December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Netscape to patch shareware version
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>| Netscape said it received word last week that the State Department had >| cleared that version for release on the Net, but only within the U.S., >| owing to current export laws banning the export of encryption schemes >| stronger than 40 bits. THe company could provide no details by press >| time on how it would ensure that the 128-bit version wouldn't leak beyond >| U.S. borders. > >Ok, any bet on how long it will take? It's already been exported. Evidently, one of those who bought the commercial version sent it to Europe as soon as it was out. I note the site removed it, however, probably because Netscape Comm. Inc. requested that they do so. Netscape generally objects to anyone else carrying their browser (.edu sites with prior permission excepted).

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Re: art-stego
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jonathan Rochkind wrote: > So a good steganography algorithm (which I understand > exists) merely changes the values of the noise so that it > now encodes your (random) message. So there's no way to > look for "suspicious bit patterns" > You are assuming that the noise bits have the same statistical properties as cyphertext. I would be very surprised if this were the case. It takes special effort to achieve good random bit streams. Image scanners may do this by accident, but then again, maybe they don't. This uncertainty is, in my opinion, the fatal flaw in image-based steganography. The same reasoning applies to audio-based steganography. Unless the devices were specially designed to insert cryptagraphically useful bits in the output (or, as Tim May suggested, good garbage bits are inserted later), then you should not rely on the pictures or audio files to keep your messages hidden. As an alternative to trying to hide bits, I proposed not hiding them at all, but instead creating an innocent reason for passing around files that contain, in some way or another, obvious random bit streams. The first idea that came to mind was to use the random bit streams to create pretty fractal pictures. I soon realized that any function that produces pretty pictures would do the trick as long as there was a way to recover the random bit stream given only the picture and the function. Perhaps it would be possible to use random bit streams to generate cool BioMorphs (ala "The Blind Watchmaker"). If enough people start passing around pictures generated from meaningless random bit streams, then other people could use this traffic to covertly exchange pictures generated from meaningful random bit streams. > if they can manage to get a cleartext message out of it, > plausible deniability is unlikely to get you far. > You could always claim you didn't know it was there, that you just downloaded the picture out of curiosity. It might help, depending on what country you live in. Tim May wrote: > Just bear in mind that this form of steganography is > getting further away from conventional hiding, and > into "pure plausible deniability." In fact, one need > not even make a serious attempt to hide the encrypted > bits: just call the encrypted file "art" and be done with > it! > Come to think of it, if the picture files were larger than the random bit streams, people very well might send just the random bit streams. "Hey Bob, take a look at the picture this creates when you feed it to the XYZ function (coefficient values A, B, and C)." Jim_Miller(a)suite.com P.S. In case anyone is wondering, the reason there is a large delay between a post from me and a reply from me is that I'm not actually on the mailing list. I read the messages by pointing my news reading at nntp.hks.net

