phrased e-mail in response. Several cases haveresulted in Web sites' being taken down, including individuals whoposted statements against Kmart and McDonald's. Overall, remember that putting words or pictures up on your Webpage is just like publishing them in the newspaper. Use Rasch's simple test: "What you should avoid putting on theWeb is the same stuff you'd avoid putting on leaflets and handingout on the street." Copyright 1997 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. rule Related sites and stories: * The Communications Decency Act: Related sites and stories - June 12, 1996 External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. rule Watch these shows on CNN for more sci-tech stories: CNN Computer Connection | Future Watch | Science & Technology Week rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards Tell us what you think! You said it... [INLINE] Puzzled about doing real business on the Web? rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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Re: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tom Weinstein wrote on cryptography(a)c2.net: {With Perry dripping Sameer's sperm from his mouth as his C2Nut Jackboots soiled the message with the following:} [I felt I had to let this go through, but I would advise that those involved restrict themselves to calmer comments from here on... --perry] > sameer wrote: > > > > In a recent announcement, Netscape Communications announced plans to > > include government back doors in their products. "By implementing this > > so-called 'key recovery', Netscape is getting a small increase in key > > length in exchange for putting your keys in the hands of the > > government," said Parekh. "This the same government that hired Aldrich > > Ames, the same goverment that has IRS employees surfing taxpayer > > databases at will. What do you think is going to happen to your keys?" > > This is utter crap, and I'm sure you know it. All we're going to do is > provide an OPTIONAL (and I mean really optional, not the way the feds > use it) way for administrators to recover private keys. This is not > GAK. I will never work on a product that includes GAK. > > Oh, but I guess saying that Netscape is responding to customer > requirements by including support for corporate key recovery wouldn't > make such good press release spam. Crap seems to be such a violent, obscene word when used to describe C2Nut's bullshit. Good thing that the cryptography list has Perry to protect the list subscribers from StrangleHold's competition defending themselves from Sameer's self-serving denigration of their products. Too bad C2Nut doesn't have a StrangleHold on the cypherpunks list, as well. Then they could use censorship threats to make us all be good little boys and girls, too. I expect all PR statements to have a modicum of bullshit in them and I resent any lame-fuck-would-be-Hitler trying to put a lid on the response to that bullshit. The fact that StrangleHold seems to have so many things to hide and such a strong need to control discussion of its product indicates to me that perhaps their product cannot stand up to the light of public scrutiny and criticsm. C2Nut's bottle-fed cryptography list may be fine for those who are afraid to know too much about StrangleHold, but anyone who owns a wetsuit needs to subscribe to the cypherpunks list for the good, old-fashioned pissing contests that send the pretenders home with their tails between their legs. (Anyone hear from DataERetch lately?) PissMonger

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 5 May 97 6:45:39 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net *+*#+#+++**# 3:30 99.99% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++++*-++***# 19:39 99.98% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *####*####*# 1:52 99.97% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +-++++++++- 1:54:28 99.94% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +-++-+++++- 1:57:01 99.90% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 35:18 99.90% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++.-.-.---.- 8:18:24 99.87% replay remailer(a)replay.com ***++- * -* 54:35 98.34% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******* *** 8:52 97.43% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -------..- 5:58:48 97.30% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net #+#**#+# + 5:34:09 95.94% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net -+.--+-.+ 1:19:01 90.79% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -..-- 3:59:41 78.48% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Problems with posts
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hmmmm I seem to be having some problems with getting my messages posted to the list (at least they are not showing up back here). :( This is just a test so please ignore. Thanks, - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: Win3.1? For fast relief call 800-3-IBM-OS2. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBM24DHo9Co1n+aLhhAQFQAwP+L3AXu9AbQsCuaNroI3UfuyAKGO70MiMM MD4bxRENaBwRc4A1aU6QsZosbuyRZfOZqCQ67ANI7Ecowfij9rc92wOvl+ePhYjS ObvDdDoDRpDqBDQ8oVimDkIwXJ8z79xxK6s3F0uevSb4pSlz3MZHrf+BoDxc5L1u mA403n2n+W8= =cAdA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Win up to $4,950.00 Instantly with Cyber Casino
by Service＠iBase.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Win up to $4,950.00 Instantly with Cyber Casino, found at http://www.iBase.net/InternetCasino. See you there! "Because face it......MONEY MATTERS!" /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// If you wish to be removed from this advertiser's future mailings, please reply with the subject "Remove" and this software will automatically block you from their future mailings. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

