December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

If only Vxxxx Fxxxxx had used encryption....
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks: [Wait! This =is= crypto-related! I promise!] Heard on the news today that Bernard Nussbaum said he had done "nothing irregular" in going through Vince Foster's effects immediately after his demise, in order to secure "sensitive information". Presumably, Nussbaum's contention is that some of the information in Foster's possession was covered by attorney-client privelege, and therefore the Authorities had no right to take it into possession. (IANAL-Comments from those who are?) Anyway, this case got me to thinking: If Vince had kept all his "sensitive" things encrypted, and never written down the passphrase, then the data would effectively have died with him. In this case, lack of key escrow is not a bug, but a feature! Then I thought some more - that the whole Key Escrow thing needs to be rethought: Instead of escrowing the private key, we need to develop better key management techniques for multiple recipients. For example, if Alice is an attorney representing Carol Client, Bob and Ray are partners in Alice's firm, which uses escrow agent E; and A, B, C, R and E are the public keys (and A'... are the private keys) of our dramatis personae: Carol sends her message to Alice as usual, generating the session key S, and encrypting it S'=A(S). Whenever Alice recieves a message, after decrypting the session key [S= A'(S')] she adds to it an additional S"= E( B(S) ) and S"'= E( R(S) ) or some other construct which involving Shamir Sharing or whatever. The details of the protocol(s) can be worked out after the basic premise: There is no reason for anyone to give up the "master key" to all of their business, when the minimal overhead in storage space for adding an escrowed =session= key will suffice. PGP needs a mechanism to handle "detatched session keys", so that our escrow agent can, upon notification by Bob and Ray that Alice has [died | left the firm], process the whole package of S" and S"' back into B(S) and R(S), so that Bob and Ray can carry on their work. Just as with a detatched signature certificate going to a notary, the detatched session key does not give the escrow agent any knowledge of the content of the message itself. Another option is to put the whole creation of S" and S"' on to Carol, which requires a public key that specifies E and {B, R}, as well as the particular escrow protocol involved. This could be tricky to implement. Also, Carol needs to be able to specify to Alice that she is retaining a copy of the communication, encrypted to self, and therefore Alice need not escrow the session key for this particular message. Comments? * "All authority belongs to the people" -Thomas Jefferson --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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Re: PERRY METZGER: YOUR MOMMY IS CALLING YOU HOME
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hell hath no fury like a martyr scorned. . .

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Re: More "S-1" foolishness (fwd)
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How about this? A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | mfroomki(a)umiami.ir.miami.edu U. Miami School of Law | P.O. Box 248087 | It's hot here. And humid. Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | See http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles/froomkin-metaphor/text.html and http://www.law.cornell.edu/jol/froomkin.htm ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 10 Aug 1995 23:34:42 -0400 (EDT) From: Dorothy Denning <denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu> To: mfroomki(a)umiami.ir.miami.edu Cc: denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu Subject: Re: More "S-1" foolishness (fwd) Thanks for sending all this stuff. The algorithm is definitely not Skipjack. Feel free to pass this along if you'd like. Cheers, Dorothy

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Crypto-relevant flame interruption
by SysAdmin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Would someone be so kind as to provide a status report on the planned SSL attack? Last word was that codework was still underway, but I might have missed something relevant to this project amidst all of the noise about excessive list noise. Fred <admin(a)dcwill.com>

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Clinton to resign?
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Associated Press reported on August 10, 1995: President Won't Resign But... (WASHINGTON) President Clinton wasn't about to give a serious answer when he was asked Thursday if he might resign. The question came from veteran columnist Sarah McClendon, who asserted that some legislators from the left and right were trying to push him out of office. [...] "Well, if you promise to run off with me I might," Clinton responded, ... "But otherwise, I can't think of any reason." - - - - - - - - - - Repeat after me: There's nothing to those crazy conspiracy theories. There's nothing to those crazy conspiracy theories.....

