December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

More EI Public Comments
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BXA has listed two more public comments on encryption transfers at its Web site: 44. Electronic Messaging Association 45. American Electronics Association BXA's PDF versions at: http://www.bxa.doc.gov/44-.pdf (420K) http://www.bxa.doc.gov/45-.pdf (339K) Our HTML conversions at: http://jya.com/bxapc44.htm (17K) http://jya.com/bxapc45.htm (16K)

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EU and FBI Wiretap Scheme
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This sounds like what Spook Herson admitted in his interview: February 25, 1997 Report: Europe OKs Wiretap Rules London (AP) -- Europe has agreed to establish international standards with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations to enable authorities to tap telephones and messages sent by fax, telex and e-mail, a London newspaper reported Tuesday. The Guardian newspaper said it obtained a preliminary agreement signed by European Union nations in 1995 that calls for telecommunications companies to provide security agencies with the key to codes installed in equipment sold to customers. The newspaper report could not be confirmed independently. The aim of the alliance between U.S. and EU agencies was to set a common standard for "international interception,'' the newspaper reported. Full details on the agreement are being drawn up by officials working in European Union committees, it said. The report said European officials drafted a memorandum of understanding after Britain warned that mobile telephone systems in the hands of organized criminals posed an international threat. ---------- Thanks to D. If anyone has the Guardian article, a copy would be appreciated. Fax to: (US) 212-799-4003 Or scan it and send e-mail to <jya(a)pipeline.com>.

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Re: Strange Looks
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike Denney wrote: Subject: new regulations Sent: 2/25/97 11:31 PM Received: 2/25/97 3:49 PM From: Ken Wallace, kwallace(a)pragma.com To: larry(a)dentistat.com TO ALL EMPLOYEES It has been brought to the management's attention that some individuals have been using foul language in the course of normal conversation between employees. Due to complaints from some more easily offended workers, this conduct will no longer be tolerated. The management does, however, realize the importance of each person being able to properly express their feelings when communicating with their fellow employees. Therefore the management has compiled the following code phrases, so that the proper exchange of ideas and information can continue. Old Phrase New Phrase ---------- ---------- No fucking way I'm not certain that's feasible. You've got to be shitting me Really? Tell someone who gives a fuck Perhaps you should check with ... Ask me if I give a fuck Of course I'm concerned. It's not my fucking problem I wasn't involved in that project. What the fuck? Interesting behavior. Fuck it, it won't work I'm not sure I can implement this. Why the fuck didn't you tell me I'll try to schedule that. that sooner? When the fuck do you expect me to Perhaps I can work late. do this? Who the fuck cares? Are you sure it's a problem? He's got his head up his ass He's not familiar with that problem. Eat shit You don't say. Eat shit and die Excuse me? Eat shit and die motherfucker Excuse me, sir? What the fuck do they want from me They weren't happy with it? Kiss my ass So you'd like help with it? Fuck it. I'm on salary I'm a bit overloaded at the moment. Shove it up your ass I don't think you understand. This job sucks I love a challenge. Who the hell died and made you boss You want me to take care of this? Blow me I see. Blow yourself Do you see? Another fucking meeting Yes, we should discuss this. I really don't give a shit I don't think it will be a problem. Fuck you How nice. How very nice! -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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More on EU and FBI Wiretapping
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to CA: EPIC reports today on the EU-FBI wiretap pact. It gives this URL for the source document which lays out the interception deception: http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/tapping/ See EPIC's full report at: http://www.epic.org/ [1] New Report Details FBI/European Tapping Agreements [2] Airline Security Report Released [3] Briefs Filed in Reno v. ACLU Internet "Indecency" Challenge [4] Crypto Legislation Introduced [5] Clipper Upgrade at DOD/Litigation Update [6] State Department Reports Widespread Illegal Wiretapping Worldwide [7] New Medical Privacy Survey [8] Upcoming Conferences and Events

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ZKP
by nobody＠jefferson.hidden.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[ocksucker] Mayo must have been sharing needles with a rabid hedgehog. o-:^>___? Tim C[ocksucker] Mayo `~~c--^c'

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Look what SPAM I got today [Customers for You !!!]
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Cypherpunks. Long time no lurk. Too busy defending the right to own unregistered guns and getting involved in local politics to dwell on the shortfalls of OS/2 PGP shells for PM GUI. PGP apps for OS/2 sucks! Anyhow, if you have any comments on the forwarded message, please Cc me. Is there a limit to spamming? Is there a way to attach nitroglycerine to an e-mail reply? ( I know Jim Bell has a few suggestions about that... :-) Ciao all JFA ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Thu, 27 Feb 1997 12:06:09 -0500 (EST) From: Quantum Communications <sales(a)quantumcom.net> To: "jctracey(a)sprynet.com" <jctracey(a)sprynet.com> Subject: Customers for You !!! Would you like more customers? Visit http://www.quantcom.com Everyone knows that the hottest way to find new customers and market your business is via direct Email. Quantum Communications offers direct Email advertising services, and related marketing services, with the following highlights: ------> Guaranteed Response Rate! Up to 3% Guaranteed Response. ------> 100% Approved Financing! No Credit Checks! ------> Never Again Get Shut Off By Your ISP! We Offer Flame-Filtering & Free Auto-Responders! ------> Targeted Mailings, Using Custom-Built Lists With Your Parameters. ------> 5 Million Recipient Co-op "The Mega-Mailer" is available. ------> Stand-Alone Mailings Available. ------> Wholesale Unlimited Access To Our "Self-Service" SMTP Mail Servers Available. ------> Ad Copy Design & Revision Available. ------> "Floodgate" Bulk E-Mail Software Available. Quantum Communications also offers Virtual Servers complete with full POP3 Email accounts and domain registration, lists of Email addresses for sale, search engine submissions, newsgroup posting announcements, and web page design. Call our Sales Department at (603) 772-4096 for details, or Visit our website at http://www.quantcom.com You may also send an email to our autoresponder: info(a)quantcom.com or direct specific questions to sales(a)quantcom.com Thank you for your time. ------- end of forwarded message ------ -- Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds(Montreal) QC Canada JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. physicists, engineers and technologists. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon and: http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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DNSSEC Encryption for DNS registration and ITAR Nonsense
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:14 AM 2/12/97 -0500, "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee(a)cybercash.com> wrote: >People may want to note that yesterday (Feb 11th) the IESG approved the DNS >dynamic update and DNS secure dynamic update (draft-ietf-dnssec-update-04.txt >and draft-ietf-dnsind-dynDNS-11.txt) as Proposed Standards. The base DNS >security protocol was approved some time ago and is now out as RFC 2065. Details are on http://www.tis.com/docs/research/network/dns.html It's a very interesting page - pointers to the RFC http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2065.txt , and downloadable beta code from TIS implementing it. Cool stuff. But then there's the politial correctness part of the web page :-) > Trusted Information Systems, Inc. has received approval from the > United States Government for export and reexport of TIS/DNSSEC software > from the United States of America under the provisions of the Export > Administration Regulations (EAR) General Software Note (GSN) license > exception for mass market software. Under the provisions of this license, > this software may be exported or reexported to all destinations except > for the embargoed countries of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, > Sudan and Syria. Any export or reexport of TIS/DNSSEC software to the embargoed > countries requires additional, specific licensing approval from the > United States Government. Yup. Can't let those Cubans secure their DNS..... At least the government did decide to permit export. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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STU-III Usage
by Jim Conrad 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: >Back when the STU-III was still called the "Future Secure Voice System" >the DoD was telling manufacturers they'd probably sell 500,000 of them, >between the DoD unclassified work, law enforcement users, defense >contractors, and similar riff-raff. I don't know how many were actually >sold, but I'd be surprised if it's a tenth of that; the government >was too cheap to spend $2-3K per box for that many users. I'm ex-Navy and worked as a contractor for the last 5 years since I got out. >From my operational experience and exposure to certain area's I would have to say that 500,000 might be more accurate than you suspect. They are used at most Navy facilities as the "standard" desk phone when the command requires operational security telecommunications access. Personnel Offices etc., probably don't have but one or two per facility but sites requiring them have them everywhere. Likewise most contractor facilities that require secure telecommunications have them available as well. ..Jim <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:> <:> Jim Conrad - Ocean View Communications - jjc(a)infi.net <:> <:> 757-490-8127 Office - 757-587-8251 Fax - 757-473-6740 Pager <:> <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>

