December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

NOT_100
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New Yorker of October 23 reports on the "Supernote," a perfect counterfeit $100-bill allegedly being used for economic terrorism. The Supernote had surfaced around 1990 and originated in the Middle East. It was no ordinary counterfeit. The workmanship was extraordinary. When a sample first arrived at the Secret Service's laboratory, a top technical analyst "examined it the way he has every other counterfeit note in the world, and called it genuine." Most alarming of all, the Supernote was so well engineered that it could fool currency scanners at the nation's twelve Federal Reserve banks. Today, the Supernote remains one of the longest unsolved counterfeiting cases in the modern history of the Secret Service, and it has begun to undermine international confidence in United States currency. The Treasury, taking its cue from the Federal Reserve, has a difficult time regarding counterfeiting, even on a very large scale, as a macroeconomic problem, because cash is a relatively small percentage of the total money supply. Wire transfers, checks, and credit-card transactions, after all, run into the trillions. Counterfeiting becomes significant to the Fed only if it undermines confidence in the dollar. Dozens of interviews with high-level insiders left the impression that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury don't fear the Supernote itself as much as they fear a confidence problem that might result if they publicly acknowledge it and countenance a large-scale investigation. (As one expert on international terrorism who has looked into the Supernote puts it, "If the note is that nearly perfect, it doesn't exist.") NOT_100 (30 kb in 2 parts)

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Re: Using deterministic programs to select private RSA keys.
by Martin Diehl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

norm(a)netcom.com(Norman Hardy) writes: Much has been said recently here about how to produce truly random primes. [snip] The protocol is to accept a sequence of key strokes for printable ASCII characters. [snip] I suggest that if you capture the time in microseconds between keystrokes and insert the least significant 8 bits between the corresponding characters (i. e. <letter1> <time2 - time1> <letter2> <time3 - time2> <letter3> ... <letter nnn> <time until double CR - time nnn>) and MD5 the set of values, the resulting "random" value will be different for both people who type different input texts as well as those people who type the same input text. It is important to be sure that you are accessing a true microsecond clock (or other high resolution clock). For example, in the IBM PC architecture, the clock tic (basic time interrupt) is one per 18.2 milliseconds or 55 interrupts per second. If you were using the clock tic rate and a highly trained typist with a regular typing rate, the interspersed time values might show a consistent set of values. On the other hand, use of a microsecond clock eliminates this problem. As regards the observation that MD5 produces only a 128 bit result, you could call MD5 after each nn values (at least 16) have been entered. In that way a few lines of input and associated timing values could easily generate a value of the same order of magnitude as the number of 1K primes. Martin G. Diehl

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Re: Netscape rewards are an insult
by Westcan1＠softnc1.softnc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Netscape rewards are an insult > > Promoting the notion that hackers are earnestly attacking > > Netscape and reporting its bugs increases its credibility to > > the stock market porkers. Is that not why dear > > all-too-attentive Jeff has been assigned duty on this list, > > feeding peanuts to chimp hackers and champ newshacks? Whoa!! > I'm afraid you're a little out of line here. > I've worked with Jeff at a couple different companies > over the last 6 years. Besides being a very good programmer > he's also one of the people I consider the most resistant > to corportate bullstuff (beleive me, we both got a lot of it at MicroUnity). > I'm sure he's on this list because he thinks it's a good > idea to pay attention to it. Maybe he is, but I'd rather hear everyone speak for themself. You can speak for you. And you can let Jeff speak for himself. And I'd rather that Netscape speak for itself, too. Is Jeff or any of the other netscape posters here officially?? Or are they here, just out of personal curiosity (without their employers knowledge, I mean ...) cause they have a whole lot of spare time on their hands to learn about cryptography and security. I wish one of them (or Netscape) would make an official comment to make sure that the record is straight, and that there is no mis-reporting. > What the hell is wrong with you people? Up 'til a few months > ago, the oft-heard refrain on cipherpunks was "why won't the > software vendors listen to us?"... now they're listening, Yep, they seem to be listening. They just don't seem to be talking. Can someone say something, please?? Is it true that: - Netscape has known about this problem since last week's scathing public attack and demonstration of the problem which included sample code posted to the Internet?? - If you run and use a Netscape client, that any machine anywhere in the world if it's on the Net could retrieve all of the files off of your hard drive or LAN?? Or even worse ... erase files on your Hard drive and wipe you out?? - Even if your machine is behind a firewall or proxy server, that there is no protection?? That you can't do anything?? Can someone comment, please?? (Carbon copy sent to: postmaster(a)netscape.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, cert(a)cert.org)

