December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Cripto FAQ in Hypertext HTML
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Because I wanted to share the RSA Criptography FAQ on WWW with our local users, I have converted your document, verbatum, to HTML Hypertext. The entire Table of Contents is clickable so that you can zoom to the particular area of interest. I can FTP somewhere public you would like (I don't know where to stash this kind of thing. It could probably use some more links in it where the document suggest that the reader go to another section for more information but... I will leave that up to someone else. -- ... __o .. _`\<,_ Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/ (*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA <#include standard disclaimer regarding my opinion an not my company's > <#include some philosophical comment >

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transient guerrilla remailers
by nobody＠rahul.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If c2.org can offer RIAB accounts on a pre-paid basis, what's to stop people interested in the cause from paying anonymously, setting up the RIAB, and just walking away? When the pre-paid period expires, the remailer goes away. If the RIAB package could communicate its existence and impending death to the pinging and verification services, the transient nature of remailers wouldn't be a problem. It would be hard to harass an unknown walkaway remailer operator who has no involvement with the day to day operations. If Tim's theory of isolating the responsibilities of the remailer operator and the site owner are held to be valid, c2.org would be off the hook. After all, c2.org didn't actually set up the remailer, John Doe did. Finding JD would be impossible from a practical standpoint, and since the remailer only lived for a few months, the motive to find and attack it is less. . . a true "Guerrilla" RIAB.

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AA + Anonymous ECash = Unhappy Fundies
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hkhenson(a)cup.portal.com writes: > AA BBS is still up, and may well stay up for the whole time > Robert is in prison. He has no other way to support his > family or pay for legal defense. Also, outside of western > TN, OK, Utah, and other backwards places, what he is selling > is legal--even protected under the First Amendment. (Though > some of it *is* kinda gross :-) ) But certainly no worse than the stuff which regularly flows through a.b.p.tasteless and a.b.p.bestiality. > AA BBS is up to about 25,000 files. There is a good chance > that they will be available through the internet at some > point. It strikes me that this would be the perfect way to generate consumer interest in anonymous digital cash protocols. The entire AA collection, hooked up to the net through a T-3, and available for a nominal fee per GIF, could easily make the AA Sysops millionaires by the time their sentences are over. Such a setup would make their pictures available to everyone, not just the limited number of people their BBS has the capacity to handle. Perhaps the server could be placed securely overseas in a neutral country which still respects privacy and free speech. Orders could be encrypted using the server's PGP key and the customer could specify the passphrase to be used to IDEA encrypt the "goods" prior to shipment, ala NetBank. > Trying to control information in the network age is about > as sucessful as pissing into the wind. When the government pisses into the wind, the citizens get wet. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: Why emoney? Why not a web of debt?
by davidm＠iconz.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Date: Sat, 21 Jan 1995 15:18:48 +1300 >> From: davidm(a)iconz.co.nz (David Murray) >> The best way to underpin the value of ecash is for the issuer to (credibly) >> undertake to convert it into real money. > > And since I would only make the promise to the few people that I am >connected to in the debt-trust web, this is doable. I doubt I could >convince all of you that I was good for $10, but I bet there are a few >readers on this list that I *could* convince. They would be able to >convince a few others that _they_ are worth $10, etc. But this, I suggest, is thinking too small, as well as (or, as a consequence) compromising anonymity somewhat. Which is not to say a central ebank is necessary -- just that (legally enforceable, audited) IOUs from a corporation that I knew could pay (because it makes it's living from being able to pay) would be preferred by me, even if I (my computer) knew that Alice's IOU is backed by Bob's which is backed by ... Zane's, who I would trust with my life (since he saved me in a boating accident 7 years ago...). Of course, the two systems can/should coexist. In fact, they're probably the same thing at different granularities. An ordinary bank takes deposits (issues IOU's to depositors) and lends the money out (collects IOU's from debtors). [The flow of credit is just the flow of debt backwards -- like current and electrons :-)] People trust bank IOUs because of the portfolio of IOUs it has collected (a certain mandated number from the Government, a certain proportion backed by property etc), and, probably, because it has received more IOUs than it has issued (so that the IOUs from Donald Trump and Orange County don't bring the system down...). On this analysis, the web of debt-trust is just an ultimately distributed bank. Instead of the bank collecting the ten dollars everyone is good for (in return for IOUs) and then lending it back out to the system (in return for IOUs), everyone's individual IOU underpins the system. This seems to leave the portfolio problem to the distributedness and interlinkicity of the e-economy (everyone essentially holds the market portfolio), or up to the individual to balance. Personally, I would be unhappy to hold my e-wealth in such a way that it was ultimately underpinned by the IOUs of a group of people living in California... > This system might even dodge the laws governing banking in various >jurisdictions ... though I doubt it. It quacks, waddles, and water >runs off its back... I don't think the banking laws are such a big problem. [Feel free to enlighten me.] The ordinary business of banking involves borrowing money from people in a special way (deposits) and lending to people, again in a characteristic way. But it is not simply borrowing and lending -- every business does that (borrows from banks, and, increasingly, in markets; lends (extends credit to) customers). Imagine a corporation that issued bearer bonds, and invested the proceeds in t-bills (or term deposits, or call accounts). Imagine that the bonds (IOUs) were issued at face value, carried no interest, and could be cashed in by the holder at any time. Imagine further that the bonds were repres- ented by bytes, and transferable anonymously. That is, the bonds are ecash, and the corporation is an ebank. But it is not a bank-bank. It is not borrowing money in a characteris- tically bankish way, and it is not lending the money in a characteris- tically bankish way. It doesn't raise the regulatory/consumer protection/ handholding or multiplier effect/credit expansion problems that (supposedly) underlie banking supervision regulations. In short, ladies and gentlemen, it is my submission that it is not, in fact, in the final analysis, when looked at from all angles in the correct way, at all, a duck. Cheers. D [Although this doesn't entirely answer your point. I don't think the distributed/web of debt-trust system would be a bank, either, although it might be a credit union. And you would have to pay tax on all those IOUs you collected ;-) ]

