December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Internet Relay Chat
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Mon, 25 Apr 1994 rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in wrote: > > I've noticed some discussions of IRC (Internet Relay Chat), both as a possible > > model for CP interactions, as well as a location for implementations of > > BlackNet (in #wares, etc.) > > > > Note that IRC, unlike MUDS, has been designed to ensure 'true-names'. While > > you do use nicknames, anyone can find out the machine name and user ID you are > > logged in from, with a /whois. Anytime you join or leave a channel, your full > > machine name and user ID is displayed to everyone, along with your nick. This > > is different from any (possibly pseudonymous) e-mail address you register for > > incoming mail. > > Fraid not....it's a trivial matter to fake the username, and if yer a > smart cookie, faking the hostname is just as easy. as far as I know, you have to hack the server to fake hostname. historically this practice has been frowned upon by the majority of IRC administrators. but yes, faking username is trivial. josh

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Re: CU Crypto Session Sat
by freeman＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Karn comments on spy-satellite resolution: > [Technical argument with which I agree, leading to approximate one-foot > resolution limit, deleted.] Phil's argument was for a 2-meter aperture at typical slant ranges in the visible-light band. I once did the calculation, also for a 2-meter aperture, with other circumstances being as optimal as I could make them; namely, looking straight down from a rather low perigee (I picked 200 Km), working in the near UV (where it still penetrates the atmosphere reasonably well -- I picked 3000 Angstroms as a round number), and with perfect seeing (which depends on luck, weather and exposure times, and perhaps on telescope and/or image-processing technology). For a circular aperture, the nominal resolving power (in radians) -- that is, the Airy disc radius to the first minimum -- is 1.22 * wavelength / aperture diameter, which for this case works out to 0.183 microradian. Multiplying by 200 Km gives 3.66 cm resolution on the ground. If one shapes the aperture to match the pattern under study, one can drive that factor of 1.22 down to as little as 0.5, but such shaping would likely be useful only for specific patterns not likely in the actual observation. I am told that careful image processing can sometimes resolve things a little below the Airy-disc limit, but not far -- the information really goes away fast at higher angular frequencies. So all in all, I am inclined to think that the best ground resolution attainable with a 2-meter aperture from orbit is about an inch. That is in fact just about enough to read a poker hand -- the spots on the cards are an inch or so apart -- but you might have trouble telling the face cards apart, as well as telling hearts from diamonds and clubs from spades. That is, if cards were well spread out you might see that a certain card had five black spots on it, or had a "face". I should probably explain about "Airy disc": The term crops up often in the study of astronomical imaging. The image of a point light source by perfect optics is a bulls-eye, a bright central spot surrounded by alternating light and dark rings, called the "Airy disc" after the physicist who first described it analytically. The 1.22 * wavelength / aperture is the angle from the center of the bright spot to the middle of the first dark ring. Of course, a possible way around this limit is to put up a larger, segmented mirror... -- Jay Freeman PS: References to physics texts on request...