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Re: 90%
by Robin Felix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:01 PM 10/12/95 -0400, zoetrope(a)infinet.com wrote: >Can I ask a question....are you guys into cryptology for the interesting >facts and knowledge or fer cracking unix codes and raising havoc? Do you drive a car to go to work, go to school, or go to the beach? Or just, perhaps, because you enjoy tinkering with it? -- Robin Felix; felix(a)delfin.com; felix(a)nosc.mil 619-291-2194(work), 619-291-5852(fax), 619-991-5081(alt) http://www.delfinsd.delfin.com/

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BeBox Security Hole?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This looks like fun... Cheers, Bob Hettinga >Date: Mon, 16 Oct 1995 23:07:58 -0700 >From: crawford(a)scruznet.com (Michael D. Crawford) >To: semper.fi(a)abs.apple.com, dev(a)be.com >Subject: Re: BeBox development questions and answers >Message-ID: <199510170607.XAA06319(a)scruz.net> > >Jonah Benton asked Melissa Rogers about security: > >>>>are there ways of excluding certain users from certain parts of the file >>>>system? >>>No >>>> >>>>i believe you support telnet- can multiple users telnet in at once? >>>> >>>Yes > >The answers to these two questions suggests the existence of the following >serious security problem, which can cause breaches on any other machine on >the network. This is a time-honored way for hackers to bust into machines >on the Internet. > >do{ > telnet to an Internet host that does not have adequate security > > Patch the telnet client on the Be box to save keystrokes into a file > > Log out > > Wait a couple weeks > > Telnet back in, retrieve the file. > > Now you have the host names, account names, and passwords for several other > machines >}while ( Internet != destroyed ); > >Would someone from Be care to clarify? > >This isn't exactly on-topic for this list, but it is a serious problem. >It's been going on for years on other OS's. > >Mike > >Michael D. Crawford | I use anonymous digital cash from DigiCash. >crawford(a)scruznet.com | Join the e-Cash trial at: >http://www.scruz.net/~crawford/ | http://www.digicash.com > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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re: e$: Reuters Smells the Coffee
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry, folks. Eudora got the best of me there... Sorry for the bandwidth... Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Yardley's 1st ed. "Black Chamber" $25+
by baum＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found one in a bookstore. I didn't buy it, but I'll go back and get it & ship it if someone is interested. ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, MS/305-3B fax (408)974-0907 * * 1 Infinite Loop * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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[burt@RSA.COM: NSA recommendation on CAPIs]
by Eric Blossom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Tue, 17 Oct 95 10:07:20 PDT From: burt(a)RSA.COM (Burt Kaliski) To: pkcs-11-dev(a)RSA.COM Subject: NSA recommendation on CAPIs Sender: pkcs-11-dev-request(a)RSA.COM Greetings -- In case you haven't seen it, NSA has produced a nice report on cryptogaphic APIs, available through http://www.omg.org/public-doclist.html The report compares GSSAPI, GCSAPI and Cryptoki, and recommends the use of each one in various applications. -- Burt

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Blacknet
by LaurianneA＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are you still up and running with Blacknet? I just need to know if you can use some info. Message me here.

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Re: Using deterministic programs to select private RSA keys.
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:38 AM 10/17/95, Martin Diehl wrote: .... > I suggest that if you capture the time in microseconds between > keystrokes and insert the least significant 8 bits between the > corresponding characters (i. e. <letter1> <time2 - time1> <letter2> > <time3 - time2> <letter3> ... <letter nnn> <time until double CR - > time nnn>) and MD5 the set of values, the resulting "random" value > will be different for both people who type different input texts as > well as those people who type the same input text. .... Indeed, but the point of the proposal is a determinate and reproducible program behavior so as to gain confidence that the output is correct by comparing output of several programs. .... > As regards the observation that MD5 produces only a 128 bit result, > you could call MD5 after each nn values (at least 16) have been > entered. In that way a few lines of input and associated timing > values could easily generate a value of the same order of magnitude as > the number of 1K primes. .... Sounds good.

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I want to learn!
by VINCENT810＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone please show me the ropes on becomeing a cypherpunk!!!! Thanxs.