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Supreme Court, free speech, anon remailers...
by davidm＠iconz.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: >Nathan Zook wrote: > >> I believe, therefore, that both the court and the dissent bode poorly for >> anonymous encrypted mail. > >But anonymous handbills are quite common, posted all over the place >here in my home town, and the Supreme Court ruled quite properly that >identities are not required for speech. I too was concerned by the strong dissent in the anonymous handbill case posted to the net, largely because I live in a country where we have inherited the odious British practice of requiring newspapers and other published material (such as handbills) to carry the name of the printer and the sponsoring organisation (or sumpin' like that...). Its contemporary significance is supposed to be as a control for defamation (yes, we still have strong defamation laws -- good thing too, IMHO, and something cryto/ anonymity may or may not render moot): which is to say turning every publisher and printer into a censor. [Even more bizarrely, the law requires newspaper proprietors and editors to swear certain documents and deliver them to the High Court every year...] Of course, I have never heard of this particular piece of legislation being invoked to prosecute someone who hasn't complied, and I've never heard of anyone complying. Nevertheless, it is on the books. It seems to me that it would only take a minor amendment to the US law on the identification of periodicals that are posted (notice the colophons [?] in all those newspapers and magazines) to apply to all publications... A couple of extra words in the definition section and away we go. (It's not a freedom of speech issue, it's an environmental issue -- all those handbills cluttering up the landfills... And it would only be fair to treat the denizens of the information superhypeway equally...). Things ain't half as safe as you might think. D.

