December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re:chek it out
by jamie＠comet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank god for procmail. jamie ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ jamie(a)comet.net | Comet.Net | Send empty message | Charlottesville, Va. | to pgpkey(a)comet.net | (804)295-2407 | for pgp public key. | http://www.comet.net | "When buying and selling are controlled by legislation, the first things to be bought and sold are legislators" -P.J. O'Rourke. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: ASM vs portable code [WAS: Re: Java DES breaker?]
by John Poole 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn wrote: > I remember sitting down with some ASM programmers in the mid 1980's > (using x86 PCs), and at that time, looking at the Codeview tracings, > it occurred to me that ASM would nearly always run 2x faster than 'C', > something that is inherent in the processes. This discussion sounds similar to the "C vs. Assembler" thread that's been raging on comp.lang.c for the past couple of months. The general consensus seems to be that on an x86 processor, using C for most of your program and using assembler sparingly is the best way to go. Plus, most compilers will produce code that runs about 1.2 - 1.5 times slower than your average assembler code. You mileage, of course, will vary. ----------------------------------------------- John Poole, 2A AM/CS, University of Waterloo http://www.undergrad.math.uwaterloo.ca/~jfpoole "I've gone too far, for too little."

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Van Eck articles
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Looking for: "Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An Eavesdropping Risk?" by Wim Van Eck, published in "Computers & Security," 1985, Vol 4 and "Protective Measures Against Compromising Electromagnetic Radiation Emitted by Video Display Terminals" by Professor Erhard Moller, Aachen University, 1990 (no source citation) Haven't found an electronic version of either of these yet, and will visit the good old "paper-based" library next week if no pointers show up. Thanks in advance... Joel

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No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>admit that HP (for example) is the best, reliability-wise, yet I have >purchased quite a few of their computers and major peripherals over the >past 20 years, and I have experienced an approximate 40% (!) defective >rate during the one-year warranty period, more than 30% falling within >the first three months. Dale, perhaps it's time for you to seek out a new career. Check that LA "Not a real paper" Times for things like "car wash assistant needed" and good luck.

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Re: sorry for the spam!
by msprague＠ridgecrest.ca.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

as of Sunday 23:00PST 12/15 he was using a mailto IP of 206.129.116.5 and http's to 192.41.31.20/thatguy/upyours.zip >Psionic Damage enscribed thusly: > >> I apologize 4 the spam, not my doing, Haven't figured out who waz >> responsible, but I will understand if I amd kicked off this list. >> Once again, I am sorry. > > The individual is a little shit operating a windows system on >IP address 206.129.116.108 as of Sunday evening. While the messages >where poping up on cypherpunks, one of the Received-By headers was >indicating his IP address. I was able to confirm his presence on the >network and determine it to be a windows system operating with the workstation >name of "MARLAEST" and a workgroup name of "ESTES ADVENTURE". He's not >operating a windows messaging pop-up or I would have sent him an appropriate >message of appreciation. Since it IS a windows system (and not running >sendmail) I think it is safe to assume that he IS the end point of this >bullshit. > > 206.129.116.108 is in a block assigned to Premier1 Internet, >Coordinator Michael Heuerman, mikheu(a)PREMIER1.NET (360-793-3658), who is also >getting a copy of this... > > This individual is still on line as of 22:43 EDT 12/15/96 > > Can someone kindly track this little asshole down and dump his sorry >ass in the nearest toxic waste dump? > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> ---------------------- >> Zer0 Faith Inc. H/P/A/V/C UNDER-WORLD >> www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 >> >> MEMBERZ: >> >> GATEMASTER, VIRIZZ, KRASH, EVIL TWIN, PHONEHAZORD, PSIONIC DAMAGE, >> MANTIKORE, ERADIKATOR, PSYCHODROME, SONIK, kOBRA, & KRYPTIK! >> >> EMAIL:zerofaith@nlights.net (headquarterz) hakker1(a)hotmail.com (Delious's >> Haus!) hackerz(a)juno.com (The Gatemaster'z palace) zerofaith(a)geocities.com >> (delivery/help/requests/suggestions) > > Mike >-- > Michael H. Warfield | (770) 985-6132 | mhw(a)WittsEnd.com > (The Mad Wizard) | (770) 925-8248 | http://www.wittsend.com/mhw/ > NIC whois: MHW9 | An optimist believes we live in the best of all > PGP Key: 0xDF1DD471 | possible worlds. A pessimist is sure of it! > >

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Re: Van Eck articles
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Looking for: > >"Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An Eavesdropping >Risk?" by Wim Van Eck, published in "Computers & Security," 1985, Vol 4 I OCR'd this and have it as either an 895K Word 5.1a (Mac) or 705K Acrobat document. I'll email a copy to anyone that's interested. > >and > >"Protective Measures Against Compromising Electromagnetic Radiation Emitted >by Video Display Terminals" by Professor Erhard Moller, Aachen University, >1990 (no source citation) I seem to have misplaced this document. However, I don't recall OCR'r it. -- Steve

