December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

North American crypto site -- correction
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Correction: the "front door" to the North American crypto site is http://www.sni.net/~mpj/usa/getcrypt.htm (the /usa was missing in in an earlier post) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Personal Edition iQEVAgUBMuWW/W+Iqt/O4EnZAQHnSAgAmMNA1UcEsd8wTkLz50ayj16t8SCFnfLs y86ZwxUd0aD7PoyMwGXbr2KkY9E9/I+CQAf9P56DbxDSCWWPzZA0Tydy0Zb+yeH1 +hIoFYMJbWi4nj34B1OtiZeNW9QbWxqyD7CUu8gdaRncxM83tsFY9UAQd8+wyV3w IFyrT6MZj+WLNBh1IhzkKTSdJzNW1mool97hm2KHH/nVuSYtBiVixmeTXkyoB5NU NfesjceO9g0PrVl0jW7NE1kOCJteFI2AAEaAKVYLVYvgvEdGSUkO0DnAXzVFCGKv Eb7/Wk0S7YVEFgVfamxsHvu/PoofVnvXX92UtXPhcHmbobqANA/yfg== =2ZhX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Jesus Christ is coming back with power and glory! Are you READY? mailto:mpj@csn.net Bible site-> http://www.sni.net/~mpj Is 40:31 BBS 303-772-1062 PGPprint=3E67A5800DFBD16A 6D52D3A91C074E41

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Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet
by David Wagner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ian Goldberg, Eric Brewer, and I wrote a paper giving a high-level introduction to privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet. Nothing terribly new, but it's about time this stuff made it past oral history and into the literature. To be presented at IEEE COMPCON '97 in February. The paper is available on the web. A html version is at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/privacy-compcon97-www/privacy-html.html and there's a postscript version at http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/privacy-compcon97.ps Comments, critiques, and discussions are welcome.

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GOO_gol
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Richard Crandall, NeXT scientist, writes eloquently on large numbers in February SciAm. He cites cryptographic strength as one result of research on the gargantuan googol and googolplex. He reviews current work on sieve techniques for factorization -- Quadratic, Number Field, Elliptic Curve Method and others -- as well as advanced algorithms. And exclaims: Blaine Garst, Doug Mitchell, Avadis Tevanian, Jr., and I implemented at NeXT what is one of the strongest -- if not the strongest -- encryption schemes available today, based on Mersenne primes. This patented scheme, termed Fast Elliptic Encryption (FEE), uses the algebra of elliptic curves, and it is very fast. ----- GOO_gol Thanks to PJP for pointing.

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about the e-mails that im recibing
by grupo textil glz ruelas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dir, cypher im recibing all your e-mails and i was wondering if you can do something abuot becouse to me all of this is pure yonk. so please do something and stop the e-mails im not a cypherpunk and i dont understan nothing you write ok see you.

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by Scott Marr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by abostick＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended consequences of the V-Chip, the programmable device to be included in next-generation television sets sold in the US that supposedly will allow parents to control their children's access to sex and violence on TV. Gladwell makes an analogy between V-Chipped TV content and air-conditioned cars in the New York City subway system in summertime: " . . . we need air-conditioners on subway cars because air-conditioners on subway cars have made stations so hot that subway cars need to be air-conditioned." Similarly, he argues, "the V-chip is likely to increase the amount of sex and violence on television, not decrease it" because when viewers can block offensive programming, there is far less pressure on broadcasters and cable operators to avoid offending. This is just the sort of thing that John Young is given to scanning and putting up on his Web site or sending out to people who send him email with FUN_nie subject lines. If I were him, I'd put it up. And, for the benefit of those people who don't think the V-Chip isn't in itself on-topic for cypherpunks, I might point out that Gladwell's argument applies equally well to mail filtering with procmail recipes -- or Sandy's and John's list moderation experiment. If the noise level on the unmoderated list jumps to even higher than we were seeing before the moderation began, that would provide observational support to Gladwell's argument. -- Alan Bostick | To achieve harmony in bad taste is the height mailto:abostick@netcom.com | of elegance. news:alt.grelb | Jean Genet http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 18:59:34 +0100 (MET) > From: Asgaard <asgaard(a)Cor.sos.sll.se> > Subject: Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd) > > >The Web does not equal the Internet, straw man argument. > > A semantic comment: > > We here all know that this is right but it's obvious that > the language is sliding towards Internet = Web. Most people Typical modern American attitude, getting it right is too much work so let's lower the benchmark so anyone can be 'right'. You'll be supporting Ebonics next. Blah. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 02:58:41 -0800 > From: Toto <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> > Subject: Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd) > > > If the people in those counties want to give away their freedom that > > is their business (and right), not mine, yours, or this countries unless > > there is evidence they are trying to take their views and impose them here. > > Right. And if someone 'chooses' to give their money to a thief with > a gun, then it is not the business of other people, or the police. > I would hate to interfere with someones 'right' to get robbed, > raped, or murdered. This is a perfect example of why we disagree. You feel society has the same responsibilities as an individual, I don't. Countries and societies are a tightly linked concept because man is a social animal. Trying to equate this to an individual who chooses to ignore the moral, ethical, and legal standards of their society is a non-sequiter. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: [Noise] From The Onion
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> SATAN TO REVISE BAR CODE SYSTEM [snip] Not to be outdone, Satan's major competitor, Choronzon, Chief Demonic Officer and only resident of the accursed 10th Aether of the Enochian System, today announced his own plans for a system to label his mortal followers and regulate their business transactions. "Stamping numbers on the foreheads and hands of individuals is primitive technology," Choronzon explained, snapping his barbed tail, and emitting a sulphurous plume. "We are pleased to announce our plans to identify our followers using digital watermarking technology licensed from RSA Data Security, Inc." Implementation of the scheme, which will involve the encoding of a subtle full-body pattern into each individual by surface ablation with high powered eximer lasers, will be managed by Choronzon's Supreme Legate to the Material World, Jim Bidzos. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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GOO_gol
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Richard Crandall, NeXT scientist, writes eloquently on large numbers in February SciAm. He cites cryptographic strength as one result of research on the gargantuan googol and googolplex. He reviews current work on sieve techniques for factorization -- Quadratic, Number Field, Elliptic Curve Method and others -- as well as advanced algorithms. And exclaims: Blaine Garst, Doug Mitchell, Avadis Tevanian, Jr., and I implemented at NeXT what is one of the strongest -- if not the strongest -- encryption schemes available today, based on Mersenne primes. This patented scheme, termed Fast Elliptic Encryption (FEE), uses the algebra of elliptic curves, and it is very fast. ----- GOO_gol Thanks to PJP for pointing.

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 18:59:34 +0100 (MET) > From: Asgaard <asgaard(a)Cor.sos.sll.se> > Subject: Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd) > > >The Web does not equal the Internet, straw man argument. > > A semantic comment: > > We here all know that this is right but it's obvious that > the language is sliding towards Internet = Web. Most people Typical modern American attitude, getting it right is too much work so let's lower the benchmark so anyone can be 'right'. You'll be supporting Ebonics next. Blah. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 02:58:41 -0800 > From: Toto <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> > Subject: Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd) > > > If the people in those counties want to give away their freedom that > > is their business (and right), not mine, yours, or this countries unless > > there is evidence they are trying to take their views and impose them here. > > Right. And if someone 'chooses' to give their money to a thief with > a gun, then it is not the business of other people, or the police. > I would hate to interfere with someones 'right' to get robbed, > raped, or murdered. This is a perfect example of why we disagree. You feel society has the same responsibilities as an individual, I don't. Countries and societies are a tightly linked concept because man is a social animal. Trying to equate this to an individual who chooses to ignore the moral, ethical, and legal standards of their society is a non-sequiter. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by Alan Bostick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended consequences of the V-Chip, the programmable device to be included in next-generation television sets sold in the US that supposedly will allow parents to control their children's access to sex and violence on TV. Gladwell makes an analogy between V-Chipped TV content and air-conditioned cars in the New York City subway system in summertime: " . . . we need air-conditioners on subway cars because air-conditioners on subway cars have made stations so hot that subway cars need to be air-conditioned." Similarly, he argues, "the V-chip is likely to increase the amount of sex and violence on television, not decrease it" because when viewers can block offensive programming, there is far less pressure on broadcasters and cable operators to avoid offending. This is just the sort of thing that John Young is given to scanning and putting up on his Web site or sending out to people who send him email with FUN_nie subject lines. If I were him, I'd put it up. And, for the benefit of those people who don't think the V-Chip isn't in itself on-topic for cypherpunks, I might point out that Gladwell's argument applies equally well to mail filtering with procmail recipes -- or Sandy's and John's list moderation experiment. If the noise level on the unmoderated list jumps to even higher than we were seeing before the moderation began, that would provide observational support to Gladwell's argument. -- Alan Bostick | To achieve harmony in bad taste is the height mailto:abostick@netcom.com | of elegance. news:alt.grelb | Jean Genet http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick

