December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Draft of editorial to SF Chronicle
by raph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Chaos and Anonymity keep the Internet Vital I could not let Martha Siegel's editorial ("Anarchy, Chaos on the Internet Must End", 2 Jan 1995) go unchallenged. To the uninformed reader, her arguments may seem plausible. However, her distortions give a picture of the Internet quite at odds with the true nature of the Net. Her views are by no means representative of those who actually use the Net. Of the dozens of messages I saw in response to the editorial, not a single one was in favor of her proposals. As Ms. Siegel correctly points out, the Net is not governed by any one individual person or organization. Rather, it is collectively run by those who use it as part of their daily lives. The operation of each Internet node is subject to the individual judgement of the people who own it. Ms. Siegel is wrong, however, in believeing that such a state of affairs is intolerable. Rather, this state of affairs has brough us a remarkable flowering of discourse, ideas and culture, which is just now beginning to be recognized in the mainstream press. In a lawyer's dream world, there is a rule covering every action in every situation, along with a well-functioning system to enforce the rules. This is the exact opposite of the spirit of the Net, and of Usenet in particular. Rather, there has evolved an informal set of guidelines for promoting open, civil discourse, collectively known as "netiquette." These guidelines may seem arcane to newcomers, but basically they simply ask people who use the Net to be considerate of other people, their time and their resources. A violation of netiquette brings on not legal action, but responses pointing out why the action was inconsiderate. Continued violation brings on ridicule and scorn -- people who engage in this are considered to be either sociopathic or just obnoxiously self-promoting. The single most infamous breach of netiquette in Usenet history was almost certainly the "green card spam," in which thousands of advertisements for green card services were posted to completely unrelated message areas, or "newsgroups." Advertisements presented in a way considerate to others are tolerated and even welcomed on the Net. Posting thousands of copies, though, is just going too far. Negative response was immediate. The perpetrators were asked to stop, but they refused to. One Norwegian hacker took it upon himself to track down and "cancel" the offending messages. Most people on the Net considered this to be entirely appropriate. A number of other self-promoting hucksters have sensed an opportunity, and have performed similar spams. In response, the Net evolved a defense mechanism to counter these spams and minimize the damage. The person currently serving this role is known by the pseudonym "CancelMoose." Almost everyone on the Net supports this effort, and agrees that it improves the overall value of Usenet. Who was responsible for the original green card spam? Why, Ms. Siegel herself, the same one who is complaining about "chaos and anarchy." Chaos, anarchy, and anonymity are a large part of what keeps the Net so vital. Particularly galling is Ms. Siegel's appeal to free speech. Usenet in its present form is perhaps the most conducive forum for free speech in history. The threat to free speech is not from chaos or anonymity, but from the sorts of changes that Ms. Siegel proposes. Usenet is astonishingly effective in getting around the practical barriers to free speech. These barriers come in many forms, including libel, trademark, and copyright laws, fear of retribution, etc. Because of its decentralized, communal nature, Usenet resists direct attempts to censor. The main tool for circumventing more these more indirect barriers is anonymity. As an example of such barriers, take the t-shirt commemorating the green card incident. It was emblazoned with the words, "Green Card Lawyers - Spamming the Globe" and a fist clutching a green card. Shortly after the shirt was proposed, Canter & Siegel threatened to sue if the shirt was in fact produced. It was only after several outraged lawyers promised to defend against such a case pro bono that I and others could be proud owners. Or take one of the sexual abuse recovery newsgroups, where anonymity is the norm. If someone were to post a message asking for support, saying "my uncle did it" under their real name, they would be vulnerable to a libel suit from said uncle. On the other hand, if they used an anonymous service such as the one in Finland, they would not simply escape punishment for the libel, but prevent it from happening at all. In many countries (and even China is on the Net these days), writings critical of the government, such as exposure of human rights abuses, are illegal. The authors face imprisonment, torture and death. By posting anonymously to the Net, the information can be brought safely to the attention of the world. Not all anonymous messages are pleasant or popular. Unpopular speech is a necessary consequence of free speech. At least to the founders of this country, the benefits of free speech outweigh the discomfort. Our founding fathers were also comfortable with anonymity -- the Federalist papers were originally published under the pseudonym Publius, because the authors felt the ideas should be evaluated on their own. Judging from the materials already published by Ms. Siegel, an Internet built according to her vision would free of such disturbing ideas, but would readily support five hundred channels of green card ads, impassioned pleas to purchase American flag plaques, and, yes, anonymous testimonials for radial keratotomy specialists.

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NYT on Phiber Optik
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's an article today on Phiber's return to indecency, a recap of MOD and celebratory party, with digs by unnabbed hiway-weebs. For copy send blank message with subject: PHI_out

