December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Corporate Use of Anon WWW Proxies
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I pulled this from the firewalls list (use majordomo(a)greatcircle.com to join)] Alex Eveleigh <Alex.Eveleigh(a)kellogg.com> writes: > Subject: Monitoring Activity on the Internet [...] > I would like to get some opinions on how easy it would be for someone > to monitor what information is being accessed on the Internet by our > company. For example how easy would it be for our competition monitor > all sites that people in our company are accessing and what > information we are pulling off the Internet. This struck me as rather ironic in the wake of The Govt. Could Be Reading _Your_ Home Page. It also sparked me to draw the short connection between industrial espionage (and simple industrial nosiness), and anonymous Web proxies. An obvious point, really, but companies often have an interest in concealing the nature/extent of their Web crawlings, too. Perhaps there's a market niche, or a few pro-anonymity publicity points, here for someone. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> "Everybody's got something to hide except for me and my monkey" -J.L. & P.McC.

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Minor Risk to LSB Steganography
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last week I attended a lecture given by Dexter Kozen at Cornell, on "Efficient Algorithms for Optimal Transmission of Video Data". He mentioned in passing a couple of approaches to choosing data that may acceptably be lost in the process (i.e. without excessive picture quality degradation). One scheme (which I believe counts as a "corona method") involves simply discarding the LSBs of all the encoded pixels or whatnot. This method was not at all a focus of the talk. Anyway, I thought I'd mention it as another minor potential threat to the use of LSB steganography in video transmission, e.g. MPEG streams. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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Digital Cash on sci.crypt
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There has been some discussion on sci.crypt of digital cash and its facilitation of kidnapping, extortion, etc. Here is a posting I made when mentions an on-line paper on the topic. I had met the author, Markus Jakobsson, at Crypto 95, but I only had a chance to check out his web site yesterday. awc(a)slcawc.aug.ipp-garching.mpg.de (Arthur Carlson TOK ) writes: >[In response to a discussion of whether digital cash could be used to >provide anonymous collection of ransom money] >Is there really no technical fix for this? To enable the prevention of >double spending in off-line systems, the ID of the withdrawer is coded >into the coins in a way that is verified by the bank. If the victim's >relatives can undo enough of the code to satisfy the bank, why can't >they undo the rest to detect when the coins are spent? Alternatively, >why can't the bank put an identifier on the coins (in a way that isn't >destroyed by the unblinding) that amounts to a message encoded in the >public key of the withdrawer? Then the withdrawer can make the >destination of the ransom money visible by revealing his private key >(after the victim has been released, of course). (He also reveals >every dime he spent in the last year and all his kinky love letters, >but, hey, we're trying to catch a kidnapper here.) There has been considerable discussion of this problem in the literature recently. A paper I found yesterday on the net is by Markus Jakobsson and Moti Yung: Revokable and Versatile Electronic Money, at <URL:http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/markus/revoke.ps> (postscript format). It has references to other work as well. The specific attack I discussed earlier applies to the current DigiCash scheme (or at least how it is assumed to work). Offline cash systems would be more complicated. The references in the paper mentioned above describe how these attacks would work on such systems and some ways of avoiding them. However there is a more powerful attack, which the Jakobsson paper addresses, in which the bank as a whole is coerced. Maybe terrorists threaten to blow up the World Trade Center unless Citibank engages in a specific protocol which will leave the terrorists with millions of dollars in fully blinded electronic cash. Even if the normal withdrawal protocol has signatures, etc. which would prevent this, Jakobsson shows that there is a corrupted protocol which if the bank is forced to follow it will leave the criminals with valid but untraceable electronic cash. The solution in the paper is to make it so that none of the ecash issued by the bank is untraceable. Under normal use it is anonymous, but if necessary the authorities can break the anonymity. This is sometimes called "Clipper cash" after the U.S. Clipper chip proposal which had similar privacy properties. With Jakobsson/Yung's approach even the more powerful attack can be defeated because the cash is traceable, and no amount of coercion will allow the attacker to create valid but untraceable cash. While these approaches are technically interesting, the political implications are more ominous. While Jakobsson labels the entity who has the power to break the anonymity an "ombudsman", implying that he defends the interests of the cash holder, he could equally well be called a "policeman" because he is the one who catches the criminals. It is all a matter of how you look at it. The question is whether these various threats of kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, etc. are good enough reasons to go to a cash system where privacy is protected only at the sufferance of government agencies. There are plenty of precedents for governments misusing supposedly- private information, such as the use of phone records to track down those who resisted the German regime during World War II. One of the attractive aspects of electronic cash has been its immunity to this form of governmental coercion. The overwhelmingly negative response to the Clipper chip proposal (other than in the cryptographic and law enforcement communities) may apply to Clipper cash as well. A related issue is the possible competition of rival cash systems. As with Clipper, where it would apparently be necessary to forbid the use of alternatives, so with Clipper cash it would seem that people would prefer true anonymity over conditional protection, even if you call the cash tracer an "ombudsman". So there would seem to be a need for governments to criminalize the use of fully anonymous electronic cash in order to force people to use the ones which the government could track. Whether this will even be possible in an increasingly global financial system remains to be seen. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: Whitehouse "dissident" web site monitoring?