December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Surety Technologies announces: Digital Notary System is on-line
by stuart＠surety.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many readers of this list have heard about the work that Scott Stornetta and I have done, beginning as Bellcore researchers a few years ago, on the problem of cryptographically secure digital time-stamping. In 1993 Bellcore spun off a company in order to commercialize this work. The company is called Surety Technologies, and we call our product and service the Digital Notary(tm) System. I am happy to report that we have just launched the product. To read about it, as well as to get the software, please visit our World-Wide Web home page: http://www.surety.com You can get the software and installation instructions directly by anonymous ftp to ftp.surety.com in the directory /dns/windows. Scott and I would both like to thank those readers of the list who have offered us their support, encouragement, and advice over the years. Stuart Haber | Surety Technologies provides Chief Scientist | the Digital Notary(tm) System. Surety Technologies, Inc. | General info: info(a)surety.com stuart(a)surety.com | (201) 701-0600, fax -0601

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internet mag
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This month's issue of Internet World Magazine deals primarily with internet security. I'm am not going to review everything in the mag but I'll list the table of content: Better Safe: Danger lurks on the Info Highway. You must take precaution to reduce your riks. By Dave Taylor and Rosalind Resnick Getting Cryptic: Phil Zimmermann's PGP gives you powerful encryption to keep your messages safe from prying eyes. Read all about it. By William Stalling. (Introductory article about PGP. Nothing we, here, don't already know) Securing the Enterprise: Connectiong your corporation to the Internet can be a security nightmare. Firewalls are the main line of defense. By Alton Hoover (An overview of Firewalls, application-layer gateways and token-based authentication schemes) Beyond the Firewall: The latest firewall technology not only detects intruders, but strikes back. By Winn Schwartau (Very interesting article. Here are some quotes to wet your appetite: Wouldn't it be nice if a computer system attacked from the Internet responded to the attack by striking back at the intruder? This is exactly what Sidewinder's implementation of type enforcement does.....It will detect the intrusion immediately....As soon as a violation occurs, a silent alarm is activated....sidewinder can be configured to react in any number of ways, once an attack has been detected...it can shut the intruder cold...(or)...it can invoke a mechanism that would record all the information from whence came the attack....By luring the attacker into a false sense of security, the hacker would continue trying to break in, unaware that every step was being recorded... Cashing In: As Internet commerce expands, a host of companies are vying to establish their system as the basis for cyberbanking and credit-card transactions. By Lisa Morgan Business Browser: New versions of Mosaic with built-in encryption promise to keep your transactions safe. By Richard W. Wiggins Unlawful Entry Crackers can feasts on your data if you fail to plug your leaky Unix system By Aaron Weiss (Five Ways to crack a Unix System) It's Alive: Although the furor has subsided, reports of Clipper's death are greatly exaggerated. The government's controversial eavesdropping effort lives on. By Steven Vaughan-Nichols Building Trust The chief executives of Trusted Information Systems -Steve Crocker and Steve Walker- talk about encryption, CyberCash, Clipper, and more. By Jeff Ubois. All in all a rather interesting mag. Check it out. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ wizard(a)alpha.c2.org Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Anonyous Cash through Options Trading
by pcw＠access.digex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several months ago, there was a discussion at length about how one could use the futures and options markets to transfer funds anonymously. This week's edition of Forbes magazine (Jan 30, 95) has the headline, "OIL! GUNS! GREED! Was Chase Manhattan ripped off by arms traffickers?" In the story, Forbes guesses that some suspiciously large losses in the options market could have been a smoke screen for money laundering: Oil traders do big business in unlisted options, providing a further smoke screen. Perkins points to deals in which Harris would buy a put option on a cargo of crude from a friendly counterpart like Bayoil and resell a similar contract in the oil market. If oil prices climbed, the put would expire worthless and Bayoil would pocket the price of the option, while Arochem would break even. If oil prices dropped, and the ultimate buyer exercised the put, Arochem could absorb the loss while conveniently neglecting to exercise its put against Bayoil, Perkins theorizes. (pg 87)

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Re: JP vs Homer
by jalicqui＠prairienet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> We are capable of controlling mail bombs, for instance, in the >following way: > > Take an incoming message, capture From: line. Strip header. MD5 body. >Add to sorted table [From: MD5(message) date]. Check for repetition of >first two fields. If reps = 1, forward message. If reps = 2, send message >to From: "Possible error. Two copies of message <message> received." If >reps = 0 mod 5, send letter to postmaster@From:. "Possible mailbomb or >spam. <reps> copies of <message> received from <From:> at your site in the >past week." Clear table of entries more than a week old every midnight. > > > If all remailers did this, then no matter where the net was entered, >the messages would be rejected. And spammers/bombers would be spamming/ >bombing their own postmaster. Probably a bad idea. If not all did it, >then add special handling to hit remailer-operator@. This would encourage >the operator to auto-magically handle the spam-bomb himself. This works only if one assumes that the exact same message is posted using the exact same path. Granted, it would probably be effective for novice spammers. Consider a premail/chain type script and a cleartext spam message. The script is executed once every five minutes, say. When it runs, it creates a new random path through the remailers, adding encryption wrappers for each hop. Your spam detector would miss this one completely unless your remailer was used as the terminal remailer for a significant number of spams. More significantly, the MD5 hashes of each message would be different even if the same path were used more than once because the PGP session key would be different (again, unless your remailer would be the terminal remailer in the particular path that repeated).

