December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ACAPULCO H.E.A.T.
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, You won't believe what a chatterbox I'm going to be today. This is just the first of several posts I am planning. Of course, the most important must come first. This week's installment of Acapulco H.E.A.T. was the second part of a two-episode show called "Code Name: Stalemate." As you may recall, from last week, the story, set at a chess tournament in Venezuela, involved the attempted assassination of an ex-KGB spy named Andre by H.E.A.T.'s archenemy, Strake. I should mention that Andre was a dead ringer for Barry Goldwater (except with a bad Russian accent.) This week's episode hardly seemed connected to last week's. Strake is still holding Krissie hostage, but he seems more intent now on killing the entire H.E.A.T. The actor who plays Strake, a total megalomanic, completely chews the scenery in the worst case of over-acting I've seen in years. This, of course, leads to gratuitous gun play (God, women with guns make me so hot), a boat chase, an exploding boat and the inevitable climactic fist fight between the Good Guy and the Bad Guy. (The Good guy wins.) During the show we have Strake bugging H.E.A.T. HQ and shutting it down (again). Only this time Ashley breaks the "Kasporov algorithm" and breaks Stake's hold over the H.E.A.T. center AND infiltrates Strake's system. Strake also spoofs a phone call so that H.E.A.T. can't trace it. The Team uses small tracking devices to locate kidnapped members (they are discovered). I got some heat (pun intended) for not mentioning last week's bikini/Fabio ratio. When these episodes were make, Fabio was not part of the Team. They are all re-runs, so I don't know if he was part of the original cast and dropped later, or the other way around. Anyway, no Fabio. None of the principles were in bikinis, except for Krissie in the romantic flashback Marcos had while she was being held hostage by Strake. A number of beach background scenes were used, however, to pump up the bikini quotient. Finally, we did have a curious exchange between Tony and Cat in which he explained Zen. It had something to do with water and ice, but I guess I wasn't spiritual enough to grok it. IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT: My operatives are everywhere. Even as I write, one of them is on the trail of Alison Armitage .GIFs! If he is successful in bagging them, he will reveal his identity and make said .GIFs available to interested Cypherpunks. Stay tuned. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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CRYPTO ANARCHY/SOCIAL BODY
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Doug Cutrell offered some well thought out speculations on the social consequences of "crypto anarchy" in an essay he just posted to the list. I would like to respond to a few of his comments. Doug wrote: ... it is imperative that cypherpunks,... consider carefully what social impact these changes may have.... cypherpunks should examine ways to influence the deployment and patterns of use of strong crypto tools in society, and not merely consider the construction of the tools alone.... With all due respect, I think this has already been done by most Cypherpunks. We have looked at societal trends, seen problems, posited strong crypto as the solution to some of those problems and examined the consequences of strong crypto solutions. No one is writing code just to write code. The Cypherpunks list has always been ideologically driven. Though Cypherpunks cover the political spectrum, they have put aside sectarian differences to work towards the narrow ideology of personal privacy. At the same time, we have always thought about crypto "side effects." ... man is a social animal. We are evolved to survive through cooperative interactions with each other.... There are universal properties of interaction which create the social body in these species, and in all human societies throughout history. These properties depend fundamentally on the publicly visible nature of most social interactions.... Well, here I must disagree. While there is no disputing that man is a social animal, I find the last claim untenable. There are numerous historical forms of cooperative interaction that do not depend--"fundamentally" or otherwise--on a "publicly visible" interaction (e.g., postal mediated relationships, private clubs and other private relationships and most aspects of the market). Individual social animals exist in a relationship to the social body deriving from the visibility of their actions to others. This *defines* individuality.... While this is an interesting concept of individuality, it doesn't jive with any definition I've ever heard. If you were the only person on the planet, you would be just as much an "individual" (perhaps MORE so) than you are with 5.5 billion other folks blocking your view of the parade. ... Strong crypto -- the tools of crypto anarchy -- represents a break in these primal functions upon which the social body is based.... it is not only a first for human societies, but a first for all of biological evolution.... nodes -- "individuals" -- may appear and disappear over extremely short time periods, as anonymous identities come and go. All nodes may have any number of unknowable links, or links which are unknowable by arbitrarily large sections of the net. Links may have new properties, such as asymmetry of identity. Individual nodes may "unknowably" represent (equate with) entire collections of other nodes. The point is that the social structure is altered along dimensions that have been constant since the dawn of the evolution of social animals. Here is the crux of the matter. Doug obviously believes that crypto anarchy represents a paradigm shift or quantum leap in human interaction. I don't think so. every one of the "unique" properties Doug claimed existed for crypto anarchy already exists in the non-crypto society. I won't (unless asked) enumerate such analogs, but I will give two "clues" as an exercise for the student: John Paul Jones and Delaware corporations. [1] This picture implies the development of something radically different than what we now think of as a social body. [2] It is far more complex, with new types of basic components and operations. [3] There is no reason to expect it to resemble any society in the history of man, or to bear any resemblance to any social body which has evolved to date... [1] Only if the picture is correct, which has not been shown. [2] Granted, it is more complex, but really "new components" has yet to be demonstrated. [3] I most heartily disagree. Humans are conservative; when they make progress, it usually looks like an extension of what went before. (Ever notice how the first autos looked like buggies? Why do computer graphic interfaces use "desk" and "folder" metaphors?) There is *every* reason to expect crypto anarchy will resemble historical social models. ... For my purposes, desirable changes would include an increased standard of living for all humans, increased communications ... undesirable changes would include ... Crypto anarchy is coming whether we like it or not. With it, your hopes and fears are much more in your hands then they have ever been before. I hope we all use our super powers for good rather than evil. In any event, the cat is out of the bag. ... it seems that a reasonable approach would be to conduct computer simulations of the spontaneous forms of self organization that occur in populations participating under various game-theoretic and economic models, when these populations have access to strong crypto.... In my opinion (offered without a shred of proof), (1) it ain't gonna happen, (2) wouldn't work even if it did happen. In closing, I want to thank Doug for refocusing discussion of social implications in such organized and thoughtful way. I want to reiterate, this is not something that Cypherpunks have not thought about and discussed before. Nevertheless, it is always good to go over old ground if it can be done in a reasoned and comprehensive manner. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Thanks to Chris Hibbert for the clarification of his (her?) police stop scenario. The first impression would have constituted very bad advice for dealing with your friend, the policeman. In his second message, Chris wrote: ... you do have to give a name (and probably an address) when the police ask. Of course, it might be added that you have to give a *correct* name, address and whatever. In common law countries, such as the US and UK, this requirement might not be as unequivocal as one might think. What name would "John Wayne" (or "Bill Clinton" for that matter) have to give? Neither was born with those names. What if Paul Stubens(?) hadn't volunteered that he was "Pee Wee Herman" when he got busted for lewd conduct? Maybe he'd still be on TV in his Playhouse. ... When they do have probable cause, they can insist that you cooperate or allow a search. And if you don't cooperate, they can arrest you. "Probably cause" is not required for a police officers to make what is called a "field stop." The criterion for a field stop is "reasonable suspicion." During a field stop, an officer can hold on to you only as long as it takes to determine if there is probable cause to believe you have committed a crime (this could include checking to see if you have any wants or warrants). Incidental to the field stop, the officer is allowed to do a gross pat-down search of you and anything you are wearing or carrying. The purpose of this pat-down is solely to determine if you have weapons that would endanger the officer. They can't, for example, look inside an envelope (which might contain drugs), because it could not reasonably be expected to conceal a weapon such as a knife or gun. ... If you assume they always have the right to insist, you will spend more time talking to cops than you have to, and will let them dig deeper than they have a right to. The longer they poke around the better the chances they'll find something you thought of as innocent that they think is suspicious.... Amen, to that. When a cop asks if he can look in the trunk of your car, or take a look around your apartment, you can say "I'd rather not," and ask if you're free to go. **Remember that they have a gun** and the right to use it in some situations. Be polite. They'll let you know if they're insisting on your cooperation. Physical resistance is a very bad idea. But there's no need to let them look if they don't insist, and they are prohibiting from insisting if they don't have a legally justifiable reason. Dittos. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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CONTROL FREAKS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Samuel Kaplin responded to Duncan's assertion that markets have ways of dealing with uncertainty, by writing: The main assumption here is that the populous and the markets realize that they are in a totalitarian state. We in the U.S. are evolving closer and closer to this and most seem not to see it, and if they do, not to care about it. I think this misses Duncan's point. Neither the populace nor the market (the economic interactions of the populace) need to realize they are in a totalitarian state, to take appropriate action. What the market does "know" is how to shift capital from lesser to more remunerative investments. This is a homeostatic flow just like water seeking its own level. The senario that I see, is [1] the borders being closed.... [2] All of the firearms and weapons being removed from private hands.... [3] The U.S. economy being isolated from the rest of the world.... Once your economy is isolated from the rest of the worlds who cares what a dollar is worth.... [1] If they stopped foreign businesspeople and tourists, the economy suffers. Without Mexican "guest workers" the price of agricultural products go through the ceiling. The US can afford to close its boarders. [2] I'm a gun nut; I know gun nuts. If you want to see a civil war, just try to remove the *200 million* guns from private hands. Gun ownership is *growing* not declining. These folks are *serious* about keeping their weapons. Contrary to popular belief, most cops strongly support the rights of civilians to keep and bear arms. Who are you going to get to grab the guns? [3] The US economy is broad, but not that broad. Without world trade (especially for petroleum) we would grind to a halt. In the meantime, the billions of people who depend on food grown in America would not quietly lay down and starve. The government can, of course, call a dollar whatever it wants. The more unrealistic the assessment, however, the faster black markets will bloom in the "alternative economy." S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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"Packet Sniffers"
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this is probably the wrong forum, but I also know that the quality of hte people here is ample to get my question answered. I am an undergraduate student at a state university in Minnesota. This summer as part of a long-term independent study I set up a Linux machine on the campus ethernet, get it assigned an IP, and then proceeded to do a practicum on system administration and information management. (This is also the same machine that briefly rand the digested version of the Cypherpunks mailing list). Following some departmental conflicts and (IMHO) illegal sanctions, the machine was shut down for some unspecified "security concerns". Essentially, it turns out, the computer science department didn't was this kind of independent project around. So I trundled across campus to another college, got the proper faculty behind me and submitted for the continuance of the project. After three weeks of jumping through the correct hoops and over the correct hurdles, there appears to be only one "concern" remaining. Some junior computer administrator has raised the concept of "packet sniffers" as being a suitable bar for my project (the machine is a 486/66 Linux machine). Unfortunately, I haven't a clue what exactly a "packet sniffer" is and am really not in a position to answer the arguments in even a semi-informed manner. Thus, I am posting here in the hope that one or more of you can take a moment to give me the lowdown on what these things are. Common sense seems to indicate that it is a piece of software or firmware that will display the contents of any packets that pass through the machine on its way to the correct destination. The specific setup would have the machine on a thinnet link in a lab with about 20 other PCs which are used primarily as word processors and terminals to the campus VAX or UNIX machines. The specific upstream setup is unknown, but I assume there is some kind of a line to a router upstream, eventually winding its way into the real world. It seems to me that a packet sniffer on the lowest link of the network wouldn't be able to look at those packets passing upstream because the router would never pass them down, but I could be just plain wrong and thats why I'm asking for some clarification. Thanks for your help. Sorry if this seems confusing. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or anyone else -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 2.1) GJ/CM d- H-- s-:++>s-:+ g+ p? au+ a- w++ v* C++(++++) UL++++$ P+>++ L++$ 3- E---- N+++ K+++ W M+ V-- -po+(---)>$ Y++ t+ 5+++ j R+++$ G- tv+ b+ D+ B--- e+>++(*) u** h* f r-->+++ !n y++**