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if-comp: Project to make Fact true (fwd)
by s1018954＠aix2.uottawa.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is something I got off the Idea Futures computers list. (The Fact claim is that a 512 bit number will be factored by '97) I don't know if the following address has been posted here before. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 17 Oct 95 13:45:40 PDT From: Robin Hanson <hanson(a)hss.caltech.edu> To: if-comp(a)merak.com Subject: if-comp: Project to make Fact true A team at Bellcore seems to be planning to try and make the claim Fact true. See this web page, and the forward in particular: http://kayak.npac.syr.edu:2008/ They plan to use the web to allow lots of machines to easily participate. They will start with a 130-digit number and work their way up to the 155-digit number required to satisfy the claim. Will they succeed by the end of '97? A crypto expert friend of mine claims their chances are 90%. I have bet accordingly. Robin Hanson hanson(a)hss.caltech.edu http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~hanson/ 818-683-9153 2433 Oswego St., Pasadena, CA 91107 FAX: 818-405-9841 818-395-4289 Div. Hum. & Soc. Sci. 228-77 Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125

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Re: Security Spectra (Oops)
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 17 Oct 1995 14:13:10 GMT From: Jeff Williams <williams(a)va.arca.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Security Spectra P.J. Ponder writes: > In your recent post to the cypherpunks mailing list you proposed a > taxonomy of security weaknesses and vulnerabilities, adding that these Please watch your attribution. Vlad Nuri proposed this rating scheme. Oops. Sorry about that. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- On another matter, what's wrong with Mr. W of NetScape Communications subscribing to this list, maybe even posting once in a while if he feels like it, and in general just being a list subscriber like the rest of us? Remember, as Mr. PM says - 'It's not a group, it's a mailing list'. Mr. Weinstein's sig file says his posts are his own opinions, anyway. NetScape biggies have certainly posted on this list before and probably will again when they have something they want to send to the list, like a press release. Cut Jeff some slack. (apology to international readers, that's an Americanism for quit busting his chops.)

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[ANNOUNCEMENT] eCash reality !!
by usura＠berserk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

e-WAVE [issue 42], a dutch language electronic newsletter published by Riverland Publications, reports that DigiCash has reached agreement with a big US bank to make eCash real. DigiCash promised the 'scoop' to Newsweek, so in next monday's issue of Newsweek we will know wich bank that is. (They are also said to be talking with a Dutch or Belgian bank or financial institution). Since there has been cut a deal with the monetary powers I wonder if we get the whole anonymous ecash or a 'diluted spieces'. -AJ- For the many subscribers of the cypherpunks mailinglist that are able to read Dutch, here is the portion of e-WAVE that has the announcement. <g> ------BEGIN QUOTE------ Tijdens de toelichting op de toepasbaarheid van Digicash's encryptie-technologie op stemmen, komt het vermaarde e-cash ter sprake. Dinnissen heeft een primeur maar mag nog niks verklappen: 'Volgende week maandag zullen wij bekend maken met welke grote Amerikaanse bank Digicash in zee gaat om e-cash tot een legitiem en valide betaalmiddel te maken.' WAT!!! E-CASH LEGAAL?! Wow, gelijk de cyberbucks natellen. En met welke bank? 'Kan ik niet zeggen.' Ook nog Nederlandse of Belgische banken? 'Er zijn ook gesprekken dichter bij huis, ja.' Kan dat eigenlijk zomaar? 'Er zijn afspraken gemaakt met monetaire instanties. De scoop is beloofd aan het Amerikaanse tijdschrift *Newsweek* dat op die maandag uitkomt.' (Shit) Spoedig meer hierover. For more information mail: erwin(a)wave.riv.nl ------END QUOTE------ 88888b d888b 888b 88 8P 888888 88888b 888 888b 88 88 d888b 88 88 88 88 88 88`8b 88 88 88 88 88 88 88`8b 88 88 88 ` 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88888P 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 `8b88 88 88 d8888888b 88 `8b88 88 88 , "" 88888P `888P 88 `888 88 88 88 `8b 88 `888 88 `888P 88

