December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Curious content
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim, I'm not so sure I'm very fond of the quote that you used in the CP-FAQ: - As Paul Ferguson, Cypherpunk and manager at US Sprint, puts it: "We're located in Herndon, Virginia, right across the street from Dulles Airport and a hop, skip & jump down the street from the new NRO office. ,-)" [P.F., 1994-08-18] As I did say this, and it _is_ true, it somehow lends conjecture to the scenario that Sprint is somehow involved with US Gov't wiretapping schemes. I'd appreciate it if you could either strike the quote or clarify it to reflect the true meaning of my remarks. Concerned, _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Managed Network Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com

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Re: Crypto Anarchist Manifesto (location)
by Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 10 Sep 1994, Karl Lui Barrus wrote: > It is probably elsewhere too; I have an HTML version on the WWW at : http://www.c2.org/~mark/lib/ca.html feel free to add links to it from anywhere else... Mark

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Re: Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
by jburrell＠crl.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>And is it possible to obtain a copy of your 1988 "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto."? >Sounds like fun. FTP Site? I found it on soda.csua.berkeley.edu last night. I don't think it was there before. Look for it in /pub/cypherpunks/rants/. -- Jason Burrell <jburrell(a)crl.com> Finger for PGP public key. There is no such thing as limited censorship. If you want your freedom, fight now. Don't wait until you've lost it.

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Reputation credits 1/3
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

After Rishab's posts on the uses of digital reputation credentials, I'd like to present some thoughts on how to implement them. Thoughts on creating a Reputation Capital Framework This document is split into three parts: A creating a useful, basic system of service, methods of distribution and implementation of reputation information, and possibilities for extending the system which may make the whole thing unworkably complex, but also may make it much more useful. I am going to begin by not rigorously defining reputation capital. The initial application, IMHO anyway, is magic filtering. The cypherpunks list gets up to 500 messages per week. Right now, I filter based on whose messages I like to read. This is a weak system that requires manual updating. It does not automatically respond when someone who I respect says "I've enjoyed XX's posts." I think that the framework I outline here can do magic filtering well. It also has the ability to evolve into a full fledged system for complex digital reputations in various realms. The simplest system would be where people collect statements of the form "I respect Alice. /s/ Bob." * Alice would collect statements like this, and append them to the bottom of her writings so that people who respected Bob would have a clue that they might be interested in what Alice has to say. A 'web of respect' could easily be formed, with each step away causing some reduction in value. The number would have to be large enough that reputations could spread--ie, that people could get some use out of this beyond an elaborate name for a kill/hotfile. It would also need to be small enough that reputations lines do not extend forever. Eventually, you don't care what Kim thinks of Loius. I would guess that some multiplier between .9 and .05 would work well. People you respect directly get the highest rating, people further away lose some amount of that respect until it trickles down to nothing. * the statement "I respect Alice. /s/ Bob." is analogous to "I find Alice's work interesting, informative, or otherwise worth reading. If someone would like to suggest a name other than reputation credentials for this, I'd be happy to hear it. Note that in this simple system, statements do not have any numerical value attached. Bob can not respect Alice 30% or 99% of the time, he only gets a binary statement. Its an obvious extension to let Bob say "I respect Alice 80% of the time. /s/ Bob." I only point this out because it is not mandatory that a system be constructed this way, and in fact, even a very simple system could be quite useful. With the addition of partial respect, the need for an automatic reduction in value becomes much less clear. If Alice respects Bob 50% of the time, and Bob respects Charlie 50% of the time, then Alice will probably find that a 25% respect rating for Charlie is good enough. (I'm not going to get into possible variations here; things seem to work well using percentages for reputation credentials and negative percentages for disrespect. The numbers are multiplied together, shrinking away to nothing pretty quickly, except in the case of a group of people with a good deal of mutual respect for each other.) Also, if several reputation credentials come in for one entity, they can simply be averaged together. This respect rating is relative; there is no central organization to say that Charlie's Used Cars sells great vehicles 25% of the time, its just what Alice's agents will be able to gauge how interesting Alice might consider someones work to be. Someone she occasionally respects sometimes thinks well of Charlie, so its more likely that she will be interested in what Charlie has to say, at least in comparison to someone Alice has never heard of at all. In this system, it makes sense for Charlie to spend a lot of time making his customers happy at first, and holding on to their endorsements of him, because there is no time limit on the statements, and no way to retract opinions. So, those are two natural enough extensions. Decaying reputations, based on the age of the signature, cause a reputation cred. to eventually become useless. Then there is the matter of retracting, or post-facto changing your statement of a reputation. This is more problematic. Remember right now, Alice, Bob and Charlie are simply collecting these reputation credentials, and storing them themselves. If Bob sends Alice a statement "I no longer respect Alice at all. /s/ Bob, 1 Sept 1994," Alice can simply forget to include it in her list of reputation credentials. If she commits to it through some crytpographically strong protocol based on her actions, she can probably dump it, and do business for some period of time before someone runs through all the work to confirm her reputation is as she presents it, and discovers she is lying based on outdated credentials. A solid system needs to ensure that up to date, complete credentials are available for most people most of the time. In my next message, I'll show several possible designs for systems that could exist in parallel to distribute reputation information, and explain why each would be useful. I'll also sketch out a set of programs to demontstrate how the system could be used.

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reputation credit 2/3
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Design criterion for a reputation service: * Reliable * trustworthy * resistant to dropping unflattering credentials * decentralized * easy to use * easier to automate * needs to support distributions of pseudonyms reputations without providing information about the nym. Designing a solid credential server is not an easy task. There are many requirements that one should meet. The basic server I am considering is designed for Internet as it is today. Mostly academics, researchers and students, operating on a highly insecure internet for mostly personal reasons. There are few large transactions occurring on the net; there is not a lot at stake in the grand scheme of things. OTOH, there is an awful lot at stake; specifications, especially bad ones, tend to live forever. Remember the RISKS piece on trains and horses? Thus the server I present could work well today in conjunction with MPAs, (Mail Processing Agents, such as procmail and filter) with newsreaders, and other similar software in order to handle bright filtering (the next generation of kill & hot files should be based on a distributed idea of whose work is worth reading, and whose is not. After that, the system should expand to cover reputations in various realms, reputations for various characteristics, and other things which I'll talk about in the next message. There are three basic models for sophisticated reputation distribution. The simplest method, of each person handling their own, has too many failure modes to be useful. The sophisticated models are essentially mail, Usenet and server based. I assume all transactions are signed, and encrypted at the users request to provide some amount of security against forgeries and traffic analysis. In a server based system, some set of databases exists to collect reputation certificates. A user (better yet, their agent) asks for a reputation certificate for some entity. The server sends it back. This could be built on the send everything you know model, or the request could be for certificates of people who the requester respects. Such filtering might be better done on local CPU. The system has the advantage of carrying all information in an easily queried format. It also has the advantage of concentrating certifications. Thus you could say things like 'The well regarded spaf' or 'The often ignored Marjorie Simpson,' because the server would collect such data. The next system would be based on Usenet. People would occasionally post their opinions to a newsgroup, and people who respected those people, directly or transitively, would pull in their postings. This system has the advantage of using existing technologies, and propagating widely, probably even past most firewalls. A third system would be based on mail. People would subscribe to lists, or send mail to folks they respect saying 'please put me on your reputations list.' The folks thus honored would then respond by sending out regular lists of who they respect or disrespect. This really requires everyone to run some sort of filtering agent. It has the advantage of allowing people to set up closed lists for propagation, and only distributing information on a demand basis. Note that this mail system is not the only one that could use mail for propagation, it simply uses mail as an automatic and regular carrier of information, while a server system would only do so on request. Both the mail and news systems may fail to provide timely information about new individuals who may have a reputation, but because you never asked for it in mail anywhere, or because articles have expired on your newserver, you can not find it. This is the reason the server system would be useful. Not so much in a filtering context, but instead in a system where reputations are relied on for various semi-real time services. The expandability of the system relies on part on its ability to find arbitrary reputation information quickly and automatically. That is something that a server system does well, but a mail or news system does not. To build a mail system, you would need some sort of decent filter (such as MH filter, procmail, or mailagent) which can run programs based on a set of conditions. You would need a rule which would watch for incoming reputation cred. certificates (which would be signed, maybe encrypted). This would pipe into your assesment program, which would keep track of how you relate to each of the various people who send you reputations cred. certificates. It would turn all the information into a database. On any high volume forum, you could filter incoming mail into a set of filters which react based on the numeric scores given to a person by your assesment program. Anyone whose carries enough reputation credits to pass your filter goes into one box, everyone else goes into another. (Clearly, you can be more selective, set up several boxes, or whatever else you want.) The tough part of making this system work is in the generation of reputations credits. Hal mentioned that the Extropians built a system based on buying and selling of reputations on a market. I don't see these reputation credits as being something tangible. You can't carry your reputation credit with you; they exist as a result of your participation in a web of respect. I don't care that Homer Simpson is a well respected authority in rec.drink.brewing; his worlds and mine rarely cross. He can't pick up his reputation credit and plop down in cypherpunks, expecting to be well respected; none of us know him. Or maybe someone does, in which case, they can (automatically) tell us what they think. Becuase reputation credit is not fungible, and because it propogates itself, buying and selling it may be confusing. If someone well respected gets an additional unit of reputation, then all the people who he/she respects will also gain slightly. I expect that a system based on giving away reputation credits would work well. If you respect too many people too mcuh, your value as a link in peoples chain will decrease, and people will start disrepecting you, becuase you disturb their filter. Eventually, if you keep it up, the value of your reputation credit will drop close to zero, as no one cares about what you have to say anymore. This may fail if someone with interesthing things to say decides to disrupt the system. I'm not sure why someone with interesting things to say would think it was worthwhile to disrupt the system, but I don't like designing things on expect and oughts. Perhaps a system could be implemented that would allow you to give reputation credit in 'transferable' and 'non-transferable' forms, so you could respect what someone had to say, but pay no attention to their opinions of people. I hope, but don't know if I can expect, that a system like this would get its initial momentum from people who want to be able to use it for their own smart filtering. If the system were well designed (easy to change how much reputation credit you give someone), then making a change in your filtering would be as simple as saying "slander tcmay(a)netcom.com +50" (slander is the working name I've been using to describe the program to enter reputations, good or bad. It came from thinking of this as a Usenet based system.) If the system could build up some initial momentum from people using it for personal filtering, then it would probably accelerate from there. As more people use the system, it becomes more useful to use it, accelerating its growth. Its growth hopefully, is not constrained by the underdesign of servers, since each person serves themselves. As the software becomes more useful, it is easy to build and design alterate systems of spreading reputations because the system is decentralized. If I decide I want to build a system where each person whose first name begins with a vowel gets an extra 5% added to their reputation, and then add 10% to my perception of the reputation credits of any one who three people I give more than 75% reputation credit to, then I can implement that in my local assesment program without disturbing everyone who relies on my server. (Admittedly, the people who currently pay attention to who I gvie rep cred to may no longer do so, after strange credits start coming out, but thats a seperate problem.)