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I strongly agree with the views of Phill Hallam-Baker and Brian Davis, and perhaps others who make the same points, that access by the White House to the various Web sites is NO BIG DEAL. I go further: I have no concerns about the NSA reading _this_ list! After all, it's a public list, so all are free to read it. Also, it may be very useful for the Feds to be seeing what we are arguing. We don't believe in "security through obscurity," do we? The notion that we are "safe" if the White House, or (horrors!) Janet Reno herself, are not reading our list or the Web sites on various issues, is the same kind of security the ostrich thinks he has with his head in the sand and his butt in the air. If you want to be unheard by the Feds, and the White House, and the FBI, and GCHQ, and Mossad, etc., then don't post publically. If you want your own access to Web sites kept private, push for the development of Web proxies ("Web remailers"). And so forth. Security is in our own hands, as it should be (and as "complex mathematics" has made it). (In the U.S. and most Western countries--actually, an increasing number of countries, worldwide--it is not easy to prosecute and convict a citizen for mere views expressed, or for reading preferences, etc.. Although I am thought of as a "crypto anarchist," and basically am such a thing, the fact is that there aren't a lot of trials for thoughtcrime in this country. I have some doubts about the circumstances surrounding Danny Casolaro's death, though, so I don't say all is rosy and perfect. I just say that paranoia that the White House or the FBI is reading public items is unwarranted.) --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Can GAK be made "not interoperable" with PGP?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > At 10:26 AM 9/13/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > > >But is this even possible, to make a GAK system "not interoperable" with, > >say, PGP? > > > >Unless the GAK system has some sort of entropy analyzer, and can recognize > >high-entropy sources which it presumes to be encrypted data (*), one can of > >course PGP-encrypt a text file and then GAK the resulting file. > > I took it to mean that they were saying that an approved program on one end > of a communication exchange could not exchange encrypted messages or > established an encrypted session of some kind with an un approved program on > the other end. Not trying to outlaw superencryption (PGP on both ends using > a GAKed channel) but GAK on one end working with an unapproved system on the > other end. A ringer GAK-work-alike that would defeat the intent of GAK. Yes, I think this was the idea of the original "software key escrow" proposal, from TIS as I recall. The sender would encode the session key with a government public key but there was some trick by which the receiver would verify that the session key was in fact encoded correctly and refuse to operate if it was wrong. So any attempt to corrupt or remove the LEAF would be detected if you were talking to a compliant receiver. That is part of why Matt Blaze's Clipper attacks were so significant, because they went to the heart of this requirement. It was always clear that you could superencrypt with Clipper, but Matt found a way in which you could send a LEAF which would be accepted by a regular Clipper phone but which had bogus data for law enforcement. So this defeated the requirement of not interoperating with rogues. Hal

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Re: Whitehouse "dissident" web site monitoring?
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > | Oh please! Some clerk browses the internet and you don't want to respect > | their privacy because of the IRS? This makes sense how? I suppose that > | you're going to dig up information about me and spread it around the > | internet because you have issues about the company I work for? > > First off, I was being somewhat sarcastic, as you might have > noticed from several things, not the least of which was the phrase > 'sarcasm aside.' > > That said, why should I respect the privacy of government > employees? There is a substantial difference between government and > private companies, in that I am not compelled in any way to do > business any private company. > > Adam Someone is making you let users at government sites browse your website? Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and fails?
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tom Rollins writes: > If this is the file that the Co$ is trying to crack, then what the > is being asked for is a pass phrase that can be handed to the Co$ > that will pass the PGP valid key check and still not decrypt the > data to anything usefull. Well, I don't have the PGP 'conventional' encryption format memorized, but there is probably a constant after the IV that is prepended to the data. The constant is used to determine if the key is correct. Since the conventional encryption runs in CFB mode and there is a full block of random IV at the beginning of the file, it is extremely unlikely that a key could be found that would properly decrypt only the first two blocks while leaving the rest unreadable... > If Larry Wollersheim does have the valid key. It would be a simpler > process to know what fake key to use and work it backwards through > the MD5 to arrive at an ascii string to produce the fake key. Not really. Even if you could find an IDEA key that would produce the desired output it would be hard to find a passphrase that would produce that key when hashed. One of the properties of one-way hash functions is that it is difficult to find a plaintext that produces a given hash. Hence the term 'one-way'.... Even if you did find a passphrase (which, if MD5 is strong, would require something like 2^64 operations), it would likely be long, have 8-bit chars, and would be impossible to type in. It would be tough to convince anyone that it was the real passphrase. andrew

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Text tracking
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 11 Sep 1995 owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com wrote: > Hal Finney wrote: > > > I'm not sure how to do it for software, but for novels it > > should be easy to fingerprint. Every couple of pages the > > author writes a sentence twice in different forms. This would > > not take a great deal of extra effort on the part of the > > author. > > Perhaps. Some authors might be offended by the idea that > using a different form of a sentence doesn't affect the work. Examples of "text tracking" in documents where language specificity is important (legal, scientific) are typically marked with changes in the justification scheme, i.e. the number of spaces to the right, number of lines to a page, number of pages total, etc. etc. Clearly it is much more difficult to apply in digital schemes, but consider that in order to modify the scheme to avoid traceback to the distributer, one of two conditions must exist. 1> The distributer must be close to the initial release point. (If not, then all documents ABOVE the distributer in the chain will be text tracked, and all the documents BELOW the distributer will not. Clearly this will brand the distributer). 2> The distributer must be entirely outside the 'legal' distribution scheme. Remember also that uniform modification of text tracking methods is itself identifying unless several 'illegal' distributers are using the same sanitizing method. The same way you can get surgery to have fingerprints removed, but the resulting scars make you all the more identifiable.