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Re: message splitting for better mixing?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Miller > > The idea: > > 1) write sender-side code to split message into N parts and send each > part through a different remailer chain. > > 2) decrypt the parts as they arrive as per normal encrypted remailer > messages. > > 3) write receiver-side code to detect "a part" and stuff it in a file > until the remaining related parts arrive. When all related parts > have arrived, present the complete message to receiver. Here is a program I found in the usenet archives which will do some of the splitting and merging features. Note that the merge is smart in that you just cat the pieces together and process them. The main feature of the prog is that you can reconstruct even with a few missing pieces, necessary because of the unreliability of remailer email. I don't think the splitting is cryptographically strong, but each piece could be separately encrypted if desired. > Path: ghost.dsi.unimi.it!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!newsflash.concordia.ca!clyde.concordia.ca!altitude!mirkwood.CAM.ORG!hebrais > From: hebrais(a)mirkwood.CAM.ORG (Philippe Hebrais) > Newsgroups: alt.sources > Subject: shade -- split a file with shadows > Message-ID: <hebrais.0xu4(a)mirkwood.CAM.ORG> > Date: 13 Dec 92 07:57:05 GMT > Organization: Secte des adorateurs des semiconducteurs > Lines: 675 > X-Newsreader: MeNews 2.8.0 > > > SSSSS HH HH AAA DDDD EEEEEEE > SS SS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HHHHHHH AAAAAAA DD DD EEEE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SS SS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSSSS HH HH AA AA DDDD EEEEEEE > > `shade' is a file splitting and merging utility. It takes a large > file and splits it into uniformly sized blocks. It can also output > extra blocks (called shadows). These shadows can be used to recover > missing sections if they get corrupted or it they are lost. With a > single shadow, `shade' can recover ANY single missing block. As many > shadows are needed as there are blocks missing. If too few blocks > and shadows are available, nothing can be recovered. > > For example, foo.bar (259042 bytes) is split into 5 sections > of 45000 bytes, 1 section of 34042 bytes and 2 shadows of > 45000 bytes. Each of these 8 parts is sent through email. > Even if any two of these eight parts gets lost, the original > foo.bar can be reconstructed. > > `shade' is a simple application of the chinese remainder theorem > for polynomials with coeficients modulo two. For more information > see the comments at the beginning of project.c. > > > > SAMPLE USAGE > > Split "bar" (111042 bytes) into 20000 byte chunks and output 2 > shadows. All these parts will be uuencoded and output to > foo.uu.001, foo.uu.002, etc. > > % shade -u -k 2 -l 20000 -o foo bar > [001] [002] [003] [004] [005] [006] [aaa] [aab] Done. > > Merge these parts back together: > > % rm foo.uu.003 foo.uu.005 > % cat foo.uu.* | shade -m -u > Merging bar (111042 bytes) > Got section 4 (20000 bytes) > Got section 1 (20000 bytes) > Got section 2 (20000 bytes) > Got section 6 (11042 bytes) > Got shadow 1 (20000 bytes) > Got shadow 2 (20000 bytes) > > Missing: [003] [005] > > Recovering 2 sections: > [001] [002] [aaa] [004] [aab] [006] > > > > DISTRIBUTION > > Shade is copyright Philippe Hebrais 1992. You have the permission > to use this code is anyway you feel appropriate as long as you give > credit where it is due. There is no warranty of any kind. I am not > responsible for any damage caused directly or indirectly by this > program. > > > AUTHOR > , > Philippe Hebrais <hebrais(a)mirkwood.cam.org> > > -- > Philippe Hebrais hebrais(a)mirkwood.cam.org > Voix: (514)731-9146 uunet!philmtl!altitude!mirkwood!hebrais

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spy satellites
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two points re the spy satellite thread. First, spy satellites want to be close to what they are looking at, so they can see it better. That means they are generally in low orbits, and low orbits are fast orbits. Typical speeds are on the order of 10,000 mph. This means that any given spot is in view of a particular satellite for only a few minutes on each pass, and due to the earth's rotation it is hard to pass repeatedly over the same spot frequently. This means you need a large number of satellites in order to provide much coverage, and even then you will probably get snapshots at an interval of hours at best (I don't know how many satellites are flying). This is OK for military bases where you are looking at construction, ships, and other large equipment, but it is not at all adequate for tracking the movement of terrorists. Secondly, any technology which did allow the government to surveil us well enough to track the physical movements and meetings of terrorists would be far more of a threat than any Clipper chip! Offering satellite surveillance as an alternative to Clipper jumps from the frying pan into the fire, IMO. Hal

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Re: message splitting for better mixing?
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Here is a program I found in the usenet archives which will do some of the > splitting and merging features. Note that the merge is smart in that you > just cat the pieces together and process them. The main feature of the prog > is that you can reconstruct even with a few missing pieces, necessary because > of the unreliability of remailer email. I don't think the splitting is > cryptographically strong, but each piece could be separately encrypted if > desired. You can also get shade from either ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto/software/dist/???????/Misc/shade.tar.gz and shade.patch.gz or ftp.dsi.unimi.it:/pub/security/crypt/code/shade.tar.gz If you're outside the U.S. and Canada please use the Italian site. Mark -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca - RIPEM MD5: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP key fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 low security key fingerprint: EC E7 C3 A9 2C 30 25 C6 F9 E1 25 F3 F5 AF 92 E3 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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RE: Milgram & Authority
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > The subjects were very upset during and after the experiment. Some broke > down while administering "lethal" shocks. They often cried and begged the > "researcher" to let them stop zapping the victim. I saw a documentary about this research about ten years ago, and they made a point which hasn't come up here: that Milgram, in subjecting his exper- imental subjects to such psychological stress (many were traumatized for months afterwards about what they had done) was being just as unethical, just as unfeeling and unthinking, as his experiment was designed to show his sub- jects as being. Why was Milgram willing to push his subjects to such lengths? Was his obedience to the "authority" of abstract scientific research any more defensible than his subjects' obedience to that authority? In a strained attempt to tie this thread to the list, I will point out that our own efforts to distribute cryptographic tools will be judged by their consequences, not by our hopes. We have as much responsibility as Milgram to consider the likely results if we succeed. It will be a different world, and, we hope, a better one. But some things will be worse, of that there is little doubt. We must constantly weigh the bad against the good and take actions on that basis, rather than blindly and unthinkingly seeking to push the env- elope just to see what happens. Hal