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reputation credit 3/3
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Assume the distribution problem to be solved, in that people can now easily and reliably get the complete reputation information on an identity that interests them. What extensions to the basic system can be made to make it more useful? What will these extension do to the usability of the system? I think the most interesting extension would be to make reputations that apply only in one realm, a realm being some online community, whether that community consists of a single mailing list (Cypherpunks) or several lists, newsgroups (firewalls, bugtraq, comp.security.unix), or even a larger area, perhaps compromising mail, news, www, other interactive service. Clearly, there is some overlap between some realms (security, cypherpunks, hackers). A good reputation in one area might carry over into another, or it might lead to a negative reputation. This effect will probably arise spontaneously from the webs of interaction. Initially, I was going to propose that it be somehow formalized, but now I see that it will arise on its own accord, given a sufficiently flexible and strong system of distributing digital reputation capital on the net. This does require that negative opinions be made possible, not just low opinions. If Charlie can say "I disrespect David 90% of the time. /s/ Charlie 1 sept 94" and those opinions can spread the same way as positive ones, then most of the useful interaction between groups is possible in a decentralized, out of control sort of way. I've sort of assumed in other places that negative opinions were possible, I just wanted to explicitly state it. Another potential extension would be the addition of more varying formalized opinions than the formalistic "I respect/disrespect..." that I've been basing this on. This also has the possibility of just taking way too much work, but has the possibility, with careful design, to be a very useful tool. What if Alice can say "I think David is a fanatic. I also think David is a windbag." and she says these things in such a way that they can be automatically responded to by software? This would require a carefully chosen list of opinions that the system would support. If you had too many opinions, then the system would be worthless, because, in all probability, people would pick different descriptors, and the information would not correlate into anything useful. The list could probably be fairly short, allowing for terms like windbag, funny, fanatical, reasonable, knowledgeable, trustworthy. That would greatly expand what you could say (or hear) about someone in a simple digital format for automatic scanning and filtering. The inclusion of terms like trustworthy or reliable could act as the basis for some business. A set of 'reliable' endorsements stretching back 20 years would make me much more comfortable with a remailer business than one that sprung up yesterday and is now well respected by 300 federal agents. None of these endorsements need be formal "I'd do business with them again" statements, the objective is to give an idea of who is thought of well, and who is not. With the addition of an encrypted open books protocol then people could automatically get an idea of what businesses are stable, and liked by their customers. I've toyed with the idea of being able to rate personalities this way, which would be useful at times, since there reputations do exist in the personal world as well as the professional. But any system of personal reputations would fail, because bad mouthing someone with a digital reputation is an open act. Very few people would talk about Alice in a negative light if they know she will hear about it. And even if they do want to, there doesn't need to be an automated system to make it easier. However, this does raise the interesting idea of a private reputations system. If a group for one reason or another wants to build a reputation service that is closed; in who may add to it and who may access it, would they be able to? It would probably be fairly simple. The slander program could be modified so that no one who didn't already have some reputation capital could be discussed. Using a system that A useful bit of reputation capital can not be anonymous, although it can be pseudononymous. If it is anonymous, there is no way to give it weight. Cooperative protocols for undeniable digital signatures could probably be designed and made workable. However, I would expect that it would be far too much work to run. I prefer to design a system that requires much less effort. If you want to protect your privacy while participating, work under a nym. There you have it, an outline of a system for possibly efficient, decentralized digital reputation capital. A bunch of extensions that may or may not work. How to distribute is addressed, but needs more work, and probably a prototype. The big question in my mind is how to get people to feed enough information into it to seed the system? Once it gets started, it will run for a while on slow growth, and then explode at some random point. (Probably right after a serious design bug is discovered. :) After it explodes in terms of use, it will be self-perpetuating because of its usefulness. Please feel free to comment on what wouldn't work. How could the system be extended to make it more useful? It might be that building something would be the best way to answer these kinds of questions.

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Re: Black Cryptoanarchy (KKK, monopolies, contract killing)
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- James A. Donald writes >Obviously if some individuals choose not to associate with some >group for irrational reasons it will harm those who so choose >more than it harms the group - but only the state can enforce >discrimination with guns, and it does, thus only state sponsored >discrimination is significant in practice. > Only the state can enforce discrimination with guns?!?!? In the South there is a long history of non-governmental groups enforcing discrimination with guns. The argument that discriminating companies will be at a competitive disadvantage is only valid if all players are rational and informed. There is good historical evidence that whole cultures are willing to assume this "disadvantage" in order to perpetuate some status quo. It could easily become the case than non-discriminating companies would be boycotted putting the disadvantage on them. I know that anarchy is near and dear to many hearts here, but there are some really nasty drawbacks to it tyranny of the majority being just one. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLnJR4VVkk3dax7hlAQGKGwP9EelH2mqmVDqQJ7k9a0ADGkJH+lkXzIBQ gImHALeHsYe5U7MKVbAyVVoRbDfUsEoRN2L1pJ7Yze1tJd3woPxpHspCmBZuYYqQ CMQSx9ly2RNtKa7hcoarHgxuLepBaMTcPE0ka8L79365kzTLplUH4N2a8QZ1tAQb BzHxy2GtRHE= =LQeH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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No Subject
by nobody＠vox.xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is PGP v 2.6.1 up on any ftp sites where we poor non-US scum could get a look at it? As Sat. Sept. 10 it seems like mathew over in the UK hadn't seen the source code yet.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When I have a moment I will diff the sources. Maybe someone will anon. post 2.6.1. onto alt.security.pgp just to annoy S***light. -- Richard Parratt

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Re: CONTROL FREAKS
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I think the point isn't that totalitarian states won't last: we know >that. The point is that those trying to establish a totalitarian >state can do a hell of a lot of damage to the rest of us before they >fail. That's not clearly true. The totalitarian states we know of developed years ago in a much less fluid environment. A few years ago, there was a UK TV drama about a contemporary Labour Party Prime Minister. In the course of the show, the new PM announced that he would immediately impose exchange controls to "keep money in Britain." (This was written before the real Labour Party officially eschewed exchange controls in a furtue Labour government.) The joke is that two weeks before the election of a Labour PM, all the loose investment funds would have left the UK anyway. Nothing left to block. I think that a *new* totalitarian state would have a hell of a time borrowing money and all of the existing states are cash poor. They need to borrow. They don't want to be distracted by rioting pensioners. Even the secret police don't work for free. Currency devaluation would hurt as well. After all, there can't be a totalitarian state that doesn't massively change (introduce uncertainly into) the conduct of life and business in its country (and if it is large, in the world). Markets have a way of dealing with uncertainty. Capital flight (seeking safer investments) and high interest rates (to compensate for risk). DCF

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RFC Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kudos, Tim, for adept mix of philosophy and gritty specifics, for brevity and wit. When the mood strikes you, an update would be appreciated. And, please, comments from those who have not seen this before or who may have forgotten. John -------------------- The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto Timothy C. May tcmay(a)netcom.com A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto anarchy. Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability for individuals and groups to communicate and interact with each other in a totally anonymous manner. Two persons may exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate electronic contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal identity, of the other. Interactions over networks will be untraceable, via extensive re-routing of encrypted packets and tamper-proof boxes which implement cryptographic protocols with nearly perfect assurance against any tampering. Reputations will be of central importance, far more important in dealings than even the credit ratings of today. These developments will alter completely the nature of government regulation, the ability to tax and control economic interactions, the ability to keep information secret, and will even alter the nature of trust and reputation. The technology for this revolution--and it surely will be both a social and economic revolution--has existed in theory for the past decade. The methods are based upon public-key encryption, zero-knowledge interactive proof systems, and various software protocols for interaction, authentication, and verification. The focus has until now been on academic conferences in Europe and the U.S., conferences monitored closely by the National Security Agency. But only recently have computer networks and personal computers attained sufficient speed to make the ideas practically realizable. And the next ten years will bring enough additional speed to make the ideas economically feasible and essentially unstoppable. High-speed networks, ISDN, tamper-proof boxes, smart cards, satellites, Ku-band transmitters, multi-MIPS personal computers, and encryption chips now under development will be some of the enabling technologies. The State will of course try to slow or halt the spread of this technology, citing national security concerns, use of the technology by drug dealers and tax evaders, and fears of societal disintegration. Many of these concerns will be valid; crypto anarchy will allow national secrets to be trade freely and will allow illicit and stolen materials to be traded. An anonymous computerized market will even make possible abhorrent markets for assassinations and extortion. Various criminal and foreign elements will be active users of CryptoNet. But this will not halt the spread of crypto anarchy. Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and of government interference in economic transactions. Combined with emerging information markets, crypto anarchy will create a liquid market for any and all material which can be put into words and pictures. And just as a seemingly minor invention like barbed wire made possible the fencing-off of vast ranches and farms, thus altering forever the concepts of land and property rights in the frontier West, so too will the seemingly minor discovery out of an arcane branch of mathematics come to be the wire clippers which dismantle the barbed wire around intellectual property. Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences! -- ................................................................. Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: by arrangement