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WSJ on CIA Dump
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Wall Street Journal January 18, 1995, p. A14. Get Smart -- Eliminate the CIA By Angelo Codevilla Over the past several years, U.S. intelligence agencies in general and the CIA in particular have proved themselves incompetent in peacetime and of little use in conflict. Stripped of their mystique and lacking the capacity to reform themselves, these organizations are virtually in receivership. The maladies ailing the intelligence community are numerous. Independent quality control was never more than a pretense, and competition among intelligence agencies was nonexistent. Producers of intelligence -- rather than the soldiers and diplomats who have to use it -- have also become its judges. All this has spawned a complex of habits, procedures, mentalities and people too entrenched to be repaired and too noxious for any part to form the nucleus of a new, healthy system. Hence, we should take Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan's advice, and rethink our intelligence from the ground up. A good place to start is with the fact that about half of the $28 billion U.S. intelligence budget pays for units directly controlled by military commanders, which routinely provide precise information for the armed forces' operations close to the front lines. The Treasury and State Departments also have their own intelligence units, which fit their needs quite well. So why do we need a national system headed by the CIA? The original justification for the creation of the CIA in 1947 was that intelligence would be best if its gathering and evaluation were divorced as much as possible from the operating departments of government -- State, Defense, etc. -- and placed under the president. This judgment has turned out to be wrong. Because presidents have relied on the CIA to run the system, the result has been a system dominated by the priorities of the producers -- not the users -- of intelligence. A basic failing is that the CIA has primary responsibility for intelligence and none at all for real world events. The CIA prefers to place its career employees in U.S. embassies, where they pretend to be employees of other parts of the government. Such "case officers" must acknowledge that they are gathering information for the U.S. Another disadvantage is that they don't speak foreign languages well. And unlike successful reporters, they virtually never know the substantive fields about which they are seeking information. Thus it is unsurprising that they are usually outdone in economic reporting by economic reporters, in military reporting by military reporters, and so forth. The Aldrich Ames case shows how much more highly the CIA values the smooth functioning of its system than what the system produces. Mr. Ames handed the KGB the capacity to shape the intelligence flowing to top U.S. officials during the endgame of the Cold War. Thus disinformation made presidents and secretaries of state more vulnerable to Gorbomania than the average citizen informed by newspaper accounts. How could the CIA fail to notice the fishiness of reports generated by a network controlled by the other side? The same way that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the agency had failed to notice that it was passing along reports from a network of agents in Cuba totally controlled by Castro's DGI, and from a network in East Germany all but a few of whose agents were working for the Stasi. In other words, while the Ames case was unusually destructive, it was a typical example of bureaucratic sclerosis. In the Gulf War, intelligence worsened the farther one got away from the front lines. The national system headed by the CIA misperceived the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime, failed to grasp the obvious signs of attack, and has yet to learn Saddam's military and political reasoning. Our imaging satellites failed to find mobile Scud launchers, and our communications intelligence antennas failed to shed light on the diplomatic intercourse between Saddam and the Soviets. National analysts misjudged Iraq's nuclear program, and were fooled by elementary camouflage. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf's public belittling of CIA-run intelligence was matched by unprintable epithets from field commanders. What happened in the Gulf would have happened in any conflict because the intelligence community's cameras and antennas were conceived, and its people trained, on the CIA's assumption that cooperative competition with the Soviet Union would last forever and that the basic designs of weapons would not change. Thus cameras, for example, were optimized to take pictures of fixed installations rather than to keep track of attacking military forces or mobile missile launchers. Long before the Soviet collapse, however, it had become clear that the CIA made bad bets. The age of mobile missiles arrived long ago, and modern weapons are defined by the software they contain rather than by observable features. So what's the point of, for example, analyzing a radar signal that a computer can change in an instant? Divorce from operational responsibility also tends to make the reports that flow to top officials less valuable than the information used to compile them. (In any given subject, the CIA delivers a consensus of the system's several agencies. It takes far more time for a paper to go through the interagency process than for someone to write the paper. Considering the elementary errors and ignorance that often come out, it is clear that the conferees do not spend much time fact-checking. Intelligence analysts become spin doctors, concerned not with facts but with pushing policy makers in the direction of their parent agencies' prejudices. Hence the ultimate irony: A system whose ostensible reason for being was to eliminate from intelligence the parochial interests of tank drivers, diplomats, bomber pilots, etc. ended up aggregating the prejudices of the analysts -- prejudices unrelieved by the sobering prospect of having to carry out the policies they are pushing for. The CIA has maintained a monopoly on judging the quality of the system's operations and products. It does not heed presidents, much less their appointees. A decade ago, the agency ignored President Reagan's executive order to reorganize counterintelligence. Two decades ago, President Ford, shocked by how far intelligence estimates were diverging from reality, asked a group of distinguished outsiders (the B team) to see whether the intelligence community's data on Soviet nuclear forces could support conclusions different from those of the insider analysts. The B Team, despite resistance from the agency, came up with results far superior to the insider A Team's. A better intelligence system should be built on a model radically different from the 1947 original. Each of the major departments of the U.S. government (State, Defense, etc.) should be responsible for gathering and evaluating the information it needs to operate in the new world disorder. Intelligence, in short, should be franchised out to its consumers. There is reason to believe that the departments would do better without the ClA's tutelage than with it. In the past, the armed forces have asked to deploy officers who speak foreign languages, who could blend in with the local population, and who would be experts in the military fields on which they were reporting. U.S. military leaders have also clamored for satellites whose products they could use. Each time, the CIA made sure such requests were denied. If those requests had been granted, the country would be better informed. In all this there is a need for some central coordination. The several agencies have to mesh their quest for agents abroad, lest they stumble over each other. The information that any part of the government collects must be available to properly cleared people in all other parts, so that any and all analysis can be based on all the facts. Fortunately, maintaining a central registry nowadays requires computers, rather than the bureaucratic monster that arose a half century ago. Finally the president of the United States' own intelligence needs should be provided by his own staff. Among its duties should be to make sure that all the agencies get each others' estimates. The availability to the president and other top decision makers of contrasting estimates from through out the government would stimulate better performance all around. So, while there is a role for a central intelligence agency in a system based on consumer sovereignty, there is none for the CIA. Mr. Codevilla, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of "Informing Statecraft" (Free Press, 1992). End

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BYTE on PGP WoT
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

William Stallings writes in the BYTE February issue on "The PGP Web of Trust."