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BBC on Net trade, G7 special summit
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BBC WSTV reports on commerce on the Net prior to a special G7 meet on the implications of the infosphere. Surprisingly, they don't mention anarchic blackmarketeers; more surprisingly they don't mention encryption - which one might expect when they talk about a one-man garage firm settling multimillion $ commodities trade contracts over the Net. Some people are about to learn something really fast. Let's hope they don't react like C&S. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Gateways to the infosphere
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here I argue that universal service is unnecessary even for equal distribution of information age opportunity, if one drops the 'highway' metaphor which, as I argued in the last episode, is lousy. This one also points out the advantage and use of demand-driven markets in widening access - Bombay slum-dwellers without clean water buy colour TVs and VCRs. For info on back issues, send a blank message with 'get help' (without the quotes) as the Subject to rishab(a)arbornet.org (do NOT 'r'eply to _this_ message). --------cut here-------- Electric Dreams Weekly column for The Asian Age by Rishab Aiyer Ghosh #43, 9/January/1995: Gateways to the infosphere Asimov once wrote of a universe where intelligent life was intelligence alone, roaming the avenues of pure thought divorced from all physical form. To reach the infosphere with your feet still on this planet though, you need a point of access, a gateway to what could easily become another world in your life. The nature of these gateways, their availability and their owners are among the more contentious aspects of the global information infrastructure. The task of developing this infrastructure to the point of ubiquity has been compared to the construction of road networks - any place, however remote, must be connected to every other. As this would make little economic sense for private investors, the task had to be one for the government. Present-day governments are poor, so they insist that subsidies should come from business in the form of universal service: providing the same thing at the same prices everywhere. The rationale for this is noble - equal opportunity to all. Without roads people can't get anywhere, literally and economically, and the same must be true for information highways. But if the info-highway is actually an information ocean, the situation changes dramatically. It is no longer necessary to move from place to place, but simply to dive in. This is true even in practical terms. On a highway, the route traffic takes is important, because of the distance, while on the Internet routing is a very low-level, technical sort of thing, as data may travel in little pieces on different paths, ignoring geographical distance. Moreover, a highway needs a physical connection between any two points, which affects costs, while the infosphere floats above waiting to be reached through a satellite transceiver from just anywhere. Nor will the lack of universal service lead to a society of information haves and have-nots. Information is unique in that one doesn't 'have' it. It is created, and a 'have- not' can easily become a 'have'. The possible inequality is in trading information resources, in knowledge opportunities. However, especially in the field of information, people are not equally equipped to take advantage of opportunities, however unequally distributed the latter may be. Instead of demanding universal service, governments should encourage the development of infrastructure where it will be best used, which is in the interests of business, anyway. Unfortunately even telecom corporations have an incorrect perception of who the best users are. They believe in connecting those who can pay now for services, rather than the many more who would benefit and therefore be able to pay the most, once they exploit currently non-existent opportunities. Demand-driven markets grow fastest, though companies right now seem to be more interested in shoving interactive television down the eyes of the reluctant and rather bored elite. A demand-driven information market is harder to work with, as prospective buyers (as also the sellers) have to be convinced of the benefits of technology. But the potential markets are huge, if far from the minds of the vendors of 'convergence' technology, as peoples' information (or entertainment) needs are often more basic than their material needs - just look at Bombay slum- dwellers, who despite limited access to clean drinking water, buy colour televisions and VCRs. They only needed to see what TV was good for, first. An information ocean is cheaper to build than any highway could possibly be. It needs no legislation to exist everywhere, this is in its very nature. Gateways to the infosphere will, governments permitting, sprout spontaneously wherever needed, as cracks on the surface of a frozen sea. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh is a freelance technology consultant and writer. You can reach him through voice mail (+91 11 3760335) or e-mail (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --====(C) Copyright 1994 Rishab Aiyer Ghosh. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED====-- This article may be redistributed in electronic form only, PROVIDED THAT THE ARTICLE AND THIS NOTICE REMAIN INTACT. This article MAY NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES be redistributed in any non-electronic form, or redistributed in any form for compensation of any kind, WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN PERMISSION from Rishab Aiyer Ghosh (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --==================================================================-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Final draft of editorial to SF Chronicle
by raph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the final cut. Only minor copyedits have been made. Thanks to all who responded -- about a dozen messages all strongly in favor. Anyone know the email address or fax number for the Chicago Tribune? Raph Chaos and Anonymity keep the Internet Vital I could not let Martha Siegel's editorial ("Anarchy, Chaos on the Internet Must End", 2 Jan 1995) go unchallenged. To the uninformed reader, her arguments may seem plausible. However, her distortions give a picture of the Internet quite at odds with the true nature of the Net. Her views are by no means representative of those who actually use the Net. Of the dozens of messages I saw in response to the editorial, not a single one was in favor of her proposals. As Ms. Siegel correctly points out, the Net is not governed by any one individual person or organization. Rather, it is collectively run by those who use it as part of their daily lives. The operation of each Internet node is subject to the individual judgement of the people who own it. Ms. Siegel is wrong, however, in believing that such a state of affairs is intolerable. Rather, this state of affairs has brought us a remarkable flowering of discourse, ideas and culture, which is just now beginning to be recognized in the mainstream press. In a lawyer's dream world, there is a rule covering every action in every situation, along with a well-functioning system to enforce the rules. This is the exact opposite of the spirit of the Net, and in particular of Usenet, the collection of ten thousand newsgroups which carries most public discussion on the Net. Rather, there has evolved an informal set of guidelines for promoting open, civil discourse, collectively known as "netiquette." These guidelines may seem arcane to newcomers, but basically they simply ask people who use the Net to be considerate of other people, their time and their resources. A violation of netiquette brings on not legal action, but responses pointing out why the action was inconsiderate. Continued violation brings on ridicule and scorn -- people who engage in this are considered to be either sociopathic or just obnoxiously self-promoting. The single most infamous breach of netiquette in Usenet history was almost certainly the "green card spam," in which thousands of advertisements for green card services were posted to completely unrelated newsgroups. Advertisements presented in a way considerate to others are tolerated and even welcomed on the Net. Posting thousands of copies, though, is just going too far. Negative response was immediate. The perpetrators were asked to stop, but they refused to. One Norwegian hacker took it upon himself to track down and "cancel" the offending messages. Most people on the Net considered this to be entirely appropriate. A number of other self-promoting hucksters have sensed an opportunity, and have performed similar spams. In response, the Net evolved a defense mechanism to counter these spams and minimize the damage. The person currently serving this role is known by the pseudonym "CancelMoose." Almost everyone on the Net supports this effort, and agrees that it improves the overall value of Usenet. Who was responsible for the original green card spam? Why, Ms. Siegel herself, the same one who is complaining about "chaos and anarchy." Chaos, anarchy, and anonymity are a large part of what keeps the Net so vital. Particularly galling is Ms. Siegel's appeal to free speech. Usenet in its present form is perhaps the most conducive forum for free speech in history. The threat to free speech is not from chaos or anonymity, but from the sorts of changes that Ms. Siegel proposes. Usenet is astonishingly effective in getting around the practical barriers to free speech. These barriers come in many forms, including libel, trademark, and copyright laws, fear of retribution, etc. Because of its decentralized, communal nature, Usenet resists direct attempts to censor. The main tool for circumventing these more indirect barriers is anonymity. As an example of such barriers, take the t-shirt commemorating the green card incident. It was emblazoned with the words, "Green Card Lawyers - Spamming the Globe" and a fist clutching a green card. Shortly after the shirt was proposed, Canter & Siegel threatened to sue if the shirt was in fact produced. It was only after several outraged lawyers promised to defend against such a case pro bono that I and others could be proud owners. Or take one of the sexual abuse recovery newsgroups, where anonymity is the norm. If someone were to post a message asking for support, saying "my uncle did it" under their real name, they would be vulnerable to a libel suit from said uncle. On the other hand, if they used an anonymous service such as the one in Finland, they would not simply escape punishment for the libel, but prevent it from happening at all. In many countries (and even China is on the Net these days), writings critical of the government, such as exposure of human rights abuses, are illegal. The authors face imprisonment, torture and death. By posting anonymously to the Net, the information can be brought safely to the attention of the world. Not all anonymous messages are pleasant or popular. Unpopular speech is a necessary consequence of free speech. At least to the founders of this country, the benefits of free speech outweigh the discomfort. Our founding fathers were also comfortable with anonymity -- the Federalist papers were originally published under the pseudonym Publius, because the authors felt the ideas should stand on their own, without opinion being swayed by the names behind them. Judging from the materials already published by Ms. Siegel, an Internet built according to her vision would be free of such disturbing ideas, but would readily support five hundred channels of green card ads, impassioned pleas to purchase American flag plaques, and, yes, anonymous testimonials for radial keratotomy specialists. ------------------------------ Raph Levien is a graduate student in computer science at the University of California, Berkeley