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Fast Cheap Unreviewed Stream Cipher
by Bill Frantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received this code from another friend. Here's a FAST somewhat cryptographically secure pseudo-random generator written by a friend of mine that wishes to remain anonymous. He has given permission for the following code to be placed in the public domain, and to be sent to cypherpunks and others for review. Alas, I have never gotten around to doing so. As it states, on a PowerPC it'll produce bits fast enough to be a pseudo-one-time pad / stream cipher for good digitized video on a LAN (the purpose for which he originally sent it to me) and hence should do point-to-point audio without even breathing hard. For those who haven't heard, the scenario is for point-to-point audio to use an affordable (weak) stream cipher, but to be changing keys frequently using our strongly secure SSL channel. Each costly break would only compromise a few seconds or so of audio. The following code may serve as the affordable (but maybe better than weak) stream cipher. /******************************************************/ /** (c) 1823 Millard Fillmore, all rights expired **/ /** Full words of pseudorandom bits at video speed **/ /******************************************************/ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <time.h> #include <sioux.h> #define WORD_SIZE 32 unsigned long shiftRand(); static void refillShiftRand(); void seedShiftRand(unsigned long seed); static unsigned long shiftRandArray[31] = { }; // to hold internal state values static unsigned long * arrayPtr = shiftRandArray; // incremented as state values are consumed static unsigned long * const end = shiftRandArray + 31; // marks end (and need to refill array) // Initializes shiftRandArray to pseudorandom contents using a seed value and the system rand function, // which is assumed to produce 16 bits per call. Low rand bits are obscured by xoring with high bits from other // calls, and all product bits depend on two or more calls to rand. The resulting values are themselves obscured, // not simply revealed at the output, hence this is probably overkill. The seed acts as a key. void seedShiftRand(unsigned long seed) { srand(seed); long cyclesPerWord = ((WORD_SIZE + 7) >> 3) - 1; // will add a net of 8 bits per call to rand unsigned long * arrPtr = shiftRandArray; for (; arrPtr < end; arrPtr++) { unsigned long rand1 = rand(); // wrap this value around word boundary: unsigned long element = (rand1 >> 8) | (rand1 << (WORD_SIZE - 8)); for (long i = 0; i < cyclesPerWord; i++) { element ^= rand() << (8 * i); //previous 8 high bits obscure 8 new low bits } *arrPtr = element; } } // Low-order bits in the following act as an xor-based linear feedback shift register (with moving taps // and stationary data); the repeat period equals (1 << 31) - 1. Higher-order bits have similar // "intrinsic" behavior, but the state of each is determined by additional xoring with a sequence // of carry bits from below, causing repeated period-doubling across the width of the word. // // The choice of 31 and 13 corresponds to a primitive polynomial mod 2; Applied Cryptography has // typos in polynomial coefficients, but the repeat period was tested directly. This code avoids a // shift-direction mistake in Applied Cryptography, and hence follows Numerical Recipes. // static void refillShiftRand() { unsigned long * tap0 = shiftRandArray + 0; unsigned long * tap13 = shiftRandArray + 13; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13 = shiftRandArray; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; tap0++; tap13++; *tap0 = *tap0 + *tap13; return; } // sum at 10 million iterations = 1344076334 /* // Slightly faster than the above on a 604, provided CodeWarrior's instruction-scheduling "optimization" is OFF. static void refillShiftRand() { unsigned long * tap0a = shiftRandArray + 0; unsigned long * tap0b = shiftRandArray + 1; // uses more registers unsigned long * tap13a = shiftRandArray + 13; unsigned long * tap13b = shiftRandArray + 14; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a = shiftRandArray; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b = (shiftRandArray + 1); *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; tap0b += 2; tap13b += 2; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; tap0a += 2; tap13a += 2; *tap0b = *tap0b + *tap13b; *tap0a = *tap0a + *tap13a; return; } // sum at 10 million iterations = 1344076334 */ // The array-filling mechanism above provides an information-conserving mechanism for producing // pseudorandom numbers with an effectively unlimited repeat period, fast, but based on a large number of // internal state bits, and having a bit of a given order eventually depend on all bits of the same or // lower order in all words in the array. // Rare, transient states having almost all zeros in the low bits will show strong correlations, // since the restoration of normal bit statistics will take several cycles. (The all-zero state // is inaccessible unless it is the starting condition -- one might test for this.) Correlations // in the frequency of low-order zero bits in sequentially generated array elements are eliminated // in the output by xoring high bits with the low bits; adding a preceding squaring operation // adds the effect of making any given output consistent with a large number of array element states, // making inferences regarding the internal state of the system relatively difficult. inline unsigned long shiftRand() { ((arrayPtr == end) ? // '?:' instead of 'if' to enable inlining by CW compiler (refillShiftRand(), arrayPtr = shiftRandArray, 0) : 0); unsigned long output = *arrayPtr++; unsigned long square = output * output; // this multiplication seems free on a 605 return(square + (output >> (WORD_SIZE / 2))); } // With multiplication (above) and summing of output to prevent bogus optimizations, 16.5 clocks per word. // Test code for CodeWarrier environment. void main () { SIOUXSettings.asktosaveonclose = FALSE; unsigned long sum = 0; seedShiftRand(12345); // easily guessed seed long start = clock(); for (long i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); sum += shiftRand(); } unsigned long end = clock(); printf("\n sum = %u", sum); printf("\n\n time = %d \n", (int)(1000.0 * ((float)(end - start) / (float)CLOCKS_PER_SEC))); }