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Re: An Attempt to Hobble SAFE Crypto Bill
by Peter D. Junger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The more I look at this draft, the more gaping holes I see. I do not think that it was ever intended to be enacted, but was rather drafted simply to give cover to those who voted for the first amendment, since they could then vote against this one. Notice that it says that you will find the definitions in the Export Administration Act, which I am sure, though I have not looked it up, does not contain a definition of ``real time'', which seems to be the key term in the draft. But now that the first amendment lost, I suppose this could have been leaked so that some other committee will vote for a compromise. As I reread the proceeding sentence, I realize that I should have said ``proposed first amendment to the SAFE bill''. We wouldn't want to get it mixed up with the First Amendment, now would we? -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH EMAIL: junger(a)samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu NOTE: junger(a)pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists

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Re: AA + Anonymous ECash = Unhappy Fundies
by davidm＠iconz.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The "cause" will do much better if the first major association is made >with something much less controversial. Girl Scout cookies, say. This may be what you are referring to, but there was a thread on alt.cp a while back on introducing cyberspace to the people, and one of the suggest- ions was a Web page to sell Girl Scout cookies. Now if we could use anon-remailers and ecash to 'enhance' that idea, just think of the mainstream publicity... D.

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Remailer exit points
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Y'know, after some thought, some of the concepts I made regarding data havens with anonymous locations might well apply to making exit-point remailers that are relatively immune from outside pressure. Given a network of entry-point remailers with well-known public keys, you could advertise an exit-point remailer by only giving out encrypted address blocks for use with various well-known entry-point remailers and a public key. The exit-point remailer could then substitute some random From: address and path entries to spoof the exit-point remailer's location. The remailer's actual location would only be known by the entry point remailers, and since their involvement is stripped by the exit-point remailers, no one would know who they are to complain to them. The spoofed exit-point remailer location could be handled by disposable MX entries, of the sort discussed here earlier, if it is deemed desireable to make the From: address valid. The remailer operator could get the actual complaints, to deal with as he would. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Re: Locksmith's Guild wants limit on free speech
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:59 AM 1/21/95, Timothy C. May wrote: > ... Check out comp.org.eff.talk for discussion of how "professional >locksmiths" are angry that "amateur locksmiths" (unlicensed, not real >members of the Brotherhood) are using the Net to disseminate and >discuss the Secret and Most Arcane Knowledge of the Guild. > >And alt.locksmithing is carrying the stuff. ... I checked out alt.locksmithing, based on some commentary I saw over in alt.current-events.net-abuse, and to be perfectly honest, there isn't really all that much going on along these lines, certainly nothing on the order of magnitude of the alt.religion.scientology crap. One or two soreheads, but by net.standards they don't even really qualify as significant flamers, and a few (apparently) professional locksmiths who are talking about things in a rather friendly fashion. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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port 25 forgeries
by santa＠northpole 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a port 25 forgery. One could probably do a better one, but this one shows you what still winds up in the headers and one can't do anything about when dealing with sendmail or an equally smart SMTP agent. Note than smail 3.1 is stupid.

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hmmm, port 25
by nutty_elf＠northpole.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

That's strange, that last port 25 forgery didn't behave as expected. Just checking it. --nutty elf

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TJOAUC 1-7
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently received by email: ======================================================================= THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN UNDERGROUND COMPUTING / Published Quarterly ====================================================================== ISSN 1074-3111 Volume One, Issue Seven January 17, 1994 ====================================================================== available for download as jauc1-7.zip of 180Kbytes from ** ftp site: etext.archive.umich.edu /pub/Zines/JAUC ** ftp site: ftp.fc.net /pub/tjoauc of cp interest I thought: Call Security / Voice Crypto FAQ Neil Johnson Telecommunications Security Howard Fuhs and seen here first: My Life As An International Arms Courier Matt Blaze lots more deleted for brevity, listed in the titles.txt file in the .zip

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CPs write code: PRNG conditioning
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See ftp://ftp.clark.net/pub/cme/ for code to condition random numbers and pseudo-random numbers. There's more to come. - Carl