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Re: fingerd
by Steven L Baur 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow writes: >> > Couple of things you can do: >> > 2. Install a more secure "fingerd" such that it only >> > allows "finger `userid(a)node.domain`" instead of >> > "finger `(a)node.domain`". > cfingerd can be gotten from: cfingerd is not a safe program. It must run as root, and has some big problems. Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 18:34:43 +0200 (MET DST) From: Janos Farkas <chexum(a)shadow.banki.hu> To: Administrador da Rede <admrede(a)opensite.com.br> cc: linux-security(a)tarsier.cv.nrao.edu Subject: Re: Finger Doubt Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.95.960918181033.2523A-100000(a)shadow.banki.hu> Howdy people! On Tue, 17 Sep 1996, Administrador da Rede wrote: > I use the newest version of cfinger, setted to not allow general finger, just > specific ones. Does anyone knows how this person did that ? I hope I can > find out, otherwise, bye bye finger service. Badly. I have sent the author a letter, but never got any reply back (it's 3 months later now!), so I just take the opportunity to warn the public against its use. Excerpts from the source (1.2.3, older versions have been a bit more directly broken, now it has root privs only at the moments it shouldn't have.) "This daemon must be run as root!" [And unfortunately, does..] ... unlink ("/tmp/fslist"); ... sprintf(st, "%s | tail +2 >> /tmp/fslist", prog_config.finger_program); ... system(st); A similarly terrible one some lines later: system("cat /tmp/fslist | sort > /tmp/fslist.sort"); As it stands, it can allow any local user to destroy any file on the system, including partition tables on disks. Please someone correct me if I am wrong, I tried this with cfingerd-1.2.2 and it allowed me to do bad things. I was a bit disappointed by the lack of any reply from the author, so I think I am now justified to tell that if anyone installed cfingerd (about 1.1 or later) on his system, disable it IMMEDIATELY, until at least the author clarifies this bug in a new version. The current version is BAD. However if you just need a finger daemon, you may take a look at xfingerd, at ftp://ftp.banki.hu:/pub/xfingerd/xfingerd-0.1.tar.gz which is the one I wrote when I got desperate about cfingerd. (If you take a look at its date stamp, you can see that cfingerd is long broken..) I too can't garantee that it's good for you, but it at least doesn't require to be run as root, which is why I started being against cfingerd. I hope this note finds everyone concerned. Janos -- steve(a)miranova.com baur Unsolicited commercial e-mail will be billed at $250/message. Real men aren't afraid to use chains on icy roads.

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RE: Just another government fuckover: New crypto regulations
by Brett Carswell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----Original Message----- >From: Toto [SMTP:toto@sk.sympatico.ca] >Sent: Friday, January 24, 1997 12:29 AM >To: Attila T. Hun >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: Just another government fuckover: New crypto regulations > >Attila T. Hun wrote: > >> free speech, which is what we are talking about. supposedly >> absolute freedom of speech in America was in the Articles of >> Confederation and was a major point of the Declaration of >> Independence. free speach was an "intention" of the Magna Carta. > >> ::> books are an intellectual 'solution' to the problem. the real >> ::>problem is the hardware. in order to negate governments and their >> ::>virtually stated intentions of blocking our inalienable freedoms, >> ::>particularly freedom of speach, we must be able to distribute >> ::>universal crypto worldwide, and be able to improve it as the shadow >> ::>governments of the various spook shows improve their ability to >> ::>break our code. > >Dear Mr. Hun, > I see that your post was expunged from the cypherpunks-politically- >correct-outgoing list. > I am assuming that it was as a result of linking crypto to free >speech. >Perhaps you need to fall more into line with the New List Order. > >Toto > >More likely 'grep dimitri '

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If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before....
by DataETRsch＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

{If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before, we're extremely sorry.} {UDCM's web site may have been under construction during the time you visited.} {UDCM's web site has finished undergoing its changes and will operate correctly.} {UDCM V2.0 has been extensively modified from its previous variation.} {Digital signaturing and public key cryptosystem capabilities have been added.} {UDCM's DS and PKCS techniques do NOT make use of conventional PN factoring.} {UDCM's source code is currently unavailable. PLEASE DO NOT REQUEST IT.} {UDCM's on-line help documentation has also been extensively modified.} {This advertisement has also been modified.} Hello, Greetings! I am Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos, president of DataET Research, Data Engineering Technologies. I am sending you this message to let you know that DataET Research has recently initiated the distribution of UDCM, Universal Data Cryptography Module. UDCM implements a revolutionarily new, extremely advanced and sophisticated, digital data encryption algorithm named IMDMP, Integrated Mathematical Data Manipulation and Positioning. UDCM (the IMDMP algorithm)... o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography. o Contains more than 150 procedures and functions. o Is a very cost-effective size of only 60 kilobytes. o Implements the IMDMP encryption algorithm. o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits. o Includes 18 sub-algorithms. o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files. o Allows multiple encryption layer levels. o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys. o Includes time and date locking features. o Includes file specific unique encryption features. o Includes file authentication guard features. o Includes digital signaturing capabilities. o Implements the public key cryptosystem method of security. o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features. UDCM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed with popular application and database programming languages and environments such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Delphi, OOP Pascal, Turbo Pascal, dBase, Paradox, Access, Sybase, Oracle, etc. DataET Research has released a shareware version of UDCM named UDCM V2.0. To download UDCM V2.0 for free, please go to: http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. I hope you will consider applying UDCM in the software you develop. Thank-you very much for your time. Sincerely, Jeremy K.Yu-Ramos President DataET Research Data Engineering Technologies

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4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
by Mike Reiter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT ENDS JANUARY 31 *** Fourth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Preliminary Technical Program) Zurich, Switzerland April 1-4, 1997 Sponsored by ACM SIGSAC For more information, including registration and hotel information, see: http://www.zurich.ibm.ch/pub/Other/ACMsec/index.html ================ TUESDAY, APRIL 1 ================ 4 half-day tutorials in two parallel tracks: Theory Track Practice Track Morning Cryptography CERT and Practical Network Security Jim Massey, Ueli Maurer Tom Longstaff (ETH Zurich) (Software Engineering Institute) lunch Afternoon Internet Security Info-Wars Refik Molva Paul Karger (Eurecom) (IBM TJ Watson) ================== WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2 ================== 09:00-09:30 Introduction and Opening Comments Richard Graveman (Bellcore) Phil Janson (IBM Zurich Lab) Li Gong (JavaSoft) Clifford Neuman (Univ. of Southern California) 09:30-10:30 Invited talk 1: To Be Announced 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:00 Session 1: Fair Exchange of Information Chair: Philippe Janson (IBM Zurich Lab) * Fair Exchange with a Semi-Trusted Third Party Matthew Franklin, Mike Reiter (AT&T Research) * Optimistic Protocols for Fair Exchange N. Asokan, Matthias Schunter, Michael Waidner (IBM Zurich Lab and Univ. Dortmund) 12:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-15:30 Session 2: Language and System Security Chair: Michael Waidner (IBM Zurich Lab) * Static Typing with Dynamic Linking Drew Dean (Princeton University) * Secure Digital Names Scott Stornetta, Stuart Haber (Surety Technologies) * A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus Martin Abadi, Andrew D. Gordon (DEC SRC and Cambridge) 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00-17:30 Panel 1: Programming Languages as a Basis for Security Chair: Drew Dean (Princeton) Panelists: To Be Announced Welcome Cocktail ================= THURSDAY, APRIL 3 ================= 09:00-10:30 Session 3: Authentication Chair: Ravi Sandhu (George Mason Univ.) * Authentication via Keystroke Dynamics Fabian Monrose, Avi Rubin (New York Univ. and Bellcore) * Path Independence for Authentication in Large-Scale Systems Mike Reiter, Stuart Stubblebine (AT&T Research) * Proactive Password Checking with Decision Trees Francesco Bergadano, Bruno Crispo, Giancarlo Ruffo (Univ. of Turin) 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:00 Invited talk 2: To Be Announced 12:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-15:30 Session 4: Signatures and Escrow Chair: Martin Abadi (DEC SRC) * Verifiable Partial Key Escrow Mihir Bellare, Shafi Goldwasser (UC San Diego and MIT) * New Blind Signatures Equivalent to Factorisation David Pointcheval, Jacques Stern (ENS/DMI, France) * Proactive Public-Key and Signature Schemes Markus Jakobsson, Stanislaw Jarecki, Amir Herzberg, Hugo Krawczyk, Moti Yung (UC San Diego, MIT, IBM Haifa Lab, IBM TJ Watson, and Bankers Trust) 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00-17:30 Panel 2: Persistance and Longevity of Digital Signatures Chair: Gene Tsudik (USC/ISI) Panelists: To Be Announced Banquet Dinner =============== FRIDAY, APRIL 4 =============== 09:00-10:30 Session 5: Commerce and Commercial Security Chair: Jacques Stern (ENS/DMI, France) * A New On-Line Cash Check Scheme Robert H. Deng, Yongfei Han, Albert B. Jeng, Teow-Hin Ngair (National University of Singapore) * Conditional Purchase Orders John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier (Counterpane Systems) * The Specification and Implementation of 'Commercial' Security Requirements including Dynamic Segregation of Duties Simon Foley (University College, Cork, Ireland) 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:30 Session 6: Cryptography Chair: Mike Reiter (AT&T Research) * On the Importance of Securing Your Bins: The Garbage-Man-in-the-Middle Attack Marc Joye, Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Univ. Louvain) * Improved Security Bounds for Pseudorandom Permutations Jacques Patarin (Bull) * Asymmetric Fingerprinting for Larger Collusions Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner (Univ. Hildesheim and IBM Zurich Lab) 12:30 Conference Adjourns