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Re: This summer's special delivery?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <ac4eb0c9030210046e6c(a)[205.199.118.202]>, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: >I have nothing further to add on this. But recall that it was just about >this time last year--just before Crypto--that the "alleged RC4 code" was >posted anonymously to the list. Do I recall correctly that that RC4 proved to interoperate with the "real" RC4? - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMCr2PCoZzwIn1bdtAQEUPAF/S1arfdr01B+/o5MlEX6F60NHUL6vgEPQ sv3264ZCsJAl7TBqqyi1a6baBF7uuTh+ =jhLU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "Protect the children" as passphrase to Constitution
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:35 PM 8/10/95 -0700, Tim wrote: >- Clinton's Executive Order today which limits advertising of cigarettes, .... >(Oh, and one amazing detail: the possible issuance of I.D. cards to all of >those under the age of 18. Besides being useful for things like curfews, What!?!?!?! I guess I'm not totally surprised - registration of all children has been high on Clinton's agenda ever since he's been in the White House. One of the more blatant examples was the child vaccination proposals - which first started out as "take over the vaccination system and register all kids so we can remind their parents to get their shots", and gradually included less and less control and funding of vaccination while retaining the registration. Sigh. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- Storyteller makes no choice - soon you will not hear his voice. His job was to shed light, and not to master. RIP, Jerry

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Re: "S1" encryption system (was: this looked like it might
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:13 AM 8/10/95 -6, you wrote: As with Peter and Nathan, I'm also a former tool of the military-industrial complex (:-), and Peter's right that the probably source of this assertion is that there's seldom any "vanilla" TOP SECRET data - anything that's sensitive enough to get TOP SECRET handling rules is usually part of some compartmented project (compartmentalization is a formalized version of Need to Know, where you need to be read into PROJECT X to get PROJECT X data.) Sensitive Compartmented Information is one well-known class of stuff. Codeword projects are identified by words picked off a list of content-free names; some codewords that have been outed in the past are ULTRA and UMBER. In addition to project-specific classifications, some of the kinds of labels on material include variants on INTEL, CNWDI (Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information), RESTRICTED DATA (less critical nuclear weapons data), FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA ( a weird classification for material that isn't RESTRICTED DATA any more but they still don't want to let folks see.) And then there's the sort of data that's SECRET by the time the people doing the grunt-work see it, but it's various extracts of REALLY SPOOKY DATA, that only a few people back in some agency know the whole picture, and it's parcelled out so one group of people gets asked to build a laser-scanner like this, and another gets asked to build a computer system like that, or a mirror adjuster like that, and none of the grunts know whether the whole deal is personal teleportation system (the cover project) or a space-based assassination system, much less how they decided on the targets.... #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- Storyteller makes no choice - soon you will not hear his voice. His job was to shed light, and not to master. RIP, Jerry