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How to Subscribe
by Cummings, Clarke A. - SMSgt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

subscription instructions??? Or is this a **private** line.

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Re: Internet Relay Chat
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> If you did hack your own IRC server, would it be possible to eavesdrop > on channels like #warez, without anyone knowing, and without fear of being > kicked off? It seems to me that this would be the true hacker's approach > if it were possible. it's been done. this practice is also frowned upon by the generality of irc administrators. josh

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PGP Question:
by Jim Sewell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've looked in the docs for the answer but it is successful in evading me. My question: I have changed my ID string from my name to my name "-1024" and "-512" to differentiate between the different keys I have. Of course, using the -ke to do this has added a "Also known as" to my key. Since my name is the same in both and the mentioned keysizes are all that have changed I'd like to remove the AKA. Can I do this? If so how? Thanks, Jim -- Tantalus Inc. Jim Sewell Amateur Radio: KD4CKQ P.O. Box 2310 Programmer Internet: jims(a)mpgn.com Key West, FL 33045 C-Unix-PC Compu$erve: 71061,1027 (305)293-8100 PGP via email on request. 1K-bit Fingerprint: 8E 14 68 90 37 87 EF B3 C4 CF CD 9A 3E F9 4A 73 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLb19ClZo7sR6KUT1AQFQwwP8Cg1tHgG3vSOO07YtGOjrJcgKWe/9Pyr3 IKtIRV0msg8pp1RrTwp/rDiWi11DG3VxAYWbZZ8Fnf8Y5prPRCwL5vGs2WZqFoXi rMSQCxlacUBt4hbzeQQ9IzzYgA8+9YTP9RIVY9k+sd1iu9tsIcP8yjPDJ9jcBgpb BEyCWAPDpXQ= =XMdl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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punknet
by Lyle_Seaman＠transarc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of my neighbors and I were talking about setting up a short-distance radio LAN (we talked about just running coax, but one of them is across a street and about 60 yds down, we don't want to buy/lease rights-of-way, etc). While I know my way around a soldering iron, I haven't designed a circuit in 10 years, and even then they weren't terribly complicated. Pointers to commercially available hardware or kit plans would be appreciated. -- Lyle Transarc 707 Grant Street 412 338 4474 The Gulf Tower Pittsburgh 15219 "Gossip is what makes the world go round. I have very few secrets. I would be deeply concerned if a device were marketed that could stop interception..." Emma Nicholson, MP.

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RE: Milgram & Authority
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Hal We have as much responsibility as Milgram to consider the likely results if we succeed. It will be a different world, and, we hope, a better one. But some things will be worse, of that there is little doubt. We must constantly weigh the bad against the good and take actions on that basis, rather than blindly and unthinkingly seeking to push the envelope just to see what happens. ......................................................... I was thinking that perhaps Phil Zimmerman is under "fire" at this time because the powers-that-be have concluded that he pushed the envelope of liberty to an unacceptable degree; that he has been categorized by them as having taken a "bad" action without forethought in regard of the adverse consequences which will befall society, if everyone is in full possession of their very own secret code. Reading what Hal said earlier about PhilZ's qualities of character, I was thinking - if this is the kind of person whom they would define as a criminal, that his actions would be considered irresponsible and damaging, then it makes sense that from their perspective he should be subjected to investigation and prosecution (persecution?). Were their concerns based on the fact that he has introduced a dangerous tool into the "herd"? Was it that he had overstepped the boundaries of the authority allowed to him as a citizen unit? Was it that they feel threatened by what he represents to them in the kind of person he is (not respecting of their authority), or by the situation which was created when he made available his software to all? I'm examining the perspective from which one makes conclusions about human actions per se; how decisions about which actions to take depend upon how one interprets the situation. This discussion originally developed from the question of whether humans have herd instincts and whether this explains their behavior in the face of "authority". In a herd, the bovines don't have much room to see beyond the next cow, and it would be difficult to see why those in front will go in one direction or another, but it would be easy to follow along based on the presumption that the ones at the front who have the better view will also know why what direction to take better than those stuck somewhere in the middle. This experiment was a contrived fabrication, an 'experiment'. The information available about it was mostly limited to what the researcher provided, and some exaggerated behavior from the actors (I guess it was mostly sound?). I expect that the test subjects believed that the 'tortured ones' were in consent to being subjected to the supposed suffering with which they were being inflicted (right?), unlike a real circumstance wherein the torture would have been repelled and the participants would have had no cause to deliver it. In real life, there must be cause for behavior - things must make sense to the person who is interpreting the situation and making decisions about what to do. >From the perspective of many on this list, it's wrong to abdicate from personal responsibility even under stressful circumstances; on the other hand, the above example presents good argument for authoritative types who think it is necessary to lead people around by the nose because otherwise, it is claimed, they will not be able to make good moral decisions when left to their own devices (or Phil Zimmerman's devices). That they should be subject to an external authority because they cannot be trusted to know when to accept responsibility. Blanc