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Re: Commerce Sec. Hearings and Encryption
by Bill Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca wrote: > Bill Campbell wrote: > > > > I have been watching the confirmation hearings for William Daley, > > and I was amazed at the number of references in the questioning > > to encryption. I have been watching confirmation hearings for a long > > time and have never noticed this much attention being placed on such > > a (formerly?) obscure topic. > > It certainly looks like someone is gearing up for a battle in regard > to cryto. > I find it very interesting that there would be a grand battle over > 'exporting' what is already freely available overseas (and always > will be, despite the export laws). This "freely available overseas" concept is a bit overstated. France and other countries are beginning to come down hard on encryption. (Also note the post from the guy in New Zealand on the hassles exporting from his country.) The US now has a "Crypto Ambassador" roaming the world, and I *don't* think he is encouraging an open common encryption standard. > I suppose that a cynic might > be led to believe that perhaps the anti-export champions' agenda > might be to make more convenient for the average joe to just > give in and accept weak, government approved crypto. Cynic or realist, you make the call. <G> The average Joe doesn't even know *why* he needs encryption...at least not yet. =Bill=

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Re: No Dimitri??
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

drose(a)azstarnet.com writes: > William H. Geiger III wrote: > > >I have noticed that there has not been any post from Dimitri in a couple of > >days. > > Yup. Ditto Tim May. Fair trade? No. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"abostick(a)netcom.com" "Alan Bostick" 23-JAN-1997 23:09:54.72 >In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by >Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended >consequences of the V-Chip, the programmable device to be included in >next-generation television sets sold in the US that supposedly will >allow parents to control their children's access to sex and violence on >TV. >Gladwell makes an analogy between V-Chipped TV content and >air-conditioned cars in the New York City subway system in summertime: >" . . . we need air-conditioners on subway cars because air-conditioners >on subway cars have made stations so hot that subway cars need to be >air-conditioned." Similarly, he argues, "the V-chip is likely to >increase the amount of sex and violence on television, not decrease it" >because when viewers can block offensive programming, there is far less >pressure on broadcasters and cable operators to avoid offending. Personally, I'd view this as a positive development. The puritanical types will be busily still protesting it, but without so many parents who (falsely) believe their children will be harmed by exposure to sex, thus dividing their efforts. Normally one would think that advertisers et al might give in to a small number... but advertisers particularly suceptible to this won't be sponsoring anything but G-rated shows anyway. (Of course, I view the V-chip itself as a bad thing, but if it has an outcome opposite in at least _some_ ways to the one intended by the neo-puritans, I can see the silver lining.) >And, for the benefit of those people who don't think the V-Chip isn't in >itself on-topic for cypherpunks, I might point out that Gladwell's >argument applies equally well to mail filtering with procmail recipes -- >or Sandy's and John's list moderation experiment. If the noise level on >the unmoderated list jumps to even higher than we were seeing before >the moderation began, that would provide observational support to >Gladwell's argument. An interesting question... although I'd point out that the degree of social pressure against spamming et al appears to be ineffective. The herd-like public (referring to the parents with their foolish fears and anyone else brainwashed into believing the puritans/fundamentalists) can put pressure on with their buying patterns... as yet such a market system is lacking in mailing lists (except for putting people on filter lists, which probably exacerbates the problem). In other words, there is no particular reason for the spammers et al to desist even if people _are_ receiving their email. -Allen

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RE: No Dimitri??
by Brett Carswell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>drose(a)azstarnet.com writes: > >> William H. Geiger III wrote: >> >> >I have noticed that there has not been any post from Dimitri in a couple >>of >> >days. >> >> Yup. Ditto Tim May. Fair trade? > >It's all part of Dr Dimitri's social experiment. Create two personalities who >appear to hate each other but are the same person. Watch out for the upcoming >series.... > Dimitri L[abia] Vulis styles his facial hair to look more like pubic hair. o o --/-- <~\ Dimitri L[abia] Vulis __\ _/\ \ / > >

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Re: Airport security [no such thing]
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitry Vulius K.O.T.M. wrote: > Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> writes: > > > Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > > > Dr.D. Vulius K.O.T.M. wrote: > > > > Nurdane Oksas <oksas(a)asimov.montclair.edu> writes: > > > > > But think about this: suppose there is a couple, bob(a)household.com, > > > and alice(a)household.com. Suppose that Rev. Mallory does not like bob. > > > Mallory forges a lot of emails like "I can still taste your sperm > > > on my lips", that appear to originate from Cindy(a)phonesex.org. > > > Then, promptly, Mallory sends an anonymous alert to alice(a)household.com, > > > warning her about naughty email activities of bob. Alice gets mad at him > > > and divorces him. > > > How would bob protect himself against such developments? > > > > Frame-ups are as old as time. The ones that work the best are those > > that are the most believable. O.J., for example. Unless Alice is > > unusually flaky or paranoid, she'll consider her options against the > > time she has invested in Bob. > > Here's an interesting twist of Sandfort's moderation policy. > > My article was crypto-relevant and flame-free and was tossed to > cypherpunks-flames. > > Igor's response to my article was also crypto-relevant and flame-free > and was tossed to cypherpunks-flames. > > Dale's response did not quote me, so it made it to the censored list. Is it really true that my response was tossed out as flames? It was crypto-relevant. BTW, this is a more than perfect illustration why rejections based on "shitstrings" are completely inappropriate for moderating. I have nothing again "grey lists", when moderators are alerted when a message containing certain suspicious word arrives (the way it's done in STUMP), but am opposed to autorejections (unless mods are mailbombed). - Igor.

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Changing the Currency
by KALLISTE＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3 Changing the Currency by J. Orlin Grabbe Lemme get this straight. You left home and went to one of them foreign places, got a handful of their money, and it felt like "play money"? But you could still use it in a restaurant, train station, or at the newsstand, right? Okay. But you say it still somehow felt "unreal", and you never were able to shake off that "monopoly money" mind set? Hmmm. Why is that? An American in Paris who gets a 100-franc note with Eugene Delacroix's picture on it, often finds it doesn't kick ass like the US one-dollar bill with George Washington's picture. The Parisian, on the other hand, may feel that the watersnip on the 100-guilder note looks downright ridiculous, while denizens of Amsterdam might prefer the bird image to Sir Donald Sangster's ugly face on the Jamaican hundred dollar bill. The Swiss 50-franc note depicting Konrad Gessner (1516-1565) doesn't say anything about "In God We Trust," but on the other hand it doesn't display the obnoxious "Counterfeiters will be Prosecuted" found on the Russian 100-ruble note (vintage 1993). Money is funny. That's why more than ten years ago when the Federal Reserve was thinking of changing the US currency, it formed focus groups in an attempt to gauge public reaction. It had a company called Market Facts go mall-trolling for potential participants. They went to the Seaview Square Mall in Ocean, New Jersey; the Buena Park Mall in Orange County, California; the Eastland Mall in Charlotte, North Carolina; and the Fox Valley Center in Aurora, Illinois. The report is entitled "Reactions to U.S. Currency Redesign: Analysis of Focus Group Discussions," and was submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on September 21, 1983. The discussions were recorded, and- -to make sure every bit of information was properly gleaned--groups were also observed in a conference room through a one-way mirror. In general the groups stated that while they did not care about the appearance of money, "they argued not to change it. There was considerable concern that our money would look 'fake' or 'foreign.' Participants also wanted to know why the government would want to change the appearance of the currency." The groups were divided into two categories: "General Public" and "Heavy Currency Handlers". Someone who took orders at McDonald's would fall into the Heavy Currency Handler category. The later groups were strongly of the opinion that money was "dirty"--not in the Michael Sindona sense of turning "dirty" money into "clean" money--but rather in the "dirty," "shabby," "shoddy," and "worn" sense. Some said the US currency was the dirtiest in the world. By contrast, a person in one of the General Public groups noted that money has "the denomination on all four corners." Some of the Heavy Currency Handlers thought it might be a neat idea to have different colors for the different denominations, to make it easier to make change. But more frequently it was remarked that "people don't like change" or "the government should leave well-enough alone." Today we know that the real rationale for currency change is to make the currency detectable by currency-detection equipment in airports (and possibly other places)-- in order to detect money launderers or anyone else carrying large amounts of currency. But the publicly- stated rationale is the misleading "prevention of counterfeiting." In this light, it is interesting that numerous questions were directed at attitudes toward counterfeiting. Many of the group participants thought counterfeiting was a serious problem, but "the majority wanted to know how much counterfeiting actually costs the public each year before taking a position on whether or not currency should be changed." None of the participants admitting to any inclination to actually counterfeit money themselves, even if they could do so without detection, but about half of them said they would pass along counterfeit bills if they received them. The other half thought that passing bogus bills would be morally wrong. But not all of the latter would "turn in bogus bills to the authorities. A few participants recounted stories of persons being hounded by the FBI to recall where they received the counterfeit bill--viewed as a deterrent to reporting counterfeit bills. This group opted, rather, to quietly destroy the bill and take the loss." The report concludes that a Counterfeiting Threat should be used to sell the idea of currency changes: "The extent of counterfeiting and, thus, the importance of adopting a new form of currency must be widely publicized. Without precise knowledge of the severity of the problem the public may assume that the benefits of adopting new money do not outweight the costs." The report doesn't mention any special information discovered by observations made through the one-way glass. January 23, 1997 Web Page: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/