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Carto international money-laundering/embezzlement case
by rcgraves＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> wrote: > > Further (and at the risk of being identified with a particular > political slant, which I don't have), this "newspaper" is actively > collaborating with other international interests to put the nail in > Free Speech, via the Holocaust issue. Carto of Liberty Lobby fame Apologies for replying to a crank whom most people are already ignoring, but I've got lots of material relating to the case of Legion v. Carto, which Dale summarizes quite wrongly, at http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/potw2/legion/ Cypherpunk relevance: HUGE. Money laundering, reputation control, data and tax havens, libertarian and Nazi fantasies, criminal cults, and a dog named Fido. Judge Maino: | I believe that I could appoint a platoon of lawyers and accountants | to look into this case and I would still not be much closer to answering | the following questions than I am today. The reason the truth will never | be fully known is because the parties, all highly intelligent and | capable, seem to have spent their lives forming organizations and then | transferring money between these organizations to avoid problems with | their opponents or the government. A good example of this is Ms. Farrel. | She gives up U.S. Citizenship, takes Columbian citizenship, and resides | in Switzerland to avoid taxes. She keeps her assets in the U.S., England, | Switzerland, Germany, Singapore and Japan. She sets up a Liberian | corporation, Neca, to take charge of her assets for the Legion which is a | Texas corporation doing business in California. Far from Dale's preoccupation with "international joo interests," it's a case of two neo-Nazi groups suing each other over the mismanagement of an inheritance. Stir in a little CoS interest (they want to cover up Marcellus's involvement with Holocaust denial and to associate recent legal actions against the cult in Germany with the Holocaust), and it's a veritable cornucopia of fruitcakes bashing each other, all over money for which no clear accounting can be made because it was always kept at least partly underground. Would that we could all do so well. The judge's letter on how he saw the witnesses is *very* entertaining. It's legion-vs-carto-letter.html in the above directory, but by all means, read it all. If you have soft copies of anything The Spotlight or any other pro-Carto rag has to say for itself, I'd be delighted to archive them, too. - -rich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMrT+85NcNyVVy0jxAQHhewIArARpR1DeaX+dKeyB+nAbL0otSEbtfO+I kRrfJMG6rR9TrMXPcRpj/ViWXvqEPOMNJoUXjv3xGfT6MoXcsuPFhQ== =f60U -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: sorry for the spam!
by Dagmar the Surreal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:49 PM 12/15/96 -0500, "Michael H. Warfield" <mhw(a)wittsend.com> wrote: >Psionic Damage enscribed thusly: > >> I apologize 4 the spam, not my doing, Haven't figured out who waz >> responsible, but I will understand if I amd kicked off this list. >> Once again, I am sorry. > > The individual is a little shit operating a windows system on >IP address 206.129.116.108 as of Sunday evening. While the messages >where poping up on cypherpunks, one of the Received-By headers was >indicating his IP address. I was able to confirm his presence on the >network and determine it to be a windows system operating with the workstation >name of "MARLAEST" and a workgroup name of "ESTES ADVENTURE". He's not >operating a windows messaging pop-up or I would have sent him an appropriate >message of appreciation. Since it IS a windows system (and not running >sendmail) I think it is safe to assume that he IS the end point of this >bullshit. > > 206.129.116.108 is in a block assigned to Premier1 Internet, >Coordinator Michael Heuerman, mikheu(a)PREMIER1.NET (360-793-3658), who is also >getting a copy of this... Aside from that, the traceroute of that IP address just happens to take it to nlights.net, which is apparently somehow affiliated with AOL, but in any case, the WWW pages the spam points to just HAPPEN to list down at the bottom an email address to contact the author which isn't a remailing service like geocities or hotmail. It's zerofaith(a)nlights.net. ^^^^^^^^^^^ Normally I don't like to call people liars in public, but I think that if Mr. Faith doesn't know who's responsible for the spam, then I'm the Queen of @#$%! England. ---------- Dagmar the Surreal, now with 50% less sodium! Coming in 1997--Surreal III, http://edge.edge.net/~dagmar (...now where did I leave that darn salt?)

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xxx
by IIR GmbH & Co 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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name.space. call for content
by mf＠MediaFilter.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello All, The black.hole in the net project is now online and functioning. Please add your project to the "switchboard" via the links generator accessable from the black.hole page: http://black.hole (or http://blackhole.autono.net) The page is beginning to get lots of hits, so now's the time to put up your stuff! Best wishes, Paul Garrin

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NYT: Faulty Crypto Policy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, December 16, 1996, p. A14. Another Faulty Encryption Policy [Editorial] The Clinton Administration has issued its third plan in as many years to keep powerful encryption programs for telephone and computer messages out of the hands of international terrorists and criminals. But this latest plan to control the export of encryption software, like the two before it, is unworkable and risks trampling on privacy rights and harming American software firms. Encryption in the hands of criminals unquestionably makes law enforcement hard. But the greatest use of encryption is by banks and other legal businesses that need to transmit confidential data without fear of interception. In legitimate hands, encryption helps to prevent crime. The Administration first sought to steer all Americans toward an encryption standard that Washington would design, thus preserving the Government's ability to tap phone calls. But after sharp criticism of Government snooping, the Administration retreated to a policy, still rejected by most privacy advocates and software firms, aimed at exports of encryption programs. The newly released regulations, which were supposed to implement the October policy, in fact make a flawed policy even worse. The one consistent thread through the Administration's plans is commitment to an encryption standard that uses mathematical "passwords" to scramble messages. The Government would then have the technical capacity to recover passwords, upon court order, and unscramble the phone or computer message. But the new policy will not succeed abroad. The Administration insists it needs not only to unscramble stored computer files but also to tap phone and computer messages, without the caller's knowledge, as they are transmitted. That would in effect require the foreign purchaser of American software to deposit its passwords with a reputable outside party -- a government agency, a bank or the computer firm from which it bought the software -- which would relinquish them upon court order and without notifying the user. What foreign company or individual will purchase software that is prey to undisclosed Government snooping when they can, buy equally powerful encryption from foreign firms that offer no such path for eavesdropping? The plan runs into other insolvable problems. It does not propose prohibiting powerful encryption software for domestic purchase, where such programs are constitutionally protected and already in wide use. Thus anyone could, with a few key strokes, send the domestically available programs over the Internet to Europe and beyond. The Administration also fears that software firms will write their programs so that the powerful domestic versions communicate readily with the easier-to-tap export products. If so, the technical result would be that criminals here and abroad could communicate out of reach of Government wiretaps. The Administration proposes to solve that problem by prohibiting software firms from providing easy communication between their domestic and export products. But that would make American export encryption programs unsellable abroad. A panel of the National Research Council recommended that Washington drop export restrictions on encryption software already available abroad, beef up the F.B.I.'s ability to crack private encryption codes and support private efforts to develop high quality encryption to stop illegal eavesdropping. Those steps will improve communications security and will not put Government law officers in corporate boardrooms, open E-mail to instant wiretaps or send foreign customers toward European and Asian software firms. [End]