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Re: Proposal for an Electronic Commerce Testbed
by Hal Varian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bob Smart <smart(a)mel.dit.csiro.au> > I've speculated above on the possibility of people supporting the > testbed by providing some useful services while charging play > money. We shouldn't depend on that. There is a class of applications > which are fun but need (or at least are helped by) money to give the > measure of success or failure. These are games, competitions and > gambling. I believe that done right they can be sufficiently > interesting with play money that people will want to take part: enough > people to test the scalability of the various proposals. > > Some of the games that can be played between individuals on the > Internet really need the ability to have a bet to make play really > meaningful: poker and backgammon are examples. The question is: will > betting with "play" money work or will people play frivolously because > the money does not have real value? You should take a look at the Iowa Electronic Markets. There have been a few thousand participants betting real money on these markets for two or three years. They would be a natural testbed for Internet dollars. To see what it's like look at telnet://iem.biz.uiowa.edu. --- Hal.Varian(a)umich.edu Hal Varian voice: 313-764-2364 Dept of Economics fax: 313-764-2364 Univ of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220

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Announcement: "CYPHERNOMICON" FAQ available
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I haven't received Cypherpunks list mail since Friday. I don't know if the list is down or if Netcom is simply not delivering mail...it's been having severe problems. So I'm sending this blind to the list, and copying Hugh Daniel and Eric Hughes, to make sure it at least gets to _somebody_.] Greetings Cypherpunks, The FAQ I've been working on for many months is now available by anonymous ftp, details below. Because there is no "official" Cypherpunks group, there shouldn't be an "official" Cypherpunks FAQ, as I see it. Thus, others can write their own FAQs as they see fit. Cypherpunks write FAQs? I've decided to give my FAQ a name, to prevent confusion. "THE CYPHERNOMICON" is what I call it. (If the reference is obscure, I can explain.) The main file is 1.3 MB. It takes about 12-15 minutes to transfer with a 14.4 modem, proportionately slower with a slower modem. And of course very fast if you're already on Netcom or on a T1 connection. (I may split the 20 chapters into pieces, later, but this could add unwelcome confusion. And I'm holding off on gzip compressing the file(s) right now, for similar reasons.) Yes, the FAQ is very long. Yes, it is not what others may have wanted (the MFAQ, described below, is the "short" version that newcomers can get, or have mailed to them if they lack anonymous ftp access). It is the FAQ I _wanted_ to write, which is reason enough for the form it's in. The CYPHERNOMICON is especially detailed in the areas that have gotten little coverage in existing books: crypto anarchy, reputations, black merkets, and the uses of digital cash. The crypto and PGP sections are fairly long, but not nearly as long as they could be, given the vast amount of material out there already. (I didn't see the need to cover these areas in great detail.) The "anonymity and remailers" chapter is also very long, and is the most disorganized, in my opinion. The plethora of sites, URLs, various remailers, features, ideas, issues, and miscellaneous cruft is just overwhelming....I hope I've made some order out of it. (The "Release-Notes" and "README" docs have more explanations of the form and rationale, including the meta-FAQ question of why this FAQ is not a Web doc.) Details: anonymous ftp site: ftp.netcom.com cd to pub/tcmay "get" the files in the standard anonymous ftp way (feel free to move it to other sites, but for now it may be best to leave it here; I think the files are all reasonably OK, with no fatal flaws (Harry Bartholomew helped test the access), but wider distribution should perhaps be slowed for several days, to make corrections of serious flaws easier to make) The following 6 files are included: Contents-Long (A detailed table of contents, about 10 KB) CP-FAQ (The complete CYPHERNOMICON, uncompressed for the time being, about 1.3 MB) Contents-Short (A brief table of contents) MFAQ (One of the chapters, the "Most Frequently Asked Questions") Release-Notes (Some comments on the FAQ.) README (Much more detailed comments, also included as the final chapter) Here is the Contents-Short: THE CYPHERNOMICON 1. Introduction 2. MFAQ--Most Frequently Asked Questions 3. Cypherpunks -- History, Organization, Agenda 4. Goals and Ideology -- Privacy, Freedom, New Approaches 5. Cryptology 6. The Need For Strong Crypto 7. PGP -- Pretty Good Privacy 8. Anonymity, Digital Mixes, and Remailers 9. Policy: Clipper,Key Escrow, and Digital Telephony 10. Legal Issues 11. Surveillance, Privacy, And Intelligence Agencies 12. Digital Cash and Net Commerce 13. Activism and Projects 14. Other Advanced Crypto Applications 15. Reputations and Credentials 16. Crypto Anarchy 17. The Future 18. Loose Ends and Miscellaneous Topics 19. Appendices 20. README Comments should be sent to me. Future releases will be coming. Enjoy. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, When I wrote: >>If you are stopped by the police, you are required to >>identify yourself if asked. Chris Hibbert responded: This is not true. If you're driving a car you are required to have a license. If you're just walking around, you're not required to have a name, or to tell it. Nope, *this* is wrong. In most jurisdictions, you do not have to provide *physical ID* if you are not in a car, but you do have to identify yourself AND give some account as to what you are up to. A cop has to have a probable cause to arrest you, and not giving your name doesn't provide it. /Au contraire/, you are "interfering with an investigation" or "obstructing justice" or whatever it's called in the particular jurisdiction. If you're surly, a cop can take you in, ... Nonsense. Where do you non-lawyers get this stuff? Surly, rude, impolite, etc. are all protected speech. (Threatening *ACTS* or physical resistance, however, is another thing.) ... Just say "Officer, someone is waiting for me. May I go now?" Just say "no"? I *guarantee* this won't work. If you are asking permission ("May I go?"), aren't you ceding to the officer the legal right to say "no"? If you believe you don't have to interact with the nice man, why not just turn your back and walk away without a word? (I wouldn't advise it.) This has been tested in court. There was a black lawyer several years ago who liked to walk a lot. He lived in one of the fashionable neighborhoods in LA, and occasionally got picked up because he "looked like he didn't belong there". He sued them and won in court every time, and got the police to leave him alone. [No, I don't have references.] A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. The gentleman in question was not a lawyer. He was a black man who was dressed and coiffured in dreadlocks and Rasta man clothes. He did not live in Beverly Hills nor Belaire, but he did like to take long walks in those neighborhoods in the middle of the night. He was arrested for not identifying himself with an "official" ID. When he sued, the court issued a temporary injunction against the police for requiring *documentary* identification. The right of the police to require a person to identify himself was never in question. I'm not sure what the disposition of this particular case was, but that's irrelevant, as it only went to the issue of documentary ID. (If memory serves, there was an interesting result of this case. The California legislature attempted to pass, or passed, a law that required to showing of official identification if demanded by a police officer. I don't know how this law ended up, unfortunately.) S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by Lile Elam 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just always remember that the cop has the gun, I don't. -lile

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Proposed changes to the Queensland criminal code.
by pkm＠maths.uq.oz.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems the fight against evil never ends... This is a clipping from the Sunday Mail, the local sunday newspaper (althogh tabloid would be a better word for it). As you can observe, it is one of those papers that have a paragraph:sentence ratio of 1:1. I hope it is of interest to you all. All spelling mistakes are mine. All grammatical awkwardness are his. :-) .... ONLINE MOVES 'OUT OF LINE'. [Date: 11/09/94 - PKM.] (COMPUTERS with Peter Young) [Title of a regular column - PKM.] Proposed changes to the Queensland Criminal Code to crack down on computer networks carrying information used for criminal acts are sparking an outcry. The proposals have been denounced as unworkable by a number of online information providers who claim their businesses will become untenable if the changes are brought in. As part of a sweeping overhaul of the State's criminal code, Attourney-General Wells plans to create two new offences falling into the category of unlawful use of a computer. They would make persons liable for up to 10 years for providing information via computer networks which contributes to a crime. One charge would relate to aiding the commission of a crime and the other would deal with being an accessory before the fact. Instructions on how to make bombs [like gunpowder? -PKM] or set up a child pornography ring are the type of material the proposed legislation wants to target. The laws would apply equally to material downloaded from a local electronic bulleting board system or that acquired by using a commercial gateway to the international Internet system. The legislation is intended to facilitate prosecution of people who knowingly make such information available on their systems, a spokesman for the Attorney-General said. But Australian Internet service providers have condemned the proposals as impractical and unable to be policed and have called for "common carrier" protection similar to that enjoyed by Telecom. Ian Peter, founder of Queensland-headquartered Internet provider Pegasus Networks, branded the proposed laws "unworkable", saying that they were out of touch with overseas thinking on the problem of balancing free speech against the need to control access to unsuitable information. Rhys Weatherley, president to the non-profit Internet access group BrisNet [Brisbane Net, for the geopolitically deprived - PKM], said the proposed laws would give police "licence to arrest" power over any computer network operator merely because offending material was available on their networks. He said the legislation would make scapegoats out of honest network operators while failing to catch real offenders. BrisNet would be forced to shut down rather than run the risk of prosecution if the laws were adopted in their reputed form. Hugh Irvine, a Melbourne businessman, whose company Connect.com.au is a leading commercial gateway to the Internet, said he was happy to co-operate with authorities to prevent hackers or child molesters from using his service to pursue their practices. However, he said that the planned Queensland legislation was equivalent to charging Australia Post executives because criminals used the mail to help plan a bank robbery. "It is heading down the path of the wrong sort of State-run surveillance and Connect.com.au would be unable to continue functioning as a business if laws in the proposed form become a reality, he said. Also wading into the fray is Electronic Frontiers Australia (EFA), a public interest group set up to monitor threats to civil liberties in cyberspace. EFA skokesman Garth Kidd labelled the Queensland proposals "a worrying development that would stifle the implementation of online services in Australia". .... Comments: The article (and also the proposed legislation) were brought to my attention by my father late last night. As a com- puter professional with ~30 years experience, he was as disgusted as I am with the proposals. He also understood quite clearly how it was unworkable in practice. Some time this week, he will be having a little chat on the subject with Wendy Edmonds, the local MLA (Member of the [State] Legislature Assembly). It seems representative cluelessness is the same the world over. :-< Peter Murphy. <pkm(a)maths.uq.oz.au>

