December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

SPI_bux
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-22-95, NYPaper: "When Spies Look Out For the Almighty Buck." "The fact of the matter is that the intelligence agencies are the center where all this is put together -- the economic, the political and the security concerns," said Robert B. Zoellick, a former top State Department official who handled much of the economic portfolio in the Bush Administration. "And perhaps that makes sense, because they should have more detachment than the individual economic agencies would." "Economic Espionage." Editorial The C.I.A. has not made a convincing case why it should start from almost no base to build a center for economic intelligence and analysis when the Government can hire outside experts or look to agencies like the Treasury Department that already have more knowledgeable staffs. William Casey had many faults as Director of Central Intelligence in the Reagan Administration. But he did know a thing or two about economics. Whenever he wanted economic intelligence, Mr. Casey often said, he would ask a businessman, not an intelligence analyst. SPI_bux (14 kb)

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RE: Let's Not Merge Mailing Lists, OK?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:11 PM 10/26/95, Ali Bahreman wrote: >Being subscribed to cypherpunks is not a prerequisite for following the list; >thanks to its hypermail archive and numerous filters. No,. of course it isn't. But copying the www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com mailiing list on a post, as you and some others did, is much more than following the list with hypermail and other such tools: it is actively posting to two mailing lists. Sometimes this is OK, but often it results in two lists only marginally educated in the issues of the other list. I replied at more length to Ali in private, but will say here that anyone is welcome to join the Cypherpunks list and to read up on the FAQs and archives of past discussions. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: idle CPU markets
by Stephan Somogyi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:45 26.10.95, Wei Dai wrote: > What other problems would benefit from easy access to lots of > distributed CPU cycles? It would be within the capability of smaller animation houses to render a feature length computer-animated film at high quality without significant capital equipment expenditure or excessive rental costs. If the granularity of transaction is per-frame (not unreasonable for a night's worth of cycles), the evil participant problem is avoidable since each frame would have to be inspected by a person, and payment for a correct frame approved by same, before it's integrated into the film. _______________________________________________________________________ Stephan Somogyi Senior Editor Digital Media

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Re: idle CPU markets
by jpb＠miamisci.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:45 PM 10/26/95, you wrote: >What other problems would benefit from easy access to lots of distributed >CPU cycles? 3D Rendering and Physics simulations come immediately to mind. signoff 2048bit-Fingerprint: 74 64 C7 6F 51 72 36 3D 87 75 F9 F5 2A F6 8F 74 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Help Phil! email zldf(a)clark.net or see http://www.netresponse.com/zldf

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type trapz...
by rwm132＠psu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

looking for a good /type trap/ program... any directions? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CATCH 22 PHANZINE $1 ppd please 4915 Woodbury Dr. Erie PA 16510-6413 rwm132(a)email.psu.edu ~~ issue four~~ ________________________________________ \/ØË £|ßËRÃR|Ã|\| |\/|ØP|-|ËRÜÇKËR

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Re: newsweek oct 30 Levy digital cash article
by Steve Bryan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>also, my question about whether one loses the downloaded Chaumian bucks >if one's hard drive crashes was answered in the affirmative by Levy. > >But as I said, if the drive is backed up you don't lose it. It's my >understanding this is the case with the current Digicash/Twain bucks. >But not necessarily with all implementations. > >This "lose your money" with digital cash really does seem to get to >people. I always point out that when you take $ out of an ATM machine, >you don't expect to get it back if you lose it. For those forms of >e-money that are irretrevable when lost users are warned not to download >huge amounts. > >Question: will people's worries about losing their e-money lead them to >accept a higher degree of tracibility as a tradeoff? I have a question about Digicash that I haven't seen addressed. I've participated in the beta test but have to admit I didn't use it with great frequency. I only downloaded $10 at a time. What surprised me was that one time I was informed that the money I had downloaded had expired. I was able to go back and pick up more but am perplexed with what happenned in that case. Does digicash actually age and disappear if not used soon enough? -Steve Bryan