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Australia, EU crypto ill news, crypto wars
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just read this on comp.risks, by Ross Anderson (via a couple of people). A crypto relevant forward if any is relavent IMO, especially this bit: Ross Anderson <rja14(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> writes: > ... While at the conference, I found out that a classified meeting > took place this March in Germany between the signals intelligence > agencies of the developed countries, plus Australia and South Africa, > at which the assembled spooks agreed to press their governments to > bring in escrow and/or weak crypto. You realise, of course, that this means war, Tatical replies? a) Lobbying - hopeless IMO, they aren't interested in listening, the politicos are just too easy to manipulate and the "masses" aren't clueful enough of what crypto means to understand the implications, or even notice. b) pretty good stego - possible technical solution c) independant states of cyberspace :-) declaration of independence c) enforced or "enabled" by b) looks good to me. Perhaps some literary skilled cpunk would care to compose a suitable reply for PGN to add to risks. Adam ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 1 Aug 1995 20:36:29 -0400 (EDT) From: "Lance J. Hoffman" <hoffman(a)seas.gwu.edu> Subject: Australia next to ban PGP Date: Tue, 01 Aug 1995 15:29:05 -0400 From: Dave Farber <farber(a)cis.upenn.edu> Subject: Australia next to ban PGP [unverified info ...] From: rja14(a)cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) Australia's proposed crypto policy: (1) Banks will get key escrow (2) Other Australian residents will be forced to use weak crypto Source: talk by Steve Orlowski, Assistant Director, Australian attorney general's department, given at the Cryptography Policy and Algorithms Conference, Queensland University of Technology, last month. p 34: `the needs of the majority of users of the infrastructure for privacy and smaller financial transactions can be met by lower level encryption which could withstand a normal but not sophisticated attack against it. Law enforcement agencies could develop the capability to mount such sophisticated attacks. Criminals who purchased the higher level encryption products would immediately attract attention to themselves.' He mentioned that his department considered itself a suitable repository for the government central decrypting unit, which would decrypt traffic for local police forces. He also wants to escrowed keys for banks and other organisations allowed to use strong crypto. Centralising the wiretap capability with the AG is represented as a useful safeguard against abuse of power by local police forces. It would be presented as a `data recovery' facility in order to reassure the voters. Centralisation will enable the AG to acquire the capability to use ``more sophisticated techniques in circumstances where the key cannot, for whatever reason, be recovered from escrow''. So the technical parameters would appear to be: 40 bit keys for the masses, 56-bit escrowed keys for the banks, and a Wiener machine sitting in Orlowski's office. Belt, braces and string. Curiously enough, he quotes a `Review of long Term Cost Effectiveness of Telecommunications Interception' as saying that ``Encryption by targets of their communications (both voice and data) is not considered as a problem for TI at present in Australia'' and goes on to say that ``there has been comparatively little market for voice encryption products, although they have been readily available''. He even produces some good arguments for the EFF, such as that much of the intelligence comes from the call log data and from calls to third parties such as airlines and hotels which are not encrypted. He also says that the OECD countries will hold a meeting on National Cryptography Policies later this year. While at the conference, I found out that a classified meeting took place this March in Germany between the signals intelligence agencies of the developed countries, plus Australia and South Africa, at which the assembled spooks agreed to press their governments to bring in escrow and/or weak crypto. Australia seems rather eager to lick Uncle Sam's boots on this issue. I wonder what the payoff was?

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Re: More "S-1" foolishness
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The other thing I noticed that really makes me question this is that G1 only uses 4 of its 8 input bits. As I wrote, it is equivalent to parity(i&0x17). A bit is a terrible thing to waste, and it is hard to imagine why it would do this intentionally. G1 may not be that important an element of the cipher but why throw away four bits? It is possible I suppose that the F and G boxes are not the ones used in the "real" version of whatever cipher this is, so this apparent weakness and the ones which Matt has pointed out may not be that significant. Hal