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Re: [ANNOUNCEMENT] eCash reality !!
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <3R85cD1w165w(a)berserk.com>, usura(a)berserk.com (Alex de Joode) wrote: > e-WAVE [issue 42], a dutch language electronic newsletter > published by Riverland Publications, reports that DigiCash > has reached agreement with a big US bank to make eCash real. > > DigiCash promised the 'scoop' to Newsweek, so in next monday's > issue of Newsweek we will know wich bank that is. (They are also > said to be talking with a Dutch or Belgian bank or financial > institution). > > Since there has been cut a deal with the monetary powers I wonder > if we get the whole anonymous ecash or a 'diluted spieces'. It will have the same features as the Ecash used in the trial. Payer is anonymous, but the payee isn't. I hope that I'll be able to finish some perl scripts that add this badly needed, but for political reasons missing, feature by the end of the month. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMIRvWioZzwIn1bdtAQHT8wF+JUheIIJxAV4ER1+lPddZhr744rR9N0/f Ps0CIGNK9Ie16XVBMXx4J0OkKqCjP0PW =HFWw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PINs
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What if You had Two PINs ??? And One Works and One Sounds a Silent Alarm . Then If You are Forced to give your PIN ,You give Them your Second PIN and They get Caught !!!!!!

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Re: transaction costs in anonymous markets
by sdavidm＠iconz.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.SUN.3.91.951016011355.2241A-100000(a)eskimo.com> Wei Dai said: "Maintaining anonymity requires that communications be done through special untraceable protocols." I think it is important to keep in mind exactly what we mean by anonymity in these discussions - there seems to be a bewildering array of flavours. Take three situations where anonymity might be useful: 1. The State Authorities come and take you away for subscribing to a publication advocating the end of socialised medicine. 2. The State Authorities come and take your assets away to pay for socialised medicine. 3. The Private Hospital comes and takes your assets away to pay for your lifesaving operation. [Avoiding 1 is (in my opinion) an unmitigated good; avoiding 2 is obviously desirable; but avoiding 3 could well be counter-productive.] This points to two categories of anonymity: Meat anonymity - there is no way of knowing which human is responsible; and Asset anonymity - there is no way of linking a particular human, transaction or activity to any particular asset, or vice versa. The point being that sometimes one will be desirable without the other. Concentrating on meat (or combined?) anonymity, there are (at least) two sorts; Legal anonymity - where the split between asset and meat is the result of the interposition of some legal structure (eg. Trust, corporation etc), the ultimate owners/controllers of which are unknown; and Digital anonymity - where the identity of the actor is mathematically unknowable (at least, at the limit). Obviously, these sorts can be layered, with legal entities transacting as digitally anonymous parties, and the owners of those legal entities protected by digital anonymity. In addition, we can distinguish between digital anonymity that allows no link between separate transactions (anonymity proper[?]), and digital anonymity that does allow links to be drawn between separate transactions or activities (pseudonymity). Similarly, we can distinguish between the various anonymous properties of transactions: A. Private Transactions. Each party to the transaction knows the identity of the others, but no third party can know who is transacting with whom. B. Unilateral Anonymity. One party to the transaction is known, but the other is unknowable. An example might be subscribing for a digital security with ecash - the issuer is known, but the purchaser is anonymous. C. Bilateral Anonymity. The identities of both parties to the transaction are unknowable. This might be the case on a cypherpunk stock exchange... "The current state-of-art (i.e. RemailerNet) adds several hours of transmition time to each message to achieve effective untraceability. Contract negotiation, for example, becomes very difficult under these circumstances." My experience of contract negotiation is that a delay of hours would be immaterial. Don't forget that email, fax machines, and even the telephone are relatively recent phenomena (not to mention the photocopier and the word-processor). Most super-tight deadlines are self-inflicted. "If these costs remain high, but anonymous markets develop regardless, it will be interesting to see how these costs affect the structure of the markets. Will special protocols for contract negotiations develop to minimize the number of round-trip messages?" Doubtless. In areas where complex transactions really have to be entered into at short notice, a lot of the negotiation goes on in advance, often by trade associations. ISDA, for instance, is forever producing standard terms and appendices so that all manner of arcane derivative transactions can be more or less negotiated over the phone. Cheers, Dm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMISijFlo3j8JHzalAQENEAP/UJTSvhAR534mh1KUQZQC1JYxZeROUaDf 6Nd42yxCmLbbSa72dEAB69jdfDHBj2sj6Jf6jL+HAGTrfG6I/dNJuKu9MaaCw64z MKe0efTCmD2caehOv9lf5tI2uJ0vAql8UdCC5gj3NhkxKr/uEAvcbIlt/Z60mmEu 4P2hxCv1u/o= =U8gP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [Palmtop News Reader - Beta Version 3]