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Clipper Chip Banking
by KALLISTE＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clipper Chip Banking by J. Orlin Grabbe Sandia National Laboratories have created the digital cash equivalent of the Clipper chip: an "anonymous" digital cash system that would give participants privacy from all viewers, except for the government agencies that would control the secret keys required for backdoor access. Just as the "Clipper" proposal (the Escrowed Encryption Standard) is a system of encrypted communication with a Big Brother peephole, so is Sandia e- cash a system of digital cash with a Big Brother peephole. It was designed that way. Why is Sandia interested in digital cash systems? Well, Sandia is responsible for all non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons. The security of nuclear weapons depends partly on cryptology. The code- breaking National Security Agency (NSA), for example, is responsible for the communication security of the Minuteman missile, as well as the codes by which the President must identify himself to authorize a nuclear strike. The use of nuclear weapons is normally based on a trustee system: two or more people are necessary to give the complete authorization code. The NSA used this idea as the basis for the Clipper chip: two designated trustee agents would each have knowledge of one-half the chip-specific unique key by which to decode the session key that encoded a particular communication passing through the chip. The Clipper chip was originally proposed for incorporation into every digital communication device: computer, fax, and cable TV. The sales aspect of Clipper was a new encryption algorithm based on 80- bit encryption keys. Financial and other institutions had begun to worry about the security of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) which uses 56- bit keys. An 80-bit key space would be 2^24 times as large as the DES key space. The catch was that acceptance of the new algorithm would involve acceptance of the NSA backdoor. At the present time, the financial industry has said, "No, thank you," and is focusing on triple-DES, which has the security equivalent of 112-bit encryption keys, and no backdoor. Sandia e-cash is a simple extension of the trustee notion. Sandia e-cash was announced as "the first electronic cash system that incorporates trustee-based tracing, while provably protecting user anonymity". The trustees in this case are key-escrow agents, and a minimal subset of them (say three out of five) would be able to combine their knowledge to trace an individual's electronic transactions. The fact that several agents would need to act in concert "protects users from the possibility that one or two trustees might be corrupt". (In other words, depending on the level of official corruption, the system would either be somewhat secure, or totally insecure.) Anonymity or privacy in financial transactions generally means an inability to determine an individual's spending patterns. Anonymity requires first and foremost protection from the prying eyes of the bank. If the bank knows what is going on in your account, then potentially so can anyone else: the records can be seized, or surreptitiously accessed by computer, or a bank employee can be bribed to make them available. (In this respect, it is useful to note that the system of Swiss numbered accounts was created to protect bank customers from bank employees. Bank employees, observing what occurred in a customer's account, could possibly subject the customer to blackmail.) Anonymity involves several aspects, including "unlinkability" and "untraceability". "Unlinkability" refers to the inability of a bank (even colluding with merchants) to determine that two payments were made by the same user. To understand this, consider the opposite case: your monthly American Express or credit card bill. Such a statement contains a set of transactions which are all linked by a common element--your AMEX or credit card account number. Because these payments are linked, they present a limited picture (a subset) of your behavior, movements, and habit patterns. Your private behavior is potentially public information. Unlinkability is therefore an aspect of anonymity. Because linkability in anonymous digital cash involves cryptological protocols, it is actually a probability concept: how probable is it that two payments can be accurately identified as having been made by the same user? Unlinkability means such probability is negligible. "Untraceability" refers to the inability of a bank to match withdrawals of digital cash with subsequent payments. To have untraceability, the information a person reveals about himself by making payments must be statistically independent of the information a person reveals about himself by making withdrawals. Of course if the bank, even when colluding with merchants, can't link or trace a person's transactions--even in probability terms- -then neither can FINCEN or the NSA. Anonymity and privacy thus ultimately hinges on concealing this type of information from the bank itself. But such anonymity, naturally, raises the issue of the selectively- enforced money-laundering laws. The prevention of money-laundering is stated as a principal raison d'tre for Sandia's e-cash system of non-anonymous "anonymity": "Money laundering . . . is hampered by physical cash and would be made easier by a completely anonymous electronic counterpart. . . . With anonymous e-cash, money- laundering would be as simple as depositing one set of electronic "coins" in an account under an assumed name and withdrawing another set from the same account." (Peter S. Gemmel, "Traceable e-cash," Technology and the Electronic Economy, IEEE Spectrum, February 1997.) To prevent such nefarious activity, Sandia even envisions one future world in which individuals would be required to submit regular reports of their financial transactions to the government: "In a different trustee-based e-cash system, the users' "wallet" software would require them to supply the authorities from time to time with transaction records stored in their electronic wallets and encrypted with their tracing keys." (Ibid.) This proposal is somewhat similar to a requirement to regularly send one's bank statements to the IRS for filing, with a committee controlling access to the file cabinet. While Sandia ponders the future needs of Big Brother government, over at the Treasury, meanwhile, Robert Rubin has appointed the Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene Ludwig, as the point man to oversee government efforts to keep a peephole into every bank account. To this end, Ludwig--when he is not attending Clinton coffee- klatsches--coordinates the electronic cash spying plans of FINCEN, U.S. Customs, the IRS, the Secret Service, ATF, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control. February 27, 1997 Web Page: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/

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Re: 128_bit
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>2-26-97. Newsbytes: > >Security Dynamics Unveils RSA SecurPC 2.0 > > Wokingham, England, By Steve Gold. Security Dynamics has unveiled > RSA SecurPC 2.0, the latest version of its software-based > encryption software. The package is claimed to the first 128-bit > encryption software to be exported from the US and its territories. No such luck. This is a press report that seems a little confused... which is say that it is, at least, a bit premature. SecurPC has a useful feature which allows for a self-decrypting file to be created with its 128-bit (symmetric) RC4 cipher. RSADSI got the NSA to agree that this self-decrypting file could be transmitted outside the US because the packaged implementation is restricted to merely decrypting the file -- with a key (password) to be passed out of band: by hand, letter, phone, etc. (The free trial version of SecurPC, which can be downloaded from the RSADSI and SDTI websites, is enabled with only the limited key-length RC4 encryption -- still the only type of crypto now allowed to be freely exported outside the US. The domestic product, as sold, offers full128-bit RC4.) The major enhancement in the 2.0 version of SecurPC, as I recall, is that it offers transparent, on the fly, decryption of a secured file, as you open the relevant application on your PC. Suerte, _Vin Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy Maya's reheated, refurbished, and regurgitated cud is completely inappropriate for the mailing lists into which it is cross-ruminated. \\\ {OQ} (_)