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Re: EU Data Protection
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:13 PM 8/11/95, Derek Bell wrote: > I think you miss an important point; your opinion is subjective, but >data can relate to objective facts (e.g. credit records). Would you take the >same stance if a credit bureau claimed that you couldn't pay back half the >loans you took out? Any entity which purports to hold or provide "true" information but which hold flaky or incorrect information will suffer. This is true of credit agencies, advice columns, restaurant reviews, movie ratings, book reviewers, doctor rating agencies, and so on. I won't get into all of the aspects of reputations, but this is what we're talking about. And I'll concede that not all of these examples are equally important, or use the same objective quality of data. A credit rating agency is no doubt more important than a movie review agency--though arguably the damaging effects of Siskel and Ebert trashing "Waterworld" can be many orders of magnitude more than TRW Credit having an incorrect bad debt recorded. The point is that we do not have government to maintain the accuracy of movie reviews, of lawyer ratings, and so forth. Even if one accepts the "Fair Credit Reporting Act" (a U.S. law which I think is unconstitutional, as it tells me I cannot report certain kinds of facts), the European-style data privacy laws are a further step in a wrong direction. Think about it: the name "data privacy" sounds good, at first blush, but what it really means is that my records are not private, that my records are inspectable by government agents to see if I have stored any illegal facts or correlations. > What worries me about the *lack* of some form of data protection >legislation is that is allows someone to build up a database of information >which is a mishmash of truth, misunderstandings and lies. How would you feel if >"Concerned Citizens against Cryptography" compiled a list of all members >of this list, branding them as `dangerous, possibily criminal subversives'? Things like this happen all the time. This is just an opinion they happen to have. Would you make it a crime for "Concerned Citizens against Cryptography" to do a "who cypherpunks" of this list and to think we are "dangerous, possibly criminal subversives"? In the U.S. such judgements are made all the time. Doesn't make the judgements right, but rightness is not the basis of the freedom to hold and express these beliefs. >What if that opinion was spread to other databases? How about the police >investigating you because of this kind of database? "Spreading" the opinion to other databases is no big deal. The police investigating is a separate issue. Many of us think the police should be very careful about investigating for beliefs and opinions, but, in fact, it happens all the time. (It's happened to me, for example.) --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: IPSEC goes to RFC
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> sdw(a)lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) wrote: > > > I really like the idea of using DNS for (public I assume) keys... ghio(a)cmu.edu (Matthew Ghio) wrote: > I don't. > > Public keys in the DNS is a bad idea because it makes it difficult to > update the database, especially in large organizations. When a host's > key is issued or changed then they would have to get the nameserver > admin to change it for them. This could become a major problem/ > inconvenience for many, many people. The host should be able to give > its own key in response to a query. That key could, of course, be > signed by any number of trusted signators to guarentee authenticity. I also like the idea of DNS-based public key distribution, but what Matthew said is true. What about this: Let the DNS-Server export the address of a machine which runs the public-key-database for this domain, similar to the MX record for the mailserver. If you need the public key for a person identified by the email address or for a host identified by hostname or IP address, you could ask the DNS server where to get the public key. The database host could run any program suitable to local requirements and export public keys with a certain protocol... Hadmut

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TIM MAY IS A CYPHERWEENIE
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think we ought to just throw TIM MAY out of the list. let's EXCOMMUNICATE HIM. its becoming increasingly clear that he is the source of all our problems. I mean, isn't it obvious that our progress has stalled? who has written any code within the last 3 days? if we got rid of him, it would be EVOLUTION IN ACTION. this is ERIC HUGHES' mailing list, and eric hughes knows how to write some decent code. I mean, TCM's signature doesn't even have any geek code, and he hasn't changed it in 4 years or so, at least since my last grandparent died (and she was considerably more skillful at programming than TCM by knowing how to make toast). get rid of all the pricks who continually spout and spew conspiracy theories. let TCM go and find himself a new mailing list. that would be a fair comeuppance if he found that he couldn't learn to do squish because he doesn't have the slightest clue. he's a leech, a parasite, sucking on the work of others, pretending that he is at the forefront of our cause when he is only at the forefront of maniacal egomania. what has he contributed to the cause? SQUAT. just a lot of ranting about conspiracy theories and his Stock Pick of the Week crap. "the web is really growing. people should focus on it". well, THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. BRILLIANT COMMENTATOR AND VISIONARY, T.C.MAY, I would have never have THOUGHT of that in a zillion years, but now that you point it out, I GUESS YOU'RE RIGHT.

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Re: IPSEC goes to RFC
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Don Eastlake has actually done a draft RFC on using the DNS for key distribution. It may be found at ftp://ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-04.txt He briefed the W3C security working group about this recently, and a number of people raised objections, notably * database bloat * zone transfer bloat * increased hits on root servers due to a new class of inquiry. There was some discussion as to whether these were valid objections, and the people running prototype code said they had had no problems. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation trei(a)process.com