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VOO_doo
by Adam Philipp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Do you feel lucky, punk?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [from Cypherpunks] Those of you who are confident that the Leahy bill won't be interpreted to punish innocent people (for example, operators of encrypted anonymous remailers) who are not directly engaged in criminal activity should read the following article, that appeared as the George Will column March 10, in my local paper. Maybe it will give you a healthy dose of REALITY (remember reality, fellows?): "Taking Property from innocents doesn't fit conservative ideals" by George F. Will. In 1827, in a case concerning the forfeiture of a Spanish ship used for piracy, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the owner could lose his ship even if he was not even aware of the use of the ship for piracy: "the thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing." That, and a long line of cases in that vein, is why the court last week said Tina Bennis has no right to compensation for her half-interest in the car she co-owned with her husband John and which was forfeited after he was convicted in Detroit of engaging in sexual activity with a prostitute in the car. The court was divided 5-4 in rejecting Mrs. Bennis' contention that the forfeiture violated her 14th amendment right to due process and her Fifth Amendment right not to have property take without just conpensation. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined in dissent by David H. Souter and Stephen Breyer (anthony M. Kennedy dissented separately), condemned the "blatant unfairness" of punishing an innocent person. And Justice Clarence Thomas, although concurring separately in the opinion written by Chief Justice WIlliam H. Rehnquist and joined by Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Thomas, said that what was done to Mrs. Bennis by Michigan law was "intensely undesireable." Because many governments are increasingly agressive in their use of forfeiture as punishment for prostitution, drug, and other offenses, this decision, although supported by the most conservative justices, should trouble conservatives: it involves conflicts between three things they value- deference to states' legislative judgments, fidelity to precedent and respect for property rights. Bennis made his mistake in 1988 in an 11-year old Pontiac he and his wife had recently purchased for $600. The trial court judge had discretion to order payment of half the sale proceeds to "the innocent co-titleholder," but commented that "there's practically nothing left" after deduction of police, prosecutorial, and court costs." Ginsburg noted that the question at issue was not whether compensating Mrs. Bennis would have been fair but whether compensation was a constitutional right. And Ginsburg's concurring opinion suggests that she would have affirmed such a right had not the car belonged as much to Mr. Bennis as to Mrs. Bennis. Although Mrs. Bennis neither consented to nor knew of the misuse of the car, Rehnquist cited the court's language in a 1926 case, that it is common "for the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it." That practice, the court had said five years earlier, is "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced." Certainly the court should not casually unsettle what it has firmly fixed. Nor should the court relieve Congress of its role in correcting dubious legal practices. the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois, has drafted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act that would, among other things, strengthen protection of innocent property owners. Still, sometimes the court has had to say, in effect, "Well, come to think about it... ." It took four years of carnage and then the 13th amendment to correct what the court did in 1857 in Dred Scott vs. Sanford. But in other cases the court has tidied up after itself. In 1896 in Plessy vs. Ferguson, the court held that "separate but equal" public facilities segregated by race were compatible with the 14th Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Later, the court conducted a protracted retreat from that position. In 1905 in Lockner vs. New York, as in similar cases, the court held that a New York law limiting bakers to a 10-hour workday violatedd teh DUe Process clause. By 1963, Justice Hugo Black could assert that the Lochner doctrint of "substantive due process," that the court can overturn laws it considers unwise, "has long since been discarded." (Actually, it has long since been smuggled into liberal jurisprudence to support a different social policy agenda.) In his obviously uneasy confurring opinion in the court's decision about Mrs. Bennis' car, Thomas says the case "is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesireable." Quite so. So it is time for the political branches of state governments and the federal government to act on the clear signals from Thomas and others concerning the need to protect innocent persons who cannot reasonably be considered culpably negligent concerning the misuse of their property. [end of article] To those suckers who say that they genuinely believe that the operator of an anonymous encrypted remailer will not be subject to criminal or civil penalties for what ends up being the misuse of their system, I would like to re-state a quote from the article above: "Although Mrs. Bennis neither consented to nor knew of the misuse of the car, Rehnquist cited the court's language in a 1926 case, that it is common "for the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it." That practice, the court had said five years earlier, is "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced." " Does this sound familiar? Doesn't it hit just a bit too close to home? I argue that a person who runs an anonymous encrypted remailer could be clearly claimed to be "entrusting" that "property" to someone else, under the meaning of the above paragraph. At least, that is the position the prosecutors could surely take, especially given this Supreme Court decision. In fact, I would argue that a remailer operator will actually be considered MORE responsible, legally, than Mrs. Bennis: The abuser of _her_ property, Mr. Bennis, was in fact the co-owner of that property, and it is doubtful that Mrs. Bennis COULD have denied to Mr. Bennis, practically or legally, the opportunity to abuse that property. On the other hand, the operator of an anonymous encrypted remailer is, in effect, "giving out the keys" to that remailer (giving authorization to use it) to anyone at any time, with no checking or other specific authorization, to people who have no legal ownership in that remailer. In fact, the system is (at least arguably) helping to cover up after those abuses. If those self-selected people commit crimes using it, who else is responsible? Question: If the Supreme Court is willing to take away Mrs. Bennis' interest in that car under THOSE circumstances, do you really believe that it WOULD REFUSE to allow a prosecutor to decide that the operator of an abused remailer should be prosecuted (or his property taken by government in a forfeiture action)? Frankly, I don't know how rude I must be before reality sinks in to your brains: If you people continue to insist that this Leahy bill won't be abused, you truly do need to wake up before you end up screwing the rest of us "out here." Your foolish endorsements of this Leahy bill play directly into the hands of those who want to ban the EFFECTIVE use of encryption. Go ahead, endorse the bill CONDITIONALLY on the removal of that offending section. But you should make it quite clear that keeping that section should kill the entire bill. You have been warned. Is it any coincidence that we first heard about this Leahy bill much less than a week after the decision that Mr. Will speaks of? Is it possible Leahy was waiting to see if the SC would allow him to misuse the wording of that proposed law? Having gotten the go-ahead, out pops the new bill. As if on cue. "Do you feel lucky? Well, do you, PUNK?" If there are any of you who have doubts as to the need for the "Assassination Politics" idea, I'd say this S.C. decision should clear them up but fast. Anybody out there believe that the decision would have gone this way if we'd all been able to chip in and fix the problem in a few days? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com p.s. especially to Tim May: If the issue wasn't so serious, and their blind support of this bill so obviously misguided, I wouldn't be rhetorically "slapping them in the face" as I'm trying to do here. Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUONFPqHVDBboB2dAQGIMQP/cQ4f7wUm3swBrXFKDgQ+QrzfrKWooDwu 0DVMIS3gRr5AOkXANjXKQmdV0U6Ug2Rf/Wtkh32S8lR+wpizvn9kg7nVhrDLHvKZ pClRAgTFolI5FDctU6J934+XxD5xt83nw15M4yenZAtPDN8OoakMft2cDKUeqEis apuLR5tzyTA= =aPdf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: IPG - newest release of the ABC Encryption Algorithms (fwd)
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>IPG Sales wrote: >> Obviously, you meet our requirements for the release of the IPG ABC >> Encryption algorithms. We need no further information from you. though we >> would appreciate your telephone num and snail mail address. > At 08:01 AM 3/19/96 -0600, Mike McNally wrote in reply: >On the other hand, the "algorithm" as presented is so hopelessly >obfuscated by the strange terminology and loose descriptions used >to present it that there's no way I (or anybody else) could seriously >evaluate it. Either publish an algorithm in some accepted format >(a real C program, or even Knuth notation) or cut back your expectations >for public analysis. > IMPORTANT: I have nothing to do with IPG and I don't endorse their stuff, I got the same mail and produced the code below to help me figure out what they are doing. John Here is my take on a C version of their code - note that a[] b[] c[] and the initial d are filled in from the 'one time pad'. The size of a,b,c is not specified it could be 8 16 or 32 bits from the text ... However the initial values of a,b & c are set using 8 bits of the 'random' key. int a[64] /* Random & 0x3500 */ int b[64] /* Randomly selected primes */ int c[64] /* randomly selected primes*/ char d; /* random start value */ int i; /* the arrays b,c are filled in from tables of smallish primes supplied by IPG using 'random' numbers supplied by IPG to select the primes (and the order of same). since all the values are > 8 bits I've assumed a,b,c = int. a[] is filled with 13568 + an 8 bit 'random' number. (13568 = 0x3500 which gets ANDed with the seed value) */ while(1) { for(i=0; i<64;i++) { a[i] = (a[i] + b[i]) % c[i]; d = (d+a[i]) & 0xFF; /* output d as next byte in stream */ /* XOR with plaintext */ } } I would not trust it without spending more time than I have right now to look at it. It arrived with the following text: >The algorithms detailed below are copyrighted 1995 and 1996 by Internet >Privacy Guaranteed, Seymour, TX. All rights are reserved. You may not >provide them to any other party, or parties, by any means or >any media, without the expressed written permission of Internet Privacy >Guaranteed. I have not agreed to this, further I strongly suggest IPG add studying trade secret and copyright law to their todo list. I do not endorse the above code or algorithm and make no comment on it's strength or otherwise.