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WELL WORTH READING
by dcgroup＠erols.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hope this e-mail finds you well. No need to hit the reply buttom if you want to be deleted from my mailing list as this program you are about to review is one you will only receive once and need to reply to stay on it. Needless to say we have a lot of confidence in this program. Good luck if you decide not to order this program. Pre- paration will meet opportunity (which will equal success) if you make the right choice. If you still feel the need to ask to be removed go ahead. I will oblige your request. ***** THE PROGRAM FEBRUARY 27, 1997 ***** Do you want to start a business that doesn't have the hassles of inventory, accounts receivable, accounts payable, or depreciating equipment. This program does it. This is accomplished by starting an investing business. No mlm here. No hidden tricks. Have you ever wondered what the most successful investors in the world know that you don't? Their "secrets" allow them to turn a small amount of money into a large amount CONSISTENTLY. One of their secrets has returned them over 100% on average per year, year in, year out for over 10 years. if you are willing to part with $32.95 (this in- cludes $3 shipping and handling) we are willing to part not only with this secret but with the following 3 reports, each of which is well worth the price of admission: 1) A second secret that has returned over 100% year in, year out for these in- vestors. When combined with the first secret you get over 300% year in, year out for the investors. $1,000 can be turned into $1,000,000 in 5 years. if you have 5 years but not the $1,000 see the second part of this e-mail. 2) 4 stocks that will double this year. Actually three, the best one is featured in part two of this e-mail. 3) 4 "events" which could cause the market to crash in 1997. ***** PART TWO ***** So you have five years but not $1,000. To show you we know how to make money we will "give" you a stock that we feel is ready to "pop". The company does not know we are doing this. This is a freebie so don't forget to send us a thank you note. KENSINGTON RESOURCES KNSRF on the nasdaq exchange - current price, about $1.00 a share KRT on the vancouver exchange - current price, $1.30 a share Kensington Resources' homepage - http://www.kensington-resources.com/ Kensington's Silicon Investor site (a "chat room" about kensington)- http://www3.techstocks.com/investor/subject-3653 Kensington target prices: $3.50 U.S. by 4/15, $7 by 12/31 KNSRF is part of a four company joint venture (a debeers subsidiary is one of the other companies) that has 71 kimberlite (the host material for diamonds) pipes. 57 have been shown to be diamondniferous. About 34 of these pipes are macrodiamond (the larger diamonds) meaning KNSRF's jv has close to 20% of the world's known macrodiamond bearing pipes. The pipes contain 6 billion tonnes of kimberlite. With this much going for it, KNSRF we feel has an explosive upside that will be realized partially in 1997. We believe KNSRF can reach $7 or more a share U.S. by 12/31/97. Do your own due diligence and we think you'll agree. PLEASE KEEP IN MIND WE ARE NOT INVESTMENT ANALYSTS. THIS IS NOT A SOLICITATION NOR A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY ANY STOCKS. DO YOUR OWN DUE DILIGENCE. THE ONLY RECOMMENDATION WE MAKE IS THE PURCHASE OF OUR PROGRAM. BELOW IS THE INFORMATION YOU NEED TO ORDER IT. PAST PERFORMANCE IS JUST THAT, PAST PERFORMANCE. FUTURE PERFORMANCE IS YET TO BE DETERMINED. WE FEEL WE KNOW HOW TO MAKE MONEY BUT WE WILL NEVER FEEL WE KNOW HOW TO PREDICT THE FUTURE. Instructions to order. Send a check or money order (payable to The DC Group) for $32.95 to: The DC Group Suite 331 1127 High Ridge Road Stamford, CT 06905 PLEASE INCLUDE YOUR E-MAIL ADDRESS AND YOUR MAILING ADDRESS WITH YOUR PAYMENT.

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$7,000 in your mailbox!!!
by KFLT 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, Our research has shown that this may be of interest to you. If not please accept our apology. By not replying you will be removed from any future mailings. This messege will only be sent to you once. Thank You =============================================== Would you spend $5 in order to receive $7000 in return? Email DavFic(a)aol.com for FREE Information NOW!!!

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Sphere packings
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[ocksucker] May's 16Kb brain's single convolution is directly wired to his rectum for input and his T1 mouth for output. That's 16K bits, not bytes. Anal intercourse has caused extensive brain damage. __ ___|[]| Tim C[ocksucker] May \__|______| /-(o_o_o_o)

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Re: Senate spams
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > Personally I think you're allowing the bad feeling generated by the > [CENSORED] PR goofup over Dimitri's false criticisms to cloud your > usually good judgement. Adam, before labeling my criticisms "false", have you examined the source code of the product in quesion to see if it's secure? So far, the people caught making false statements are Sameer Parekh (spit) and his lackeys Greg Broils (spit) and Sandy Sandfart (spit). --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy May has been beaten up numerous times by fellow prostitutes for driving blow job prices down. ,,, (. .) -ooO-(_)-Ooo- Timothy May

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[ocksucker] May sexually molests little children, farm animals, and inanimate objects. ___ \/ \/ |_O O_| Tim C[ocksucker] May | ^ | / UUU \

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C[rook] May's mother attempted to pro-choice the unwanted little bastard by fishing with a coat hanger in her giant cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little Timmy's fetal cranium (not much to begin with). o/ Timmy C[rook] May <| / >

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Re: Senate spams
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greg Broiles wrote: > > > Greg doesn't seem to realize that, without a fellow C2Nut schill to > >censor the unlobotomotized, his horseshit will no longer go > >unchallenged. > > Your predictable whining about C2Net and suggestions that everyone > who disagrees with you is either working for a government and/or out to get > you hardly qualify as challenges - they seem to rather be on the level of > Vulis's ascii art, although the rate at which you produce them makes me > suspect you're still generating them by hand. How long are you and your bum-buddies at C2Nut going to continue to try to denigrate god-and-everybody by making out-of-context links to Dr. Vulis? Is Senator McCarthy alive and well at C2Nut? Whining? Suggestions? I'm 'flaming' shit-for-brains, and I'm working from the fact sheets. Fact: Sammy's pecker-tracks are all over the attempted takeover of the CypherPunks list. Fact: John Gilmore turned over control of the CypherPunks list at toad.com to C2Nut employee Sandy Sandfort, under the pretext of cutting down on mailbomb attacks. Fact: List subscribers were forcibly relocated to a list Censored by C2Nut employee Sandy Sandfort. Fact: C2Nut employee Sandy Sandfort then proceeded to Censor the posts to the CypherPunks list in an attempt to blunt criticism of the takeover of the list. Fact: C2Nut employee Sandy Sandfort announced that his Censorship of the CypherPunks list was not based on cryptographical content. Fact: Sandy Sandfort approved posts to the Censored list that insulted those who criticized him, while deleting the posts of those who responded to those insults. Fact: C2Nut employee Sandy Sandfort deleted incoming CypherPunks posts directly, sending them to none of the lists, if they reflected poorly on his employer, fellow employees, and his supporters. Fact: Under C2Nut employee Sandy Sandfort's list dictatorship, many of the so-called 'Evil Dr. Vulis ASCII' spams originated directly from toad.com, with forged headers. Others originated from the ISP's of C2Net employees. Fact: C2Nut's Sameer controls cypherpunks.com on the WWW. Fact: C2Nut stands to profit from having control of the CypherPunks name. Fact: C2Nut's employees were, and are, working in conjunction with others who have major financial interests that will benefit from control of the CypherPunks reputation capital. Fact: C2Nut and their employees apply threats of legal attack, both directly and indirectly, to those whose words conflict with the goals of C2Nut and their web of associated interests. Fact: If C2Nut wants the hidden agendas of themselves and their associates to remain hidden, then they need better firewalls in place. > "Challenge", my butt. Better have some more Scotch. Better to have Scotch in my mouth than my employer's sperm. And I doubt whether your butt is much of a challenge. > -- > Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: > gbroiles(a)netbox.com | > http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. > | -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Senate Intel Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has published a special report on its activities from January 4, 1995 to October 3, 1996, which shows an unsuprising parallel to Cypherpunks topics -- even a bit on crypto. We've put it at: http://jya.com/sr105-1.htm (135K) Here's the TOC: I. Introduction II. Legislation Intelligence Budget S. 922 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 S. 1718 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996 The National Imagery and Mapping Agency III. Arms Control Chemical Weapons Convention START II Treaty IV. Counterintelligence The Aldrich Ames Espionage Case French Flap Economic Espionage Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act V. Counterterrorism Terrorism Threat Overview Khubar Towers and OPM-SANG Bombings VI. Counterproliferation Non-Proliferation North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs Long-Range Missile Threat VII. Oversight Activities National Security Threats to the United States Intelligence Support to U.S. Efforts in Bosnia Inquiry into U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to the Bosnian Army Congressional Notification of Foreign Policy Decisions Persian Gulf Syndrome Zona Rosa Vietnamese Commandos CIA/Contra/Cocaine Link CIA Use of Journalists, Clergy, and Peace Corps Volunteers in Intelligence Operations Guatemala Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement Congressional Notifications of Intelligence Activities Airborne Reconnaissance National Reconnaissance Office Carry Forward Small Satellites Covert Action Encryption Export Policy Security of the U.S. Information Infrastructure Jane Doe Thompson Case Oversight of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union Program Review and Audit Staff VIII.Foreign Intelligence North Korea Iraq Russia China Mexico Economic Espionage Environmental and Demographic Intelligence Intelligence Sharing with the United Nations IX. Confirmations DCI John M. Deutch DDCI George J. Tenet X. Committee Internal Reforms and Enhancements End of the Designee System Term Limits PolicyNet Appendix Summary of Committee Activities Number of Meetings Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee Bills Referred to the Committee Committee Publications Memorandum of Agreement Regarding TIARA and JMIP