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Re: \"S1\" encryption system
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is it possible that there are multiple levels of encryption included in the "S1" algorithm? This question is prompted by reviewing the DoD's Multilevel Security (MLS) Program at: http://www.disa.mil/MLS/mls_home.html One of the features of this program is to design means to simultaneously transmit data with different levels of security, so that communicants send and/or read the data according to their levels of security clearance. This is amplified in Section 3 of the program description at: http://www.disa.mil/MLS/info/basics/sec3.html#2 Excerpts: Multilevel security allows information systems to provide capabilities that augment its existing single-level data processing and data communications services. Data of multiple security levels are processed and transferred by the system, which also separates the different security levels and controls access to the data. ... When a system operates in the multilevel mode, it allows data of two or more security levels to be processed simultaneously when not all users have the clearance, formal authorization, or need to know for all data handled by the system. The system is able to separate and protect the data according to these restrictions. To amplify the definition, an MLS system might process both Secret and Top Secret collateral data and have some users whose maximum clearance is Secret and others whose maximum clearance is Top Secret. Another MLS system might have all its users cleared at the Top Secret level, but have the ability to release information classified as Secret to a network consisting of only Secret users and systems. Still another system might process both Secret and Unclassified information and have some users with no clearance. In each of these instances, the system must implement mechanisms to provide assurance that the system's security policy is strictly enforced. In these examples, the policy allows access to the data by only those users who are appropriately cleared and authorized (e.g., having formal access approval) and who have an official need to know for the data. A related mode of operation is the partitioned mode, also known as compartmented mode. Although similar concepts and solutions are involved for compartmented mode operations as are for the multilevel mode, there is also a key difference. In the compartmented mode, all users have clearances for all the data processed but may not have authorizations for all the data; whereas for multilevel mode, some users may not even be cleared for the highest level. Because the compartmented mode is often envisioned for the intelligence community, all such users would have Top Secret security clearances and often authorizations for one or more, but possibly not all, compartments in the system. End excerpts. There are also descriptions of the soft and hardware implementations of MLS. Would anyone care to comment on how this differentiation of levels of security is done, by a single encryption program or multiples, and if multiples, their arrangement? Is feature then embedded in the hardware, such as the Fortezza card system cited in the program?

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Re: SSL bruting progress
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Will Kinney <kinney(a)bogart.colorado.edu> writes on cpunks: > > We've not managed to isolate the cause of it, as (two people) have > > nearly swept the entire keyspace (heh they had a bit of spare compute) > > and no key has been forthcoming so far. > > Um, if you're going to sweep the whole space yourself before you release > the code, what's the point in a public sweep? Surety. Nothing as disappointing as throwing all your spare compute joyfully into such a fun cpunk project, and then finding no key comes from it. Witness the RC4 bruting, which lots of folks thought fun, but unfortunately (well it should have been expected, and it was in part, as there were no specs, all we knew was microsoft said it was RC4 in some way, nothing more) no key. Also the private sweeping wasn't planned, just Eric Young said, hey I've started at 8000 I'll sweep up from there till you're ready. (Eric already had his own SSL bruting code). Then David Byers asked for a copy of Andrew Roos brute ssl to port to the maspar he has access to, and next thing he said, hey I got it working at 1.5M keys/sec and left it running, it'll reach Eric's start in a couple of days. As it turned out that they haven't found anything yet, their keysweeping is going to be very useful to figure out what's wrong. It's much harder to track down problems, accidentally unswept keyspace etc, when there are 100s of sweepers. Anyway, when we're as sure as we can be that it will work, we'll probably try to persuade Hal for another sample session. So that it will be a challenge, that we don't know the answer for. Perhaps it would be fun to have a regular key crunching ring set up once it's all verified, and proven to work. Part of the problem with this is the legal implications, you probably can't expect to get away with breaking SSL sessions no questions asked - give us a SSL session key startup and we'll brute it - at least not openly. A central key distribution point kind of blows this, as it gives legal beagles somebody to go after. The other key distribution architecture, is an unknown machine out there somewhere in cyberspace :-) Ie a blacknet style address and 2048 bit public key: brute(a)cyberspace.nil with a charge levied in anon digital cash. A sweepstake perhaps, he who hits the key first gets the anon digital cash remailed to him (tax free of course). An architecture resilient to interference on both legal and ill-meaning key-sweepers sides (the possibility exists for someone to reserve keyspace and not sweep it) is to just search randomly. Very simple architecture, but somewhat wasteful of resources, least likely to be detected, as there is less communication. One drop off of 'the session' to cpunks, and another of the result by the euphoric lucky person who happened to start in the right place. Adam -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED RSA TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ --rsa--------------------------8<------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) -------------------------------8<------------------------------- TRY: rsa -k=3 -n=7537d365 < msg | rsa -d -k=4e243e33 -n=7537d365