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Media watch
by A.J. Janschewitz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NPR's "Weekend Edition/Saturday" has an insubstantial piece on Phyber Optik on today's program, check local NPR times/listings. Nexis-hunters might want to check out a manifestly stupid editorial in today's Hartford (CT) Courant, significant only because it is the (L-A Times-owned) paper of record in the state of greatest wealth in the U-S. I would summarize it, but I don't understand it; something to do with shrink-wrap copyrights and digital cash. Fax copies sent to interested parties, just give me a number. ==a.j.== "The large print giveth and the small print taketh away." - Tom Waits

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul, I think we're after two different objectives here. You want Alice to be sure that Dave can't read her file; I want Dave to be sure that he can't read Alice's files. Alice should worry only about her privacy: if she doesn't want Dave to know what she's sending, she should encrypt her file in a way that Dave cannot break. Dave certainly doesn't want to know what Alice is sending him, because he might have to answer to a Grand Jury if he did. My protocal makes it very difficult for Dave to gain any useful knowledge about Alice's files. Dave does this not as a courtesy to Alice, but for those three wonderful letters, CYA. Of course, any data haven worth paying for will offer lots of neat features, like PGP support, anonymous file drops, and all other sorts of goodies. But that does little good if Alice can trick Dave into selling child pornography. Douglass Floyd asked, "How do I know if [be certain that] it's encrypted?" Unfortunately, I'm pretty sure the answer is, "You decrypt it." My protocol at least delays the decryption until it's [hopefully] too late to matter. b& [Here's part of the thread; nothing new follows.] At 11:00 PM 1/13/95, Paul J. Ste. Marie wrote: >At 10:07 PM 1/13/95, Ben Goren wrote: >> ... Alice hashes her file and uses that hash as the key to encrypt the file. >>She sends the file to Dave, and sends the original hash when she wants it >>back. Dave decrypts, and confirms the hash. >> >>Unfortunately, this still doesn't quite close the loop--Dave knows the >>contents of the file once Alice sends the key. It does, however, make it >>very difficult for Dave to know anything about Alice's file. ... > >This seems overly complicated. If Dave has a known public key, then Alice >should be able to hash her file, sign the hash, encrypt (the hash, her >public key, and the file) with Dave's public key, and (anonymously) sends >the result to Dave's (encrypted) address. Dave then decrypts, verifies the >sig, and stores the file, hash, and PK together, indexed by the hash. > >When Alice wants the file back, she signs (the hash and her encrypted return >address), encrypts the result with Dave's key, and sends it off. Dave >decrypts the request, fetchs the public key based on the decrypted hash, >verifies the signature, encrypts the file with Alice's provided public key, >and sends it back to the encrypted return address. > >To avoid Dave's knowing the file contents, Alice can encrypt it before the >described protocol and decrypt it afterwards. The protocol is subject to a >replay attack, but the result of the replay would cause the file to be sent >to the original sender and not to the replayer. > >The signed hash in the first step prevents people from spamming Dave with >files that have Alice's public key. Alice only requires an encrypted >address and public key for Dave, and Dave validates the retrieval request >against the public sent in the first step. > > --Paul J. Ste. Marie > pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0xCFF23BD5.

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RE: State of PGP dll?; Encrypted session projects
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sdw(a)lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) writes: > What is the state of the Windows/.dll PGP libraries? > Does anyone have a usable version yet? I helped David get a compiled version of a .DLL, but it was way too raw to use. Specifically, all we did was make a DLL of all of the code, exporting all of the subroutines. A usefull .DLL would only publish the "important" ones, and leave the internals hidden. The selection of which routines need to be classified as "important" is a bunch of work. Additionally, I expect that some of the routines would really be better off with a wrapper that made less of their internals visible. All quite doable, but a non-trivial effort. I know I'm too busy to attack it. > For Windows: twnsck12.zip, which is simple, is GNU, and has source and > by writing a relatively simple windows serial terminal emulator and > using Comt ($15 or 25 shareware) to convert it to a telnet client. > Both of these could be modified fairly easily. There are sources to a simple terminal emulator in the MSVC samples directory. Changing it to use sockets wouldn't be all that hard. Last time I looked, comt didn't work under NT, and so I stopped looking at it. There are also terminal emulators in the code in at least two books, Monk's Windows Programmer's Guide to Serial Communications, and Nelson's Serial Communications, a C++ developers's Guide. Since I'd much rather write C++ than C, I prefer Nelson's. I use ewan as a terminal emulator, got it from cica or wustl, I forget which. Dunno if sources are availavle. > Does anyone have better ideas? Any suggestions on login/key > exchange sequence? SKey would work if you are talking to a unix box that you can get the admin to change. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Slogan/procmail help
by jsled＠free.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Speaking of testing stuff.... After my last question about C'punks slogans, I've messed up some stuff and haven't storage of the list since, therefore I don't have any of the replies. If anyone would like to compile a list of what's been said (if anything) and mail to to me (to jsled(a)ctp.org) I'd be eternally grateful. Also, if anyone is fluent in procmail (I think there are a couple of you floating around), please mail me at jsled(a)ctp.org... Thanks a bunch, sorry for the annoyance. Joshua M. Sled <jsled@ctp.org/jsled@free.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLxfoaaTT29daLBKRAQGXlQP/dYc4aPR7rNApmqG78jIDhYZJh6bqMg4i AXVAAZ5IzLP4Z/qch7zkiTM05DjbmXOzkcVBmhlGlO+H2VfNug569A/jEKFnDrDs wg0Rv5mPWLo74zUECHxp7faviAVmOxt7Bx3JzQCmHZXBekq+owUetEraq9hKzCzr qQR+KUq3X+k= =4gq8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- þ KWQ/2 1.2g NR þ "MTV get off the air!" - DKs

