December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Keeping America safe from Soy Milk
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 1 Aug 96 at 14:35, E. ALLEN SMITH forwarded: > > JONESBORO, Ga. -- An 18-year-old self-styled anarchist who allegedly > > distributed a free, homemade pamphlet with anti-government rhetoric > > has been charged with advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government. > [...] > > The pamphlet was laced with with anti-police cartoons, obscenities, > > and anarchist slogans. The one overt reference to violence was an > > illustration of a "Molotov cocktail" on the same sheet with a recipe > > for "soy milk" made from water-soaked soybeans, sugar and vanilla and > > strained through a T-shirt. Nuff said. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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My crypto-export URL was in the wrong place
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I typo'd on the URL. http://www.osf.org/~rsalz/crypto-export.html Sorry for any confusion.

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Re: A Libertine Question
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:50 PM 7/30/96 -0700, Mike Duvos wrote: >Alan Horowitz writes: >> On Mon, 29 Jul 1996 jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >> >> > Think of how many of our laws are being enacted that tacitly make being >> > poor or indigent a crime. >> >> Horseshit. This is a poorly-disguised re-tread of one of the standard >> lines of the Patrice Lumumba University brand of leftist agitprop. > >Here in Seattle, we have an city attorney who specializes in creating >ordinances to annoy and harrass the underclass, often paving new roads >over former civil liberties in the process. The process of regulatory torment of homeless folks is divisible into two methods: restriction of anonymous behavior (e.g., travel, public speech, business transactions), and restriction of behavior to property-owners (sleeping, eating, assembly, recreation). The former is or should be disturbing to crypto-anarchy friendly folks because it limits the ability of every person to travel or make purchases or otherwise engage in economic activity anonymously. The latter should be disturbing to crypto-anarchy friendly folks because of the relationship between physical presence and regulatory jurisdiction - a government which requires you to establish your relationship to something valuable within its jurisdiction (like a car or real estate) before allowing you to exercise human/economic rights effectively establishes its ability to regulate you by seizing or otherwise burdening your relationship with your possession. In practice, the no-anonymity requirement is frequently conflated with the latter, in that demonstrating your relationship to valuable property implies susceptibility to punishment (and/or sufficient socialization/indoctrination) and long-term presence for later enforcement, such that a request for identification (with corresponding dossier check for previous instances of "antisocial" behavior) is likely to be unnecessary or penologically nonproductive. Which is a long way to say that street cops don't usually torment people with nice cars and/or houses, so those folks don't need to be so concerned about making sure their "papers" are "in order". So the unconstitutional and oppressive character of the various laws Mike Duvos refers to is mitigated by their lack of evenhanded enforcement. If a cop can demand ID from someone who "looks like he doesn't belong here" he can demand it from you. (modulo driving, this isn't legal. But give Justice [sic] Rehnquist and Clinton and random congressional maniacs a few more years and see where things stand.) Both requirements are reducible to the notion that a person must be punishable before they may act - in the extreme case, a person must be punishable before they will be allowed to exist. I find it very difficult to harmonize this position with the idea that governments exist to serve people, not the other way around. But maybe I just don't have my head right. Because homelessness itself is not inherently problematic (or easily distinguishable from "legitimate" activity), it's difficult to define it as a crime beyond Mr. "strong libertarian [sic]" Horowitz' "threat to public order and decorum". Cities have learned to regulate everyday activities since those are the only ones they're certain homeless people will engage in. Police officers have, in general, the good sense to avoid applying these regulations to people who look like they don't present a threat to "public order and decorum". Today those laws are applied to people who may smell bad and don't want traditional jobs. Tomorrow they may be applied to people who won't use only government-approved crypto or who want to defend themselves with guns or other weapons. And just as some people "don't have a right to live in Seattle" if they won't toe the line, other people may find they "don't have a right to live in the United States." * (* Other people (apparently not "strong libertarians") buy into all of that suspicious crap about the Bill of Rights and people being allowed to be themselves even if other people find it upsetting or non-decorous. But they probably don't appreciate how difficult it is to be a policeman, so we'll just ignore them, they're probably leftists. If they don't like how things go here, they can just get the hell out, hmm? Banning T-shirts with crypto code printed on them - that's one thing. But banning ratty old T-shirts that haven't been washed is totally different.) The regulation of ordinary social and economic activity is not a "homelessness issue", it's a "freedom issue". If you admit that it can legitimately be regulated but reassure yourself with your trust in the discretion and good judgement of the regulators, your liberty is more a matter of grace than of right. Have a nice day. -- Greg Broiles |"Post-rotational nystagmus was the subject of gbroiles(a)netbox.com |an in-court demonstration by the People http://www.io.com/~gbroiles |wherein Sgt Page was spun around by Sgt |Studdard." People v. Quinn 580 NYS2d 818,825.

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Re: A Libertine Question (fwd)
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate <ravage(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com> argued: >As long as they have a license to operate a food dispencing facility (in >other words they are certifying they are aware of the correct processes for >such operations) then nobody should have the right to interfere with their >operation unless with probable cause (ie proof of danger such as bad weenies >in their hot dogs). This would not apply to individuals or families making >such food in the same place for their own and NOT public consumption. I believe the issue with Food Not Bombs is they didn't get the appropriate permits, etc, or were denied them, or something. However, I disagree with you on this point. I think they shouldn't be required to obtain a license, but everyone whom they serve food to should know that they don't have such a license. This would equal informed consent. Also, with Food Not Bombs, many of the people that the food is being served to is also involved in cooking, distributing food, and cleaning up. I've been told it's exactly like a big picnic, except for anyone is invited to help and/or eat.

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Corporate e-mail policy
by George Kuzmowycz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The company I work for has set up a committee to draft a security policy involving, among other things, e-mail. Since I'm responsible for our networking and e-mail, I'm part of this group. Unfortunately, I'm outnumbered by legal, auditing and HR types who, basically, want to have access to everything. I am aware that there's a line of thinking which holds that what you do or say on company time, using company equipment is the company's business. I do not subscribe to this line of thinking, and believe that employees expect a "zone of privacy" in which their telephone calls will not be listened to and their e-mail will not be read or monitored. I am also aware that recent court cases have not supported this "zone of privacy" and have pretty much held that the employer can do whatever it wants with e-mail. What I want out of this process is to keep myself and my staff out of this business. As a practical matter, I'm sure the company could bring in a hired gun to do whatever they want; since our e-mail system does not easily support strong crypto, it's all there for the taking. In an ideal world, the rest of the group would agree with me and say "Yup, we have no business reading e-mail." Since that's not likely, I'm looking for examples of "privacy-friendly" corporate policies that I can put on the table in our meetings, and end up with a minority report. -gk-

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RE: Tolerance (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca > Date: Fri, 02 Aug 96 11:19:52 EST > Subject: RE: Tolerance (fwd) > > Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> wrote: > >Libertarian views should be basicaly if it doesn't harm anothers person or > >property without their prior consent then it should be legal and >permissible. > > It is important to consider cultural factors when deciding how groups will react > to differing standards of legal and permissible actions. For example, a brief > summary of the basic tenets held by some different European cultures are given > below: > > British: Everything is permitted, unless it is forbidden. > German: Everything is forbidden, unless it is permitted. > France: Everything is permitted, especially if it is forbidden. > Culture has nothing to do with inherent civil liberities, you have them simply for being alive. People create social contracts to limit those rights. You have the cart before the horse. Jim Choate

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RE: Tolerance (fwd)
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> wrote: >Libertarian views should be basicaly if it doesn't harm anothers person or >property without their prior consent then it should be legal and >permissible. It is important to consider cultural factors when deciding how groups will react to differing standards of legal and permissible actions. For example, a brief summary of the basic tenets held by some different European cultures are given below: British: Everything is permitted, unless it is forbidden. German: Everything is forbidden, unless it is permitted. France: Everything is permitted, especially if it is forbidden. Au revoir, James

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privacy is a SMOKESCREEN.
by artichoke bill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

from eff: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: ALERT: Congress Rushing to Enact Anti-Privacy Bill - Call Congress NOW! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **** Last minute update **** Just before ye editor was about to send this issue out, reports are filtering in that negotiations on the bill that is the subject of the alert below, have collapsed. CNN reports: "Key members of the Senate blamed House conservatives for the failure, saying they had insisted on linking proposed new wiretapping authority for the FBI to an expansion of privacy laws." CNN quotes Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY) as saying that House Republican leaders "have come up with this smokescreen called privacy". You may wish to let Rep. Schumer know how you feel about your right to privacy being labelled "a smokescreen": 9th Dist. NY Schumer, Charles E. (D) 1-202-225-6616 (voice), 1-202-225-4183 (fax) The full text of the CNN article is available at: http://www.cnn.com/US/9608/01/wh.terror.bill/index.html The article also reports that "lawmakers said there is hope for agreement after the month long" Congressional recess beginning at the end of this week. THIS MEANS THAT THE ALERT BELOW IS STILL URGENT, and still important. We just have a short breathing space now.

