December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

IBM enters WWW security market
by Jeff Simmons 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > -------- Forwarded message -------- > Newsgroups: comp.os.os2.announce > Date: Fri, 29 Sep 1995 14:49:59 GMT > From: tsipple(a)vnet.IBM.COM > Subject: OS/2 NEWS: New, secure version of WebExplorer > > Submitted by: Timothy F. Sipples (tsipple(a)vnet.ibm.com) > Source: Timothy F. Sipples (tsipple(a)vnet.ibm.com) > Date received: 1995 September 26 > Date posted: 1995 September 29 > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > New, secure version of WebExplorer for OS/2 Warp > > ATLANTA, Sept. 27, 1995--The latest additions to IBM's Internet > Connection software family will enable companies to encrypt > Internet transactions and better protect internal networks with > firewall software as they explore new business opportunities on > the Information Superhighway. > > Today's announcements include: > > * A new secure version of the Web Explorer for OS/2 Warp > > * The IBM Internet Connection Secure Server for OS/2 Warp > > * The Internet Connection Secure Server for AIX > > * An enhanced version of the Internet Connection Secured > Network Gateway > > * an enhanced version of the Internet Connection for OS/2 > Warp > > * an enhanced version of the Internet Connection for Windows > > "Businesses of all kinds are considering the immense opportunity > the Internet offers but are reluctant to take the plunge until > they feel they can do so in a planned, secure manner. The > Internet Connection family provides our customers with that > reassurance, freeing them to explore a whole new world of > possibilities," said Lois Dimpfel, vice president, Networking > Software Products, IBM Networking Software Division. > > The Internet is evolving as a means for conducting electronic > commerce, and the new IBM secure servers and OS/2 Warp client are > superbly positioned to meet customer security needs. The IBM > Internet Connection servers and client support both of the > emerging security technologies -- Secure Hypertext Transfer > Protocol (S-HTTP) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) -- to provide > customers with maximum flexibility. > > New OS/2 Warp client and secure servers > > The new version of the Internet Connection for OS/2 Warp, the > first Internet client to be included at no charge in an operating > system, adds security support to an Internet application suite > that has won generous praise in its first year of availability. > OS/2 Magazine recently chose the Internet Connection for OS/2 > Warp as a winner in its editors' choice awards. > > The Internet Connection family of client software was also > enhanced last week. The Internet Connection for OS/2 Warp, > provided at no charge as part of the Warp bonus pack, now > includes table support, streaming graphics, an integrated news > function and other enhancements through HyperText Markup Language > (HTML) 3.0 extensions. These enhancements will also be available > in the secure version being announced today. > > The InternetConnection for Windows was enhanced with improved > performance, additional graphic viewers, audio players and other > features. > > IBM's new web server software provides unmatched scalability for > customers. The OS/2 Warp version can run on cost-effective > desktop systems sold in retail outlets, while the AIX version > runs on highly-scalable RISC System/6000 platforms. > > Both the IBM Internet Connection Secure Server for OS/2 Warp and > the Internet Connection Secure Server for AIX were designed to be > quickly and easily configured using any industry-standard > browser. The installation and configuration is menu-based and > includes online help designed to assist an administrator with > making the correct choice. > > The new Internet Connection secure servers and clients allow > businesses and their customers to conduct transactions over the > 'Net knowing that the data is protected. For example, an auto > parts supplier might create a secure web server containing its > catalog, including high-quality images of the items, on the web > along with the ability to place an order. A customer would use > the Internet Connection secure client -- or an S-HTTP- or > SSL-compliant client from another vendor -- to browse the > online catalog, order a part and pay for it with an encrypted > credit card number. > > Enhanced secured network gateway > > A new version of IBM's Secured Network Gateway, a software > product generally known as an Internet "firewall," today joins > the Internet Connection product family. Formerly part of the > NetSP product family, the Secured Network Gateway operates on an > AIX platform to protect a corporation's internal enterprise > network resources from Internet intruders, while allowing > legitimate traffic to flow through the firewall. > > The Internet Connection Secured Network Gateway offers a number of > advanced features, including: proxy server, SOCKS servers, filters and > domain name service. > > Among several features added to the new version is support for > AIX version 4.13, in addition to AIX version 3.25. The new > operating system support offers customers the option to run the > Secured Network Gateway on PowerPC hardware. > > Another key feature of the new version is data encryption. Data > can safely flow between two firewalls across a public network. > The firewall encrypts IP data packets, creating a private "IP > tunnel" from one secure internal network to another. > > The new secure IP tunnels could be used for a company with the > Secured Network Gateway installed at its various sites to safely > and confidently transmit sensitive financial data from a branch > office over the Internet to corporate headquarters. Customers > could also use the new feature to securely administer a firewall > from a remote location. > > Internet Connection directions > > Just as the Internet itself continues to expand phenomenally, the > Internet Connection family, now consisting of seven generally > available products, will also grow. Current product plans call > for additional web clients on a number of platforms, and web > server software for OS/400, MVS and selected non-IBM systems. > > "We don't intend to just keep pace with the market; we intend to > be the pacesetter," said IBM's Dimpfel. "IBM has worldwide reach > and strengths like no other company. The IBM Global Network, > robust software products, IBM services and gateway software to > link with existing business systems using DB2 and CICS--all this > means customers don't have to deal with patching together > solutions from a collection of vendors." > > The Internet Connection product family is a component of IBM's > imperative to provide people and organizations with > network-centric computing, a new model that combines networking > software, network services and computing devices to facilitate > computing anywhere, anytime. > > IBM, the world's largest software provider, creates, develops and > manufactures the industry's most advanced information technologies, > including networking systems, software, computing systems, storage > devices and microelectronics. > > Pricing and availability > > The secure server software for OS/2 Warp is $2,999 for the first > license with additional licenses available for $2,699 each. The > AIX secure server software is $4,999 for the first license and > $4,499 for an additional license. The Internet Connection Secured > Network Gateway is priced at $9,999 for the first license, with > additional licenses available for $8,999. > > The new secure WebExplorer for OS/2 Warp is $35 per copy and > pricing on the enhanced IBM Internet Connection for Windows has > been reduced to $59. > > Both secure servers and the secure Web Explorer for OS/2 Warp > will be generally available in December of this year. The new > version of the Secured Network Gateway will be available in > October. > > > IBM, OS/2, AIX, CICS, DB2 and RISC System/6000 are trademarks of IBM. > > Windows is a trademark of Microsoft Corp. > -- Jeff Simmons jsimmons(a)goblin.punk.net

