December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(FWD) New Remailer & "Bit Bucket"
by quill＠pwa.acusd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I didn't see this on the list, so I'm forwarding for general interest: Quill I would like to announce a new remailer: nately <remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> Send mail to the remailer with the subject "remailer-help" for instructions. This is a Ghio type remailer with one change. Rather than processing incoming messages immediately, I hold them in a pool. Periodically (once per minute for now) the pool is checked. If it holds more than n messages (currently five) then random messages are selected and send to the remailer script until only n messages remain. An undocumented feature of this remailer is that it can act as a bit bucket. All messages requesting forwarding to "null" will be trashed. I am pleased to act as a bit bucket for the purposes of increasing traffic through the web of remailers. I am a graduate student in astrophysics, this is the computer on my desk, and I am root. I am the primary user of this computer. The other occasional users are five graduate students with better things to do than mess with your messages. It should be stable for 2 or 3 years (till I get the Ph.D.) baring any serious legal hassles. -- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD lcottrell(a)popmail.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. -- _____________________ ____________________________________________________ \-=[ iumop ap!sdn ]=-\/If marriage is outlawed, all inlaws will be outlaws/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finger me ... for my PGP 2.6.1 key ...

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Re: MAIL: crime and remailers
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by Jason Burrell: >Hey Blanc, can digital money be used for that? >Double-blind systems? Uh, wait, the NSA can. . . Hmm, >who are those guys running out of that van, dressed in >black, with big guns, coming toward my house? (Sound of >wood cracking and gunfire) Its the GESAP--. . . ............................................................. Sure, Jason - whatever gets you through the fight, it's allright, it's allright. . . . Wait - is that Fabio, with the G.E.S.T.A.-- H.E.A.T., dressed in a sleek black turtleneck & carrying a big gun? But why is he running toward Your house? :>) Blanc

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anonymous poster software
by khijol!erc＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I hacked this up in a little under an hour (with distractions), so it's not the absolute best software - it could stand some improvement - but it works. It could, with very minor hacking, do as an anonymous mailer. I wrote it in response to someone asking me if I could write such a thing for them in C. Yes, there are lots of itty-bitty remailers and posters out there, but this serves the bill for being totally anonymous and it's pretty quick, being written in C. Besides, I didn't want to learn perl or any of that grotesque stuff - I'm a purist at heart ;) - ---------------------------------- cut here -------------------------------- /* * anonpost - strip headers from incoming message, preserving Subject:, then * pass the rest of stdin to inews argv[]. * * Copyright 1994 by Ed Carp (ecarp(a)netcom.com) All rights reserved. */ /* * How to set this up: * * 0. Change "#define INEWS" and "#define SIG" * * 1. cc -s -o anonpost anonpost.c -O * * 2. mv anonpost /usr/local/bin # or wherever * * 3. echo "* * * * * su <whoever> -c '/usr/local/bin/anonpost -n alt.sexual.abuse.recovery -f anonasar(a)khijol.UUCP -r anonasar(a)khijol.UUCP < /usr/spool/mail/anonasar;rm /usr/spool/mail/anonasar'" >> /usr/lib/crontab * */ #define INEWS "/usr/lib/news/inews " #define SIG "/home/anon-asar/.signature" #include <stdio.h> #undef NULL #define NULL (0) main (argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { char inews[1024]; char subject[128]; char line[1024]; FILE *in, *p; int i; *subject = NULL; while (1) { /* * read header */ while (fgets (line, 1022, stdin) != (char *) NULL) { line[strlen (line) - 1] = NULL; if (strlen (line) < 2) break; if (strncmp (line, "Subject: ", 9) == 0) strcpy (subject, line + 9); } if (*subject == NULL) strcpy (subject, "<no subject>"); strcpy (inews, INEWS); for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { strcat (inews, argv[i]); strcat (inews, " "); } strcat (inews, "-t '"); strcat (inews, subject); strcat (inews, "'"); if ((p = popen (inews, "w")) == (FILE *) NULL) { perror (INEWS); exit (1); } /* * read the rest of the article, passing it to inews */ while (fgets (line, 1022, stdin) != (char *) NULL) { line[strlen (line) - 1] = NULL; if ((strcmp (line, "--") == 0) || (strcmp (line, "-- ") == 0)) { while (fgets (line, 1022, stdin) != (char *) NULL) if (strncmp (line, "From", 4) == 0) { *subject = NULL; break; } } if (strncmp (line, "From", 4) == 0) { *subject = NULL; break; } fprintf (p, "%s\n", line); } /* * append the .signature file in the current directory */ if ((in = fopen (SIG, "r")) != (FILE *) NULL) { fprintf (p, "--\n"); while (fgets (line, 1022, in) != (char *) NULL) fprintf (p, "%s", line); fclose (in); } /* * post */ pclose (p); /* * make sure we didn't get an EOF */ if (*subject != NULL) break; } } - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com Finger ecarp(a)netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744(a)anon.penet.fi ** PGP encrypted email preferred! ** "What's the use of distant travel if only to discover - you're homeless in your heart." --Basia, "Yearning" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLoEldCS9AwzY9LDxAQFEDgP/a0OeUQ//m7KO1dUZhLb3wlI4IzYl70JR PcYL/x2nf+XaskdrWN0YqXqeeV6jaPk7e1xOT/bvKgYs1MADuaUgEgcd0XynYvOl wOFYAxYN+qWi8+rC0DTxUSysOYGUH3hgMyaN5/dqCINC8pOYIz5iO+BEQC8yN9U3 H1GMiexO04w= =371T -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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pgp 2.6.1 available on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