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Re: Running PGP on Netcom (an
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:52 AM 9/12/94, SAMUEL KAPLIN wrote: >What illusion of security? If I have my secret keyring residing someplace >where I can't physically control who has access to it, no way is this >keyring secure!! It goes against the definition of a secret. Once you tell >someone a secret, It no longer is a secret. In effect this person has told >Netcom his secret, therefore it no longer is a secret. Just because you're >paranoid, doesn't mean they're not out to get you. Be paranoid!! But keeping it on your home machine, the bad guys could break into your house, set up a keyboard monitoring program, and get it that way. Or if they wanted to, grab you and force you to reveal your key. It's not black and white. There are degrees of security. I keep my encrypted secret key on dunx1, a UNIX box used by many other people. Anyone who has the ability to can either watch my keystrokes, probe through memory to retrieve my key or message, or probably a few other things I haven't thought of. The benefit, though, of being able to decode messages as soon as I receive them, and being able to send encrypted messages when I'm not at home is major. For me at least, it's a fair trade-off. There isn't anything I send right now that I would find particularly embarassing should it become public knowledge. If I did get into that situation, I'd probably create a second key pair for use only at home, and keep both in use. The bad guys will almost always be able to get your key. Even if they have to get you to get it. The goal is to raise the difficulty such that they aren't willing to do it. Bob -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, PGP, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)post.drexel.edu PGP & RIPEM keys on key servers When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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Running PGP on Netcom (and Similar)
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A "Cypherpunk RISK" (apologies to the "RISKS" list) to running PGP on Netcom, Portal, America Online, etc. systems (and on university, corporate, etc. systems), is the obtaiing of *all* records, directories, etc. by court order. This has happened more than once, and will likely happen more and more in the future, as law enforcement realizes what a treasure trove this can be. (The person being monitored may not be told about it, of course.) The latest such case involved Lewis De Payne, a user, and Netcom, his (and my) Internet provider. Details are being discussed in Usenet groups, and were brought up also at yesterday's Cypherpunks meeting. Not that had Mr. De Payne been using PGP on Netcom, with his secret key stored there, the cops would have it. (The passphrase maybe not, depending on whether he stored _that_ there, too. And whether Netcom had logs of keystrokes entered, which strikes me as something they would probably have--we really need a "zero knowledge" kind of "reach-back" for remotely-run PGP.) I just don't think the dangers are worth it. All the theoretical hot air about whether kestroke timings are "random enough" is moot if Netcom is turning over records to investigators. It creates a dangerous illusion of security. (For those with no home machines, and perhaps those who mainly use campus services, workstations, etc., I'm not faulting you; people use what they have to use. Longer term, though, PGP needs to run on secure hardware. Secure meaning not easily grabbed by the authorities without even one's knowledge!!) --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Just In Case You Missed It
by alano＠teleport.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 11 Sep 1994 18:33:16 -0700 >From: Bruce Baugh <bruceab(a)teleport.com> >To: alano(a)teleport.com >Subject: Just In Case You Missed It > > >>Path: news.teleport.com!news.world.net!news.sprintlink.net!redstone.interpath.net! ddsw1!panix!zip.eecs.umich.edu!newsxfer.itd.umich.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com! swiss.ans.net!malgudi.oar.net!news.ysu.edu!doug >>From: acbul1(a)penfold.cc.monash.edu.au (Andrew Bulhak) >>Newsgroups: alt.humor.best-of-usenet >>Subject: [alt.discordia] "official" Discordian secret code >>Followup-To: alt.humor.best-of-usenet.d >>Date: 12 Sep 1994 01:09:02 GMT >>Organization: best of usenet humor >>Lines: 89 >>Approved: best(a)cc.ysu.edu >>Message-ID: <3509ne$4rm(a)news.ysu.edu> >>NNTP-Posting-Host: unix1.cc.ysu.edu >>X-Disclaimer: the "Approved" header verifies header information for article transmission and does not imply approval of content. See .sig below. >>Originator: doug(a)unix1.cc.ysu.edu > >From: snorri(a)nwu.edu (Snorri Abrahamsen) >Newsgroups: alt.discordia >Subject: "official" Discordian secret code > > > In these days of NSA and Clipper and Key/Escrow and PGP and Wilkesman >Kid Ranger Decoder Rings, it seems one of the things most on everyone's >collective hive-like minds must be security. Security and privacy, make >that. > Now Discordians have always had a versatile and powerful secret code, >one that has defied the efforts of the world's greatest spy-masters and >crypto-fiends to crack for countless centuries (or at least since 1962 or >so). It goes like this: > > A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z > 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 > > It's a damn fine code, and whoever invented it should get a big gold >star, lots of LDD medals, and a beefy slap on the ass for good effort and >sheer genius. But I'm afraid that now I have some *SHOCKING NEWS*! > > I have reason to believe that the Discordian secret code has been >_compromised_. You know, "Loose lips sink ships" and all that, right? >(Or is it, "Loose lips sink Golden Apple Corps"? I'm never sure...). >Well, it was worse than loose lips. It is my suspiscion that some >traitorous Discordian actually gave the code to the NSA. > > What to do now for all your Discordian encryption needs? I mean, it >would now be insanely dangerous (or at least not very private) to use the >old encryption scheme. > > I therefore propose creating a new Discordian secret code, perhaps based >on a cypher model (where each character is represented by some word), >although other models might work really well, too. Anyway, here's a start >to a Discordian cypher... > > A Andersianism > B Quasimodo > C yorba linda > D colostomy > E chao > F mojo > >etc... > > This is a fun scheme because the utter apparent randomness of it. Or at >least it seems random... Anyway, it's probably not the best possible >scheme for a Discordian Secret Code. Here's are some alternate schemes I >had for encoding messages: > > * Implosion Method. Write message on lightbulb. Implode lightbulb. >Recipient then reverses time continuum and grabs pre-imploded lightbulb >from alternate timeline, reads message, and tosses back for implosion >before anybody notices. > Advantages: NSA Clipper plans (oddly enough) do not extend as far as >including key/escrow chips in all time travel devices. > Disadvantages: Useless against the Great Race of Yith. > > * St. Gulik Method. Write the message in radioactive ink on box paste >and feed to specially trained homing cockroaches. Release the homing >cockroaches to skitter home. Reassemble message from roach entrails. > Advantages: Enemy cryptographers don't like touching roaches. > Disadvantages: Kills the roaches; difficult to train them to go home. > > * O'Leary's Cow Method. Write message on paper and burn to ashes. >Send ashes to recipient. > Advantages: No way for enemy to decode message. > Disadvantages: No way for recipient to decode message. > > * Formless Spawn Method. Write message on outer surface of trained >Shoggoth in really strong permanent ink. As Shoggoth moves, message will >be scrambled on its surface. With the proper command word, recipient can >command shoggoth to assume original form(lessness), descrambling the >message. > Advantages: Message devours any enemy crytographer who tries to decode it. > Disadvantages: No good if recipient fails sanity check. > > > Any other suggestions for good encryption schemes would be welcome... >I'm beginning to feel insecure already, as well as a little on the insane >side (you try training a shoggoth to act as your message-pod...) > > >-- >Postings to alt.humor.best-of-usenet reflect what the submittor considers to be >the best in usenet humor, and the poster is responsible for the content. The >moderator removes duplicates, copyrighted material, posts without headers, but >does not drop articles based on content. See the group charter for more info. >Sigs may be truncated. Moderator address: best(a)cc.ysu.edu >-- >/-------------------------------------------------------------------------\ >|bruceab(a)teleport.com Bruce Baugh, thoroughly unaffiliated with Teleport| >| "An' besides you IS a rabbit." "Not a 'nothing-BUT-a-rabbit', tho'." | >\-------------------------------------------------------------------------/ > > |"I would call him a Beastialic Sadomasochistic | alano(a)teleport.com | |Necrophile but that would be beating a dead | Disclaimer: | |horse." -- Teriyaki (What's up Tiger Lily?) | Ignore the man | | -- PGP 2.61 key available on request -- | behind the keyboard.|

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Re: Cracking MD5 for $10M
by sw＠tiac.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>...another algorithm dominates it >for single processor loop detection... at least in storage space. It >works as follows: get a sequence of values v(i+1) = MD5(v(i)); >simultaneously get another sequence w(i+1) = MD5(MD5(w(i))), and start them >at the same place, v(0) = w(0). That is, you're running one of them twice >as fast as the other. I like to call this the "two race cars" algorithm--you start a fast car ahead of a slow car on a single-lane track, and if the fast one runs into the slow one it's a looped track. Funny, just two weeks ago a coworker put a 32-bit CRC function into the programming language I use, and I was playing with finding collisions. (I bet a dollar there would be a non-trivial collision between CRCs of the 76,000 files on our biggest disk and lost.) Has anyone mentioned using this sort of method to generate same-hash texts with, say, opposite meanings? David Wagner says-- >Another thing -- I'm not sure this method is (directly) useful for >generating lots of collisions, if that is what is desired. I believe >Dr. Hellman wrote some paper about the cycling properties of random >functions (out of interest in DES), and he concluded (if I remember >correctly) that when you generate lots of random starting values and >look at their cycling properties, most starting values will drain into >a very few specific cycles. Seems to me that even if lots of random starting points drain into the same cycle, you've still got lots of collisions. Either points where the sequences join the cycle, or points where different tributaries join each other before joining the cycle. --Steve - - - - - - - - - - They say the User exists *outside* of the net. No one knows for sure, but I intend to find out! --ReBoot (Saturday morning 3D animated cartoon)