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How to Handle Corrections/Additions to Cyphernomicon
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks all for the responses to the Cyhernomicon. Some people have begun to send corrections, clarifications, elaborations, etc., and others have asked me what _form_ such points shold be made in, e.g., should they list the "16.3.1" section numbers, etc.? So here are some points: 1. By all means send corrections, etc., as I said in the docs (the Release Note). 2. Include a *fragment of text* you are responding to. This will allow me to grep for the fragment or keyword and thus make the changes. 3. The section numbers ("13.9.1") are *NOT* useful, as they change automatically everytime I rearrange material. (By the way, I only chose to number the stuff out to 3 levels..."MORE" will do it to any number of levels, or mix in bullets, stars, Roman numbers, etc.) 4. If you think some points ought to be publically discussed, use your judgement and, then, go ahead and do so. Obviously I didn't intend the FAQ as a static, undiscussable document. (There are themes in it that don't get enough discussion, and that need discussion.) --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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They Know How Many Letters You Send
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I stopped to get money at an ATM for my bank (Wells Fargo) this morning, and there were little flyers littering the area informing me that I can now purchase stamps there, just as easily as I can get money. There was no surcharge for the convienience. I instantly saw visions of new junkmail. "Since you are such an active user of the postal service, we'd like to offer you this wonderful automatic stamp licker for only..." And then I thought of that data building up somewhere, in a creaky database somewhere, and heard the dialog "Citizen IYTC804HI3 has purchased 845 stamps to date this year and isn't a registered home business owner. Red Flag." Maybe I'm getting cranky and paranoid in my old age.