available in /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp261 -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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HIT MEN
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, I'm stymied. I keep arguing the real world, and everyone responds as though this were a MUD game. David Merriman wrote: If the escrow agent has a reputation for reliability, honesty, integrity, etc, then the nature of the transaction is irrelevant.... I'm sorry, but this is patently ludicrous. This is not a MUD or MOO. We're not talking about game theory and the "iterated prisoner's dilemma." This is about the real world. I could cite hundreds of examples where folks don't think "the nature of the transaction is irrelevant." Tree huggers won't buy from McDonalds, irrespective of quality, because Mickey D's "encourage the destruction of the rain forests." Gun nuts won't do business with Taco Bell because it's owned by Pepsico, and they've supported gun control. There are "green" shoppers and "investors of conscience." Hell, Duncan won't even buy the fine chickens produced by Foster farms because Foster is in bed with the Klintones (well not literally... well maybe). The burden of proof is on those who would tell us that human nature will change over-night when crypto-anarchy comes on line. People *do* care about the morality of those with whom they do business. I see no reason to believe that will change. Anonymous murder for hire, is not easy. It isn't going to be any more a threat under crypto-anarchy than it is now. Please, let's get out of this Tabloid, the-sky-will-fall mind set. It's going to be okay. S a n d y Who is signing off this thread. What's coming is coming, no matter what we do or say. History will have the last word. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Cyphernomicon FAQ -- Review in "Wired"
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May): > 1. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh tells me he has committed to write a review of the > Cyphernomicon FAQ for "Wired," for either December or January publication. > I had nothing to do with this, and it surprised me when he contacted me to > notify me. (I reminded him of the "pre-release" status, the It surprised _me_ that you put this on the list - magazines usually don't care to announce their future stories so much in advance, but this is a little review and cypherpunks are noted for their discretion ;-) so I guess it's ok. As far as the "usefulness" of info on "advanced stuff", and the "questions it will generate" - awareness is all about arousing curiousity. It will be a Good Thing if people who keep reading about the nuclear terrorists and pedophiles can come and see for themselves what _really_ goes on on the list. Of course the membership may soar for a while before declining again, but _some_ new useful people are bound to join. > 3. Hal Abelson, Professor of Computer Science at MIT, has asked me if he > could convert the FAQ into a Web document for his class on "ETHICS AND LAW If he does a good job, then it would be nice. A web is really the best way to browse through so much inter-related info. > 4. Yes, I still have concerns about multiple, out-dated copies floating > around. I worry about people going to great lengths to "Webify" the version Come on. Responsible sysadmins regularly mirror updates - from the thousands of PGP sites to the dozens who download 6 mb of movie databases each week. Every one does not get in sync as soon as the new release is out, but these things usually don't take more than a week. > 5. Rishab is especially anxious to get CompuServe, AOL, etc., versions > available, or referenced in his review in "Wired." Thus, if any of you want Scott Loftesness (76703.407(a)compuserve.com) the primary SysOp of CompuServe's Telecom and Internet Forums says he'll have the Cyphernomicon in both forums: TELECOM FORUM (GO TELECOM) LIBRARY: NETWORK SECURITY (LIB 6) FILENAME: CYPFAQ.ZIP INTERNET FORUM (GO INETFORUM) LIBRARY: RESOURCES-TECHNICAL (LIB 15) FILENAME: CYPFAQ.ZIP Worst comes to worst, WIRED can put it up in their forums at AOL etc. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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RE: THE LAST WORD... (maybe)
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sandy Sandfort Now everybody can either waste their time thinking up really neat-o keen-o ways to whack innocent spouses, business enemies and rich uncles, or you can support strong crypto and privacy by thinking up ways to mitigate the potentially negative side-effects of crypto-anarchy. ................................................................ Isn't it just another means to an end, like all others. Should only a few be allowed to use a system, method, or invention; should there be barriers against tools because someone might misuse them or misapply them, etc. (same arguments) My question, in noting the possibilities discussed, was to consider what the means of defense would be against such an event transpiring. Not a responsibility for some law-enforcement agency to take up, but for potential victims. Not that there is anything specific which cypherpunks should think up to counter the possibility that crypto will be used for murder-for-hire, but just that it is always necessary for independent anarchist types to arrange for their own solutions to the problems of technological advancement (or any other kind). "Technology" (actually, technologists) make new things possible or easier, and those who exist in the milieu within that culture must find a way to deal with the consequences of the new introduction into their midst. That is the ideal, right - you ascend to new heights of knowledge, ability, and efficacy, rather than keeping everyone on a lower level of functioning because someone might get out of hand and create a problem for others. I wouldn't think, "oh, it can't be done", simply because I myself can't imagine it. I would think, "so - what could I do about that", seeing as how it could be possible to someone and as how it isn't realistic to expect to be able to stop *every* one from reasoning along those lines. And I can think of things which an individual could do to deal with such contingencies, but could there be a crypto solution? Blanc