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CEB September 11, 1994 issue 2
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CYPHER-REBELS ELECTRONIC BOOK (CEB) SEPTEMBER 11, 1994 ISSUE 2 Publisher Gary Lee Jeffers ccgary(a)mizzou1.missouri.edu A compendium of the best software & info for today's electronic privacy freedom fighters. This text may be distributed in part or in full anywhere you want. It may be given away freely or copies may be sold. CEB wants to be free & valuable. If, as Chairman Mao says: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.", then what is democracy? TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. PGP Section 1. PGP general Section 2. Michael Johnson's PGP FAQ contribution Section 3. Stealth PGP. Chapter 2. Steganography. "A picture is worth a thousand words." Chapter 3. Shells for PGP Section 1. Christopher W. Geib's WinPGP26.ZIP Section 2. Ross Barclay's WinFront 3.0 Chapter 4. Generally cool things. Section 1. Loompanics sources. Section 2. Viruses sources. Chapter 5. Getting the Cypherpunks' archived & indexed list. Chapter 6. Remailers & chained remailers. Chapter 7. Current problems in Crypt. Chapter 8. Text sources. Section 1. Books Section 2. Rants Section 3. CYPHERNOMICON - Tim May's "official" Cypherpunks' FAQ. Chapter 9. Cypherpunks' mailing list. getting on etc.. CCCCCCCCCC YYYY YYYY PPPPPP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRRR CCCCCCCCCC YY YY PP PP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRRR CCC YY YY PP PP HH HH EE RR RR CCC YY YY PPPPPP HHHHHHHH EE RR RR CCC YYY PP HHHHHHHH EEEEEEE RR RR CCC YYY PP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRR CCC YYY PP HH HH EE RRRRRRR CCC YYY PP HH HH EE RRRRRR CCCCCCCCCC YYY PP HH HH EE RR RR CCCCCCCCCCC YYY PP HH HH EEEEEEE RR RR PP HH HH EEEEEEE RR RR RRRRRRRRRRR RR RR RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEE RRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBB EEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSS RRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBBBBB EE EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSS RR RRRR EEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSS RRR RRRR EEEEEEEE BBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSS RRR RRRRR EEEEEE BBBBBB EEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSS RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEE BBB EEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEE BB EEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSS RRRRRRR RRRR EEEEEEEEEE BBB EEEEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSSSS RRR RRRRR EEEEEEEEEEEE BBBBB EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSSS RRRRR RR EEEEEEEE BBBBBBB EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RR RRRRR EEEEEE BBBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RR RRRRR EEEEEE BBBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RRR RRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBB EEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSS RRRR RRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBB EEEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSSS PPPPPPPPPPP GGGGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPPPPPPPPPP GGGGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPP PP GGG PPP PP PPPPPPPPPPPP GGG GGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPPPPPPPPP GGG GGGGGGG PPPPPPPP PPP GGG GG PPP PPP GGGGGGGGGGGGG PPP PPP GGGGGGGGGGGG PPP Chapter 1. PGP general. PGP is Pretty Good Privacy from Phil Zimmermann. It is currently the best available encryption available to civilians at large. Zimmermann is the programmer on the original PGP versions but now, apparently, just guides other programmers in making improved versions. PGP uses two encryption algorithms: RSA for its Public Key powers & IDEA for its bulk encryption. The advantages of PGP over other crypt/decrypt systems are: 1. RSA algorithm. Allows users to communicate without needing a secure channel to exchange keys. - PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION. 2. The program system has been very well done & has huge development support. 3. It has huge popularity. 4. Security is guaranteed with distribution of source code & public investigation. 5. Its free. 6. Both RSA & IDEA are "STRONG" algorithms. MIT,s PGP 2.6 has the blessing of Zimmermann. PGP 2.6 ui is believed to have Zimmermann's approval because he has not attacked it. It is believed that Zimmermann will not endorse the ui version due to possible legal problems. Section 2: Michael Johnson's PGP FAQ contribution Michael Paul Johnson <mpj(a)netcom.com> has an excellent faq on Subject: Where to Get the Latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ (Last modified: 7 September 1994 by Mike Johnson) You can get this faq by anonymous ftp to: ftp.csn.net /mpg/getpgp.asc It is also posted monthly on alt.security.pgp The latest versions of PGP are VIACRYPT PGP 2.7 , MIT PGP 2.6.1 & PGP 2.6ui. Which is best? I would say MIT PGP 2.6.1. It has source code which VIACRYPT doesn't give you & it is more advanced than the ui version. In comparing the MIT & ui versions, Michael Johnson had this to say: "The "unofficial international" versions are really just PGP 2.3a, modified just enough to make it compatible ust with MIT PGP 2.6, but do not include all of the fixes in MIT PGP 2.6 the and MIT PGP 2.6.1. They are named pgp26ui* or have "ui" somewhere a in their file names." In his faq, he gives some instances in which sions the ui version might be preferable. Section 3: Michael Johnson's PGP bomb contribution. From: Michael Johnson <mpj(a)csn.org> Subject: PGP Time Bomb FAQ PGP TIME BOMB FAQ Michael Johnson writes: "There has been some confusion about the annoying "Time Bomb" in MIT PGP2.6, as well as some other PGP version compatibility issues. This is an attempt to clear up some of that confusion." You can get this faq by anonymous ftp to: ftp.csn.net /mpj/pgpbomb.asc Section 3. Stealth PGP 37 Stealth PGP refers to a PGP file that does not have the RSA prefix tag on the beginning of a PGP encrypted file or to PGP utility software that disguises this tag. Possibly, a later version of PGP with have this as an option. The advantages of "Stealthy" PGP are that its files cannot be found by Internet search programs that hunt for the PGP/RSA tag & that a "Stealthy" file may be more securely hidden by a good steganography program. From: Mark Grant <mark(a)unicorn.com> Subject: Stealth PGP Responding to my question "Has Stealth PGP been done yet?" Mark Grant says: Kind of, there's a 'stealth' filter available that strips and attaches headers to PGP messages after encryption. It's available from various places, and the documentation is available on my 'other people's PGP addons' WWW page : http://www.c2.org/~mark/pgp/other.html There's also information about Privtool, my PGP-aware mail program for Sun workstations at : http://www.c2.org/~mark/privtool/privtool.html Mark EMAIL: mark(a)unicorn.com URL : http://www.c2.org/~mark/ Chapter 2. Steganography "A picture is worth a thousand words." ============================================= %% = !I = %% %%% = !!! BB = %%%* *%%%% = **!!** & = *** @** = u \ x! ) < = * *** + m ) c $ = ** = # k } º = º = $%- & u = = ------- = @!p +e$ ~ # = º = h 6& ; | = º = =,# {{ = º = = º º = = º º = = º º ============================================= º º STILL LIFE WITH CRYPT +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Steganography is the craft of hiding messages in pictures. The text is, of course, encrypted text rather than plain text. The current best steganography program has been done by Arsen Arachelian Below, follows his text contribution: From: rarachel(a)prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian) WNSTORM is available from: ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXX/Steg Usual routine to get it. i.e. cd /pub/crypto/software, get the README file, and if you agree to the terms then follow the instructions. Short description off the top of my head (I wrote the beastie) Another info scrap should be in the same directory as WNSTORM. WNSTORM is a data encryption/steganography utility which is pretty secure for most uses. Unlike some stego systems WNSTORM is expandible, all you have to do is write your own LSB injector/extractor for whatever data format you wish to hide information into. WNSTORM doesn't require the recipient of the host picture, sound, movie, etc. to have the original un-stormed picture. Unlike primitive stego programs, WNSTORM doesn't compare an stormed picture with an unstormed picture. WNSTORM will cover its tracks statistically. If it changes a 0 bit in the LSB data stream to a zero, or a 1 bit to a 1, it does nothing. If it changes a 1 bit to a zero, it will balance itself by changing an unused adjacent 0 bit to a 1. Ditto for a 0->1 transform. WNSTORM will NOT change every bit of the LSB in order to prevent detection. It will use a passkey along with a probabilistic algorithm to decide which bits it will change. The algorithm for picking bits depends on the previous succesfully encoded/decoded cyphertext AND the passkey. Internally WNSTORM works by picking "windows" or "packets" of bytes out of either a random number stream or an LSB stream extracted from a picture, sound, movie, etc. It then injects eight bits of cyphertext into this window. Each window is of variable size. The bit locations where the bits are inserted are randomly exchanged for each pass. The bit values are also randomly exchanged for each pass. WNSTORM includes an injector/extractor for PCX images, however I will write more injecotr/extractor programs for it in the future, and OTHERS can do so as well. Chapter 3. Shells for PGP. Section 1. Christopher W. Geib's WinPGP26.ZIP From: "David K. Merriman" <merriman(a)metronet.com> Subject: Christopher W. Geib's Windows PGP shell I've just finished making an ftp deposit to soda in the cypherpunks/ incoming directory of WinPGP26.ZIP; it's the latest version of the Windows PGP shell Shareware, and understands 2.6/2.6ui/2.7. Dave Merriman Section 2. Ross Barclay's WinFront 3.0 From: Ross Barclay <RBARCLAY(a)TrentU.ca> Subject: PGP WinFront 3.0 Now Available! (New Windows front end for PGP) To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, ~rbarclay(a)TrentU.ca -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Announcing PGP WinFront 3.0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A freeware Windows front end for PGP 2.3a and 2.6 Copyright 1994 Ross Barclay (rbarclay(a)trentu.ca) WHAT IT IS: - PGP WinFront is the most fully featured free (or otherwise) Windows front end available. It will make using PGP easy for beginners, and it will drastically increase the speed at which experts use it too. PGP WinFront is now into is third revision and I have tried to implement as many of the suggestions that I received as possible. PGP WinFront was designed by its users, but was coded by me. Features: - Supports secret key ring placement on floppy drive - Support en/decryption to/from clipboard - Move / Copy / Delete files - Online hypertext help - Online hypertext PGP help - Keyring reader to pick names, view key characteristics - Keyring reader supports less-often used "huge" keyrings - Signature Checker - Very configurable - over 25 user-definable settings - more . . . This program does too much to list here. And it's free! This version is a complete rewrite of the popular PGP WinFront 2.0. The feature-set has largely been set by users who sent in suggestions. Please read the file README.TXT and peruse the help files. Please send me your comments. HOW TO GET IT: At the moment, there are 2 ways to get this program: 1) Via FTP - The PGP WinFront 3.0 filename is called PWF30.ZIP. - It has been uploaded to the incoming directories of the following FTP sites: ftp.cica.indiana.edu ftp.eff.org ftp.wimsey.bc.ca black.ox.ac.uk soda.berkeley.edu ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de ftp.ee.und.ac.za ftp.demon.co.uk - Hopefully, they will be slotted into the PGP directories soon. On CICA, it will be placed into \pub\pc\win3\utils. That is where PWF20.ZIP was placed. - Once you get the program, please upload it to other FTP sites! 2) From Colorado Catacombs BBS - dial (303)772-1062. The file is called PWF30.ZIP - once you get the program, please upload it to other BBSs. *** The mail access system I had was discontinued. This is because the file was too big to fit into my account. However, you can still register PWF and request certain PGP and PWF related items using my mail access system. Details of these are on the "About" screen of PWF 30. - --Ross Barclay - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ross Barclay (rbarclay(a)trentu.ca) Assistant Editor | To receive my PGP | public key, send PC NEWS Review: Windows Edition | me e-mail with the Bellevue, WA (206) 399-8700 | subject: GET KEY - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To receive PC NEWS Review, send me e-mail with the subject: GET PNR. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBLmZ7fdgpRteEZ9JhAQFeXgIAxIpvJQeMsx7YecNgtusBDMqL662XFeX2 qL0qF8HcN4ReZ9MYjtn9t8N1zWGxkPOXQEI3KfM7uk8JTzxjZ5LG2g== =gSYT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Chapter 4. Generally cool things. Section 1. Loompanics sources. Something cool from Vincent: Most of the Loompanics Unlimited catalog is online as: gopher://gopher.well.sf.ca.us/00/Business/catalog.asc And you can send mail to them at: loompanx(a)pt.olympus.net You can also get their catalog at: Loompanics Unlimited PO box 1197 33 Port Townsend, Wa. 98368 P id Send $5.00 for their general catalog - free with any order. Section 2. Viruses sources. AMERICAN EAGLE PUBLICATIONS Cypherpunks, I have found a source of info. that I just must share! American Eagle Publications, Inc. P. O. Box 41401 Tucson, AZ 85717 I'm sure they will send you a catalog just for the asking. So, what are they about? They are about VIRUSES! They don't just carry a couple of virus things - they are the VIRUSES-ARE-US of the virus world! They have a journal: Computer Virus Developments Quarterly. They have books on viruses, virus protection, cryptanalysis, the science fiction book "Heiland", a CD-ROM for $99.95 of several thousand live viruses, disks of viruses with source code, executable & utilities, programs & cards for boot protection, & even a virus IDEA computer system protector. Copy follows for two items of particular interest to Cypherpunks: POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE, KOH By the "King of Hearts" A sophisticated piece of software which uses ideas first developed by computer virus writers to secure your computer system against those who would like to get their hands on the information in it. You give KOH a pass phrase, & it uses state of the art IDEA data encryption algorithm to encrypt all of the information on your hard disk & your floppies. It is, for all intents & purposes, unbreakable, & works well with DOS & Windows. Many encryption programs offered commercially are easily cracked, but this one is not. Some people call this program a virus, come say it is not. In ways, it acts like a virus to do some of your security housekeeping for you. Yet at worst it is a friendly virus that lets you choose when & how it will replicate. program & manual on disk, $10 program, full source, & manual on disk, $20 (Overseas customers add $12: KOH cannot be exported from the US, but since it was not developed in the US, we will forward your order to the overseas distributor. Please allow 6 weeks for delivery) HEILAND By Franklin Sanders 276 pages, Paperback, 1986 Here's an entertaining book about America in the year 2020. If you wonder if it's proper to use viruses in wartime or if such a virus could be termed "good", this book will give you some food for thought. Sanders makes use of computer "worms" when the oppressed people of the US attack the federal government in an all-out war against tyranny. Sanders uses his worms right too - not as some all-powerful monster. Rather, they are deployed as part of a larger military strategy. For a book written in 1986, that's not bad! And if you're fed up with the government, this book is sure to give you a vision for the future. Sanders has been part of the mounting tax protest in this country. He's fought the IRS in court for years & won some important battles. Unfortunately the government seems to be con- firming some of his worst suspensions about them. Now you can get a good dose of his philosophy & his ideas about remedying our problems. And if you work for the government, don't be offended - this book is doubly recommended for you! Book, $8.00 for shipping add $2 per book. 5% sales tax for AZ. residents. It is my belief that in the next few years more uses for viruses than just being a vandal will be found. Also, they may find a place in protecting our electronic freedom. - for instance virus remailers. Also see my previous post - The FREEDOM DEAMON. Also, they have a place in my CHATTERBOX concept(a remailer for chat mode or commands). "Viruses aren't just for Sociopaths anymore!" Also, I suspect the state may start cracking down on virus tech- nology. Incidentally, did you all know that crypt has a place in modern viruses? Encryption is used to hide "nasty" code & virus signatures until they get into the system & decrypt. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKK! BBBEEEAAATTTTT STATE ! Chapter 5. Getting the Cypherpunks' archived & indexed list. Vincent also tells us about the complete Cypherpunk's text on line & indexed with fast access times: Eric Johnson has put one together as: http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src Please don't think that you used to be safe doing something illegal on this list and that you no longer are. That would be foolish. -- Vince The "http" is for "Hyper-Text Transport Protocol". This is not FTP, though it is a protocol similar in function to FTP. It is used by "WWW" (World Wide Web) of which Mosaic is the most popular implementation. If you have Mosaic, you can just give the above path. If you do not have mosaic, you should spend some time trying to get it. Mosaic makes it really easy to quickly move through lots of information on the net. Mosaic is a point and click hypertext interface. You can FTP to ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu and go into Mosaic. WWW has a simple language for writting your own hypertext documents - "HTML" (Hyper Text Markup Language). You can think of this as sort of like Troff, LaTeX or Postscript, but for hypertext documents. One page of HTML can make dozens of normal files easy to access. For example, my README.html security page points to many normal files: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html It turns out that the mail database is really in "WAIS" (Wide Area Information Server). You can use WAIS directly, though I think it is easier to use through mosaic. To use WAIS you would do: ws -h pmip.maricopa.edu -d cpindex/Cypherpunks <keyword> The "ws" may be "waissearch" on your system. You can get lots of info on WAIS from ftp://wais.think.com/comp.infosystems.wais-FAQ As someone pointed out, this "http" method does not yet work with "lynx" (a text only implementation of WWW) on the cypherpunks mail database. It seems it will take a new version of lynx or WAIS for this to work. But the Unix "xmosaic" works fine. :-) This form of global filename starting with something like "ftp://", "http://", "gopher://" etc is also part of the WWW architecture. These names are called "URLs" for Universal Resource Locator. Well, that is probably enough acronyms for today. :-) -- Vince From: Vincent.Cate(a)FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: WWW Acronyms (was Re: Cypherpunks' mail database does exist) Gary Jeffers: > Vincent, you state that a fully archived, indexed cypherpunks >mailing list exists as: >http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/cypherpunks.src >Ok, so I ftp'ed to pmip.maricopa.edu & tried to get to cypherpunks.src, >but even the subdirectories weren't there. The "http" is for "Hyper-Text Transport Protocol". This is not FTP, though it is a protocol similar in function to FTP. It is used by "WWW" (World Wide Web) of which Mosaic is the most popular implementation. If you have Mosaic, you can just give the above path. If you do not have mosaic, you should spend some time trying to get it. Mosaic makes it really easy to quickly move through lots of information on the net. Mosaic is a point and click hypertext interface. You can FTP to ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu and go into Mosaic. You also have a typo, it is "Cypherpunks.src" with a capital C. WWW has a simple language for writting your own hypertext documents - "HTML" (Hyper Text Markup Language). You can think of this as sort of like Troff, LaTeX or Postscript, but for hypertext documents. One page of HTML can make dozens of normal files easy to access. For example, my README.html security page points to many normal files: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html It turns out that the mail database is really in "WAIS" (Wide Area Information Server). You can use WAIS directly, though I think it is easier to use through mosaic. To use WAIS you would do: ws -h pmip.maricopa.edu -d cpindex/Cypherpunks <keyword> The "ws" may be "waissearch" on your system. You can get lots of info on WAIS from ftp://wais.think.com/comp.infosystems.wais-FAQ As someone pointed out, this "http" method does not yet work with "lynx" (a text only implementation of WWW) on the cypherpunks mail database. It seems it will take a new version of lynx or WAIS for this to work. But the Unix "xmosaic" works fine. :-) This form of global filename starting with something like "ftp://", "http://", "gopher://" etc is also part of the WWW architecture. These names are called "URLs" for Universal Resource Locator. Well, that is probably enough acronyms for today. :-) -- Vince PS I only read cypherpunks once a day, some time after midnight when my collection for the day is done. From: rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Subject: Accessing the Cpunk WAIS archive "Gary Jeffers" <vikram!CCGARY(a)MIZZOU1.missouri.edu> > http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src > is the location of all the Cypherpunks' posts with index. I can > get to this place by placing a "www" in front of this instruction. Do an archie search for lynx or mosaic or some other decent browser. This is a WAIS indexed archive; no hyper links; you type in a keyword, and get a list of matching articles, and select one (or more) of them to look at. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA Chapter 6. Remailers & chained remailers. From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) Message-Id: <9408300753.AA22369(a)anchor.ho.att.com> To: CCGARY(a)MIZZOU1.missouri.edu Subject: Re: Using remailers, chained remailers? There's somebody who posts a remailer summary to the list about monthly. There are three or four sets of remailers out there: - anon.penet.fi, which gives you an account an12345(a)anon.penet.fi which people can reply to. Send "Subject: help" to anon(a)anon.penet.fi and it'll probably give you a useful reply. Its big use is for anonymous Usenet posting with working replies. - The cypherpunks remailers, which are mostly one-way no-reply mailers; some also support Usenet posting. Soda is pretty typical. - Various enhanced cypherpunks remailers, which have features like encrypted reply addresses you can attach at the end. You can get information on using the soda remailer by sending email to remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu, with "help" somewhere in the posting; I'm not sure if it wants it in the Subject: or in the body. That's the remailer that posts from "Tommy the Tourist" with random NSA-bait at the bottom of postings. Here's a recent posting on getting status of remailers. Note that some really only remail once per day, so they may be working fine even if it says they're not. ---- Date: Mon, 15 Aug 1994 13:39:33 -0700 From: Raph Levien <raph(a)kiwi.CS.Berkeley.EDU> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: "finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" now operational Hi all, I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at http://http.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Please do not take the uptime figures too seriously, at least for another week or so. The script has only been running reliably for a few days. Please let me know about any other remailers which I missed. I've only included remailers which can mail to arbitrary addresses, so I already know chop and twwells are missing. If you've got a Web page, please feel free to include a link to this page. If you think your Web page is relevant to the subject of remailers, let me know and I'll link it in. Comments and suggestions welcome! Raph Levien ------- # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465 Chapter 7. Current problems in Crypt. 1. We need an Internet Chat PGP system for conversations in real time. Note: #Freedom channel on the Internet Chat system has carried out fast encrypted conversations for years. When a Cypherpunk contacted one of their members (Sargent someone), he was politely told that their system was private. Sargent was unwilling to disclose method. Is their system some kind of security by obscurity code that cannot be varied (like by a drop in crypt/decrypt algorithm)? Or maybe the crypt method could be a drop in variable method & Sarge was unaware of it? Possibly other #Freedom members would be more knowledgeable? Possibly, a knowledgeable & diplomatic Cypherpunk could hit paydirt by pursuing this. 2. Has Arsen Arachelian really solved the problem of discovery of crypt in steganograpy by statistical examination of the least significant bits in his WNSTROM? I have seen no debate on this. 3. If the Feds capture the internet & put their anti-privacy hardware & protocols in place & outlaw remailers, does anyone have any idea how to build secure & effective remailers? A "Fortress remailer"? 4. If the above possibility happens & Cyperpunks' list is outlawed, does anyone have ideas how to make a "Fortress list"? Chapter 8. Text sources. Section 1. Books. From: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> Subject: O'Reilly PGP book Date: Wed, 7 Sep 1994 13:38:58 -0400 (EDT) coming soon, PGP hits the mainstream: PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel 1st Edition November 1994 (est.) 250 pages (est),ISBN: 1-56592-098-8, $17.95 (est) PGP is a freely available encryption program that protects the privacy of files and electronic mail. It uses powerful public key cryptography and works on virtually every platform. PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel is both a readable technical users guide and a fascinating behind-the-scenes look at cryptography and privacy. Part I of the book describes how to use PGP: protecting files and email, creating and using keys, signing messages, certifying and distributing keys, and using key servers. Part II provides background on cryptography, battles against public key patents and U.S. government export restrictions, and other aspects of the ongoing public debates about privacy and free speech. -- <A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/mech.html"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Fndtn. </A><P> Online Activist The best book in cryptography is: APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C by Bruce Schneier Loompanics advertising copy follows: In Applied Cryptography, data security expert Bruce Schneier details how programmers can use cryptography - the technique of enciphering messages - to maintain the privacy of computer data. Covering the latest developments in practical cryptographic techniques, the book shows programmers who design computer software and systems we use every day. Along with more than 100 pages of actual C source code of working cryptographic algorithms, this pratical handbook: * Explains data encryption protocols and techniques currently in use and likely to be used in the future. * Offers numerous present day applications - from secure correspondence to anonymous messaging. * Includes numerous source code fragments and shows how to incorporate them into larger programs. * Discusses related issues like patents, export laws, and legal rulings. And much more! 1994, 7 1/2 x 9, 636 pp, Illustrated, indexed, soft cover. APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: $44.95 (order number 10062) $4.00 for shipping and handling. UPS ground. Additional $7.50 if you want UPS w day air(blue)- that would be $11.50. Loompanics Unlimited PO Box 1197 Port Townsend, WA 98368 Section 2. Rants. For good rants FTP to soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/rants Section 3. CYPHERNOMICON - Tim May's "official" Cypherpunks' FAQ. This is a giant (1.3MB uncompressed) faq by Tim May. To get it by anonymous ftp: ftp to ftp.netcom.com /pub/tcmay - This directory has it & its associated files. Chapter 9. Cypherpunks' mailing list. getting on etc.. ======================================================================== 63 X-Delivery-Notice: SMTP MAIL FROM does not correspond to sender. Received: from MIZZOU1 (SMTP) by MIZZOU1 (Mailer R2.10 ptf000) with BSMTP id 8875; Sun, 11 Sep 94 23:25:40 CDT Received: from relay2.UU.NET by MIZZOU1.missouri.edu (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with TCP; Sun, 11 Sep 94 23:25:39 CDT Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxgzh01248; Mon, 12 Sep 1994 00:22:38 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA27527; Sun, 11 Sep 94 21:22:46 PDT Date: Sun, 11 Sep 94 21:22:46 PDT Message-Id: <9409120422.AA27527(a)toad.com> To: CCGARY(a)MIZZOU1.missouri.edu From: Majordomo(a)toad.com Subject: Majordomo results Reply-To: Majordomo(a)toad.com -- >>>> help This is Brent Chapman's "Majordomo" mailing list manager, version 1.92. In the description below items contained in []'s are optional. When providing the item, do not include the []'s around it. It understands the following commands: subscribe <list> [<address>] Subscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) to the named <list>. unsubscribe <list> [<address>] Unsubscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) from the named <list>. get <list> <filename> Get a file related to <list>. index <list> Return an index of files you can "get" for <list>. which [<address>] Find out which lists you (or <address> if specified) are on. who <list> Find out who is on the named <list>. info <list> Retrieve the general introductory information for the named <list>. lists Show the lists served by this Majordomo server. help Retrieve this message. end Stop processing commands (useful if your mailer adds a signature). Commands should be sent in the body of an email message to "Majordomo(a)toad.com". Commands in the "Subject:" line NOT processed. If you have any questions or problems, please contact "Majordomo-Owner(a)toad.com". PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