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Re: cryptography eliminates lawyers?
by dsc＠swcp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn wrote, >But won't clients insist on proper credentials in one form or another? Yes. >Doesn't the practicality and accountability of a centralized authority >(or several authorities) provide the best answer to this? No. >Who is going >to accept my signature promising that I did indeed get a law degree and >pass the bar? Very few. Certification can be from multiple private and government organizations and might vary depending on the type of legal service (or other lawyer service) needed. Licensing can only be done by an entity that can use physical force to prevent buying and selling legal services. >I don't see how the net will eliminate the basic need for highly >qualified professionals and the proof that they have credentials. It won't. The needs might shift a little but they will be there. >Perhaps diplomas and such will be transfered into digital signatures for >the institutions, but I can't see how this "cracks" any "monopoly." >Perhaps the monopoly is shifted to those who have diplomas, rather than >those "licensed to practice" but so what? It might "crack" government enforced monopoly. Should a market monopoly survive some form of crypto-anarchy it would be in the form of a certification entity that does such a good and efficient job that it is very hard to break into the business. Not so bad if it happens, but much more honest, efficient and softer-edged than "licensed to practice". I suspect that people have needs for varying levels and varying specializations so that several kinds of certifications may develop and might be supplied by multiple entities. I suspect that many people would want a certification that a lawyer meets the usual licensing requirements of the outside world. Who knows, maybe that would be the most popular kind. But it won't be the only kind. Dar =========================================================== Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com Fax: +1 505 898 6525 http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html ===========================================================

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Re: cryptography eliminates lawyers?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 13 Sep 1995, Dar Scott wrote: > Black Unicorn wrote, > >But won't clients insist on proper credentials in one form or another? > > Yes. > > >Doesn't the practicality and accountability of a centralized authority > >(or several authorities) provide the best answer to this? > > No. > > >Who is going > >to accept my signature promising that I did indeed get a law degree and > >pass the bar? > > Very few. > > Certification can be from multiple private and > government organizations and might vary depending > on the type of legal service (or other lawyer service) > needed. Didn't I just say this above? A centralized, or several centralized authorities. I guess the center of my question is, how can you apply Web of Trust to e.g. a university degree. Who cares what Bob and Alice think my degree is in, the client only wants to know from the institution. Licensing can only be done by an > entity that can use physical force to prevent > buying and selling legal services. I believe you are incorrect, but I guess my main concern is your characterization of "Physical force." I am assuming you mean coercion, and not that you will be jailed or such (though this may be the case). I would argue that as long as coercion exists (violence of any type, physical or not) you have a licensing authority. Take the hollywood blacklist. No one actually pushed around suspected pinko screenwriters (well, at least, if anyone did, it was incendential) but they certainly faced a great deal of persuasive motivation. Look at the committee as the licensing authority here. (Licensing you as a non-communist as it were). If several governmental and private authorities were in the practice of certifing that Bob has a law degree from Tremont University, and that he is competent to practice in D.C., and given that the citizens of D.C. will look for these credentials, isn't this a license? Afterall, Bob has to pass some test or requirement to get the signatures. Isn't this coercion in your definition? Can't the multiple authorities set common or near common guidelines? Rather, don't they HAVE to in order to have their signatures worth the electrons they are transmitted with? If you take the exteme position you seem to, there's an antitrust case here. Am I not "licensing" my key signature to people provided they pass my key signature criteria? Am I not doing violence by withholding my signature and the benefits it might convey for certain "terms?" In this definition, all trusted authorities are by definition licensing. Either their signature is worth nothing, and thus they are not coercive by witholding it, or it is worth something, and thus to be non-coercive they must give it to anyone who asks, rendering their signatures worthless. This is the trap of the licensing argument. The evil is not licensing, which I think serves a real purpose, but created convenience fees, taxation through the withholding of licensing and the use of other government largess. I wrote a massive piece on this and sent it to the list about a year and a half ago. With interest I will repost it. The real question is how you decide what an authority to license is. Is it to be dictated by government? Or by market forces (i.e. the reputation of the licenser). > > >I don't see how the net will eliminate the basic need for highly > >qualified professionals and the proof that they have credentials. > > It won't. The needs might shift a little but they > will be there. Then why will lawyers, or a 'professional monopoly' be broken? > >Perhaps diplomas and such will be transfered into digital signatures for > >the institutions, but I can't see how this "cracks" any "monopoly." > >Perhaps the monopoly is shifted to those who have diplomas, rather than > >those "licensed to practice" but so what? > > It might "crack" government enforced monopoly. Now you are getting more specific. > Should a market monopoly survive some form of > crypto-anarchy it would be in the form of a > certification entity that does such a good and > efficient job that it is very hard to break > into the business. Agreed. Again, what does this do to lawyers? See my above comments on what constitutes a license. > Not so bad if it happens, > but much more honest, efficient and softer-edged > than "licensed to practice". I'm not so sure. There will be a tremendous amount of corporate power in these authorities, and if (as you seem to be saying a few paragraphs up) it is hard to break into the trusted certification business, there is a monopoly again. > I suspect that > people have needs for varying levels and varying > specializations so that several kinds of > certifications may develop and might be supplied > by multiple entities. Like the several state Bars? Hint: An attorney licensed in Deleware has a much different speciality likely than one licensed in Alabama. > I suspect that many people would want a > certification that a lawyer meets the usual > licensing requirements of the outside world. > Who knows, maybe that would be the most popular kind. > But it won't be the only kind. So you have estentially admitted that a central authority is required? Or will be more often used? So is this a license or what? Looks like one to me. If your defintion of license is simply who does the coercing, I think you should reconsider. > Dar > > =========================================================== > Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 > > Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 > 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com > Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com > Fax: +1 505 898 6525 > http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html > =========================================================== > > >

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re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P. Trei writes > "CYPHERPUNK" considered harmful > I would like to propose that we, the 'cypherpunks', are making a > strategic error, which will make it far more difficult to achieve the > goal we share. > Our error lies in our approach to encouraging the widespread use of > crypto. It is an error of hubris - overweening pride. > We too often think of ourselves as an elite - smarter and better in > various ways to our non-cpunk neighbours. We refer to these others as > 'Joe Sixpack" and other such derogatary terms. I think thsi is confusing two separate things. The need to publicise and encourage the use of crypto is important to many of us and lots of us do this in various ways (web pages, magazine articles etc). The other aspect of the cypherpunks is writing code, discussing protocols etc, some of which is fairly arcane stuff and is by necessity the interest of an "elite" (as you put it). I think the success of this list lies in the mixture. > I suggest that we drop the term 'cypherpunk' - it has the wrong > connotations to get our ideas into the mainstream. I don't have a > perfect replacement yet: I'll come clean and say that initially the term "cypherpunks" made me cringe (and still does, maybe 'cos I'm a brit ;-) ;-) but I certainly remembered it and it stuck in my mind enough to get me interested in this stuff in the first place. In short, don't ditch the name because if nothing else it *is* memorable, much more so that some more comventional tag. However, you do make some bloody good points about not alienating more conservative people by coming over all crypto-anarchist (or whatever your particular bent is) when encouraging/publicising the use of crypto. The "why use crypto" questions and answers was a good example of how to appeal to a more conservative viewpoint. When trying to find out about crypto intially on the WWW I was rather overwhelmed by the number of political rants and a bit underwhelmed by the lack of solid info. This situation has improved a lot in the last 2 years but still needs work IMHO. [An aside to Web page maintainers... <whinge> Another thing to consider (for Web sites in particular) is that people from _all over the world_ will be reading it. If your site is a fairly central one, bear in mind that a lot of rants about congress trampling all over the Nth amendment mean bugger all to a lot of us furriners, and come over as a bit parochial. I'm not saying a local perspective is a bad thing, just that it shouldn't be the only thing. </whinge> ] my 2c worth Sherry

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MS-Word macros disassembler/cracker?