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by jalicqui＠prairienet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>For example, the Linux mavens could tell us if Linux-based remailer >boxes could be hung on dedicated connections to The Little Garden >network, as a specific example. A "black box remailer" such as several >folks have suggested (Chaum (in 1981), me, Eric Hughes, others) might be >buildable for under a grand. We could ask here for contributions, and >might even raise this amount of money. Then each of us who contributed >could have "accounts," maybe several of them. Imagine 100 or more >"remailers" all on this one machine--I'm deliberately ignoring the >security issue for now. Little Garden has stated categorically that >they will not tell users what they can or can't do with their machines >(though I can think of some cases where they might have to, as with >spamming, etc.). Anyway, you can see where I'm headed. The "Linux mavens" followed by the "black box" stuff sparked an idea... First, before delving into dreamland: I'm sure Linux could be hung off just about any store-and-forward (a la UUCP) or TCP/IP-based network there is with a minimum of trouble. Linux junkies are familiar with the concept of "distributions". For the uninitiated, Linux itself is just a kernel; Linus Torvalds doesn't hold anyone's hand when it comes to actually turning that kernel into a working system. As a result, people have done this job themselves: they build their own working systems painstakingly from scratch and then archive it off to disk or CD-ROM, which they sell or give away. Most of the time, when you get Linux, you're actually getting one of these "distributions" of Linux, complete with all the frills that don't come with the kernel (like the shell, basic utils, and so on). Now how 'bout this: Consider a new distribution of Linux, the "Cypherpunk" distribution (if ya don't like the name, make up yer own!). This would be a bare minimum of a distribution, with nothing fancy: bash, misc. utils like ls, etc. This can fit (tightly) in 20 MB. The supplied kernel would have every networking option under the sun turned on, but would be otherwise bare of frills as well. Now let's add minimal network utils (telnet and telnetd for connecting and sendmail for obvious reasons), perl, PGP, and a remailer package. To make it as easy as possible, I'd use the UMSDOS filesystem, so that Linux could be installed on a DOS machine without any reformatting, repartitioning, or similar headaches. We could make this available via FTP or press some CD-ROMs if we were ambitious. Better yet, the cool Linux thing to do now is to install via NFS; this makes installing Linux as easy as sticking in a boot disk and pointing the install program at the NFS server (well, not quite, but pretty close). After adding in the cute little install program (like the Slackware distribution already has) and some boot options, you'd have an "instant remailer" software package, able to transform any 386SX/4MB RAM DOS machine or better into a Linux-based remailer site, complete with aliases, logging policies, etc. already configured for you. I bet even Tim May could install this if it were done right. :-) So, am I dreaming, or does this sound viable to y'all?

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Re: Cone of silence update
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Begin Forwarded Message ---------- Date: Wed, 18 Jan 95 21:03:02 -0500 From: burton(a)het.brown.edu (Joshua W. Burton) To: silent-tristero(a)world.std.com Subject: Cone of silence update I haven't been able to turn up the original New York Times article I saw, but our own Providence (RI) Journal today reprinted an article from the Washington Post, no date given, that tells substantially the same story, though without any mention of the cost of Intelink. Since a few people have asked me for details, I thought I'd better post this verbatim. Be sure to save a copy, in case this article disappears the way the first one I saw did.... GOVERNMENT'S SECRETS FLOW THROUGH AN INTERNET CLONE WASHINGTON - When the US intelligence community recently decided to modernize the way it communicates, it did what countless other government agencies, businesses and individuals have done over the last few years: it turned to the Internet. But the regular Internet wouldn't do. For spies and other government officials concerned about secrecy, that very public, very uncontrollable global mesh of computer networks was too risky a place to do business. So the intelligence community created its own Internet. Dubbed Intelink and based on the same technology used to run and navigate the original Internet, this new network for sharing supersecret information---including satellite imagery and video footage---officially began operating just a few weeks ago. When the bugs are worked out and a final system is in place, it will allow analysts, policy-makers, military officials and soldiers in the field to tap quickly and directly into classified information at the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Pentagon and diverse other parts of the national security bureaucracy. Those familiar with Intelink say it could promote cooperation in a business characterized by internecine rivalry, and that at the very least it will centralize and speed up information retrieval. ``This is a major breakthrough,'' said Barry Horton, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications and intelligence. ``Intelink for the first time, in a user-friendly environment, allows every element of the intelligence community and every element of the Department of Defense to reach into every other element,'' he said. As one might imagine, it's not for everybody. Horton said the system is now available only to people with ``Top Secret'' or higher security clearances. Moreover, those who run the system eventually will have to confront a major issue of how to make Intelink flexible enough to accommodate users with a variety of clearances. There are many levels of classification higher than Top Secret, and for Intelink to be useful to those working on the most secret programs, the officials responsible would have to be comfortable placing such information on the system. And, while Pentagon and CIA officials spoke of how Intelink promises to improve communication and cooperation among the agencies and reduce duplication of effort, others said there is good reason to be skeptical. The intelligence community has made innumerable attempts to eliminate redundancy and streamline information channels, but there has been little progress. ``It's gone like gangbusters since its inception, but any Internet-like thing grows overnight. The question is, is it going to mature well? And how will it operate in a time of crisis?'' said Ross Stapleton-Gray, who recently left the CIA to start a business providing Internet services to embassies in Washington. In a way it is fitting that what some call an Internet ``clone'' should come out of the national security bureaucracy. Internet itself was started under Department of Defense sponsorship in the 1960s, as an attack-proof communications link among military, corporate and university research centers. ``Remember, Internet is a DoD creation,'' said Neil Munro, a reporter for Washington_Technology, a local business newspaper, who recently broke the story about Intelink's start-up. ``This is the prodigal son....They created it and now it comes back in much stronger fashion.'' All those familiar with the system said it is totally walled off from the Internet, and designed never to be penetrated. But several experts familiar with Intelink noted that no system is ever totally secure. ``This would obviously be a Mount Everest for hackers,'' said John E. Pike of the Federation of American Scientists. But Pike, who said he thinks Intelink has the potential to ``revolutionize'' the intelligence community, added that it would be so difficult to crack he doubts many will try. The network now operates among several dozen intelligence agencies and centers. But it is the talk of the intelligence community, and its reach is expected to grow rapidly. Those who now have regular access to it number in the hundreds, estimated Martin C. Faga, general manager of the Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems at the Mitre Corp., the company that helped the intelligence agencies set up the system. ----------- End Forwarded Message -----------