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FER_mat
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-16-96. NYP Book review: Fermat's Last Theorem: Unlocking the Secret of an Ancient Mathematical Problem By Amir D. Aczel The world has many worlds, with the priestly cult of mathematicians, so mystifyingly and inaccessible to most people, among the more esoterically interesting of them. Aczel describes the intrigue and double-dealing in the international world of mathematical speculation, some of which involves Andrew Wile's proof of Fermat's theorem. ----- FER_mat ---------- The NYP reported on Wile's proof in January, 1995: http://jya.com/fermhak.txt (15 kb) FERM_hak

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SAV_eit
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-16-96. NYP: "Global Debate Over Treaties On Copyright" Given the overwhelming domestic objections to most of the treaty proposals, the obvious questions are: Who does support them? And why is the United States pushing so hard for them in Geneva? In fact, the main beneficiaries of the new copyright rules are the highest-stake copyright holders: rich, politically powerful entertainment and media conglomerates, which fear that pirated material will destroy the lucrative international market for products that can be digitally copied and distributed globally. In the digital world, computer software companies are already effectively using various data encryption technologies to protect their products for distribution over the network. And if progress to date is any indication, these technologies will become even more sophisticated and effective over time. ----- SAV_eit

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Re: ITARs effects
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

azur(a)netcom.com (Steve Schear) writes: > >Adam Shostack writes: > [snip] > > In my case the > >government's lawyer has made it quite clear that they would consider > >putting cryptographic software on a web site as a violation, and I > >don't think that for this purpose there is any distinction either in > >the government's mind or in reality between an FTP site and a web > >site. > > > > These changes are all aimed at making it harder to make money from strong > crypto and therefore reduce its common availability worldwide. They do > little to keep it from circulating worlwide, what ever its country of > origin as anonymous posting to a newsgroup is still straightforward. > > Look for more shareware and commercial crypto source to circulate in > printed, rather than machine-readable, form to take advantage of freedom of > speech rules. > > -- Steve >From the proposed regs: ----------------------- 16. Section 734.7 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows: 734.7 Published information and software. * * * * * Accordingly, such encryption software in both source code and object code remains subject to the EAR even if published in a book or any other writing or media. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ------------------------ Peter Trei trei(a)Process.com

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fwd: e-mail for free children's books for hospitals (fwd)
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded this anonymously so as not to get flames for being OFF Subject. Spread the spirit of Christmas :-) > --------- Begin forwarded message ---------- > From: Janet_Alfermann%TCI_DALLAS(a)trinityconsultants.com > To: James_McDonald(a)radian.com, > GARDNER.MINDY@epamail.epa.gov,kelemetcsl@bv.com, eriqe(a)aol.com, > ericscheier@worldnet.att.net,Denise_Ratcliff@mgind.com,CN=KNICKREHM.DENISE_A/O=Trinity_Consultants@KANSAS-CITY.VA.GOV,jumisch@cris.com, > stelzer(a)tannalum.attmail.com, effland@juno.com,kopecky@sky.net, > tjalfer(a)is.usmo.com, pderner@umr.edu,jderner@marvin.ecc.cc.mo.us, > eckelkac@river.it.gvsu.edu,gg14stu@semovm.semo.edu, > Laura.Dulle@anheuser-busch.com,rseggelk@redwood.DN.HAC.COM, > rebecca.light@qm.sprintcorp.com,michelle_wilde_at_NIL001@ccmailgw.mcgawpark.baxter.com,redingers@earthlink.net, > spring@terra.geology.indiana.edu,schroedp@mail.olathe.k12.ks.us, > kupneski.mj(a)pg.com, plutz(a)umr.edu > Subject: Please read > Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1996 14:22:45 -0500 > Message-ID: <862563FF:006DB8EA.00@mail.trinityconsultants.com> > > > > > > Christmas spirit INTERNET style. > > The Houghton-Mifflin publishing co. is giving books to children's > hospitals; how many books they give depends on how many emails they > receive from people around the world. For every 25 emails they > receive, they give one book--it seems like a great way to help a good > cause. > > All you have to do is email share(a)hmco.com. > > Hope you can spare the seconds...and let your friends know. So far > they only have 3, 400 messages...last year they reached 23,000. > > Merry Christmas > > > > > --------- End forwarded message ---------- > > > --

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Zerofaith/Mail Bomb (fwd)
by Michael H. Warfield 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All... flagg(a)nlights.net enscribed thusly: > From nlights.net!flagg Mon Dec 16 02:56:39 1996 > Date: Sun, 15 Dec 1996 23:57:28 -0800 > From: flagg(a)nlights.net > Message-Id: <TCPSMTP.16.12.15.-9.57.28.2446633616.3387407(a)nlights.net> > Subject: Zerofaith/Mail Bomb > To: mhw(a)wittsend.com > After examining the header to the email bomb you recieved, it was > determined that the person was not "MARLA ESTES" but a user named > "Eradicator". The date is off by one day in the header file, check it > out, (though we do keep logs of the ppp logons). Well... I was close... :-) Only excuse I've got for missing that one little detail is that it was late... Good thing she didn't have a message pop-up. Hate collateral damage. > Eradicators account was removed as well as "Zerofaiths" and another > alias he hides under, "Kobra". This was quick action after we had managed to identify roughly where the nonsense was originating. These guys did good. > If you have any questions, feel free to call me voice at 206-259-6417, > or email back. I have no problem giving out the information we have to > you. > Mike Carpenter > Delivered from Northern Lights BBS, Everett, WA. Mike -- Michael H. Warfield | (770) 985-6132 | mhw(a)WittsEnd.com (The Mad Wizard) | (770) 925-8248 | http://www.wittsend.com/mhw/ NIC whois: MHW9 | An optimist believes we live in the best of all PGP Key: 0xDF1DD471 | possible worlds. A pessimist is sure of it!