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Re: Blurring the Chains of Causation
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in my view the ultimate foolishness of this sort was bringing Cessna Aircraft to it's knees by sueing them on behalf of people who crashed because of their inability to handle the airplane in the conditions into which they put themselves. -paul > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Thu Aug 1 18:32:44 1996 > Date: Thu, 1 Aug 1996 10:39:12 -0700 > X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type> : > text/plain> ; > charset="us-ascii"> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) > Subject: Blurring the Chains of Causation > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 4559 > > > An unusual thread name, "Blurring the Chains of Causation." > > What I mean is this: > > - the U.S. legal system has been blurring, or confusing, the chain of > cause-and-effect in crimes > > - Example: allowing suits by insurance companies and states against tobacco > companies. A smoker gets cancer by his actions, and it used to be that this > was his action, his responsibility. Now, we hold tobacco companies liable, > and perhaps will someday hold executives of these companies criminally > liable. (This for a product which is not illegal, mind you.) > > (There are a bunch of related examples. "Civil liability" is a major way > this blurring is happening. Gun manufacturers being sued for crimes > committed with their guns, ladder makers sued by the families of criminals > who leaned ladders up against electrified fences, and so on. How long > before a bookstore is sued for "allowing" a book to be bought by someone > who later is "inspired" to commit a crime--actually, John Grisham ("The > Firm") is involved in a lawsuit against Oliver Stone for his film, "Natural > Born Killers," which Grisham claims "inspired" a murder. This has got to > stop, in my opinion.) > > - "They made me do it" defenses. Hostess Twinkies are implicated in the > brutal murder of San Francisco's mayor and a city councilman. Childhood > abuse is exculpatory in other cases. Psychobabblers blather about what > caused people to behave as they did. A mass murderer says pornography made > him kill 25 women. A lawyer claims his client's son committed suicide after > listening to heavy metal music. And so it goes. > > This blurring has links to cryptography, bomb-making instructions on the > Net, availability of porn on the Net, and many other things. > > To cut to the chase: > > - a librarian who "allows" a person to check out "The Anarchist Cookbook" > is *not* causing a crime, though much of the rhetoric one hears is > otherwise. > > - the _author_ of that book (Powell, allegedly) is *also* not causing a crime. > > - the _publishers_ of that book (Lyle Stuart, as I recall--my copy is not > handy) also have not committed any crime > > To make things clear, some of the language being proposed in the > rush-to-law about anti-terrorism, wiretapping, anti-encryption, etc. As > Sen. Feinstein puts it, "We hope we can wrap up the repeal of the Bill of > Rights and have it on President Clinton's desk before the close of the > Olympics on Sunday." :-( > > - if I _advocate_ strong crytography, avoidance of taxes, undermining of > government power, crypto anarchy, etc., I have not committed any crime > (Caveat: advocating the violent overthrow of the U.S. government apparently > is a crime, as are certain forms of conspiracy, a la RICO, tax evasion, > etc.) > > - if I _use_ strong cryptography, I have not committed any crime, ipso > facto, nor am I necessarily conspiring to commit any crime > > And so on. > > Many of the proposed restrictions seek to further blur this chain of > causation, by making someone who provides access to materials which _may_ > later be used in a crime, or which may "inspire" someone to crime, a kind > of criminal. > > The trend picked up steam with the "deep pockets" precedents in the 70s > (*), was fed by the blame-passing psychobabble of the same decade, and has > now reached its present state by a willingness of the courts to hear such > cases. > > People who actually commit real crimes are the criminals, not those who > sold them Hostess Twinkies without first checking their blood sugar level. > Not those who let a library patron look at a "dangerous" book. And not > those who provided strong cryptographic tools which _might_ be used by > terrorists, pedophiles, and money launderers. > > --Tim May > > (* "deep pockets" -- If there are N parties in a lawsuit, and one of them > shares only 5% of the (putative) blame but has 95% of the overall assets, > go after the party with the "deepest pockets." This forced Cessna and > Piper, the leading light aircraft firms at one time, to stop selling light > aircraft. The example with Oliver Stone being sued is a clear case of > this.) > > Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > > >

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Re: Is 1024-bit PGP key enough?
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

actually, the IDEA key is 128 bits. -paul > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Fri Aug 2 03:06:24 1996 > X-Sender: gcg(a)mail.pb.net > X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (32) > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type> : > text/plain> ; > charset="us-ascii"> > Date: Thu, 01 Aug 1996 22:16:06 -0400 > To: jim(a)ACM.ORG > From: "Geoffrey C. Grabow" <gcg(a)pb.net> > Subject: Re: Is 1024-bit PGP key enough? > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 1454 > > At 15:38 08/01/96 PDT, Jim Gillogly wrote: > > > >Somebody says: > >>> Is security provided by 1024-bit PGP key sufficient against most powerful > >>> computers that are available today? Say if smoe organization spent 10 > >>> billions of dollars on a cracking machine, would it be possible to crack > >>> the keys in reasonable time? > > > >Derek Atkins <warlord(a)MIT.EDU> responds with some useful and authoritative > >information -- thanks. > > > Also, remember that although the PGP key is 1024 bits, it generates a much > smaller IDEA key with 56 bits (I think... anyone?). The 56 bit key is > vunerable to that $1 mil mystery machine that the NSA may or may not have. > > G.C.G. > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | > | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | > | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | > |----------------------------------------------------------------------| > | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at http://www.pb.net/~wizard | > | and on a plethora of key servers around the world. | > |----------------------------------------------------------------------| > | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > >

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Re: "adjust your attitude with their billy club" (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 2 Aug 1996 01:36:56 -0400 (EDT) > From: Alan Horowitz <alanh(a)infi.net> > Subject: Re: "adjust your attitude with their billy club" > > "Given the loss of privacy tolerated by 99.9999% of American citizens in > the past twenty years, no one has a right to complain about the > government taking new powers for itself." > > You cannot have it both ways. If you are free to define what is or is not > a public nuisance when you do it; likewise am I. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION Articles in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution. ARTICLE IX. The enumeration of the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. ARTICLE X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. [The first ten amendments went into effect on 15 December 1791.]

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More on the latest Surveillance Bill...
by jseiger＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The outline below is from a document produced by the House Republican Conference. It is ONLY A SUMMARY of the proposed bill and is NOT actual legislation. No one I have spoken with has seen any specific legislative language yet. The outline is confusing on several points, particularly the "FBI DIGITAL TELEPHONY" Section, which says: "The bill authorizes the FBI to use enhanced telephone technology to investigate suspected terrorist activity. Funding for equipment purchase was provided in the 1996 omnibus appropriations measure enacted earlier this year." The first sentence above is not at all clear, and probably won't be until we can get our hands on the actual text of the bill. It could be additional wiretap authority (ie, roving wiretaps), or it could be nothing. As far as the funding goes, the "1996 omnibus appropriations measure" DID NOT contain funding for implementation of the law - but it did appropriate $37 million to cover new equipment for the FBI. The rest looks like it is a scaled back version of a measure the Administration and members of Congress were pushing earlier this week, but the scope of the new bill depends a lot on what the actual text says. I will post additional information as soon as I get it. Jonah -- Bipartisan Antiterrorism Initiative HR__ Committee on the Judiciary No Report Filed To Be Introduced Floor Situation: The House is scheduled to consider HR__ on Friday August 2, 1996. On Thursday August 1, the Rules Committee granted a rule to allow the bill to be considered under suspension of the rules. It is debatable for 40 minutes, may not be amended, and requires a two-thirds vote for passage. Summary: HR__ includes several bipartisan initiatives intended to bolster federal efforts to combat domestic terrorism in addition to those already enacted earlier this year as part of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132). The bill contains the following counter-terrorism provisions: Aviation SECURITY MEASURES: The bill enables domestic airports to aggressively search for and prevent explosives from causing destruction and harm to individuals or property through enhanced explosive detection procedures, baggage and passenger screening, and FBI authority to improve airport security training and standards to ensure that provisions of the 1990 Aviation Security Act (P.L 101-604) are implemented expeditiously. Specifically, the bill (1) requires the FAA to implement increased explosives section methods immediately, (2) strengthen the level of training and expertise possessed by security personnel who are assigned to domestic airports, (3) allows airports to use available funding to reinforce such training for security personnel, and (4) extends criminal background requirements to include a greater number of airport employees. IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS: The bill urges implementation of provisions enacted in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132), such as designating and freezing the assets of foreign terrorist organizations and implementing expedited removal procedures for aliens convicted of a crime. BIPARTISAN "BLUE RIBBON" COMMISSION: The bill establishes a special commission to review all aspects of U.S. anti-terrorism policy and make legislative recommendations about methods to most effectively establish a long-term defense against terrorist threats, including enhancing the nation's human intelligence capabilities. PRIVACY ACT AMENDMENTS: The bill includes provisions which grant a cause of action against the U.S. if in the course of a wiretap investigation damaging information is willfully disclosed to the detriment of an innocent party by the federal government. The cause of action includes monetary damages to the plaintiff if a favorable decision is rendered in federal court. EXPLOSIVES STUDY: The bill authorizes a study on black and smokeless powder by an independent agency selected by the National Institute of Justice. FEDERAL RACKETEERING STATUTE CRIMES: The bill permits federal prosecutors to deem those acts determined to be terrorist in nature as substantial enough to invoke criminal prosecution under existing criminal racketeering (RICO) statutes. FBI DIGITAL TELEPHONY: The bill authorizes the FBI to use enhanced telephone technology to investigate suspected terrorist activity. Funding for equipment purchase was provided in the 1996 omnibus appropriations measure enacted earlier this year. -- ** THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH ONLINE CONTINUES TO THE SUPREME COURT ** It's not too late to be a part of history -- Join the Lawsuit <http://www.cdt.org/ciec> -- <ciec-info(a)cdt.org> -- Jonah Seiger, Policy Analyst Center for Democracy and Technology <jseiger(a)cdt.org> 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 PGP Key via finger (v) +1.202.637.9800 http://www.cdt.org/ (f) +1.202.637.0968 http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

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Information gathering by news servers
by Scott McGuire 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How much information about what someone reads can be gathered by a news server? Is there an anonymous way to read a public news server, or would a server have to be set up intentionally to allow anonymous reading? Scott

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Tao Renji Public Key system
by Jean-Paul Kroepfli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Bruce, I was testing the Raike's Public Key software, when I remembered a section of your excellent book. In Applied Cryptography, second edition, section 19.10 (page 482) you present the Renji's work about a public key algorithme based on finite automata. Where could we found the FAPKC1 and FAPKC2 algorithms, their implementations, and executable versions (you mention an Intel486 test). Many thanks, With kindest regards Jean-Paul ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~- Jean-Paul et Micheline Kroepfli (our son: Nicolas and daughter: Celine) eMail: JeanPaul.Kroepfli(a)utopia.fnet.fr Also Compuserve and MSNetwork Phone: +33 81 55 52 59 (F) PostMail: F-25640 Breconchaux (France) or: +41 21 843 27 36 (CH) or: CP 138, CH-1337 Vallorbe Fax: +33 81 55 52 62 (Switzerland) Zephyr(r) : InterNet Communication and Commerce, Security and Cryptography consulting PGP Fingerprint : 19 FB 67 EA 20 70 53 89 AF B2 5C 7F 02 1F CA 8F "The InterNet is the most open standard since air for breathing"