1 0

(Fwd) Extropia dead
by Alec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Mailing-List: contact pgp-users-help(a)joshua.rivertown.net; run by ezmlm >Reply-To: pgp-users(a)joshua.rivertown.net >Comments: Authenticated sender is <fredr(a)[204.141.41.5]> >From: "Fred B. Ringel" <fredr(a)[204.141.41.5]> >Organization: Rivertown.Net >To: pgp-users(a)joshua.rivertown.net >Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 12:52:57 -0500 >Subject: (Fwd) Extropia dead >Priority: normal > >Hi all- > > Thought I'd pass this *bad* news along. :-(( > > Fred >------------------------------------------ >Date: Mon, 5 May 1997 00:39:36 -0700 (PDT) >From: Miron <miron(a)best.com> > >Due to best.com (Best Internet) policies >remail(a)miron.vip.best.com has been shut down. >You will only received one notice.

1 0

Re: Firewalls
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Sun, 4 May 1997 From: Graham-John Bullers <real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> Subject: Re: Firewalls Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Reply-To: Graham-John Bullers <real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca> On Sun, 4 May 1997, Anonymous wrote: Vulis does you wife no you write this? > Timmy Mayo the self-admitted child molester > possesses a rudimentary dick less than one > inch long, half the size of Graham-John Bullers' > clitoris, that barely makes a fistful. Thereby > hangs the root of this Jew-hating sissy's sick > fixation on little boys and Usenet forgeries. > > \|||/ > (o o) > -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timmy Mayo > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Graham-John Bullers Modulator of alt.2600.modulated ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ email : real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756(a)freenet.toronto.on.ca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2 1

Re: XS4ALL censored pages (fwd)
by root 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As we guessed XS4ALL don`t even have the guts to send us a copy of the pages they censored. Check this out... >Dear Paul, >>Postmaster, >> >>Please send me a copy of your current pricing for web space. >> >>Also, please send me a copy of the marajuana pages you recently removed >>from your web server. > >Hearby you recieve information about all services from xs4all. > >We don't know anything about marajuana pages so we can't send you a copy of >that. > >Kind regards, > <Much pricing information and rattling of the stick in the swill bucket cut> >XS4ALL Internet B.V. Sales afdeling: >Postbus 1848 Email: sales(a)xs4all.nl >1000 BV Amsterdam Http://www.xs4all.nl/business > >Tel: 020-6222885 Fax: 020-5352002 >Ma. t/m vrij. van 12.00u tot 20.00u