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Re: Cybersmut
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young quotes NY Post on Kiddie porn: Rule No. 1 is that [kids] must never ever give their real name, address or telephone number to anyone on-line. Hurray! Let's teach the next generation the value of pseudonymity now! BAN TRUE NAMES! Note: I still have mine in my sig though... too late for me. Tim's axed his phone # suddenly! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Data Havens, NOT!
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney writes: > The data haven concept as I understood it held data for public access in > some form (for sale or for free) which would be illegal in some > jurisdiction. This might include credit information that was older than > the legal limit, libelous claims, damaging medical records, etc. > Frankly, I suspect that most usages would be directed towards reducing, > rather than increasing, individual privacy. So this is not an area I am > interested in working towards. I believe the Data Haven started out as a Message Haven to get the effect of anon remailers with less traffic analysis hassles, so there would be no pseudonymous login or anything, you'd either download everything, or apply some filter (as with an alt.anon-messages group). However, the current discussion of glorified remote file systems makes no sense to me. If you can keep something encrypted on a remote site as an archive, you can do it at home. A data haven is more likely to get busted than your home PC; serious efforts (RF pickup of keystrokes/display) will be equally effective in either case. Here's a summary of data havens as I see them: Remote file system where people can anon/pseudonymously dump and read files - in the 'pure' variety there'd be no record of who posted/can read a file. Advantages: 1. Could hinder traffic analysis, if they did not have pseudonymous login in any form. 2. Could act as a store of encrypted data for those who can't/don't encrypt on their own systems 3. Could act as a backup OTOH: 1. Would depend on 'correct usage' ie download of enough irrelevant cover data, and would be vulnerable to analysis at the TCP/IP level. Newsgroups remain far better as means to evade traffic analysis 2. Don't keep all your encrypted BlackNet commodities in one basket - it can be busted more easily than your home machine. If you can encrypt there you can encrypt at home; if encryption is illegal at home, you can't legally access the havens. 3. Pfaugh! Rent space on Netcom. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you want to not be able to read the files on your storage site, then why not just try reading them? Check their entropy to make sure it is maximal, check that they can't be unzipped, unstuffed, displayed as gif or jpeg files. When a new format becomes popular add that to the list. This is all you can do. What does this gain you? I'm not sure. If someone posts encrypted Windows 95, then publicizes the location and the key, people will get the data just as easily as if it were not encrypted. Hal

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voice pgp
by Loren Fleckenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've heard mention that Phil Zimmermann was going to demonstrate Voice PGP at the January Cypherpunks meeting at Cygnus. Can anyone mail me a note about this? Has the meeting already taken place? How well did the demo perform?

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Self-service computers
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A friend of mine forwarded this to me; I couldn't resist forwarding it to the list. b& ---- Date: 4 JAN 1995 16:32:23 -0500 From: Kay Lukens <klukens(a)halcyon.com> Newgroups: alt.humor.best-of-usenet Subject: [pdx.general] Re: Keep self-service COMPUTERS out of Oregon! From: keithl(a)chip.klic.rain.com (Keith Lofstrom) Newsgroups: pdx.general,or.politics Subject: Re: Keep self-service COMPUTERS out of Oregon! It has been pointed out by the stalwart defenders of our rights (to be told what to do) that self-service for gasoline is a Bad Thing. We are assured by many of the same people that self-service for pharmaceuticals, personal defense, transportation, and education are also Bad Things. Other folks, nominally their political competitors (in the same sense that Burgerville and Burger King are competitors) assure us that self-service in personal morality is an *extremely* Bad Thing. And look at what happened to Joycelin Elders when she suggested self-service for sex... >From this, we must conclude that self-service is in itself highly suspicious. Look at self-service grocery stores - all the time people are buying things that are bad for them. Self-service entertainment has resulted in Beavis and Butthead. And look at the way many computer professionals dress - if this is not an indictment of self-service apparel, what is? However, in the finest tradition of bureaucratic micromanagement, we as computer professionals are not qualified to even consider these effects on other aspects of Society. Such thoughts must be reserved for Wiser Heads Than Ours (unless of course the subject is economics or nuclear power, in which case Our Opinions Count). No, we as computer professionals must confine our thoughts to self-service as it affects us - through our flagrant, dangerous, and socially irresponsible use of Self-Service Computers! Self-Service Computers: Threat or Menace? Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Backaches. Obesity. Bleeding Piles. Bill Gates and Steve Jobs. Computers are a known health threat. Reputed Scientific Journals, such as the National Enquirer, are full of stories of people being turned into three-headed cabbages by Nucular Radiation from video displays. It is obvious that the average computer professional, while quite able to find obscure flaws in Pentiums or the secret levels in Doom, is a helpless incompetent when it comes to actually typing on or reading from personal computers. We get so caught up in our alleged thinking that we don't notice our bodies turning into rickety tubs of cancerous lard. We Need Help! Meanwhile, the Great Unwashed Masses are being deprived access to the Information Super Duper Highway. Confined to low paying jobs as sanitation workers or Congressional Representatives, these poor wretches are unable to share in this cornucopia of undocumented, virus-ridden software, poorly informed opinion, and stolen pornography that we call the Internet. These outcasts of the information age must fritter away their time which such mind-numbing activities as outdoor sports, rampant sex, and junkets to the Caribbean. When these people accidentally find their way onto the Internet, perhaps by mistakenly sending their rent check to America On Line, they begin posting meaningless, inappropriate drivel such as spam advertisements for shady lawyers, or actual referenced facts from original sources, violating the hallowed traditions of the Internet. While all citizens must have access to the Net, LET'S NOT GET CARRIED AWAY HERE. What Should We Do? (That is, how can we find new excuses to control other people with minority opinions?) The only solution is to ELIMINATE self-service computers! Every computer in the State of Oregon *must* be operated by THREE OR MORE people - one to do the thinking, one to do the typing, and one to read the screen - preferably through a foot of leaded glass! Think of all the jobs this would create! Not only would we have jobs for all the new operators themselves, we could create vast new bureaucracies to insure that the operators are specially trained, certified, and licensed! Computer Cops could roam the streets, equipped with special Jolt-sniffing dogs, breaking down the doors of self-service scofflaws! Pizza delivery drivers would find new income and respect by turning in their hacker clients! Elizabeth Furse, famous for not reading her own email and for having flunkies type in press releases, will become our shining symbol of the new, socially responsible computer age! You can help. Send your checks to C.A.S.H., the Committee to Abolish Selfservice Hardware, care of me (thnx Frank). I will see that your donation gets the attention it deserves. And on behalf of all of us here at C.A.S.H. (Arnold who handles the left side of the keyboard, Julia the right side, Millie the punctuation, Sam who reads the verbs, Trevor who reads the nouns, and our shop steward Penny, who is lobbying for a government grant to bring in a mentally-challenged lesbian vegetarian special needs hispanic-surnamed person of color to watch the blinky lights on the modem) may you have an appropriate and socially enlightening seasonal celebration! -- Moderators accept or reject articles based solely on the criteria posted in the Frequently Asked Questions. Article content is the responsibility of the submittor. Submit articles to ahbou-sub(a)acpub.duke.edu. To write to the moderators, send mail to ahbou-mod(a)acpub.duke.edu. -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0x875B059.