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Re: Bombs & bomb threats in LA
by Conrad Walton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >and everyplace else all the news.answers FAQs are stored. What, precisely, is >an acid bomb? Also note the standard blame-the-Internet (not, say, increased >irritation with government after the Republicans failed to reduce it) >rhetoric. i'm not exactly sure what an acid bomb is, but according to my book, The Anarchist Cookbook, that I bought in 1972 (was the internet around back then?), there is a compound called "picric acid" that is "more powerful than TNT, but has some disadvantages". if you'd like the recipe, I'll be more than happy to mail you it through the US Postal system. Wouldn't want to give the Internet any more of a bad name for distributing subversive materials. There is also instructions on using an inverted vial of sulpheric acid, that will then eat thu the stopper at the top (bottom) of the vial. when the acid makes it thru, then is mixes with Potassium Chloride and causes a small explosion which sets off the larger explosion in the dynomite packed around it. just thot you'd like to know. thanks, conrad __________I_N_D_U_S_T_R_I_A_L___A_R_T_W_O_R_K_S__________ Conrad Walton http://www.industrial-artworks.com/ POB 2815, El Segundo, CA 90245 1-310-640-3365 ---------------------------------------------------------

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URGENT: Surveillance Bill Gets New Life - House Vote lLikely TODAY!
by jseiger＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(please forward where appropriate) It's not over yet.... The House has scheduled a vote on "suspension" for a 'counter-terrorism' bill TODAY (Friday). Despite media reports that the negotiations had stalled out, house Republicans have apparently worked out their differences and are set to vote on the bill today. The Senate may or may not vote on the measure on Saturday. No one I've talked to knows for sure what's in the bill, though I have heard that there are no encryption provisions and that some of the wiretap proposals have been scaled back. I will post details as I get them. In the mean time, keep those calls coming into Congress. Jonah ** THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH ONLINE CONTINUES TO THE SUPREME COURT ** It's not too late to be a part of history -- Join the Lawsuit <http://www.cdt.org/ciec> -- <ciec-info(a)cdt.org> -- Jonah Seiger, Policy Analyst Center for Democracy and Technology <jseiger(a)cdt.org> 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 PGP Key via finger (v) +1.202.637.9800 http://www.cdt.org/ (f) +1.202.637.0968 http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

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Licensing, Permits, and Freedom
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:23 PM 8/2/96, Cerridwyn Llewyellyn wrote: >Jim Choate <ravage(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com> argued: > >>As long as they have a license to operate a food dispencing facility (in >>other words they are certifying they are aware of the correct processes for >>such operations) then nobody should have the right to interfere with their >>operation unless with probable cause (ie proof of danger such as bad weenies >>in their hot dogs). This would not apply to individuals or families making >>such food in the same place for their own and NOT public consumption. > >I believe the issue with Food Not Bombs is they didn't get the appropriate >permits, etc, or were denied them, or something. However, I disagree with >you on this point. I think they shouldn't be required to obtain a license, >but everyone whom they serve food to should know that they don't have such a >license. This would equal informed consent. Also, with Food Not Bombs, many >of the people that the food is being served to is also involved in cooking, >distributing food, and cleaning up. I've been told it's exactly like a big >picnic, except for anyone is invited to help and/or eat. It was in fact "Food Not Bombs" which I was referring to in my post a few days ago. My point to the City Council was one of inconsistency (picnic groups not similarly hassled). Also, the use of "permits" to harass/muzzle a group. "Permits" are often used to stop speech and acts which are not considered acceptable. Drawing on my own community for an example, Santa Cruz tried to regulate palm readers, astrologers, mystics, and seers. This eventually fell apart, possibly when the implications became clear to the bureaucrats (the future was already clear to the Cassandras, but nobody believed them). My "Licensed Ontologist" line in my .sig was added during one of the debates about the claimed need to license and regulate persons in various professions. (There are of course the usual other examples, where job unions and cartels stop "outsiders" from participating. Often for ostensibly good reasons, but "guilds" nonetheless. The implications of crypto anarchy for these guilds are left as exercises for the student.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Freeh slimes again: Digital Telephony costs $2 billion now ...
by Dave Farber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

And I testified in front of the House that their estimate was grossly understated. I think it is more like 4-5 Billion . I called it the Software Full Employment Act of 94. (copy of testimony available). djf At 08:52 AM 8/2/96 -0700, Brock N. Meeks wrote: > >On Thu, 1 Aug 1996, Ernest Hua wrote: > >> Louis Freeh is now asking the Congress for $2 billion to fund >> Digital Telephony. Yes, that is FOUR TIMES what he said it >> would cost the taxpayers to give up their own privacy. Score >> one for the cynics who said $500 million was not enough. > >I broke the story about how much Digital Telephony would *really* cost in >CyberWire Dispatch more than two years ago. The price tag in my piece: >"... at least $2 billion..." In that Dispatch I wrote that the Clinton >White House had made the decision to support the bill based on a flawed >cost/benefit analysis study the FBI had done. > >--Brock > >

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Re: Let's Say "No!" to Single, World Versions of Software
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:16 PM 7/31/96 -0700, Tom Weinstein <tomw(a)netscape.com> wrote: >The only thing they can revoke is their permission to provide it for >download over the internet. They can't revoke our permission to sell >it in stores or via snail mail. They _could_ refuse to give export permission for new RC4/40 versions, and threaten prosecution if it's placed on the Internet. It would be highly bogus, of course, but that's one of the "benefits" of using selective enforcement and having the export strength limitations be an individual-case-basis rather than a defined law they can be held to. Tim wrote: > Actually approving of disapproving a piece of software for sale > to U.S. citizens is not currently possible. Sure. The Commerce Klaus of the Constitution lets them do it if they want to, though that required Congressional cooperation. TRUST NO ONE!

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Re: Sen. Leahy's "impeccable cyberspace credentials"
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 27 Aug 96 at 21:16, jim bell wrote: > See the difference? An open system holds legislators to a much > higher standard, which is why they don't like it and is why we > should insist on it. Fine Jim, but how? Any idea of a system that could lead to that? JFA who's ROTFL! DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants: physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Re: FYI: GOP's Stolen Laptop...
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:41 PM 8/27/96 -0500, Andrew Loewenstern <andrew_loewenstern(a)il.us.swissbank.com> wrote: >> They should have used PGP on those files..... > >...but I thought fine, upstanding, and law-abiding citizens didn't have >anything to hide... These are _Republicans_, Andrew! :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Reassign Authority!

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An open letter to the Editor of The Observer
by matthew＠itconsult.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I understand the text of the Observer article is available at http://www.hclb.demon.co.uk/obs.txt] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I. T. Consultancy Limited Our reference L2217 The Editor The Observer 119 Farringdon Road London EC1R 3ER 26 August 1996 AN OPEN LETTER FOR PUBLICATION Sir, I read with some interest the article by David Connett and Jon Henley in yesterday's edition regarding the Internet and child pornography. I was particularly interested as I am a computer consultant advising clients on Internet issues. In my professional opinion, the technical standard of the reporting was sufficiently poor as to be both inaccurate and misleading. The purpose of this letter is to clarify certain technical issues which might cause your readers to reach unfounded or incorrect conclusions. It is important to be aware of the various methods by which information generally (which can include pornography) is distributed around the Internet. Your article focuses on one particular route, namely Newsgroups. It is Newsgroups which are detailed in the Metropolitan Police's letter to Internet Providers and which are concentrated upon by your article. There are several other means of distributing information. I believe however that the Police letter lists fewer than the 150 groups referred to by the authors. Interestingly enough Newsgroups only offer the means of broadcasting information to anyone who wants to retrieve it. The authors do not appear to have a sufficient grasp of what a "remailer" does. For example they seem to draw a direct link between the use of such remailers and people being able to "log on and participate in 'live' and 'interactive' filmed sessions". A lay reader would perhaps draw the inference that the remailer is somehow involved in any such live participation. Unfortunately this could not be further from the truth. Remailers simply allow people to post messages, either as email to other people or to Newsgroups for general reading. Nothing more. Remailers are generally incapable of being "logged on" to. Your article also refers to "remailing companies", from which the lay reader might infer that remailers are operated for commercial profit. Such an inference would again be wholly incorrect. I know of no organisation operating a remailer for profit, indeed none of them even charge for their services. They are generally run by individuals on a voluntary basis who consider them as a service to the Internet community. Your article appears not to mention any of the purposes of such remailers other than in terms of the distribution of pornography. In my view it would be difficult to present a balanced article without doing so. Different remailers take different steps to prevent whatever their operators consider as "abuse". My understanding is that Mr. Helsingius' service restricts messages to 48k bytes (or characters) and prohibits postings to the "binaries" newsgroups designated for images. I also understand that it only allows 30 messages per user per day. At a technical level these restrictions would make it almost impossible to use his service for mass distribution of any binary data, not just pornography. It therefore appears surprising to me that your article should allege that Mr. Helsingius' remailer is responsible for handling "90 per cent of all child pornography" on the Internet. I wonder what substantiating evidence The Observer has to this effect other than the alleged claim by Toby Tyler. Indeed it appears from your article that the words "is supplied through this remailer" may not be a direct quote from Toby Tyler. Your article alleges that "the photographs made available to Demon's subscribers through the Internet are supplied anonymously by remailing companies". The lay reader might infer from this that all photographs therefore come via remailers. Again this would be far from the truth. Finally I hope this letter offers some assistance to your readers in clarifying a number of issues which were perhaps less than clear in your article. Given your newspaper's difficulties with technical issues, I would be grateful if you would kindly refer any editing of this letter to me prior to publication. Yours faithfully, Matthew Richardson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAgUBMiFvEAKwLwcHEv69AQGjIQP+IGR9rhvdYXe7CuCcwPl/tIrIBryikTM2 IVOpygTF2nCPf3WEJ8czRvs1emp9d9d++69XiG1f6QAeP9Jv/h9KzVtV7mjjuqCX LhlhXBYjLIiGCcxljKZ07zHFlCeZWCzuAmIFnZbz2fNNjqyicheIMlxI2tDrGgjp dlaGZuAI2XY= =dkXg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[Fwd: Re: Code Review Guidelines (draft)]
by Wendell Lee 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubcribe wendell(a)singnet.com.sg To: hag(a)ai.mit.edu Subject: Re: Code Review Guidelines (draft) From: lists(a)lina.inka.de (Bernd Eckenfels) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 1996 03:30:49 +0200 (MET DST) Cc: ichudov(a)algebra.com, adam(a)homeport.org, firewalls(a)greatcircle.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, coderpunks(a)toad.com In-Reply-To: <199608272111.RAA23997(a)galapas.ai.mit.edu> from "Daniel Hagerty" at Aug 27, 96 05:11:39 pm Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Hi, > Much better, look at rfc822. (I wouldn't consider *anything* that > has the word "sendmail" in it a good reference). its much better if you dont rely on the content of the string at all. Dont use sh -c or system and you will be save. Simply asume that all characters are valid in user suplied strings and treat them exactly that way... If they need to be exporeted then unfortunately they need to be 'untainted' and this should be done by positive not negative lists as mentioned in the guidelines. Greetings Bernd PS: I have collected the references on http://www.inka.de/sites/lina/freefire-l/ -- (OO) -- Bernd_Eckenfels(a)Wittumstrasse13.76646Bruchsal.de -- ( .. ) ecki(a){lina.inka.de,linux.de} http://home.pages.de/~eckes/ o--o *plush* 2048/A2C51749 eckes@irc +4972573817 *plush* (O____O) If privacy is outlawed only Outlaws have privacy