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 16 Dec 96 6:49:25 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ************ 14:59 99.98% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu -++-+++*++++ 41:38 99.98% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +*+******+** 32:02 99.96% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 34:51 99.93% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ------+----+ 2:57:46 99.90% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ------------ 2:57:37 99.88% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#**+ *-++* 11:55 99.58% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com +########* * 2:36 99.51% replay remailer(a)replay.com -- -+**+*+- 32:21 99.43% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++ ++++++ 1:18:02 99.22% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++-+-++++ + 1:19:04 99.08% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ------ -..- 7:21:13 98.40% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -+++++ ++ .+ 3:00:38 98.13% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com #****+****** 27:28 93.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -._.-.-++* 8:44:55 92.01% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #*###+#*#+ 2:53 84.35% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com . --__.. 25:50:51 79.18% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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RE: !! Point 'n Crypt -- Win95 Privacy for Everyone !!
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Walt Armour <walt(a)blarg.net> > To: "'Matthew Ghio'" <ghio(a)myriad.alias.net> > Cc: "cypherpunks(a)toad.com" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> > Subject: RE: !! Point 'n Crypt -- Win95 Privacy for Everyone !! > Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1996 22:30:23 -0800 > There is no arguing that 40 bits is strong security. I agree with that. [...] > As for security, the current release of PnC is primarily targetting > privacy, not security. They are two very similar but different approaches. > 40 bits is sufficient to encrypt files and keep them away from friends, > family and coworkers (unless you work at the NSA). The point of Point 'n > Crypt is to attempt to make encryption technology easily useable and > widespread. If anything you have is of such a nature that 40 bits isn't > enough protection then by all means don't use PnC (at least not this > version :). [...] > later, > walt Would you mind telling us just how you expand the 40 key to the 56 bits needed for DES? (Security through obscurity has a bad rep on this list). For many methods of doing so, 40bit DES is NOT secure against a motivated individual's attack. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Re: Would you send money to Gary Rasmussen ?
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i have done a lot of business with Gary in the past, and recommend him without reservations. -paul > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Fri Dec 13 18:15:33 1996 > Date: Fri, 13 Dec 96 19:54:50 GMT > From: peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk (Peter M Allan) > To: 75542.1003(a)compuserve.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, jimg(a)mentat.com > Subject: Would you send money to Gary Rasmussen ? > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 1344 > > > > > > Gary Rasmussen (RagyR(a)aol.com) replies to me as below: > > Have people got a view on the second question ? I've had > no contact with Gary before and he may very well be honest; > but there's proper trust and there's stupidity. > > > Hi Peter, > > > > > I'm looking for Kahn's book. Have you an acccurate price now? > > > > A lot of copies (about 100) have been sold since .... > > > > > > > (And is there anyone I'd know who'd suggest I send you money ?!) > > > > Good question, but very hard to answer since I don't know who you > > know. Can tell you that I operate Classical Crypto Books primarily as > > a service for other members of the ACA. Two possible references are > > the current and past ACA presidents: > > > > jimg(a)mentat.com (Jim Gillogly, ACA President 1996-1998) > > 75542.1003(a)CompuServe.COM (Randy Nichols, ACA President 1994-1996) > > > > Operating CCB is not my main occupation (by day I'm a scientist working > > for MIT's Lincoln Lab). Can also say proudly that in 1.5 years of operating > > CCB I haven't had any complaints. > > > > Please let me know if you have other questions or would like a complete > > copy of the CCB catalog. > > > > Best Wishes, > > Gary Rasmussen > > Classical Crypto Books >

1 0

Germany to regulate the Web.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from the www-security list. Germany seems to want to: 1. Require blocking of German-verboten material. 2. Mandate content labling (PICS?) 3. Ban 'cookies'. 4. Require Digital Signatures on all net traffic. -pt ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Sun, 15 Dec 1996 23:48:32 -0800 To: www-security(a)ns2.rutgers.edu Subject: Germany bans cookies! (and a whole lot more) From: nobody(a)cypherpunks.ca (John Anonymous MacDonald, a remailer node) web servers within Germany anyway... as of August 97... see below Germany Passes Sweeping Cyberspace Law The German government approved a bill Wednesday aimed at regulating the Internet and protecting user privacy while banning smut, pro-Nazi content and online fraud. The so-called "multimedia law" essentially extends current German laws to the dominion of cyberspace, placing responsibility for suspect content on suppliers, but without clearly defining whether a supplier could also be construed to make a carrier -- such as an online service like CompuServe or AOL Bertelsmann Online -- also liable. The law is scheduled to take effect in August 1997, prior to the 1998 deregulation of the European telecommunications market. Under the law, online services could be held responsible for illegal material if they have the technology to block transmission of such content, and after notification, still disseminate the objectionable content. The law also calls for content to be tagged electronically if unsuitable for minors to ensure it could be filtered out --similar to the V-chip television initiative in the U.S. The law would also prohibit "cookies" -- tiny programs that trace a user's path through the Net, recording what they visit, examine and purchase. Instead, the law would require that services give users the opportunity to use a site or service anonymously. The German law also puts into place the idea of so called "digital signatures" -- a string of coded information which would clearly identify the origin of messages, files and images shipped via the Net. Such signatures would use a central authority to prevent fraudulent commercial transactions on the computer network by matching a publicly accessible data string with a confidential string of numbers, also called a key. www.mediacentral.com/Magazines/MediaDaily/Archive/1996121207.html/634827