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was on the Info-Sec mailing list and appears to be a request for help in cracking some sort of execute-only wrappers on MicroSoft Word-for-Windows macros, the concern being that the macros need to be defused if they're malignant. If anybody wants to, they may respond right to: njb(a)csehost.knoware.nl <Niels J. Bjergstrom>. . . . . >All the macros are made ExecuteOnly, meaning that they are compiled or >encrypted so that the Word macro interpretor can execute them, but they >cannot be listed or edited. Does anyone reading this list happen to know >where we can find a cracker or disassembler for ExecuteOnly Word macros? It >is of vital importance that we are able to read malignant Word macros, and >any help will be appreciated. . . . . >macro vira to us at the email address below. And I repeat: We are very >interested in obtaining a cracker for the Word macro language >encryptor/compiler. We haven't looked at this yet. For all we know it could >be very simple, but any info is appreciated. > >Niels > >-- Niels J Bjergstrom, Ph.D., m/ISACA Tel. +31 70 362 2269 -- >-- Computer Security Engineers, Ltd. Fax. +31 70 365 2286 -- >-- Postbus 85 502, NL-2508 CE Den Haag London: +44 181 519 8011 -- >-- Netherlands Email: njb(a)csehost.knoware.nl -- >-- PGP Public key available on request - please use when mailing vira --

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Factoring Software (fwd)
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just saw this on Usenet, was wondering who knows this guy. Obviously not a cpunk or it would have hit the list right away. Not in the mood to run code on my account without knowing that I know what it will do. From: bobs(a)mathworks.com (Bob Silverman) Newsgroups: sci.math,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,sci.math.num-analysis,comp.arch.arithmetic Subject: Factoring Code Date: 13 Sep 1995 09:22:38 -0400 Organization: The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA 01760 Lines: 41 Distribution: inet Message-ID: <436luu$3lu(a)puff.mathworks.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: puff.mathworks.com Several people have requested factoring code recently. After thinking about it I have decided to offer a deal. I do not have the machine resources I once had, and have some numbers that I would like factored. They are in the 80-90 digit range. My code will do an 85 digit number in about 500 hours on a single Sparc-10. The code is perfectly parallelizable, so 40 machines will do 85 digits overnight. Run time for QS can vary by a factor of 2.5 depending on how "rich" the number being factored is in small quadratic residues. I will make available my complete Multiple Polynomial Quadratic Sieve code, along with instructions, to anyone who will factor at least one of these numbers. This code includes the siever, the code to combine large primes, the matrix solver (a naiive Gaussian elim over GF(2), but one which solves a 25K x 25K system in 15 min on a single Sparc), and the code to multiply everything together and find the factors. I will also throw in a routine which reads the output file and scans for bad relations. Sometimes, when running on many machines, I/O errors creep into the output files. A machine can go down when writing a record, or there can be a network problem etc. I also have a program which excizes bad records in the output files And one which sets up multiple sub-directories with the proper data files so one can run in parallel. Also included is a program which scans the output files in these multiple sub-directories and counts the number of relations found. There is also a program to predict (fairly accurately!) how close to done you are based on output from the counting program. This code will also include a decent collection of fast, very portable multiple precision routines. All this is for the taking if you guarantee to factor just one number for me. - -- Bob Silverman The MathWorks Inc. 24 Prime Park Way Natick, MA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMFd5fsLa+QKZS485AQELHAL/QS2LizHGSzT7h3b8cU78GiR9QLoaQ6zf FEEyt8XRDFqlUe7CKFfDKB1SPPviAZeBPM4XDfswfvfXpKNLamZQUNc7VYgzPIC0 3knFeQf2A/zWuGBZQp/TM0xBcwKW5lW7 =Zyke -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://bert.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Death threats ALWAYS pgp signed * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company *

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"Who knows this guy?"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:39 AM 9/14/95, don(a)cs.byu.edu wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Just saw this on Usenet, was wondering who knows this guy. Obviously not >a cpunk or it would have hit the list right away. Not in the mood to run >code on my account without knowing that I know what it will do. > > >From: bobs(a)mathworks.com (Bob Silverman) >Newsgroups: >sci.math,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,sci.math.num-analysis,comp.arch.arithme >tic It's funny, this thing about names and reputations. You see, I know the name "Bob Silverman," and his company, Mathworks, a whole lot more than I know the name "don(a)cs.byu.edu". Mathworks was heavily in the news last fall during the Pentium debacle (including someone I used to know from Intel, Cleve Moler). I've only seen the posts of "don(a)cs.byu.edu" since 8-29-95, just the last two weeks. (I don't claim to have a complete archive, as I delete a lot of stuff. But this is the earliest don(a)cs.byu.edu post I can find.) Certainly I am not impugning the reputation of don(a)cs.byu.edu, just noting the irony of him asking for if anyone knows who Bob Silverman is. Strange days. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Key Escrow as Law Enforcement's *Worst Nightmare*
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Be careful what you ask for--you might get it." (Albanian Proverb) I'll summarize my post with my last line: In short, key escrow could be law enforcement's worst nightmare, as it truly opens up the Web as a worldwide, distributed file system. At 6:31 PM 9/12/95, S. Keeling wrote: > I would just like to point out that, when a LEA comes to you >to get at the contents of your computer, (s)he is not going to >patiently wait while your system wipes the offending evidence off your >hard disk. The first thing they do is make a copy of everything, so >they can work from the copy. Besides, you do have backup tapes laying >around all over the place, don't you? This is a main reason why "key escrow" is a double-edged sword for Law Enforcement. That is, it is not an unadulterated "win" for them. Consider the easy availability of a "key escrow" system (I'm deliberately avoiding calling it either SKE, or CKE, or GAK) in which files may be locally encrypted with the files, local decryption software, etc., stored locally--but with efficient fast-erase methods (ranging from the oft-mentioned "thermite charge" to a more user-friendly overvoltage to fry the motherboard (for example, just to make the point). (My point is not to speculate on what a "dead man switch" might look like, but merely to look at the implications of widespread key escrow and data destruction tools.) Key escrow, with the keys deposited safely with one's "Family" (in both senses of the term), and/or with one's lawyer, and/or in offshore locations) could make the use of dead man switches much "safer." A numbers game operator can rest easy in flushing his computer, knowing key escrow and remote storage