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I want to learn!
by Leo_Martensen_at_~~HEID-DHS＠ccmail.odedodea.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: VINCENT810(a)aol.com >Message-Id: <951017234254_126621887(a)mail06.mail.aol.com> >To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: I want to learn! >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk >Can someone please show me the ropes on becomeing a cypherpunk!!!! Thanxs. Me Too, I'm catching on but some help would help ! Leo_Martensen_at_~~HEID-DHS(a)ccmail.odedodea.edu

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unsubscribing
by Sheedy, E.C.C. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies for the e-mail but could someone please tell me how one unsubcribes from this list as the recent changes have messed it up. _______________________________________________________ Kamer : B40 KPN Research Telefoon : +31-50-5822816 PO Box 15000 Fax : +31-50-3183110 9700 CD Groningen Email : e.c.c.sheedy(a)research.kpn.com The Netherlands ________________________________________________________________

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Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by Modemac 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Several weeks back, I posted a message stating the need (in my opinion) for a system of anonymity on the Internet that would be more secure than the anonymous remailers. Despite the valuable service provided by the remailers, I am troubled by their vulnerability. It seems likely that at some point in the near future, a remailer is going to be silenced, and possibly (though not inevitably) the contents of its database made public. This may possibly lead to criminal charges being filed against someone, based on alleged criminal acts in which the remailer plays a part. (I am not going to state what these "criminal acts" may be, because I don't know which ones will be involed. I don't know when this blow to the remailer system will come, or who it will happen to. I simply believe that, given the growing trend towards censorship and anti-privacy in government and business circles, the blow will come sooner or later.) The vulnerability of the remailer system, in my opinion, rests in the fact that a remailer is physically located in a certain place. This makes the remailer a target for attacks, as shown by the futile efforts (so far) of the so-called "church" of Scientology to silence the remailers at anon.penet.fi and xs4all.nl. (The original demand of Scientology in the Penet affair was for the entire contents of Julf's database to be revealed, but fortunately Julf was able to limit the exposure to a single user. When Scientology attempted to raid xs4all, their original seizure order was against the remailer itself - -- but fortunately (again) the remailer itself had been closed two months before. The representative of Scientology had to re-phrase the seizure order on the spot, declaring instead that the reason for the seizure was the existence of the infamous "Fishman Affivavit" on an xs4all Web page.) I believe a system of anonymity is needed that can withstand attacks of this sort. The current remailer system may be able to weather the oncoming storm, but it will suffer damage in the process. A system to reduce the effect of pro-censorship forces on sources of online anonymity is needed. But what shall this system be? Since the prime vulnerability of the remailers rests in their physical locations, we have the possibility of physically hiding their locations. This is impossible in the long run, and it hampers the ability to set up a remailer on a short-term basis. How hard is it to set up a node that is hidden from efforts to discover its location? If setting up a remailer requires you to go into hiding, many would-be privacy activists will be dissuaded from giving it a try. Rather, I wonder if it would be possible to devise a system that introduced a random element into the picture, one that lessens the possibility of blame being placed on any one individual, or any one site. The Netherlands responded to Scientology's attack on xs4all by spreading the Fishman Affivavit far and wide. At the time of this writing, this document now exists on more than eighty Web pages in Holland, and this makes it far more difficult for Scientology to stop the spread of information. (They are still trying, however. The latest word from Europe is that a member of Scientology's "Office of Special Affairs" has flown to Europe, and is now calling service providers and individual users. A lawyer for Scientology is there as well. See alt.religion.scientology for more details of this case.) Using Scientology as an example once again (this will be my last mention of it, I promise), note the failure of the "church" to shut down alt.religion.scientology. They have tried every possible means to prevent the newsgroup from spreading information to the world, and every attempt to stop this "leak" has failed. If it was possible to effectively eradicate a newsgroup, Scientology would certainly have done so by now. Alt.religion.scientology cannot be shut up because it is distributed to thousands of sites around the world, thus making it impossible to shut them all down. That's why I believe a newsgroup for anonymous messages would be able to withstand attacks by would-be censors. Previously, I had suggested the possibility of a "moderated" anonymous newsgroup that would forward all postings to the address of the "moderator," where they might then be randomly distributed to remailers before being posted to the anonymous newsgroup. However, that idea had several inherent weaknesses, including attacks on the "moderation" site and newgroup messages designed to compromise the newsgroup and send postings to other places. The way to prevent a newsgroup from being compromised in this manner, then, would use a different method -- one that is immune to control messages. In the course discussion with a group of cyberpunks on IRC a couple of days ago, another possible system for anonymity was devised. This system can reply on a unmoderated newsgroup as a source for messages. Instead of forwarding messages to an address in order to hide the ID of an anonymous poster, it was suggested that PGP be used to protect the messages themselves. The basic idea for this system goes like this: 1) A person writes a message and encrypts it with PGP. 2) That person then posts his message to the "anonymous messages" newsgroup. 