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Re: Why emoney? Why not a web of debt?
by davidm＠iconz.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: Censored Girls Anonymous <carolb(a)barton.spring.com> >From: davidm(a)iconz.co.nz (David Murray) >Subject: Re: Why emoney? Why not a web of debt? >Cc: >Bcc: >X-Attachments: > >>Many companies are already founded on "a web of debt". >>"Sallie Mae (Student Loans), Ginnie Mae (General Loans), and Freddie Mac >>(Real Estate Loans)," all come to mind at the moment. They're nicely >>formatted, processed and make even more money for investors as the >>interest rates change. > >Of course the ultimate IOUs these webs of debt are (implicitly, if not >explicitly) based on are those of the American taxpayer -- which means >Uncle Sam is playing collection agency, which the usual supporting cast >of guns and goons. > >>So maybe the remailer IOU's, could be traded for the data haven IOU's, >>and so forth. I think someone does have a credit card IOU situation. >>The systems, and precedence for debt trading are there (and interest >>rates are going up again soon, indicated the Fed last week!). > >Of course, someone's going to have to package up those IOUs (and make >people pay interest if anyone is going to make money out of it... (Even >students pay interest.) Which is why I'm pushing (endlessly, tediously) >the idea of a special purpose corporation whose job it is to issue IOUs >(in return for an equivalent amount of cash). The people who buy the IOUs >get anonymous ecash that anyone (remailers, data vaults, data havens) will >accept (because it is credible that it will be repaid), and the corporation >that issues the IOUs gets to use the money it got paid to earn interest >until the IOUs are cashed in. > >>I just wonder who wants to play "collection agency"? > >Which is the big problem for community action generally -- as the community >gets bigger (and more anonymous?) the effectiveness of communal >disapprobation diminishes (:-)). A special purpose corporation, on the other >hand, not only has a reputation to protect, and can be sued, but has an >interest in making its financial/credit rating details as public as possible >(reassure the customers, and make more intersest income -- although the real >income is likely to come from fees...) > >Cheers, > >D. >

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Re: Locksmith's Guild wants limit on free speech
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Commenting on Tim's comment about the decline of the guilds of "licensed professionals" (I'm a licensed architect long-time arguing against the breed's conceits and camouflages and irresponsibilities): Here in NYC there is a new trial policy to allow architects and engineers to "self-certify" their construction documents as in compliance with the building code rather than being approved by a municipal examiner. Over decades a sub-species has grown called "code consultants" or "expediters", which advises and processes documents for A-E's who have become ignorant of the arcana of the building code. This group of several hundred, has pretty muchly dominated, by default or by design, the non-governmental side of construction through their specialized knowledge of the code, procedures, interpretations, regulations and who to see for favorable treatment in the Building Department. A-E's used these folks with happiness, usually, for it relieved the self-certified high-minded animals to concentrate on the important stuff of design and schmoozing and puffing feathers. On the municipal side, agency employees found that it was easier to deal with these consultants than contrary professionals. And, the culture welcomed ex-public officials into their well-paid ranks to lubricate the wheels. An odd result so far is that while owners and professionals like the idea of speeding up the process they are reluctant to take on the concomitant responsibility for deficiencies in meeting code standards in final construction. The city will inspect 20% to keep tabs. Both fear that they do not know the code well enough to take the risk of being found at fault by random municipal inspections of construction. A-E's dread the liability and blame by owners for well-known construction corner-cutting, and owners suspect their professionals competency and ethics -- afraid that the pros will certify in ignorance or cupidity and that the owners will face costly corrections without having the traditional scapegoat of over-weening government to justify cheating in the field. The code consultants I've talked to say they wait for the animals frightened of their own shadows to return to the safe stables. Perhaps "code consultants" precurse the trajectory of cryptographers?