exists. "Remote storage"? Sure, the Web offers easy and transparent ways to split files up and store them in various locales. Kind of makes "search warrants" a problem, doesn't it? The promise of the Web, to many of us, is that URLs essentially make the machines accessible via the Web into a kind of huge, distributed file system. Remote sites can already be used for storage, obviously. The Web offers a new degree of automation of the process, with many interesting possibilities. An interesting project would be build tools similar to ftp for automatic backup of files to remote locations, perhaps locations that accept "deposits" for a fee. (In digital money tokens, even.) The tool could do multi-part splitting, and could encrypt the files. Keys (and the locations of the parts) could independently exploit the kind of "key escrow" mentioned above. So, a raid is made on a site. The files are not found there, as they have been automatically filed on other sites, with the key/location info escrowed with escrow agents who are not cooperative with search warrants, subpoenas, etc. (It may be sufficient for a person to "remember" the N sites, as the sites may be uncooperative enough so as to make it impossible for the law enforcement people to "demand" access to files. I can discuss this furhter. While not "secure" in a strong crypto sense, in practice this will be pretty effective--after all, the pieces are similar to offshore bank account access info, and law enforcement is pretty much powerless to get N countries/banks to cooperate on a blanket search.) In short, key escrow could be law enforcement's worst nightmare, as it truly opens up the Web as a worldwide, distributed file system. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: An opportunity not to be missed
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Wed, 13 Sep 1995, David C. Lambert wrote: > >> I propose that we get some likely candidate (actually, a similar candidate >> to the one above) to advocate the benefits of anonymity on the net. Is Wavy Gravy running his "Nobody for President" campaign again this time? After all, Nobody's going to balance the budget, and Nobody's going to get the government out of your bedroom, and on the internet, Nobody can tell if you're a dog or not :-) #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: Whitehouse "dissident" web site monitoring?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This whole flap reminds me of the days it was discovered that the FBI was buying Usenet access, on tape monthly rather than online. >(Phill Hallam Baker's request that we respect the privacy of >Government employees started this thread) Yup. It would be nice to know what our employees are doing with all this fancy equipment we've bought them, but on the other hand, I'd far rather have them seeing the abuse the net gives them in person rather than having to have the FBI or some other filtering bureaucracy explain to them what the net all about ... #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: GAK/weak crypto rationale?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:46 PM 9/12/95 -0400, Brian Davis wrote: >> > I don't doubt that wiretaps may sometimes be abused despite the >> > incredibly onerous review process, but they have positive aspects, too. >> >> In how many of these cases did you fail to get the necessary information >> because of encryption? Has this proportion been changing over the years? > >I wasn't personally involved in any of the cases, but I suspect the >answer re encryption is zero. There was the time the FBI agent failed to >push the record button, however. >My response was to the wiretap correlation to career-making cases. >I don't believe encryption is widespread enough yet to be a serious problem >in the Title III area. It is a potential problem, though, as encryption >(rightfully) spreads. You're probably right. On the other hand, especially as dealers in politically incorrect substances get better privacy technology, this will become much more of an issue, and I get the impression from what I read in the papers that big drug busts, arrests of major organized crime figures, and the rare terrorist cases are probably big career wins for the police agents and prosecutors involved. >The question I am debating with myself, with all >of your help, is what the policy "ought to be." As you might guess, I think the government makes lots of laws about things that are not their business, and wiretaps and other privacy invasions are especially useful for prosecuting victimless crimes and dissident political groups, since none of the participants call the cops. On the other hand, I've had friends whose businesses have been burned down by the Mafia, and don't like murderers bombing pubs, either, and stopping people like that is legitimate police business. However, I think the moral case is very clear that people have the right to communicate freely and privately, and to use whatever technology or languages they want to to attempt to do so; any government that would try to prevent that is more of a threat to freedom than a benefit. And police have had a lot of success with informants, and new technology has really improved equipment for bugging suspects- if you folks do your jobs honestly and apologize when you make mistakes about invading incorrect suspects' privacy, go ahead and use it. The really gray areas are things like widespread coordinated surveillance of public activities - cameras in the subways, etc. #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Ron Plesser's take on NIST GAK meeting
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I converted a document in some proprietary Windows binary format to ASCII. Formatting mistakes are mine. Ron Plesser is a very experienced lobbyist. He was involved in the passage of the ECPA, among other things. He's CIX's lawyer, and sent this document to CIX (the Commercial Internet Exchange), which passed it on to its membership. John Gilmore PIPER & MARBURY L.L.P. Memorandum To: Interested Parties From: Ron Plesser Date: September 11, 1995 Subject: NIST Key Escrow Encryption Meeting The National Institute of Standards and Technology on September 6 and 7 held a meeting on issues regarding key escrow encryption, focusing on export criteria for software and desirable characteristics for U.S. key escrow agents. Ten draft software key escrow export criteria were put forth by NIST for consideration and possible revision (see below). Key escrow encryption is the recent Administration proposal for an alternative to Clipper Chip, which industry opposed. Key escrow would, in the Administration's view, allow the export of software with strong encryption. In summary, the government would permit the general licensing of 64-bit-key encryption provided that it be manufactured with a key that would be maintained by independent escrow agents who were certified by the U.S. government. Foreign escrow agents could be used where there was a bi-lateral agreement with the particular country involved. NIST Deputy Director Ray Kammer provided an overview of the goals of the meeting, and said that NIST plans to issue a Federal Register notice containing a "revised set of thoughts" in three weeks. There will be a 60-day comment period following publication of the revised principles in the Federal Register. The NIST will then review the comments received and determine whether there is enough consensus to proceed. There will be additional meetings on September 15, 1995 to discuss the Federal