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Re: Australian Interbet Betting System Gets US Interest 08/26/96
by Mark Neely 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>CentreBet can be reached at http://www.taunet.com.au/centrebet BTW .. that is //www.taunet.net.au/centrebet ^^^ Regards, Mark ___ Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au Lawyer, Internet Consultant, Professional Cynic Author: Australian Beginner's Guide to the Internet (2nd Ed.) Australian Business Guide to the Internet Internet Guide for Teachers, Students & Parents Check out my Anti-SPAM FAQ: http://www.accessnt.com.au/faqs/spam.htm

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Identification docs needed.
by John C. Randolph 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

c'punks, Sorry for the off-topic post, but I think that the resourceful people on this list might be able to help. I have a friend here in NYC who is in a bit of a bind, because she has *no* id. Her birth was never recorded (i.e. no birth certificate!) So, the question is: Anyone have any suggestions as to how one could obtain documentation that would pass muster with the local passport office? I'm hoping to help her obtain the documentation she needs to get on an airplane without gaining too much attention from the JBT's. BTW, she was born a US citizen in Puerto Rico. Baptismal records may be forthcoming, but that isn't certain. advTHANKSance, -jcr

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(Fwd) Re: **"OuR" Project press release** (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I thought I would forward this so those less connected might know of amateur space technology. With a factor of 5 increase in altitude these folks will be putting things in LEO. My guess, 3-5 years. Forwarded message: > From postmaster(a)ddg.com Tue Aug 27 23:25:59 1996 > Message-Id: <199608280351.WAA21839(a)oak.zilker.net> > Comments: Authenticated sender is <stu(a)mail.zilker.net> > From: "Stu Barrett" <stu(a)zilker.net> > Organization: Personal Business > To: hct(a)ddg.com > Reply-To: hct(a)ddg.com > Errors-To: postmaster(a)ddg.com > Precedence: bulk > X-Listserver: AutoShare 1.0.2fc14 by Mikael Hansen > X-Administrivia-To: Stu Barrett (Stu(a)Zilker.net) > X-To-Unsubscribe: autoshare(a)ddg.com, body: unsub hct > X-See-Also: http://www.DDG.com/ > Date: Tue, 27 Aug 1996 22:53:36 -6 > Subject: (Fwd) Re: **"OuR" Project press release** > Priority: normal > X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.23) > > Pulled this off of the net. The was even better than SkyeDance IV ;-) > > ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- > > Paul Robinson & Ken Mizoi wrote: > > > > To All Fellow Rocketeers: > > > > The "OuR" project was launched Friday, August 16th, 1996 at 9:05 PST. > > All available flight data is still being analyzed so any information > > presented is preliminary and is provided for the courtesy of all those > > who have supported the "OuR" team. > > > > First, the principal members of the "OuR" team are, in alphabetical > > order, Frank Kosdon, Phil Prior, Paul Robinson, and Jim Rosson. These > > dedicated souls spent two years of dedicated research and effort, not > > to mention tens of thousands of dollars, to build and fly the "OuR" > > project. > > > > The R motor is a proprietary engine design with the propellant > > provided by Frank Kosdon. It was 10.5" in diameter and contained > > almost 300 pounds of propellant, including a 21 pound, full diameter > > delay "cake" for tracking. It was calculated to burn for 10.5 > > seconds, and provide 285,000 Newtons of total impulse. Yes, in > > rocketeer terms an R27,000! > > > > The airframe was 21 feet long, with a 5 to 1 conical nose. The gross > > launch mass was about 700 pounds. On board was a ten watt video > > downlink, provided by Jon Dunbar, a Trimble GPS, video overlay and > > associated electronics, provided by Bob Rau, and various other backup > > electronics. Both main and drouge parachutes were provided by Bob > > Stroud. > > > > The rocket was launched in almost no winds, pointing a few degrees > > away from the town of Gerlach, NV for safety reasons. The rocket flew > > perfectly straight and the motor functioned flawlessly with a total > > activity time around 12 to 14 seconds. The rocket coasted for about > > 80 seconds, slightly more than calculated, into the ozone layer. The > > altitude simulations pointed to an expected altitude of just under > > 100,000 feet. With the increased activity time and increased coast > > time, the altitude most likely exceeded 100,000 feet. > > > > One highlight of this flight was the video data transmitted back to > > earth from approximately twenty miles in the sky. What was seen was a > > clear outline of the entire Black Rock Dessert and the surrounding > > terrain, the curvature of the earth, and the great blackness of the > > space. > > > > Higher altitudes are accessible by smaller rockets, but the intent of > > this project was to successfully build and fire a "large" rocket > > motor. Previously, only commercial enterprises have had success with > > motors of over four inches in diameter and the results of last year's > > BALLS launch support this presumption. Furthermore, the instruments > > carried aloft simply would not fit in say a 54mm "altitude optimized" > > motor. > > > > Unfortunately, the rocket failed to deploy its recovery systems and > > accelerated to over Mach 1 and impacted into the sand dunes several > > miles away. There was a loud sonic boom heard by all that literally > > shook the earth. In fact, instead of the nominal "hole and fin slits" > > seen in previous impacts, there was a twenty foot diameter area with > > large chunks of sheared earth as if a high energy charge had been > > detonated under the ground. The rocket was not recovered, but several > > pieces of metal, fiberglass, and burnt Nomex were found indicating the > > ejection charges did in fact fire. > > > > As more data is analyzed, and more hard facts are gathered, more > > information will follow. Furthermore, the rights to the video are in > > the negotiation stage with the various film crews present, but do > > expect a very detailed video from Earl Cagle of Point 39 Productions. > > > > Once again, the "OuR" Project members wish to express sincere thanks > > to all those who listened, donated, and gave their support who were > > not specifically named. This project would not have flown if were not > > for the "believers" and the tremendous team spirit. Only they know > > the sweat and the number of hours it takes to fly such a rocket. > > > > Members of the "OuR" Team > > ----------------- > Stu Barrett > e-mail: stu(a)zilker.net > Phone: 512-255-6052 > > "Out the transceiver, down the coax, through the router, down the > fiber, off another router, down the T1, past the firewall.....nothing > but Net." >

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SCO giving free licenses to UNIX OpenServer
by Scottauge＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hit www.sco.com Pick What's New Look for UNIX Unbound. Read, Understand, and Delight... Microsoft maybe in trouble at last. This is for single user home based UNIX systems. Was announced August 19, don't know how long this is to happen.

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Real or Not ?
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I snagged this off a news group this AM.. comments?? A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and that the NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it can be a deadly mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of Craig Steingold was arrested _one day_ before he and others where to stage a protest at government buildings; the police had a copy of a message sent by Steingold to another activist, a message which had been encrypted with PGP and sent through E-mail. Since version 2.1, PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") has been rigged to allow the NSA to easily break encoded messages. Early in 1992, the author, Paul Zimmerman, was arrested by Government agents. He was told that he would be set up for trafficking narcotics unless he complied. The Government agency's demands were simple: He was to put a virtually undetectable trapdoor, designed by the NSA, into all future releases of PGP, and to tell no-one. After reading this, you may think of using an earlier version of PGP. However, any version found on an FTP site or bulletin board has been doctored. Only use copies acquired before 1992, and do NOT use a recent compiler to compile them. Virtually ALL popular compilers have been modified to insert the trapdoor (consisting of a few trivial changes) into any version of PGP prior to 2.1. Members of the boards of Novell, Microsoft, Borland, AT&T and other companies were persuaded into giving the order for the modification (each ot these companies' boards contains at least one Trilateral Commission member or Bilderberg Committee attendant). It took the agency more to modify GNU C, but eventually they did it. The Free Software Foundation was threatened with "an IRS investigation", in other words, with being forced out of business, unless they complied. The result is that all versions of GCC on the FTP sites and all versions above 2.2.3, contain code to modify PGP and insert the trapdoor. Recompiling GCC with itself will not help; the code is inserted by the compiler into itself. Recompiling with another compiler may help, as long as the compiler is older than from 1992.