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Re: C`punks slogan? - Pri
by jsled＠free.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- lmccarth(a)thor.cs.umass.ed wrote: > Lest we suffer a recurrence of the C'punks Logo thread, which generated a > whole raft of list traffic which would have been better kept private, please > reply directly to Joshua and not to the whole list. [He seems to imply that > he wants private replies ("testing procmail") anyway, but I want to encourage > this practice explicitly.] Thanks... actually, that's exactly what I wanted, but forgot to put it in... and my last post about "Slogan help": disregard that entirely... it's not needed (either part). But so far I've only gotten one reply about the slogan thing, so please give me help on that one, folks... Josh Sled <jsled@ctp.org/jsled@free.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLxf3kKTT29daLBKRAQGEWgQAhrKR/r/+mqXO63RN86c7hq3bsmid2KLU ct2zJAebaZBzVvltrF3WsBYoWmCSo1tWrYFjv3QsU1gnRJRyxSGVtzzkfOSq7b51 UlGRzUb+6AXvviWmqdBwHGWbT4M6/mxxH8X8gC/eeFWyHMpgEcFzhV9tWUHCqkC/ GMDvXoaKPa0= =i71M -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- þ KWQ/2 1.2g NR þ "MTV get off the air!" - DKs

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> newsgroups. Mandating encryption renders this mode useless. >> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > At 02:42 AM 1/15/95 -0600, Larry E wrote: >Here, I don't understand your point. If you mean an encrypted >message to a remailer cannot result in a plaintext usenet posting, >that of course is not true. The remailers have PGP keys of their >own, just as any private user may. In addition, some of the >remailers support direct usenet posting. Thus, a message may be >encrypted to the remailer and posted as plaintext as the remailer >decrypts the message. I wasn't referring to requiring encryption using the remailer's public key. I was referring to the stuff discussed here, where the remailer operator insists on ensuring that the traffic is encrypted over and beyond the remailer's public key, in order to give the operator plausable deniability. Really, all inbound remailer traffic should be encrypted with the remailer's public key if any significant level of security is desired. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Another problem w/Data Havens...
by Robert Rothenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I can see a potential problem with Data Havens (as they've been discussed here) that may very well inspire the wrath of the authorities more than nuclear secrets or dirty pictures of J.Edgar Hoover... How does one keep a site from becomming a remote pirated-software exchange site? (Esp. since after that MIT case laws may be changed...) It seems that such a service could become a magnet for the "elite warez" crowd... and even if the operator isn't jailed it could lead to a shutdown of the service.