government's requirements for its own information processing standards for key escrow encryption. This meeting will take place at the Gaithersburg, Maryland Hilton Hotel from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. It was clear from the meeting, both in presentations and conversation during breaks, that most computer systems and certainly those used by large entities will have key escrow systems for encryption. There was even a person who spoke who said that they are doing this now. Many people at the meeting acknowledged that key escrow would be implemented at some point for domestic as well as for exported programs. The issue is who would hold the key. For example, could a company hold its own keys or could an independent agent be used? The people who create mass market software, however, still expressed significant opposition to key escrow. While the government went to some length to express that this solution is neutral as to software or hardware, it has to be acknowledged that hardware-based systems are easier to control. The subject that was not well discussed was encryption in relation to network services and the internet. It was discussed in relation to the issues of interoperability and the ability to decrypt both sides of a communication. The assumption that I and others had at the outset was that the Administration had made progress in the last year in raising itself from the ashes of Clipper Chip. By the end of the meeting that was not altogether clear. There will remain a great deal of controversy surrounding this issue. Congress is sure to get involved and it will get messier before it gets resolved. Administration Comments Mike Nelson, who is special assistant for information technology to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and co-chair of the inter-agency working group on encryption, provided a historical overview of the data encryption issue. He said that the proposed 64-bit-key encryption is 17 million times stronger than the 40-bit-key encryption currently allowed to be exported. Under the proposed policy, software with 64-bit-key encryption could be exported to friendly countries under certain conditions, all of which require that a key to that encryption be available in the U.S. from an independent third-party. Mr. Nelson stated that the new policy will open up new market opportunities for the U.S. computer software industry, and that key escrow has the potential to become a de facto global standard. The Administration policy for 40-bit-key encryption will continue as-is, and no keys will have to be escrowed for such systems. Mr. Nelson said that the government's main concern is that strong encr In response to questioning, Mr. Nelson stated that the 64-bit-key limit is being imposed because the government is not certain that the key escrow system will work. Once the system is up and running, longer keys may be allowable. He said that the draft criteria are based on national security needs, and that they were pushed as far as possible to meet commercial needs. Mr. Nelson added that the Administration is discussing the possibility of federal legislation with Hill staff to avoid varying state laws on encryption. Industry Perspectives General reaction was mixed to the government's proposal. Most heavy industrial and commercial users of encryption seemed accepting of the Administration's position. To them this meant greater flexibility and would mean that most larger systems could get export licenses for 64-bit-key systems and this would expand the capacity to sell larger systems abroad. This position was exemplified by Trusted Information Systems (TIS), representatives of which spoke several times. In a presentation, Peter Dinsmore of TIS offered restatements of the criteria to make them more commercially viable, and a set of "criteria for the criteria," which are as follows: 1) don't specify commercial criteria, 2) don't exceed the minimum, 3) don't allow criteria creep, 4) don't solve the dual-rogue problem, 5) don't over protect, and 6) use generic nomenclature. He recommended that criteria six and nine be removed altogether, a view that was echoed by other participants. The mass market software industry and the public interest groups were very opposed to the Administration proposal. They do not believe that 64-bit key is sufficient, and they do not believe that anyone will buy U.S.-manufactured software with a key that is to be held by a third party under at least some control by the government. There was a fair amount of confusion on the issue at the meeting, but it now seems clear that the government would permit foreign escrow where there are bi-lateral agreements with friendly nations. In a presentation, Bob Holleyman of the Business Software Alliance criticized the Administration's failure to "liberalize export controls on generally available software employing non-key escrow encryption." Also, he stated that the Administration's proposal and the draft criteria "continue to reflect a misunderstanding of the market place and, if implemented in anything like their current form, will prevent key escrow encryption from ever being commercially adopted." Mr. Holleyman r In addition, the representative of MCI strongly objected to the proposal as an incursion into the private sector and as an impediment to the development of a strong information infrastructure. Encryption guru Whit Diffie of Sun Micro Systems and others objected to the proposal. Danny Weitzner of the Center for Democracy and Technology said that CDT was going to go to Congress and object to the implementation of this proposal. They thought that it was a bad deal and the government should not be placed in the position of directing standards and requiring back doors into encryption systems. Discussion of Criteria Six, Seven and Eight Following the industry presentations, participants divided into groups to discuss various criteria. The group that discussed criteria six, seven and eight made the following observations and recommendations. There seemed to be universal objection to criterion six. This would limit the interoperability of systems. It effectively states that exported 64-bit key cannot be used to decrypt messages that were encrypted with a higher value. This would make it very difficult for U.S. companies to interact with foreign subsidiaries. The internet would find great difficulty in connection with this criteria. Regarding criterion seven, concern was raised that in the context of e-mail, it would be onerous to do key escrow for every transmission. Concern also was raised about maintaining the integrity of intellectual property in instances in which the escrow agent is in a foreign country. In effect, when one chooses an escrow center, one also is selecting a legal system. A request was made for a supplemental document explaining applicable existing laws. Concern was raised that all of the criteria are focused on the voice communication paradigm, rather than on the dynamic data communications environment. Laws also are focused on this paradigm, and law moves slowly whereas computer technology moves rapidly. In addition, the criteria do not address varying international laws on issues such as privacy. Companies will have to comply with the laws of the strictest countries. Concern was raised that privacy considerations are not as apparent in the criteria as ease of access by law enforcement agencies. Also, innocent parties could be de-escrowed. In addition, it was emphasized that encryption must not interfere