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CJR for perl-RSA t-shirt
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a draft of the CJR I intend to file, for the perl-RSA t-shirt. Please check it over for technical inaccuracies or other problems. It should sound quite familiar, as I have shamelessly ripped off the CJR that Phil Karn filed for the Applied Cryptography book. Let me know what you think! Raph ======================================================================= ATTN: Maj Gary Oncale - 15 Day CJ Request U.S. Department of State Office of Defense Trade Controls PM/DTC SA-6 Room 200 1701 N. Fort Myer Drive Arlington, VA 22209-3113 Fax +1 703 875 5845 ATTN: 15 Day CJ Request Coordinator National Security Agency P.O. Box 246 Annapolis Junction, MD 20701 Subject: Mass Market Software with Encryption - 15 Day Expedited Review Requested Subject: Commodity Jurisdiction Request for perl-RSA t-shirt, an encryption program INTRODUCTION This is a Commodity Jurisdiction Request for mass market software with encryption capabilities. The name of the software product is "perl-RSA t-shirt", by Adam Back. It is published in the form of a t-shirt by Joel Furr, 916 W. Trinity Ave, #10, Durham NC 27701. I have no DTC registration code. I have reviewed and determined that this t-shirt, the subject of this CJ request, meets paragraph 1 of the "Criteria for Determining the Eligibility of A Mass Market Software Product for Expedited Handling." I base this determination on the following facts: a) this t-shirt is readily available from Joel Furr, and has been shipped in quantity of several hundred copies, thus qualifying it as mass market software; b) sufficient documentation is included to allow installation and use by any end user capable of typing in the software, or scanning the bar code, and running it. Additional documentation is available on the Internet World Wide Web at http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ . To my knowledge the author and publisher provide no "product support" as that term is generally understood; and c) the t-shirt contains encryption software source code listings that provide confidentiality. A duplicate copy of this CJR has been sent to the 15 Day CJ Request Coordinator. DESCRIPTION The t-shirt contains an implementation of the RSA asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Furthermore, instructions, in the form of a terse usage string, are given for using the implementation to provide confidentiality. The source code of the implementation is featured both as four lines of text and also as a bar code, making the t-shirt machine readable as well as machine washable. The algorithm is implemented in the Perl scripting language, and will run on any standard Unix configuration that includes both an implementation of the Perl language and the common "dc" (desk calculator) program. Two copies of the shirt are included with the filing of this CJ request. ORIGIN OF COMMODITY This t-shirt originates in the United States. While the primary author is a citizen of the United Kingdom, living in England, other contributors to the work are citizens of the US living in the US. The publisher is a United States citizen living in the United States. The t-shirts are manufactured and printed in the United States. The cryptographic algorithm implemented in this t-shirt comes from various sources, at various times, and was produced with both private and public sources of funding. The source code implementation contained in the t-shirt also comes from a variety of countries, including Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. The algorithm is thought to be designed for private and commercial civilian use. The t-shirt is currently publicly available from Joel Furr, at a list price of $12.36, including shipping and handling. More ordering information is available on the Internet World Wide Web at http://www.danger.com/ad-perl.html . CURRENT USE The t-shirt is intended as an implementation of the RSA cipher for those who wish to incorporate encryption into their communications. The small size of the implementation makes it particularly useful in contexts in which existing cryptographic infrastructure is not available. Examples of the commercial use of the cipher implemented include integrity verification, authentication and confidentiality of electronic mail, computer software, voice, video and other information in digitized form. For example, the cipher is used either by itself for email privacy, and also as a component in other protocols that provide privacy and authentication, including PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), S/MIME (Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions), MOSS (MIME Object Security Services), PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail), and SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). The uses of this cipher have not changed significantly over time, although their popularity has grown substantially. Their present military utility is unknown, except that it is believed that the algorithm is not approved for the protection of US classified information. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS There are no military standards or specifications that this t-shirt is designed to meet. There are no special characteristics of the t-shirt, including no radiation-hardening, no ballistic protection, no hard points (the t-shirt is only available in soft 100% cotton), no TEMPEST capability, no thermal and no infrared signature reduction capability (in excess of that provided by a typical black cotton t-shirt), no surveillance, and no intelligence gathering capability. The t-shirt does not use image intensification tubes. OTHER INFORMATION I recommend that this t-shirt be determined to be in the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. I believe that it qualifies for the general license GTDA for General Technical Data to All Destinations, because it qualifies as "publicly available". ATTACHMENTS I have enclosed two copies of the t-shirt, included with the primary filing of this CJ request. Sincerely, Raphael L. Levien