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:53 AM 1/14/95 -0600, Larry E wrote: > ... Those who believe remailers are an evil will argue against any >measure that will promote their presence (and I'm not suggesting >you're in that group). ... True enough. > ... Is encryption a step in the right direction, if an imperfect one? If >not I hope some other positive steps are proposed soon, else I fear >remailers may face extinction. The big problem I have with mandatory encryption for remailers is that it thwarts one of the two major purposes of remailers. Basically I see remailers serving two goals: 1) Defeating traffic analysis of point-to-point communications. Mandating encryption for this is redundant--anyone who wanted this would be encrypting their mail to begin with. Also, I don't believe this mode of operation generates many complaints. 2) Anonymous broadcast transmission. This one can generate a lot of complaints, but it is also very important for things like *.recovery newsgroups. Mandating encryption renders this mode useless. There is a third use, which is anonymous point-to-point transmission. While this is of some benefit for anonymous tip line, it makes things like mailbombs and hate mail very easy. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:51 AM 1/14/95 -0700, Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu wrote: > ... Dave certainly doesn't want to know what Alice is sending him, because he >might have to answer to a Grand Jury if he did. ... > >Of course, any data haven worth paying for will offer lots of neat >features, like PGP support, anonymous file drops, and all other sorts of >goodies. But that does little good if Alice can trick Dave into selling >child pornography. ... At 11:45 PM 1/14/95, Robert Rothenberg wrote: > ... How does one keep a site from becomming a remote pirated-software exchange >site? (Esp. since after that MIT case laws may be changed...) It seems that >such a service could become a magnet for the "elite warez" crowd... and even >if the operator isn't jailed it could lead to a shutdown of the service. The whole point of a "data haven" is that the site of operation is in a jurisdiction where these things are not legal problems. If you operate a DH in a location where child pornography/copyright laws are vigorously enforced, I really doubt that encryption is going to make any difference. As Robert rightly points out, a DH probably will become a location of massive copyright violation, etc ad nauseum. I've cc'ed Mike Godwin on this in the hope that he can shed some light on what the scienter requirements for something like this would be. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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L.A. area-Karl Hess Club
by j.hastings6＠genie.geis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following was written by me, Kent Hastings: Sorry, no PGP sig, I'm stranded in Chico,CA for a while... L O S A N G E L E S A R E A M E E T I N G "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice, and let me remind you, moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." - Aristotle, as used by Karl Hess for Barry Goldwater. --- T h e K a r l H e s s C l u b --- "GOODBYE, MURRAY!" In the third meeting in the Post Election Series, we intended to present an update on the Objectivists after our meetings with the Republicans, the Libertarian Party, and Left Anarchists. Unfortunately, the Ayn Rand Institute declined our invitation to address our group on The Night Of January The 16th. When readers of Liberty Magazine were asked to rate the influence of various thinkers, at the top, with an equal rating to Rand, was "Mr. Libertarian," Murray N. Rothbard, PhD. Murray died last week, so we will instead have a special Memorial tribute to his life and thought. He is best known for his work in Austrian School economics and Libertarian philosophy, and notorious for bashing Objectivists with essays like "The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult." (Don't worry, the abuse was mutual). His most recent libertarian strategy was to make an alliance with the Old Right, a.k.a. "Paleoconservatives." We hope you'll agree that this is relevant in our Post Election environment. Samuel Edward Konkin III (SEK3) knew Murray personally, and credits him as a founder of the modern Libertarian movement in written accounts in his magazine, New Libertarian. I assume SEK3 will host tributes from others who also knew Murray. Monday, January 16, 1995 Hasmik's Family Restaurant Cheviot Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles National Blvd (I think 9824 National) Unfortunately, I can't attend this one because of the floods, and I don't have the address handy, but it is the same time and place as the last meeting. Kent - j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com

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Re: Scientology
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 1/15/95 TO: THOMAS M. SMALL COUNSEL FOR RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER AND BRIDGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. FROM: Lance Cottrell Operator of remailer@nately and mixmaster@nately In response to your email of January 3, 1995 requesting that I block anonymous posting to the Internet news groups alt.clearing.technology and alt.religion.scientology. Although my remailers have always supported direct posting to news groups, this feature has never been advertised or supported. Since direct posting from my remailers is never used, I am willing to comply with your request. Posting to alt.clearing.technology and alt.religion.scientology has been blocked. By this action I do not admit to any wrongdoing on my part, nor do I wish to imply any wrongdoing on the part of any users of my remailers. I am merely turning of a feature that I never intended to be used. By design it is not possible to prevent users from using my remailers to send a message to another computer to be posted. I can not, and will not, block mail to other remailers or to mail-to-news gateways. Yours, Lance M. Cottrell CC: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com, remailer-operators(a)c2.org, alt.privacy.anon-server, alt.privacy, alt.religion.scientology, alt.clearing.technology -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLxl9WlVkk3dax7hlAQH5lAP9HWND3nMsoz/Yn6fz36iqtDqI7s3cEllM Gaajeq4qAR/t5a5CrEyOW1sYq+bxw5UZppREJC5uBbcp7ZP2k/7jprEcq9O7run3 ZX985aIY8f5kI6GmUemhmQcflgyNDoeDJMFhRBrvDQqCWueLKVUZLNXx9bsMCi94 EH/mStSfdJY= =UgN1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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2 announcements of possible interest
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