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cryto
by kenny_austin＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

would you please add my name to your mailing list... thanks... kenny (kenny_austin(a)juno.com)

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Depends / Re: Senate spams
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greg Broiles wrote: > > At 01:26 AM 2/28/97 -0600, snow wrote: > >> At 01:41 AM 2/27/97 -0800, Toto wrote: > >> > I didn't see a single post on CypherPunks where anyone expressed the > >> >least problem with pure, unmitigated spam being deleted. > > Greg Broiles wrote: > >> My point precisely. The question is not "is it useful to eliminate some > >> messages from the list?", but "which messages shall we eliminate?". > > > > This is mis-direction, and I believe it is deliberate on Boiles > >part. > > > > The question isn't "which messages shall we eliminate"--which implies > >that the original writer was seeking to silence _someone_, but rather > >given that there are [many some a-few] messages being sent to this list that > >are sent by non-human entities (bots, auto-replies, bounces etc.) is there > >a way to avoid propigating them. > > Will you count Raph's remailer statistics as "machine generated" and > exclude them, too? Only asinine, dip-shit numbskulls would be capable of making this idiotic extrapolation. Why am I not surprised it came from Greg? > Many/most of the "spam" messages are sent to the list because someone > (either the author, or a third party) wanted them to be sent to the list. > The fact that one or more machines are used to carry out that person's > wishes is irrelevant. We're not talking about the effects of alpha > particles or honest mistakes, we're talking about a deliberate choice to > send some content to the list. More DoubleSpeak transposing the issues of Spam and content. > And we're apparently talking about other > people choosing to override that choice to send content to the list, on the > basis of dislike for the sender, the sender's purpose, or the content of > the message. No we're not, Greg. _You_ seem to be the only one speaking of censorship based on personality, agendas and content. (Try to keep in mind that the thoughts and words of others are no longer being censored by your associates.) > And, like Toto said, there's nobody left who's arguing (modulo the > Freedom-Knights guy, whose name escapes me at the moment, who may not > really be on the list, haven't seen anything from him in a week or so) > against all censorship, just people arguing against censorship that they > don't like or done by people they don't trust, but in favor of censorship > they do like, or done by people they do trust. Toto is calling Greg a lying fuck who deliberately disseminates misinformation as to the stances taken by others. Greg seem to have taken it upon himself to provide a misinterpretation of the posts of others, even though those posts are available for people to read for themselves, making their own judgements as to what they say. I have maintained from the beginning that there needs to be a CypherPunks list which is free from filtering in any way, shape or form. I have also maintained that the interests of crypto would also be served by the maintenance of lists which offer filtering services by those who wish to provide them--even a CypherPunks-NoToto list. Anyone who read my post to Igor, suggesting that I would have no problem with him intercepting autobot-replies that result from mailbomb attacks, also knows that I suggested even the empty spam-messages being deleted should be stored where they are open to scrutiny, and that I, for one, would indeed be scrutinizing them. For Greg to purport that the interception of mail-bomb attacks equates somehow to content/personality censorship is unmitigated bullshit aimed at the dim-witted (of which I believe there are very few of on any of the CypherPunks lists). If Greg would like to put forth a logical train of thought which compares the interception of empty auto-bot messages generated in response to the forged posts of a mailbomb attack with Sandy's fascist censorship methods (which Greg eloquently described, but misdirected their source), then I would like to see it. > I don't see anything morally wrong with deliberately altering the flow of > messages to and through the list, but I think it's bad form to pretend not > to be doing that. Who is doing this, Greg? Name names. Give us an example of who is doing this and pretending not to do it. Why are your claims so vague? -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk writes: > > > > No, you 'all' have it wrong. > > > The censorship experiment was actually the result of the tremendous > > > amount of envy on the list over my having a 16" dick. > > > > So when a super babe says she wants a man with a 12" dick, do you > > have to go cut off 4 inches? Me being only 11", I just have to give > > her up. > > I always said this list would degenerate into a penis size > competition ;-) ITAR-relevant urban legend: once the Soviet government order 10K dozen 8" condoms in the U.S. and the Nixon administration made sure that each one was stamped "medium". > Paul (18") Bradley --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

4 6

Re: GAK
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May was born when his mother was on the toilet. _ {~} ( V-) Timmy May '|Y|' _|||_

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Re: NWLibs> Re: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> writes: > >Objective journalism, my lily white butt. Journalists are whores - just ask Declan "Censorship" McCullough. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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ANNOUNCE: "Digital Money Online" report released 24 Feb 97
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: Rachel Willmer <rachel(a)intertrader.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Tue, 25 Feb 1997 16:53:28 +0000 From: Rachel Willmer <rachel(a)intertrader.com> To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: ANNOUNCE: "Digital Money Online" report released 24 Feb 97 Digital Money Online Intertrader Ltd February 1997 Intertrader is pleased to announce the release of this 50 page report, which compares several current and future digital money technologies, such as Mondex, Cybercash and First Virtual. Available online at <http://www.intertrader.com/library/DigitalMoneyOnline/dmo/dmo.htm> or you can download a PDF copy at <http://www.intertrader.com/library/DigitalMoneyOnline/dmo/order.htm> All comments welcome! Regards Rachel P.S. This report supersedes the previous "Electronic Transaction Protocols". -- Rachel Willmer, Intertrader Ltd, Cova House, 4 John's Place, Edinburgh Email: rachel(a)intertrader.com Tel: +44 131 555 8450 Fax: +44 131 555 8451 Sun Internet Associate and winner of 1996 SMART Award for Innovation "We develop Java Commerce Solutions" ---------- The e$ lists are brought to you by: Intertrader Ltd - Commerce Solutions in the UK Visit for details ... Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk Like e$? Help pay for it! See Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, see Thanks to the e$ e$lves: Of Counsel: Vinnie Moscaritolo (Majordomo)^2: Rachel Willmer Commermeister: Anthony Templer Interturge: Rodney Thayer --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/