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I am the anti-Ch<fnord>
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got some email responses to my SAIC info. Here's a little more fun on a Sunday evening. All the statements below are true. Among the first two (possibly the very first two) MX records for not-connected sites desiring Internet-style names were: att.com and mirror.tmc.com. That is, the phone company, and a small subsidiary of the Times-Mirror corporation. It was from mirror that mod.sources/comp.sources.unix was moderated -- for many years, the only source of free software available to Usenet. Seismo was the forwarder for both ATT and TMC (via special-case lines in Rick's sendmail.cf file). ATT, through ihnp4 in Chicago (site of the Democratic convention), vied with seismo for the we'll-call-anyone philosophy that a few sugar daddies (er, backbone) sites had that kept uucp Email and Usenet running back then. Under the auspices of the curiously-named "Network Action Central" many ATT sites did dialup UUCP to mirror on a daily basis, ostensibly to pick up mod.sources. I was the administrator of mirror.tmc.com; the tmc.com domain "conflicted" with tmc.edu, the Texas Medical Center. The NIC back then asked me to ask tmc.edu to "reconsider." Do you know where their book depository is/was? Rick started Alternet, now "Shared" with Microsoft. Unlike Sprint and MCI, ATT "curiously" decided to *not* become a network service provider, but instead allied with BBN and sells their technology, equipment and services. I worked at BBN for five years, in the same department that became BBNPlanet, the global ISP and ATT's partner. I also wrote INN, which now handles essentially all the Usenet traffic in the world. So who cares about the latest media mega-deal of Eisner or Time-Warner-Turner? We already control the Internet media; the Web is merely~~~~#@ NO CARRIER

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More forged cancels
by jbyrd＠tiac.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

These were found in control. Note that they all have the string "CANCELLED", and all are timestamped 17:56. The first one is definitely forged. The others look like they probably are. I asked Jukka Santala, and he didn't issue that forgery. I asked Joel Rubin, and haven't gotten a response yet. I haven't asked the other people yet. So I'll go ahead and post this, crossposted to the affected groups. It looks like the Cancelschnauzer is hitting lots of groups. A note to the canceller: if you try to cancel this, I'll just put it back. -----------------begin control message Path: sundog.tiac.net!news.sprintlink.net!in2.uu.net!sunic!mn6.swip.net!seunet!news2..swip..net!plug..ne ws.pipex.net!pipex!tank.news.pipex.net!pipex!usenet.eel.ufl.edu!news.gmi..edu!msunews!netnew s.upenn.edu!ts7-28.upenn.edu!user From: 73323.603(a)compuserve.com Newsgroups: soc.culture.german,soc.culture.jewish Subject: cmsg cancel <73323.603-3009951517290001(a)ts7-28.upenn.edu> Date: Sun, 1 Oct 1995 17:56 GMT Organization: The National Alliance Message-ID: <cancel.73323.603-3009951517290001(a)ts7-28.upenn.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: ts7-28.upenn.edu Approved: 73323.603(a)compuserve.com Control: cancel <73323.603-3009951517290001(a)ts7-28.upenn.edu> X-Cancelled-By: 73323.603(a)compuserve.com Lines: 1 CANCELLED. ----end control message These others are suspicious, the Santala cancel is definitly forged. I don't have the original posts of any of these, I suspect they are all related to National Alliance. ------------rest of the cancels: Path: sundog.tiac.net!news.kei.com!news.mathworks.com!tank.news.pipex.net!pipex!in2..uu..net!howla nd.reston.ans.net!ix.netcom.com!netnews From: jmrubin(a)ix.netcom.com (Joel Rubin) Newsgroups: soc.culture.german,soc.culture.jewish,rec.radio.shortwave,alt.2600 Subject: cmsg cancel <44lfpn$qoh(a)ixnews7.ix.netcom.com> Date: Sun, 1 Oct 1995 17:56 GMT Organization: Netcom Message-ID: <cancel.44lfpn$qoh(a)ixnews7.ix.netcom.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: ix-sf17-08.ix.netcom.com Approved: jmrubin(a)ix.netcom.com (Joel Rubin) Control: cancel <44lfpn$qoh(a)ixnews7.ix.netcom.com> X-Cancelled-By: jmrubin(a)ix.netcom.com (Joel Rubin) Lines: 1 CANCELLED. ======== Path: sundog.tiac.net!news.sprintlink.net!in2.uu.net!sun4nl!xs4all!mail From: nobody(a)alpha.c2.org (Anonymous) Newsgroups: mail.cypherpunks,alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.2600,alt.stop.spamming,alt..stop- spamming Subject: cmsg cancel <199510010427.VAA28730(a)infinity.c2.org> Date: Sun, 1 Oct 1995 17:56 GMT Organization: Mail to Usenet Gateway at Utopia Message-ID: <cancel.199510010427.VAA28730(a)infinity.c2.org> NNTP-Posting-Host: utopia.hacktic.nl Approved: nobody(a)alpha.c2.org (Anonymous) Control: cancel <199510010427.VAA28730(a)infinity.c2.org> X-Cancelled-By: nobody(a)alpha.c2.org (Anonymous) Lines: 1 CANCELLED. ======== Path: sundog.tiac.net!news.sprintlink.net!in2.uu.net!sunic!sunic!sunic.sunet.se!news..funet..fi!zippo..uwa sa.fi!!jsantala From: jsantala(a)walli.uwasa.fi (Jukka Santala) Newsgroups: alt.2600,news.admin.net-abuse.misc Subject: cmsg cancel <tlqbws0p37xU084yn(a)walli.uwasa.fi> Date: Sun, 1 Oct 1995 17:56 GMT Organization: And you think we're organized? Message-ID: <cancel.tlqbws0p37xU084yn(a)walli.uwasa.fi> NNTP-Posting-Host: walli.uwasa.fi Approved: jsantala(a)walli.uwasa.fi (Jukka Santala) Control: cancel <tlqbws0p37xU084yn(a)walli.uwasa.fi> X-Cancelled-By: jsantala(a)walli.uwasa.fi (Jukka Santala) Lines: 1 CANCELLED. ======== Path: sundog.tiac.net!news.texas.net!newshost.comco.com!news.tamu.edu!news.utdallas..edu!news01.. aud.alcatel.com!gatech!news.mathworks.com!zombie.ncsc.mil!simtel!news.sprintlink..net!in2..uu.. net!sunic!mn6.swip.net!seunet!news2.swip.net!plug.news.pipex.net!pipex!tank..news..pipex..net!pi pex!news1.digital.com!nntp-hub2.barrnet.net!nntp-ucb.barrnet.net!well!usenet From: themed(a)well.com Newsgroups: alt.2600 Subject: cmsg cancel <44mknk$1m0(a)nkosi.well.com> Date: Sun, 1 Oct 1995 17:56 GMT Organization: The Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link, Sausalito, CA Message-ID: <cancel.44mknk$1m0(a)nkosi.well.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: sf-tty7-ppp.well.com Approved: themed(a)well.com Control: cancel <44mknk$1m0(a)nkosi.well.com> X-Cancelled-By: themed(a)well.com Lines: 1 CANCELLED. ========