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Re: Whitehouse "dissident" web site monitoring?
by lindat＠iquest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: an215712(a)anon.penet.fi >X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Organization: Anonymous forwarding service >Reply-To: an215712(a)anon.penet.fi >Date: Tue, 12 Sep 1995 17:17:15 UTC >Subject: Whitehouse "dissident" web site monitoring? > >- ---------------------------------------------------------- > > WHITE HOUSE MONITORING OF DISSIDENTS ON THE INTERNET > > > The National Security Agency presumably can monitor >subversive communication on the Internet without leaving any >trace by "sniffing packets" at traffic nodes. For purely >political purposes, however, the White House may be forced to do >the monitoring in-house, which means that they leave traces >everywhere they go. > > With just a superficial search for such traces, The >Washington Weekly has uncovered intensive monitoring of >"dissident" Internet sites by the White House. > > It turns out that computers from inside the White House have >kept pretty good tabs on information available on Whitewater, >Vince Foster, and Mena at a few key repositories on the World- >Wide Web, a subset of the Internet. > > Just three such sites: "The Washington Weekly, "The >Whitewater Scandal Home Page" and "Whitewater & Vince Foster," >were accessed 128 times by four computers from the Executive >Office of the President between August 28 and August 31. If the >White House is showing a similar interest in other sites on the >World Wide Web, that would amount to a monitoring operation of >considerable magnitude. Tim Brady of the Yahoo! World-Wide Web >index says that his company alone has indexed approximately 725 >political sites. That monitoring effort would be nothing, >however, compared to the effort required to follow all anti- >Clinton discussion on the Usenet, another subset of the Internet. > > The White House did not respond to an inquiry (attached >below) asking for an explanation and asking whether this >constituted "casual browsing." > > Interestingly, the week after the White House snooping of >files, which included a series of articles by J. Orlin Grabbe on >Vince Foster's ties to the NSA, the following little piece >appeared in Newsweek Magazine: > > "Conspiracy theorists perked up when Deborah Gorham told Senate > Whitewater investigators in June that her boss, the late deputy > White House counsel Vince Foster, asked her to put two secret > notebooks from the National Security Agency in a White House > safe. The suggestion that Foster dealt with the NSA sparked > feverish speculation on the Internet that he was involved in > espionage. The reality appears more prosaic. The White House > won't give details, but sources say Foster's files dealt with > legal questions about national emergencies...." ==================================================== During the Waco Hearings, Charles Schumer said he'd seen Foster's missing file and all it had in it was a memorandum about "Linda Thompson and THAT tape." Now, put that with the "sources say Foster's files dealt with legal questions bout national emergencies . . . ." and I will presume that "THAT tape" and I constitute a "national emergency." Harumph. At any rate, we've (AEN News) had a number of military-based sniffs here. -- Linda ================================================ > Does the White House follow anti-Clinton discussion on Usenet >newsgroups just as closely? The White House posts press releases >to Usenet in collaboration with the Artificial Intelligence Lab >at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. But MIT System >Administrator Bruce Walton says that the White House does not use >the same server for reading netnews. It would be difficult - >although not impossible - to find the server that the White House >uses for reading or receiving netnews and check for traces on >that server. > > Readers may be tempted to post a threat to the President on a >newsgroup just to see if they get a visit from the Secret Service >the next day. That experiment is not advisable. It is a criminal >offense. But Usenet just might be a faster conduit for getting >the attention of the administration than the email address that >the White House has published for the president. > >Attachment: > > > THE WASHINGTON WEEKLY >_________________________________________________________________ > >August 31, 1995 > >Virginia M. Terzano >White House Office of the Press Secretary >The White House > > >Dear Ms. Terzano: > > It has come to my attention that several dissident sites on >the World Wide Web have been visited by White House computers >this week. Apparently, all information regarding Whitewater, >Foster, and Mena has been transferred to White House computers. > > Specifically, the sites, > >"Washington Weekly" (http://www.federal.com) >"The Whitewater Scandal Home Page" >(http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~crow/whitewater/) >"Whitewater & Vince Foster" >(http://www.cris.com/~dwheeler/n/whitewater/whitewater-index.html) > >have been visited by White House computers ist1.eop.gov, >ist6.eop.gov, ist7.eop.gov, and gatekeeper.eop.gov between August >28 and August 31, and a total of 128 files have been transferred >to those White House computers. For all sites, this constitutes a >significant increase over previous access by White House >computers. > > In light of this information, I have the following questions: > >(1) Does this constitute "casual browsing" by White House staff, or > is it, in light of the considerable time and effort spent during > regular business hours, part of a monitoring or intelligence operation? > >(2) For what purpose is the information transferred to the White House used? > >(3) Does the White House keep information from these web sites on file, > and does the White House keep a file on the persons responsible for > these web sites? > >(4) Is the April 9 statement by David Lytel of the White House Office of > Science and Technology to Amy Bauer of Copley News Service that the > administration does not monitor anti-Clinton activity on the web still > operative? > > > Thank you very much for your cooperation in this matter. > >Sincerely, > >Marvin Lee >The Washington Weekly > >Copyright (c) 1995 The Washington Weekly (http://www.federal.com) > > > Linda Thompson American Justice Federation Home of AEN News and "Waco, the Big Lie" "America Under Siege" 3850 S. Emerson Ave. Indianapolis, IN 46203 Telephone: (317) 780-5200 Fax: (317) 780-5209 Internet: lindat(a)iquest.net "When even one American -- who has done nothing wrong -- is forced by fear to shut his mind and close his mouth, then all Americans are in peril." Harry Truman