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Crypto Anarchy and the Social Body (Meta Strong Crypto)
by doug＠OpenMind.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to all for the responses to my "Black Cryptoanarchy" post (flames and all!) I apologize for rehashing old libertarian debates, on which I am not well-informed, and I will focus here exclusively on the subject of "crypto anarchy". As I wrote the following post, it grew in size to the point where it made sense for me to cast it into "essay" format (at the risk of looking like just another net-kook). CRYPTO ANARCHY AND THE SOCIAL BODY (META STRONG CRYPTO) Let me begin by making it clear that it is not my intent to discredit cypherpunks or the goals of crypto anarchy. I have embraced these notions wholeheartedly until quite recently, when I began to question some of the assumptions about the consequences of this technology. I wish to raise these concerns openly here, and if my reasoning is flawed, I hope to have the flaws exposed. It seems likely that the complete suite of tools for crypto anarchy *will* become widely deployed in the next few years -- certainly by the end of the decade. I will argue that there are aspects of this technology which have the potential to induce powerful changes in the structure of the "social organism" of man, which have no counterpart in prior human history. The qualitatively fundamental nature of these changes makes their impact very difficult to predict. Therefore it is imperative that cypherpunks, who are perhaps best qualified to examine these issues, consider carefully what social impact these changes may have. We should discuss what, if anything, may be done with respect to development and deployment of the tools of crypto anarchy, in order to influence the final outcome for the greater liberty and standard of living of mankind as a whole. I will argue that cypherpunks should examine ways to influence the deployment and patterns of use of strong crypto tools in society, and not merely consider the construction of the tools alone. The study of social dynamics in the presence of strong crypto, and of how to introduce strong crypto tools in such a manner so as to achieve desirable patterns of deployment and social dynamics, is what I term "meta strong crypto". THE SOCIAL ORGANISM My background is in the disparate fields of biology and mathematics, so I begin in these areas. In biological terms, man is a social animal. We are evolved to survive through cooperative interactions with each other. We are by no means unique in this regard... cooperating societies of individuals have evolved many times throughout nature, often arriving at similar structures from independent origins. Almost all primates are social animals of one type or another, and the social structures of the larger primates such as baboons and chimpanzees are particularly complex. Very complex social structures also occur in distantly related (but highly intelligent) species such as porpoises and elephants. In all such cases, the social interactions are complex enough to justify describing the whole in terms of a "social body". There are universal properties of interaction which create the social body in these species, and in all human societies throughout history. These properties depend fundamentally on the publicly visible nature of most social interactions. Individual social animals exist in a relationship to the social body deriving from the visibility of their actions to others. This *defines* individuality. Relationship to group is fundamental, and creates the context of consequence, reprisal, negotiation, and positioning upon which all animal or human societies are based. Strong crypto -- the tools of crypto anarchy -- represents a break in these primal functions upon which the social body is based. The significance of this break is difficult to comprehend... it is not only a first for human societies, but a first for all of biological evolution. Picture a visual image for the traditional social body as a graph. The graph consists of numerous nodes -- individuals -- and a complex web of interrelationships between them. Now consider what the tools of strong crypto do to this graph. Nodes -- "individuals" -- may appear and disappear over extremely short time periods, as anonymous identities come and go. All nodes may have any number of unknowable links, or links which are unknowable by arbitrarily large sections of the net. Links may have new properties, such as asymmetry of identity. Individual nodes may "unknowably" represent (equate with) entire collections of other nodes. The point is that the social structure is altered along dimensions that have been constant since the dawn of the evolution of social animals. This picture implies the development of something radically different than what we now think of as a social body. It is far more complex, with new types of basic components and operations. There is no reason to expect it to resemble any society in the history of man, or to bear any resemblance to any social body which has evolved to date. It is something radically new and different. POSSIBILITIES Many people have embraced with unreserved enthusiasm the dawn of a new era to be ushered in by strong crypto. There is an expectation that the power of the new tools, and the extent of the social changes, must necessarily lead to desirable improvements. For my purposes, desirable changes would include an increased standard of living for all humans, increased communications and interactions between individuals across the whole of human civilization, as well as increased personal liberty to pursue any desired avenue of exploration/growth. On the other hand, undesirable changes would include a massive lowering in the standard of living for most peoples, the creation of Orwellian societies, increased fragmentation and decreased communications between the peoples of the world, or more marked catastrophes such as the advent of massive terrorism on a global scale (whether nuclear, biological, or merely conventional terrorist attacks are involved). SIMULATIONS/SPECULATIONS Since the effect of strong crypto on the social body of man is so difficult to understand or predict, it seems that a reasonable approach would be to conduct computer simulations of the spontaneous forms of self organization that occur in populations participating under various game-theoretic and economic models, when these populations have access to strong crypto. It would be very instructive to examine what kinds of long-term stable structures can arise under various initial conditions. It would be particularly relevant to attempt to model what structures can develop when the strong-crypto tools are introduced in various ways, rather than starting out as a ubiquitous presence in society. Various models for the spread of the technology could be developed. These are the tools of meta strong crypto. I will here venture into the realm of blatant speculation: I speculate that stable patterns of organization with the highest degrees of global liberty and prosperity would arise from scenarios in which the access to strong crypto tools is ubiquitous and uniform. I speculate that many of the more disastrous scenarios and unpleasant steady-state societies would be characterized by inhomogeneities in the deployment of strong crypto. SELF-CATALYSIS AND INSTABILITY When reading the views of those who are most optimistic about the potentials of crypto anarchy, there seems to be an implicit assumption that the advent of strong crypto will be self-catalytic and rapidly spread throughout all segments of society. I think this assumption is natural, given the history of the information age, wherein technological advances have inevitably become ever more accessible to the general public. I believe that strong crypto does indeed have the potential to be "auto-catalytic" and to rapidly spread throughout society in an unstoppable wave. However, I see this auto-catalysis as susceptible to various forms of instability that may result from immaturity in its initial deployment. The principle weakness of this auto-catalysis is the fact that strong-crypto relies upon technology which requires a certain standard quality of living. It requires computers of adequate speed and networks of sufficient bandwidth and interconnectivity. If the threshold standard of living necessary to acquire this technology lies well below the average standard of living in society, then the deployment of strong crypto may spread rapidly and uniformly throughout society. However, if this threshold standard of living is very near or above the average standard of living, then the tools of strong crypto will necessarily spread only through certain privileged channels of society. Any pre-existing class divisions in the society may become greatly pronounced, and in general inhomogeneous dynamics make predictions in the absence of simulations very difficult. CONCLUSIONS Strong crypto and crypto anarchy may well provide the mechanisms for a type of social body never before seen in the history of biological evolution. However, the mere existence of this technology in and of itself does not guarantee any particular qualities for this new social body. The new dynamics are extremely complex and will be unlike anything previously encountered. Computer simulations of populations of individuals with access to strong crypto tools under various models may give us some clues as to the stable patterns of organization likely to emerge. The modeling skills of sociobiologists, economists, and game theorists could all be applied to this problem. The exact details of the introduction and spread of the tools of strong crypto into the population may be expected to have important effects on the eventual new stable patterns which emerge. Cypherpunks should consider not just the implementation of the tools of strong crypto, but also the dynamics of its spread throughout society and the dynamics of its pattern of use. Although it is tempting to focus exclusively on the mathematical algorithms and protocols, economics and sociobiology are critical to understanding and influencing the eventual impact of strong crypto on the quality of human life. History teaches that it is a mistake to assume that a ground breaking new technology will necessarily produce the most positive changes it is capable of. Let us not follow in the foosteps of those who have made this mistake in the past.