1 0

Re: Rape, death and XS4ALL
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul Bradley sez: : > Perhaps we should further expose XS4ALL's hypocricy by renting from the : > web space and putting up some pages they won't like. : I think this is an excellent idea, I`ll call or mail them in a few days : to find out their pricing structure. 30 Guilders a month (approx 17 USD a month) you get 5mb for your homepage. -- -aj-

1 0

Re: Rejecting Dialog with Government Vermin
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 22:43 5/01/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: >On Wed, Apr 30, 1997 at 08:24:27PM -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >> I feel confident that a statistical analysis of various countries' >> governments would reveal a wide scatter in the relationship between >> population and government size. One of the main factors in this scatter is >> simply the amount that government has decided to butt into activities that >> could (and should) be privatized. Another is the amount that the >> government steals from one group in order to reliably receive the votes of >> some other group. > >> Population size would end up being a very poor determinant of government >> size. > >Yes, there would be scatter, but it is not important. The only reason "it is not important" is that this scatter is what demolishes your view of the world. > Population size >is *obviously* a strong determinant of government size. But probably not even close to the largest determinant. >So, having clearly established that larger countries will on balance >have larger governments, we can then just look at organizational >dynamics. *Any* large organization requires more infrastructure to >function. *Any* large organization will develop bureaucracy. This >is true for governments, this is true for businesses, this is true >for schools, this is true for militias. A big city police department >will have many different precints, with multiple layers of >management, a small town will have a chief of police and a few >deputies. But NONE of this is truly needed. I have a solution to that problem. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Bypassing the Digicash Patents
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is hard to understand why a system where it is impossible to track payments (Chaumian anonymity) is cheaper than one where it is possible to do so, but we choose not to. If avoiding tracking payments is cheaper than tracking them, why wouldn't participants just not bother to track them even when they theoretically could? Granted, there are situations where taking away someone's options can make him better off. The classic example would be the Prisoner's Dilemma, which I will assume people here are familiar with. Given the choice to cooperate or defect, standard analysis predicts that both players will defect. Remove that option, and they will be forced to cooperate, leading to a better ("lower cost") outcome for both. The structure of the game forced them to take advantage of an option which has the net result of costing them more. The question is whether this kind of reasoning would apply financial transactions. Is it really true that taking away the option of tracking transactions is going to save money overall? Sure, not keeping records is a priori going to be cheaper than keeping them, but the question is how much the loss of those records is going to hurt you. Presumably records are kept to protect against various risks. Without that protection, you need other means to control the risk. But if those means exist and they are cheaper than record-keeping, then again even without anonymity it should be cheaper to use those methods in place of the records. I think we would need to see a more detailed explanation of exactly why it is that people can't save money today by avoiding keeping records, when they could do so if it were impossible to keep records. (One possible explanation is that it would be a regulatory effect. People are forced by the government to keep records, to their detriment, that they would prefer not to keep. With anonymous bearer certificates it would not be possible to keep the records so people might hope to escape the regulations. However the problem with this reasoning is that the same forces which require the record-keeping would be likely to ban the use of instruments which prevent keeping records.) Hal