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Re: Linux security issues
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:23 10/26/95 -0500, Aleph One wrote: > I dont see what this has to do with Linux. The question should >be does the PGP pass phrase ever apper in a swap partition/file. Actually keeping the pass phrase out of swap space is fairly easy (although I havn't looked at the PGP code to see if it actually does this). Read the pass phrase in raw mode, one character at a time and convert it one character at a time to the decryption key for the private RSA key. Then the OS doesn't need to buffer the whole line, either in kernel space or in user space. However, the pass phrase is not the only dangerous information. Intermediate forms used for decrypting the RSA private keys, and the decrypted RSA private keys also have to be protected. The logic of PGP requires that it keep at least one of these around for a long time, so it will probably be written to swap space. N.B. This problem affects all virtual memory operation systems. I can think of the Unix/Linux family, MacOS with virtual memory turned on, and most mainframe OSs (e.g. IBM's VM/ESA). ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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pub key expert wanted
by rschlafly＠attmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re: Schlafly v. Public Key Partners & RSA Data Security I am deposing the inventors, but there are apt to be some loose ends that I will need to tie down and I may need some expert testimony. I'd like to have someone * with expertise in public key crypto * with some impressive-sounding credentials * willing to volunteer to help break some patents Any suggestions? Roger Schlafly rschlafly(a)attmail.com phone: 408-476-3550

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Re: CJR returned to sender
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:43 PM 10/26/95, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > The ITARs are currently keeping us(Netscape) from distributing >our US-only products to people within the United States. We have >asked for clarification from the government about network distribution, >such as how much verification of location and citizenship of the >recipient we must do, and have yet to receive a response. That >makes it more than just an export issue, at least for us. And I agree that this is a much more important issue than whether a t-shirt can get an OK for export or not. If the CJR for the t-shirt is ultimately granted, what useful information will be derived, or what implications for Netscape's question will be discovered? If the CJR for the t-shirt is ultimately denied, ditto? Distribution over networks--which is happening every day, and which is happening every time the Cypherpunks list contains code fragments and other useful comments on crypto tools--is a much more serious issue. The t-shirt joke is unlikely to help. (For all those who commented that wearing the munitions shirt is rilly, rilly kool, I say "Great!" Wear it in the mosh pits, just lie to people about how the t-shirt "has been classified as a munition." It hasn't been as of this writing.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Mail to News gateways
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am compiling a quick list (for my own use, mostly) of mail 2 news gateways to link to from my homepage. (As opposed to, for example, posting it to Usenet or something) A while back there was Yet-Another-Rehash[tm] of this theme and I saved the messages: Homer's lightlink.com and Alex de Joode's mail2news(a)utopia.hacktic.nl. mail2news(a)c2.org used to be alive, but either wasn't getting the groups I was posting to or it was shut down. (Sameer: email me please about this) Anyway, if anyone knows of anything else please tell me. Oh, and the URL is http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don/mail2news.html Thanks. Don Oh, by the way, anyone have any cool PGP/crypto icons to Inline into my web page? <g>

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Testing... Is this thing turned on?
by scottg＠b4a206.mdc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry for mulching bandwidth, but I haven't received anything for about a week...

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Re: CJR returned to sender
by aba＠atlas.ex.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the T-shirt which some poeple are starting to view as an overplayed joke: I'd agree that we on cypherpunks have probably heard enough on the subject, to the extent that it was creating a lot of noise a while back, but the idea I think is to create publicity wherein ITAR is ridiculed by demonstrating that the State Departments ITAR related decisions are inconsistent, and arbitrary. This I think is a similar tactic to that used by Phil Karn, with the Applied Crypto case, and by MIT with the MIT PGP source code book and CJR on that. Also the SSL 88+40 brute force was mostly a political demonstration, most anyone could have predicted the approximate MIPs required, and that it was ridiculously weak. Yet much of the media attention widely ignored the fact that it was a simple fact, 40 bits isn't enough, and chose instead to play on wording such as "French Student Hacker breaks Netscape", which of course is wildly inaccurate on numerous counts. As to the accusation that a T-shirt is silly, sure, I absolutely agree, but it's *supposed to be* silly, the point being to get a decision from the state department, and say, look the decisions these people are making with extreme weight of law ($1,000,000 fines &c) are ridiculously inconsistent, and arbitrary, and cost the US software industry 100s of millions of dollars each year in lost trade. With a silly example, I would have thought you would be more likely to get positive editorials from the press. I mean if you say PGP, some people are sucked in by the crypto scare stories Freeh and co put out. If it's a T-shirt you'd have a hard time saying it was a dangerous item, or that the info was dangerous. If unclear fabric printing is the issue, put it on a floppy disk (would take less than one sector), print the program on the disk label and try that too. Also my uk printed shirts, and Don Henson's (other US supplier) have a simply huge barcode (Joel's is around 1/2 the size) the aim being to remove all doubt about readability. See pictures (mine (UK), and Don's (US) respectively): http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/uk-shirt.html http://www.colossus.net/wepinsto/wsft_f/wspp_f/tshirt1.html You could probably transcribe that barcode by hand the stripes are that fat. The ITAR docs themselves don't seem to make the case that machine readability is significant, that was to my understanding just an arbitrary decision they displayed with Phil Karn's Applied Crypto disk set. No to the disks due to being more machine readable than the book, or something. The reason for the barcode was to try to encourage banning of the T-shirt by pandering to thier apparent prediliction to ban machine readable forms of things freely available in print form. On the "has been declared a munition by State Department", this is clearly incorrect. Don Henson used this in his earlier ads, and I corrected him on this wording, and he now says something different. The wording on the shirt (Joel Furr's shirt which is what Raph mailed I understand) the caption is: "This shirt is a munition" and you can see a picture of this shirt it, here: http://www.danger.com/ad-perl.html I don't think saying this shirt is a munition is that misleading. It is arguable, and of course no decision has been obtained from the State Department, but if anyone is so sure about it I'd invite them to make a public demonstration of exporting it in any medium they fancy (paper, disk, internet, T-shirt). Another candidate: export snuffle without asking permission. I hear that it is only 10 lines of C code. Adam -- Munitions T-shirt home page: http://www.obscura.com/~shirt/ #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2)