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"The Book of Encyphered Names"
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Somebody asked me what the name "Cyphernomicon" means, another said it was not at all an obscure reference. And another asked if I was claiming that encyption is in some way "evil." I merely borrowed the name from the original "Cyphernomicon," also called "The Book of Encyphered Names." It came to us early this century via the Black Russian anarchist Peter Krypotkin, who had obtained his copy from Sheik Ibn al-Taz Khallikak, the Pine Barrens Horror. It apparently originated in ancient Sumeria, where the cuneiform writing lent itself to encypherment, and spread from the gates of Ishtar to the back alleys of Damascus. A knock-off of it was done by the Mad Arab Al-hazred, and translated by John Dee (better known for his work with Kool John Dee and the Rappin' Cryps). The Cyphernomicon was apparently the basis for the crypto system used by King Solomon for his "Keys of Solomon" (Solomon-Strasser primality test). The original manuscript is on display in the Crypto Museum in Twenty-Nine Primes, California (a few miles from the NSA SIGINT post at Zzyzx). I got this information from my friend Klaus! von Future Prime. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cyphernomicon in compressed forms
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've put two versions of the FAQ up in compressed forms, labelled "compressed" and "gzipped" (with the .Z and .z suffixes). These can be handled in the normal way, with "uncompress" (at your end) and "gunzip" at your end (I'm not sure the trick of forcing the gunzip at my end will work, with the chmod bits I set...that's a reason I left it in uncompressed form). I'm doing this because someone said their VAX won't take files bigger than 1 MB. This may help, as the compressed files are around 450K each. But please don't ask me for other versions. In particular, I can't help the CompuServe users, etc. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: CONTROL FREAKS
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From 1) Samuel Kaplin & 2) Sandy Sandfort: The senario that I see, is [1] the borders being closed.... [2] All of the firearms and weapons being removed from private hands.... [3] The U.S. economy being isolated from the rest of the world.... [1] If they stopped foreign businesspeople and tourists, the economy suffers. Without Mexican "guest workers" the price of agricultural products go through the ceiling. The US can[not] afford to close its borders. [2] . . . Gun ownership is *growing* not declining. These folks are *serious* about keeping their weapons. . . . . [3] The US economy is broad, but not that broad. Without world trade (especially for petroleum) we would grind to a halt. . . . ...................................................................... ........... Although I can't see the US arriving at Samuel's scenario completely, neither can I prevent from seeing the threat which does rear its ugly head; the trend is towards the proposal & acceptance of more controls. It may not succeed 100%, but still there is an intervening time to consider during which the "legislators" attempt to accomplish just these things. 1) The suffering of the economy has not stopped the big G in the past from preventing "guest workers" or others from crossing the borders, or at least giving them & their US employers a hard time in the process. 2) Gun ownership may be increasing (among the "inner city youth" mostly, it appears sometimes), but nevertheless there are many other groups building up their campaigns against the possession of certain weapons and against "violence" per se. 3) There are always groups in govmt & private industry who wish for protection against the vicissitudes of world trade problems; if it were not for the efforts of those who constantly oppose them it is conceivable that the US could be closed to most areas of trade (even if only temporarily, until the pain becomes too great). It isn't conceivable that the US would ever become 100% isolated and totalitarian, but it is true that there are many people who would support such measures as would arrive at that stage eventually, if they could have their way. Sandy & others (including myself) may be able to reason that it wouldn't work to do such-and-such, because of the adverse consequences and because it wouldn't make economic sense, but it doesn't follow logically that the members of Congress & their supporters will also reason along the same lines. Unfortunately I am constantly reading in the news that just such restrictive, constraining ideas and interests are being proposed in Congress and applauded by private groups. I think that there may be a big tug-of-war between the growing contrasts in the political/philosophical inclinations of the citizenry of the US. The lines between them are becoming more clearly demarcated (to myself, anyway). (Oh - and of course, there will be a role in there, in between, for crypto, what with all the secret messages they will all want to send to each other.) Blanc