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prime numbers
by johnsonc＠chem.udallas.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm just wondering if anyone knows whether or not (1+4k) can be written as the sum of squares or not, and if so, what the proof of that is? Anyone care to share?? Thank you, Carrie Anne Johnson -- What? Because I kill indiscriminately? -Tom Servo

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RE: Milgram & Authority
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell writes: >Never be afraid to jinx sideways to throw them off your tail. Practice >violating small orders so that when it really counts, you'll be able to >violate big orders smoothly without even having to think about it. > >Not to attack others facing a different world but how many jews could have >saved themselves during the 1930s by choosing to become illegal aliens in >the US or the UK. > >Practice disobedience. I heard a hilarious version of this, perhaps on another list a while back. Someone who had an office with several chairs for visitors in it was faced with people asking where they should sit. Visitor: "Where should I sit?" Office owner: "There." (points) visitor sits down... Office owner: "Sit over there." (points to another chair) visitor complies... Office owner: "No, go sit over there," (etc.) The point being that people who ask to be ordered around, when the situation doesn't warrant it (sometimes it may be appropriate/polite to ask where to sit, for example), deserve to be shown the folly of their ways. With regard to Hal's earlier point about the implications of cryptography, I don't worry much about it. Sure, the path we take in history will undoubtedly mean some folks who would have lived will now die....such is the nature of nearly all choices. (By not studying medicine and becoming an itinerant doctor in Africa, I have undoubtedly "killed" hundreds or even thousands of people living on the bare margin of survival who might likely have lived had one additional doctor been available. And so on.) Protecting my own privacy, my own financial dealings, using the currency of the form I wish to use (rather than which the State tries to compell me to use), and using other things on the Cypherpunks agenda can hardly be considered in the same class as coercing by physical force, murdering others, etc. I know Hal was not comparing use of crypto to coercion, but it needs to be said that what we are doing is fully moral by my standards. As to the Milgram case, I have no sympathies for the "traumatized." They knew they were subjects in an experiment, and were probably being paid for the experience. Besides, being one of the subjects I would think would be quite a memorable experience. In any case, since they actually harmed no one, but only were given a glimpse into their own psyches, what's the damage? (That they "felt" damaged is not enough, else every psychotherapist who aroused unwelcome memories and every party to a conversation who caused uncomfortable feelings would be similarly open to such claims of damage.) (Of course, the reality is that in today's world, Milgram's experiment would probably be labeled as torture--of the test subjects told to pull the levers--and he and his institution would be sued for multiple millions of dollars. One more reason for data havens, medical havens, and such.) If we go down the path of worrying about "psychic pain" inflicted on others, then how can we operate in a world of failed marriages and relationships, of hurt feelings, and of other such psychic damages? Emotional and psychological assault is part of the world, and is not at all the same as physical assault. We're losing track of this lately. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Milgram & Authority
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May If we go down the path of worrying about "psychic pain" inflicted on others, then how can we operate in a world of failed marriages and relationships, of hurt feelings, and of other such psychic damages? ....................................... What about the psychic trauma caused by Clipper? You could probably make a case for that, in terms of psychological warfare, given the current attitudes. Blanc