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Re: [NOISE] Cable-TV-Piracy-Punks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:36 PM 3/31/96, Mike Duvos wrote: >We aren't talking about IC masks here. We are talking about >electrostatic charges which would instantly leak away if the >insulation around them were in the least bit compromised. The surface layers above the active portion of a chip can be stripped away and chip remains functional. This includes the outer packaging layers (epoxy, or of course, ceramic with metal lids) and parts of the so-called "scratch protection," usually a type of silicate glass. The active capacitors are not affected by removal of these layers. >Such data wouldn't even survive the preparation for scanning >microscopy, much less the actual inspection process. Actually, we did it all the time in my lab at Intel, and I understand from my former co-workers that the technology has only gotten better. (This does not mean voltage contrast is easy. For one thing, modern chips have 3-5 metal layers, due to spectacular advances in chem-mechanical polishing, and each metal layer acts as a ground plane shielding the lower layers from visibility and inspection with electron beams. And EPROM and EEPROM cells are effectively impossible to analyze, for various reasons.) This does not mean I think reverse-engineering of smart cards or satellite boxes is easy. SQUIDs won't do it, either. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and (fwd)
by kelso＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I would just like to point out that, when a LEA comes to you > to get at the contents of your computer, (s)he is not going to > patiently wait while your system wipes the offending evidence off your > hard disk. The first thing they do is make a copy of everything, so > they can work from the copy. Besides, you do have backup tapes laying > around all over the place, don't you? Sounds like a recomendation for SFS (Secure File System). It encryppts everything going to the disk. I used an SFS partition for a while. But, I swap between DOS and Linux. Havn't seen SFS for linux yet. Later, Tom <kelso(a)netcom.com>