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"Time" Magazine and "Future Shock" Author
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I'm into my daily "blackout" of toad mail to Netcom, so am posting blind, as usual. If this article has already been posted, my condolences.] The January 23rd issue of "Time," this week's issue, features a cover story on talk shows, Limbaugh, Gingrich, and "HyperDemocracy." I haven't seen the physical issue yet, but have skimmed the Web version at: http://www.timeinc.com/time/magazine/magazine.html Point your browser at it and have fun. Lots of folks are flaming the article, in the usual newsgroups (e.g., alt.data-highway). Me, I'm as scared as "Time" is about "direct, electronic democracy," though perhaps for different reasons. On a related note, the article and sidebars touch heavily on the "cybergurus" who are advising Newt Gingrich on his journey into cyberscpace, notably Alvin Toffler ("Future Shock," "The Third Wave," "Powershift," etc.) and George Gilder ("Beyond Wealth and Poverty," "Macrocosm," lots of essays on the Net). As it happens, I spent some time talking to Alvin and Heidi Toffler at an interview last Friday in L.A.--they were being interviewed before and after me. Not enough time to really get into issues, and of course they did most of the talking (Heidi is especially opinionated, and had just been in a highly publicized battle with newage guru Arianne Huffington, spacey wife of losing candiate in California, Michael H.). Anyway, we talked about John Brunner (as you all know, Brunner's seminal "The Shockwave Rider," was inspired by "Future Shock") and his ideas. (And we all agreed that "Stand on Zanzibar" was his crowning achievement...even Shalmaneser admitted "Christ, what an imagination he's got.") Tidbits: * on digital cash: Heidi: "Oh, we're for it! Did you hear what I just told the interviewer?" (I didn't, as I was in the adjacent room. Later comments lead me to believe that neither of the Tofflers has a clear idea of what's going to happen with digital cash and crypto anarchy.) * on the NSA and the t-shirt I showed them ("Cypherpunks: putting the NSA out of business"): "Oh, no, we need a strong NSA now more than ever!" (What else would I expect? They view the NSA as the main bastion against terrorists plotting to blow up the World Trade Center. Alvin was generally more reserved and thoughtful. When I pointed out that the very hotel room we were in could be used to plot crimes, even nuclear terrorism, and that the solution to stop this would have to be an Orwellian regime of continuous monitoring, Alvin nodded thoughtfully, but Heidi just sniffed. I mention this to give a flavor, just a whiff, of what senior advisors to the most influential man in America are thinking.) * I gave Alvin a copy of my "Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities" paper. * My interview was pretty disappointing, by the way. Lots of sitting around, delays in getting my laptop hooked up to Netcom (outside calls had to be unblocked). The interviewer wanted memorable, quotable stuff from me, but I felt constricted sitting around and being expected to spout on cue. Maybe they'll get a few minutes of usable stuff.... (Print media is so much better. An interviewer can let the tape recorder run for hours, can edit the containing material of a quote, and can thus produce clear, coherent quotes. A video interview is more constrained in lots of ways, and offending gestures or rambling interjections cannot be easily edited out. As one example, at one point I naturally (to me at least) said something about "As we just saw...." Well, this made this quote unusable. And so it goes.) I was generally unhappy with the whole thing. Four hours to get there, two hours spend waiting around, an hour to resolve problems, an hour under the camera lights (being told not to move, to "use the mouse," to "tell us why cryptography is important," etc.), and five hours to get home. All for a few minutes at most on a t.v. show. Oh, the show is the BBC's "Horizons" science series, which may also get sold to U.S. outlets, etc. I think the title will be "The Information Bomb," and features segments on information warfare, a la Winn Schwartau's views, the Tofflers, some military planners, and--maybe--me. I don't have high hopes for my segment. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tc/tcmay

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"Disclosing" private email
by Arthur Chandler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings! I'd like to solicit your/our best thoughts on the following message. San Francisco State University is considering a policy of "disclosing" private email to outside agencies. I'm aware that such a policy is yet another argument for using crypto; and the last cypherpunks meeting gave some encouraging instances of "transparent" encryption schemes that are not a hassle or a fear-barrier for newbies. But if you could post or private email me your thoughts about the legal/ethical aspects of "disclosure," I'd be much obliged. I've put a few of my own concerns at the end of the enclosed quote. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >From: "Deirdre C. Donovan" <deirdre(a)mercury.sfsu.edu> > >I am rewriting the information handouts which we here in San Francisco >give out to our students when they apply for Internet access accounts. >The issue with which I am struggling is one of privacy. I have heard of >universities (anecdotally only) where the administration reserves the >right to read E-mail. Here, we are leaning more toward something like the >paragraph below, which is taken verbatim from an Indiana University draft >document. > > IU computing centers will maintain the confidentiality of all > information stored on their computing resources. Requests for > disclosure of confidential information will be reviewed by the > administrator of the computer system involved. Such requests > will be honored only when approved by University officials > authorized by the [President] of the campus involved, or when > required by state or federal law. Except when inappropriate, > computer users will receive prior notice of such disclosures. > I'm uneasy about the chain of "prior notice": 1) Does this policy give university administrators the power to read private email before the decision is made to "disclose" it to outside persons or agencies? 2) Does this "prior notice" mean "We're going to do it" or "We plan to do it, and if you disagree, let's discuss it before we release it"? 3) What constitutes "inappropriate"?

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CDT, RSACi, and "public service" groups (1/3)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 24 Jul 1997 15:12:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Cc: chris_barr(a)cnet.com Subject: CDT, RSACi, and "public service" groups On Thu, 24 Jul 1997, Jonah Seiger wrote: > We do not believe ratings are appropriate for news sites or sites that are > geared toward public discussion of political/social issues (CDT has refused > to rate our sites with RSAC). Of course that hasn't stopped CDT from, as I understand it, proposing a "public service site" exemption to RSAC, similar to the "news site" exemption. Under such an RSAC-PS scheme, organizations defined as legitimate "public service" groups -- and only those groups! -- would be exempt from labeling each of their pages for violence, nudity, and so on. After all, if CDT wanted to label and the RSAC-PS scheme didn't exist, they'd have to cordon off the portion of their site with the Pacifica decision as inappropriate for children. The RSAC working group discussed "public service sites," according to RSAC head Stephen Balkam, during a conference call on July 10. RSAC-PS raises the same troubling questions as RSACnews: what is a "public service" group? Who decides? Is CDT? Focus on the Family? The fight-censorship archives? The Cato Institute? The Washington Post? The U.S. Congress? The Democratic Party? NAMBLA? Jim Bell's Multnomah County Common Law Court? The above is what I understand to be the case. I emailed CDT a week ago about this but haven't heard back. I'd appreciate clarification. -Declan