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Where to get PGP
by exabyte!smtplink!mikej＠uunet.UU.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 26 April 1994 by Mike Johnson) The latest commercial version is 2.4 The latest freeware Mac version is 2.3 The latest freeware version for all other platforms is 2.3a If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest information I have from them on compiled versions are: MS-DOS 2.4 Unix 2.4 (several different platforms) WinCIM CSNAV 2.4 Mac version expected late this summer. ViaCrypt David A. Barnhart, Product Manager 2104 West Peoria Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85029 Tel: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 E-Mail: 70304.41(a)compuserve.com E-Mail: wk01965(a)worldlink.com Credit card orders only. (800)536-2664 (8-5 MST M-F) The freeware version of PGP is intended for noncommercial, experimental, and scholarly use. It is available on thousands of BBSes, commercial information services, and Internet anonymous-ftp archive sites on the planet called Earth. This list cannot be comprehensive, but it should give you plenty of pointers to places to find PGP. Although the latest freeware version of PGP was released from outside the USA (New Zealand), it is not supposed to be exported from the USA under a strange law called the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of this, please get PGP from a site outside the USA if you are outside of the USA. This data is subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Thanks to Gary Edstrom and Hugh Miller for providing part of this data. FTP sites: soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) Verified: 21-Dec-93 ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ghost.dsi.unimi.it /pub/crypt Verified: 21-Dec-93 ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) /src/security/pgp23A.zip (MS-DOS executables & docs) /src/security/pgp23srcA.zip (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS, Amiga sources, docs, info on building PGP into mailers, editors, etc.) /src/security/pgp23A.tar.Z (Same as PGP22SRC.ZIP, in Unix tar format) /src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx (Macintosh version) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) csn.org /mpj/README.MPJ contains variable directory name -- read this first. /mpj/help explains how to get to hidden directory containing PGP /mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ contains current PGP /mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgptools/ contains related tools /mpj/public/pgp/ contains PGP shells, faq documentation, etc. ftp.netcom.com /pub/mpj (see README.MPJ -- similar layout to csn.org//mpj) /pub/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca (192.48.234.1) /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23A.zip /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23srcA.zip ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) StealthPGP: The Amiga version can be FTP'ed from the Aminet in /pub/aminet/util/crypt/ as StealthPGP1_0.lha. Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command: archie -s pgp23 (DOS Versions) archie -s pgp2.3 (MAC Versions) ftpmail: For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. BBS sites: Hieroglyphics Vodoo Machine (Colorado) DOS version only (303) 443-2457 Verified: 26-Dec-93 Colorado Catacombs BBS (Longmont, CO) v.32bis/v.42bis 14,400 baud (303) 938-9654 (Boulder, CO number) 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity (303) 678-9939 (Longmont, CO number) Exec-Net (New York) Host BBS for the ILink net. (914) 667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Carrying RIME, Throbnet, Smartnet, and Usenet Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> PGP 2.3A has been posted to the FidoNet Software Distribution Network and should soon be up on most if not all Canadian and U.S. nodes carrying SDN software. It has also been posted on almost all of the major private North American BBS systems, thence to countless smaller boards. Consult a list of your local BBSes; most with a sizeable file inventory should carry the program under the filenames listed below. If you find a version of the PGP package on a BBS or FTP site and it does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. Here is the result of an archie search for pgp: Host gatekeeper.dec.com Location: /.0/BSD/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 16 23:10 pgp Host hpcsos.col.hp.com Location: /mirrors/.hpib1/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 17 00:10 pgp Host netcom.com Location: /pub/halliday FILE -rwx------ 212992 Nov 27 20:21 pgp Location: /pub/kevitech FILE -rwxr-xr-x 89643 Dec 3 05:46 pgp Location: /pub/torin DIRECTORY drwx--x--x 4096 Jan 11 18:59 pgp Host quepasa.cs.tu-berlin.de Location: /.4/pub/bsd/386bsd-0.1/unofficial/doc/software FILE -rw-rw-r-- 12121 Feb 2 1993 pgp Host files1zrz.zrz.tu-berlin.de Location: /pub/mail DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Jan 11 1993 pgp Host sun.rz.tu-clausthal.de Location: /pub/atari/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 30 18:56 pgp Host ftp.uni-kl.de Location: /pub1/unix/security DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Feb 24 1993 pgp Host minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de Location: /pub/atari/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 30 17:56 pgp Host info1.rus.uni-stuttgart.de Location: /afs/.rus.uni-stuttgart.de/sw/rs_aix32/pgp-2.3/bin FILE -rwxr-xr-x 211318 Aug 23 1993 pgp Host info2.rus.uni-stuttgart.de Location: /afs/rus.uni-stuttgart.de/sw/rs_aix32/pgp-2.3/bin FILE -rwxr-xr-x 211318 Aug 23 1993 pgp Host jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu Location: /pub/public_domain_software/NetBSD/usr/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -rw-r--r-- 478 Jun 9 1993 pgp Host bloom-picayune.mit.edu Location: /pub/usenet-by-hierarchy/alt/security DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Mar 14 00:17 pgp Host mintaka.lcs.mit.edu Location: /pub DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jun 18 1993 pgp Host cecelia.media.mit.edu Location: /pub FILE -rw-r--r-- 321424 Nov 30 20:27 pgp Host josquin.media.mit.edu Location: /pub FILE -rw-r--r-- 321424 Nov 30 20:27 pgp Host archive.egr.msu.edu Location: /pub DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Mar 9 18:58 pgp Host xanth.cs.odu.edu Location: /pub DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Oct 18 00:00 pgp Host arthur.cs.purdue.edu Location: /pub/pcert/tools/unix DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jul 31 1993 pgp Host f.ms.uky.edu Location: /pub2/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -rw-r--r-- 478 Dec 17 02:10 pgp Host dime.cs.umass.edu Location: /pub/rcf/exp/build/pgp-2.3 FILE -rwxr-xr-x 241916 Mar 15 15:42 pgp Location: /pub/rcf/exp/build/pgp-2.3/src FILE -rwxr-xr-x 241916 Mar 15 15:41 pgp Host granuaile.ieunet.ie Location: /ftpmail-cache/ie/tcd/maths/ftp/src/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 2 11:43 pgp Host walton.maths.tcd.ie Location: /src/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 May 30 1993 pgp Location: /src/misc/pgp-2.0/src FILE -rwxr-xr-x 316640 Oct 18 1992 pgp Host cs.huji.ac.il Location: /pub/security DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Oct 26 19:26 pgp Host ftp.germany.eu.net Location: /pub/comp/msdos/local/utils DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jul 12 1993 pgp Host csn.org Location: /mpj/public DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Mar 14 20:30 pgp Host isy.liu.se Location: /pub/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Sep 19 00:00 pgp - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.4 mQCNAi0aFSUAAAEEAOCOKpaLepvJCFgIR4m+UvZe0IN8g7Guwc+6GH4u6UGTPxQO iAhk/MJ7E8LE4c55A1G8to2W4y3aKAHvi9QCYKnsLV8Ag0BYWo3bGGTPEfkS7NAI N+Zy6vSjuF1D6MUnbvrQJ5p4efz7a28iYRKoAdan2bfnvIYWUD9nBjyFM+vFAAUR tDdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajQgW2V4cCAz MSBEZWMgOTRdiQCVAgUQLTqfXj9nBjyFM+vFAQGU7wP/ZuuHfdAnCIblNCtbLLG8 39CSg6JIVa3KWfe0WIz6dXFU3cvl2Wt094kJgZ+Nmq01INWlib2lTOznbkA9sV1W q0aJSBHFWQH29qGmIdEqThs7A5ES2w8eRjJD80lxHodRIkBcC5KI6x4Mxo8cib5V BrwsvtG0+81HD6Mrpvc+a0GJAJUCBRAtJc2rZXmEuMepZt0BAe4hA/9YANYPY4Z3 1pXv2mT6ReC09cZS5U3+xxC5brQdLsQGKuH6QVs/b5oc6NV84sh8A9tZyHG2067o 3XIEyN7PPQzRm2UUnHHqw9lBCNhMiFQsAJi4W+m8zXrVrpJWK0Wv61eV2/XIQl0V d4lxu0r+MNRP6ID6FBzA4C9rO+RYEZmwOIkAlQIFEC0aGRzb/VZRBVJGuQEBfaUD /3c2h//kg843OIcYHG4gMDqdeeZLzGlp3RVvh0Rs3/T0YylJZGjPL2L/BF/vfLlB 9E2Urh9mDG/7hiB5FncrUnkmN63IkSj+K9YyfPyYxBVx06Srj8ZzYynh0N+zledd 6cnwxRXhaD3Wc4EfSNR7BH9M2rjkGzyb5to9cgBb0ng+ =BLg5 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-938-9654 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org ftp:csn.org//mpj/README.MPJ for crypto stuff | | |||/ /_\ | aka mpj(a)netcom.com mpjohnson(a)ieee.org mikej(a)exabyte.com | | |||\ ( | m.p.johnso(a)nyx.cs.du.edu CIS 71331,2332 PGP key by finger | | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLb2GQD9nBjyFM+vFAQGhkAP/SNtm2H+Id/P7ohoBIboe41GVKHWYxAyO I+wopaNMMLKpwQsIk16lFpJFL2HvtanZtJo7A8iIE/cQqzeQ55yaieepnPH6AbJB Mh1o81EywgrOUAp/D05aO6xUNlvSAEPaBe4FutxUacXsRrk4PUS4Upx1kbHCq68O BxcKObtAVhU= =mA3W -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Canada and SIGINT
by Bill Robinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm pursuing a personal research project on the Communications Security Establishment, Canada's own tiny version of the National Security Agency. I'm looking to make contact with anyone who has information, rumours, innuendo, hearsay, or whatever on this subject, or who is also just interested in it. If anyone *is* interested, I have put together an introductory briefing on CSE containing background information about the organization, its facilities, and its mandate, along with my somewhat speculative analysis of how its activities may relate to Canada's laws on eavesdropping. No secrets are revealed, but there is a fair amount of information that is pretty hard to find. E-mail me if you want me to send you a copy (at roughly 30k, it seemed a bit long to ship out to everybody :-). Ciao, Bill Robinson barobins(a)watserv1.uwaterloo.ca