1 0

[QUERY]Point-n-Crypt URL (???)
by Mullen Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To avoid flame wars, I know "...40-bit DES is not secure." I'm just interested in the interface, etc. Unfortunately, I lost the URL of where to DL a demo. Could someone please forward me this information? Thanks! PM

1 0

Re: Gov't Clarifes Position-Surprise!
by Harondel J. Sibble 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 16 Dec 96 at 0:26, pgp-fone(a)rivertown.net wrote: > Expect some form of cooperation with EC governments if this stuff goes > through. The recent posting to cypherpunks about the "radikal" raid in the > Netherlands is probably a good foreshadowing of this. If you have not seen the > article, and want to, I will be happy to remail it. > > > Tim Scanlon > Tim, please send me the article when you have a moment, thanks! > Cheers Harondel J. Sibble (aka The Juice-Meister) homepage >> http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/Harondel_Sibble/ email >> sibble(a)infomatch.com or 75301.157(a)compuserve.com PGP public key >> finger sibble(a)infomatch.com

1 0

Van Eck articles, reply..
by AaronH4321＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I went to the library and found an article on Van Eck. I posted it at my site. It was a little long to e-mail. Check it out at: http://members.aol.com/aaronh4321/vaneck.html If anyone has more current information please e-mail me. Aaron....

1 0

No Subject
by Casey Iverson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1 0

PUBLIC: Citibank Visa & the FBI
by pjb＠ny.ubs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sometime ago, i saw a thread about citibank giving someone, i think it was the fbi, some visa account information to use in a sting opereation. will someone please give me a pointer to this thread? cheers, -paul

1 0

RE: Securing ActiveX.
by Blake Coverett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This thread branch seems to be based on bad assumption. Why would one want to run ActiveX controls in a sandbox? If you need a sandbox, use a Java applet, if you need native code level access to the system use ActiveX. Running code in a sandbox, a la Java applets, is one approach to allowing safe execution of downloaded code. If one has a perfect implementation of the sandbox, which doesn't appear to be the case for Java thus far, this can be a useful solution. There is however a severe limit to the types of applications you can run from inside a sandbox unless you subscribe completely to the 'Network Computer'-type model. Digitally signed code, a la ActiveX, is another approach to the same problem. If the digital signatures and infrastructure around them are sound, which they appear to be for ActiveX, this is also a useful solution. The built-in gotcha with this model is the all or nothing nature, either I trust the software publisher to run arbitrary native code on my machine or I don't run it at all. Specify technical issues follow: > It can be done under 95 but Microsoft will have to write a Sandbox > Virtual Machine (a Virtual x86 session whose API's are filtered to > prevent access to certain things like the file system, and disables > direct I/O.) Not that easy under '95, but it already exists for NT. But of course it's not enough to filter out filesystem calls. The entire windowing system would have to be separated as well. For example a rogue control might watching all edit controls for ones that have the ES_PASSWORD style and grabbing the contents. An equivalent Unix problem would be to allow an open-access guest account with the ability to transfer in and execute arbitrary binaries. While doing this securely may be possible in theory I don't think the state of the art is up to it today. (I sure wouldn't allow it on my system.) > The problem is how to deal with DLL's. You don't know all > features/functions of all DLL's. It may be possible to write a DLL that > runs outside the sandbox and can act as a proxy to the file system, so > it's iffy unless you limit the DLL's and services that ActiveX apps talk > to, and make them all live inside the sandbox. DLL's are by definition mapped into the processes address space, they would have to be inside the sandbox too. It's not a call gate type of thing. regards, -Blake

4 3

unsubscirbe
by Andrew Fairbanks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

would someone please take me off the list apf(a)ma.ultranet.com Thankyou

2 1

Re: Van Eck articles, reply..
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Aaron wrote: >I went to the library and found an article on Van Eck. I posted it at my >site. It was a little long to e-mail. Check it out at: > > http://members.aol.com/aaronh4321/vaneck.html > >If anyone has more current information please e-mail me. Christopher Seline wrote a well-known critique in 1989 of TEMPEST: "Eavesdropping On the Electromagnetic Emanations of Digital Equipment: The Laws of Canada, England and the United States." It includes numerous citations, including those mentioned by Joel and the one you found. He claims that the Van Eck article was "purposely misleading." We've put his article at: http://jya.com/tempest.htm Seline promised a later version of what he called a rough draft. Does anyone know of a successor to the 1989 article?

1 0

Army Cryptanalysis manual online
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The US Army's Field Manual on Basic Cryptanalysis (FM 34-40-2), dated September 1990 is available for downloading as an Acrobat PDF file from: http://www.atsc-army.org/cgi-win/$atdl.exe/fm/34-40-2/default.htm Fairly classic in nature (substitution, transposition, and code systems). Huge files (so far, at 28.8, after about an hour and a half, I've only been able to grab the table of contents and a couple of appendices - some kind-hearted person with a T1 or greater may want to get everything, then zip and mirror to save us bandwidth challenged folks the pain). Also, for the complete listings of almost 300 downloadable FMs through the Army's Digital Training Library (ATDL), check out: http://www.atsc-army.org/cgi-win/$atdl.exe?type=fm&header=%2Fatdl%2Fbrowse%2 Ffm.htm Have fun! Joel Note: This site isn't wholly reliable. It seems to regularly go up and down, and sometimes the bandwidth is terrible. Probably worth your patience though.