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No Subject
by satan_is_a_hacker＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone has any text files on the following topics please send them. I have many files if any one else needs them. PGP Making decryption tools Anarchy Satan Anything underground

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Re: No Dimitri??
by Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)amaranth.com> writes: > I have noticed that there has not been any post from Dimitri in a couple of > days. > > I am assuming that this means that the list moderation has now started? Yes - anything I say is junked irrespective of content. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Commerce Sec. Hearings and Encryption
by Bill Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca wrote: > Bill Campbell wrote: > > > > I have been watching the confirmation hearings for William Daley, > > and I was amazed at the number of references in the questioning > > to encryption. I have been watching confirmation hearings for a long > > time and have never noticed this much attention being placed on such > > a (formerly?) obscure topic. > > It certainly looks like someone is gearing up for a battle in regard > to cryto. > I find it very interesting that there would be a grand battle over > 'exporting' what is already freely available overseas (and always > will be, despite the export laws). This "freely available overseas" concept is a bit overstated. France and other countries are beginning to come down hard on encryption. (Also note the post from the guy in New Zealand on the hassles exporting from his country.) The US now has a "Crypto Ambassador" roaming the world, and I *don't* think he is encouraging an open common encryption standard. > I suppose that a cynic might > be led to believe that perhaps the anti-export champions' agenda > might be to make more convenient for the average joe to just > give in and accept weak, government approved crypto. Cynic or realist, you make the call. <G> The average Joe doesn't even know *why* he needs encryption...at least not yet. =Bill=

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If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before....
by DataETRsch＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

{If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before, we're extremely sorry.} {UDCM's web site may have been under construction during the time you visited.} {UDCM's web site has finished undergoing its changes and will operate correctly.} {UDCM V2.0 has been extensively modified from its previous variation.} {Digital signaturing and public key cryptosystem capabilities have been added.} {UDCM's DS and PKCS techniques do NOT make use of conventional PN factoring.} {UDCM's source code is currently unavailable. PLEASE DO NOT REQUEST IT.} {UDCM's on-line help documentation has also been extensively modified.} {This advertisement has also been modified.} Hello, Greetings! I am Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos, president of DataET Research, Data Engineering Technologies. I am sending you this message to let you know that DataET Research has recently initiated the distribution of UDCM, Universal Data Cryptography Module. UDCM implements a revolutionarily new, extremely advanced and sophisticated, digital data encryption algorithm named IMDMP, Integrated Mathematical Data Manipulation and Positioning. UDCM (the IMDMP algorithm)... o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography. o Contains more than 150 procedures and functions. o Is a very cost-effective size of only 60 kilobytes. o Implements the IMDMP encryption algorithm. o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits. o Includes 18 sub-algorithms. o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files. o Allows multiple encryption layer levels. o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys. o Includes time and date locking features. o Includes file specific unique encryption features. o Includes file authentication guard features. o Includes digital signaturing capabilities. o Implements the public key cryptosystem method of security. o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features. UDCM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed with popular application and database programming languages and environments such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Delphi, OOP Pascal, Turbo Pascal, dBase, Paradox, Access, Sybase, Oracle, etc. DataET Research has released a shareware version of UDCM named UDCM V2.0. To download UDCM V2.0 for free, please go to: http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. I hope you will consider applying UDCM in the software you develop. Thank-you very much for your time. Sincerely, Jeremy K.Yu-Ramos President DataET Research Data Engineering Technologies

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Re: THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"abostick(a)netcom.com" "Alan Bostick" 23-JAN-1997 23:09:54.72 >In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by >Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended >consequences of the V-Chip, the programmable device to be included in >next-generation television sets sold in the US that supposedly will >allow parents to control their children's access to sex and violence on >TV. >Gladwell makes an analogy between V-Chipped TV content and >air-conditioned cars in the New York City subway system in summertime: >" . . . we need air-conditioners on subway cars because air-conditioners >on subway cars have made stations so hot that subway cars need to be >air-conditioned." Similarly, he argues, "the V-chip is likely to >increase the amount of sex and violence on television, not decrease it" >because when viewers can block offensive programming, there is far less >pressure on broadcasters and cable operators to avoid offending. Personally, I'd view this as a positive development. The puritanical types will be busily still protesting it, but without so many parents who (falsely) believe their children will be harmed by exposure to sex, thus dividing their efforts. Normally one would think that advertisers et al might give in to a small number... but advertisers particularly suceptible to this won't be sponsoring anything but G-rated shows anyway. (Of course, I view the V-chip itself as a bad thing, but if it has an outcome opposite in at least _some_ ways to the one intended by the neo-puritans, I can see the silver lining.) >And, for the benefit of those people who don't think the V-Chip isn't in >itself on-topic for cypherpunks, I might point out that Gladwell's >argument applies equally well to mail filtering with procmail recipes -- >or Sandy's and John's list moderation experiment. If the noise level on >the unmoderated list jumps to even higher than we were seeing before >the moderation began, that would provide observational support to >Gladwell's argument. An interesting question... although I'd point out that the degree of social pressure against spamming et al appears to be ineffective. The herd-like public (referring to the parents with their foolish fears and anyone else brainwashed into believing the puritans/fundamentalists) can put pressure on with their buying patterns... as yet such a market system is lacking in mailing lists (except for putting people on filter lists, which probably exacerbates the problem). In other words, there is no particular reason for the spammers et al to desist even if people _are_ receiving their email. -Allen

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Re: If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before....
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Ramos, You promised to release the algorithm of your program as well as crypto-relevant source code. You promised to do it atfer a month, and the time has come. We are eagerly awaiting the promised code. Thank you so much for your openness. igor DataETRsch(a)aol.com wrote: > > {If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before, we're extremely sorry.} > {UDCM's web site may have been under construction during the time you > visited.} > {UDCM's web site has finished undergoing its changes and will operate > correctly.} > {UDCM V2.0 has been extensively modified from its previous variation.} > {Digital signaturing and public key cryptosystem capabilities have been > added.} > {UDCM's DS and PKCS techniques do NOT make use of conventional PN factoring.} > {UDCM's source code is currently unavailable. PLEASE DO NOT REQUEST IT.} > {UDCM's on-line help documentation has also been extensively modified.} > {This advertisement has also been modified.} > > Hello, > > Greetings! I am Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos, president of DataET Research, Data > Engineering Technologies. I am sending you this message to let you know that > DataET Research has recently initiated the distribution of UDCM, Universal > Data Cryptography Module. UDCM implements a revolutionarily new, extremely > advanced and sophisticated, digital data encryption algorithm named IMDMP, > Integrated Mathematical Data Manipulation and Positioning. > > UDCM (the IMDMP algorithm)... > > o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography. > o Contains more than 150 procedures and functions. > o Is a very cost-effective size of only 60 kilobytes. > o Implements the IMDMP encryption algorithm. > o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits. > o Includes 18 sub-algorithms. > o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files. > o Allows multiple encryption layer levels. > o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys. > o Includes time and date locking features. > o Includes file specific unique encryption features. > o Includes file authentication guard features. > o Includes digital signaturing capabilities. > o Implements the public key cryptosystem method of security. > o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features. > > UDCM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed > with popular application and database programming languages and environments > such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Delphi, OOP Pascal, Turbo > Pascal, dBase, Paradox, Access, Sybase, Oracle, etc. > > DataET Research has released a shareware version of UDCM named UDCM V2.0. > > To download UDCM V2.0 for free, please go to: > http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. > > I hope you will consider applying UDCM in the software you develop. Thank-you > very much for your time. > > Sincerely, > > Jeremy K.Yu-Ramos > President > DataET Research > Data Engineering Technologies > - Igor.