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VMS Anonymous Remailer/LISTSERV Software
by cfrye＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks, this sounds like a start, the only question is do I have to have root capabilities to implement this? Do you know of a LISTSERV site I might contact? *** It sounds like you would need only your own account for email access, though the amount of traffic may attract your sysop's attention :-). Or, to leave the programming running "resident", you may require root priviledges after all. If there are hooks in the listserv source code allowing it to fire whenever a new message comes in, you wouldn't. I'm sorry, it's really late -- I'm trying to say that you probably won't need root priviledges to set up the remailer if you could have a daemon-like software agent waiting for the mail to come in. There, that wasn't so hard! <YAWN> I know that in the UNIX world, users have set up remailers in Netcom accounts and university accounts without root priviledges. For a complete list of publically accessible mailing lists, which includes LISTSERV's, look in the newsgroup news.answers and find the eight-part posting entitled something like "Guide to Publically Accessible Mailing Lists". I used the search term "Mailing List" and found it after a few tries. If you don't have access to Netnews, mail me and I'll get them for you. One LISTSERV location I know of is news-admin(a)auvm.american.edu. Yeah, it's an Internet address, but there should be a human on the other end. I wish I could help technically, but I hope this information gets you started on a successful project. Don't hesitate to ask if you think I could help out. g'night! Curt