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UUNET Customer Liaison: USENET "netiquette" Reminder
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It would appear that UUNET does not consider themselves to be a common carrier any more -- they now claim the right to cut sites off for violating netiquette. .pm ------- Forwarded Message From: help(a)uunet.uu.net (UUNET Customer Liaison) Message-Id: <QQxzjt24313.199501191826(a)odin.UU.NET> Subject: USENET "netiquette" Reminder To: news-subscribers(a)uunet.uu.net Date: Thu, 19 Jan 1995 13:26:40 -0500 (EST) Because of recent improper use by users on AlterNet sites we are sending out this reminder to all sites currently subscribing to news. If you have not reviewed the accepted USENET netiquette with your users recently we strongly suggest you take this opportunity to do so. Before you or your users post to USENET, please take the time to learn the rules of the environment which you are entering. Doing so can make the difference between creating a good name for you and your company on the Internet or a bad one. Please read the postings contained in news.announce.newusers to familiarize yourself with the etiquette of USENET. This information may also be obtained via anonymous FTP at UUNET's archive (ftp.uu.net) in the directory /usenet/news.answers/news-newusers-intro.Z UUCP customers may obtain the file via UUCP. It is your responsibility to ensure that the users on your system are also aware of the proper guidelines for posting to USENET. Improper use of "netiquette", the guidelines of the USENET community, will be viewed as a violation of the rules of a network. This is in violation of your contract with UUNET/AlterNet and will likely result in your a loss of news posting privileges for your site. Tamara Bowman help(a)uunet.uu.net Manager Technical Support uunet!help UUNET Technologies, Inc. ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: UUNET Customer Liaison: USENET "netiquette" Reminder
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It would appear that UUNET does not consider themselves to be a common > carrier any more -- they now claim the right to cut sites off for > violating netiquette. Strange. First, they were never a common carrier: they went to some legal pains to get registered as an enhanced service provider. I don't know what the differences are, but when the first "Internet Porn" article by Joe Abernathy appeared years ago, Rick wasn't worried. He told me ESP was better then CC, but I don't remember why (perhaps it was no FCC regulation?) It's unclear how this new policy affects their ESP status. /r$

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by david d `zoo' zuhn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

// Are there options for several machines to share a connection? (I'm // sure there are....). Someone who already has a connection may be // willing to host additional machines, which could share some of the // charges. Around here (in the Twin Cities) one can get a dedicated connection for $100/month without any startup fees. And of course one can set up a local network and use the machine with the modem link as a router. Having one of these dedicated lines, I'd be happy to host remailer-boxes at my site. Ideally, they'll be small & only require a network cable and a power cord. I'm also willing to seriously consider initiating remailer-accounts on my machine. If you'd be interested in a remailer account, drop me a line. -- - david d `zoo' zuhn -| armadillo zoo software -- St. Paul, Minnesota -- zoo(a)armadillo.com --| unix generalist (and occasional specialist) ------------------------+ http://www.armadillo.com/ for more information pgp key upon request +----------------------------------------------------

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Re:I have had ENOUGH of this government bullshit!!
by David Yaffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm Canadian, and I am really scared by what is going on in the States. If the US gooberment succeeds in banning/controlling crypto, how long will it be before it happens here. Does anyone know if the Canadi-humm gooberment is trying to do ban/control crypto? And to the person who wrote this I have one word: A-F*CKIN-Men! >Screw this. I have finally blown my stack over this bullshit governmental >crap. From this oint forward, I fully and completely make available, IN THE >U.S, the International version of PGP 2.63.ix. >If there are any cops, Feds, Spies, wops, spics, gigaboos, alternate >lifestyles, punks, crackers, crackheads, whatever other name calling terms, >I left out, want to stop me --- TRY!!!! This is bullshit people! We have >the inalieable right to full and total screcy, privacy, and personal >protection of whatever * W E * determine to be private information. The >government has gotten out of hand with this shit. If you are a member of the >F.B.I, C.I.A, S.S, N.S.A, X.Y.Z community and you don't like this action, >show up at my doorstep guns drawn. Cause you show up at MY door step, you'll >need them! That I promise! David. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBM9m01DoM1b3tdf0JAQGbTwP+O3SE9MjWYBGsSjhlk+9PhbNrKsstHgVH zG8kTfcAyAku5OEQt3bNGCbStsxiAGkYjhqT2G5i+cvdjSODMive5V2tquSjacz2 yn5GrEfGq4fUJbr1FuFN6xO+2xHSvjEVmMa5bHz8XOjDTP3NvGQUnhbcQC+YoLPi sa05zvnWd7Q= =axM8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailer-on-a-CD
by jalicqui＠prairienet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>The "Linux mavens" followed by the "black box" stuff sparked an idea... > >>package. To make it as easy as possible, I'd use the UMSDOS filesystem so >>that Linux could be installed on a DOS machine without any reformatting >>repartitioning, or similar headaches. > >>distribution already has) and some boot options, you'd have an "instant >>remailer" software package, able to transform any 386SX/4MB RAM DOS macine >>or better into a Linux-based remailer site, complete with aliases, loggng > >>So, am I dreaming, or does this sound viable to y'all? > >OK, let's ponder the minimum hardware necessary, >possible minimal configuration (Intel/clone based): > >(1) Case. >(2) Power supply. >(3) Motherboard/CPU and 4mb RAM. >(4) Hard drive w/ controller. >(5) modem card. Add "standard serial port" here, for reasons I'll get into in a moment... >(5) No monitor, keyboard, floppy, or video card. > (a) would require some "umbilical cord" connection to initially > set up from another PC. > (b) need to operate on "umbilical", direct and uucp modes. The "umbilical cord" here could be a standard serial port; this could be used in several ways. In addition, Linux has the ability to do TCP/IP through the parallel ports (using a LapLink-style protocol), so that could possibly work as well. There are a few options here: Reuse the monitor, keyboard, etc. for each installation. Go ahead and throw in the floppy, and set up the Linux kernel on the floppy to use the serial port as the console instead of the monitor/keyboard. Connect your second PC using the PLIP (that's the parallel port IP stuff) protocol. On the second PC, one would run a program that wouls telnet to the first PC and run the install program, which would run via NFS on the PLIP line. >I am just thinking out loud here, but the hardware could be damn >cheap (sub $500). You can find old 386 boards with 4mb right on >the board (no SIMMs) for next to nothing (the decreasing popularity >of 30-pin SIMMs makes this a surplus store reality, as nobody >wants to bother to strip out the RAM chips anymore). As far as price, I've seen 386SX motherboards run for $99. At a going rate of $50 per MB of RAM, buying a used MFM disk and controller for, say, $40 (I had the option of buying a junk box full of stuff, including two 20MB drives and a 10MB, for $100), some cheap $10 everything-board, a $70 14.4 modem, and a power supply at $50 (here I may be way off), that adds up to... $470. Not a bad guess! And this assumes you pay new prices for the motherboard, RAM, multiport, modem, and power supply... Also, if you wanted to splurge, you could opt for a few more MB of RAM and a CD-ROM drive. With our recently pressed "Cypherpunk Toolkit" CD-ROMs :-) and a boot floppy, you wouldn't necessarily need to install anything at all; the Linux kernel could store site-specific info (entered the first time you booted up via a cute user-friendly interface) on the floppy and load it to a RAMdisk, mounting the CD-ROM for all the rest of the interesting stuff. On multipurpose systems (you only use the computer a few hours per day and run the remailer using some store-and-forward system the rest of the time), this wouldn't take up any hard disk space, and your remailer could conveniently disappear with a simple Ctrl-Alt-Del and the slam of a safe door. ("But officer, all I have on my hard drive is DOS and Windows. See for yourself! I don't even have PGP here...") You know, the more I think about this, the more ideas pop into my head. I'd better quit before I get dizzy... What if the site-specific stuff on the floppy were encrypted... or the kernel... ? Could we use Matt Blaze's CFS...? Store the site-specifics on a data haven for backup... with auto-download on bootup... notebook remailers in car trunks using RadioMail or POP3 that have no single physical location... dynamic remailer configuration (download your IP address and alias info, etc. from the Remailer Server)...? STOP THE WORLD, I WANT TO GET OFF!!! There; that's better. Maybe I'll play around this weekend and try building a minimal Linux distribution (on what hard disk space :-). Then again, maybe I won't, so don't be bashful to play around on your own!