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Re: idle CPU markets
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>1. Many such applications want their computation to be highly >responsive-- the long turn-around involved in farming your task >over a WAN is often prohibitive. (E.g. real-time graphics.) Use the right tool for the right job. Cycle sales are useless for most applications, and forcing a square peg into a round peg will only result in frustration. There are a gazillion useful outlets for this technology, though - more pop up all the time. The latest I heard today was OCR .tiff -> .txt conversion, where the payee can afford (cpu-wise) to toggle all the settings to the highest (slowest) quality. >2. Also many applications that need this kind of power are highly >sensitive to inaccuracy or fraud. A scientific modelling experiment >which uses zillions of cycles can be rendered completely worthless >if a tiny calculation that had been farmed to Joe Blow is done wrong >or is lied about by Joe. Voting - send the same data to 3+ unrelated machines (if you can afford redundancy) and accept the 'majority opinion'. Sanity checking - depends on the algorithms in question; may require human intervention in many cases, where errors (accidental or not) may not be easily machine-recognizable. ... just to name a couple of the top of my head. >3. Similarly, many such applications are highly confidential. This is the easy one :) That is to say, solutions to this problem are already being implemented for other applications. -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: idle CPU markets
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>What other problems would benefit from easy access to lots of distributed >>CPU cycles? > >3D Rendering and Physics simulations come immediately to mind. A graphic-arts chum of mine is really hyper about cycle sales - it will allow him to produce broadcast-quality commercials on a project-by-project basis without a huge initial hardware upgrade investment. Is anyone working on a Java libarary/demo/whatnot that allows plug-in algorithms, work completion 'fetch next batch' code, and some rudimentary authentication scheme? If not, I may tinker with this - if so, I'd like to chat :) -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: Linux security issues
by Paul Koning 1695 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Actually keeping the pass phrase out of swap space is fairly easy (although >I havn't looked at the PGP code to see if it actually does this). >... >However, the pass phrase is not the only dangerous information. >... >N.B. This problem affects all virtual memory operation systems. Not all of them. In at least one (VMS) you can pin pages in physical memory, i.e., prevent them from being written to disk. Actually, any OS that does I/O directly to user pages has that capability in the kernel; in the case of VMS (and possibly others, I don't know) it also exists as a system service that applications can invoke. This solves the problem: you can pin a suitable number of pages, and put your sensitive data buffers there. paul

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e-mail, business and privicy
by WOOD＠VAX2.ROCKHURST.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An old subject, but could someone please give me a pointer to the legalities of reading other peoples mail in the working environment. Many thanks, ------------------------------------------- | "Computers are boring and slow." | | | | David Wood | | Information Systems Specialist? | | wood(a)vax2.rockhurst.edu | -------------------------------------------