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Anti-porn conference in Manila
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Religious Alliance Against Pornography has been holding a biggish conference in Manila; the focus is on child pornography, and a major topic of discussion is the evil of electronic networks. The Interpol is among those participating; the head of their kiddie-porn division claims Britain is the source of most European stuff, and bemoans the fact that too little is spent on monitoring traffic, as the war against drugs is considered more important. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: bruce s(t)erlings talk
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>can you get me a copy of bruce serlings talk given to law enforcement ^^^^^^^^ Uh, yes, well... I wonder if he's related to Rod... S>T<erling, yes? Post 'em first, and lot God sort them out... Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Smoke & Mirrors
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A friend of mine has a business setting up networks for business's in the Baltimore area. He contracts out the security end of the setup to a firm called "Smoke and Mirrors". They create firewalls and handle encryption capabilities. I think the company is in the baltimore area, and was wondering if anyone on the list has heard of this company? With a name like smoke and mirrors I guess they better be good. Anybody know? Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLyLIZD2paOMjHHAhAQHIuwQAhMdaCsA5j7W/Z/m2VHLeaendI7/JHNGv qm1hePuz3OolJmYgaWyAODlefcLkaKNapeEh5/xRoleEI8dUWuC+njJKvw6MKkr/ b6b/UbcKpLf/qqpFVuz+BbCnBUIY8iALhCLe832o5yxzAV2GT64Sj5gfjhUa3XVy 5dR4yI51SNc= =ZvUV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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E-Mail Security - New Book
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

E-MAIL SECURITY WITH PGP AND PEM: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ELECTRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE ...a new book by Bruce Schneier John Wiley & Sons, 1995 ISBN 0-471-05318-X $24.95 The world of e-mail is the world of postcards. Between you and your correspondents may lurk a foreign government, a business competitor, an overzealous law enforcement agency, or even just a nosy neighbor. The problem is, all of these potential eavesdroppers, given fairly simple access tools, can read your messages as easy as a postal worker can read your postcards. E-MAIL SECURITY is about protecting electronic mail fm spies, interlopers, and spoofs--people who may want to destroy, alter, or just look at your private communications. The book shows how you can protect the financial information, contract negotiations, or personal correspondence you entrust to public or private networks--and it shows how this protection is available right now, with free or inexpensive software. The book discusses PGP and PEM: how they work, how they are different, and how to choose which one is right for you. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Part I: Privacy and Electronic Mail Chapter 1: The Problem Chapter 2: Encryption Chapter 3: Key Management Chapter 4: Authentication Chapter 5: Certificates Chapter 6: Keeping Your Private Key Private Chapter 7: Odds and Ends Chapter 8: Patents, Governments, and Export Laws Part II: Achieving Electronic-Mail Privacy Chapter 9: Requirements and Features Chapter 10: Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Chapter 11: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Chapter 12: Comparing PGP and PEM Chapter 13: Attacks Against PGP and PEM Appendix A: Pretty Good Privacy Appendix B: Privacy Enhanced Mail ***************************************************************** If you are interested in a copy of E-MAIL SECURITY, please send a check for $25 + $5 postage (ask for rates abroad) to: Bruce Schneier 730 Fair Oaks Ave Oak Park, IL 60302 The book won't be available until at least the end of the month, so please be patient.