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Re: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Toto <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> writes: > Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > > > > Toto wrote: > > > Who is the janitor at the Japenese embassy in New York City? > > > What is the postal code of Mule Shoe, Texas? > > > Who is buried in Grant's Tomb? > > > > Grant? > > One out of three gets you a green card, Igor. Look up the postal code > for Muleshoe, Texas, and you get a citizenship card. > If you can name the janitor at the Japanese embassy, however, you'll > probably be indicted for espionage. It's unnatural to be a U.S. citizen because most people aren't. I used to walk my dogs by Grant's tomb. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Your News from Infoseek for Saturday, March 1, 1997
by Infoseek News Center 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello abba, Here are your personal news headlines from Infoseek for Saturday, March 1, 1997. To read the latest news or search for these articles, visit the Infoseek News Center at: http://yournews.infoseek.com To view previous headlines, click the "See Older News" button. Technology News http://yournews.infoseek.com/mtechnology Fri 10:00 Lawmakers Seek Free Export of Encryption These headlines are provided by Reuters, Business Wire, and PR Newswire. ********************************************************************** To change your Infoseek News Center profile, go to http://yournews.infoseek.com/ and click "Personalize." To stop receiving personalized news e-mail from Infoseek, either: * Go to http://yournews.infoseek.com/page?pg=pro_reg.html and change your "news delivery option"; or * Reply via e-mail to this message, and put the word "cancel" in your reply's "subject" line; or * E-mail newsctr(a)infoseek.com, and put the word "cancel" in your message's "subject" line. Send comments or suggestions to: comments-news(a)infoseek.com

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Re: "Suspected of purchasing diesel fuel"
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Casey Iverson <iverson(a)usa.net> writes: > At 07:22 PM 2/28/97 EST, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > >I recall that when I was becoming a naturalized amcit circa 1986, I was aske > >a single question: name the 2 senators of New York State. These were D'Amato > >and Moynihan back then, and they still are. I've heard of cases when the IN > >didn't want someone to pass the exam, and they asked much harder questions > >which some people actually flunked. > > > Biggest mistake the INS ever made was to allow a piece of Russian dung like > *you* into the USA Vladimir Il'yich Lenin said: the capitalists will sell us the ropes on which we will hang them. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Russian Invasion
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Toto <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> writes: > Casey Iverson wrote: > > > > At 07:22 PM 2/28/97 EST, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > > >I recall that when I was becoming a naturalized amcit circa 1986, I was as > > >a single question: name the 2 senators of New York State. These were D'Ama > > >and Moynihan back then, and they still are. I've heard of cases when the > > >didn't want someone to pass the exam, and they asked much harder questions > > >which some people actually flunked. > > > > > > Biggest mistake the INS ever made was to allow a piece of Russian dung like > > *you* into the USA > > It's a trick. A post-Reaganite desk jockey in Washington figured out > that we could save millions of dollars in missle fuel by luring the > Russians to the U.S. and 'then' nuking them. > Now, if we could only get them to all visit Congress at the same > time... You have reached the Central Intelligence Agency Web site - running StrongHold. All of our agents are busy right now. Your session is important to us. Please remain on the socket for the next available operative. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Electronic Cash
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 27 Feb 97 18:16:03 EST From: weffross(a)counsel.com (Walter A Effross -- American Univ. - Washington ) To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Electronic Cash To: rah(a)shipwright.com Inet Robert, I thought that you and the members of your group would be interested in this Symposium. Please feel free to send the information around to whatever listservs you think appropriate. Thanks! Walter THE ELECTRONIC FUTURE OF CASH - A SYMPOSIUM The Washington College of Law and the American University Law Review are proud to announce a full-day Symposium on the Electronic Future of Cash, to be held at the law school in Washington, DC on Friday, April 18, 1997 in connection with the publication of a special Symposium issue of the Law Review on this topic. The first panel, "The Technology of Electronic Cash," will include: Newsweek columnist Steven Levy; Cybercash General Counsel Russ Stevenson; Peter Wayner, author of Digital Cash: Commerce on the Internet; Gary Lorenz, General Manager of the Diebold Campus Systems Division; and a representative (invited) of the National Security Agency. This panel will examine the operation of stored value cards and encryption techniques and will include a demonstration of a "cyberpayment" made online with digital cash. The second panel, "Commentary on the Regulation of Electronic Cash," brings together the authors of articles in the Symposium issue (provided, with additional materials, to all registrants) to review and recommend regulatory efforts from the viewpoints of academics, practitioners, bankers, and consumer advocates. Panelists include: Professor Mark Budnitz, Georgia State University College of Law; Richard Field, Chair of the Electronic Commerce Payment Committee of the American Bar Association; Professor Egon Guttman, Washington College of Law; Professor David Oedel, Mercer University Law School; Simon Lelieveldt, Senior Policy Advisor, Payment Systems Policy Department, De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central Bank); and Brian Smith of Mayer, Brown & Platt. Dr. David Chaum, the founder and president of DigiCash, has been invited to give a luncheon address. The third panel, "The Perspectives of the Regulators," includes: Thomas Baxter, Jr., General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; William Kroener, General Counsel of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Michael Billsma, Acting Director, Community and Consumer Law, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; Stephen Kroll, Legal Counsel, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), United States Treasury Department; Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Justice Division, Department of Justice; John Lopez, Counsel, Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy; Paul Glenn, Special Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision; and Lucy Morris, Assistant Director for Credit Practices, Federal Trade Commission. A reception will follow. Registration fees (including lunch) are: $150 for preregistrants; $175 for registration at the door; $100 for Washington College of Law alumni; $80 for judges, law clerks, and government employees; and $40 for full-time academics. Please register early, as space may be limited. For a registration form and more information, please contact Professor Walter Effross, the Symposium's organizer and panel moderator, at (202) 274-4017, see our Symposium website at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/journals/lawrev/electronic_cash/con f.htm, or email: futurecash(a)wcl.american.edu. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/