with use of existing software. Information was requested on two encryption schemes, Banker's Trust and Fortress. It was recommended that the TIS restatement of criterion seven be adopted. This restatement is as follows: "The key escrow mechanism allows access to both sides of a simultaneous (i.e., two-way) communication with only access to the decrypting information from one of the users." It also was recommended that for bi-directional communications, both parties negotiate a common key and escrow it, and that for one way communications, the sender select the escrow key. Regarding criterion eight, it was agreed that the technology issues, international issues, and privacy issues are the same as those for criterion seven. It was noted that certain implementations would require escrowing of the session key, which is unrealistic. It was agreed that with one court order, law enforcement agencies should have the ability to decrypt a stream of messages. However, there must be a time limit on decryption. It was agreed that agents should be able to implement an automated system. General Review/Comments on All Criteria Industry and government representatives met less formally with the objective of reviewing each of the criteria and attempting to reconcile differences. However, this did not occur; instead, broader issues were discussed. There was a certain amount of tension during this session, as each side complained that the other did not understand its needs. Industry members said that it seemed that implementation of the draft criteria, or a version thereof, is a foregone conclusion on the part of government, without industry input concerning the entire concept. Specifically, industry members challenged the 64-bit maximum as being arbitrary and unnecessary. They said that although 56-bit encryption was discussed with government last year, technology moves rapidly, and now 64 bits are not enough. A NIST representative countered that the National Security Agency is "putting a big card on the table" with 64 bits. Industry members also protested that the criteria do not meet the needs of the global marketplace. Consumers will not buy products designed to meet these criteria because they already have access to 64-bit encryption with no keys either free or at a low cost. They argued that the scope of the criteria (e.g., criterion nine) is broader than the stated objective of exportability, and requested more information as to why each criterion is being proposed. Concern also was raised that foreign countries with bi-lateral agreements with the U.S. will act against U.S. key escrow agents. Also, industry will not know the terms of these agreements. Export Procedures Officials of Department of State and the Department of Commerce explained in general terms how this program would work. Each application would go first to the State Department for a jurisdictional certification on technical aspects. If State were satisfied that the criteria had been met, then it would certify the application over to the Commerce Department for general licensing procedures. There would also be an escrow package, that would have to be certified. It was not clear who would control the certification of escrow agents. Escrow Agents The issue of who could be an escrow agent and how they would be controlled was discussed, but not resolved. The issues of liability for wrongful release, the conditions of release, and related questions were not resolved. It seemed clear to me that escrow agents would have to be independent of the user entity. If this law firm were to use an encryption package in its London office, the key would have to be placed with a third party. Conclusion While no issues were resolved at the meeting, it provided a valauble forum for the exchange of ideas between government and industry. Focus now turns to Congress, and to the crafting of a constructive response to the upcoming Federal Register notice. The Administration seems open to changes. The mass market software industry and the public interest community seem negative. We will continue to keep you informed. --- Draft Export Criteria --- for Software Key Escrow Encryption Software key escrow encryption products meeting the following criteria will be granted special export licensing treatment similar to that afforded other mass-market software products with encryption. 1. The product will use an unclassified encryption algorithm (e.g., DES, RC4) with a key length not to exceed 64 bits. 2. The product shall be designed to prevent multiple encryption (e.g., triple-DES). 3. The key required to decrypt each message or file shall be accessible through a key escrow mechanism in the product, and such keys will be escrowed during manufacture in accordance with #10. If such keys are not escrowed during manufacture, the product shall be inoperable until the key is escrowed in accordance with #10. 4. The key escrow mechanism shall be designed to include with each encrypted message or file, in a format accessible by authorized entities, the identity of the key escrow agent(s), and information sufficient for the escrow agent(s) to identify the key or key components required to decrypt that message. 5. The product shall be resistant to any alteration that would disable or circumvent the key escrow mechanism, to include being designed so that the key escrow mechanism cannot be disabled by a static patch, (i.e., the replacement of a block of code by a modified block). 6. The product shall not decrypt messages or files encrypted by non-escrowed products, including products whose key escrow mechanisms have been altered or disabled. 7. The key escrow mechanism allows access to a user's encrypted information regardless of whether that user is the sender or the intended recipient of the encrypted information. 8. The key escrow mechanism shall not require repeated involvement by the escrow agents for the recovery of multiple decryption keys during the period of authorized access. 9. In the event any such product is or may be available in the United States, each production copy of the software shall either have a unique key required for decrypting messages or files that is escrowed in accordance with #10, or have the capability for its escrow mechanism to be rekeyed and any new key to be escrowed in accordance with #10. 10. The product shall accept escrow of its key(s) only with escrow agents certified by the U.S. Government or by foreign governments with which the U.S. Government has formal agreements consistent with U.S. law enforcement and national security requirements. Note: Software products incorporating additional encryption methods other than key escrow encryption methods will be evaluated for export on the basis of each encryption method included, as is already the case with existing products. Accordingly, these criteria apply only to the key escrow encryption method incorporated by a software product, and not to other non-escrowed encryption methods it may incorporate. For instance, non-escrowed encryption using a key length of 40 bits or less will continue to be exportable under existing export regulations. - Please also review discussion paper #1 (distributed earlier), which raises a number of issues involving exportability criteria and how exportable products could be designed. Discussion paper #2 (also previously distributed) presents questions involving key escrow agents. ~WASH01A:49767:1:|09/11/95 1-10

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Re: Can GAK be made "not interoperable" with PGP?