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Re: Laws Outside the U.S.
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Isn't it inevitable that this will -- for the same reasons of equity > among the member countries -- evolve into a single set of laws governing > the *use* of crypto throughout the EC? Probably. But perhaps not for private citizens, but for police, bank, government interaction. Since they opened the borders between the countries they really have a problem. In some towns near to France they have robberies, where the robbers just walk 300 meters to France and can't be caught neither by german nor by french police. At the moment we have a some criminal nazis. (we already had the discussion). They use BBS, Fax and cryptosoftware for their national and international communication. In Italy they have islands with more fax-machines than humans. Could be reason enough for prohibition. > Can you provide any predictions as to its content? No. > It seems to me > that the EC may be a *huge* force -- for good or ill -- with respect to > crypto, depending on which way the rules fall out. It _is_ a huge force. But often more ill than good. :-( They have taken the germans their pretty large, well-tasting and cheap bananas and given them ugly, dark-brown, tiny, expensive ones. Perhaps they will do the same with cryptography. :-{ > In the first place, > because of the sheer size of the EC and the combined power and populace > of its member countries, but also because any internal crypto advantage > the EC is perceived to hold might be an additional spur to liberalization > of US crypto export policy. Smile. As long as the US keep their policy, we have a better market. I like the US policy. :-D Hadmut

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Internet Security: Secure Communications Over Untrusted Networks
by voidstar＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