3) A remailer scanning the newsgroup picks up the message, decrypts it, strips the headers and makes it anonymous, and sends it to its destination. Because the anonymous messages come to the remailer by scanning a newsgroup, tracking a remailer's incoming-mail logs would be useless. To offer further protection for the remailers, a random system could be devised to ensure that no one knows exactly which remailer scans a particular message at a particular time. I am not a programmer, and some of the technical details in this proposal go over my head. Hopefully you can clairfy some of the points presented here and see if this system is possible or not. The actual remailer code, involving scanning the newsgroup for PGP-encrypted messages and stripping headers, could be written with PERL scripts. This would keep it portable, and it would be easy for a person to tell if it has been tampered with. This code would be distributed widely. A series of remailers would be used to decrypt anonymous messages. A "token" (like the token ring of IBM fame) would be passed back and forth between all of the Cryptoclients in the remailer network, so that only one remailer would be "active" at any given time. This token would be passed back and forth at random, so no one would know exactly which remailer is being used to anonymize a message. The "token" is the key to this remailing system. This token would include necessary information such as the last message scanned, and to coordinate timing among the remailers. This will work to avoid duplication of messages. (Of course, the remailers should also hold messages for a random amount of time -- say, up to two hours -- in order to prevent someone from being traced, based on the time he posted his encrypted message to the newsgroup.) The decryption key for the anonymous messages would be created using a 2047-bit PGP key. To prevent this key from falling into the wrong hands, a "web of trust" could be used to pass pieces of the key among each other. If enough sites trust remailers trust a site, that site will receive enough pieces of the group key to be able to respond and "accept" the token. The public key for this PGP key would be sent to the keyservers. People would encrypt their messages using this key. The mental image I have is that of a virtual "anon demon," zipping back and forth among the network of remailer sites, stopping at each site to scan messages from the newsgroup and send them to their destinations. If a large network of remailers is connected in this fashion, it becomes impossible to prevent stop anonymous messages from reaching their destination simply by attacking one site, or even a series of sites. The "anon demon" would simply bypass the compromised sites and use other points in the network. Comments are welcome concerning the vulnerability of this system, its complexity, its ability to withstand attacks, and any other constructive criticism. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMIToGR7ohFhEPknNAQHEtwP9EmdEVtNoEJC6MtokZs66ea27Nx874K+s ueOiX21QL01SGjn7AvHUxTDPSiNXdnqSlDRqsnc2nefNlkhc2bzZklovlnZ15XC/ ZUxRWtCBk0LFoPyxbc/kEOM2cjqJdZ4llxYRHed0RcH0ABvYcGv8ZTjxtKEwN9Sy IDxmiTlqHXU= =yLqV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by Herb Sutter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:58 10.18.1995 -0700, Modemac wrote: > 1) A person writes a message and encrypts it with PGP. Using a set public key? Which would mean the remailers all share the same pub/pri key pair (or pieces thereof)? You'll have to come up with a good way of maintaining this secret, since if you're not careful it could be compromised by something as simple as an attacker's trying to attach a new remailer to the remailer group or physically attack any existing remailer. > 2) That person then posts his message to the "anonymous messages" > newsgroup. > 3) A remailer scanning the newsgroup picks up the message, > decrypts it, strips the headers and makes it anonymous, and > sends it to its destination. Not only is the anonymity of the entire traffic load compromised if the single shared private key is compromised, but even if the secret is kept the newsgroup articles' headers being posted in the clear still opens this scheme to traffic analysis (even if you put it a short random remailer delay, as you say later on; computers are very good at sifting through large volumes of data to find this kind of pattern, especially if the remailer delay's upper bound is known (you proposed two hours)). >The actual remailer code, involving scanning the newsgroup for >PGP-encrypted messages and stripping headers, could be written with >PERL scripts. This would keep it portable, and it would be easy for >a person to tell if it has been tampered with. This code would be >distributed widely. ...and if someone installs their own remailer and adds it to the group, and therefore it must get the complete shared private key at some point (of necessity, else it couldn't decrypt the messages), and then the attacker can just look at the key and decrypt all traffic...? Herb ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Herb Sutter 2228 Urwin, Suite 102 voice (416) 618-0184 Connected Object Solutions Oakville ON Canada L6L 2T2 fax (905) 847-6019