2 announcements (one from PRIVACY, the other from Cyberia.) second is NII Security Issues Forum to Hold 2 Meetings 01/27/95 NEW 01/12/95 Date: Fri, 13 Jan 95 11:25:27 EST From: denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Subject: INTERNATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY INSTITUTE 1995 Call for Participation (Deadline: March 15, 1995) INTERNATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY INSTITUTE 1995: GLOBAL CHALLENGES September 21-22, 1995 Washington, DC Presented by The National Intellectual Property Law Institute The International Cryptography Institute will focus on the cryptography challenges associated with meeting the information protection needs of users and the law enforcement and national security needs of nations. The Institute will address such topics as: - national encryption policies and regulations - meeting user needs for information security and data recovery - meeting law enforcement and national security needs - national and global encryption markets and product availability - international approaches and standards - creating an international cryptography infrastructure - the use of encryption technologies in different countries - cryptography in the financial industry and other industries - legal and policy issues of digital signatures and digital cash - new developments in encryption policies and technologies Persons interested in speaking at the conference are invited to submit a proposal to the Institute Chair: Prof. Dorothy E. Denning, Chair ICI '95 Georgetown University Computer Science Department 225 Reiss Building Washington DC 20057-0997 ph: 202-687-5703, fax: 202-687-6067 e-mail: denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu Proposals must be received by MARCH 15, 1995, and should include the following: - Name, title, organization, address, phone, fax, and e-mail address - Brief biography - Title of presentation - Abstract of presentation or paper - Amount of time requested for presentation and discussion Notification of acceptance will be made by April 15, 1995. Papers and materials for the proceedings will be due on August 15, 1995. Inquiries about registration or the proceedings should be addressed to: The National Intellectual Property Law Institute P.O. Box 27913, Washington, DC 20038-7913 ph: 800-301-MIND or 202-962-9494 fax: 800-304-MIND or 202-962-9495 ------------------------------ From: Seth Greenstein <sethg(a)access.digex.net> Subject: NII Security Issues Forum to Hold 2 Meetings 01/27/95 NEW 01/12/95 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING Agency: Office of Management and Budget Action: National Information Infrastructure Security Issues Forum: Notice of Public Meetings and request for public comments SUMMARY: The National Information Infrastructure Security Issues Forum will conduct two public meetings to continue a dialogue between government and the private and public interest sectors on issues related to the security of information on the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Interested parties -- especially beneficiaries of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps, and users of public information, and participants in the sophisticated communications networks which support the U.S. transportation and customs systems -- are invited to submit a 1 - 2 page position statement and request to testify. The meetings are sponsored by the NII Security Issues Forum of the Information Infrastructure Task Force and Mega-Project III of the U.S. Advisory Council on the NII. DATES: Both public meetings, "Security of the Electronic Delivery of Government Information and Services" and "Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems and Trade Information," will be held simultaneously on Friday, January 27, 1995, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. in Raleigh, North Carolina. Those wishing to testify should submit a 1 - 2 page position statement and request to participate by January 20, 1995. Individuals wishing to offer general comments or present questions may request to do so during the meeting. Written comments may be submitted on paper or electronically, in ASCII format, and will be accepted until February 10, 1995. ADDRESSES: The public meeting, "Security of the Electronic Delivery of Government Information and Services," will be held in the Auditorium of the North Carolina Museum of History, 1 East Edenton Street, Raleigh, North Carolina. The public meeting, "Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems and Trade Information," will be held in the Auditorium of the Department of Cultural Affairs, 109 East Jones Street, Raleigh, North Carolina. Both buildings are in close proximity to the North Carolina Capitol Building. Position statements and requests to appear for the meeting, "Security of the Electronic Delivery of Government Information and Services," sent to the Government Information Technology Services Working Group, marked to the attention of Ms. April Ramey, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1425 New York Avenue, Room 2150 N.W., Washington, D.C. 20220. Position statements may also be submitted via fax to (202) 622-1595 or through electronic mail to april.ramey(a)treas.sprint.com. Electronic mail should be submitted as unencoded, unformatted, ASCII text. Position statements and requests to appear for the meeting, "Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems and Trade Information," should be sent to the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center of the Department of Transportation, marked to the attention of Mr. Gary Ritter, DTS-21, at 55 Broadway, Cambridge, MA, 02142. Position statements may also be submitted via fax to (617) 494-2370 or through electronic mail to "Ritter(a)volpe1.dot.gov". Electronic mail should be submitted as unencoded, unformatted, ASCII text. Parties offering testimony are asked to provide them on paper, and where possible, in machine-readable format. Machine- readable submissions may be provided through electronic mail messages sent over the Internet, or on a 3.5" floppy disk formatted for use in an MS-DOS based computer. Machine-readable submissions should be provided as unencoded, unformatted ASCII text. Written comments should include the following information: * Name and organizational affiliation, if any, of the individual responding; * An indication of whether comments offered represent views of the respondent's organization or are the respondent's personal views; and * If applicable, information on the respondent's organization, including the type of organization (e.g., trade association, private corporation, non-profit organization) and general areas of interest. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information relating to electronic delivery of information and services, contact Ms. April Ramey of the Treasury Department at (202) 622- 1278. For further information relating to transportation and trade issues, contact Mr. Gary Ritter at the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center by telephone at (617) 494-2716. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Issues for Public Comment A. Background The public meetings are part of an ongoing dialogue with the Administration to assess the security needs and concerns of users of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). The NII is a system of high-speed telecommunications networks, databases, and advanced computer systems that will make electronic information more widely available and accessible than ever before. For example, citizens may be able to learn about federal benefits programs through public kiosks, or may receive their social security payments through direct deposit to their bank accounts. As the U.S. transportation infrastructure becomes more complex, Americans will benefit from the application of information technologies to such operations as toll collection, motor vehicle registration, and traffic routing. This increased availability and accessibility of services and products provided through information technology will dramatically affect the way in which individuals conduct their everyday affairs. Consequently, broad public and commercial use of the NII hinges upon implementing technologies, policies, and practices that not only ensure that users of information systems have access to information when and where they need it, but that subjects of information records are able to protect themselves from unauthorized or inappropriate use of information. "Americans will not use the NII to its full potential unless they trust that information will go where and when they want it and nowhere else," declared Sally Katzen, Administrator of the Office of Information Regulatory Affairs at OMB and chair of the Forum. "The Federal government is a primary user of the NII and thus a catalyst for change. Yet the NII will be designed, built, owned, operated, and used primarily by the private sector, making it essential that security on the NII be considered in partnership with the public." To address these critical issues, the Vice President formed the Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF). The IITF is chaired by Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and is comprised of senior Administration officials having expertise in technical, legal, and policy areas pertinent to the NII. The mission of the IITF is to articulate and implement the Administration's vision for the NII. The NII Security Issues Forum was established within the IITF to address the cross-cutting issue of security in the NII. The Forum is chaired by Sally Katzen, Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget. In addition to the IITF, the President has established the U.S. Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure. The Advisory Council represents industry, labor, and public interest groups, and advises the Secretary of Commerce on issues relating to the NII. Mega-Project III, one of three work groups of the Advisory Council, is responsible for addressing security, intellectual property, and privacy issues as they relate to the NII. B. Structure and Content of Public Meeting Security is linked inextricably to broad public use of the NII. The technologies, policies, and procedures used to ensure the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of digitally produced and transmitted information, information products, and services on the NII will determine whether, how, and to what extent digitally linked information services will be broadly used in such critical applications as providing public information, supporting the delivery of government services, utilizing intelligent transportation systems, and conducting trade. Development of policies and procedures that will ensure the security of public and private information and communications on the NII requires study from different perspectives, whether that of the subject of the information, the user of the information, or the creator of the information. The Forum and Mega-Project III seek input from parties representing beneficiaries of federal information and services and users of intelligent transportation systems and trade data. Solutions to these concerns will come via technical solutions, as well as legal and policy mechanisms. The Forum and Mega-Project III seek input in this area as well. Specifically, what legal measures, policy mechanisms, and technological solutions, or combinations thereof, can be used to effectively protect the security of federal benefits information or transportation or trade data, delivered or made accessible on the NII? A panel of witnesses drawn from the public will be assembled to discuss the following topics with a panel of senior Administration officials, members of the Security Issues Forum, members of the Advisory Council, and policy makers at the State level, and to field questions and comments from other members of the public. Position statements for the meeting, "Security in the Delivery of Electronic Information and Services," should address four principal questions: 1. How do you envision the NII being used to provide services and information electronically to citizens? Specifically, what types of services and information should be delivered or made available? 2. What risks and threats do you foresee in making services and information available via the NII? Such threats might include fraud, unauthorized access, breach of confidentiality or privacy, breach of integrity, and system performance. 3. What legal, policy, and ethical issues do you foresee affecting usage of the NII? Such issues may include liability, information/property rights, access, document/records management, legal admissibility/evidentiary requirements, and auditability. Do some issues, such as privacy and open access, tend to countervene each other? 4. What kinds of administrative or technical solutions should be developed or promoted to address security, legal, and ethical concerns? Such solutions may include verifying recipient and/or vendor eligibility, ensuring operational and systems security, and establishing means to facilitate settlement, detection, and prosecution. Position statements for the meeting, "Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems and Trade Information," should address five principal questions: 1. Who should be permitted access to sensitive trade and transportation information systems? How can inappropriate access and use be prevented? 2. What technical and institutional safeguards in electronic data transmission, storage, and retrieval are needed to protect the security of trade and transportation data? Such risks might include: disclosure of proprietary and confidential business information, criminal access to trade and cargo records, disclosure of individual travel patterns or vehicle locations, or disclosure of transportation dispatch communications regarding sensitive cargo shipment routes, itineraries, and locations. 3. What does an "appropriate level of security" consist of? Is there a "one-size-fits-all" solution, or can policies be established which flexibly meet diverse needs? 4. Do certain systems merit greater degrees of security protection, such as traffic signal control systems, variable message signs, fleet location monitoring, electronic toll collection, international trade data, and motor vehicle registration records? 5. Who should establish and enforce security policies? How can government and the private sector work together to support a secure National Information Infrastructure? II. Guidelines for Participation in the Public Hearing Individuals who would like to participate on a panel must request an opportunity to do so no later than January 20, 1995, by submitting a brief, 1 - 2 page summary position statement. If approved, each participant will be allowed to present brief opening remarks. Primary participation, however, shall be during the general discussion to follow, according to the format described above. Participants in the public meeting will testify before and participate in discussions with a panel consisting of members of the Advisory Council, members of the Security Issues Forum, and other Administration officials. Individuals not selected as panel participants may offer comments or ask questions of the witnesses by requesting an opportunity to do so and being recognized during the meeting by the chairs of the meetings. Oral remarks offered in this fashion should not exceed three minutes. No advance approval is required to attend the public meetings, offer comments, or present questions. The public meeting on "Security of the Electronic Delivery of Information and Services" will be chaired by Mr. Jim Flyzik, Chair of the Government Information Technology Services Working Group of the IITF. The public meeting on "Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems and Trade Information," will be co-chaired by Ms. Ana Sol Gutierrez, Deputy Administrator of the Research and Special Programs Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and Ms. Christine Johnson, Director of the Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office of the U.S. Department of Transportation. More information about the Clinton Administration's National Information Infrastructure initiative can be obtained from the IITF Secretariat. Inquiries may be directed to Yvette Barrett at (202) 482-1835, by e-mail to ybarrett(a)ntia.doc.gov, or by mail to U.S. Department of Commerce, IITF Secretariat, NTIA, Room 4892, Washington, D.C., 20230. For inquiries over the Internet to the IITF Gopher Server, gopher, telnet (login = gopher), or anonymous ftp to iitf.doc.gov. Access is also available over the World-Wide-Web. Questions may be addressed to nii(a)ntia.doc.gov. For access by modem, dial (202) 501-1920 and set modem communication parameters at no parity, 8 data bits, and one stop (N,8,1). Modem speeds of up to 14,400 baud are supported. Sally Katzen Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Certified to be a true copy of the original by John B. Arthur, Associate Director for Administration