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> writes: > Timothy C. May wrote: >>But is this even possible, to make a GAK system "not interoperable" with, >> say, PGP? >> Unless the GAK system has some sort of entropy analyzer, and can >> recognize high-entropy sources which it presumes to be encrypted data >> (*), one can of course PGP-encrypt a text file and then GAK the >> resulting file. > > I took it to mean that they were saying that an approved program on one > end of a communication exchange could not exchange encrypted messages or > established an encrypted session of some kind with an un approved program > on the other end. Not trying to outlaw superencryption (PGP on both ends > using a GAKed channel) but GAK on one end working with an unapproved > system on the other end. A ringer GAK-work-alike that would defeat the > intent of GAK. > I don't know if the government can prevent that with a software-only > system or indeed if half a secure system can be made completely secure. The breakout session that I was in was directly charged with this issue. We talked at length about it. There were NIS&T and NSA folks at the session. The consensus was that the Government wanted to prevent a version of PGP that was export enabled (GAK and short keys) that would be backward compatible. The group stated strongly that this was a "non starter." That is, it was unacceptable. Vendors wanted "sales appeal." That means compatibility with existing software. And compatibility with existing export-approved systems. [DES has been exported to "friendly" countries with strict controls.] And criteria #2 specifically outlawed superencryption. No DES | TRAN | DES | TRAN | DES. They were serious. talk to CME, he was in that session. I believe that this criteria is stupid, or at least ill-advised. But the govies insisted. All the more justification to ignore the US rules and develop off-shore. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: An opportunity not to be missed
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:57 AM 9/14/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >Is Wavy Gravy running his "Nobody for President" campaign again this time? >After all, Nobody's going to balance the budget, and Nobody's going to >get the government out of your bedroom, and on the internet, Nobody can tell >if you're a dog or not :-) Or to update it for today: "Nobody(a)remailer.org for President." --Tim ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 AM 9/13/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >While I have had some qualms about the name, on balance I think it has been >good for us. After all, it's not as if _other_ groups don't already exist! >In particular, the British branch of Cypherpunks disliked the name >"Cypherpunks" so much that they used a different name for themselves, the >"U.K. Crypto Privacy Association." It doesn't seem to exist anymore, for >whatever reasons. But the name may have been a factor, at least. Note too that Brits differ from Americans. "Wired" worked well here from the beginning but has had problems there. Differing national characteristics. DCF "Let's all just agree to disagree. My system can thrive with widespread disagreement among rabid individualists --- can yours?"

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Re: Digital Fingerprinting
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > Then, in W.Ky., as in Stockbridge, "You can get > > anything you want..."? :) > > I'd stick with: > *********************************************** > You can't always get what you want 1 > but if you try > sometimes, sometimes you get what you need. 2 > *********************************************** > > 1 ability to dump garbage where you want > 2 a better appreciation for the environment > :-) Why do I feel like I'm sitting on the group W bench? Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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CAGK rationale (was: Re: GAK/weak crypto rationale?)
by cme＠acm.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Tue, 12 Sep 1995 17:52:22 -0400 (EDT) >From: Brian Davis <bdavis(a)thepoint.net> > In our district, we >managed to convict almost 20 people in an investigation of the state >legislature, including the now-former Speaker of the House and > 6 other >legislators. Bribing lobbyists took hits, etc. > >Particularly effective were the court-approved video and audio tapes of >the Speaker taking a bribe in exchange for certain action on legislation >and responding to the bribing party: "Well bless your heart." >That has become the office's mantra. Clearly, the world needs CAGK -- Citizen Access to Government Keys -- with all gov't officials forced to use keys held by various newspapers and other watchdog agencies.... The video and audio bugs aren't part of the wiretap process so they don't apply here. - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +----------------------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison -+

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[Meeting at Tim's house participant] Who wanted the AT&T UNIX for 8086/80286 ?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Would the person who expressed interest in my collection of genuine AT&T UNIX for the AT&T 6300 (an 8086) and 6300 Plus (an 80286) complete with several shelf feet hard cover doccumentation as well as the developer kit please get in touch with me? As for the rest of you: you may stop laughing now ;-) - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMFeqlyoZzwIn1bdtAQEkswF/dxu8jYNFjLVRK+3SbNy9ee2fc4xzsro6 elH7VHUX85Y/23EQmL0wBoVkAyqHKk0Z =uYSW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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