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Re: Microsoft: WFW & Win95 TCP/IP is insecure, and alleged serious computer crime
by llurch＠Networking.Stanford.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted, emailed, and archived. I probably should have talked to a lawyer first. Oh well. Followup-To poster (that means email) or spawn new threads. The FAQ is at http://www-dccs.stanford.edu/NetConsult/Win95Net/faq.html. It's getting dated; please download the new.txt link, in UNIX mbox format. The quixote list archive server has been turned off for security reasons. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <461u88$luk(a)dingo.cc.uq.oz.au> in a few newsgroups, DavidS(a)gpo.pa.uq.edu.au (David Steadson) writes: >In article <45rims$9fc(a)Networking.Stanford.EDU>, llurch(a)Networking.Stanford.EDU >says... >> >>Note that Microsoft's "in order to have this problem, there must be a >>UNIX >>computer on your network" really means "if you're connected to the >>Internet, and you're not behind a firewall that disallows all SMB traf >>fic, >>you have this problem." Some other bits are misleading as well. > >Ummm, this is new?? I knew about this security hole in MS TCP/IP months ago, >via newsgroups. Lots of things are new, and very interesting, especially for Usenet readers, because the story involves forged cancels, apparently stolen passwords, and serious computer crime. I'm so glad you asked. Unsurprising Fact: Microsoft has finally acknowledged and documented the problem, and, without fanfare, released a patch for Windows for Workgroups that claims to fix it. Fact: several people at Microsoft have been lying about the problem. In early September, paulbal(a)microsoft.com assured a gathering of Stanford computing support staff that the problem had been fixed in build 490, so I looked no further into it. For a while. Fact: On September 27, I reposted a July article from the SAMBA email list archive about the bug you know all about. I asked for confirmation on whether it had been fixed in the release version of Win95, and whether a fix was available for WFW. Supposition: Early morning September 28, my kerberos password was apparently hacked, and my .forward file was disabled on several UNIX machines, preventing me from receiving some personal and work-related email. I did not notice this problem until October 6 because I seldom log on to the machines in question. Fact: On September 28, I received several replies to my post, several saying that Microsoft had assured them that it had been fixed at some specified (often specified different) build. I also received two replies that the problem had *not* been fixed, and volunteering to reproduce the problem for me. Fact: I posted the confirmation of the bug to win95netbugs(a)lists.stanford.edu. Fact: The Windows for Workgroups security bug fix patch on Microsoft's FTP server is dated late night September 28. Fact: On October 2, Paul_Krill(a)InfoWorld.Com phoned and emailed me inquiring about the problem. He had also been assured by Microsoft sources that the problem had been fixed. I forwarded several articles his way indicating that it had not been fixed. I again searched the Microsoft Knowledge Base for any mention of "SAMBA" or "SMBCLIENT" and found none. Fact: On October 4, received an email message from henrysa(a)microsoft.com inquiring about the problem and offering to investigate for me the current status of the problem. In reply, I sent him the three email messages that are included at the bottom of this post. I have not received any sort of reply from Henry. Fact/Supposition: October 2 (?), somebody made a directory on a Stanford FTP server world-readable and world-writeable, uploaded several megabytes of "warez," and advertised the site on hacker BBSes. Since many people had access to this directory, there were no suspicions about who was responsible. My kerberos password, which I now believe was stolen, would have been sufficient to cause this problem. Fact: Late night/early morning October 14-15, in a routine browse of the Microsoft Knowledge Base, I came across articles on the SMB security bugs, which we all know about now. I posted them, with commentary rather less lurid than what you have seen from me since, when I was perturbed. Fact: The article was canceled. On this day 10/18/95, under penalty of perjury, I swear that it was not canceled by me. My PGP signature should be legally binding. Fact: I also Cc'd the article to \win95netbugs and myself via email. The email made it. NewsWatcher works such that separate Message-IDs are created for news and email, and someone reading the news post has no way of knowing whether the article was also emailed. Supposition: the canceler did not know that NewsWatcher worked this way. Fact: In the morning, I noticed the article was missing, but that earlier and later articles by me were there. I figured something must have gone wrong, so I reposted it. Fact: From 12:10 to 5PM, I was with Kevin Morris at Sacred Heart school in Atherton, building a local PhoneNET network. Obviously, I had no Internet access. While I was there, my second post of the article was canceled. Fact: Around 7PM, I noticed the second cancel, and a followup thereto from a netcom account confirming that the article had been posted and propagated, got really pissed off, and posted it a third time. I also posted to news.admin.net-abuse.misc and our local news administration group. I also Cc'd several PC and networking magazines via email, and cross-posted to a .test group so that I would have verification of the propagation of the article in hand. Fact: Today, as was the case 15 hours after it was posted, article <llurch-1510951157410001(a)tip-mp3-ncs-3.stanford.edu>, to which there was that netcom followup, is missing, presumed canceled, from the core Stanford news servers nntp and csd-newshost. It is present on the secondary news host morrow.stanford.edu, and on external sites. No one has been able to provide any explanation for this. Supposition: the canceler either screwed up or canceled the cancel or, more likely, forged a repost after seeing the netcom followup. For some reason, however, the article did not make it back onto nntp or csd-newshost. Fact: Later that night and in the morning, I received copies of the forged cancels of my messages as seen from nasa.gov, rand.org, and mcom.com. I posted them to news.admin.net-abuse.misc. Supposition: an individual or group has gone great lengths, engaging in quite a bit of highly illegal and unethical behavior, in order to cover up security and networking bugs in Microsoft products. Opinion: they have failed. In a big, big way. - -rich graves distributed computing and communication systems stanford university llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMITf34ND7LjhcPQ9AQGlsQP+KFNuOehBPLExKjJc0e/7bv8iAF29bYgi o4ioLYuwx4AKtR2hER85PWWPNBuDO+G8uqDBcDNzKZ+VxrNDWvhP9oSfTy9ry9OM p5hkcQfB/MqqeDZ5nFOXmTkI2y+EI3az1lHWBr9kQuSalpAVkXTx0/qeW9WWYVFZ cuZ8+Tf3W7o= =G/Dk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Unanswered letters to henrysa(a)microsoft.com:

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Re: Netscape PR
by Charles Gimon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > If you wish to get an official statement from Netscape, you should > contact our PR department. Their number is 415-528-2802. > They don't have e-mail?

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Re: I want to learn!
by stevenw＠iglou.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>From: VINCENT810(a)aol.com >>Message-Id: <951017234254_126621887(a)mail06.mail.aol.com> >>To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com >>Subject: I want to learn! >>Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >>Precedence: bulk > >>Can someone please show me the ropes on becomeing a cypherpunk!!!! Thanxs. > > Me Too, I'm catching on but some help would help ! ^^^^^^ Looks like this is now a proper noun, thanks to AOL. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more +1 415 390 9732 | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)iglou.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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ABA Draft Digital Signature Guidelines Open for Comment
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The long-delayed ABA draft digital signature guidelines are now available for public comment. This is potentially an important document, and is worth some time for those interestested in the legal and economic effects of digital signatures. An internet version and more info can be found at: http://www.intermarket.com/ecl/digsgleg.html The comment period ends Nov 30, 1995, so don't delay. Due to the ABA's Section on Science and Technology's fear that its intellectual property will be ripped off, the document is in a strange "read-only" format, relying on the "Common Ground Mini-Viewer". The program has been designed to prevent users from printing their own copy of the document. Paper copies can be ordered from the ABA for $15 (see website for details). I would apologize on behalf of the ABA Information Security Committee for this user-unfriendly method of distributing the document (it certainly makes quoting from it in your comments difficult!), but the Chair of the Committee, Michael Baum, unilaterally removed me from the Committee a few days ago. I nonetheless urge you to read this interesting document. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's hot here. And humid.

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