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4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
by Mike Reiter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT ENDS JANUARY 31 *** Fourth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Preliminary Technical Program) Zurich, Switzerland April 1-4, 1997 Sponsored by ACM SIGSAC For more information, including registration and hotel information, see: http://www.zurich.ibm.ch/pub/Other/ACMsec/index.html ================ TUESDAY, APRIL 1 ================ 4 half-day tutorials in two parallel tracks: Theory Track Practice Track Morning Cryptography CERT and Practical Network Security Jim Massey, Ueli Maurer Tom Longstaff (ETH Zurich) (Software Engineering Institute) lunch Afternoon Internet Security Info-Wars Refik Molva Paul Karger (Eurecom) (IBM TJ Watson) ================== WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2 ================== 09:00-09:30 Introduction and Opening Comments Richard Graveman (Bellcore) Phil Janson (IBM Zurich Lab) Li Gong (JavaSoft) Clifford Neuman (Univ. of Southern California) 09:30-10:30 Invited talk 1: To Be Announced 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:00 Session 1: Fair Exchange of Information Chair: Philippe Janson (IBM Zurich Lab) * Fair Exchange with a Semi-Trusted Third Party Matthew Franklin, Mike Reiter (AT&T Research) * Optimistic Protocols for Fair Exchange N. Asokan, Matthias Schunter, Michael Waidner (IBM Zurich Lab and Univ. Dortmund) 12:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-15:30 Session 2: Language and System Security Chair: Michael Waidner (IBM Zurich Lab) * Static Typing with Dynamic Linking Drew Dean (Princeton University) * Secure Digital Names Scott Stornetta, Stuart Haber (Surety Technologies) * A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus Martin Abadi, Andrew D. Gordon (DEC SRC and Cambridge) 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00-17:30 Panel 1: Programming Languages as a Basis for Security Chair: Drew Dean (Princeton) Panelists: To Be Announced Welcome Cocktail ================= THURSDAY, APRIL 3 ================= 09:00-10:30 Session 3: Authentication Chair: Ravi Sandhu (George Mason Univ.) * Authentication via Keystroke Dynamics Fabian Monrose, Avi Rubin (New York Univ. and Bellcore) * Path Independence for Authentication in Large-Scale Systems Mike Reiter, Stuart Stubblebine (AT&T Research) * Proactive Password Checking with Decision Trees Francesco Bergadano, Bruno Crispo, Giancarlo Ruffo (Univ. of Turin) 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:00 Invited talk 2: To Be Announced 12:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-15:30 Session 4: Signatures and Escrow Chair: Martin Abadi (DEC SRC) * Verifiable Partial Key Escrow Mihir Bellare, Shafi Goldwasser (UC San Diego and MIT) * New Blind Signatures Equivalent to Factorisation David Pointcheval, Jacques Stern (ENS/DMI, France) * Proactive Public-Key and Signature Schemes Markus Jakobsson, Stanislaw Jarecki, Amir Herzberg, Hugo Krawczyk, Moti Yung (UC San Diego, MIT, IBM Haifa Lab, IBM TJ Watson, and Bankers Trust) 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00-17:30 Panel 2: Persistance and Longevity of Digital Signatures Chair: Gene Tsudik (USC/ISI) Panelists: To Be Announced Banquet Dinner =============== FRIDAY, APRIL 4 =============== 09:00-10:30 Session 5: Commerce and Commercial Security Chair: Jacques Stern (ENS/DMI, France) * A New On-Line Cash Check Scheme Robert H. Deng, Yongfei Han, Albert B. Jeng, Teow-Hin Ngair (National University of Singapore) * Conditional Purchase Orders John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier (Counterpane Systems) * The Specification and Implementation of 'Commercial' Security Requirements including Dynamic Segregation of Duties Simon Foley (University College, Cork, Ireland) 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-12:30 Session 6: Cryptography Chair: Mike Reiter (AT&T Research) * On the Importance of Securing Your Bins: The Garbage-Man-in-the-Middle Attack Marc Joye, Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Univ. Louvain) * Improved Security Bounds for Pseudorandom Permutations Jacques Patarin (Bull) * Asymmetric Fingerprinting for Larger Collusions Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner (Univ. Hildesheim and IBM Zurich Lab) 12:30 Conference Adjourns

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No Subject
by fuck you 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone has any text files on the following topics please send them. I have many files if any one else needs them. PGP Making decryption tools Anarchy Satan Anything underground

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Re: [ADMINISTRATIVIUM] Degausser
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When Timmy `C' May's mother gave birth to him after fucking with a bunch of sailors, she didn't know who the father was but decided to tell him that he was a Russian as the Russian sailor was the one who satisfied her the most. /~~~\ {-O^O-} Timmy `C' May \ o / (-)

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Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks maiing list
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to start a thread to discuss the moderation and rejection policy. My perfectly crypto-relevant article regarding possible attacks on human relationships with the use of forged mail and anonymous remailers, has been tossed out (sorted) into cypherpunks-flames mailing list. You can receive a copy of my article by an email request. The explanation that Sandy Sandfort gave me mentioned that he rejected my message because it continued a thread where Sandy noticed instances of "flaming". Note that my message was free of any flames, including its quoted part. Sandy also states rather plainly that crypto-relevance is not the criterion by which he moderates this list. I question this policy. I would like to hear your opinions as to whether such policies satisfy the current readership. - Igor.