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We Will Send Your Bulk Email
by Product Link 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*If you want to be removed from our mailing list, please respond to this email and put "Remove" in the subject line. We will send out your bulk E Mail. Period. No qualifiers, no conditions, no nonsense...and we'll do it at the best prices. Call us as (805) 654-4042. We are Product Link. We are a business partner with a marketing company which develops buyers for its clients' products through electronic marketing; primarily broadcast fax. Together, we have over a hundred clients, almost 10% of which are Fortune 500 companies. We have numerous staff, and have just begun, at client request, to send high volumes of E Mail. If you're new to bulk E Mail marketing, as we were a short time ago, I can confirm that all the E Mails you've been getting from E Mail software companies about how great E Mail marketing is; well, they're true. However, as those of you who have already purchased software and have tried bulk E mail know, nothing good ever comes easy. Our staff has spent millions of advertising dollars on our clients' behalf; everything from commercials on the Superbowl to ads in the New York Times, to full page spreads in Scientific American.; not to mention the sending of over 1,000,000 marketing faxes a year for major corporations. Bulk E mail has been quite an eye opener. The Internet, the on line services and ISP providers are full of shrill, self appointed "net cops," whose mission in life seems to be dumping on those who have the audacity to sell product via E Mail. I don't wish nor intend to debate the issue here, except to say that if you've purchased bulk E Mail software (or intend to), you've already found out that when you attempt to use it, your ISP provider will shut you down, your E Mail account will be bombed, and electronic flames will become a way of life. Since we have a low tolerance for allowing small groups of vocal fanatics to dictate our business life, we set up our own system to send out Bulk E Mail. This system will be greatly expanded in 30 days or so (we're installing more T lines), but we currently have room on our system to send out Bulk E Mail for a limited number of companies or individuals other than ourselves. We'll send out your order, large or small. We'll do it quickly, and we'll do it at a really great price. You can supply the list, or we'll supply the list. Place an order with us, and we'll give you advice on how to set up your E Mail so your on line service won't shut you down, how to write your material, and much more. We will also write your marketing material, if you so desire. If you supply a list, we can run it through our computer program to sort out all duplicates and bad AOL or CompuServe addresses. If you buy a list from us, we will guarantee that the exact number of names you order will go out; if we send a list for you and a number of addresses are not delivered, we will send out more E Mails until you get delivered exactly what you ordered. We can even tell you how to confirm that your list was sent. We also have programs that can filter out E Mail "bombs" and other irritating toys played with at your expense by people who don't have a life. When we first began exploring bulk E mail, we contacted numerous firms advertising that they would send out bulk E mail. What we got was answering machines, disconnected numbers, and no call backs. The one firm that did contract us would only send limited numbers of E mails for us, and then only if we had already sent the list out once and taken off all the removes (go figure...if we could send out the list once, what did we need them for?). We finally got so exasperated, we set up our own system. And are we glad we did. Speaking as a marketing man with over 30 years experience in major advertising, E Mail marketing will change the face of advertising and cost of sale forever. I do not believe that has ever been a vehicle like it in history to allow anyone of any size and any budget to advertise and sell their products literally overnight. We employ 18 people, and I guarantee you that when you contact us as (805) 654-4042, you'll get a call back. Right away. And the office phone number we give you, will have a live person at the other end. Following is a price list to give you an idea of the quality of our company. Please bear in mind that Bulk E Mail is effective in large numbers; i.e., 25,000 and above. Price List To Send Bulk E Mail: Amount Cost Set Up (One Time Fee) 25,000 $150.00 $50.00 50,000 $275.00 $50.00 75,000 $400.00 $50.00 100,000 $550.00 $50.00 Bulk E Mail amounts above 100,000 per sending will be bid on a case by case basis. If you wish to modem us a list, there may be a small charge for down load depending on list size. We can provide a list for you at a nominal charge. If you wish us to "clean" your list (remove all duplicates and bad addresses), we will supply a bid on a case by case basis as with writing your marketing materials and other services. If we may be of service to you, please call us directly at (805) 654-4042. Thank you.

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Re: Depends / Re: Senate spams
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greg Broiles wrote: > At 07:27 PM 2/28/97 -0800, Toto wrote: > > Only asinine, dip-shit numbskulls would be capable of making this > >idiotic extrapolation. > Please sketch out the details of this "extrapolation". Simple enough. Snow stated: "given that there are [many some a-few] messages being sent to this list that are sent by non-human entities (bots, auto-replies, bounces etc.) is there a way to avoid propigating them." Which Greg extrapolated to suggest: "Will you count Raph's remailer statistics as "machine generated" and exclude them, too?" Which I suppose could be taken to yet another level of extrapolation by asking the question, "Will you count cc:'d messages as 'machine generated' and exclude them, too?" After which it could be further extrapolated to ask, "Will you count posts composed on computers as being 'machine generated' and exclude them, too?" Greg, in his typical muddying of the waters, tries to twist the thoughts of others around to the extent that, if one followed Greg's logic to its conclusion, one might believe snow is of the opinion that the "Welcome to Cypherpunks" message should be deleted because it is auto-generated. If this is, indeed, the case, then I would expect snow would explain his reasons for thinking thusly. > You cannot talk about spam (using the "inappropriate or off-topic message" > definition, not the "posted too many times" definition) without talking > about content. Once again, you are self-servingly using the C2nsorship definition of spam, which is not common to any of the anti-spam forums that I follow. Of course content must be taken into consideration, even in the case of auto-generated messages. Auto-generated messages, such as remailer information, can be on-topic for the list. As far as I am concerned, posts by list subscribers cannot possibly be off-topic, since it is up to the subscribers to decide what they consider to be a suitable topic for the list. > You are also talking about censorship based on content, but you don't seem > to want to admit it. Another misrepresentation on your part. All moderation/censorship is based on content. I have always maintained, however, that a rational person is capable of looking at the content, source, and destinations of a post and determining if it is shotgun-spawned crapola and/or a mailbombing or denial of service attack. > > Anyone who read my post to Igor, suggesting that I would have no > >problem > >with him intercepting autobot-replies that result from mailbomb attacks, > >also knows that I suggested even the empty spam-messages being deleted > >should be stored where they are open to scrutiny, and that I, for one, > >would indeed be scrutinizing them. > > Boy, this sounds like a really familiar system .. can't quite remember > where I've seen it used before .. Well, you certainly didn't see it on the CypherPunks list. What was seen there was a fascist takeover of the list by a dictator who relegated posts he and his employer personally disliked to the flames list. > There was some guy named Toto who wrote > to me a few weeks ago, Try including specific quotes, Greg, even if they are out-of-context. > >> I don't see anything morally wrong with deliberately altering the flow of > >> messages to and through the list, but I think it's bad form to pretend not > >> to be doing that. > > > > Who is doing this, Greg? Name names. Give us an example of who is > >doing this and pretending not to do it. Why are your claims so vague? > > Because I'm interested in talking about ideas, not people. Not just because you were blowing smoke? > I realize this > may come as something of a surprise, but there are some circumstances where > simply calling someone an "idiot" or a "liar" or saying that they've got > their employers' sperm in their mouth is not a meaningful substitute for > explaining why you think they're wrong. Never let it be said that I am one to let bad taste (pardon the pun) stand in the way of a cheap shot. And I do explain why I think you are not only wrong, but purposely attempting to misrepresent the stances taken by others. I will reiterate that I am of the belief that there should always be a completely unmoderated, uncensored CypherPunks list, and that additional, filtered lists, should be merely a conjunction to that list, in the interests of spreading information regarding strong crypto in the widest possible manner. -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Try It Before You Buy It!
by Andy Barber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Imagine this: A network program that lets you: TRY IT BEFORE YOU BUY IT! This is unlike ANYTHING you have seen before. Like joining a network marketing program in reverse! You get to try it out, w/ no obligation, see if it works, and THEN decide if you want to participate in the actual money-making end of it! Best of all, it COSTS YOU NOTHING!!! It's totally free. Visit our Web-Site at: http://www.crt-enterprises.com/downline.htm register FREE You have NOTHING to lose, and possibly EVERYTHING to gain! Email abarber(a)vgernet.net, Put "FREE" in subject. Thank you