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Internet World Magazine
by jml＠wizard.synapse.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This month's issue of Internet World Magazine deals primarily with internet security. I'm am not going to review everything in the mag but I'll list the table of content: Better Safe: Danger lurks on the Info Highway. You must take precaution to reduce your riks. By Dave Taylor and Rosalind Resnick Getting Cryptic: Phil Zimmermann's PGP gives you powerful encryption to keep your messages safe from prying eyes. Read all about it. By William Stalling. (Introductory article about PGP. Nothing we, here, don't already know) Securing the Enterprise: Connectiong your corporation to the Internet can be a security nightmare. Firewalls are the main line of defense. By Alton Hoover (An overview of Firewalls, application-layer gateways and token-based authentication schemes) Beyond the Firewall: The latest firewall technology not only detects intruders, but strikes back. By Winn Schwartau (Very interesting article. Here are some quotes to wet your appetite: Wouldn't it be nice if a computer system attacked from the Internet responded to the attack by striking back at the intruder? This is exactly what Sidewinder's implementation of type enforcement does.....It will detect the intrusion immediately....As soon as a violation occurs, a silent alarm is activated....sidewinder can be configured to react in any number of ways, once an attack has been detected...it can shut the intruder cold...(or)...it can invoke a mechanism that would record all the information from whence came the attack....By luring the attacker into a false sense of security, the hacker would continue trying to break in, unaware that every step was being recorded... Cashing In: As Internet commerce expands, a host of companies are vying to establish their system as the basis for cyberbanking and credit-card transactions. By Lisa Morgan Business Browser: New versions of Mosaic with built-in encryption promise to keep your transactions safe. By Richard W. Wiggins Unlawful Entry Crackers can feasts on your data if you fail to plug your leaky Unix system By Aaron Weiss (Five Ways to crack a Unix System) It's Alive: Although the furor has subsided, reports of Clipper's death are greatly exaggerated. The government's controversial eavesdropping effort lives on. By Steven Vaughan-Nichols Building Trust The chief executives of Trusted Information Systems -Steve Crocker and Steve Walker- talk about encryption, CyberCash, Clipper, and more. By Jeff Ubois. All in all a rather interesting mag. Check it out. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ wizard(a)alpha.c2.org Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:14 AM 1/19/95 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >* I favor separating the "account that remails" from the "owner of the >site," as I have argued in vain in the past. (Example: a willing site >gives out or sells many accounts...each is legally separate, and each >must be legally challenged. My longer posts dealt with this.) I offer to pay for and operate a remailer account on any system that will have me. Do we have the software yet to run a remailer out of an account? >It's time to get cracking on this crisis. The Cable companies may come to our rescue. Even old fuddy-duddy Cablevision is going to be offering connections this year. If those connections are characterised merely as physical connections, that could offer legal protections. My contrib for now will be to draft an all purpose response letter to respond to civilian and official complaints concerning remailer abuse. DCF - -- You know, Private Idaho brings PGP signing within about 10 keystrokes in any Windows mailer. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLx6vUYVO4r4sgSPhAQFjzgP/ZVAonNBsZpMCg/tlWohvC7ratGTZWtCz /WXC+Z1PAKhigdz8VhWhkPXLj/jYba1LUMBI9giNP6T9TSxMw6jjzgvs44tw4LF4 X0pF/lv9OS7GKcPw//4FyB1FKgfwpJA+mHr8gqlLrxREXv3qpHfKRuu/ecg5urmS jwiSSKsjZhU= =Aoq4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >What are the cheapest "live connections" (24-hour a day connections) >available? Where I am, about $100 a month, plus whatever the local >phone company charges for a dedicated line. ISDN is an option, but it >looks to cost $400-800 to get started, plus a monthly charge (which I >don't recall, except that I "gulped" when I heard it). I am currently using ISDN from my home in San Jose. You're right in that the startup costs are the barrier--even a cheap single B channel (56K) terminal adapter for use with a serial port will run $300-$400 dollars. The telco charges are minimal in my area; $25 monthly for the line itself (115 Kbps async bandwidth). Connect charges are free for non peak usage, and $0.60/hour for peak usage time (0800 to 1700) Mon-Fri. This is the Pacific Bell "Residential" ISDN plan. For business lines, it goes up to $50 monthly with $0.60/hour 24 hours a day. In addition to this would apply any standard long distance charges that would