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Re: Spamming (fwd)
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From daemon Sun Aug 25 06:35:39 1996 Message-Id: <199605140403.EAA00545(a)fountainhead.net> Subject: Re: Spamming To: jad(a)dsddhc.com (John Deters) Date: Tue, 14 May 1996 04:03:55 +0000 (GMT) Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960822220224.006a0ff0@labg30> from "John Deters" at Aug 22, 96 05:02:24 pm From: Vipul Ved Prakash <vipul(a)pobox.com> Reply-To: vipul(a)pobox.com X-Organization: Positive Ideas Content-Type: text Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk X-Status: > > At 02:55 PM 8/22/96 +0000, Vipul Ved Prakash wrote: > >> > >> At 06:09 PM 8/20/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: > [deleted] > >> 1. Junkmail requires the SENDER to pay for it, not the recipient. > > Internet pricing models are complicated and debatable, but you surely > > end up paying for snail-junk-mail. Not directly, but hidden in the high > > first-class mail costs. More mail, more infrastructure, higher costs. > > This could be quite true for the net also, if we consider bandwidth costs > > money. > > I beg to differ. The USPS considers "junk" mail their bread-and-butter. > Huge mailings of all manner of bulk mail (especially those that are PostNet > barcoded by the sender) pay the bills around the Post Office. Your "more > mail, more infrastructure, higher costs" argument is flawed. The post > office has many fixed costs related to maintaining their huge presence, > delivering to so many rural addresses. If we had to pay a per-letter basis > *discounting* the value provided by the infrastructure already in place > supporting the bulk-mail handling systems, we'd be paying roughly Federal > Express 2-day letter rates for each piece of mail (around $6.00, if memory > serves correctly.) Alright, I agree. Though this could very easily differ with size and reach of a PS. But on the net it means more bandwidth right? Which means more bandwidth, and more money. Hang on. This might not be a problem in US (as jim bell points out there is tons of untapped bandwith), but it is in other not so well connected countries. For example, if somebody spams an Indian Network from india, the spam goes to US and comes back to india (since our govt sayz you cant connect 2 local networks!) and eats up most of the 20 MBps bandwidth. Gov't will buy more bandwidth and will make us pay for it! - Vipul

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ALERT: Sen. Kerry, who voted FOR THE CDA, will be online tonight to chat! (8/28/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================ __ _________ __ \ \ / /_ _\ \ / / HELP EDUCATE SENATOR KERRY ONLINE! \ \ / / | | \ \ /\ / / AT THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION ONLINE CHAT \ V / | | \ V V / ON AUGUST 28, 1996 -- 4PM CDT/5PM EST \_/ |_| \_/\_/ SENATOR KERRY, WHO VOTED FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, WILL BE ONLINE! PLEASE ATTEND AND EDUCATE HIM ABOUT SMART NET POLICY! DO NOT DISTRIBUTE AFTER SEPTEMBER 1, 1996 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of contents What's New Why you should join these chats Chat schedule Getting chat software ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT'S NEW Senator John Kerry, who voted in favor of the Communications Decency Act and who has been dragging his feet on the encryption issue in the Senate Commerce Committee, is on the Democratic Convention Chat schedule for this Wednesday, 4pm CDT (5pm EST). Like many Senators, John Kerry's views are a combination of his personal opinions, plus his perception of his constituencies' opinion. When he voted IN FAVOR OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, he was not listening to his constituency very well. The high tech community of Cambridge must make him understand that bad Internet policy, like the Communications Decency Act, can kill this industry, causing us to lose our jobs and the state to lose a valuable industry. Although Sen. Kerry shouldn't be let off the hook for voting of the CDA, he needs to be shown that in hindsight, this was a terrible vote. Hostility will not change his mind though, so please don't ask questions like, "Senator, what the heck were you thinking when you voted for this stupid bill which everyone knew was unconstitutional?" Questions like these will just cause him to wrap himself in a "protecting children" speech. Instead, why not try questions like, "Senator, don't you think that enough has changed in the past several months that would suggest that parents are really the best ones to control their kids access to the net? Would you still vote for the CDA today?" "Senator, don't you agree laws such as the CDA are really a poor second to a little bit of plain old parenting? If more parents were to learn about the net, would there still be a need for the CDA?" "Senator, I surf the net with my 10-year-old. I think that's a far better cry than the CDA. What could we do to encourage more parents to take this approach, rather than passing laws that harm Massachusetts businesses and freedom of speech?" Know that the urge to flame him for his vote on the CDA will be strong. It should be, it was a terrible position for someone from such an incredibly net-savvy state. No matter how you view politics, it was a poor move. It angers both the business and public. Please do not flame him, instead try to change his mind. It is imperative that the net community come out and show him this is a very serious issue for us, and that we won't forget his position on this. Remember, the chat is at 4pm CDT, which is 5PM EST. Please show up early, as this is likely to be a very full chat. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHY YOU SHOULD JOIN THESE CHATS The Democratic convention's online chat program has begun! It's crucial that Netizens make net concerns a high profile issue in the online chats this year. You can do this by showing up and simply asking the right questions. Does the candidate think the Communications Decency Act is an effective method of shielding kids from material online, or parental control? Does the candidate support the use of privacy-enhancing encryption technology? Does the candidate support program such as THOMAS, that put government info in the hands of the people? If you don't ask these questions, they'll never know we care. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CHAT SCHEDULE [Notably missing from this schedule are Senators Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) and Russell Feingold (D-WI) and House member Jerrold Nadler (D-NY). All three have impeccable cyberspace credentials and we look forward to seeing them online.] All chats take place at http://ichat.dncc96.org:4080/ Monday 08/26/96 - 4:20pm CDT Governor Lawton Chiles 08/26/96 - 7:15pm CDT House Candidate Michela Alioto 08/26/96 - 10:30pm CDT Congressman Bill Richardson Tuesday 08/27/96 - 9:00am CDT Senate Candidate Houston Gordon 08/27/96 - 5:00pm CDT Congresswoman Nita Lowey Wednesday 08/28/96 - 9:00am CDT - Senate Candidate Houston Gordon 08/28/96 - 10:00am CDT - Governor Gaston Caperton 08/28/96 - 3:00pm CDT - Senator John D Rockefeller IV ----> 08/28/96 - 4:00pm CDT - Senator John Kerry 08/28/96 - 4:30pm CDT - Senator Harry Reid 08/28/96 - 9:30pm CDT - Representative Corrine Brown Thursday 08/29/96 - 10:30am CDT - Senate Candidate Houston Gordon 08/29/96 - 2:30pm CDT - Senator Kent Conrad 08/29/96 - 3:30pm CDT - Representative Eliot Engel 08/29/96 - 6:00pm CDT - Representative Barney Frank 08/29/96 - 7:00pm CDT - Senators Boxer & Murray Don't miss this opportunity to question the newsmakers on net issues such as free speech and privacy! We have to ensure that they feel appreciated for standing up for Net issues. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- GETTING CHAT SOFTWARE The Democratic Convention has chosen iChat's chat software for their interface. To obtain a copy, simply follow the links from the main convention homepage at http://www.dncc96.org/ to the software section. ### ============================================================================

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Re: AFDA Web Site
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Aug 28 09:08:59 1996 > MEMORANDUM > > SUBJECT: AFDA Web site, located at: http://www.afda.org > > In September, the Web site for the Association of Federal Defense > Attorneys > (AFDA) will become password-protected for members only. Those of you > who > have paid your membership dues for 1996 will be receiving an email > message > containing a User ID and Password, which will be good through December > 31, > 1997 -- almost a year and a half of unlimited usage for the small > membership Okay, so are they going to encrypt the email, or should I go ahead and make arrangements to steal a message :-) Dave Merriman - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- PGP Email welcome, encouraged, and PREFERRED. Visit my web site at http://www.shellback.com/p/merriman for my PGP key and fingerprint "What is the sound of one hand clapping in a forest with no one there to hear it?" I use Pronto Secure (tm) PGP-fluent Email software for Windows -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMiOcLsVrTvyYOzAZAQG4XAQAnNHZtuU5rB9cttuP4xIJ16N/XO3Ds6+L k4sS0w0I8+Rm+0Py9kYf3en3I9oPrP8fuQxXefBtlTO9FltWrApSR5otgO1LJtX6 EzYtDcXnXwD7nRZ74efLFktn5DXG4xODIFT0fRWbohZOkukh6ePheWWnOiPc+nFr e8hXmqO7KWk= =IfoC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Crypto-related (sort of) Dilbert
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Aug 28 09:17:30 1996 For those that haven't seen it - the Dilbert page has a kind-of crypto-related comic at http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/dilbert/ Dave Merriman - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- PGP Email welcome, encouraged, and PREFERRED. Visit my web site at http://www.shellback.com/p/merriman for my PGP key and fingerprint "What is the sound of one hand clapping in a forest with no one there to hear it?" I use Pronto Secure (tm) PGP-fluent Email software for Windows -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMiOeL8VrTvyYOzAZAQEEIwQAms06+S3+2NGhh18vgC2sHQ7/tOsry5i1 BPAPVo2guBfHMNhtCaof0mie/wsv6mKoESz8HwtRdSZTOLUtGntsS4TQxfEgdkFA bDJxdC1bathMcgSw2He/pU+KldModPh3BGGzoQjAlkQPyE/15boDJUrZyW2rKphI wLWekKCd+1w= =J/2x -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Scoring Politicians on Digital Liberty Issues (Re: Net Politics)
by jseiger＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:38 PM 8/27/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >(I have no idea where the virtual nexus of this debate is taking place... [the 'virtual nexus' of this debate is actually on fight-censorship <http://www.eff.org/~declan/fight-censorship/>. Somehow it got cross posted to c'punks. Though I know it is annoying, I am cc'ing this to c'punks but I will keep all further replies to fight-censorship] >I think it laudable that CDT has chosen to remain in D.C. to "work within >the system." Personally, I could never stomach doing this. Thanks. Sometimes I need to throw back a few bottles of Pepto (or something a little harder), but working in DC is sometimes rewarding and always exciting. <...> >On the specific issue of whether Sen. Leahy is or is not a "friend of the >Net," to use him as an example here, I suggest a different approach. >Instead of classifying Leahy as a friend or an enemy, or Burns as a friend >or an enemy, etc., why not a *ratings system*? A very solid suggestion. I think this is a good idea for a lot of reasons, not the least of which is that it would help define our issues for the Congress, the Administration, the press, and the rest of the country. Partly because it's true and partly because we are not as well organized as we could be, the perception of the net.community on Capitol Hill is of a less-than-unified body politic. This idea could help to change that attitude if it is done right. <...> >The issues for a scorecard might be accumulated on the Net, with inputs >from CDT, VTW, EFF, Cypherpunks, and other interested groups. It could be >messy, but perhaps not. Even a *simple* set of principles, picked by almost >any of these organizations, would likely be enough to get a reasonable >scoring system...it's not as if we all don't know that Leahy's support for >the Digital Telephony Bill was a major downcheck--whatever the realpolitik >issues were--and that his support of Pro-Code is a major upcheck. The value >of scoring is that it takes out the often-painful issues of classifying >politicians as "friends" or "enemies." I remember 2 years ago (I think?) VTW did something like this. As I recall, the only issue was Digital Telephony, and every member of Congress (save 2 or 3) got an F. IMHO, this was not as effective as it could have been, but it was a good start. Our issues are much more front-and-center than they were in 94, so this time around perhaps such and effort will have more impact. As far as I know, VTW is gearing up to do this again, though I haven't spoken to Shabbir about his plans. If he or anyone else is seriously considering doing this, I am certainly happy to contribute some time and a few ideas to the effort. Jonah ** THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH ONLINE CONTINUES TO THE SUPREME COURT ** It's not too late to be a part of history -- Join the Lawsuit <http://www.cdt.org/ciec> -- <ciec-info(a)cdt.org> -- Jonah Seiger, Policy Analyst Center for Democracy and Technology <jseiger(a)cdt.org> 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 PGP Key via finger (v) +1.202.637.9800 http://www.cdt.org/ (f) +1.202.637.0968 http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