please post INTERNET SECURITY SECURE COMMUNICATIONS OVER UNTRUSTED NETWORKS A one-day seminar on November 12, 1994 Embarcadero Hyatt Regency Hotel in San Francisco. Methods of achieving authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation are key to the successful realization of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Today's Internet is a proving ground for what will become the NII. The San Francisco Chapter of the IEEE Computer Society has put together an outstanding program on encryption, intrusion detection, firewalls, architectures, and protocols for Internet Security. Speakers in this seminar will describe several of the main techniques that exist today and the directions in which they are evolving. The seminar will be helpful to engineers, engineering managers and product planners seeking current knowledge of Internet Security. PROGRAM 8:30 a.m. Registration opens 9:00 a.m. Introduction 9:05 a.m. Keynote Address James Bidzos, President of RSA 9:45 a.m. Steven Bellovin, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Firewalls for Computer Security" 11:00 a.m. Teresa Lunt, SRI "Intrusion Detection" 11:45 a.m. Round Table Lunch (incl. with registration) 1:00 p.m. Professor Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Stanford "Cryptography: The Foundation of Secure Networks" 2:00 p.m. Dan Nessett, Ph.D., SunSoft and PSRG "Future Internet Security Architecture" 3:00 p.m. Matt Blaze, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Protocols: Security Without Firewalls" 4:00 p.m. "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty" A Panel Discussion on the Social Implications of Internet Security Rex Buddenberg NPS Alan McDonald FBI Stewart Baker formerly of the NSA James Bidzos President of RSA Matt Blaze Bell Labs Martin Hellman Stanford A one day seminar in San Francisco, on Saturday, November 12th, covering private and public-key encryption, key-escrow, fire-walls, architecture and protocols for security, intrustion detection, and a spirited panel discussion on "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty" ! SEATING IS LIMITED. PRE-REGISTER BY OCTOBER 15TH. 9:05 Keynote Address James Bidzos, President of RSA James Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security, will present the keynote address. Mr. Bidzos heads a company whose encryption technologies are licensed for products ranging from computer operating systems, to software copy protection, to electronic mail, to secure telephones. RSA has licensed several million copies of its encryption software, and has become a focal point for debate on appropriate application of cryptography. Mr. Bidzos has gained a unique perspective on the requirements of effective cryptographic systems. He will highlight the problem of providing strong encryption for users of computer networks while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement 9:45 Steven Bellovin, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Firewalls for Computer Security" When you connect your computer to the Internet, you also create a channel into your computer. Clever vandals, thieves and industrial spies have found ways to abuse most of the Internet protocols from FTP and Telnet to the World Wide Web and Network Time Protocols. Short of pulling the plug, firewalls provide the surest defense. The firewall administrator must keep abreast of new methods of attack and understand how firewalls can mitigate the threat. Steven M. Bellovin, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at AT&T's Bell Laboratories and co-author of the well known guide "Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker." As one responsible for protecting "the phone company" from Internet hackers, Dr. Bellovin can describe from firsthand experience how firewalls can be constructed to screen them out. Dr. Bellovin will join us in a live video teleconference from Bell Laboratories. 11:00 Teresa Lunt, SRI "Intrusion Detection" Inevitably, someone will try to breach your firewall and might succeed. The time it takes you to discover the intrusion and catch the culprit depends on the event logging you have established. However, logging the many different transactions that might expose trespassing produces mountains of data. Automatic digestion of the logs is the only hope of monitoring them all. Teresa F. Lunt, Director of Secure Systems Research at SRI's Computer Systems Laboratory, directs work in multilevel database systems and intrusion detection. Ms. Lunt will describe intrusion detection and demonstrate automated tools developed at SRI to analyze audit data for suspicious behavior. 1:00 Professor Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Stanford "Cryptography: The Foundation of Secure Networks" Data in transit across unsecured networks like the Internet are subject to wiretapping attacks and impersonation. Moreover, privacy of communication and authentication of the sender's message are essential to Internet commerce, with exchange of contracts, receipts, credit card drafts and the like increasingly commonplace. Encryption can solve some of these problems, but what kind of encryption? Authentication only or encrypted messages? Secret key or public key, or both? Will you need a giant key ring for mes sage keys, session keys, file keys, and passwords? Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Professor of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University, is co-inventor of public key cryptography with Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle. He was elected a Fellow of the IEEE for contributions to cryptography. Dr. Hellman will explore threats to communication and costs of electronic countermeasures. He will explain the importance and means of authenticating electronic messages, and he will survey public key cryptography. Dr. Hellman will describe public key techniques including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal and Digital Signature Standard (DSS). He will also describe the current status of export control and encryption standards such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) and its encryption algorithm, Skipjack, which is implemented in Clipper and Capstone chips. 2:00 Dan Nessett, Ph.D., SunSoft and PSRG "Future Internet Security Architecture" Dan Nessett, Ph.D., of the SunSoft Division of Sun Microsystems, and until recently with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, has worked extensively in local area networks, distributed operating systems and distributed systems security. He is a member of the Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG), which is convened under the auspices of the Internet Society. Dr. Nessett will explain the emerging Internet security architecture work undertaken by the PSRG. The architecture will guide the development of security mechanisms used in Internet standards. 3:00 Matt Blaze, Ph.D., Bell Labs "Protocols: Security Without Firewalls" We use firewalls because Internet protocols are not inherently secure. Can we rehabilitate the Internet protocols to produce protocols which are secure, not computationally prohibitive, and compatible with existing protocols? Matt Blaze, Ph.D., of Bell Laboratories will talk about the problems of integrating cryptographic protection into large-scale network infrastructure. Dr. Blaze is the author of "A Cryptographic File System for Unix," presented at the 1993 ACM Conference on Communications and Computer Security, and co-author with John Ioann idis of "The Architecture and Implementation of Network-Layer Security Under UNIX," which describes "swIPe," a network-layer security protocol for the IP protocol suite. Dr. Blaze will address issues concerning network security protoc ols, key management and distribution, and threats and models for cryptographic engineering. 4:00 A Panel Discussion on the Social Implications of Internet Security "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty" At one end of an imagined security spectrum lies the information police-state. Through traffic analysis, mandatory personal ID numbers and escrowed encryption, and the ability to record all messages and commerce carried out on the Information Superhighway, governments could maintain dossiers on every aspect of the personal life and business of its citizens. Privacy advocates fear that a corrupt government could use such information against its political enemies and to subvert personal freedoms. At the other extreme lies information anarchy. Through the use of digital cash, anonymous remailers, and strong non-escrowed encryption, the Information Superhighway could become a hide-out for criminals and national security threats. The potential for black-market activity and the associated tax-evasion is so enormous that some have speculated that governments could eventually collapse. Law-enforcem ent advocates fear that they will be unable to keep up with criminals and terrorists who ply their trade electronically. Our distinguished panel will provide insight into the interplay between the rights of individuals to privacy and freedom, the rights of companies to conduct unrestrained trade, and the ability of law enforcement and security agencies to perform their functions efficiently. This conclusion to the seminar will put into perspective the social changes that might be wrought by the technical advances discussed earlier in the day. Panelists include: Rex Buddenberg NPS Alan McDonald FBI Stewart Baker formerly of the NSA James Bidzos President of RSA Matt Blaze Bell Labs Martin Hellman Stanford Rex Buddenberg, Instructor of information systems architecture and applied networking at the Naval Postgraduate School, will moderate the panel. Mr. Buddenberg is a maritime command, communication, control and intelligence (C3I) consultant and a computer networking author. As a C3I architect for the U.S. Coast Guard, he developed plans and specifications for extending Internet connectivity to oceanographic ships. Mr. Buddenberg contemplates the means and effects of net warfare as both the good guys and bad guys share the same network. Alan McDonald, Special Counsel for Electronic Surveillance Matters, Information Resources Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, is a specialist in the law and policy concerning electronic surveillance, Digital Telephony, and encryption issues. He frequently represents the FBI's view of law enforcement equities in light of advanced telecommunications and encryption. Stewart Baker is a former General Counsel to the NSA and a partner in Steptoe & Johnson, a Washington, DC law firm. His expertise is in telecommunications, computer export policy, security of national information infrastructure and encryption. Mr. Baker brings direct experience with the problem that strong encryption creates for the NSA in protecting our national security. QUESTIONS? CALL (415)-327-6622. Cut-off and complete this form, enclose your check payable to the IEEE SFCS, and mail to: IEEE Council Office 701 Welch Rd. #2205 Palo Alto, CA. 94304 To qualify for the reduced Pre-registration fees, your application with check must be postmarked no later than Oct. 15, 1994. Registration fee includes lunch, refreshments, and parking. Seating is limited. To make sure the seminar is not sold out, call (415) 327-6622. please check the appropriate box Fees on or before Oct. 15th: ___ IEEE Member $ 110 ___ Non-member $ 120 ___ Student $ 85 Fees after Oct. 15th: ___ IEEE Member $ 125 ___ Non-member $ 145 ___ Student $ 100 (students must present ID) The seminar location is the Hyatt Regency Embarcadero Hotel, near the Ferry Building, in San Francisco. Your registration fee includes the all day seminar, lunch, and convenient parking in the garages underneath adjacent Embarcadero Centers 1, 2, or 3. (Keep your ticket for validation). Please print clearly: Name : __________________________________________ Title : __________________________________________ Company: __________________________________________ Address: __________________________________________ __________________________________________ _______________________________ ___ ______ Day phone #:(___)_____-_______ IEEE member (or affiliate) #:_______ ____ (for discount) College/University (if student):___________________ ___ Vegetarian lunch option Refunds will be honored through October 22nd, substitutions any time. Additional information can be obtained by telephoning the IEEE Bay Area Council Office: (415)327-6622. IEEE SFCS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES TO THE SEMINAR Sponsored by the San Francisco Chapter of the IEEE Computer Society. The IEEE is a non-profit organization.