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Re: Australia, EU crypto ill news, crypto wars
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > a) Lobbying - hopeless IMO, they aren't interested in listening, the > > politicos are just too easy to manipulate and the "masses" aren't > > clueful enough of what crypto means to understand the implications, > > or even notice. > > The "masses" are not that clueless (remember the 80% against Clipper > in a US poll a year ago). It depends how it is packaged to the voter, if it is even presented at all (as you note below so much gets quitely swept through, and presented fait-a-compli once they've already signed some euro deal). The US at least makes a token of having public debate, I wouldn't be suprised to see little to no coverage of this in the UK for instance. If it was worded as 'government wants to force taps on all your phones' as presumably the clipper vote was, then you might get a reaction, but if it's worded as a way to keep tabs on all those evil child pornagraphs who teem in the countless millions on the internet, well it's not so eady to convince people. Some folks still have a mistaken belief that because that nice police man says that we need to do this to protect our children then it is so. Also note that Clipper wasn't completely quashed, Clinton elected to use it for government contractors, and government official business where crypto would be used, by presidential decree. Not a very democratic move, and still a ploy to get the thing accepted by misspent government money in creating a market for the things, and mandating it's use in defense contracting work for the government. > The problem 'here' in the EU is the smartly construed distance > between commons and rulers. We vote for members of a debate club > (who are very generously paid out of tax money) lacking any power > whatsoever. The EU decision on crypto-policy will emerge from closed > chambers of the Commission, and in every member country the local > politicians will announce that 'it has been decided by EU and there > is nothing we can do about it, even if we would like to'. Sure that's exactly the approach taken to ram these things down our throats with out public debate. > But this doesn't mean that national freedom-of-(crypto)speech > campaigns will be useless. Civil disobedience, still very common > amongst European citizens faced with ridiculous EU regulations, will > be more likely to thrive if the legitimacy of crypto regulations is > publically questioned in a continuous mode. Civil disobedience is a nice way to protest obvious nonsense, of course, but doesn't help financial institutions who will be by law required to use escrowed encryption with the AU govt holding the keys (in the case of the AU example government current line). Where's your privacy then? You must fight for it, whilst your very efforts are illegal, and these ludicrous laws can then be selectively enforced depending on the whims of some arbitrary power. > A significant difference between (for example) Sweden and USA is the > punishment scales. Suppose Sweden had an ITAR (which it > hasn't). Almost everyone would laughingly export PGP and Wei's > library anyway, because the remote possibility of prosecution > (assuming similarities with the current situation in the US) would > hardly feel like a threat. A conviction would result in a few 100$ > fine, maximum. Liveable, as you could view it as a 'freedom tax', but unjust. > An *enforced* ban on crypto in Scandinavia is remote enough that I'm > confident 'SuperStego for Windows' will be out in ver 7.3b by then. Well there's several issues: should they be allowed to do this (no way), and will they get away with it in the current level of crypto awareness (probably IMO), and will it be an effective deterrant (depends, the US one seems to keep US companies out of crypto, even though it has probably aided rather than hindered PGPs popularity), and is it enforceable (well ultimately no, due to good stego - your 'SuperStego for Windows' v 7.3b). If you're confidence in Swedens resistance to big brotheresque crypto regs is justified, well perhaps a bevy of political thought criminals will come live in Sweden to escape their own repressive regimes. Hows the job market for unix hackers? Adam -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED RSA TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ --rsa--------------------------8<------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) -------------------------------8<------------------------------- TRY: rsa -k=3 -n=7537d365 < msg | rsa -d -k=4e243e33 -n=7537d365