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Re: Today's Dilbert
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:12 AM 8/22/96 -0400, you wrote: >I can't believe nobody mentioned wednesday's dilbert cartoon.. Because we missed it in the papers and were waiting for it to show up on the web site? http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/dilbert/archive/dilbert960821-9577.gif # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Reassign Authority!

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Re: SCO giving free licenses to UNIX OpenServer
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When SCO is as good as Linux with all the free support I'll waste the bandwidth or the $15 for the CD

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[Noise] Re: SCO giving free licenses to UNIX OpenServer
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Free evaluation is hardly a threat. "SCO today announced plans to provide a free license to use its popular UNIX systems, including SCO OpenServer and SCO UnixWare, to anyone in the world who wants to use them for educational and non-commercial use to enable the evaluation and understanding of UNIX systems." Hmmmmm. I don't even think that could qualify as a threat to Linux let alone Microsoft. The rest of "Unix Unbound" reads like an overpriced, underexperienced marketeer wetdream filled with empowering bold moves, 20 years of this and 60 billion of that. The comparison with AT&T's similar move 25 years ago is essential market-speak. Any student of posturing should study this. At 08:05 AM 8/28/96 -0400, you wrote: >Hit www.sco.com > >Pick What's New > >Look for UNIX Unbound. > >Read, Understand, and Delight... Microsoft maybe in trouble at last. > >This is for single user home based UNIX systems. > >Was announced August 19, don't know how long this is to happen. >

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Re: File System Encryption
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 27 Aug 1996 09:01:03 -0500 (CDT), Douglas R. Floyd wrote: >> I'm aware of the three main disk encryption programs SFS, SECDRV, and >> SECDEV, but I need to find a solution that works with Windows 95 32bit >> or Windows NT 4.0. >> >> I'm currently using SFS 1.17 and Secure Drive under Win-95, but am >> unable to continue to work in dos compatability mode due to severe >> performance hits. I am open to commercial products that have passed >> peer review, but know of none. >> >> If anyone could suggest a solution (outside of switching OS's), I >> would be *most* gratefull. >> >> Please respond to the list, as I am a subscriber under another >> account. > >If you have another 386 or 486 lying around, you could install Linux and >Ian's encrypted loopback code on a remote box, then NFS or Samba the >filesystem over. For protection, you could modify the vlock command to >lock the console (and not unlock it), and disable inetd. Then, unless Better yet, patch some stuff onto a spare power supply cable so that a small siren would go off on a reboot and then use those security bolts to hold the case on. That would probably discourage someone from rebooting off a floppy. >someone has the permissions to access the files through the network, the >files are inaccessable ;-). Neat idea, and a great use for all the linux security patches we've heard about. / If you think education is expensive, try ignorance. / Home: Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp / Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY" / Work: cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 | (619)689-6579 / Member in good standing of the GNU whirled hors d'oeuvre

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[NOISE]Re: stego virus aka Intro to Computers 101
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

trying not to be technical Excecuting a program involves putting commands into the CPU. Move data such as a GIF or a JPEG is not anywhere near the same. GIF, JPEGs, TIFFs, WAVs, AUs, MPEGs are data. Not executables. At 07:56 PM 8/28/96 -0400, you wrote: > If a virus is embedded into a giff ,is it executed when the giff is or >does it require the usual overwriting etc methods to execute it? > TIA > >

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Other nations' bad laws and crypto/GAK ...
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A legal concern about GAK ... What would be the basis for each and every request for GAK keys from other nations? What sort of process would decide which purposes are okay for which to grant access to GAK keys? What if it is to enforce this new Malaysian law against Karaoke (say, because someone was importing karaoke equipment to Malaysia)? It seems like we should not be supporting other nations' repressive laws. Is each and every GAK key to be granted to be carefully reviewed for concerns on national security/foreign policy/repressive law/stupid law? If so, then it seems like a huge government beaurocracy will have to be created just to handle proper review of GAK requests. Ern -------- From Nando Times ... CONCERNED MALAYSIAN STATE RULES AGAINST KARAOKE Copyright © 1996 Nando.net Copyright © 1996 Reuter Information Service KUALA LUMPUR (Aug 28, 1996 10:35 a.m. EDT) - Citing concerns about moral decay, the central Malaysian state of Selangor will close all illegal video games outlets and karaoke lounges from September 1, the national Bernama news agency reported on Wednesday. Licensed video games arcades will also be closed on expiry of their licences while the licensing conditions for karaoke lounges have been tightened, Bernama quoted Selangor's Chief Minister Muhammad Muhamad Taib as saying. As in many Asian countries, karaoke has become a popular recreation, resulting the mushrooming of lounges in many of Malaysia's cities. Officially Moslem Malaysia is vigilant for any erosion of moral standards among its youth. ... [ SNIP ] ...

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DoJ is poking around
by skeeve＠skeeve.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Im running a mirror of the DoJ site on http://www.skeeve.net/doj/ It has had some 14000 hits or so since I put it up.. so I installed a stats package to see where they were coming from... low and behold! US Government wdcsun1.usdoj.gov 09:07:07 /doj/ wdcsun1.usdoj.gov unknown - [28/Aug/1996:09:07:07 +1000] "GET /doj/ HTTP/1.0" 20 0 8416 also US Military palisade.spacecom.af.mil 07:21:50 /doj/ 08:30:51 /doj/ looks like the DoJ have been looking around at the mirrors.. maybe to legally hassle people about them.... Well since Im not in the US.. good luck DoJ anyone else been probed by the Doj? -------------------------------------------------------------------- Skeeve Stevens Email: skeeve(a)skeeve.net CEO/The Big Boss/All round nice guy URL: http://www.skeeve.net/ MyInternet Australian Anglicans Online http://www.myinternet.net/ http://www.anglican.asn.au/ Phone: (+612) 869-3334 Mobile: (0414) SKEEVE [+61414-753-383] Key fingerprint = D2 7E 91 53 19 FE D0 5C DE 34 EA AF 7A 5C 4D 3E

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Re: Bullshit or Not ?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:57 AM 8/28/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >I snagged this off a news group this AM.. comments?? > >A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and that the >NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it can be a >deadly mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of Craig Steingold >was arrested _one day_ before he and others where to stage a protest at >government buildings; the police had a copy of a message sent by Steingold >to another activist, a message which had been encrypted with PGP and sent >through E-mail. This is quite bogus. The first clue is the mention of "Craig Stiengold". A variation of "Craig Shergold" a widely known (and misspelled) urban legend. This has been debunked a number of times. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Cypherpunks Home Page
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can't get to the cypherpunks web page. Have been trying for last two daz, seems that the WWW server has decided not to respond. - Vipul -- Vipul Ved Prakash Voice 91 11 2247802 <vipul(a)pobox.com> Fax 91 11 3328849 Web Development, PERL Scripting, Cognitive Comuting, TCP/IP, Linux, Cryptography and Internet Security

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Re: SCO giving free licenses to UNIX OpenServer
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 28 Aug 1996 08:37:26 -0700 (PDT), Eric Murray wrote: >> Hit www.sco.com >> Pick What's New >> >> Look for UNIX Unbound. >> >> Read, Understand, and Delight... Microsoft maybe in trouble at last. >I doubt it. People don't use Microsoft products because >of their quality or functionality. OTOH, it might get people to play around with another alternative to NT. >> This is for single user home based UNIX systems. >Single-user UNIX isn't all that useful. >Linux and FreeBSD are both free, and come with source code. >You can get "commercial" versions of Linux for around $30 >(that's on CDROM). You can get support for Linux, and probably >for FreeBSD. True. However, if you have odd-ball hardware (like my RAID controller) it *will* come with an SCO driver. I'd have to write my own to use it under Linux. / If you think education is expensive, try ignorance. / Home: Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp / Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY" / Work: cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 | (619)689-6579 / Member in good standing of the GNU whirled hors d'oeuvre

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Re: Real or Not ?
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a vulture investor in pgp.com I heartily endorse Paul's aggressive cooperation with the Feds. Would not have trusted him with my tax-haven wealth had he not had the balls to fight the gov to build his rep and then wisely get in bed for the loving. That's how we gonna leverage PGP's worldwide trust to make lotsa dough like all the patriotic giants of computer boom-boom-boom -- fake-fight the gov and betray, betray, betray the stupes. Don't waste your life being a principled, poor outsider. Dive deep into the shit with the titanic buzzards of the industry. It'll make your drooling alma mater and yo sweet juicy momma call you a genius.