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Re: Running PGP on Netcom
by SAMUEL.KAPLIN＠warehouse.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: Running PGP on Netcom (an >> But keeping it on your home machine, the bad guys could break into your >> house, set up a keyboard monitoring program, and get it that way. Or if >> they wanted to, grab you and force you to reveal your key. It's highly doubtful that they could physically get to my computer without my knowledge. I service alarms for a living. I work for the company who monitors my alarm. I am the only person who knows the specs on my alarm. It would be pretty tough to conceal a court order to suspend the monitoring from me. Someone would tip me off. Plus the system will communicate with me via 2 other methods that no one knows about. Pretty doubtful. >> It's not black and white. There are degrees of security. I keep my >> encrypted secret key on dunx1, a UNIX box used by many other people. >> Anyone who has the ability to can either watch my keystrokes, probe throug >> memory to retrieve my key or message, or probably a few other things I >> haven't thought of. The benefit, though, of being able to decode messages >> as soon as I receive them, and being able to send encrypted messages when >> I'm not at home is major. For me at least, it's a fair trade-of I guess it depends on your level of paranoia or guilt. :) If I was just putzing around with the software, then I wouldn't be too concerned. If I was actually doing something illegal or confidential with the software then I would be greatly concerned. But under no circumstances would I consider that arrangement secure. If the cops nail this guy, he has no one to blame but himself. He hanged his own ass. >> There isn't anything I send right now that I would find particularly >> embarassing should it become public knowledge. If I did get into that >> situation, I'd probably create a second key pair for use only at home, and >> keep both in use. Then you have the possibility of people sending you secure messages on a compromised key. (The one on the Unix Box) In most cases, its not the technology that nails you, it's human error. Take for example the recent Tiffany's robbery. The police hadn't a clue who pulled it off. I heard statements of grudging praise from many members of the NYPD police department. It was very close to the perfect robbery. They received a tip from a citizen that someone was selling rings matching the description of the stolen merchandise on the street. They busted this individual and he sang. If they would have left the goods sit for a couple of years, they would have gotten away with it. Human stupidity compromised the whole operation. >> The bad guys will almost always be able to get your key. Even if they hav >> to get you to get it. The goal is to raise the difficulty such that they >> aren't willing to do it. This is probably true, but in most cases they won't have to take it from you. Somehow someone will screw up and hand it to them on a silver platter. Instead of John the Baptist's head, its yours! ;{ --BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5pUekAAAEEAKrDj64Zj9AJU+gC7/Ivdk8b1ef6a1T9K5CGFeu1yFDSXLyD DLIdGunZR/4ilosLMxdlZcNqPwZ3HgxL+Gk3y2SwYfqKpeWExWPgb696lgzf2BRC tED15ZAwi3UDIkcouv2PBiDwPNUUmnLb5diDXdA3qtALb+XzlwpnimeWAf3FAAUT tCFTYW11ZWwgS2FwbGluIDwrMSAoNjEyKSA1MzAtNzMxNj6JAJUCBRAuaVLjQqfV nzRSzxkBAcXuA/47yIN+sltMyIRqCgUZz/gubdI6LUcpFsTcXsFWppROpAWFPJv0 J9z/UoP1kjJ+nrAAizuKuhmC5eg5OOxUE+tUgSPl6hAtu2xJYmKtCbQpxF0sG8ni 4e8I8Zsk5vcopO5Vub96CiVgPjI5vITCb32kcLKI1yyFaztbHdtOasUthg== =M8Dh --END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== Processed by WILDUUCP! v1.00 for WILDCAT! ===========================================================================

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Re: E.C.T.
by macorp!moonlight!ken＠uu4.psi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First, I like the idea of running important social engineering experiments, like ECT, in cyber-simulations. It gives pretty realistic feedback. But Second, I worry about discovering clever ways to "charge" the play money for general internet services. This will condition people to accept paying in all kinds of novel ways for services that were once freely available. After that, the folks who are trying to figure out how to charge for internet use the way phone companies charge will find little resistance from the net users. Ken

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Re: reputation credit 1-3
by macorp!moonlight!ken＠uu4.psi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In my varied experience with performance appraisals, I have found that one person's "respect 50%" is another person's "respect 90%". Collecting reputation endorsements from many people would have to include this wide margin of error. In practice, when the reputation system reached critical mass, it would develop a norm for how much to trust the average respect number. In fact, the stabilization of this reputation norm is one criterion for reaching the critical mass. Ken

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Re: PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by No Taxes through No Government 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, physical resistance to authority is, more often than not, a bad idea, and hopefully most of us know why (even if you're right and even if you're being attacked, they're not above planting a gun/drugs/other thing on you to justify beating/killing you). But the Supreme Court has said, most emphatically, that there is no "requirement to identify oneself", regardless of whether an officer has probable cause to stop and question the individual. Brown v. Texas, 443 US 47 (1979). I'd repost the relevant excerpts from this great case again if I hadn't already posted it so many times to so many different fora. Suffice it to say, regardless of whatever else may be at issue, the "ruling establishment" (i.e., the highest legal authority in the country) has stated that there is no requirement to identify oneself. Just had to get that off my chest. We now return you to our regularly scheduled stuff.