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Re: CONTROL FREAKS
by SAMUEL.KAPLIN＠warehouse.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: CONTROL FREAKS To: cactus(a)bibliob.slip.netcom.com (L. Todd Masco) From: frissell(a)panix.com (Duncan Frissell) Subject: Re: CONTROL FREAKS Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >> After all, there can't be a totalitarian state that doesn't massively chan >> (introduce uncertainly into) the conduct of life and business in its count >> (and if it is large, in the world). Markets have a way of dealing with >> uncertainty. Capital flight (seeking safer investments) and high interest >> rates (to compensate for risk). The main assumption here is that the populous and the markets realize that they are in a totalitarian state. We in the U.S. are evolving closer and closer to this and most seem not to see it, and if they do, not to care about it. The senario that I see, is the borders being closed. (After all we HAVE to stop all of these illegal aliens.) All of the firearms and weapons being removed from private hands. (The crime rate is SO high this is the only way to solve it.) The U.S. economy being isolated from the rest of the world. (The world doesn't trade fair with us, so we just won't trade with you.) Once your economy is isolated from the rest of the worlds who cares what a dollar is worth. If the government says a dollar buys a loaf of bread, then I guess it does. After all they have all of the weapons. The most incideous thing is that the average American would go along with all of the rationalizations listed above. --BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5pUekAAAEEAKrDj64Zj9AJU+gC7/Ivdk8b1ef6a1T9K5CGFeu1yFDSXLyD DLIdGunZR/4ilosLMxdlZcNqPwZ3HgxL+Gk3y2SwYfqKpeWExWPgb696lgzf2BRC tED15ZAwi3UDIkcouv2PBiDwPNUUmnLb5diDXdA3qtALb+XzlwpnimeWAf3FAAUT tCFTYW11ZWwgS2FwbGluIDwrMSAoNjEyKSA1MzAtNzMxNj6JAJUCBRAuaVLjQqfV nzRSzxkBAcXuA/47yIN+sltMyIRqCgUZz/gubdI6LUcpFsTcXsFWppROpAWFPJv0 J9z/UoP1kjJ+nrAAizuKuhmC5eg5OOxUE+tUgSPl6hAtu2xJYmKtCbQpxF0sG8ni 4e8I8Zsk5vcopO5Vub96CiVgPjI5vITCb32kcLKI1yyFaztbHdtOasUthg== =M8Dh --END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== Processed by WILDUUCP! v1.00 for WILDCAT! ===========================================================================