3 3

U.S.S. Liberty
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C. May is another loser who pays for got.net because he lacks the mental capacity to gain net access as a perk of either employment or academic achievment. o)__ (_ _`\ Tim C. May z/z\__)

1 0

Making bridges...
by jlucas4＠capital.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mailing list: Don't want to be a bother but... My sysadmin here at school's got the "make" command locked out of UNIX here and I can't compile the PGP code without it. If anyone has a bridge for this then please let me know. Jeigh

1 0

Hard to Tax Scenario
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robin Hanson, inventor of the Idea Futures prediction market, is a very creative and thoughtful writer who has posted to this list occasionally. He says he sent the message below to the CP list over the weekend, but I didn't see it. I am including it (in bits and pieces) in its entirety for the benefit of others who may also have missed it. Robin Hanson, <hanson(a)hss.caltech.edu>, writes: > Hi. The volume here is too high for me to subscribe regularly, but I > subscribed recently so I could ask the following question: > > How well thought out is the notion that widespread crypto could > allow a large fraction (>30%?) of the economy to avoid taxation? > > I've heard this speculation many times, and just saw it in print in, > in David Friedman's article in the summer '96 issue of Social > Philosophy and Policy. But I have trouble imagining how it could > work. For those who don't know, by the way, David Friedman is the son of Nobel prize winning economist Milton Friedman. Both father and son have libertarian leanings, and David in particular has tackled some of the hardest problems which would be faced by an anarchic society. > Imagine Ann is a doctor who wants to ply her trade without taxation. > Patients go a local high res medical net booth, which Ann runs from > long distance using several real time digital mixes. To do this, Ann > spends most of each day in her expensive home VR room. So we are imagining a future scenario in which medicine is commonly if not universally practiced via these remote means? Or do we have two classes of doctor, the anonymous virtual ones and the identified ones that you go and see in person? I ask because at least some of the difficulties Ann faces seem due to her virtual practice. > Patients pay Ann in untraceable cash, which she uses to pay for > groceries and other net services. Her cover story about why she > spends so much time in her home VR room, and how she pays for > groceries, is that she is a receptionist for some sham company. The need for a cover story raises the question of from whom Ann has to keep her secrets. In a society where (we will stipulate) 30% avoid taxation, the moral significance of not paying taxes will be different than it is today. We had some interesting posts in an earlier discussion on this list describing the situation in Italy, where apparently tax avoidance is raised to a higher degree than in the U.S. It sounded like it has the approximate moral status that speeding does here, a minor infraction which almost everyone does some if not all of the time. In some sub-cultures no doubt the tax avoidance rate would be even higher. In such a society Ann may not have to care that much about keeping her secrets, as long as she doesn't have too high a profile at tax time. > Ann has many collegues which she does business with regularly, > including equipment suppliers, a pharmacist, a nurse practitioner, > emergency substitutes, and various specialists. Ann has never met any > of these people in person, and they all show each other fake faces, > voices, and even rythms of walking and speaking. Ann's social life > outside VR is entirely divorced from her work life. Well, that last part is true for me already; I telecommute to a company 300 miles away and have no social life with my co-workers. For that matter my wife and I have practiced cocooning for several years, and I haven't had a close friend from work since the early 1980's. Being married makes this easier, of course. The other part of this scenario, where Ann interacts with her co-workers via fake faces, does seem disturbing. I could imagine, though, that this might be common in such a culture. Maybe everyone pretties themselves up when on the videophone. If there is widespread understanding that most faces are at least somewhat false, then perhaps going all the way to a completely faked up face would seem more acceptable. But to someone from my generation it will be hard to accept. > To convince patients to trust her, Ann gets bonded by a certification > service. To obtain this certification, Ann must be careful to not > refer to any people who know her "true name", such as her teachers at > the physical school she physically attended. And Ann must somehow > assure the certification service that she will not resell the > certification, allowing others to pretend that they are her. It is possible that we might see a more performance-based certification rather than a recommendation based one. My wife is a physical therapist, and she had to pass a licensure exam given by the state which qualifies her to practice. In an earlier message to me Robin pointed out the crucial role played by recommendations in hiring decisions. Certainly I would be much more likely to hire someone who listed his previous jobs and for whom I could get good recommendations by his earlier supervisors than an applicant who insisted that this information was confidential. Robin also suggested that there could be a selection effect, so that the doctors from good schools with good grades would use these advantages to maximize their income, and so the only anonymous ones would be the ones who didn't have these qualifications. This could lead to a situation where most anonymous service providers were assumed to be inferior to regular ones, so they would get less money even if they were actually just as good. (I apologize to Robin if I missed the point of his earlier discussion or am presenting it incorrectly.) Even with such disadvantages, a doctor like Ann might accept a lower fee at first while she builds up her reputation as an anonymous doctor with talent and ability. After a few years she could hope to have overcome the stigma which (we will suppose) anonymous doctors face and display some strong recommendations based on her successes. In the long run this could be a winning strategy due to the tax savings. (I haven't given the problem of reselling certificates enough thought to discuss it in any detail. There have been some discussions of "is a person" credentials which could apply, but that opens up a big can of worms.) > If Ann ever slips up, revealing her true name to a virtual associate, > failing to convince a physical associate of her sham employment, > or if anyone ever breaks through her realtime digital mixes, Ann > is open to expensive blackmail, she may have to start over with a > new virtual persona, and may have to go to jail for a long time. This is an interesting problem which I haven't seen discussed before in this form. In Vinge's original "True Names" people were afraid of harrassment and physical threats if their identity were discovered, but Robin's example of the danger of being exposed as a tax evader could be very bad as well. If there is this much tax avoidance, we might assume that tax rates are high, and penalties for tax evasion are high as well. On the other hand, if tax evasion is nearly universally practiced, perhaps there are strong cultural pressures against turning someone in. There is also the question of how good the technology is for anonymous communication. At best it would appear to require a widespread infra- structure, and if this is used largely for tax evasion it is hard to see how it could survive. So I think this would be a very significant issue to be faced by the prospective 'nym. > It seems to me that Ann is paying a high price for an ability to > avoid taxation, and at current tax rates it is hard for me to believe > that she wouldn't just rather pay the taxes. What am I missing? > > Robin D. Hanson hanson(a)hss.caltech.edu http://hss.caltech.edu/~hanson/ It is hard to judge how high the various prices are that she pays. The socialization aspect may not be important if she has friends outside work. The risks of being caught will depend on factors we don't know, like the technology and legal system. Rather than assuming that tax rates are the same, it might be more plausible to assume they have gone up in order to keep revenues stable. Another problem which Robin didn't mention is the issue of insurance payments. It is hard to see how Ann's patients can get reimbursed for their expenses if we assume that Ann is in effect a "black market" doctor. This problem may be somewhat specific to the medical scenario, but I suspect that many other professions are going to have trouble switching to a cash basis. Anyone whose customers are businesses, for example, will face the problem that the businesses' books will need to show that an expense is justified in order to deduct it. This will be a major problem for the "anonymous firm" we have discussed occasionally. One difficulty I find with this scenario is its science fictional nature. It is hard for me to consider details about the life of a doctor who works via VR. Also, if we are already in a situation where 30% of people are avoiding taxes there will certainly have been major changes in society, but I don't know what they will be. This makes it hard for me to focus on the issues specific to Ann's anonymity. However I do like Robin's choice of a concrete and vivid example like this. Hal