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Bulletin: Cypherpunks say no taxes owed by moneychangers!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:23 AM 4/8/96, jim bell wrote: >At 12:53 PM 4/7/96 PDT, Jim Gillogly wrote: >> >>jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> writes: >>>FWIW, I think that there is no capital-gains-type tax on currency >>>conversions. In other words, if I take dollars and buy yen today, and the >> >>I bounced this off a CPA, who said she would be very suprised if this is >>really the case: in general the IRS considers increases in wealth to be >>taxable, and unless there's a specific exclusion for currency transactions >>that she doesn't know about, she suspects this is not the case. As a >>conceptual counterexample she points out that you are responsible for any >>profit you make from selling your car for more than you pay for it (but, >>as you might expect, you don't get to take a loss if you sell it for less). > >That assumes that there is "profit" from exchanging currencies. On any >given transaction, there is never any "profit." The only thing that might >be called a profit is a difference in exchange rates, and that really isn't >an increase in wealth at any point. Ask that CPA to look it up. There are people and companies who make a nice business in currency exchange, ranging from the large companies one finds in international airline terminals and banks to the smaller, "Mom and Pop" moneychangers one finds in barrios and other such places. These moneychangers attempt to make a "profit" on each exchange (else they'd hardly stay in business). It will probably come as a surprise to them that, according to both a CPA and Jim Bell, no taxes are owed on their businesses, as "no wealth was created." Don't believe everything you read on this list, folks. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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DES as a stream cipher
by Karl A. Siil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, As this sounds like a previously solved problem, I wanted to find out about using DES (or any block cipher) as a stream cipher, i.e., in a manner that keeps input and output data length equal. I don't want to use a true stream cipher, as I want to use the same key for multiple messages and stream ciphers tend to place the bulk of their overhead in the re-key. Since stream ciphers have "memory," I would have to "re-key" to the same key for each of my messages. I would rather key something like DES once and run it in CBC mode or use some other form of IV. Help or pointers to help are greatly appreciated. Karl

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Friday (15 Sep) GAK meeting at NIST
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was hoping to attend and enturbulate, but my schedule doesn't quite wrap around it. Here's the schedule and talking paper they sent when I inquired. Jim Gillogly Hevensday, 21 Halimath S.R. 1995, 21:48 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WORKSHOP TENTATIVE AGENDA Developing Federal Key Escrow Standards September 15, 1995 Hilton Hotel Gaithersburg, Maryland 9:00 Welcome, Agenda Overview Miles Smid, NIST Goals and Objectives 9:10 Discussion of Goals and Objectives Ray Kammer, Deputy Director, NIST 9:20 Initial Thoughts on Standards Development Miles Smid, NIST 9:30 Industry Perspectives (5-10 min max.) Note: We still have a few slots of 5 min. available. Please let Arlene Carlton (301-975-3240) know if you would like to make a formal presentation. 10:30 Break 10:45 Discussion Technical Considerations 11:00 Identifying Technical Issues Miles Smid, NIST 11:15 Discussion 12:00 Lunch 1:30 Breakout sessions 3:15 Break 3:30 Breakout session reports 4:15 Discussion 4:30 Future Activities (Miles Smid, NIST) 5:00 Close Note: The workshop will be held September 15, 1995 (9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.) at the Gaithersburg Hilton Hotel, 620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, Maryland. The meeting will be open to the public, although seating is limited. Advance registration is requested, please contact Arlene Carlton on 301/975-3240, fax: 301/948-1784 or e-mail: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov. (9/6/95) --------------------- Developing Federal Key Escrow Encryption Standards Workshop September 15, 1995 Discussion Paper In announcements made on August 17, 1995, the Government stated its intention to work with industry and other interested individuals to develop federal key escrow encryption standards, including those implementable in software. This standard, when developed and approved, will be used by federal agencies (and others, if they so choose) in conjunction with FIPS-approved encryption techniques. The structure of the envisioned standard(s), its technical specificity, goals and objectives, important technical considerations, and issues of process must be addressed in order to move forward. Some of the more technical issues include: - Is a standard interface for the release of keys desirable? - What documentation is required? - How will operational procedures be developed? - How will conformance be validated? - Will security be evaluated? If so, under what criteria and by whom? - How will configuration control be maintained? - Are new FIPS-approved algorithms necessary? - Should escrowing be built into the Public Key Infrastructure? - Is a standard escrow system identification field needed? - Is split knowledge required? - Do systems which permit data to be encrypted for both storage and transmission need to provide for both types of escrow? - Does the government require special features (e.g., two hour access, continuous real-time decryption, etc.)? - Who will draft the standard? Timeframe? Note: These issues will be discussed at the Key Escrow Standards Development Workshop to be held September 15, 1995 (9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.) at the Gaithersburg Hilton Hotel, 620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, Maryland. The meeting will be open to the public, although seating is limited. Advance registration is requested, please contact Arlene Carlton on 301/975-3240, fax: 301/948-1784 or e-mail: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov. 9/6/95 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by Jason Roissetter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIVE