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Where to get the CYPHERNOMICON other than ftp.netcom.com?
by franl＠centerline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp.netcom.com is always maxed out with connections. Is there somewhere else I can download the CYPHERNOMICON from? A Web site perhaps? -- Fran Litterio franl(a)centerline.com (617-498-3255) CenterLine Software http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/ Cambridge, MA, USA 02138-1110 PGP public key id: 1270EA1D

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Cyphernomicon FAQ -- Review in "Wired"
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of items of interest: 1. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh tells me he has committed to write a review of the Cyphernomicon FAQ for "Wired," for either December or January publication. I had nothing to do with this, and it surprised me when he contacted me to notify me. (I reminded him of the "pre-release" status, the incompletenesses and holes, but he feels it's still timely to review it. And by the time his review gets printed, a newer revision will be available.) I'll make some comments later, but I of course urge Rishab to make his own comments here. 2. The Cyphernomicon is available in two main places that I know of: * My own anonymous ftp site: ftp.netcom.com, in pub/tcmay - 6 files, including the full FAQ, listed as "CP-FAQ" - and 2 flavors of this in compressed and gzipped forms - Contents, MFAQ (Most Frequently Asked Questions), etc. - Netcom has been having performance problems, lately * The Karl Barrus/Chael Hall gopher and ftp site: gopher chaos.bsu.edu - Karl has split the full CP-FAQ file into 20 chapters, each of which can be individually retrieved/mailed. The Cyphernomicon can of course be put on other ftp sites, though this complicates the version control problem. I would appreciate it if anybody who does put it on an ftp site agrees to keep it current, to periodically check my own ftp site and copy over newer versions. (I think the approach of _pointers_ to a few sites is a better approach than copying the actual documents to many sites. The most popular docs will be replicated at more sites, but I think the Cyphernomicon FAQ is sufficiently specialized that a few sites will be enough...that might change if Rishab's review in "Wired" meets with interest...) 3. Hal Abelson, Professor of Computer Science at MIT, has asked me if he could convert the FAQ into a Web document for his class on "ETHICS AND LAW ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER." I have great respect for Hal--co-author of course of the seminal "Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs"--so I responded favorably. He says that if I agree, which I did, he'll leave the Web doc available permanently, even after the class is over. More on what the URL is when it's ready; you can try http://martigny.ai.mit.edu/6095, which is his home page for his class. 4. Yes, I still have concerns about multiple, out-dated copies floating around. I worry about people going to great lengths to "Webify" the version they have, and then being unwilling, naturally enough, to repeat the work each time a new version appears. I worry that the "pre-release" version, the version 0.666 I released, will become frozen/encrusted/trapped in the silk of the aptly-named "Web" and thus forever be the de facto public release. (Unless I abandon the writing tools on my own computer and instead concentrate only on adding links and making changes to the Web version. This I just won't do.) 5. Rishab is especially anxious to get CompuServe, AOL, etc., versions available, or referenced in his review in "Wired." Thus, if any of you want to make this conversion, download the FAQ, or the chapters (from Karl's site), etc., and _agree to keep the version relatively current_, then this would be a Good Thing. (I'm not sure the advanced stuff in the Cyphernomicon, stuff about remailers, digital cash, etc., is the most useful stuff for typical "Wired" readers, given the questions the material will generate (as it does on our own list!), but this is not my call to make. Rishab says the editors at "Wired" want his review, so it's out of my hands.) Rishab says he needs to have the CompuServe/AOL/etc. addresses by 27 September, as his review is due on 1 October. So, not much time. There are of course major _size_ problems. I tried to e-mail the FAQ to one list member without ftp access who assured me his mail system could handle it--but it couldn't. And another list member uses a VAX, and only the first line would transfer. The compressed versions have also caused problems for some folks (though not to others, so I know the versions are kosher). Frankly, I shudder to think about the AOL and CompuServe folks, not to mention the Prodigy customers, trying to get a megabyte-plus file, or a gzipped file! So, if someone makes this available, please be careful to make sure it is really retrievable and readable on these systems. Thanks. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Tedious Chomsky arguments, some small remailer relevance.
by jamesd＠informix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