3 2

Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey, i can doit to... RareTrip -------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- begin 644 greets.com MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` ` end -------------------------------------->>CLIP<<---------------

1 0

Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

1 0

Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

1 0

Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >>From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >>Subject: Encryption to the poors >>>>Hey, i can doit to... >>RareTrip >>-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >>begin 644 greets.com >>MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >>M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >>MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >>M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >>M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >>M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >>M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >>M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >>MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >>M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >>MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >>M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >>M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >>M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >>M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >>G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >>` >>end >>-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >> >

1 0

Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

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Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

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Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

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This list sucks
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

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Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

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Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

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Encryption to the poors
by Fuck＠yourself.up 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Fuck(a)yourself.up >Subject: Encryption to the poors > >Hey, i can doit to... >RareTrip >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >begin 644 greets.com >MZPJ\3"<!40)2`98#OB8!B_Z+#@@!BQ8"`;AW`5#\K3/"JXO0XOA_R+8/>XT/ >M1XQW]#?&_D'\#TT,O5EX4\U\2(T/1XQ_]#^%K7]5@X4(__&!A@&4%7LJ14C1 >MWN^D>Z/9Y!C\43_,RS"R5JI(@ERBOU?^"/4G"@'KL`)-Z+!_-``N``!V`%P` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M``````````````````````"_:KW4:+S3"[GUK,(a)^GMM)2PCU4;N[^!MY.WDX >M>3A'\7022H4*2[_!('<KN[XZ>1IT,KFI"+N\3WEOOTR;:NFS3PY'N^/S49B[ >MWCIY&GD.>0Y!)RX'*Q\M'VD@=U:[PQMY.W0FN;T$N[!/>6^_!\HG^S**B5R[ >M6""_#L83>1V_"/GQ^<C&47E@>1]Y'WD8>1AY;E^97\PZ!"P?*1<O%VD@=RN[ >MOCIY&B:W7ZT.,;O'('D8#E.XIR._(<@,N[@Z>1IY;7EM#-@Z&`1=D@X`LG<: >M``````````````````````````````````!7:0D<-V]S```````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` >M````ZE>_5KA6N,<%>O![L,00@V#58Q(1I+[3#@`_\LDK`.A9@;#XZ,8!OOSR >G6$NDN+L`N[D`N;H`NKT`O;X`OK\`OPX?``"RX4-!_[[X_A\JY]<` >` >end >-------------------------------------->>CLIP<<--------------- >

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Anonymous hate mail from John Gilmore, his friends, and lovers
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

More shit from some "cypher punk" asshole: >Received: (from daemon@localhost) by abraham.cs.berkeley.edu (8.7.5/local) id RAA17454 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Mon, 16 Dec 1996 17:14:06 -0800 >Date: Mon, 16 Dec 1996 17:14:06 -0800 >Message-Id: <199612170114.RAA17454(a)cypherpunks.ca> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com >From: nobody(a)cypherpunks.ca (John Anonymous MacDonald, a remailer node) >Comments: There is _no way_ to determine the originator of this message. > If you wish to be blocked from receiving all mail from the remailer > network, send your request to the <remailer-operators(a)c2.org> > mailing list. The operator of this particular node can be > reached at <remailer-admin(a)cypherpunks.ca>. >References: <2Js2yD23w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> > >Could you please stop wasting the time of cypherpunks with your stupid >vendettas? Your posts are consistently a stupid waste of time. "Cypher punks" have no life.

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RE: Securing ActiveX.
by Blake Coverett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim McCoy wrote: > The other problem is that the proposed Authenticode system and other "signed > applet" systems only provide accountability after the fact. This is little > help when your hard drive is toast and the only proof you had was a logfile > which was the first thing erased... No, it's not really the accountability that's the issue. It's the ability to choose before the fact that I 'trust' the software's author. > The illusion that only "trusted software > puslishers" will be given blanket authorization is a pipe dream: users are > sheep who will hit that "OK" dialog box as many times as necessary to get the > tasty treat they are anticipating (and there is actual experimental evidence > to back this up :) Yup, point well taken. <story user=clueless>I popped into an empty users cube last week to borrow the phone. On the monitor was a post-it note from one of his co-workers that read, 'Please write your password here:' and of course the helpful fellow had done just that.</story> With real users I suspect only centrally administered security decisions that they can't override will be effective. Hmm... wonder what I can retrofit into IE to accomplish that. > I expect that the first post-Authenticode ActiveX virus > will be one to modify the signature checking routines or add additional keys > to the registry which makes the second round of the attack appear to be a > valid OS update from Microsoft. Shh... we have enough kool dewds floating around here looking for ideas. > The state of the art was up to it quite a while ago. Check out KeyKOS and > other OSes which use capability semantics for access control. I agree 100%. The intent of my comments was that such security *is* possible, but it's not available in widely deployed mass-market OS's. I'd love to hear feedback to the contrary, but it seems to me that it's extremely difficult to layer that type of security onto an existing system. -Blake (who's thinking about putting crazy glue into one user's floppy drive)