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New Product in beta: SecurText
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Sat, 1 Mar 97 02:12:26 -0500 From: <softpub%toolz.UUCP(a)vec.net> To: Softlist(a)vec.net Subject: New Product in beta: SecurText [Software Entrepreneur's Mailing List] [p1198: Sat Mar 1 02:12:17 1997] >From: "Wormhole Technologies, Inc." <Erik(a)wormhole-net.com> We have been developing SecurText for over a year now and we finally have a beta. SecurText is an anti-hacker, anti-virus, e-mail enhanced network product. It is a versatile, elegant, easy-to-use alternative to PGP. It runs on Windows 3.1, 3.11, and Win 95. Our commercial release will be fully S/MIME compliant, have built-in e-mail functionality for totally seamless sending and receiving of secure messages and attachments, and protect against viruses. Check out our free beta at http://www.wormhole-net.com. Note that, due to export controls on encryption, this version does not give you military strength encryption so do not use for actual privacy or security. For the actual, military strength version you must send me your name, US mailing address, plus $3.50 for s/h, and I will send it to you. Send to: Wormhole Technologies, Inc. (softpub member) 6 Ash Avenue West Orange, NJ 07052 By the way, I would really like this beta circulated as much as possible and to get as much feedback as possible. Kindly provide me with an e-mail address when you download and I'll send you a short questionnaire (just 6 questions). Thanks. --------------------------- Very truly yours, ERIK P. WEINGOLD, President/CEO Erik(a)wormhole-net.com Wormhole Technologies, Inc.<tm> keeping the net free with cryptography<tm> http://www.wormhole-net.com -- Send Software Entrepreneur's Mailing List postings to: -- softpub(a)toolz.com -- Send mailing list add/change/delete/gripes to: -- softpub-request(a)toolz.com --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/

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Pro-CODE Bill
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've put the new Senate Pro-CODE encryption bill announced by VTR here last week at: http://jya.com/s377.htm (23K)

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Re: Depends / Re: Senate spams
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn wrote: [snip--left nut] > it would be nice > to try to draw more of a connection between the ideas and ideals and > the reality of the list, otherwise, we'll all wind up looking like > hypocrites. If I post missives misinterpreting your own words and intentions, then you may no doubt be seen as a hypocrite to the gullible, or to those who choose to limit their world view by reading my posts and killfiling yours. In either case, I don't think this is a reason for you to lose a lot of sleep. > I personally don't see anything wrong with limiting > postings to subscribers, as long as subscriptions are open to all. > I also don't see anything wrong with warning a poster about commercial > messages, or other technical problems such as attaching really huge > files to go to the list, since all uncensored forums do this and > everyone I know of agrees with it. To have this option seemed to me to be an area of common agreement among CypherPunks list subscribers at the time of the 'Laker's fans named Bubba' mailboming of the list via forged subscriptions to a sports forum. The attempts to label, as hypocrites, those who thereafter complained about the fascist measures taken by self-appointed list saviors, are nothing more than anal-retentive smoke blowing. I have an efficient ISP provider and can, for a reasonable price, not worry about excessive download time, etc. The real-world reality is that there are those for whom paying to download the results of mailbomb attacks constitutes a denial of service to them. There are undoubtedly also others whose financial and personal time constraints may make a filtered version of the list attractive to them, and thus lead to them retaining their interest in crypto issues, instead of losing interest. I have not seen any of the anti-censorship elements in the CypherPunks suggest that there should not be alternatives available for those whose personal needs and/or interests are better served by various methods of filtering. To attempt to force UCE/Spam on those ill-equipped to deal with it serves no purpose other than to lessen the number of people who will have information in regard to the issues surrounding strong crypto. > The "problem" here (if there is one) is determining SPAM and the like > on a case-by-case basis. Suggestions have been floated here, but as > far as I know, none have been implemented. Igor has implemented spam-attack measures, and has been straightforward in both revealing these measures and asking for opinions in regard to his actions and proposals. I do not anticipate Igor resorting to furtive methodologies in self- servingly manipulating posts but, at the same time, I monitor what is going on in the background of the various lists. I regard 'trust' as something that should be undertaken with one's eyes open, just the same. > The real test, of course, > is when deletions do occur, whether there are any complaints, and > how those complaints are handled. Thankfully, the CypherPunks list will likely never lack for paranoid subscribers to raise warning flags whenever nefarious activities take place in regard to the list (or when the computer 'burps', either). It is up to the individual subscriber to separate the realities from the delusions. (I myself count on the space aliens to provide me with advice and support from the messages I receive from them when the Scotch I drink shorts out the spaces between the mercury fillings in my teeth. You may have a different method.) -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Pro-CODE Crypto Bill
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Olsen wrote: > At 12:47 PM 3/2/97 -0500, John Young wrote: > >We've put the new Senate Pro-CODE encryption bill at: > > http://jya.com/s377.htm (23K) > There is an interesting addition to the bill that I have not seen discussed > here yet. The pro-code bill has added an "Information Security Board". This > provision worries me. It sound like a nice little rubber hose committee. > ("The House Committee on Unamerican Encryption"?) > Any opinions on this new development? As long as Senator Charlie McCarthy is heading the committee, then I can't foresee any problems. (But, for the record, I do not know Alan Olsen, and have never been associated with him personally, or member of any group with which he is associated.) Excuse me, I hear a pounding on the door... -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Pro-CODE Bill
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Upon looking over the bill in question (helpfully provided in a more accessible location by jya), I do have some concerns over whether it allows for anonymous remailer export - it has a provision stating Nothing in this Act may be construed to affect any law intended to prevent the- (2) illegal or unauthorized distribution or release of classified, confidential, or proprietary information; or (3) enforcement of Federal or State criminal law. Which causes some question in my mind whether it would cover laws against or discouraging anonymous remailers. (While the Supreme Court would probably find outlawing anonymous remailers to be unconstitutional, laws discouraging their export or other lesser forms of harrassment might still pass muster, unfortunately.) -Allen

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DES Challenge / Who'da Thunk It?
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems that all of the efforts to meet the DES Challenge are being sabotaged on one level or another. The des-challenge(a)muffin.org group have never been able to fly on more than one wing. The New Media Laboratories effort has been plagued by rogue clients and its participants being subjected to varieties of interference/trojan-horses. Peter Trei's software has been appearing on international servers, with bugs which don't match those in the original source code. Pointers to BryDES software have turned out to be misdirected, in many cases. I suspect that if the 'New Coke' had hired RSA's people, that we would all be drinking their 'imitation Pepsi' product, instead of 'Classic Coke', as God intended us to do. Crayola had the foresight to call upon RSA's expertise, and, as a result, the wool was pulled over the public's eyes and they came to accept the 'new' colors, even though they are part of the 'plot' against the Visual Illuminatti. Perhaps these new revelations will lead to people taking my posts to this list more seriously in the future. -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Pro-CODE Bill
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following provision also causes me some doubts about exactly what will be allowed for export: (B) Exception.--The Secretary shall prohibit the export or reexport of particular software and computer hardware described in this subsection to an identified individual or organization in a specific foreign country if the Secretary determines that there is substantial evidence that such software and computer hardware will be-- (iv) intentionally used to evade enforcement of United States law or taxation by the United States or by any State or local government. which could be construed to cover anonymous remailers, fully anonymous digital cash, anything set up to verify gambling fairness, and various other things of interest to Cypherpunks (including the use of PGP by, say, a drug "kingpin"). Admittedly, the "identified individual or organization in a specific foreign country" will help in limiting this application. -Allen