chen(a)intuit.com (Mark Chen) writes an amazing article worthy of Chomky himself I note that Chomsky fans, like Chomksy himself, have no shame in lying bare faced in public. > There is no mention anywhere of moral superiority. There > is a statement of the demonstrable fact that "the editors > and the ambassador, in the not very distant past, have > supported racist murder on a scale that exceeds Amin's > wildest fantasies," referring, perhaps, to the (then) > .... One: Chomsky's claim clearly implies a claim of extreme moral superiority. Two: Your claim, and Chomsky's claim, is a flagrant lie Amin murdered three hundred thousand people, ate a few of them, and daydreamed out loud of extending a similar rule over all of black Africa. 2.1. Even if the Ambassador and the editors of the New York times had personally commanded the repression and man made famine in East Timor they could not have clocked up as many as Amin did in real life, let alone in Amin's "wildest fantasies". 2.2 It is completely false that the New York times supported the genocide in East Timor. They were sympathetic to, or tolerant of, the wrong side in East Timor, but, unlike Chomsky, they did not support genocide. Nothing the New York times said or did remotely compares with Chomsky's enthusiastic support of Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia. Chomsky compared Pol Pot's genocide to the denazification by the French Resistance after world war II. When did the New York Times compare Indonesia's repression in East Timor to reconstruction after the American Civil War? More rationally, Mark Chen claims that I have failed to make my case that Chomsky is seeking to achieve a totalitarian state in America by democratic, constitutional, and institutional methods, as the National German Socialist Workers party did in Germany, rather than by revolutionary methods, as the Bolsheviks did in Russia. Certainly it is true that Chomsky never says in so many words "Hey let us imitate the great methods that Pol Pot used in order to make sure the will of the people prevails over the immensely powerful secret conspiracy by evil racist capitalist imperialists." But Chomsky defines peoples free choice to say one thing rather than another thing, to listen to one source rather than another source, to be "extreme coercion and control". With this definition, it obviously follows that exterminating those who engage in "extreme coercion and control" is an act of self defence. When a socialist argues labor theory of value, I know he is planning to rob me. In the same way, when Chomsky argues that speech is coercion, and choice is submission, I know that he and his pals in the government are planning to enhance our civil liberties by protecting us from that speech, and to enhance our lives by rescuing us from that submission. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we James A. Donald are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. jamesd(a)netcom.com

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(Fwd) Internet Security: Secure Communications Over Untrusted Networks
by Ian Farquhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> of effective cryptographic systems. He will highlight the > problem of providing strong encryption for users of computer > networks while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Has anyone else noticed how this exact phrase keeps popping up time and time again? I for one don't consider it axiomatic, and have grave doubts that LEO's do have a legitimate SIGINT requirement at all. It looks like the opposition are formulating their own catch-cries now. Ian. #include <std.disclaimer>

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OK, *THIS* IS MY LAST WORD...HONEST
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, That sneaky Jeff Barber has lured me out for one last word; cross my heart and hope to be assassinated by a digitally anonymous crypto-murderer. He wrote: I'm sorry that you're signing off this thread, particularly since it was you that challenged others to "disprove" your scenarios. That was not my main *challenge*. My shoot-from-the-hip scenarios were meant to be illustrative. I wanted Cypherpunks to use their powers for good, not evil. My primary challenge was to think up ways to defeat digital murders for hire. Why? Because: (1) Cypherpunks support strong crypto and other technological means for securing personal privacy. (2) We have enemies who are attempting to suppress such techniques by inflaming the general public with sensationalistic claims (e.g., PGP pedophiles, Net narcotraffickers, anonymous assassins). (3) To offset these tabloid bugaboos, it is in our best interest to solve these "problems" rather than to think up new and better ways to create crypto-chaos. Now everybody can either waste their time thinking up really neat-o keen-o ways to whack innocent spouses, business enemies and rich uncles, or you can support strong crypto and privacy by thinking up ways to mitigate the potentially negative side-effects of crypto-anarchy. Don't forget why we tune into the Cypherpunks Channel. Let's keep our eyes on the prize. I now say adieu to this thread for the second, and last, time. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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It's MEME time!!!
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought I'd jump onto the meme-creation bandwagon before it gets too full.. Cryptography - it's not just for governments anymore! --- Clipper and the Wiretap Bill: salvos in the War On Privacy! --- The price of security is continuous surveillance. --- Denning's Dilemma: Privacy or Oppression. There's no middle ground. --- Surrender Dorothy!