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Re: If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before...
by Krenn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > {If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before, we're extremely sorry.} > {UDCM's web site may have been under construction during the time you > visited.} > {UDCM's web site has finished undergoing its changes and will operate > correctly.} > {UDCM V2.0 has been extensively modified from its previous variation.} > {Digital signaturing and public key cryptosystem capabilities have been > added.} > {UDCM's DS and PKCS techniques do NOT make use of conventional PN factoring.} > {UDCM's source code is currently unavailable. PLEASE DO NOT REQUEST IT.} > {UDCM's on-line help documentation has also been extensively modified.} > {This advertisement has also been modified.} Well halellujah. > Greetings! I am Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos, president of DataET Research, Data > Engineering Technologies. I am sending you this message to let you know that > DataET Research has recently initiated the distribution of UDCM, Universal > Data Cryptography Module. UDCM implements a revolutionarily new, extremely > advanced and sophisticated, digital data encryption algorithm named IMDMP, > Integrated Mathematical Data Manipulation and Positioning. > > UDCM (the IMDMP algorithm)... OH! OF COURSE! IMDMP! COOL!! > > o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography. > o Contains more than 150 procedures and functions. WOW!! 150!!! > o Is a very cost-effective size of only 60 kilobytes. > o Implements the IMDMP encryption algorithm. Of course, who doesn't?! > o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits. > o Includes 18 sub-algorithms. 18?! HOLY COW!! > o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files. What a breakthrough! Astounding!! > o Allows multiple encryption layer levels. > o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys. Of course not, it's IMDMP!! > o Includes time and date locking features. > o Includes file specific unique encryption features. Specific unique encryption features!! NO WAY!! COOL!!! > o Includes file authentication guard features. > o Includes digital signaturing capabilities. > o Implements the public key cryptosystem method of security. Of course, everyone knows the public key cryptosystem method is the best! Excellent! > o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features. > > UDCM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed > with popular application and database programming languages and environments > such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Delphi, OOP Pascal, Turbo > Pascal, dBase, Paradox, Access, Sybase, Oracle, etc. > > DataET Research has released a shareware version of UDCM named UDCM V2.0. Hey, v2.0, neat name, where'd you come up with it?! > > To download UDCM V2.0 for free, please go to: > http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. AOL!! Oh YES! Cool! > > I hope you will consider applying UDCM in the software you develop. Thank-you > very much for your time. Oh most certainly! I'm gonna run out and implement EVERYTHING in UDCM!! Thanks man!! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMuhyVUnqfwPpt/QVAQFM4wQAymizJEI/F5SFcWILNfGNoIsxxYza6Bfo yadEF9BnlcXujq0ZFZiRv7SddXjTS5TgVZLutZdEIx/NYPESkH7MXh18CyI/EXo6 NSyAiE0pFFRIrAgV4FWVVS9jsTWKucfI7NbWKSLEWTK8e6fdywAlXzlvbPT+1v6C b4vWK4akrBs= =74mf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:57 PM 1/23/97 -0800, Alan Bostick wrote: >In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by >Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended >consequences of the V-Chip, the programmable device to be included in >next-generation television sets sold in the US that supposedly will >allow parents to control their children's access to sex and violence on >TV. While I think it's always useful to consider unintended (or otherwise unexpected) consequences, Gladwell's argument sent a shiver down my spine with its shameless paternalism. This bit (from roughly the middle of his piece) is what I found creepiest: "According to one recent study, somewhere between twenty and twenty-seven per cent of the parents of four-to six-year-olds never restrict their children's viewing hours, never decide what programs they can watch, never change the channel when something objectionable comes on, and never forbid the watching of certain programs. It has apparently never occurred to these parents that television can be a bad influence, and it strains credulity to think that the advent of the V-chip is going to wake them up. Yet their families - mainly lower-income, ill-educated - are the very ones most in need of protection from television violence. Here is a rearranging effect with a vengeance: not only does the V-chip make television worse, it makes television worse precisely for those already most vulnerable to its excesses." I understood Gladwell's point to be, in essence, that the V-chip will allow TV producers to generate higher levels of morally impure content which he fears will pollute the minds of poor children because their parents are too stupid to protect them from the harmful content and too poor to buy new televisions which will include V-chips. While I think 95% of broadcast TV is crap which isn't worth the time expended watching it, even reading arguments like "poor people should be protected from harmful ideas they're too stupid (or too poorly educated) to avoid and too poor to purchase protection from" makes me feel dirty. I don't think Gladwell is, in any meaningful way, an opponent of government control of speech/expression - he's just an opponent of inefficient or optional forms of government control of speech/expression. He's a reasonable writer, but he's chosen to use his powers for evil instead of for good. (Some of his work is available on the web; apparently he once worked as a reporter for the Washington Post and is now on the staff of the New Yorker.) -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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Re: seeds of our own destruction
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <32E72BCB.3CBA(a)deltanet.com>, on 01/23/97 at 01:13 AM, Kevin Stephenson <cts(a)deltanet.com> said: +You wrote some very interesting articles. It is the UN. if you want a real scare, read the UN "world constitution" on human rights and privacy --their idea of a Bill of Rights. It just happens that it is virtually word for word equivalent to the mainland Chinese "rights" -in other words: rights as long as they are consistent with the aims of the state (UN) and the security needs of the state at the given moment. ...and the UN is to be granted overall sovereignity by virtue of the right to unilateraly tax its 'member' states, and not necessarily in an equitable fashion. to put it in context, it is clearly the havenots reducing everyone to the status of havenot; there will be no others. this, of course, will eventually give way to tribal governments and the cycle will start over after the population is reduced by its own pollution and starvation to a new balance with nature. disease, more than starvation, will be the biggest killer. men will be too hungry, and too sick, to fight until it stabilizes. there will be exceptions, of course, but they will lack sufficient power to extend their sphere of influence before they are overrun by the mass, or destroyed by chemical and germ warfare in the last gasp. the meaning of the 144,000 becomes more clear... +Read Revelations (if you haven't). have more than several textbooks on it, and have taught classes on Revelation. however, I strongly believe the interpretations are still 'every man for himself' --presuming, of course, the propounder has at least the prerequisite grounding and understanding in the fundamental concepts, starting with John the Revelator, who never died, and why portions of the book are sealed. the best general reference on symbology, at least of what I have seen so far: Opening the Seven Seals (The Visions of John the Revelator) Richard D. Draper Desert Books, Salt Lake City ISBN 087579-547-1, SKU 2142298 +Maybe put some scriptures on cypherpunks. casting pearls before swine? +Happy Armageddon. Frances Ford Coppola wasted the good title: 'Apocolypse Now' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: Encrypted with 2.6.3i. Requires 2.6 or later. iQCVAwUBMuc64b04kQrCC2kFAQFXBwP/RhEeldizuSelbrHtfCSDsrwRaT0hn1qd e/j6Q0IPHMkzrFS+bnTGia5hLogTgU61tdvq38AGlRt2LpQZVekStZqCog4Jfmx0 olK1xzpNEr71UsDxxYe5ooIhHwWVWfZsxtj6k8/eSYtLbontN+BCHbk6V+Py3BOi HOpugpbs8V4= =2XXx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: fingerd
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, These messages have been sent about fingerd. My preference for fiddling with remote fingers is to leave fingerd as supplied by the vendor (run by "nobody") and replace the finger program itself. It can be made to recognise when it is being run by "nobody" and behave differently from when run by another user. Source at the end of this file. (Bashed out fairly quickly starting from a utmp-eraser I made for a luser who wouldn't tolerate wall messages from shutdown.) I have (among other things) an extension to TCP-wrappers (a new hosts_access.c file), and a prog to find disk space wasted by duplicated files. (mail me with Subject: "send goodies" for these.) -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk Date: 23 Jan 1997 17:22:10 -0800 From: Steven L Baur <steve(a)miranova.com> > cfingerd is not a safe program. It must run as root, and has some big > problems. > On Tue, 17 Sep 1996, Administrador da Rede wrote: > > I use the newest version of cfinger, setted to not allow general finger, just > > specific ones. Does anyone knows how this person did that ? I hope I can > > find out, otherwise, bye bye finger service. > Badly. > I have sent the author a letter, but never got any reply back (it's 3 > months later now!), so I just take the opportunity to warn the public > against its use. /* * * compile and test myfinger * * cc -C -o myfinger myfinger.c * * * (assuming the standard finger is /usr/ucb/finger) * cp /usr/ucb/finger /usr/ucb/finger.real * cp myfinger /usr/ucb/finger * * * (if using TCP wrapper reverse-fingers, make them NOT nobody, * but another id such as nobody2.) * * I disclaim any disasters........ * */ /* * * my finger program - local only, to be less informative than /usr/ucb/finger * */ #undef _utmp_h #define TRUE 1 #define FALSE 0 #define FAKE 1 #define WIPE 2 #define UTMP "/etc/utmp" #include <stdio.h> #include <pwd.h> #include "utmp.h" #include <lastlog.h> main(argc, argv, env) int argc; char **argv; char **env; { int i, listed; struct passwd *pwent; if (argc < 1) exit(0); /* beat sneaks */ /* If run by "nobody" (uid=65534) assume this is a remote finger */ /* otherwise run the standard finger command */ if (65534!=getuid()) { execv("/usr/ucb/finger.real", argv); /** if we get here exec failed, so we default to my finger **/ } printf("Login Name Where\n"); listed = 1; while ((pwent = getpwent()) != NULL) { if (argc > 1) { /* * if there are args, and name is NOT one of them, we skip * it */ listed = 0; for (i = 1; (!listed) && (i < argc); i++) { if (!strcmp(argv[i], pwent->pw_name)) listed = 1; } } if (listed) info(pwent); } } info(pwent) struct passwd *pwent; { long lpos; FILE *fp; int i; struct utmp *sp; struct utmp utmpentry; char *login,*gecos; login=pwent->pw_name; gecos=pwent->pw_gecos; sp = &utmpentry; if ((fp = fopen(UTMP, "r")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "failed to open utmp for reading\n"); exit(1); } i = fseek(fp, 0, 0); if (i) { puts("failed to fseek start of file"); exit(2); } do { /* get current pos in file using ftell */ lpos = ftell(fp); /* fread the struct */ fread(sp, sizeof utmpentry, 1, fp); if (!feof(fp)) { if (!strcmp(login, sp->ut_name)) { if (!nonuser(utmpentry)) { utmpentry.ut_host[15]='\0'; printf("%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n",login,gecos,sp->ut_line,sp->ut_host); } } } /* on error we close & exit */ if (ferror(fp)) { fprintf(stderr, " file error! so failed to find our session in utmp\n"); fclose(fp); exit(3); } } while (!feof(fp)); fclose(fp); } /* end */