3 2

ElGamal
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May is widely recognized on the net, because of his frequent vitriolic postings, as someone/thing ready to cut off his own penis to spite the testicles, although his friends recognize him better from the rear. __o _ \<_ Tim May (_)/(_)

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RE: !! Point 'n Crypt -- Win95 Privacy for Everyone !!
by Walt Armour 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Security through obscurity is no security at all. As for PnC (actually, the scCryptoEngine beneath it), we get the 40 bits from the 56 bits by nulling out the high nybble of every other byte. walt ---------- From: Peter Trei[SMTP:trei@process.com] Sent: Monday, December 16, 1996 2:02 AM To: walt(a)blarg.net; cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: RE: !! Point 'n Crypt -- Win95 Privacy for Everyone !! > From: Walt Armour <walt(a)blarg.net> > To: "'Matthew Ghio'" <ghio(a)myriad.alias.net> > Cc: "cypherpunks(a)toad.com" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> > Subject: RE: !! Point 'n Crypt -- Win95 Privacy for Everyone !! > Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1996 22:30:23 -0800 > There is no arguing that 40 bits is strong security. I agree with that. [...] Would you mind telling us just how you expand the 40 key to the 56 bits needed for DES? (Security through obscurity has a bad rep on this list). For many methods of doing so, 40bit DES is NOT secure against a motivated individual's attack. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Re: ASM vs portable code [WAS: Re: Java DES breaker?]
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 14 Dec 1996 21:28:46 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >> Averaging several runs: >> "C": 102,300 crypts/sec >> ASM: 238,000 crypts/sec >Someone on this list should know if it is possible to maximize speed in >a typical 'C' routine, using Register variables (particularly for loops), >inlining everything possible, etc., to get executable code much closer >than a factor of 2x difference. Can it be done on a PC, and how hard >would it be to explain, to cover a representative variety of techniques? A good optimizing compiler comes _close_ to hand coded, especially with the many new concerns on Pentium+ processors (pipeline optimization, fpu tricks, etc). # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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permanent invasion of privacy
by attila＠primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'll pass the article along... I'm not sure I wish to even comment on the two social worker do-gooders who are proposing [and have legislation introduced] something worse than Hillary's "It take a global village" other than $E^&*&@!!! the absolute ultimate on invasion of privacy imaginable. might as well add this one to: "...they get my weapon, still smoking, from my cooling hand." or maybe: "54-40 or fight" needless to say, any member of the cypherpunk list would be an automatic loser in this game of life. I for one believe ability and drive is signicifantly more genetics than social environment. -attila == I'll get a life when it is proven and substantiated to be better than what I am currently experiencing. --attila ************** forwarded article **************** LICENSING PARENTS REVISITED The December 1996 edition of the journal Society contains a symposium on the subject of "Licensing Parents" -- a totalitarian proposal with which regular readers of The New American may be familiar. (See "Whose Child Is This?" in our November 28, 1994 issue and "Are You Fit to Be a Parent? in our January 23, 1995 issue.) Included in the symposium were Dr. Jack C. Westman of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, author of Licensing Parents: Can We Prevent Child Abuse and Neglect? and Professor David T. Lykken of the University of Minnesota, author of The Antisocial Personalities. Westman and Lykken are the most prominent advocates of a system of parental licensure in which parents would have to be certified "competent" by the government before being permitted to raise a child. In his Society essay, Lykken writes, "I will testify in support of a parental licensure bill to be introduced at the next session of the Minnesota State Legislature. The only sanction proposed in this bill for unlicensed parents who produce a child is periodic visits by child- protection caseworkers who will do an annual audit of each child's physical, social, and educational progress." However, Lykken asserts, "Minnesotans and their legislative representatives will [eventually] recognize the need to take one further step. That step, I suggest, should be to take custody of babies born to unlicensed mothers, before bonding occurs, and to place them for adoption or perma- nent care by professionally trained and supervised foster parents." Nor is this the last step that Lykken would take toward the abolition of parental authority by the state. The December 17, 1994 Minneapolis Star-Tribune reported, "Under Lykken's system, if children were born to un- licensed parents, the state would intervene immediately. Licenses would be checked in hospital maternity wards. Unlicensed parents would lose their children permanently. Adoptions would be final and irreversible." Furthermore, according to Lykken, "Repeat offenders might be required to submit to an implant of Norplant [a surgical contra- ceptive] as a way to keep them from having another baby for five years." Source: Insider Report, p.12 The New American December 23, 1996

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Re: KRA_gak
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:50 AM 12/13/96 -0500, John Young wrote: > 12-12-96 > "High-Tech Leaders to Facilitate Recovery of Encrypted > Information Globally. Key Recovery Alliance Welcomes 29 > New Members" > The key recovery alliance has more than tripled its membership > and identified its charter objectives. > + expediting the widespread, global use of strong encryption > + evaluating technologies that are flexible and scaleable to meet > various changing commercial needs and policies > + promoting interoperability between different key recovery and > non-key recovery solutions > + defining a commercial infrastructure for worldwide development > of strong encryption > + maximizing security for business While this will, of course, be obvious to those frequenting CP, notice a curious fact here: The commentary above refers to the organization as a "Key Recovery Alliance." Well, one might normally expect that organizations are usually named based on their primary raison d'etre. Yet, the objectives listed above clearly do not require, or even desire, "Key Recovery." Quite the opposite, in fact. If there was any need to demonstrate the illegitimacy of this arrangement to the press or public, you need merely show that the people and organizations participating in it don't even consider the goal implicit in the name to be a desireable outcome. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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