apply to a particular call. This is an excellent setup for fast, cheap, INTERMITTENT connection to the Internet. My particular ISP is in Santa Cruz, with POPS in SC, SJ, and soon Monterey. An unlimited connect time PPP account runs $75 monthly. This actually gets me a three bit subnet so that I can put five IP boxes and an ISDN router on my ethernet at home. A remailer in this scenario would need to have their MX record point to their ISP, and process mail via POP (incoming) and SMTP (outgoing). It would be straightforward to implement a timed or demand dial scenario (say, every fifteen minutes) to accomplish this. While not the ideal (continuous internet connection with pure SMTP based mail transport), it would suffice for a moderately loaded remailer, I'd imagine. Of course, this involves the mail subsystem of your ISP, partially defeating the purpose of having ubiquitous anonymous remailer "instances" whose operation is outside the control of an ISP. Still, it would be a good start. == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLx7Y2E1Diok8GKihAQExmwP8DmWuHMunZoaA4Y8qh7jx56hqgs4p3Bgo DgHf2J4FoPwzVzXwSH0ep+1tKkHWNnDTXB7UVtuZjLF4uE4HtY72d0ANEfZ0AgPw 9peOBzZoukxpl6nMmHszUBWXxfP4DJW9AvbPdzOWFE1OAMIQLi6mpEyGE3Vouv61 WX+4gzx+4M0= =iP7S -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by jalicqui＠prairienet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >> Jeff's response is exactly what I was hoping for! The "Cypherpunks >> distribution" version of Linux would be a great way to spread cheap >> remailer technology on cheap Linux boxes. Hell, I might even augment >> my Macs with one of these things! > >One thing I should've noted is that a Linux-based cheap remailer is >mostly useless without a "live connection" to the Net. That's why I >mentioned hanging these directly off The Little Garden's net (i.e., >putting the box in the same building as the physical net, to avoid >expensive connections). Not necessarily. Imagine, for example, a FidoNet or UUCP remailer. It might be nice for Internet users to have some kind of mail aliasing in the DNS for you, but it wouldn't be required by any means. I think it would be better to have lots of remailers with ugly addresses (like "jeff%jtj-l.uucp(a)cei.com", which is my address on my Linux box at home) than only a few with nice ones. (FidoNet has its own problems, such as paranoid BBSes that disallow encrypted traffic, but that's another matter.) These remailers wouldn't even need to be up 24 hours; you could run it at night, calling up on bootup and every hour thereafter or something. It's not perfect, to be sure, but what else is perfect? I don't know how hard it is to get in on the local FidoNet, but UUCP isn't too hard, and is a lot cheaper. When I was in college, my college gave me a feed for free. I'm not so familiar what providers charge. Of course, university accounts have their good and bad points; however, if you could persuade someone offsite with control over a domain name (for example, "remailer.net" :-) to give you a mail alias on their domain, this would take a bit more effort to track than your typical "remailer.uiuc.edu" type domain. This would make it less likely that the university would hear complaints, also, since most complainers would be more likely to complain to "postmaster(a)remailer.net" than "postmaster(a)uiuc.edu" if your machine was called "anon(a)anarchy.remailer.net" instead of "anon%anarchy.uucp(a)uiuc.edu" or "anon(a)anarchy.uiuc.edu". And this doesn't even get into the neato-cool new services you West Coasters get, like RadioMail... >What are the cheapest "live connections" (24-hour a day connections) >available? Where I am, about $100 a month, plus whatever the local >phone company charges for a dedicated line. ISDN is an option, but it >looks to cost $400-800 to get started, plus a monthly charge (which I >don't recall, except that I "gulped" when I heard it). Around here, it isn't even available unless you access through the CompuServe numbers or call long distance (read: $$$). That may be changing soon... >So, even an el cheapo 486-based Linux box, for perhaps $800 or so, >would need to solve the problem of a cheap, continuous connection to >the Net. (My supposition is that one approach is to share these >connections, hence my notion of hanging machines on other people's >nets.) No need for even a 486. If it takes an hour to process a remailer script, so much the better for the mix. You could call it a "required latency feature". :-) >Are there options for several machines to share a connection? (I'm >sure there are....). Someone who already has a connection may be >willing to host additional machines, which could share some of the >charges. Set up correctly, these "Remailer-In-A-Box" type machines could do several things to share a connection. They could, for example, all be connected with serial cables and use UUCP to get mail where it needs to go. I believe, in addition, that you can chain up to three deep with PLIP. This of course assumes that Ethernet isn't an option.