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TWP Ups Net Freedom
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post, October 27, 1995 Freedom of Net Speech (Editorial) Is speech on the Internet like speech in a public square, or is it more like speech in a privately owned mall, where leafleters and demonstrators need permission? And what about universities, where students using university accounts for e-mail and other messages may find themselves subjected to disciplinary rules? The latter problem occurred most recently at Virginia Tech, which has come under challenge for disciplining a student who sent a letter described as abusive to another student. The difficulty of framing such questions or even of defining the terms they're made up of (Is cyberspace really a "space," or just the ability of a lot of machines to talk to one another?) should be ample illustration of why millions of Internet users are still sloshing around in a state of legal ambiguity. And that ambiguity, though congenial to the anarchically inclined folks who have been in cyberspace since its not-very-remote beginnings, can't be sustained much longer as millions of users pile into cyberspace through commercial, university-owned and workplace hookups. The providers of these hookups all have an interest in what their users "say" to other users once they're on line, but the interests vary. Some providers are afraid -- with cause -- that they may be liable for pirated, libelous or other lawbreaking material posted on their accounts, or (depending on the outcome of assorted legislation) for transmitting pornographic or indecent material to minors. Universities have another set of motivations that go beyond fear of legal vulnerability and that have led many -- including Virginia Tech -- to institute student conduct policies that can be used to curb even non-cyberspace speech. Virginia Tech authorities say the existing student life policy prohibits "words or acts" that constitute "abusive conduct" that "demeans, intimidates, threatens or otherwise interferes with another person's rightful actions or comfort," whether on line or off. As with the notorious "hate speech" regulations at many campuses, this is a dangerously broad category, though the lines between interfering with someone's comfort and actually threatening him are probably drawable by a court. Technologically oriented civil liberties groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation have been arguing for some time that if First Amendment rights in cyberspace aren't codified and nailed down early, tendencies toward restraint will multiply to cover more and more of the new "sectors," and this will greatly reduce the potential of electronic communication both socially and commercially. An even more cold-eyed pragmatic argument is that speech restrictions, notoriously hard to enforce in the real world, are even more so in the virtual one: In one formulation much repeated by programmers, the Internet "interprets censorship as a malfunction and detours around it." Add this to the practical impossibility of commercial owners monitoring every message sent via cyberspace, and you have enforcement nightmares. There are better and broader arguments, though, for being skeptical of any efforts to restrict the content of cyberspace speech in ways that go beyond existing and permitted controls on real-world speech, whether on child pornography, stalking, libel or the rest. Universities have some wiggle room here, but for the same reason university "hate speech" codes or restrictions on what professors may say in class are a terrible idea, it's bad practice to restrict student speech on-line. Free speech is good for the Internet for the same reasons it's good for the real world. -----

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Re: e-mail, business and privicy
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:15 PM 10/27/95, WOOD(a)VAX2.ROCKHURST.EDU wrote: >An old subject, but could someone please give me a pointer >to the legalities of reading other peoples mail in the working >environment. > >Many thanks, I doubt many others will offer answers to this one, so I will. The usual way to get authorization to read the mail of other people is to be officially deputized as a member of the Citizen's Morality Watch. Your local law enforcement office, or the FBI, can help you fill out the paperwork and get you the badge and ID card. (I signed up early, and have one of the ID cards signed by William Webster.) Once deputized, you are authorized to read whatever mail you may think a threat to the public consciousness. And when GAK arrives, you'll be duly authorized to gain access to escrowed keys. And to escrowed house keys, escrowed car keys, and escrowed diaries. This will finally give us the same measure of security that the Soviets had when babushkas and KGB men read one's mail, and that the Iranians now have with the Islamic Purity Patrols on the streets of Teheran. --Klaus! von Future Prime, avatar

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Diffie-Hellman Key Generation
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of software available outside the US for generating large (1024-bit or more) Diffie-Hellman keys ? The default key for CTCP is only 512 bits, and I'd like to be able to give out some larger keys (e.g. 1024 and 2048 bits) so that people have a choice of the level of security that they want to use. Alternatively, does anyone have any pre-generated large keys that I can put in there ? Finally, I'm basing this on comments in 'Applied Cryptography' that D-H keys should be at least 512 bits and preferably 1024. How does the difficulty of breaking a D-H exchange with a 512 bit key compare to breaking a 512 bit RSA key ? Mark

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Re: Mark Twain Bank's DigiCash offer
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal writes: > As far as I can tell there is no charge for moving funds between > your ecash wallet and the "mint" at the bank. The charges are for > moving between the "mint" and the world access account. If you > had a shop which was able to pay much of its expenditures in ecash > it sounds like there would be no percentage fee to the bank. The gotcha being that as long as your money is in the "mint" it is not under FDIC protection... Just how safe your cash is when it is in the mint is entirely related to the security of Mark Twain's systems, which are high-profile machines that will surely be subjected to many cracking attempts. Some may prefer to keep complete control over their cash and store all of it themselves. Unlike physical cash, this stuff can be split up, encrypted, and stored in multiple places, possibly offering more security than the Mark Twain "mint." andrew