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MATH: Brands' cash, Hal's post #2
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This post gives numerical examples to go along with Hal Finney's excellent description of Brands' digital cash, posted earlier. If the math is too much, just remember the whole point: > Blind signatures are, IMO, the key to anonymous digital cash, and in fact > to many forms of anonymity. The ability to engage in mutual information > manipulation with another person, while guaranteeing that no linkage will > later be possible between the data exchanged and the results of that > calculation, is the foundation for interacting in a complex way without > losing any privacy... > Vicki wants to end up with a non-interactive signature on m', which is a > special transformation of m. To do this, she engages in an interactive > signature protocol with Paul, getting him to sign m... the result is > that she ends up with a non-interactive signature on m' because Paul was > willing to participate in an interactive signature session on m Continuing along: > Now for the mathematics. Recall the g is the "generator" of the group, > the base of all of the powers. x is Paul's secret key, and GX=g^x is his > public key. I will use g = 10, n = 17389 as in the previous example. Paul will choose x = 351 to be his secret key, so GX = 10^351 mod 17389 = 16987 is his public key. In addition, the message is m = 1994. > As the first step of the interactive protocol, Paul chooses a random w > and sends Vicki MX = m^x, GW = g^w, and MW = m^w. Paul chooses a random w = 666 MX = 1994^351 mod 17389 = 11740 GW = 10^666 mod 17389 = 7115 MW = 1994^666 mod 17389 = 13262 > The relationship between m', which is what Vicki will end up > with a signature on, and m, which is the number that Paul sees, is > m' = (m^s)*(g^t). Vicki chooses s = 3694, t = 1243 m' = (1994^3694)*(10^1243) mod 17389 = 10313 > the challenge c is calculated as the hash of (m,MX,GW,MW). Vicki > must transform these numbers so that Paul will not recognize them, but in > such a way that the mathematical relationships are maintained. > To do this, Vicki chooses two (more) random numbers, u and v (along with > s and t above). Vicki chooses u = 5192, v = 100 > MX' = m'^x = ((m^s)*(g^t))^x = (m^(s*x))*(g^(t*x)) = (MX^s)*(GX^t) > GW' = g^w' = g^(u*w+v) = (g^(u*w))*(g^v) = (GW^u)*(g^v) > MW' = m'^w' = ((m^s)*(g^t))^(u*w+v) = [...] = > (GW^(u*t))*(MW^(u*s))*(m'^v) MX' = (MX^s)*(GX^t) = (11740^3694)*(16987^1243) mod 17389 = 10710 GW' = (GW^u)*(g^v) = (7115^5192)*(10^100) mod 17389 = 12113 MW' = (7115^(5192 1243))*(11740^(5192 3694))*(10313^100) mod 17389 = 9314 > Using these, Vicki calculates her hash c'= Hash(m',MX',GW',MW'). c' = hash(10313,10710,12113,9314) = 7672 (some hash function I made up) > Now, the c she sends to Paul... > c = c'/u c = (7672/5192) mod 17389 = 323 [ 5192 c = 7672 mod 17389 --> 5192 c" = 1 mod 17389 --> c" = 3520 ==> c = c" 7672 mod 17389 = 323 check: (323 5192) mod 17389 = 7672 ] > Paul will ... calculate r = c*x+w. r = (323 351 + 666) mod 17388 = 9711 > [Vicki calculates] r' = u*r + v r' = (5192 9711 + 100) mod 17388 = 11800 > The resulting signature on m' is (MX',GW',MW',r') So the resulting signature is (10710,12113,9314,11800) Okay, that should be an actual example of the protocol, unless I messed up somewhere ;) I hope to finish going through Hal's third post soon. Karl Barrus klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLoImUMSF/V8IjI8hAQGRmAP/RojMlpm8rnnx4K6c3GEHsBoQL7hIhdBB bTiwBhkXbi8ZhHsZJtX9mFceIhTK7yIxVsq9y17d2m5NghGME1qtIN+MjbbvwHfp j9S9fWwF6/mIiRvV9IM1a23IGhyZi0ZQASLKRiPlStjbcwv6QoGxZQuTyGOD8pSn hpoKosUFbqY= =EIjf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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National Research Council
by SAMUEL.KAPLIN＠warehouse.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: National Research Council > Kenneth Dam, committee chair, was Deputy Secretary of State (1982- > 1985) and is currently the Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign > Law at the University of Chicago Law School. > General W. Y. Smith, retired, committee vice-chair, is president > emeritus of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and has also served in a > number of military posts including that of deputy commander in chief of > the U.S. European Command in Germany. > Lee Bollinger, formerly dean of the University of Michigan Law School, > is currently provost of Dartmouth College and a constitutional scholar. > Ann Caracristi, retired, was Deputy Director of the National Security > Agency (1980-1982). > Benjamin Civiletti was U.S. Attorney General (1979-1981), and is > currently in private practice with the law firm Venable, Baetjer, Howard > and Civiletti. > Colin Crook is senior technology officer for Citicorp. > Samuel Fuller is vice president of corporate research at Digital > Equipment Corporation. > Leslie Gelb is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. He served > as Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs > (1977-1980). > Ronald Graham is a director of information sciences at AT&T Bell Labs > and a professor of mathematics at Rutgers University. > Martin Hellman is professor of electrical engineering at Stanford > University. Dr. Hellman was one of the inventors of public key > encryption. > Julius Katz is president of Hills & Company, and was deputy United > States trade representative (1989-1993). > Peter Neumann is principal scientist in the Computer Science Laboratory > at SRI International. He is the chairman of the ACM committee on > computers and public policy, and a member of the ACM study group on > cryptography policy. > Raymond Ozzie is president of Iris Associates, a wholly-owned > subsidiary of the Lotus Development Corporation. Iris Associates is the > developer of Lotus Notes. > Kumar Patel is vice chancellor for research at UCLA. > Edward Schmults was Deputy Attorney General of the United States > (1981-1984) and is a former senior vice president for external relations > and general counsel for the GTE Corporation. > Elliot Stone is executive director of the Massachusetts Health Data > Consortium, which is responsible for the collection and analysis of the > state's large health care databases. > Willis Ware, retired, is with the RAND Corporation as senior computer > scientist emeritus. He chairs the Computer System Security and Privacy > Advisory Board which was established by the Computer Security Act of > 1987. Is it me or are there a disproportionate amount of legal/government/military/ types on this list? Keeping this in mind, do you really think any of our comments will go anywhere but in the old circular file? --BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5pUekAAAEEAKrDj64Zj9AJU+gC7/Ivdk8b1ef6a1T9K5CGFeu1yFDSXLyD DLIdGunZR/4ilosLMxdlZcNqPwZ3HgxL+Gk3y2SwYfqKpeWExWPgb696lgzf2BRC tED15ZAwi3UDIkcouv2PBiDwPNUUmnLb5diDXdA3qtALb+XzlwpnimeWAf3FAAUT tCFTYW11ZWwgS2FwbGluIDwrMSAoNjEyKSA1MzAtNzMxNj6JAJUCBRAuaVLjQqfV nzRSzxkBAcXuA/47yIN+sltMyIRqCgUZz/gubdI6LUcpFsTcXsFWppROpAWFPJv0 J9z/UoP1kjJ+nrAAizuKuhmC5eg5OOxUE+tUgSPl6hAtu2xJYmKtCbQpxF0sG8ni 4e8I8Zsk5vcopO5Vub96CiVgPjI5vITCb32kcLKI1yyFaztbHdtOasUthrQuU2Ft dWVsIEthcGxpbiA8c2FtdWVsLmthcGxpbkB3YXJlaG91c2UubW4ub3JnPg== =J2S+ --END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== Processed by WILDUUCP! v1.00 for WILDCAT! ===========================================================================