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Re: Depends / Re: Senate spams
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow wrote: > I think that any reasonable person could assume that missives f > from "mailer-daemon" could safely be excluded from the list. It is doubtful > that anyone out there has such a login, and if they do, well, it is stupid > enough that ignoring it would be doing them a favor (After a while they > _might_ get the idea that no one with a clue SENDS mail "mailer-deamon", > and change their login. I'd like to see a show of hands to see how many list members have received any posts from nancy.net/sally.net/conentric.net that they didn't personally delete without reading. These people don't seem to realize that the CypherPunks aren't interested in finding out how to "Make Big $$$ At Home, Licking Your Own Dick", because we do it anyway, without any expectations other than our own, personal reward. I do find snow's post rather embarassing, however, since I just sent an email asking mailer-daemon to marry me. It's bad enough being rejected, but being auto-rejected really cuts to the bone. -- Toto http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Guardian on EU-FBI Wiretap Pact
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to CM. The Guardian Weekly, Volume 156, Issue 9 Week ending March 2, 1997, Page 4: UK to join FBI phone taps Richard Norton-Taylor and Alison Daniels BRITAIN has secretly agreed with its European Union partners to set up an international telecommunications tapping system in co-operation with the FBI, it was revealed on Monday. The agreement covers telephones and written communications -- telexes, faxes and e-mail. To make tapping easier, telecommunications companies will be obliged to give security and intelligence agencies the key to codes installed in equipment sold to private customers. Detailed plans are being drawn up by officials in a secret network of EU committees established under the "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty, covering co-operation on law and order issues. Civil liberties groups, while agreeing that there was a need for such an agreement to fight against serious crime, said the plans raised a number of privacy and data protection issues and must be the subject of a full public debate. Britain is an enthusiastic supporter of joint action in this area, which is conducted on an inter-governmental basis with no role for the European Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. It is an area where the EU's "democratic deficit" is most evident. Key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding signed by EU states in 1995, which is still classified. It reflects increasing concern among European intelligence agencies that modern technology will prevent them from tapping private communications. EU governments agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington as they work out detailed plans. ----- As posted yesterday, for a report on EU-FBI wiretapping: http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/tapping/

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No Subject
by Bohus Simek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Blowfish
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[retin] May prefers to have sex with little kids because his own penis is like that of a three-year-old. _ o |<)_/# Tim C[retin] May TT <T

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 3 Mar 97 6:45:58 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de -++++++++-++ 1:22:34 99.99% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net *++.-# 5:22:40 99.98% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ###--*.###-# 2:44:25 99.98% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#*#+**+-++ 16:11 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *+#*#+#++#*# 2:24 99.95% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ------------ 5:40:48 99.94% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net -+ *++*+ *** 28:51 99.63% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com __.._--__.-+ 22:39:55 99.55% replay remailer(a)replay.com --**++**+*** 15:52 99.41% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ---+---._. 3:25:41 99.03% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - -- -_*--- 2:17:36 98.95% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com -++++++ +++ 44:00 98.82% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net .- +- -. - 1:12:29 96.16% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** *** +* 53:49 94.54% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org *+++++ + 24:17 91.73% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ##-+*+ ## 9:05 91.47% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com . _ 91:28:31 89.63% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -+++ 59:37 21.19% wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com 37:27 -5.74% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Military Snooping
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green posted the message below elsewhere which raises provocative questions about military snooping on the Net to combat anonymizers and remailers: [Forward] At the FC'97 rump session, Paul Syverson from NRL presented a paper titled "Onion Routing". The description of the system sounds very much like Wei Dai's PipeNet. However, the development team seems to be unaware of PipeNet and the discussions about it that we had in the past. NLR has currently five machines implementing the protocol. Connection setup time is claimed to be 500 ms. They are looking for volunteers to run "Onion Routers". It appears the US military wants to access websites without giving away the fact that they are accessing the sites and is looking to us to provide the cover traffic. What a fortunate situation. They said that the source would soon be on the web page, but so far it has not appeared. http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/projects/onion-routing/ [End forward] For those who don't want NRL snooping on their accesses, we've put three of the Onion-Routing papers at: http://jya.com/onion.htm http://jya.com/privnet.htm http://jya.com/hri.htm (a conversion from PDF)

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Re: DES Challenge / Who'da Thunk It?
by Cynthia H. Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 3 Mar 1997, Sean Roach wrote: > At 02:36 PM 3/3/97 +0100, James Morris wrote: > ... > >Actually, there's a theory that the secret recipies for Coke, Pepsi and > >Kentucky Fried Chicken are part of a biological chinese lottery, where > >the results are collected via satellite-based spectrometry of atmospheric > >methane radicals. Note that children who are too young for these foods > >will quite happily eat Crayola. > > > >More than this I cannot say. > > You might be interested to know that Pepsi owns Kentucky Fried Chicken. > Take a look at the supply trucks some time, Taco Bell, Hot & Now (whatever > that is), Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Pizza Hut are all Pepsico subsidaries. > I'd say that the chips are weighted heavily on one side. Hope you know > which numbers to bet on. I'd lay my $ on the suppliers of red dye #3, yellow dye #7, etc., and get Pepsi, Coke and Crayola fanciers all at once. Cynthia =============================================================== Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng. E-mail: cynthb(a)iosphere.net | PGP Key: See Home Page Home Page: http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/ Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received. Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.

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NSA Sued by Cryptographer
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've received from Anonymous a copy of a February 28, 1997, complaint against NSA by an ex-Sandia cryptographer: http://jya.com/nsasuit.txt (41K) The cryptographer, William Payne, was: project leader for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit [MSCU] at Sandia between about 1982 and 1986. The MSCU was funded by NSA. Payne designed and built the hardware/software data authenticator for the US/USSR Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for Sandia between 1986 and 1992. Payne held SECRET clearance when Payne worked for the Navy, DOE Q clearance, crypto and SCI access while at Sandia. The document says that Payne was a source for the Baltimore Sun story on NSA's "spiking" deal with CryptoAG*, and other stories, after he was fired in 1992 for attacking the quality of NSA's cryptography. It includes descriptions of agreements between Sandia and NSA, algorithms, critiques and procedures. A sample: Payne revealed to the public the value 31. "The algorithm required stepping two of its internal registers at a rate many times the data rate." NSA believes that 31 is classified. Payne believes that this is classification abuse. Therefore, Payne issued a FOIA to NSA crypto-mathematician Brian Snow also on June 10, 1996. I found no evidence that NSA possesses any special crypto skills, and apparently hides its deficiencies behind the veil of classification abuse. To the contrary, I discovered generic deficient crypto work. We brought this to the attention of NSA. Sandia even offered to help NSA fix its deficient crypto work. And NSA attempted to correct its deficient crypto work. Therefore, under 5 USC 522b I request access all technical documentation on, 1 Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm, 2 Benincasa's revision of 1, 3 The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm, 4 Your MSCU algorithm, 5 the clipper algorithm, 6 the STU III algorithms. I feel that published analyses of the above 6 algorithms will show the Clinton administration, congress, and the public that NSA possess no superior knowledge of crypto matters. Payne received no response from NSA. ---------- * "Cryptographic units were 'spiked' so that the crypto key was transmitted ['covert channel'] with the cipher text." For more on the CryptoAG story see: http://jya.com/cryptoa2.htm

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2-way anonymous ecash ?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Peter Foldiak <Peter.Foldiak(a)st-andrews.ac.uk> Newsgroups: sci.crypt On http://www.digicash.com/ecash/aboutcrime.html Digicash says: "... ecash is not at all well suited for black markets, extortion, bribes and tax evasion. The reason is that only the payer is anonymous, the recipient of the money has no anonymity at all. Furthermore, all money that the payee receives must be given to the bank. It is not possible to hide from the bank the fact that you received money (and thereby hide it from the authorities). So tax-evasion is definitely out. For people who operate black markets the same story holds. First of all, their income is visible. The second reason is far better: if any of the customers ever wants to, he can prove that a certain payment was made by him. This means that a criminal accepting ecash can be identified with the retroactive help one of his customers. ..." Is this really true under all circumstances? Can (some kind of) e-cash be made truly two-way anonymous, like physical cash?

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