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Leaked NSI PR About $50-Annual-Fee-for-Domain-Name
by Richard.Johnson＠Colorado.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a pointer to a very interesting draft press release, apparently scheduled for release on 18 September 1995. Short version: The article specifies $100 one-time fee for new domain name registrations, and a $50/year annual fee for all .com, .edu, .gov, .net, and .org domains. Long version: > From: rpwhite(a)best.com (rpwhite) > Newsgroups: best.general,best.announce,best.www,ba.internet,comp.protocols.tcp-ip.domains,talk.bizarre > Subject: INTERNET BEGINS FEE-BASED REGISTRATION > Date: 12 Sep 1995 12:18:18 -0700 > Organization: BEST Internet (415) 964-2378 > Lines: 495 > Approved: dillon(a)best.com > Message-ID: <434mdq$c3r(a)shell1.best.com> > NNTP-Posting-Host: shell1.best.com

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The Joy of Java
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> "Krakatoa--East of Java" An excellent Rant in which our Titular Leader, Tim May, sings the praises of Java and denounces an evil sect of Crypto Separatists, the self-described "Coderpunks." > Well, I was not invited to join the elite and secret > coderpunks list, but I still have some thoughts on coding > and, especially, on the opportunities offered by Java. Sorry > if this interferes with discussions of Rabbi Heir and Morris > Dees. Given the various parameters which determine the life and death of mailing lists, I fully expect Coderpunks to become moribund within six months, and its members to reunify with this list. Very few of these "I'm going to start my own list with less noise" adventures ever make it long term, absent the personalities and critical mass of interesting information which drove the list they spun off from. > 1. Java is of course not a perfect language, nor even the > best for specific applications. Other languages will > continue to thrive. Critics of the language and related > items (applet model, JDK, JITs, etc.) may point to various > problems (e.g. security). > 2. However, the "big picture" is compelling. Java arrives > at a time when a Babel of languages and platforms threatens > interoperability. C++ is despised by many (though, to be > fair, liked by many, too), and developers are adopting > Visual Basic (and the vbx widgets, etc.), PowerBuilder, > Delphi, flavors of Smalltalk (no pun intended), and > scripting languages (Perl, TCL, Python, etc.). I completely agree with this. Java incorporates the type of automatic corruption-proof memory management found in languages like APL, the basic notions of object oriented programming, fast dynamic linking, and a C-like program structure. This is powerful combination of features and gives Java the potential to do all the platform-independent things that were advertised for C before the rude reality of thousand line makefiles reared its ugly head. . The complete specification of the Java Virtual Machine means that the behavior of Java programs is perfectly well-defined, and one does not have to tweek anything which is processor or operating system dependent. In the future, I expect Java bytecode to become a significant channel for the distribution of popular applications, with compilation to fast native code on numerous platforms. Java is clean, and its concepts are easily understandable even by persons whose eyes glaze over after the first 30 pages of the C++ manual. > 4. What is so compelling, to me, is that Java programs have > an excellent chance of running on various flavors of Unix, > on Windows-95 and NT systems, on Macs, and on other systems > without changes, and without any special compilers bought by > the users! (Netscape browsers, and even Microsoft browsers, > are able to view applets, or soon will be. And cheap or free > applet viewers are available.) Expect NT to be a Unix-killer in the future. It can be ported to any machine, and its microkernel client-server design with pluggable third-party APIs permits it to manifest simultaneously the personalities of numerous different operating systems. Contrast this with the many different binary incompatible Unix flavors and its marketing advantage becomes clear. NT sales just broke one billion per year and are climbing steadily. NT and Java will be the big players in the future. If Netscape becomes its own OS, requiring no Microsoft software, it will probably capture the low-end "Web TV" market. > 6. One can imagine several applets of interest to > Cypherpunks. The ability to fairly transparently run them on > multiple platforms, effectively bypassing the platform > dependencies, is very important. Check out Hal Finney's site > for some "crytographic primitive" applets he's written. Indeed. One can imagine a nice set of Java classes and methods which interoperates with PGP, and has none of the fixed buffer allocation, limits, and awkward memory management present in PGP. Java tends to do the kinds of things PGP does very cleanly, and implementors can worry about the algorithms without being distracted by housekeeping. Any code produced can instantly be used by others in their applications. This is a powerful paradigm, encourages others to expand on existing work, and renders kludges like "PGPTools" unnecessary. > 10. "Mindshare" is the real story. Java arrives at the > right time. Cypherpunks needs--those needs that go beyond > just the "sealed envelopes and signatures" level which PGP > provides so well--are likely to fit in with this Net-centric > communications model. (I'm already thinking in terms of Java > applets for building blocks for Cypherpunk sorts of things.) Java Applets, mobile crypto agents, and the new Web-centric view of cyberspace will go a long way towards encouraging the planet-wide use of strong crypto, as well as effectively swatting annoying mosquitos like ITAR. Indeed, with Java, I can put up a Web page which teaches someone about a cryptographic algorithm, allows him to try it out and run sample data through it, and provides him with a platform-independent implementation of it to use as he wishes. All in one fell swoop. That's a pretty powerful concept. Java has come at the right time, and it will produce chaotic change in the existing order. Should be interesting. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Denver area meeting, SUNDAY, 9/17, 2 pm
by adwestro＠ouray.cudenver.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As usual, we'll congregate at the food court in the basement of the Tivoli, near the confluence of Larimer St., Speer Blvd., and the Auraria Parkway, and perhaps drift off to nearby libraries or restaurants after an hour or two. Email for directions or more info. Alan Westrope <awestrop(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu> __________/|-, <adwestro(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> (_) \|-' 2.6.2 public key: finger / servers PGP 0xB8359639: D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43 7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: I *swear* I have not used the term 'big-endian' in the last 10 years. iQCVAwUBMFYHkFRRFMq4NZY5AQGuGwQAmOqG0gpZHlUsmQxHcCfA2Hg30LQH9FXN xgz+gZuMWLFDNIZp/5bmodK18B4NpE4AtJH9QhA8kngb11/onVAu8aiw/EFGbTyT yHF2NVN20gGOGAYbeJzpUWHnJhPUB9QYszdwc8K0VvDtYfxq/H8mDfgDiGjNenCG z8ryBpKWYkQ= =cscS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Netscape to patch shareware version
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:00 PM 9/12/95 +0200, you wrote: >>| Netscape said it received word last week that the State Department had >>| cleared that version for release on the Net, but only within the U.S., >>| owing to current export laws banning the export of encryption schemes >>| stronger than 40 bits. THe company could provide no details by press >>| time on how it would ensure that the 128-bit version wouldn't leak beyond >>| U.S. borders. >> >>Ok, any bet on how long it will take? > >It's already been exported. Evidently, one of those who bought the commercial >version sent it to Europe as soon as it was out. The Netscape "personal edition" was available in Europe on some store shelves soon after it's release. (The PE edition of netscape has the 128 bit encryption.) As for what Netscape will do in this case... They had made plans to release the 128 bit version in a method similar to what MIT uses, but they found that they could actually get people to buy a copy if they kept that one as only available by ordering it. (Who says that people will not pay for encryption?) Now all they need to do is come out with a version with a bigger key. (Hint, hint...) I will keep my personal feelings about Netscape to a minimum here. There are certain things that they do well and there are others they do not. But those problems will continue to be forwarded to Dave Null... Well, on to more profitable things. > >I note the site removed it, however, probably because Netscape Comm. Inc. requested that they do so. Netscape generally objects to anyone else carrying their browser (.edu sites with prior permission excepted). > > > > | Minister of Forced Caffinization in the DNRC | alano(a)teleport.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | -- PGP 2.6.2 key available on request -- | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano | <fnord> |