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In reference to comments made to me and to the Group
by Barry C. Collin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This message was in response to comments made by E. Allen Smith on my recent remarks on cyberterrorism. Dear Mr. Smith: Thank you for your perspectives. Save for the irrelevant flaming, I appreciated your taking time. Following are my comments. >>Terrorism to CyberTerrorism > >> The face of terrorism is changing. While the motivations remain the >> same, we are now facing new and unfamiliar weapons. The intelligence >> systems, tactics, security procedures and equipment that were once >> expected to protect people, systems, and nations, are powerless >> against this new, and very devastating weapon. Moreover, the methods >> of counter-terrorism that our world's specialists have honed over the >> years are ineffectual against this enemy. Because, this enemy does not >> attack us with truckloads of explosives, nor with briefcases of Sarin >> gas, nor with dynamite strapped to the bodies of fanatics. This enemy >> attacks us with one's and zero's, at a place we are most vulnerable: >> the point at which the _physical _and _virtual _worlds converge. Let >> us first define theses two domains. > > Ever since the dawn of technological civilization, we've been vulnerable >to terrorism inflicted by those with technological knowledge and intelligence. >Ever since someone discovered how to produce poisonous gases, we've been >vulnerable to attacks such as those in the Japanese subways. Ever since the >electrification of countries, we've been vulnerable to attacks on power >production and distribution systems. Ever since most vehicles became >petroleum-powered, we've been vulnerable to attacks on petroleum production and >distribution systems. Ever since we found out how to cultivate anthrax, we've >been vulnerable to any competent bacteriologist. These are all different tools. Some are simple to create and deploy, some are not. While the definition of classical terrorism (and its motivations) remain the same, we must study each of these tools separately if we are to understand how to detect, prevent, and respond to the threats. > All the above is is Information Super-Highway hype. Thank you for your opinion. >[...] > >>Achieving CyberTerrorist Goals > >> So how does a CyberTerrorist achieve his mission? Like any terrorist, >> a CyberTerrorist actively exploits the goals of the target population >> in areas in which they take for granted. > >> There are three potential acts in CyberTerrorism at the point of >> convergence: >> * 1.Destruction; >> * 2.Alteration; and >> * 3.Acquisition and retransmission (these are a unit). > > I would point out that many instances of the last (I would guess you refer to >the getting and distribution of, say, ITAR-restricted information - you do >accuse crackers of complicity in "CyberTerrorism" by breaking military >security) are not, properly speaking, terrorism; they are instead the >distribution of information that should not be restricted. You guessed incorrectly; I'm not talking ITAR. Test yourself: Can you think of any sensitive or personal information, that if exposed or utilized, could cause terror -- or destabilization? If you can't, you are not trying; you should know more than most the value of privacy, whether it be military, corporate, or personal. >One person's >terrorist is another person's freedom fighter (I'd call both sides in >Nicaragua's Sandanista-Contra conflict terrorists). This nifty statement frequently comes from people who've never seen a child blown up, seen people disfigured, seen property damaged beyond all recognition. Perhaps it is a safe place in your office, Mr. Smith, behind your terminal judging other's thoughts. I don't have that luxury. I've spent more than anyone's fair share of time going through rubble, identifying pieces of what were once people, and telling their families. Freedom fighters who kill random and innocent victims are terrorists and cowards. If you feel otherwise, Mr. Smith, perhaps it is time to step out into harm's way, and then perhaps you too will waken in the night with the images that haunt me. *Then* you can talk to me about such matters. Until then, stick to coding. > >[...] > >>Potential CyberTerrorist Acts > >[...] > >> * A CyberTerrorist will attack the next generation of air traffic >> control systems, and collide two large civilian aircraft. This is >> a realistic scenario, since the CyberTerrorist will also crack the >> aircraft's in-cockpit sensors. Much of the same can be done to the >> rail lines. > > Only a bloody utter idiot would build such systems without enough >backups to avoid these problems; they could come about through computer bugs >or component failures as well. Networked systems are notorious for going down >(see the recent happenings with AOL, for instance); they're _going_ to have >backups if anyone intelligent is running them. Of course, you may have a point >with a government-controlled air traffic controller systems. > The same can be said of most of your other scenarios. These require more than once person be involved. Do not kid yourself, we are not dealing with stupid people here. And bloody utter idiots we have a-plenty -- too many administrators more concerned with their balance sheets to provide the tools people like you need to build safe systems. You'd be surprised of the amount of criminally-inadequate systems out there. That's why it _is_ important that folks like you push the envelope to better the systems. The goal here, Mr. Smith, is to put me out of business, not by flames, but by helping to build better systems. I think we share that goal. > >>CyberTerrorists: Who, Where, and Why? > >> The purpose of this paper is to help you understand the threats that >> exist, and hopefully, to help you prevent these types of atrocities. >> But know this - there are people out there with very different goals, >> who are our real threats, and who are, or will be, attacking us. Make >> no mistake, _the threats are real, today___.__ > > Most people with technical knowledge have a pretty large motivation to >keep the technical society going. One, the loss of it would make our knowledge >useless. Two, we have enough contact with technology and science to want it to >continue - how many neo-Luddite engineers do you know? The Unabomber is the >main exception... and even he didn't use his main area of knowledge in his >bombings. We are not concerned with engineers. We are concerned with fanatics, and fanatics are fanatics whether they are engineers or gardeners. Do not be so naive to believe that everyone shares the morals you have. Mr. Smith, there are people out there who want you dead, and will use all the techniques you pointed out above to accomplish their goal. As I said before, technology is just another tool. >> Who are the CyberTerrorists? There a great many poor movies and too >> many works of fiction about the hacker and cracker communities. In the >> popular media, there recently was the Kevin Mitnick incident, where >> one cracker broke into another cracker's systems. This spawned endless >> press and at least two best selling books. While this incident >> received much attention, the events amounted to meaningless children's >> games. > > I'd agree with that, from what I know of the Mitnick incident(s). I'm >not sure if Shinomura (sp?) should be called a cracker; others with more >knowledge can comment on this. Agreed. >> By and large, the cracker community, based primarily in the United >> States, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and in the nations of the >> former Soviet Union, is composed of individuals who see the cracking >> process merely as a challenge, a brain teaser, a puzzle. They view >> themselves as not only being innocent of any crime, but perhaps even >> doing something righteous, something to counter the dark monoliths of >> the corporate and government worlds. They believe they are being >> persecuted. These individuals believe that what they are doing is not >> doing any true damage. At its least harmful, these crackers just look >> at information. However, privacy issues and military secrecy can >> render such infiltrations acts of terror. > > Often, military secrecy is just an excuse to not allow information >damaging to governments, etcetera from getting out. With NSC involvement, how >deeply do you think the Iran-Contra dealings were classified? I would, however, >agree with you about privacy issues... but governments are far greater threats >in this regard than all the crackers in the world. Much of the information in >question would not be around in so many places (such as notoriously accessible >government databanks) except for governments gathering information they >shouldn't have in the first place. Whether you are right or wrong about what governments have locked away is not in my work area. As I've said, my work is in fanatics, the disenfranchised, etc. People are people, and some turn rogue. It happens. And people are purchased. My work keeps me entrenched in such mire regularly. > >[...] > >>Crackers as Facilitators > >[...] > >> Historically, individuals engaged in the practice of terror tended not >> to be people working upon a computer 20 hours per day. Terrorists have >> not been in the business of tracking the latest holes found in UNIX or >> an obscure government telnet opportunity. There _are _people, however, >> who are in that business - for illicit as well as good cause. As >> stated, just as indigenous people may be turned into soldiers, so can >> crackers be turned into CyberTerrorists. Sometimes such a transition >> may be motivated by money or prestige. Usually, this transition will >> occur without the cracker's cognizance. The potential threat from such >> transitions is mind boggling, considering the damage even one >> mis-directed cracker can cause. > > The first statement is correct... and is likely to continue to be the >case. We would appreciate some evidence for such transitions occurring without >cognizance, or indeed being at all likelyLet me know what you do for a living, and then we can share more. Not trying to be "spooky", but understand that my piece of the world rests in the violent world, and I need to watch my own back. > >> Further, as young, educated people are brought into the folds of >> terrorist groups, this new generation will have the talent to execute >> the acts of CyberTerrorism of which we have spoken. > > Unlikely. For state-sponsored terrorism, for instance, countries with >the motivation for such are also ones that tend to block people from computer >experience. Getting on the Internet is rather likely to expose the people in >such countries to information that will destabilize them... including programs >such as PGP that are restricted by ITAR in the name of (among other things) >decreasing terrorism. You might be interested in the number of "students" attending our universities that have solid terrorism backgrounds. The ones I spoke to made their purpose very clear. > >> We are going to see increasing levels of in-house expertise, and >> concomitant exponential increases CyberTerrorism. Unlike other methods >> of terrorism, CyberTerrorism is safe and profitable, and difficult to >> counter without the right expertise and understanding of the >> CyberTerrorist's mind. Combine our increasing vulnerability, with the >> explosive increases in the level of violence, and increasing expertise >> available inside terrorist organizations through new blood popular >> media, there recently was the Kevin Mitnick incident, where one >> cracker broke into another cracker's systems. This spawned endless >> press and at least two best selling books. While this incident >> received much attention, the events amounted to meaningless children's >> games. > > You appear not to be making much sense here, but I'll put it down to >misformatting. Yes, there is a block of text missing. If you have any interest, I can resend. Exactly how is CyberTerrorism profitable? Certainly, it's >_possible_ for people to be _hired_ to do things that may enable some form of >terrorism... but that doesn't make the _terrorism_ any more profitable than >before.It's more profitable since the cost of entry, and continued operations, are less. In addition, access to financial resources (computer crime) is readily available. And you don't lose someone after they've been blown up. > >[...] > >> If a computer security advisor states that you, your organization, and >> your country are safe behind firewalls, behind a system put into place >> by people who have never fought cyberbattles, behind audit trails, >> passwords, and encryption, then a great and dangerous fallacy (or >> fantasy) is being perpetrated upon you. The only solution is the quick >> deployment of a counter-CyberTerrorist - someone who knows what you >> are up against today, someone who lives in the world of the people who >> are, and will be, attacking - someone who can train the people who >> must fight the battles. > > Passwords and encryption can do a very good job of stopping crackers, >thank you - that's one major concern for which they're developed.It's all in the implementation, Mr. Smith. You know that. >Economic and >other espionage are very much already on the minds of those suggesting using >firewalls, passwords, and encryption; they're a lot more experienced, when >the computer community's expertise is summed up, than you are.Again, just because the tools for protection are there, doesn't mean they are properly implemented. You could not possibly be telling me that everything is locked down safely at this point. Bottom line, if you can make it, someone can break it. Always has been, always will be. > In other words, the above just translates into "give us money." Have some idea of what you speak before you speak, Mr. Smith. We do not accept funding from the private or public sector. We are all volunteers who research high-intensity crime and low-intensity conflict. When I am not volunteering, my job is to make sure you can safely send out your emails without getting blown away or blown up. > >>Ex Post Facto > >> An effective auditing system will only inform the target manager that >> they have taken a hit; perhaps a fatal hit. By that point, it is too >> late. _Now _is the time to take action. Unfortunately, due to this >> open nature of this document, specific counter-CyberTerrorism measures >> cannot be discussed. Those discussions must be reserved for secured >> facilities. > > Nobody disagrees with that auditing isn't the _only_ method needed; >_everyone_ uses other methods.Watch your generalizations. You'd better tune in to how bad things really are. Remember that old saying about prevention and >cure? > Your claim that you can't discuss security in the open is laughable. >Quite simply, security by obscurity doesn't work; in cryptography, it's one of >the signs of "silicon snake-oil" - which is what this document looks like in >any event. First, making a system obscure motivates a lot of people to try to >find out how it works; intelligent people are curious, and don't like >unnecessary secrets unless they're authoritarians. Second, the less people >know about a system, the less people can spot bugs to be _fixed_ in that >system. I prefer a system that has been tested by as many people as possible, >thank you, particularly if my life may depend on it.Again, I'm not worried about you at your keyboard clicking away and offering opinions. There's more to this than encryption. Take off the blinders, Mr. Smith: encyrption is just one little piece of this puzzle. It comes down to psychology, far more than technology. I appreciate your curiousity, your wish for totally open systems. In a perfect world, or even a sane world, that would be ideal. I would love society to be filled with people like you who believe in improving the state of the art, the pushing of the envelope, etc. But you are not who I deal with every day. Unfortunately, just because you don't see these folks, doesn't mean they are not there. They are not the ones with cutesy handles and who send messages to usenets and such. It's the people off the radar screen, the one's that know better than to go public. I've spent way too much time with these nutcases, and I assure you, Mr. Smith, they are very real. > In other words, go back to the drawing board and find something else to >try to sound a tocsin over. > -AllenOpen up your world, Mr. Smith. There is a whole parallel universe of garbage that exists with yours. Whether or not you believe or understand that is frankly irrelevant to me or my work. But hopefully this will open your eyes to the fact that this is not about evil governments, nor military spookery, nor commercialization, nor fear of crackers. The next time I have to travel to a bomb site, and as I try and figure out what cause could justify the death of someone who just happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, I will not be thinking of you in your office lecturing me on the computer world. Barry C. Collin -- Institute for Security and Intelligence A Non-Profit Research Institution P.O. Box 9877 Stanford, California 94309-9877 USA