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Read about this NEW income making opportunity!
by youtoocanmake＠lotsof.money 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: FC: Responses to Tim May's criticism of SAFE, and a rebuttal
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:10 5/02/97 -0700, Ernest Hua wrote: > The NSA/FBI is NOT standing still while we are all bickering about > precisely which dotted-i and crossed-t to support. They can, at > the stroke of Clinton's executive order pen, initiate effectively > THEIR law, while we must gather forces and summon Congress to jump > through enough hoops to pass effective legislation. > >In short, they can get what they want instantly, while we cannot >except through a long and arduous process (during which they can throw >many procedural and lobbying obstacles to slow us down). The process >is clearly in THEIR favor (and not without good reason), and we must >face that fact. Then let's force them to take that step, which (BTW) they haven't done already. They are well aware of the highly questionable constitutional nature of such a system, and I'm sure they're worrying that not only would such an executive order galvanize opposition to such a plan, it would also delay for a year or two the perceived "need" for the legislation they currently (and secretly) seek. By the time the executive order is overturned by the SC, it'll be too late to restore it as Congressional legislation. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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ISP fighting gov't on privacy issue
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [From: CNET NEWS.COM] ISP battles for rebels' rights By Janet Kornblum [May 2, 1997, 12:45 p.m. PT] Todd Jagger, owner of what he calls the "world's smallest" Internet service provider, doesn't like the secessionist Republic of Texas rebels. But he has sued the state attorney general to protect their privacy. The state attorney general's office, seeking to gain information about the rebels, asked to see the records of ten Texas ISPs. Requested items included copies of email and logs of Web site visitors for several groups calling for Texas to split off from the United States. .... See: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C10327%2C00.html?nd -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQCVAgUBM24yMT5A4+Z4Wnt9AQFVvgP/cUAjpVYWsoNGvqMsX4vaSnAzL3ZhtOFI 0TcBnIOqvOjIJQ+G7ecBPkA+z/4lSA2r5Ed01/Yiau4a9a/A4KcT8a6jWVN4uimB Ll2QSYgrAD9xx0SWLpfGfQsjUJrlsGYsuJ6SiL/rfCCpNKpaD7hXwU0JtwrFdJLp C6HQaHBrY3c= =iCkV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Insults about Vulis
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: > > At 10:22 PM -0800 5/4/97, Alan Olsen wrote: > >I really knew what specific actions caused people to have such a NASTY > >opinion of C2net. > > This is an easy one. The only continuing insults I see come from Vulis. No > further explanation is needed. > (One wonders why Vulis does not simply program one of his insultbots to > spew out a daily insult.) Tim should try to keep in mind that his vision is limited due to his generous use of self-censorship. Were it not so, then he might be aware of more than a few people who regard StrangleHold's empire with suspicion. I suppose that Mr. May regards Tom Weinstein, of Nut$crape, as just another Vulis tenacle. Or perhaps Mr. Weinstein is in Tim's killfile. Of course, Tim lets us all know that once he has spoken from upon high, that there is nothing more to be said in the matter. Perhaps Tim could ask Vulis, a programmer, to send him an insultbot to compose his Vulissaults. Or perhaps he could take the time to scan all the list posts and get a realistic view of list opinions and attitudes before he speaks out. Or perhaps he could stop to think about how much criticism of C2Nut's products is blunted by their censorship of other lists and their gang of legal-eagle thugs. [Please note that "Blame it all on Vulis," a favorite cypherpunk game, is not sold in stores.] > But the C2Net flap is behind us. The continuing claims that it was C2Net > which instructed Gilmore to remove Vulis are incorrect- Once again, Tim speaks of things of which he has, by his own admission, little knowledge, since he claims to have only lightly perused a precious few of the articles from this time period. Both John and Sandy stated that it was Sandy SameerFart who approached John with the offer of moderation/censorship. Robert Hettinga belatedly proposed that it was he who suggested the idea to Sandy (about the same time that Bob was coming into some cash and reputation capital promoting C2Nut's pet projects). While I anxiously await most of Mr. May's posts with eager anticipation, I think it might be wise of him to consult the archives regarding those things which transpired during his absence from the list, before speaking out so strongly on the issues involved (particularly if he is going to give the impression that once he has spoken, there is nothing more to be said). FactMonger -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/ "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" http://bureau42.base.org/public/webworld "The Final Frontier" http://www3.sk.sympatico.ca/carljohn/

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Software patents
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:30 PM 4/29/97 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Anyway, getting back to the point, "avoiding unpleasantness" also means not >having patent lawyers sue those very essential "hoity-toity" trustee banks >for rediculous reasons, like patent infringement, actual or not. There is a simple way to prevent patent lawyers from suing you for supposed patent infringement. Distribute your software from a jurisdiction in which software patents do not exist. South Africa is one of many such jurisdictions. Anecdote: at a conference, I asked a patent attorney what strategy to follow if your patented technology is only happening in the client software. He looked at me like I was drooling on myself and said: "Uhm... Well... Then you have a problem." IANAL, but I suppose the best strategy for the owners of a shaky software patent would be to make people believe that their technology is patented in many more jurisdictions than it actually is. Have fun, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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