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Re: Jude Milhon in WIRED
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oh, come on, Perry - your memory must be decaying. I've met Jude 3-4 times in the last 1.5 years, including at Bay Area cypherpunks meetings (the long boring photo-shoot for the NY Times Magazine, for instance), and it's been referred to in the past that "cypherpunks" was her pun. She's also the one who put out requests for character contributions to a novel she's doing, which went to the list. Besides, if you're grumpy that you haven't met someone, you need to get out here to the left coast more often - New York winters must be getting to you :-) Bill

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Re: C`punks slogan? - Pri
by jsled＠free.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- lmccarth(a)thor.cs.umass.ed wrote: > Lest we suffer a recurrence of the C'punks Logo thread, which generated a > whole raft of list traffic which would have been better kept private, please > reply directly to Joshua and not to the whole list. [He seems to imply that > he wants private replies ("testing procmail") anyway, but I want to encourage > this practice explicitly.] Thanks... actually, that's exactly what I wanted, but forgot to put it in... and my last post about "Slogan help": disregard that entirely... it's not needed (either part). But so far I've only gotten one reply about the slogan thing, so please give me help on that one, folks... Josh Sled <jsled@ctp.org/jsled@free.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLxf3kKTT29daLBKRAQGEWgQAhrKR/r/+mqXO63RN86c7hq3bsmid2KLU ct2zJAebaZBzVvltrF3WsBYoWmCSo1tWrYFjv3QsU1gnRJRyxSGVtzzkfOSq7b51 UlGRzUb+6AXvviWmqdBwHGWbT4M6/mxxH8X8gC/eeFWyHMpgEcFzhV9tWUHCqkC/ GMDvXoaKPa0= =i71M -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- þ KWQ/2 1.2g NR þ "MTV get off the air!" - DKs

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Re: Another problem w/Data Havens...
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:45 PM 1/14/95, Robert Rothenberg wrote: >[. . .] >How does one keep a site from becomming a remote pirated-software exchange >site? [. . . .] Simple. The file is deleted upon retrevial. b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0x875B059.

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