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AT&T IVES chip
by xpat＠vm1.spcs.umn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Interpretive Summary From PC Week: "Security Chip, interface aim to assist Electronic Commerce" AT&T IVES (Information Vending Encryption System) chip will encrypt data, video on demand, banking, etc. The IVES chip will be use in AT&T cable-TV-boxes this year. It is available to OEM's for Internet data security applications. IVES uses algorithms licensed from RSA. No mention of any dreaded built-in peephole. --------------------------------------------------------------------- P M Dierking |

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:49 PM 01/19/95, Jeff Licquia wrote: >persuade someone offsite with control over a domain name (for example, >"remailer.net" :-) to give you a mail alias on their domain, this would take >a bit more effort to track than your typical "remailer.uiuc.edu" type >domain. This would make it less likely that the university would hear >complaints, also, since most complainers would be more likely to complain to >"postmaster(a)remailer.net" than "postmaster(a)uiuc.edu" if your machine was >called "anon(a)anarchy.remailer.net" instead of "anon%anarchy.uucp(a)uiuc.edu" >or "anon(a)anarchy.uiuc.edu". I was thinking of this same thing. I'm hopefully going to have a unix box on the net in my college dorm room soon, but I'm a bit hesitant to run a remailer on it. I'm a bit scared to ask whether it would be allowed, on the "it's better to get forgiveness then permission" line of thought. But I'd rather avoid the potential of having to get forgiveness either. If my site had a "machine.remailer.net" address, there would be many benefits. For one, I don't have to worry about some administrator coming accross a list of anon remailers (in a Time magazine scare-tactic article, eek!), and noticing that one of them appears to be operating from some student's dorm room, and secondly, as Jeff says, people who complain are just going to complain to admin(a)remailer.net. They aren't going to take the time to try to figure out that my IP address is really in oberlin.edu, and complain to postmaster(a)oberlin.edu. So administration@oberlin would never even realize I was running a remailer, and since they haven't yet made any indication that that would be against the rules, I would be in a good position. Maybe it's time for Eric to figure out what he's going to do with remailer.net.

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Status of GUCAPI
by Insomnia Gallumbits 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm just about done with the first part of my crypto library, the internal generalized I/O, and largely done with the framework for the encoding rules. Since I haven't fully outlined what I'm doing here, I thought I'd mention the outline in the hopes of getting some real feedback and perhaps some random snipets of code. In essence, what I'm building is a crypto library that takes a very general approach with a few parameters controlling its behavior. The idea is to have something that anybody can drop into their mail agent and have an easy way of using crypto and interface with existing systems such as PGP. A major design goal is to be backwards compatable with PGP, but paramount is having a plug-and-play library that will be flexible enough to meet future crypto needs. One of the biggest problems today is that crypto libraries are chiselled out to deal with very specific cases -- the most general I know of if is RSAREF, which AFAIK only supports BER/DER for encoding and RSA and DES/CBC for encryption. I'll grow more clueful on that, and other crypto and key management issues, as I get to actually working on them. The things that I've parametrized in the design are: - Type of I/O. Right now, files (and fds) and a couple of memory configurations are supported. I've made it trivial to add new types of I/O as well, and there are flags to support to immediate zeroing of data once it is read into the internal structures. - Encoding of data. There are multiple ways to encode a bytestream and these methods can be nested. For example, PGP, MIME, and uuencode use their own formats. In this library, you can specify the type. I also want to eventually put logic in (where possible) to determine the type and will also use this to support various compression schemes. - Ciphers (this is the big one). Right now, as I've mentioned, things are very haphazard. What I want is a way to change one parameter from, for example, CRTYPE_IDEA to CRTYPE_DES and thus change the encryption scheme. - Key management. I know of two major ways of doing things right now, X.509/PEM certificates as pushed by RSADSI, and PGP web-of-trust. As far as I can tell, PEM-style certificates are just a degenerate case of PGP web-of-trust. - Random sources. People should be offered a pretty good source of random numbers, but should also be allowed to drop in their own sources. This is going to be relatively tough on platforms I don't know much about, IE Mac and PC, but I'm hoping for some help on this. I can also salvage some code from RIPEM for those. - Autoconfiguration to incoming messages. People should be able to open a file and have it work, even with schema added to the library after the original adaption to GUCAPI. There's some other stuff that I'm probably forgetting here, but that's the gist of it. The cipher code is going to be pretty simple: I'm getting a lot of code from various places on the net; the code exists, it just isn't put into a form that is easy to use. The most difficult is going to be a generalized scheme for key management: first off, I'm probably going to simply use PGP's web-of-trust as my model, assuming the X.509/PEM style certificates can be treated as degenerate cases of web of trust. I also intend to offer a GSSAPI interface to all of this, as seems appropriate when I get to it. This is so far all in C: I'm not a C++ convert yet and C is still the most portable of the languages about. Later, perhaps class libraries can be designed around the same code. Thoughts? Am I wasting my time, or is this a worthwhile pursuit? And should I find a better name than GUCAPI? -- Todd - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLx7wfCoZzwIn1bdtAQGIWAF9GgY29Qop9p1TEryO3oe/cFUyyBAJQtp7 yPGjEDyCvk/vtLHTAxhQoMTE98MMkPP1 =EoBl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by Jaeson.M.Engle＠josaiah.sewanee.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just out of curiousity on this subject, is there any remailer software for Macs? I think I have enough leverage and power on my campus to be able to run a remailer here during the school months *which is when I have net access*. If there isn't, how hard would it be to do? Could it be done with something like MailShare indirectly? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBLx8CQkiLvmPjc4XdAQFS4wP/aufMYK054Ed5fZn84xLDSsXqF3+hv4jw uQKSUl6Kv46Ek+IypX0DwI31SqasS96vosC0W/p9uPO/MFoAyp9/EdcAkH65yWSO Gv3iQmm/j0Lx81dxTB4mjYZUdY3wJQFd4O/vY+mT9I6OmtE6lNDzYRyn9VCl7zfw t5G67Z6+Pas= =TosY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- aka: (-: Jaeson M. Engle || jme(a)josaiah.sewanee.edu :-) (-: www server: http://josaiah.sewanee.edu/ :-) (-: It's January 29th! IT'S TIME!!! Ask me for details!:-) (-: Finger 'jme(a)josaiah.sewanee.edu' for my Public :-) PGP block.

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IRS to keep unreviewable secret dossiers on US citizens
by xpat＠vm1.spcs.umn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from : St Paul Pioneer Press, Jan 29, 1995 "IRS plans to collect more data on individuals to nab tax cheats" a "vast expansion of secret computer database of information it keeps on virtually all Americans" will include "credit reports, news stories, tips from informants, and real estate, motor vehicle and child support records, plus conventional Govt financial data" "Any individual who has business and/or financial activities can expect upgraded agency reports to be put to IRS auditors promptly" Here's the kicker: "Although agency officials concede that some of the data collected will be inaccurate, taxpayers will not be allowed to review or correct it" ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ So much for the FOIA. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ P M Dierking |

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