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Re: "The Book of Encyphered Names"
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Somebody asked me what the name "Cyphernomicon" means, another said it >was not at all an obscure reference. And another asked if I was >claiming that encyption is in some way "evil." > >I merely borrowed the name from the original "Cyphernomicon," also >called "The Book of Encyphered Names." It came to us early this >century via the Black Russian anarchist Peter Krypotkin, who had >obtained his copy from Sheik Ibn al-Taz Khallikak, the Pine Barrens >Horror. This book can't exist because Arthur Clarke proved that the world would end when all "Nine Billion Names of God" were listed. Of course, he didn't deal with the technical point of what would happen if they were encrypted. If the nine billion names were merely a list of all possible combinations of a certain length of a certain alphabet, then the encrypted list should be equal to the regular list if the encryption carries the set in an arc that is one-to-one and onto itself. I.e. automorphic. But I seem to remember that the monks in the list had certain rules about the combinations of their letter. That would make it still a very interesting question of what would happen if the 9 billion names came out encrypted. If no one knew the key, then the world is still safe. But what if one guy knows the key? What if that guy is a mute? What if he's merely an obstreperous hermit? What if he sets out to decrypt the list for his own personal communion with G*d? (Is my email listing the common "G*d" bringing us one step closer to glory or one step closer to destruction?) What if he has access to the neat Cray/SRC machine about which I carried on so intently? So many questions! (?)

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Distribution of FAQ to CompuServe, American Online, etc.
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've had two messages this afternoon asking if people could/should post the Cyhernomicon on AOL and CompuServe. I replied in a negative way to each request, but maybe I need to explain further. My "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" has been spread to many boards. Which is good, I guess. What's not good in this electronic age is dealing with the dozen or so messages I get in most weeks asking questions, challenging the assumptions, requestiing explanations of terms like "MIPS" and "ISDN," etc. ("Like, dewd, anarchy is like cool..heh heh heh" or "I'm writing a paper for my Poli Sci class and I have some questions...") I just don't have the time to do this kind of "outreach." Some of them I tell about the Cypherpunks list--some of you may've joined via this sort of thing--but others I just thank, telling them I can't engage in a letter-writing process with them. Back to CompuServe and AOL. The FAQ I wrote has a lot of Cypherpunks-centric material in it, and is not intended as an "outreach" document (as, say, some short libertarian books by Hazlitt and Karl Hess were intended to be). I don't even plan to announce it on Usenet, so announcing it on CompuServe, AOL, etc., seems like a bad idea. On the other hand, putting it on these services and then announcing it only to Cypherpunks is OK...just another distribution channel. But don't advertise it to non-Cypherpunks, for these reasons. I just can't handle the questions that would arise. I hope you all can understand this. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cnet's stance on content filters
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 25 Jul 1997 12:48:48 -0400 From: Lauren Gelman <gelman(a)acm.org> To: declan(a)well.com Subject: Cnet's stance on content filters >Date: Wed, 23 Jul 1997 17:40:12 -0400 >To: chris_barr(a)cnet.com >From: Lauren Gelman <gelman(a)acm.org> >Subject: Cnet's stance on content filters >Cc: >Bcc: >X-Attachments: > >with regard to: http://www.cnet.com/Content/Voices/Barr/072197/index.html > >First, I think there are a number of problems inherent in any content >filtering system, some of which you discuss in your column. > >Given that, I think the main problem with the Internet Content Coalition >approach is how, and who, will determine what is a "real news >organization" is and what "bona fide news sites" are. Is this the job of >the ICC? You completely ignore this issue both in the column and on the >ICC web site. What are the criteria that categorize Cnet as a "news >organization? Would EPIC and the ACLU (cited in your column) also fall >under that category? What about listservs where news is disseminated? > >The U.S. Public Policy Office for the Association for Computing (USACM) >web site http://www.acm.org/usacm disseminates news about computer policy >related issues as well as USACM position pieces on those issues. It also >archives back- issues of the "ACM Washington Update", a bi-weekly >electronic newsletter. Is the USACM web site a "bona fide news sites"? > >I believe these are important questions which need to be addressed before >Cnet endorses any content-filtering approach to censorship. "Privilege" >needs to be defined before Cnet or any other group can seek "to make sure >that only real news organizations claim this privilege." > > >-Lauren Gelman >Associate Director >USACM > > /\ /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/ Association for Computing, + http://www.acm.org/usacm/ Office of U.S. Public Policy * +1 202 544 4859 (tel) 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 302 B * +1 202 547 5482 (fax) Washington, DC 20003 USA + gelman(a)acm.org

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RC4
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been out of e-mail range for a while, so some of sci.crypt has fallen off the back end of my host. And I don't read the full Cypherpunks feed. So some of these may be dumb questions, but they're mine and I would like them answered. Does anyone know if this is really RC4? Has anyone compiled it to see if it will run? Has anyone tried to use it to decrypt messages encrypted with some commercial RC4 program? I see that it has been posted anonymously. Was it posted to Cypherpunks only, or did it also get on sci.crypt? If not, did someone from Cypherpunks, anonymously or not, crosspost it to sci.crypt? Has there been any reaction from anybody? RSADS? NSA? NIST? I just sent a copy of Bidzos asking for comment. This seems to be a REALLY GOOD THING, but I would like some verification that it is not a hoax. Inquiring minds want to know. Bruce