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Re: Kerberos
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "David J. Bianco" <bianco(a)itribe.net> Date: Sun, 24 Sep 1995 16:32:30 -0400 >The Open Software Foundation's Distributed Computing Environment has the >concept of a central security registry (which is currently based on >Kerberos). I haven't delved too deeply into them, but the OSF website has >some DCE RFCs about adding public key capabilities to the registry. They >should be off the OSF home page somewhere at <http://www.osf.org>. Sort of. The DCE registry isn't really based on Kerberos. Rather, DCE uses Kerberos code to do its private-key stuff. We're planning on adding the ability to use public key to get initial tickets to the security server. Outside of integration with other security domains, this means that the security server no longer needs to store everyone's private key, reducing exposure if it's been cracked. If anyone wants more details on how current or planned DCE security, drop me a line. Perhaps some of the other folks on this list who also know about it will speak up, too. /r$, DCE whipping boy

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Re: Europe
by banisar＠epic.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:45 PM 10/1/95, Mats Bergstrom wrote: >Perry M. wrote: > >> I was wondering if the Europeans had an equivalent of EPIC or EFF >> lobbying against crypto restrictions there, given the disturbing news >> a week or so ago. > There are a few groups in Europe (Privacy International is based in UK, Argedaten in Austria, CLI in Spain, misc EF-X) but none of them are as organized as their US counterparts. However, there are also Privacy Commissions in every country who are also friends to the battle. There was quite a bit of discussion at their last meeting in Copenhagen last month on crypto and the Denmark and Ontario, CA Privacy Commissions just came out with a joint report on crpyto that we are working on scanning in and making available on our web page. Dave David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org

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SAIC in VA
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/business/locations/va.html **** Business Directory **** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC IN VIRGINIA * Alexandria + Alexandria/Eisenhower Ave. (Loc. 238) + Alexandria/DMSO (Loc. 692) + Alexandria/DTG (Loc. 691) + Alexandria/JHK (Loc. 801) + Alexandria/MARITIME SERV DIV (Loc. 365) + Alexandria/TSC (Loc. 694) + Washington D.C./AMSEC (Loc.347) * Arlington + Arlington/Jefferson Davis HWY (Loc. 294) + Arlington/AMSEC (Loc. 678) + Arlington/BALLSTON (Loc. 765) + Arlington/CAPS (Loc. 785) + Arlington/CM (Loc. 573) + Arlington/CON. SUP. Facility (Loc. 964) + Arlington/CSI ADV. APP. DIV. (Loc. 963) + Arlington/CSM & AT (Loc. 402) + Arlington/CSS (Loc. 309) + Arlington/FSD (Loc. 784) + Arlington/ICITAP (Loc. 769) + Arlington/LEO (Loc. 587) + Arlington/MOSES (Loc. 612) + Arlington/RDO (Loc. 783) + Arlington/SAI T (Loc. 329) + Arlington/SCT (Loc. 830) + Arlington/SEM (Loc. 711) + Arlington/SIM. TECH (Loc. 717) + Arlington/SIM. TECH (Loc. 990) + Arlington/TRG (Loc. 539) + Arlington/TRG (Loc. 668) + Arlington/TTG (Loc. 708) + Crystal City (Loc. 508) + Virginia Square/ATG (Loc. 215) * Dahlgren + Dahlgren/Danube Drive (Loc. 226) + Dahlgren/AMSEC (Loc. 716) * Chantilly + Chantilly/NSI (Loc. 944) * Falls Church + Falls Church/EHSG (Loc. 052) + Falls Church/HCTG (Loc. 456) + Falls Church/SKYLINE/TAG (Loc. 284) * Ft. Belvoir + Ft. Belvoir (Loc. 709) * Hampton + Hampton/Enterprise Parkway (Loc. 761) + Hampton/Enterprise Parkway (Loc. 833) + Hampton/Enterprise Parkway (Loc. 256) + Hampton/Command & Control (Loc. 550) + Hampton/NASA LANGLEY (Loc. 618) * Herndon + Herndon/TAG (Loc. 946) * King George + King George/NAVSWC (Loc. 924) * Lynchburg + Lynchburg/Timberlake Road (Loc. 212) * McLean + McLean (Loc. 049) + McLean/COMSYSTEMS (Loc. 092) + McLean/ENTERPRISE CENTER (Loc. 747) + McLean/TE&A (Loc. 741) + McLean/TOWER (Loc. 015) * Newington + Newington/CVR (Loc. 474) * Norfolk + Norfolk/Plume Street (Loc. 441) + Norfolk/RE WRIGHT (Loc. 931) * Petersburg + Petersburg/NSSSG (Loc. 638) * Portsmouth + Tidewater/CHCS (Loc. 649) * Reston + Reston/EITS (Loc. 641) * Richmond + Richmond/NSI (Loc. 951) * Virginia Beach + Virginia Beach/SEG (Loc. 282) + Corp Office/AMSEC (Loc. 346) _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 09-07-95