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cute.. ;)
by johnsonc＠chem.udallas.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> == 1+4000 = 4001? I know this isn't your question. give me the real number haha... cute. oops, I guess I forgot an essential part of the problem.... that should be "If (1+4k) is _prime_, can it be expressed as the sum of squares? If so, what's the proof of this..." btw, for technicalities sake, let k be a variable!! cute matt ;) thanks again.... Carrie Anne >

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Detweiler
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who is Detweiler? Reuben

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VMS remailer?
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For people wanting to get more remailers going there seems to be a serious apathy for helping people get them going. After posting that I had come into possesion of a VAX account from which I might run a remailer and then asking for some help, I got all of ZERO responses (except from people asking me to help them if I did manage to get any information). Since I had already checked out the available code which only seems to work on UNIX accounts, perhaps someone might inform me that one cannot run a remailer from a VMS account. I assume this is the case since no one deigned to answer. Pretty bogus. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbyNrD2paOMjHHAhAQGy5gP/X0OgIotYPnF9+MneK9g+JGqVlhwQCZel B/Dy7Unb+c25TIjo7C3IwLzGZkst+3Lnt3SlPKUoqmpYRESiPeONZs+G1Ra6gXeD Hl/7eQFAQp+4T5medwDmp69m7gn3dMKQcVmBmSN8uZ5MN4KiaKuzExWPHNTAxWDD KpZQr2Pfcx4= =sG2o -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: VMS remailer?
by cfrye＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not a programmer, but you might write to a LISTSERV site and ask for the source code for the LISTSERV managing software. I would assume that you would need to make the following modifications: o Read the intended user's address from the first line of the message o Run the VMS version of a shell script to delete all header information above the intended address (like X-Anon-To:cfrye@mason1.gmu.edu) o Make the LISTSERV software use that X-Anon-To address as the desination, as opposed to a distribution list o Destroy all records of the incoming message, which is interesting on a VMS account as they are usually kept around for a day (I think?) OK folks, what am I missing? Curt