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Re: Airport security [no such thing]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ichudov(a)algebra.com writes: > Dr.Dimitry Vulius K.O.T.M. wrote: > > Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> writes: > > > > > Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > > > > Dr.D. Vulius K.O.T.M. wrote: > > > > > Nurdane Oksas <oksas(a)asimov.montclair.edu> writes: > > > > > > > But think about this: suppose there is a couple, bob(a)household.com, > > > > and alice(a)household.com. Suppose that Rev. Mallory does not like bob. > > > > Mallory forges a lot of emails like "I can still taste your sperm > > > > on my lips", that appear to originate from Cindy(a)phonesex.org. > > > > Then, promptly, Mallory sends an anonymous alert to alice(a)household.com > > > > warning her about naughty email activities of bob. Alice gets mad at hi > > > > and divorces him. > > > > How would bob protect himself against such developments? > > > > > > Frame-ups are as old as time. The ones that work the best are those > > > that are the most believable. O.J., for example. Unless Alice is > > > unusually flaky or paranoid, she'll consider her options against the > > > time she has invested in Bob. > > > > Here's an interesting twist of Sandfort's moderation policy. > > > > My article was crypto-relevant and flame-free and was tossed to > > cypherpunks-flames. > > > > Igor's response to my article was also crypto-relevant and flame-free > > and was tossed to cypherpunks-flames. > > > > Dale's response did not quote me, so it made it to the censored list. > > Is it really true that my response was tossed out as flames? Yes. > It was crypto-relevant. So was my original article. They did not contain any flames or personal attacks, contrary to what Sandy claims. > BTW, this is a more than perfect illustration why rejections > based on "shitstrings" are completely inappropriate for moderating. > > I have nothing again "grey lists", when moderators are alerted when a > message containing certain suspicious word arrives (the way it's done in > STUMP), but am opposed to autorejections (unless mods are mailbombed). It's ironic that Igor's article which I'm quoting ALSO got tossed into cypherpunks-flames, even though it wasn't a flame. Apparently the only comments on moderation that Sandy passes to the censored list are the ones praising him. This way he'll be able to report unanymous support for his moderation policies. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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RE: If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before....
by Mullen, Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: DataETRsch@aol.com[SMTP:DataETRsch@aol.com] >o Includes time and date locking features. How do you implement this feature? Where is the time/date information stored? Is this in that header you were talking about before? Is there some method which is designed to thwart simply changing the CMOS time? Thanks! ~ Patrick >---------- >From: DataETRsch@aol.com[SMTP:DataETRsch@aol.com] >Sent: Thursday, January 23, 1997 9:35 PM >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before.... > >{If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before, we're extremely sorry.} >{UDCM's web site may have been under construction during the time you >visited.} >{UDCM's web site has finished undergoing its changes and will operate >correctly.} >{UDCM V2.0 has been extensively modified from its previous variation.} >{Digital signaturing and public key cryptosystem capabilities have been >added.} >{UDCM's DS and PKCS techniques do NOT make use of conventional PN factoring.} >{UDCM's source code is currently unavailable. PLEASE DO NOT REQUEST IT.} >{UDCM's on-line help documentation has also been extensively modified.} >{This advertisement has also been modified.} > >Hello, > >Greetings! I am Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos, president of DataET Research, Data >Engineering Technologies. I am sending you this message to let you know that >DataET Research has recently initiated the distribution of UDCM, Universal >Data Cryptography Module. UDCM implements a revolutionarily new, extremely >advanced and sophisticated, digital data encryption algorithm named IMDMP, >Integrated Mathematical Data Manipulation and Positioning. > >UDCM (the IMDMP algorithm)... > >o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography. >o Contains more than 150 procedures and functions. >o Is a very cost-effective size of only 60 kilobytes. >o Implements the IMDMP encryption algorithm. >o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits. >o Includes 18 sub-algorithms. >o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files. >o Allows multiple encryption layer levels. >o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys. >o Includes time and date locking features. >o Includes file specific unique encryption features. >o Includes file authentication guard features. >o Includes digital signaturing capabilities. >o Implements the public key cryptosystem method of security. >o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features. > >UDCM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed >with popular application and database programming languages and environments >such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Delphi, OOP Pascal, Turbo >Pascal, dBase, Paradox, Access, Sybase, Oracle, etc. > >DataET Research has released a shareware version of UDCM named UDCM V2.0. > >To download UDCM V2.0 for free, please go to: >http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. > >I hope you will consider applying UDCM in the software you develop. Thank-you >very much for your time. > >Sincerely, > >Jeremy K.Yu-Ramos >President >DataET Research >Data Engineering Technologies > >

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Re: THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: IN%"abostick(a)netcom.com" "Alan Bostick" 23-JAN-1997 23:09:54.72 > > >In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by > >Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended > >consequences of the V-Chip I noticed that when my nephews buy video games, the first ones they check out are the ones plastered with the 'protective' ratings-symbols that proclaim that the game is the 'baddest of the bad' in terms of violence, etc. Thanks to the violence-rating system, they no longer have to waste time checking out 'dweeb' programs that contain absolutely no blood and gore. Toto

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate wrote: > Typical modern American attitude, getting it right is too much work so let's > lower the benchmark so anyone can be 'right'. Are you referring to the CypherPunks 'censored' list? Toto

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Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks maiing list
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to start a thread to discuss the moderation and rejection policy. My perfectly crypto-relevant article regarding possible attacks on human relationships with the use of forged mail and anonymous remailers, has been tossed out (sorted) into cypherpunks-flames mailing list. You can receive a copy of my article by an email request. The explanation that Sandy Sandfort gave me mentioned that he rejected my message because it continued a thread where Sandy noticed instances of "flaming". Note that my message was free of any flames, including its quoted part. Sandy also states rather plainly that crypto-relevance is not the criterion by which he moderates this list. I question this policy. I would like to hear your opinions as to whether such policies satisfy the current readership. - Igor.

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Re: If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before...
by Krenn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > {If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before, we're extremely sorry.} > {UDCM's web site may have been under construction during the time you > visited.} > {UDCM's web site has finished undergoing its changes and will operate > correctly.} > {UDCM V2.0 has been extensively modified from its previous variation.} > {Digital signaturing and public key cryptosystem capabilities have been > added.} > {UDCM's DS and PKCS techniques do NOT make use of conventional PN factoring.} > {UDCM's source code is currently unavailable. PLEASE DO NOT REQUEST IT.} > {UDCM's on-line help documentation has also been extensively modified.} > {This advertisement has also been modified.} Well halellujah. > Greetings! I am Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos, president of DataET Research, Data > Engineering Technologies. I am sending you this message to let you know that > DataET Research has recently initiated the distribution of UDCM, Universal > Data Cryptography Module. UDCM implements a revolutionarily new, extremely > advanced and sophisticated, digital data encryption algorithm named IMDMP, > Integrated Mathematical Data Manipulation and Positioning. > > UDCM (the IMDMP algorithm)... OH! OF COURSE! IMDMP! COOL!! > > o Is a royalty-free Windows DLL module featuring advanced cryptography. > o Contains more than 150 procedures and functions. WOW!! 150!!! > o Is a very cost-effective size of only 60 kilobytes. > o Implements the IMDMP encryption algorithm. Of course, who doesn't?! > o Allows encryption keys as large as 2048 bits. > o Includes 18 sub-algorithms. 18?! HOLY COW!! > o Processes all forms of binary and ASCII files. What a breakthrough! Astounding!! > o Allows multiple encryption layer levels. > o Has absolutely no back-doors or magical keys. Of course not, it's IMDMP!! > o Includes time and date locking features. > o Includes file specific unique encryption features. Specific unique encryption features!! NO WAY!! COOL!!! > o Includes file authentication guard features. > o Includes digital signaturing capabilities. > o Implements the public key cryptosystem method of security. Of course, everyone knows the public key cryptosystem method is the best! Excellent! > o Includes data importance and sensitivity stamping features. > > UDCM, being a Windows DLL module, can be accessed through programs developed > with popular application and database programming languages and environments > such as: C, C++, Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Delphi, OOP Pascal, Turbo > Pascal, dBase, Paradox, Access, Sybase, Oracle, etc. > > DataET Research has released a shareware version of UDCM named UDCM V2.0. Hey, v2.0, neat name, where'd you come up with it?! > > To download UDCM V2.0 for free, please go to: > http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. AOL!! Oh YES! Cool! > > I hope you will consider applying UDCM in the software you develop. Thank-you > very much for your time. Oh most certainly! I'm gonna run out and implement EVERYTHING in UDCM!! Thanks man!! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMuhyVUnqfwPpt/QVAQFM4wQAymizJEI/F5SFcWILNfGNoIsxxYza6Bfo yadEF9BnlcXujq0ZFZiRv7SddXjTS5TgVZLutZdEIx/NYPESkH7MXh18CyI/EXo6 NSyAiE0pFFRIrAgV4FWVVS9jsTWKucfI7NbWKSLEWTK8e6fdywAlXzlvbPT+1v6C b4vWK4akrBs= =74mf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Commerce Sec. Hearings and Encryption
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Campbell wrote: > > toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca wrote: > > Bill Campbell wrote: > This "freely available overseas" concept is a bit overstated. > France and other countries are beginning to come down hard > on encryption. True. Perhaps I should have said "freely available, but it might cost you more than you expect." > Cynic or realist, you make the call. <G> The average Joe > doesn't even know *why* he needs encryption...at least > not yet. The average joe is quickly becoming aware of the issue of data security (and therefore being exposed to the 'concept' of encryption as something that will impact his life). Of course, this is coming about as a result of commercial pressures to make him feel safe about handing over his Visa number, etc. To me, this indicates that this is the opportune time to inject a deeper level of understanding into the issue of crypto, at a time when the average joe has his attention directed toward the crypto arena. Toto