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Re: DoJ is poking around
by Will Rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03:42 AM 8/29/96 +1000, Skeeve Stevens wrote: > >Im running a mirror of the DoJ site on http://www.skeeve.net/doj/ > >It has had some 14000 hits or so since I put it up.. so I installed a stats >package to see where they were coming from... > >low and behold! > >US Government >wdcsun1.usdoj.gov > 09:07:07 /doj/ > >wdcsun1.usdoj.gov unknown - [28/Aug/1996:09:07:07 +1000] "GET /doj/ HTTP/1.0" 20 >0 8416 > >also > >US Military >palisade.spacecom.af.mil > 07:21:50 /doj/ > 08:30:51 /doj/ > > >looks like the DoJ have been looking around at the mirrors.. maybe to >legally hassle people about them.... > Or, just maybe, some DoJ employees wanted to see what folks on the outside were doing to tweek their bosses:-)? Reminds me of the *thousands* of hits the "Intel Secrets Page"(http://www.x86.org/) has gotten from users at intel.com since it went up. True, Intel was considering legal action against the site, but there's almost no way all those hits are from Mr. Grove's investigators.... Will Rodger -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMiTHI0cByjT5n+LZAQFObAf9G1fBFETkuWL5mlTmKb2RwLTs/HyTGML7 c8nSdpS+Hsj/I+ofvqUHn07ahulsr+kDLWQmmR3JHFKlT0KCsfydmAn0CvjTVRw+ dyeRTFzxW5fbcmwLBpzmijKllQjoEa7GiM3kUgaGb7MYqssnDoa5YDIA9jYtFvTY 3cKymCiyqNUGWTsskLLAS8zjClIH9q9yF6qq+unY66PyRo44dUGkDH6L1Jd4AOZ6 b/Mgphj3oW59veX/scfxKcLlMAnxvJoLpdlLysJHeU2jhVB/tjRneAxNxZqCTFi8 uVXpPbL568V1xR9uyxmaZbbQqG7+0PgEj+kW5r99zvTZfd0fMd6irA== =EwSd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Real or Not ?
by Osborne, Rick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think we all know this is fake. I saw the original web page out there (search lycos for "pgp crack" to find it) and it originally had an extra line at the end (tactfully ommitted, I see) which said something to the effect of "In case you couldn't tell, this is a joke!" -oz ---------- Subject: Real or Not ? Date: Wednesday, August 28, 1996 7:57AM I snagged this off a news group this AM.. comments?? A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and that the [...]

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Reg E changes
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 28 Aug 1996 11:21:09 -0700 To: rah(a)shipwright.com From: Somebody Subject: Reg E changes Bob, If you have not already done so, please submit a public comment re: the proposed Reg E changes [Docket No. R-0919]. The deadline is September 7th. You may want to announce this to other fans of bearer certs. Thanks to my friends at the Fed, I am in possession of comments already submitted. The opposition is trying to get the Fed to not make the proposed account/non-account based distinction when deciding what is covered under Reg E, but instead use a $ cap. The logic is that there is an account anyway, be it on the card (such as the record of the total on a prepaid card that is used for paying subway fares) or be it at the bank. We need to make sure that the supporters of non-book entry systems make their voices heard. When writing the comment, please include a request to do away with the hard copy signature requirements for opening accounts. If the Fed gets enough requests, they will include it in the next round of proposals. -- Somebody --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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RE: File System Encryption
by Wayne Clerke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Drifter[SMTP:drifter@c2.net] wrote: On Wed, 28 Aug 1996 02:55:20 +0400, Wayne Clerke <wclerke(a)emirates.net.ae> wrote: >Tried secdev? Edgar Swank (author of secdrv) recently posted >that secdev (note, not secdrv) does, in fact, uses 32 bit disk >access with win95. Win95 reports that the secure device is in >compatibility mode, but the host disk (and therefore the secure >volume file) is being accessed in 32 bit (disk) mode. Not sure >what issues there are with '32 bit FILE access' mode here. > >Sounds worth a try though. Please post the results if >you try this. > I have actually had Secure File System, Secure Drive, and Secure Device all installed with mounted volumes at the same time under Win95. However, 32bit file access is not the problem. When you load a TSR in Win95, the operating system forces you into 16bit DOS compatability mode. I'm not a kernal guru so I can't explain all the specifics, but it basically makes 95 act as Win-3.11 and looses multithreading (as it were) and creates serious memory paging problems if you have >32mb installed. You've got this all wrong. Only certain types of TSRs cause this. I'll leave it to an expert and just quote the author of secdrv: Edgar Swank wrote: >For those users of Win95 and SecureDrive who are concerned about loss >of 32-bit disk access, I've recently learned that use of Secure Device > > ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/ibmpc/secdev/secdev14.arj > >instead avoids this requirement. Although the Secure Device virtual >drive is listed as in compatibility mode, the real drives are not so >affected. And since the virtual drive is mapped to a dos file on one >of the real drives, I believe you get 32-bit phyical drive access >there as well, although access is still slowed by CPU time necessary >to encrypt and decrypt. Thanks for the reply though .. and if you need assitance with getting SECDEV working under 95, just drop me a note. Thanks for the offer ... Drifter Regards, EMail: wclerke(a)emirates.net.ae PGP key ID: AEB2546D FP: D663D11E DA19D74F 5032DC7E E001B702 PGP mail welcome. Voice: +971 506 43 48 53 <a href=mailto:wclerke@emirates.net.ae>Wayne Clerke</a> If you're not living on the edge, you're taking up too much space.

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Re: libelous action
by James C. Sewell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:57 AM 8/27/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >I would remind you that each and every sale you make of this product, when >based on material misrepresentation, constitutes a fraud. If made by >wire, as these sales seem they may, they represent wire fraud. That's one >count of fraud and one count of wire fraud. If a check is sent to you via >mail, that's a count of mail fraud to boot. > Wow, imagine what would happen if a bunch of "in-the-know" folks bought a product like this under the claims to strong crypto and then found out they were fooled! With charges like these a guy could get into real trouble. I sure hope Mr. Holt isn't personally accountable. He sounds like a real swell guy. It would be a shame for him to go to prison for what is obviously his misunderstanding of what is cryptographically strong and what is a pitiful excuse for a product. Of course I've never seen his product so I don't know which category it falls into, but it would be a shame. Disclaimer: I may or may not be serious. I have made no direct claims so whose to say what my intentions are in posting this ;\) Jim Sewell - Programmer Tantalus Inc. jims(a)tansoft.com Key West, FL 33040 Amateur Radio: KD4CKQ 801 Eisenhower Drive Compu$erve: 71061,1027 Multi-player computer games

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