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:12 AM 5/27/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Sat, 25 May 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> > Why the first in chain? If the anti-traffic-analysis provisions are >> >working properly, it should be impossible to prove that a given first remailer >> >was the first remailer for any particular message. I had thought that even >> >civil courts required that you be the person who committed some act, not the >> >person who _might_ have committed some act. Otherwise, all the remailers are >> >in danger. This is even if someone tries an entrapment by sending through some >> >illegal material - if the courts accept that they should be allowed to do this, >> >then all the remailers they chained are going to be hit. >> >> Likewise, I don't see why the first address in the chain is vulnerable, as >> long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy >> remailer, and probably a temporary output address. > >I repeat, all it takes is one person to send through only one remailer >(perhaps even a Co$ plant) and the first in chain remailer is toasted. > >Think before you type please. You should take your own advice. The mere fact that the first link in the chain is "known" doesn't mean that it is provably involved. Without a substantial amount of bugging that the COS hasn't the resources to do, there is a big difference between them _believing_ that a given message originated there, and being able to prove it in court. And notice my caveat: "As long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy remailer, and probably a temporary output address." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Java Crypto API questions
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:44 AM 5/31/96 -0400, Moltar Ramone wrote: >On Fri, 31 May 1996, Lucky Green wrote: >> Where does this leave foreign vendors? Will Sun sign the 3DES package of a >> foreign vendor? > >Probably. But they won't be able to export the signed 3DES package :) >It leaves foreign vendors in trouble, is where. But why can't they just export the SIGNATURE, if it is detached from the software itself? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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new info-sec mailing list
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Info-sec heaven is introducing a new mailing list. Unlike many of the Internet's mailing lists, this is not an open forum for people on the Internet to exchange ideas. Rather, it is a monthly mailing used to inform readers of new information that can be found in info-sec heaven. If you would like to be informed of new information, services, search capabilities, protection software, articles, books, and other information that appears in info-sec heaven without having to come in periodically and look for yourself, please let us know by sending email to fc(a)all.net and we will add you to our monthly list. Thank you for your time. -- -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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Re: DCSB: Electronic Commerce: The State of the Art
by geoff＠commtouch.co.il 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The signature on the message attached below did not verify. Pronto Secure has the neat feature of doing signature checking on the fly. In the process of testing PSecure I have collected from the keyservers, the keys of most people on the list who pgp sign their messages. (Another neat feature of PSecure makes this a one click task) I could quite easily perform the service of bouncing messages with bad signature back to the list. Please let me know if people agree that this would be a useful service, or is it inappropriate ? My experience over the past few months is that around 10% of all signed traffic on the list checks with a BAD SIGNATURE! Geoff Klein Pronto Secure Product Manager.