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Re: CJR for perl-RSA t-shirt
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Subject: Mass Market Software with Encryption - 15 Day Expedited Review > Requested > >Subject: Commodity Jurisdiction Request for > perl-RSA t-shirt, an encryption program ROTFL! I haven't had this much fun since the hogs ate my little brother. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re:WHERE did this come from?
by grigor42＠aurora.eexi.gr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Crypto hardware summary
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[A summary of my points on crypto hardware follows my response to Norm.] Norm Hardy writes: >What key length are you using that takes 3.2 sec? >The DSP can operate concurrently with other processing, giving an >improvement greater than 3.2/1.9. I'm aware of this -- I was using Tim's pessimistic estimate of improvement... to make it clearer for those who didn't read his post, I should have said, "Even if the reduction is only from 3.2 seconds to 1.9 seconds, it would be significant for someone running a server." I'm aware that with DSPs you can get rather better results; an ASIC will get you another order of magnitude over DSPs (assuming equivalent price -- the Moto 96K DSP is a real gem for bignum math but is many times more expensive than an equally effective ASIC. They were also having serious availability problems last year...) Here is a summary of my points on this subject to date, for those who haven't been following this discussion: o Using coprocessors of any sort to achieve speed in cryptography operations is probably not justified for end users; it is almost always justified for servers with a high volume of transactions requiring public key authentication or encryption. o DSPs are not really as attractive as general purpose CPUs for accelerating cryptography for high-volume servers. Although DSP architecture is somewhat more conducive to bignum math, the benefits seem to be offset by the wide availability of standard CPUs and tools for programming them. If a large increase in speed is desired without resorting to single-purpose hardware, I recommend using a large number of standard CPUs as coprocessors, rather than an equivalent approach with DSPs. (The fact that uint multiplies on a 486 take multiple clock cycles is offset by the higher internal clock speeds and lower cost of the 486. You can point out super-fast DPSs, and I can point out their super-large price tags, more expensive tools, and substantially more expensive programmers.) o The real way to go for speed is ASICs, which give you much better bang for the buck, although they have disadvantages, including problems of export, inflexibility, etc. My favorite RSA chip board so far is from Uti-Maco in Belgium, which is a tamper-resistant add-in card with a 8086-compatible controller and a custom BIOS for doing RSA and DES operations in h/w, which allows s/w to be developed using standard tools. (I have ranted at length about the complications involved with _Beligan_ crypto export controls, which seem to stem from NATO pressure and US desire to balkanize the market for cryptography products.) o People doing valuable transactions on servers are going to want tamper resistance and hardware-key security. This is more important in some cases than speed, although speed is also very important. o People running cryptography-based transaction clients on their PCs are going to learn, one way or another, that having valuable secret keys on their hard disks is not a great idea. This, not speed, is the primary motivation for consumer-oriented cryptography hardware. People want their keys and financial transactions on secure, removable, non-mechanical media. Products that provide this are just starting to come on the market, notably from National Semiconductor and Telequip. o End-user software will need to be written to allow, but not require, external cryptography devices. Consequently, consumer software that performs valuable transactions still needs to be written in an extremely paranoid fashion with respect to the reliability and security of the underlying hardware.

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Spoofing HTTP server certificates
by Greg Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since there has been a lot of talk about the "man in the middle" attack on the secure web servers, has anyone actually considered the processing time required to fake a certificate from scratch? I haven't really familiarized myself with how the certificates are generated, etc, but it's my understanding that they are signed with RSA. The few recent factorings of RSA keys have shown that brute force attacks are feasable with distributed processing. Since these projects were done "just for the fun of it", wouldn't it seem likley that someone (or some people) would take the time and effort to factor the certificate signing key? After all, it would actually be worth something. gmiller(a)grendel.ius.indiana.edu http://www.ius.indiana.edu/~gmiller/