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Re: PRZ encrypted voice software release imminent
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:36 PM 8/11/95, Ray Cromwell wrote: > My question is, how portable is it, and does it work over TCP/IP rather >than just modem connections (I suggested this about a year ago)? My ideal >implementation would function on the following architectures: > >Unix: can be used through either /dev/tty?? or Socket (probably want >to use UDP). Works on Solaris, IRIX, AIX, NetBSD/FreeBSD/BSDI and Linux. >(audio devices are all proprietary) > > >Windows: uses Window's sound card device drivers, works via either >comport or WinSock > >Mac: uses Mac sound drivers, uses Mac modem port or MacTCP >From the "MacWeek" article, it initially runs on the Macintosh, using the sound capabilities built into (nearly) all Macs. Direct modem connections, with Internet versions to follow. (Windows to follow, too.) Sound quality with 9600 baud modems said to be pretty good, quality with 14.4 modems said to be very good, and quality with 28.8 modems said to be better than standard phone quality. The Mac may be a strange platform to develop on, to many of you, but it has some advantages. The sound tools are relatively standardized and are even built into the OS. Developers can thus count on what users will have. But why the developers actually picked the Mac to do first is something they can talk about. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: PRZ encrypted voice software release imminent
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:36 8/11/95, Ray Cromwell wrote: > My question is, how portable is it, and does it work over TCP/IP rather >than just modem connections (I suggested this about a year ago)? My ideal >implementation would function on the following architectures: I can't comment on the features of PGPFone. However, know that Internet telephony (as all "real time" services) work overe UDP only, not TCP. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Euro Comm Adopts Privacy Directive (NewsClip)
by nobody＠valhalla.phoenix.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

European Commission Adopts Privacy Directive Brussels, Aug. 11, -- The European Commission is now well on its way towards affording a high level of protection to personal data held on computer systems, following the formal adoption of a Directive on the protection of personal data, Newsbytes has learned. "I am pleased that this important measure, which will ensure a high level of protection for the privacy of individuals in all Member States, has been adopted with a very wide measure of agreement within the Council and European Parliament," said EC Single Market Commissioner Mario Monti, announcing the measure. According to Monti, the Directive will also help to ensure the free flow of information society services in the "Single Market" by "fostering consumer confidence and minimizing differences between member states' rules." "Moreover, the text agreed includes special provisions for journalists, which reconcile the right to privacy with freedom of expression," he said, adding that the member states must transpose the Directive within three years (i.e., write it into their own legislation), "but I sincerely hope that they will take the necessary measures without waiting for the deadline to expire so as to encourage the investment required for the information society to become a reality." Monti claims that the Directive will establish a "clear and stable" regulatory framework necessary to guarantee free movement of personal data, while leaving individual EU countries room for maneuver in the way the Directive is implemented. According to the Directive, free movement of data is particularly important for all services with a large customer base and depending on processing personal data, such as distance selling and financial services. In practice, however, banks and insurance companies process large quantities of personal data on such highly sensitive issues as credit ratings and credit-worthiness. If each member state had its own set of rules on data protection, for example, on how data subjects could verify the information held on them, cross-border provision of services, notably over the information superhighways, would be virtually impossible and this extremely valuable new market opportunity would be lost, the EC claims. According to the EC, the Directive aims to narrow divergences between national data protection laws to the extent necessary to remove obstacles to the free movement of personal data within the EU. As a result, any person whose data is processed in the EC will be afforded an equivalent level of protection of his rights, in particular his right to privacy, irrespective of the member state where the processing is carried out. The EC claims that, until now, differences between national data protection laws have resulted in obstacles to transfers of personal data between EC member states, even when these countries have ratified the 1981 Council of Europe Convention on personal data protection. This has been a particular problem, the EC notes, for multinational companies wishing to transfer data concerning their employees between their operations in different member states. According to the Commission, such obstacles to data transfers could seriously impede the future growth of information society services. The Directive establishes the principle of "fairness," so that a collection of data should be as transparent as possible, giving individuals the option of whether they provide the information or not. The Directive requires all data processing to have a proper legal basis. The legal grounds defined in the Directive are: consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interest of the data subject, and the balance between the legitimate interests of the people controlling the data and the people on whom data is held (i.e., data subjects). This balance gives member states room for maneuver in their implementation and application of the Directive, the Commission claims. Press & Reader Contact: European Commission, +32-299-1111 --