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Boulder, Colorado RMIUG Crypto-Fest 9/13 6:30pm
by Michael Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- What: Rocky Mountain Internet User's Group (RMIUG) Crypto-Fest When: Tuesday 13 September 1994 7:00pm-9:00pm, cookies at 6:30pm Where: NCAR (West end of Table Mesa Drive), Boulder, COLORADO Who: Philip Dubois (Philip Zimmermann's lawyer and a very nice guy) and Mike Johnson (alledged crypto expert, designer of the Diamond Encryption Algorithm, PGP beta tester, and PGP user). Sorry, Philip Zimmermann had a change of plans and will be at a conference in Atlanta. The show must go on! RMIUG "Crypto-Fest" A users approach to encryption with PGP (Pretty Good Privacy): I. A Very Short History of Cryptography A. Single Key Systems B. Two Key Systems (Public Key Cryptography) C. Hash Functions (MD4, MD4, SHA) D. What can be done with encryption? II. Current crypto applications III. PGP Building Blocks A. Public Key Algorithm (RSA) B. Hash function (MD5) C. Symmetric Key Algorithm (IDEA) D. Compression engine (Info-ZIP) E. ASCII armor engine F. Key database G. File formats IV. What can PGP do? What are its advantages? A. Privacy B. Authentication with nonrepudiation C. Compression (ZIP) D. ASCII armor C. Distributed Key Management (the Web of Trust) D. Inter-platform compatibility E. Wide availability F. Source code available (except for Viacrypt Digi-Sig) G. Ease of use (best around, but could be better) V. Who uses PGP? What do they use it for? VI. How do you use PGP? Read the fine manual. 2 books coming. A. Getting PGP B. Installing PGP C. Generate your key D. Distribute your public key E. Add keys from your correspondents E. Signing messages F. Encrypting messages (public key method) G. Conventional encryption pgp -c VII. History/development of PGP & Legal Issues A. Why did Philip Zimmermann write pgp? B. Legal Issues C. Version History VIII. What's happening now? A. Legal Actions & Status B. Political Action C. Future Development Plans There will be opportunities to ask questions of the two panelists during and after the presentation. ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAgUBLnUoSPX0zg8FAL9FAQE6nAQAmWpomcfCcWslktsuRYPNotY8kJFOwiuL BUrh5L/UbCnM8L9Gh36CF2PGjrwuxDLhlySc70yhAGpBuMijWryTk0mPcJVKDoDm 6Z9v+L0Xs4Ql2kTshYpiJg5DlUd7CKsuREN0r07xJUMybudUXM8NLUG9YGvDz4CX tIGH4nlDAS4= =Qedh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Spatial Databases, Law, and Information Policy conference
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded-by: Lee Tien <tien(a)well.sf.ca.us> Forwarded-by: thardy(a)mail.wm.edu (Trotter Hardy) From: Harlan Onsrud <onsrud(a)mecan1.maine.edu> Date: Thu, 8 Sep 1994 11:10:08 -0400 Subject: Conf on Law, Information Policy and Spatial Databases THE CONFERENCE on LAW and INFORMATION POLICY for SPATIAL DATABASES October 28-29, 1994 Arizona State University College of Law Tempe, Arizona SPONSORS National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis Center for the Study of Law, Science and Technology, Arizona State University College of Law CONFERENCE OVERVIEW Geographic information systems (GIS) and their associated databases are gaining widespread use throughout government and the commercial sector in our communities, the nation, and the world. These automated mapping and analysis systems are allowing the collection, integration and interrogation of vast amounts of data. The data and processing capabilities supplied by the technology will constitute a significant component of the emerging national information infrastructure. This enabling technology holds out the promise of increased efficiency in commerce, improvements in the environment, health, and safety, increased convenience for consumers, increases in participatory government, and improved public and private decision-making generally. However, increased use of detailed databases and processing capabilities also poses threats to the ideals of democracies and rights of individuals - the ideals of freedom, security, privacy, and open and free access to government. As we continue to move toward global economies and international networked environments, the need to reconcile competing social, economic, and political interests in digital geographic data will greatly expand. This conference brings together legal and information policy experts with geographic information system specialists to explore four interrelated aspects of information law critical to the handling of geographic information: namely, (1) intellectual property rights in spatial databases, with particular emphasis on copyright; (2) access rights of citizens to publicly held information, including the policies of government agencies in charging for geographic data; (3) protecting personal privacy in using geographic information systems; and (4) liability in connection with the use, sharing, and distribution of GIS data and analysis results. PRELIMINARY PROGRAM Friday, October 28 Welcome and Introduction (7:45 am - ASU Law School, Pedrick Great Hall) Access to Government's Spatial Information I (8:00 a.m.) Moderator: Robert Reis, NCGIA and School of Law, SUNY-Buffalo Establishing a Legal Setting and Organizational Model for Affordable Access to Government Owned Information Management Technology Hugh Archer, Executive Consultant Plangraphics, Inc., Frankfurt, Kentucky A Case for Commercialization of Government Information Products and Services Lori Peterson Dando, Esquire County Attorney's Office (former), Hastings, MN Spatial Databases and Information Policy: A British Perspective David Rhind, Director Ordnance Survey, United Kingdom Question and Answer Session Intellectual Property Rights in Spatial Databases I (9:00a.m.) Moderator: Helen Sharretts-Sullivan, Office of the General Counsel, Defense Mapping Agency Copyright, Licensing, and Cost Recovery: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis William Holland, Executive Director Wisconsin Land Information Board, Madison, WI Surveyors' Copyright in Plans of Survey: Law and Policy John D. McLaughlin, Geographical Engineering and Norman Siebrasse, College of Law, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton Canada Copyright in Electronic Maps Dennis S. Karjala College of Law, Arizona State University Question and Answer Session Break (Coffee, tea, etc.- College of Law Lobby) (10:00 am) Intellectual Property Rights in Spatial Databases II (10:30 am) Moderator: Elaine Albright, Chair, American Library Association Committee on Telecommunications Rights in Government-generated Data Jessica Litman School of Law, Wayne State University Lessons from the Past: Legal and Medical Databases Anne Wells Branscomb Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University European Community Directive on Databases Pamela Samuelson School of Law, University of Pittsburgh Question and Answer Session Access to Government's Spatial Information II (11:30 a.m.) Moderator: Dorthy Chambers, J.D., Chief, Branch of Information Access Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Land Management A Review of Alaska's Public Information Access Laws Representative Kay Brown Alaska Legislature, Anchorage, Alaska Issues Concerning Access to Electronic Records Barbara Petersen, Staff Attorney Florida Legislature Joint Committee on Information Technology Resources Federal Information Dissemination and Pricing Policy Peter Weiss, Senior Policy Analyst Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. Question and Answer Session Lunch (12:30 pm - Several eating places within walking distance) Access to Government's Spatial Information III (2:00 pm) Moderator: Earl Epstein, J.D., School of Natural Resources, Ohio State University