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Re: Cryptanalysis of RC4 - Preliminary Results (Repeat)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:39 AM 9/30/95 -0400, Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: >The problem is that if these keys are weak, there may be many others >that are also weak. In fact, by the time we explore all of the >weaknesses, we may find the system is no longer very strong at all. These so called weak keys are far from weak. You have a 1 in 64000 chance of reducing the search space by 64000. Big deal. Use 128 bit session keys. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Restrictions on Munitions _Imports_
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:58 AM 10/2/95, Michael Froomkin wrote: >On Thu, 28 Sep 1995, Douglas Barnes wrote: >[...] >> communications problems, their fear of RSA Labs, new Belgian >> export controls they haven't tried to work with yet, and their >> belief that I need a US crypto import license, which I can't persuade >> anyone to admit _exists_. > >There is no such animal under US law. Note however (1) you need export >permission to re-export the import, just as if it was produced here; (2) I don't expect that any specific _crypto_ import licenses exist, but certainly various kinds of _munitions_ import licenses exist (improperly, in my opinion, of course). Specifically, importers of guns must have licenses. And not just because of local laws, as the Feds (U.S. Customs, BATF) get involved in seizures of ammunition, clips, guns, etc. (A recent case here in the Bay Area involved the highly publicized seizure of some large number of crates of Chinese or Russian 7.39 mm ammo...it was alleged that improper licenses had been gotten, or had been forged, or some other such crime. After Feinswine got her media attention, calling the imports "shocking," it was later admitted that the warehouse contents were duly licensed and the news was carried on page C23 that the importers were kosher. (As with most laws, a welter of competing laws are involved. The Gun Control Act of 1968 is involved, as is the McClure-Volkmer Act, etc. And during the recent anti-gun hysteria, new laws were passed about the importation of ammunition, clips, etc.) As far as other munitions go, try "importing" a French Exocet, a Russian Strelka, or any number of other "munitions" items. Given that crypto is classified as "munitions" for the purpose of export control (including the ITARs), it would not surprise me in the least if the same sorts of restrictions on imports of the aforementioned munitions are not applied to at least some crypto imports. If not now, soon. (Given that many folks are talking about a strategy that has been apparent for many years: develop core crypto in less hostile environments than the U.S.) I can't cite a specific law affecting crypto imports at this time--and I doubt any crypto products have been affected so far--but clearly there are restricitions on imports of ammunition, guns, missiles, jet fighters, and--maybe soon--on "crypto munitions." --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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The Free Speech Implications of Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've seen a bunch of messages in this group, and on Usenet, about what can be done to track down and punish (or otherwise stop) the posters of racist, fascist, inflammatory posts. This in light of several recent widespread postings of racist screeds. People are doing traceroute analyses, asking what can be done, proposing to sue those who send them unwanted spewage, etc. Well, guess what? The very technologies we have been so central in deploying are the technologies that make _conventional_ means of controlling distasteful material so hard. Think about it. Remailers mean the people whose speech we abhor will be untraceable. (I of course mean Chaum-style mixes, and ecologies of mixes, not the "almost mixes" we have now, where a motivated operator can screen posts, stop spams, etc.) All is not lost, in the long run, as "digital postage" schemes may develop. This will reduce Net-wide spamming, though not have an effect on a lot of "distasteful" speech. In that regard, reputation filters will help. A person could insist that he will only read messages from persons or nyms he knows. (Sure, it doesn't stop the problem of the _mail volume_ itself, but first things first. The current delivery paradigm is unlike the paid-transport system of the various mail delivery systems.) Crypto anarchy means the racists, sexists, speciesists, and other "ists" cannot be muzzled. I call this a good thing. It's why I'm here. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Crypto hardware (was: Using sound cards to accelerate RSA?)
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> belief that I need a US crypto import license, which I can't persuade >There is no such animal under US law. Note however (1) you need export Perhaps they're worried about contributing to patent infringement?

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Bryn Mawr talk TODAY on Enigma and Its Effect on the Computing Age
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded-by: Dave Farber <farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu> and "Steven" Bi-Co Mathematics Talk Series at Bryn Mawr College Charles Terry: "The Cryptography of the Enigma Machine and Its Effect on the Computing Age" Monday, October 2, 1995, Talk at 4pm in room 338, Tea at 3:30 in room 355 Bryn Mawr College, Park Science Center ------------------------------ Steven P.S. I was told he obtained permission to bring an authentic machine to the talk and will demonstrate it's operation afterwards.

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Re: WHERE did this come from?
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:38 9/30/95, rivaud(a)rain.org wrote: >Attatched to this is, (I hope), the header text from a unsolicited e-mail >message I received. The return address does not work. WHY? How can I >inform the sender that I hope to never receive there material again? > >I tried "reply-all" through Eudora, but my reply got bounced back to me >as undeliverable. > >I have removed the content of the original message. I don't know why it >was sent to me, but it contained material that I found offensive. > >Any help, or words of wisdom and enlightenment would be appreciated. >Information would be nice too. > >Thanks. This is a KNOWN SPAM (it is currently being talked about in the Net-SPAM Usenet Newsgroup). It has been coming from 3 sites (one in Italy, one in France, and one in Germany). The national Police in all 3 countries (as well as the FBI) are apparently investigating it. To track the situation monitor this Web Page (Which should be Globally Accessible): http://www.panix.com/~lan/crusader

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Re: Spoofing HTTP server certificates
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:52 AM 10/2/95 -0400, Greg Miller <gmiller(a)grendel.ius.indiana.edu> wrote: > Since there has been a lot of talk about the "man in the middle" >attack on the secure web servers, has anyone actually considered the >processing time required to fake a certificate from scratch? > I haven't really familiarized myself with how the certificates >are generated, etc, but it's my understanding that they are signed with RSA. While I haven't seen Verisign's various public keys posted to the net, and didn't see them anywhere on their web page, I assume they're at least 508 bits long, and the ones for better-than-personna certification (or at least Class 3) ought to be ~1024 bits long, unless they're limiting themselves to 512 bits to support software that's limited by ITAR stupidity (which would be a shame, but is certainly possible.) For the moment, breaking a 512-bit key remains hard, though maybe within the NSA's reach. It's probably one of the next big factoring challenges after the RSA-130 number is taken out by the General Number Field Sieve folks. The better fake, which is much more possible, is to build a chain of certifications (trivial) and convince your victim to accept them instead of the real ones (more doable, especially if some vendor's software isn't written carefully, or is written carefully but requires the user to think about what he's reading.) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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European Email Police (fwd)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may be of interest to cypherpunk folk (yanked from the UK Electronic Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk) P. Madden =============================================================== The Electronic Telegraph Monday 2 October 1995 The Front Page Plan to police e-mail seems certain to fail By Adrian Berry, Science Correspondent A EUROPEAN Commission plan to police the use of secret codes in electronic mail appears certain to fail. To detect criminals, the commission is seeking legal powers to prevent people from using secret codes on the Internet which it cannot crack. Nature magazine says this would "effectively end the Internet's status as an unregulated medium for the free flow of information". The plan would require any person or company encrypting e-mail messages to leave the "secret keys" to read them in the hands of a law enforcement agency. But Dr Peter Lammer, managing director of Sophos, the Abingdon-based supplier of encryption software, said: "This plan would never work because people wishing to evade it could legitimately use layers of encryption. "Suppose I send a secret file. I would first encrypt it with my own system. I would then obey the law by encrypting it a second time with the European-approved system. "Even when the government agency had decrypted the message using the keys they had been given, they would still find that the message was totally unintelligible because of the second layer of encryption." In France, it is illegal to use any kind of encryption, and police can arrest the authors of any e-mail which they cannot understand. Codes are used by a vast range of financial companies, sending money orders and sensitive commercial details. Reply to Electronic Telegraph - et(a)telegraph.co.uk Electronic Telegraph is a Registered Service Mark of The Telegraph plc