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RSA-129
by Derek Atkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We are happy to announce that RSA-129 = 1143816257578888676692357799761466120102182967212423625625618429\ 35706935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 = 3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 * 32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 The encoded message published was 968696137546220614771409222543558829057599911245743198746951209308162\ 98225145708356931476622883989628013391990551829945157815154 This number came from an RSA encryption of the `secret' message using the public exponent 9007. When decrypted with he `secret' exponent 106698614368578024442868771328920154780709906633937862801226224496631\ 063125911774470873340168597462306553968544513277109053606095 this becomes 200805001301070903002315180419000118050019172105011309190800151919090\ 618010705 Using the decoding scheme 01=A, 02=B, ..., 26=Z, and 00 a space between words, the decoded message reads THE MAGIC WORDS ARE SQUEAMISH OSSIFRAGE To find the factorization of RSA-129, we used the double large prime variation of the multiple polynomial quadratic sieve factoring method. The sieving step took approximately 5000 mips years, and was carried out in 8 months by about 600 volunteers from more than 20 countries, on all continents except Antarctica. Combining the partial relations produced a sparse matrix of 569466 rows and 524338 columns. This matrix was reduced to a dense matrix of 188614 rows and 188160 columns using structured Gaussian elimination. Ordinary Gaussian elimination on this matrix, consisting of 35489610240 bits (4.13 gigabyte), took 45 hours on a 16K MasPar MP-1 massively parallel computer. The first three dependencies all turned out to be `unlucky' and produced the trivial factor RSA-129. The fourth dependency produced the above factorization. We would like to thank everyone who contributed their time and effort to this project. Without your help this would not have been possible. Derek Atkins Michael Graff Arjen Lenstra Paul Leyland

3 3

help
by Roger Bryner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

info, please

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Re: DId you ever think...
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: uri(a)watson.ibm.com > Date: Tue, 26 Apr 1994 20:00:44 -0500 (EDT) > > jpp(a)markv.com says: > > Also, after reading Crypto '92 and '93 for a while, I am more and > > more impresed and suprised with the work that NSA put into creating > ^^^ > > DES from Lucifer. > > Surely you mean IBM? [Also a similar message which I unfortuenatly deleted so I can't credit the author :(] No, my writing ability is not in error here -- my mental model of the history of DES is what is in error. I will now update my personal model of DES development to include two steps at IBM. Lucifer -> proto-DES at IBM, and proto-DES -> DES at NSA. Learn something new every day... Since about 1977 I wondered what the 'rediscovered crypto techniques' were. Thanks! j'

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Crypto scripting language
by peace＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> > I was most >> > taken by the idea of a "Crypto Toolkit". I think it would be understand- >> > able to write the code in plain, vanilla C (as opposed to C++). One >> > good reason is the widespread availability of C compilers, especially >> > with UNIX. Additionally, C++ compilers do take up more space (although >> > this would be more of an issue with PCs. >> >> I think Tim had in mind something that was accessible more from a higher- >> level language than C or C++; ideally, something interpreted so you could >> sit down and type in a few commands to get something useful. Perl and >> TCL are two languages which Tim mentioned and which have been discussed >> here in the past. Smalltalk might do, although it is not as "freely" avail- >> able. >Yes, this is mostly what I meant. Lots of stuff here, and I really >should use my outline processor to do a better job of outlining >options, routes, and miscellaneous points. But I'll just make a few >notes here. (The theme of the next Cypherpunks meeting, date not yet >finalized, is "Protocols," so issues like this are presumably >relevant. Depending on the date, I may be in LEA., and would welcome >meeting with other Southland Cpunks to discuss ideas.) I wrote a cryptographic scripting language that has been implemented in a commercial product. I hesitate to post it here due to its length. If there is a place to send it where it can be archived for public down-load, I could do that. I am in the process of writing it up for a symposium, but have other things that I would rather do. If I could modify it to improve it's integration w/ telescript, I would like to do it, but I don't have telescript, does anyone here have it? Peace

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