Effects of Data Policies on the Evolution of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure Nancy Tosta, Staff Director U.S. Federal Geographic Data Committee The Public Interest and the Cost of Government Information: Experience Under the Federal FOIA David Sobel, Legal Counsel Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington D.C. Promoting a Free Access, Minimal Cost-recovery, Royalty Arrangement for State Held Geographic Information Systems Keene Matsunaga, Esquire, and Jack Dangermond, President, Environmental Systems Research Institute and Prudence Adler, Assistant Director, Association of Research Libraries Question and Answer Session Access to Government's Spatial Information IV (3:00 p.m.) Moderator: Frederick K. Ganyon, J.D., Deputy Chief, Nautical Charting Division, NOAA The Value of Geographic Information. A review of international policies in cost recovery, privatization and commercialization of information gathering and dissemination. Krysia Rybaczuk and Michael Blakemore Mountjoy Research Centre, University of Durham, United Kingdom Remote Sensing Law: Obstacle or Opportunity for GIS? Joanne Gabrynowicz, Associate Professor - Remote Sensing Law and Policy Department of Space Studies, University of North Dakota Implications of Increased Access to Geographic Information Dr. Ronald Abler, Executive Director Association of American Geographers Question and Answer Session Break (4:00 p.m. - coffee, tea, soft drink - College of Law lobby) Liability for Spatial Data I (4:30 p.m.) Moderator: Daniel Strouse, Director, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology, ASU College of Law Tort and Criminal Liability as a Function of the Right to Control Content Henry Perritt, Professor of Law Villanova University School of Law Local Government Liability for Erroneous Data: Law and Policy in a Changing Environment R. Jerome Anderson, Esquire, and Alan R. Stewart, Esquire Plangraphics, Inc., Frankfurt, Kentucky A Case Study in the Misuse of GIS: Siting a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility in New York State Mark Monmonier, Department of Geography Syracuse University Question and Answer Session Saturday, October 29 Liability for Spatial Data II (8:00 a.m.) Moderator: t.b.a. Liability for GIS Datasets as applied to the Commercial, Non- profit and Other Private Sectors Bishop Dansby, Esquire GIS Law and Policy Institute Exploitation of Intellectual Property: Liability, Retrenchment and a Proposal for Change Edward J. Obloy, General Counsel, and B. Helen Sharretts- Sullivan, Defense Mapping Agency Certification of GIS Databases: Reliance and Liability Implications Lawrence Ayers, Executive Vice President and Cliff Kottman, Exec. Manager of Federal Systems, Intergraph Corporation Spatial Data Analysis in the Formation of Public Policy and its Acceptance as Evidence: A Litigator's Perspective on Geographic Information and Analysis Terry Simmons, PhD, Attorney at Law Reno, Nevada Question and Answer Session Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems I (9:15 a.m.) Moderator: Lawrence Winer, College of Law, ASU In Plain View: Geographic Information Systems and the Problem of Privacy Michael R. Curry Department of Geography, UCLA Privacy and the Intersection of Geographic Information and Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems Sheri Alpert and Kingsley Haynes The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University Privacy: Alternative Protection Scenarios Dr. David Flaherty Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia Question and Answer Session Break (10:15 - Coffee, tea, juice & rolls - College of Law Lobby) Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems II (10:45 am) Moderator: t.b.a. Fair Information Practices of the Information Industry Steven Metalitz Information Industry Association, Washington DC Marketing Community Perspectives on Protecting Privacy Tom Gordon, President and General Manager Equifax National Decision Systems, San Diego CA European Perspectives on Protection of Privacy Charles D. Raab, Department of Politics University of Edinburgh, Scotland Question and Answer Session Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems III (11:45 a.m.) Moderator: t.b.a. Some Information Age Techno-fallacies and Some Principles for Protecting Privacy Gary Marx, Chair Department of Sociology, University of Colorado-Boulder Protecting Indigenous Peoples' Privacy from "Eyes in the Sky" Wayne Madsen Computer Sciences Corporation, Fairfax, VA Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems Harlan J. Onsrud, Jeff Johnson, and Xavier Lopez NCGIA, University of Maine, Orono, Maine Question and Answer Session Closing Announcements (12:45 p.m.) ****************************************************** REGISTRATION FORM Maximum registration will be 250 participants NO ON-SITE REGISTRATION [ ] Full Registration (before October 3) $145 (after October 3) $195 [ ] Student Registration $70 Name: __________________________________ Title: ___________________________________ Affiliation: ______________________________ Address: ________________________________ ________________________________________ ________________________________________ ________________________________________ Phone: __________________________________ FAX: ___________________________________ Email: __________________________________ Make check payable (in US dollars) to: University of Maine and send to: Conference on Law and Information Policy for Spatial Databases NCGIA 5711 Boardman Hall, Rm. 348 University of Maine, Orono, Me 04469-5711 ****************************************************** LOCATION & TRANSPORTATION The conference will take place on October 28 and the morning of October 29, 1994 in the Pedrick Great Hall at the Arizona State University College of Law. The conference has been scheduled to follow immediately GIS/LIS '94 in Phoenix, Arizona. Those attending GIS/LIS and then staying on for this conference should be able to take advantage of reduced airfares because of the Saturday night stay over. The College of Law in Tempe is located approximately ten miles from downtown Phoenix or five miles from the airport. Taxis and hotel shuttles are convenient and moderately priced. For those traveling by car, take the University Avenue exit on Interstate 10 and head east to the ASU campus. The campus is immediately adjacent to Old Town Tempe which contains numerous restaurants and shops within easy walking distance. COOPERATING ORGANIZATIONS American Bar Association Section of Science and Technology American Congress on Surveying and Mapping American Society of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing AM/FM International Association of American Geographers Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Federal Geographic Data Committee Information Industry Association National States Geographic Information Council Urban and Regional Information Systems Association CONFERENCE SUPPORTERS Federal Agencies: Bureau of Land Management Coast and Geodetic Survey Defense Mapping Agency Federal Geographic Data Committee Environmental Systems Research Institute Equifax National Decision Systems Intergraph Corporation FOR FURTHER INFORMATION Conference on Law and Information Policy for Spatial Databases 5711 Boardman Hall, Rm 348 University of Maine, Orono, Maine 04469-5711 Phone: (207) 581-2149 Fax: (207) 581-2206 E-mail: ncgia(a)mecan1.maine.edu ___________________________________________ Harlan J. Onsrud National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis 5711 Boardman Hall, Rm. 348 University of Maine Orono, Maine 04469-5711 Phone (207) 581-2175 FAX (207)581-2206 E-mail: onsrud(a)mecan1.maine.edu