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Re: FORGED CANCELS of posts on n.a.n-a.m
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <modemacDFr0qB.IyK(a)netcom.com>, Rt. Rev. Modemac writes: >Dr. Dimitri Vulis (dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com) wrote: >: The National Alliance are not the first despicable racist net.abusers who forge >: cancels for other people's articles critical of them on n.a.n-a.m. Ken Arromdee >: has condemned one such forger, the graduate student Pyotr Vorobiev from Lehigh >: University's Mechanical Engineering and Mechanics Department (+1 610 758 4100) > >When Scientology began cancelling posts by their critics on >alt.religion.scientology, Homer Wilson Smith wrote a program called >"Lazarus" to track for cancels. The idea is simple: whenever a cancel >message appears, Lazarus announces it on the newsgroup. > >Mayhap a Lazaraus-type program can be put into effect on >news.admin.net-abuse.misc? Many other newsgroups are affected by such net.abuse (Vorobiev-style forged cancels based on contents); I just saw some messages on forged cancels in soc.culture.jewish and soc.culture.german. I think running Lazarus-like programs in _all_ newsgroups would be an extremely Good Idea. Alas, the time when people used to contribute their time and equipment for the public good of the net seems to be over. Peraps I'm just dreaming; or perhaps Dave Hayes will like the following idea enough to implement it. Also, I think it's a matter of time before some Cancelpoodle figures to put 'light' into the Path: of its Vorobiev-style forged cancels; then they will not be seen by lighlink.com where Lazarus now runs. This needs to be addressed. Anyway, here are my thoughts on this proposal: There would be a collection (at least 5 or 6) of cancel-watchers (sort of like the deamons that now watch misc.test) all over the world. They should be well-connected (preferrably, one hop away from sites like uunet, howland.reston.ans.net, etc). Each watcher would look at incoming articles in "control", and whenever it sees a cancel, it would replace its own uucp name in the path by something like ellipsis (to keep it confidential) and forward the cancel to a central cataloguer (singly or in batches). E.g., is a watcher at xyzz123.uucp saw a cancel with the header Path: xyz123!howland.reston.ans.net!someplace it would send it to the cataloguer with the Path: replaced by Path: ...!howland.reston.ans.net!someplace The cataloguer would wake up every few hours (for example), group the collected cancels by message-ids of the cancelled articles, and e-mail reports to the (distinct) addresses (other than "usenet@*" or "news@*") mentioned in the "From:", "Sender:", "Authorized:", and "X-Cancelled-By:" headers, and quoting the entire cancel and the Path's as seen at different sites by the cancel-watchers. This way, if the cancel is forged, its author will learn within hours that it has been fraudulently cancelled and will automatically receive enough Path: samples from all over the world to see where it was posted, by comparing the Path headers in several copies of cancels. A user or an entire site should be able to "opt out" of having its cancels reported by sending a command to the cataloguer. There should be a limit of, say, no more than 100 such notifications sent to a site in one batch (to prevent too much traffic in the event of really massive forged cancellation). I don't have the resources to do this right now, but I would be happy if some civic-minder netters took this proposal and ran with it. --- Dr. Dimitri Vulis Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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SAI_cya
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-2-95. W$Japer: "Internet Users Spooked About Spies' New Role." Web Review reported last week that the company in charge of assigning domain names, Network Solutions Inc., had been acquired by Science Applications International Corp., a closely held company which has many former intelligence and defense officials on its board. Web Review raised questions about whether SAIC is acting as camouflage for the government. Users of the Internet, which was originally created as a communications medium for Defense Department researchers, are reacting to the news with hostility. "I don't want a spook corporation, particularly a private spook corporation, to be anywhere near a control point on the global cooperative Internet," says James Warren. SAI_cya (8 kb)

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Re: DNS Security ( was Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down...)
by kerowe＠ncsa.uiuc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:58 PM 10/1/95, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote: >DNS security is an important point. People not aware of efforts in this >area may want to check out draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-05.txt which has >more or less passed working group last call and is being considered by >th Security Area Directory / IESG. Reference code is also available >(see message pasted at end below). > >Donald But the proposed DNS extension itself does not deal with CRL and Key Compromise Lists. Ken. ------------------------------------------------------------- Kenneth E. Rowe (kerowe(a)ncsa.uiuc.edu) Senior Security Engineer (217) 244-5270 (Office) / Security Coordinator (217) 244-0710 (NCSA IRST) National Center for Supercomputing Applications *** email ncsa-irst(a)ncsa.uiuc.edu for computer incident response ***