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Re: No Dimitri??
by Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: > "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)amaranth.com> writes: > > > I have noticed that there has not been any post from Dimitri in a couple of > > days. > > > > I am assuming that this means that the list moderation has now started? > > Yes - anything I say is junked irrespective of content. I see that Moderator Sandfort has allowed this article through (to prove me wrong) but has tossed all my other articles into cypherpunks-flames. Most of them were crypto-relevant, on-topic, and contained no flames. I bet he's going to toss this one too. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks maiing list
by Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes: > I would like to start a thread to discuss the moderation and rejection > policy. I predict that Sandy won't allow any posts on the censored list that question his moderation poilicy - only the unanymous praises. > My perfectly crypto-relevant article regarding possible attacks > on human relationships with the use of forged mail and anonymous > remailers, has been tossed out (sorted) into cypherpunks-flames > mailing list. A dishonorable act. > You can receive a copy of my article by an email request. Perhaps you want to start putting up rejected articles on a Web page? > The explanation that Sandy Sandfort gave me mentioned that he rejected > my message because it continued a thread where Sandy noticed instances > of "flaming". Note that my message was free of any flames, including > its quoted part. That's correct. > Sandy also states rather plainly that crypto-relevance is not the > criterion by which he moderates this list. I question this policy. Sandy's personal likes and dislikes of certain posters are the criterion. > I would like to hear your opinions as to whether such policies satisfy > the current readership. You won't be allowed to on this censored mailing list. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: seeds of our own destruction
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <32E72BCB.3CBA(a)deltanet.com>, on 01/23/97 at 01:13 AM, Kevin Stephenson <cts(a)deltanet.com> said: +You wrote some very interesting articles. It is the UN. if you want a real scare, read the UN "world constitution" on human rights and privacy --their idea of a Bill of Rights. It just happens that it is virtually word for word equivalent to the mainland Chinese "rights" -in other words: rights as long as they are consistent with the aims of the state (UN) and the security needs of the state at the given moment. ...and the UN is to be granted overall sovereignity by virtue of the right to unilateraly tax its 'member' states, and not necessarily in an equitable fashion. to put it in context, it is clearly the havenots reducing everyone to the status of havenot; there will be no others. this, of course, will eventually give way to tribal governments and the cycle will start over after the population is reduced by its own pollution and starvation to a new balance with nature. disease, more than starvation, will be the biggest killer. men will be too hungry, and too sick, to fight until it stabilizes. there will be exceptions, of course, but they will lack sufficient power to extend their sphere of influence before they are overrun by the mass, or destroyed by chemical and germ warfare in the last gasp. the meaning of the 144,000 becomes more clear... +Read Revelations (if you haven't). have more than several textbooks on it, and have taught classes on Revelation. however, I strongly believe the interpretations are still 'every man for himself' --presuming, of course, the propounder has at least the prerequisite grounding and understanding in the fundamental concepts, starting with John the Revelator, who never died, and why portions of the book are sealed. the best general reference on symbology, at least of what I have seen so far: Opening the Seven Seals (The Visions of John the Revelator) Richard D. Draper Desert Books, Salt Lake City ISBN 087579-547-1, SKU 2142298 +Maybe put some scriptures on cypherpunks. casting pearls before swine? +Happy Armageddon. Frances Ford Coppola wasted the good title: 'Apocolypse Now' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: Encrypted with 2.6.3i. Requires 2.6 or later. iQCVAwUBMuc64b04kQrCC2kFAQFXBwP/RhEeldizuSelbrHtfCSDsrwRaT0hn1qd e/j6Q0IPHMkzrFS+bnTGia5hLogTgU61tdvq38AGlRt2LpQZVekStZqCog4Jfmx0 olK1xzpNEr71UsDxxYe5ooIhHwWVWfZsxtj6k8/eSYtLbontN+BCHbk6V+Py3BOi HOpugpbs8V4= =2XXx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks maiing list
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Igor Chudov @ home wrote: > > My perfectly crypto-relevant article regarding possible attacks > on human relationships with the use of forged mail and anonymous > remailers, has been tossed out (sorted) into cypherpunks-flames > mailing list. I have noticed that the 'sorting' of messages seems to be based as much on personality as upon content. > The explanation that Sandy Sandfort gave me mentioned that he rejected > my message because it continued a thread where Sandy noticed instances > of "flaming". Note that my message was free of any flames, including > its quoted part. The standard of what constitutes a 'flame' seems to rest very much upon whom a comment is directed at, or merely 'vaguely toward'. There have been more than a few postings stronly lambasting various generic grouping of individuals which have passed without censoring. Your post, however, included Dr. Dimitri's vague reference to a homosexual 'elite'. While it was directed toward no one in particular, I suppose one could 'infer', from his past postings, that it referred to certain individuals, or a group of individuals. So it would seem that, in quoting the posts of others, one must take into consideration what various readers may infer from their previous posts. > Sandy also states rather plainly that crypto-relevance is not the > criterion by which he moderates this list. This was more than obvious to anyone who cared to cast an objective eye on the process, but their input was pooh-paah'd by the 'washed masses'. > I would like to hear your opinions as to whether such policies satisfy > the current readership. Like all of the 'opinions' that were expressed prior to the censorship of the list? I haven't seen any indication that these opinions were given the slightest consideration. This is not the readership's list. It is a private individual's list. My view of Sandy's moderation is that it is rather willy-nilly, and not done particularly objectively. There have been personal insults directed toward various individuals, including myself, which seem not to have been considered 'flames', while there are more than a few posts which, even on the closest of inspection, I can see no reason for dumping the the 'flame-crapper', other than the fact that they are somewhat associated to the 'unclean' list members. The moderation, at best, seems to encourage 'snide' commentary meant to be ill-disguised cheap-shots. I would much rather have list members taking strong, clean shots at their 'targets', than to be subjected to two-faced people talking out of the side of their mouths. In short, I don't see the moderation as being 'fair', and I don't think it was ever meant to be. I don't have a problem with this, since it's a private list, and, as far as I am concerned, the list-owner can censor it, or have it censored, any way he or she sees fit. I would like to point out, however, that anyone who has had their posts 'sorted' into the 'flames list' is now a 'known flamer', as evidenced by the fact that their post has been designated a 'flame' on a list run by a champion of free speech on the electronic frontier. It is obvious that some of the more intuitively intelligent list members are aware of this, as is indicated by the nervous fear with which they 'explain why' their post is crypto-relevant. Toto

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Re: If you were unable to download UDCM V2.0 before...
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Krenn wrote: > Oh most certainly! I'm gonna run out and implement EVERYTHING in UDCM!! > Thanks man!! Yours is the post these guys have been waiting for. All of those other CypherPunks just 'flamed' them by asking technical questions about their products. Who knows, they may make you their marketing manager. Toto

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Re: THE NEW YORKER on the V-Chip
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:57 PM 1/23/97 -0800, Alan Bostick wrote: >In the Jan. 20, 1997, issue of THE NEW YORKER, the "Comment", written by >Malcolm Gladwell, makes a powerful arguement about the unintended >consequences of the V-Chip, the programmable device to be included in >next-generation television sets sold in the US that supposedly will >allow parents to control their children's access to sex and violence on >TV. While I think it's always useful to consider unintended (or otherwise unexpected) consequences, Gladwell's argument sent a shiver down my spine with its shameless paternalism. This bit (from roughly the middle of his piece) is what I found creepiest: "According to one recent study, somewhere between twenty and twenty-seven per cent of the parents of four-to six-year-olds never restrict their children's viewing hours, never decide what programs they can watch, never change the channel when something objectionable comes on, and never forbid the watching of certain programs. It has apparently never occurred to these parents that television can be a bad influence, and it strains credulity to think that the advent of the V-chip is going to wake them up. Yet their families - mainly lower-income, ill-educated - are the very ones most in need of protection from television violence. Here is a rearranging effect with a vengeance: not only does the V-chip make television worse, it makes television worse precisely for those already most vulnerable to its excesses." I understood Gladwell's point to be, in essence, that the V-chip will allow TV producers to generate higher levels of morally impure content which he fears will pollute the minds of poor children because their parents are too stupid to protect them from the harmful content and too poor to buy new televisions which will include V-chips. While I think 95% of broadcast TV is crap which isn't worth the time expended watching it, even reading arguments like "poor people should be protected from harmful ideas they're too stupid (or too poorly educated) to avoid and too poor to purchase protection from" makes me feel dirty. I don't think Gladwell is, in any meaningful way, an opponent of government control of speech/expression - he's just an opponent of inefficient or optional forms of government control of speech/expression. He's a reasonable writer, but he's chosen to use his powers for evil instead of for good. (Some of his work is available on the web; apparently he once worked as a reporter for the Washington Post and is now on the staff of the New Yorker.) -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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