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Re: How can e-cash, even on-line cleared, protect payee identity?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199510260424.OAA12383(a)sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au>, jirib(a)sweeney.cs.monash.edu.au (Jiri Baum) wrote: > What you'd really want is for Alice to pay for the new coins in ecash. Right. > I'm wondering whether a "coin-changer" would be easier or harder to > set up than a "bank" (from regulatory point of view). I don't think it would be any easier to set up. Harder perhaps, since its sole purpose is money laundring. However, if there are several Ecash currencies there is a legitimate need for Ecash currency arbitration. Who is to stop the following protocol? US Ecash -> Swedish Ecash Swedish Ecash -> US Ecash The resulting coins are no longer traceable unless the repayer cooperates. The repayer (or in this case currency arbitrator) keeps of course a percentage at each transaction. No different than a Casa de Cambio. It can be set up anywhere and even be done anonymously. I am working on an implementation. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMJENOCoZzwIn1bdtAQETtQGA1c2lAxu2HcrudvQ7OgIrJptiDBueqVM5 uYIuB4n0fNzv6kdh+LYqctKj2BzOlE22 =a7mC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Linux security issues
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 26 Oct 1995, Bill Frantz wrote: > However, the pass phrase is not the only dangerous information. > Intermediate forms used for decrypting the RSA private keys, and the > decrypted RSA private keys also have to be protected. The logic of PGP > requires that it keep at least one of these around for a long time, so it > will probably be written to swap space. Couldn't you use mmap() to map a disk file into your address space, keep all your secret data in that part of the address space, and then carefully wipe that file before exiting ? I guess you'd then have the problem that people could just read that file (if they had the priviledges to do so) to find all the secret data rather than having to trawl through the swap file though.. and you'd still have to worry about disk buffering. So it probably wouldn't be a big improvement. Mark

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PRZ On Mitchells
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello again cypherpunks: [I hope this info. isn't already posted, my sincere apologies if it has. I get the "digest" version of the firehose these days, and there's a slight delay on my end.] Anyway, I'm informed by my brother in Punta Gorda, FL that "Mitchells in the Morning" -- a conservative/libertarian husband & wife talkshow on "National Empowerment Television," featured Phil Zimmermann and Robert Holliman(sp?) President of the "Business Software Alliance" this morning. Talk was mostly about how stupid software export controls are, as PRZ was understandably reluctant to discuss details of the grand jury investigation. Humorous sidenote: PRZ said that the Exon <spit!> bill is the equivalent of turning the entire Internet into the children's room at the public library. I will be getting a videotape of the show in about 2 weeks, and if anyone wants me to make them a copy please e-mail me (privately!) and I will try to oblige. JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh iQCVAwUBMJET0W1lp8bpvW01AQGKIwP+L4zvjUp6NewdpJYUL5yHH8g7NZjm2DCN GyOA4RvzTTFt9c1xZzTPZ4cpxky5+6JrBYClAg0UiyqXBkRf55JDVONrf7NpSUT0 9cLPDzRVxs4Tns+hjVU0G/O29hfQJ6TbxEtqIRmg+GElar4tbC3cYILbc1gnrxOh FeQ+ltB63oc= =9umd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Jim Ray Disemboondogglin' -- Reducing the rate of increase in a government program when adjusted for inflation (as opposed to a "cut"). -- Tom Ray, my brother. Visit my "Pretty Good Homepage" at http://shopmiami.com/prs/jimray/ Featuring cypherpunk stuff and some babypictures! ----------------------------------------------------------------------- PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Key id. # E9BD6D35 (key on page & servers) <liberty(a)gate.net> IANAL ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Help Phil! email zldf(a)clark.net or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________

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QUB_ity
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CJL has provided the Oct 13 Science article on "Quantum Computation," by David DiVincenzo of IBM Research, as summarized by the post of October 23. QUC_omp (53 kb in three parts) (Math flubs by this ibm-qubity)

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Children's Rooms at Libraries Need Regulation
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:18 PM 10/27/95, Jim Ray wrote: >Humorous sidenote: PRZ said that the Exon <spit!> bill is the >equivalent of turning the entire Internet into the children's room >at the public library. I will be getting a videotape of the show in >about 2 weeks, and if anyone wants me to make them a copy please >e-mail me (privately!) and I will try to oblige. Actually, the "children's rooms" at public libraries are next on the list to be regulated. Many of the books our children are reading feature _talking animals_ and other examples of animism and pagan beliefs. Some even have witches and goblins. That our tax dollars are being used to fund pagan and heathen views is cause for alarm. Thankfully, out here in California we are shaking off our liberal, heathen, godless Jew commie system. Los Altos, a prosperous community in Silicon Valley, recently banned the mention of Halloween in its schools. No costumes, no heathen imitations, and NO DEVIL WORSHIP! Hallelujah! "Freedom is not the freedom to have wrong beliefs." --Klaus!

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