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"precip"} = "<mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<remail(a)ecafe.org> cpunk"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. News: the remailer list has been rewritten, and the new version is live! It should be more accurate, reliable, and faster than before. Penet is back up! Enjoy. remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org --+-+++----+ 52:32 100.00% ecafe remail(a)ecafe.org *--********# 7:37 99.99% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *##*#**+#*## 2:47 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *********+** 9:56 99.98% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org --+****+*--+ 2:04:31 99.98% robo robo(a)c2.org #+###**+#*## :59 99.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com +**+*-++*++* 11:35 99.95% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*#+###***-# 8:29 99.95% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -++---+---++ 1:35:11 99.94% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net *****++**+** 23:08 99.93% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ## ##*+#*## 2:03 99.79% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net ---+ --+-+- 1:18:05 99.70% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com -.-.---.--- 10:24:01 99.68% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -.---.----- 8:06:45 99.54% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++ +++++ ++ 43:52 99.08% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net *+--*+ +** 20:36 98.79% c2 remail(a)c2.org ++++++ +++ 47:07 98.74% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net ----------- 3:27:18 98.64% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi - ++-++--++ 2:43:34 98.63% hroller hroller(a)c2.org #+###* **# :57 92.70% rahul homer(a)rahul.net **#****+### 2:05 99.52% wmono wmono(a)spook.alias.net **** 7:37 87.49% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de **+*#***+ 6:37 68.05% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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`Hack Microsoft' challenge is NYT Computer News Daily's top story
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See http://nytsyn.com/live/Lead/275_100295_074418_19095.html MICROSOFT BECOMES NEW TARGET OF HACKING CHALLENGE (10/2) By HEATHER GREEN c.1995 Bloomberg Business News BERKELEY, Calif. -- Microsoft Corp. has been chosen as a new target for computer hackers. Community Connexion, an Internet service provider that last week promised a free T-shirt to anyone who found a flaw in Netscape Communications Corp.'s software, extended the challenge Friday to include holes in Microsoft products. . . . The article quotes Sameer and includes the URL http://www.c2.org/hackmsoft/ -- Rick Busdiecker Please do not send electronic junk mail! net: rfb(a)lehman.com or rfb(a)cmu.edu PGP Public Key: 0xDBD9994D www: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/rfb/http/home.html send mail, subject "send index" for mailbot info, "send pgp key" gets my key A `hacker' is one who writes code. Breaking into systems is `cracking'.

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Re: X.509, S/MIME, and evolution of PGP
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Wed, 27 Sep 1995 15:22:08 -0700 >From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> Bill, >I'd always heard X.509 public key certificates were a hierarchical, evil, >anti-WebOfTrust ISOism. But Netscape is now doing them, and talking S/MIME, >so I sat down to read the specs, and they're really not all that bad. I was all set to scream, when I read this first sentence. Then I read on. >(Technically, I've only read PKCS#6 and RFC 1422, and not the real ISOisms...) >Yeah, they've got lots of clunky ASN.1 Ambiguous Encoding Rules and X.500 >Silly Name Format, but those can be lived with, and the X.500 may be possible >to simply ignore in most cases. At this point, I realized that we agree in evaluation but not in weighting. Twice now, I have had to deal with X.509 certificates in real code and it is excruciatingly painful -- especially for someone, like me, with some background in performance engineering and much background in software engineering. ASN.1 is not merely ambiguous, it is actively wrong as part of a design methodology. It encourages people to define structures in the BNF style -- and they do (witness X.509). When you translate this into C or PASCAL structures by an automatic translator, you end up with structures whose definitions are nested so deeply that even with short field names you would have variable names which occupy a substantial part of a line of text. However, ASN.1's BNF-ness encourages people to use longNamesWithEmbeddedCapitals -- so you end up with variable names which turn routine C function calls into multi-line, unreadable blocks. You also end up with too much code. I recently had to deal with X.509 certs for an authentication application (a firewall proxy). The proxy was about 30KB of code prior to the ASN.1. The ASN.1 code, just to do packing and parsing, was over 100KB (.o file sizes, in both cases). You also end up with too many bytes being transferred. I worked out an example of ASN.1 abuse -- defining a triple-DES key structure for encrypting and transmittal -- as a raw C structure (following long established practice and performance engineering (an array of unsigned char, with offsets for each key and the IV)) and as ASN.1 (following modern ASN.1 practice). The raw C structure was 32 bytes long. The ASN.1 structure was 86 bytes. Worse was the code dedicated to structure definition and packing/unpacking. In the raw C case, it took 48 ASCII characters to define the structure and its offsets (including comments) and nothing to pack/unpack. With ASN.1, it took 55085 characters of definition, pack and unpack code. This is a factor of 1148 in source code expansion. -------------------------------- I could go on at length, and have in other fora. Not only is ASN.1 clearly the work of Satan, the Distinguished Name definition is more than a victim of ASN.1 generality, it is a clear reason for the unpopularity of systems which use it. Do you remember when X.400 names started showing up in e-mail (e.g., with Lotus Notes). How many of those names do you see now? It didn't work. The concept is flawed -- but it lives on in X.509. [It reminds me of a flaky grad student's idea of a way to do things -- elevated to standard before people had the chance to try it and discover how completely bogus it was.] It is possible to implement something which reads and writes ASN.1 -- but it is ugly, it inflates your code and it hurts your runtime. I would like to see as many hold-outs against ASN.1 and Distinguished Names as possible. PGP is one such. TIS/MOSS has learned its lesson (from PEM days) and is making all of the ASN.1 and DN stuff (X.509) optional. With luck, the X.509 parts will die away (although MOSS was retarded so strongly in the PEM days that it may never recover -- may never acquire the market share to make it a force). I would strongly encourage others to join the battle. This might not be easy. It is clear that there is an ASN.1 juggernaut. It is taking over all sorts of standards. I believe I know why. It makes the job of the standards writer easier. However, I also believe it needs to be fought...not merely to save future S/W development efforts from the waste and abuse which ASN.1 creates, but also to take a stand against the process by which non-implementors get together on standards committees and come out with standards which preclude good software architectures -- and who, in a kind of old-boy-network, endorse other standards (e.g., the ISO set) as part of their own. Such a design process is destructive. - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)tis.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |Trusted Information Systems, Inc. http://www.tis.com/ | |3060 Washington Road PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2| |Glenwood MD 21738 Tel:(301)854-6889 FAX:(301)854-5363 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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