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Proposed changes to the Q
by SAMUEL.KAPLIN＠warehouse.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Proposed changes to the Queensland criminal code. From: pkm(a)maths.uq.oz.au To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Proposed changes to the Queensland criminal code. Cc: ijc(a)axiom.maths.uq.oz.au, ma157727(a)mailbox.uq.oz.au, >> It seems the fight against evil never ends... >> This is a clipping from the Sunday Mail, the local >> sunday newspaper (althogh tabloid would be a better >> word for it). As you can observe, it is one of those >> papers that have a paragraph:sentence ratio of 1:1. >> I hope it is of interest to you all. All spelling >> mistakes are mine. All grammatical awkwardness are his. :-) .... >> ONLINE MOVES 'OUT OF LINE'. [Date: 11/09/94 - PKM.] Sounds like Australia is catching up with the U.S.A. :( Many local governments here are trying to implement this type of crap. Welcome to 1984 ten years late!! :) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== Processed by WILDUUCP! v1.00 for WILDCAT! ===========================================================================

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Running PGP on Netcom (an
by SAMUEL.KAPLIN＠warehouse.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Running PGP on Netcom (and Similar) From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: Running PGP on Netcom (and Similar) To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Cc: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) >> Not that had Mr. De Payne been using PGP on Netcom, with his secret >> key stored there, the cops would have it. (The passphrase maybe not, >> depending on whether he stored _that_ there, too. And whether Netcom >> had logs of keystrokes entered, which strikes me as something they >> would probably have--we really need a "zero knowledge" kind of >> "reach-back" for remotely-run PGP.) Never mind the keystroke logs, if his line was wiretapped they have all of the keystrokes coming in and going out. Get his secret keyring from Netcom and they could monitor his communications with out a problem. >> I just don't think the dangers are worth it. All the theoretical hot >> air about whether keystroke timings are "random enough" is moot if >> Netcom is turning over records to investigators. >> It creates a dangerous illusion of security. What illusion of security? If I have my secret keyring residing someplace where I can't physically control who has access to it, no way is this keyring secure!! It goes against the definition of a secret. Once you tell someone a secret, It no longer is a secret. In effect this person has told Netcom his secret, therefore it no longer is a secret. Just because you're paranoid, doesn't mean they're not out to get you. Be paranoid!! >> (For those with no home machines, and perhaps those who mainly use >> campus services, work stations, etc., I'm not faulting you; people use >> what they have to use. Longer term, though, PGP needs to run on secure >> hardware. Secure meaning not easily grabbed by the authorities without >> even one's knowledge!!) This just goes to prove that no matter how secure the crypto system is, if it is implemented in an insecure way, the whole system is compromised. If you are using a "One Time Pad" to communicate with someone and you make an extra set of pages and give them to someone that you really don't know and trust (Netcom), no way can you call this secure. Even though most will agree that the "One Time Pad" is the most secure crypto system, it is being implemented in an insecure way hence it is insecure. --BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5pUekAAAEEAKrDj64Zj9AJU+gC7/Ivdk8b1ef6a1T9K5CGFeu1yFDSXLyD DLIdGunZR/4ilosLMxdlZcNqPwZ3HgxL+Gk3y2SwYfqKpeWExWPgb696lgzf2BRC tED15ZAwi3UDIkcouv2PBiDwPNUUmnLb5diDXdA3qtALb+XzlwpnimeWAf3FAAUT tCFTYW11ZWwgS2FwbGluIDwrMSAoNjEyKSA1MzAtNzMxNj6JAJUCBRAuaVLjQqfV nzRSzxkBAcXuA/47yIN+sltMyIRqCgUZz/gubdI6LUcpFsTcXsFWppROpAWFPJv0 J9z/UoP1kjJ+nrAAizuKuhmC5eg5OOxUE+tUgSPl6hAtu2xJYmKtCbQpxF0sG8ni 4e8I8Zsk5vcopO5Vub96CiVgPjI5vITCb32kcLKI1yyFaztbHdtOasUthg== =M8Dh --END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== Processed by WILDUUCP! v1.00 for WILDCAT! ===========================================================================

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