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Re: "Packet Sniffers"
by Oluf Bagger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You should tell the staff at your campuss that a Linux box is no greater threat than any of those PC's used for word processing. A packet sniffer can hide itself as a resident program on a doze box and collect data into a data file. Such a program can be installed by any user on the doze box or even spread as a virus. On a Linux box only root programs have access to the ethernet driver. Any packet sniffer programs can therefore only be installed by root. On a Linux box you only allow access to known users and you have log files stating when users have logged in and out. If the machine have been abused in some way you can trace the problem using the log files. Best Regards, Oluf -------------------------------------------------------------------- Oluf Bagger, Eurochip DTU. tlf: +45 4593 3332 lok. 5722 fax: +45 4593 0216

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RC4
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It occurs to me that if the code has not been posted to sci.crypt, then some cypherpunks reader outside the US/Canada should do so. Bruce

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Re: RC4
by HALVORK＠sofus.hiof.no 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It occurs to me that if the code has not been posted to sci.crypt, then >some cypherpunks reader outside the US/Canada should do so. > >Bruce Ops... I never saw this original posting. Could somebody please re-post it? Please include RC4 in the Subject. - Halvor Kise jr. (from Norway (

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RC4 Source Code
by Tom Rollins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, Strange, I didn't see the RC4 code at my site. Would someone that saved it please E-mail me a copy. Thanks, Tom Rollins <trollins(a)debbie.telos.com>

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PGP on Multiuser machines
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:25 PM 9/12/94, SAMUEL KAPLIN wrote: >It's highly doubtful that they could physically get to my computer without >my knowledge. I service alarms for a living. I work for the company who >monitors my alarm. I am the only person who knows the specs on my alarm. It >would be pretty tough to conceal a court order to suspend the monitoring >from me. Someone would tip me off. Plus the system will communicate with >me via 2 other methods that no one knows about. Pretty doubtful. But they *could*. It would involve a lot of work, but theoretically, they could, right? That still puts it in the catagory of "trade off." Besides, I suspect your situation isn't a common one. ;-) >I guess it depends on your level of paranoia or guilt. :) If I was just >putzing around with the software, then I wouldn't be too concerned. If I >was actually doing something illegal or confidential with the software >then I would be greatly concerned. But under no circumstances would I >consider that arrangement secure. If the cops nail this guy, he has no one >to blame but himself. He hanged his own ass. I don't consider myself "putzing" around with the software. Besides the fact that the more encrypted messages are out there, the less "suspicious" one becomes, I send things like credit card numbers and the like via email. Nothing that would embarass me, but not something I like to have floating around. >Then you have the possibility of people sending you secure messages on a >compromised key. (The one on the Unix Box) In most cases, its not the >technology that nails you, it's human error. Take for example the recent Good point. Although I would hope that if I were doing something nefarious, I would have smarter partners than that. :-) Bob -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, PGP, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)post.drexel.edu PGP & RIPEM keys on key servers When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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