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Another Book By Schneier...
by werewolf＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saw this on one of the cryptography conferences..... From: schneier(a)chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: E-Mail Security - New book by Bruce Schneier Message-ID: <D2qsIJ.Dzz(a)chinet.chinet.com> Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX Date: Sat, 21 Jan 1995 06:25:31 GMT E-MAIL SECURITY WITH PGP AND PEM: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ELECTRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE ...a new book by Bruce Schneier John Wiley & Sons, 1995 ISBN 0-471-05318-X $24.95 The world of e-mail is the world of postcards. Between you and your correspondents may lurk a foreign government, a business competitor, an overzealous law enforcement agency, or even just a nosy neighbor. The problem is, all of these potential eavesdroppers, given fairly simple access tools, can read your messages as easy as a postal worker can read your postcards. E-MAIL SECURITY is about protecting electronic mail fm spies, interlopers, and spoofs--people who may want to destroy, alter, or just look at your private communications. The book shows how you can protect the financial information, contract negotiations, or personal correspondence you entrust to public or private networks--and it shows how this protection is available right now, with free or inexpensive software. The book discusses PGP and PEM: how they work, how they are different, and how to choose which one is right for you. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Part I: Privacy and Electronic Mail Chapter 1: The Problem Chapter 2: Encryption Chapter 3: Key Management Chapter 4: Authentication Chapter 5: Certificates Chapter 6: Keeping Your Private Key Private Chapter 7: Odds and Ends Chapter 8: Patents, Governments, and Export Laws Part II: Achieving Electronic-Mail Privacy Chapter 9: Requirements and Features Chapter 10: Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Chapter 11: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Chapter 12: Comparing PGP and PEM Chapter 13: Attacks Against PGP and PEM Appendix A: Pretty Good Privacy Appendix B: Privacy Enhanced Mail ***************************************************************** If you are interested in a copy of E-MAIL SECURITY, please send a check for $25 + $5 postage (ask for rates abroad) to: Bruce Schneier 730 Fair Oaks Ave Oak Park, IL 60302 The book won't be available until at least the end of the month, so please be patient.

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Ben Goren Eyes Only
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995 Ben Goren <ben(a)Music.ASU.Edu> said: Mr. Goren, Mail to <ben(a)Music.ASU.Edu> ricochets. Hep.

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim writes: > One thing I should've noted is that a Linux-based cheap remailer is > mostly useless without a "live connection" to the Net. I disagree - live connections are great for fast-response systems, but we got along just fine in the uucp dialup world with occasional connections; in an environment like remailers where you _want_ batchy performance, the clunkiness can even be a "feature". I don't know how many providers are offerring uucp or ip dialout from their servers, or whether they're much cheaper than real ip, but you can do ok with, say, hourly polling to a TIA or term connection to fill your mailbox from a POP server, or nightly if that's enough. TIA also has the advantage over SLIP/PPP that outgoing mail from your system will _always_ have unverifiable IP addresses - you look like netcom.com, just like everyone else TIA-connecting from netcom does. And connections from shared-IP-address-pool systems like netcruiser or dialup PPP systems probably don't do much logging of who's used what IP address beyond when nameserver caches clear. Bill

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RE: syrinx remailer up and running
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Well folks, the syrinx remailer is up and running now. The particulars: > >Address: syrinx(a)c2.org Could you post the capabilities of this remailer, like cpunk, hash, pgp, ksub, latent, etc.? == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov

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Re: Data Vaults (vs. Data Havens)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim and Eric write things like: > I fully concur. The connotations of the word "haven" imply activities > that ordinary people don't see themselves doing. This means that > ordinary people won't generally use something called a "haven", even > if they might use exactly the same service called something else. We can always call them "Private Storage Servers" or some such; an interesting question is whether the main uses will be for retrieval by the storer, or by someone else, or by a bunch of others, and how we describe the service may affect that. Bill

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Re: T.A.Z. on Disk
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Angus Patterson wrote: >> >> > I also saw another e-book site that had some more of [Bey's] stuff, can't >> > remember what it was though. > >On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Mark Grant wrote: >> There's some more on the WWW at http://www.uio.no/~mwatz/bey/index.html. > >Bey sings the line that good is no different from evil, feeling >is better than thinking, and truth indistinguishable from lies. > >Sounds like a pile of crap to me. Still, I suppose that feelings >and lies are a poets job. Hm. Can we maybe head off the Ideology War before it becomes unstoppable? Cypherpunks write code, and do lots of other stuff too, but I'm hoping that endless political wars is something cypherpunks don't do, or at least try not to do on the cypherpunks list. [It's possible that the ideology of the list is as homogenously anarcho-capitalist as it seems, but I'd bet there's enough anarcho-others to sustain several never-ending political 'discussions' of the sort that will make the list even less useful then when we spent dozens of messages a day talking about logos.]

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