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No Subject
by Anonymous Remailing Service 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

E. Brian sed: >Unbelievable!!! To add to this distressing truth, I have learned that >the White House also subscribes to a number of newspapers and periodicals >which are reviewed for things of interest to the Administration and to >the President. I I I I I I ammmmmmmmmm shocked! mebbe tha Slickster just wants to know who orlin's "Deep Throat" is... Keep checkin' them fingerprints, Willie! >Ooops. Dog bites man. >And do you really think the White House couldn't hire a couple of net >gurus to sniff packets if they wanted to hide their "monitoring"(=reading). who sez they dont post, too? heh

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Cash Is Dying
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

6-14-96: NYT ad for The New York Times Magazine: Cash is dirty. Cash is heavy. Cash is quaint. Cash is expensive. CASH IS DYING. "You believe in banks don't you? That's good, because ultimately money is backed by nothing but your own confidence, habit and faith -- a form of faith as powerful and essential to modern life as any religious belief. The coming digital era will make this plain to everyone, as never before." (Continued on Sunday) From "Dead as a Dollar" by James Gleick ...the cover article in this week's issue. --------- Yes, the James Gleick whose co-founded Pipeline is near dead as a dollar. Hope his multi-million-dollar PSI-buyout lives.

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No Subject
by A5113643667＠attpls.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Cypherpunks and Tom, The ones I've heard about are SKIP, Photurus and ISAKMP(sp?). Peace --- NOTICE: This message originally included graphics and/or sounds which can only be received by AT&T PersonaLink(sm) subscribers. You received only the text portion(s) of the message. Please contact the sender for information that was deleted. To learn how to send and receive graphics, voice and text messages via AT&T PersonaLink Services, call 1-800-936-LINK. ---------------- Received: by attpls.net with Magicmail;12 Sep 95 10:34:32 UT Date: 12 Sep 95 13:05:43 UT Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com (owner-cypherpunks) From: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com (owner-cypherpunks) Subject: Re: draft key mgmt props To: peace(a)acm.org (Tom Jones) cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com (Cypherpunks) Message-Id: <199509121024.GAA15929(a)frankenstein.piermont.com> In-Reply-To: <Your message of "Tue, 12 Sep 1995 07:15:16 -0000." <3E79EDD0>> Reply-To: perry(a)piermont.com (perry) X-X-AUTHENTICATION-WARNING: frankenstein.piermont.com: Host localhost didn't use HELO protocol X-X-REPOSTING-POLICY: redistribute only with permission Tom Jones writes: > Does anyone here feel like explaining the situation between the three > key management proposals now at the internet draft stage? Which ones are you refering to? .pm ----------------

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Re: Alternic.net (was domain zapping)
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:54 AM 6/26/96 -0400, you wrote: > >William Knowles writes: >> With all the talk about InterNIC zapping domains, there should be >> some talk about other registries, Alternic.net : http://www.alternic.net >> is offering an alpha test for registering new TLD's and the prices >> are considerably less expensive than the Internic. > <snip crap> > >They can offer to sell you anything they like, of course, and you can >pay them, but you don't get anything at all for the money. Domains >registered with them don't appear in the real DNS. > >.pm Perry, What constitutes "real DNS"? DNS server administrators need only add one line to their named.boot file to resolve .nic hosts. secondary nic 204.94.42.1 db.nic It's that easy! The concept of centralized name resolutions is flawed and only exists out of habit. J.

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Degaussing a pile of 5.25" media
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have 3 bags full of 5.25" diskettes (in NYC). Can someone please let me use their degausser before I get rid of them? (Anyone who wants them after they're degaussed is welcome to them :-) --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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