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Re: PRZ encrypted voice software release imminent
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, if it was a substantial improvement over the other "Internet Phone" stuff that's out there, and had a good way of dealing with switching, etc., then people would use it to make "free" l.d. phone calls on the net, and the cryptography would get a free ride. Generally, you are right in suggesting that anything that requires people to crawl behind their computers, attach new cables, purchase and debug a sound card under Windows, and generally engage in techno-weenie hardware manipulations will have less appeal than something plug and play. Even given the extremely user-hostile elements of PGP the software, I would be surprised if PGPFone became as popular.

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No Subject
by Bryan Strawser 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a previous message, Timothy C. May said... > > What is your working definition of "nym server"? There have been discussions concernign this before both on here and other mailing lists, such as remailer-operators. A nym server is an operation similar to anon.penet.fi, but more secure. Sameer has two of these operating now that uses PGP encrypted reply blocks and such. [omega.c2.org and alpha.c2.org, both of which use different operating methods] What John is attempting to do is have a nymserver like anon.penet.fi, where folks can create an alias and send/recieve mail/postings to it. However, unlike Julf's system, a secure nymserver would prevent the owner from being able to divulge who the real-life person is behind the alias because of the PGP encrypted reply block and other options involved. Bryan -- Bryan Strawser, Gondolin Technologies, Bloomington, IN USA Remember Waco feanor(a)gondolin.org Live free or die

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Bay Area Meeting This Weekend?
by Joe Thomas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm just about to fly out to San Francisco, and I realized that coming up is the second Saturday of the month, the traditional meeting time for the Bay Area Cypherpunks. I haven't seen any meeting announcements, so please e-mail me if there 's one scheduled (and if you can give a ride from S.F. if so!). I've just temporarily unsubscribed (I'll catch up on the archives when I return), so please cc me if you announce the meeting to the list. Thanks, Joe Thomas

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No Subject
by Rich Helton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

help <rich_helton(a)msmgate.mrg.uswest.com>

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Re: EU Data Protection
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 7:13 PM 8/11/95, Derek Bell wrote: >> I think you miss an important point; your opinion is subjective, but >>data can relate to objective facts (e.g. credit records). Would you take the >>same stance if a credit bureau claimed that you couldn't pay back half the >>loans you took out? There's a difference between what information you maintain for internal purposes and what information you give to other people. I don't really _care_ what nonsense a credit bureau may have in their internal records, only what they tell other people about me. If they somehow think I'm a bankrupt Communist space alien, but tell their credit-rating customers that my credit looks ok, it's not my business. If they use their own internal records to decide that _they_ don't want to lend me money, well, somebody else will get my business; it's in their interest to be accurate. A more interesting question is whether reporting credit transactions in private communications with their data customers constitutes libel if they inaccurately say bad things about me, and do I have a right to force them to tell me. Tim May thinks this kind of forced speech violates the US Constitution; I'm less bothered by laws telling corporations what to do (since corporations are fictional creations of the state) than by laws telling human-owned businesses or individual humans what to do. Tim May replies: >Think about it: the name "data privacy" sounds good, at first blush, but >what it really means is that my records are not private, that my records >are inspectable by government agents to see if I have stored any illegal >facts or correlations. Yeah. If you register your computer and its data with the Data Police, they have the right to inspect it. If you _don't register, that gives them reasonable suspicion to believe that you might have "illegally unregistered data" on the machine, so they have the power to inspect it. Kind of like proving you're not a witch.... #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- Storyteller makes no choice - soon you will not hear his voice. His job was to shed light, and not to master. RIP, Jerry

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