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Unix Expo Disk Distribution Plea
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

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Re: Chomsky Arguments / Redefinitions
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jamesd(a)netcom.com (James A. Donald) writes: [Blanc's statements Re: this argument about Chomsky, whomever the hell he is.] > By the way when I called this thread "more tedious Chomsky stuff" > I was perfectly serious - This thread has been beaten to death > time and time again, and many people have a kill file that > automatically kills anything with Chomsky in the header. I haven't had the pleasure of reading this thread before, but, thanks to the wonder of killfiles, I won't have to again. *plonk* to Threads-From-Hell

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kerberosV telnet
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone have any fun diffs for kerberized telnet/telnetd that I could play with? An IDEA encryption module? A Diffie-Hellman module? Standards not necessary, we're just experimenting here. --- Jef

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crypt
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I built crypt awhile back. I'm pretty sure I got the source from ghost.dsi.unimi.it. Now that site says everything has been moved to ftp.dsi.unimi.it, but there seems to be no crypt.c there, although there is plenty of other crypt stuff. In the meantime, I was cleaning up (big mistake), and lost my copy of the source. Can someone tell me where the source is for the crypt program? I'd like to build it for my Linux system. ps I promise not to export it. thanks, tw

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Data Haven via FTP
by dfloyd＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here is a possible way to set up a data haven using FTP, instad of mailing your stuff. Term is a program that allow you to set up pseudo-SLIP between two boxes. It also allows one to redirect ports. If it would be possible to redirect say port 10000 on box A to the ftp port of box B, then one could FTP to box A and that would be for all intents and purposes an "anon remailer" for box B. This could be chained as well... port A on Box A to port B on box B to port C on box C to ftp on the target box. This is a very rough idea. Authication is still a problem. Possibly have the files in a directory that is readable, writable, but not "ls"-able, and the files PGP encrypted, or put them in incoming, and the server encrypts them with the owner's PGP key, and renames the file. - -- Just some rough ideas from one that is awake much too late. Douglas R. Floyd -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLoJ5p3Dkimqwdwa5AQHmxgP+Ijc8BmWOgTotFKmUDr7a6L1Q6EsgwWDB fi+P6NbW5Bq18FUsakcb/WXUd5dbMw94D0xQNeAJDE/CkIZmWhPu/IWNXZvqJ9ZA nr0/hrR3LF6LgCtH/Mqoq75JeRimVyaSpWuMgKxCtwJE6cFtp+AQ1+ABDqP4YQCw iJE1UzM3qbI= =KoYf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: any CP going to the International Cryptography Institute this week?
by p.v.mcmahon.rea0803＠oasis.icl.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Carl Ellison <cme(a)tis.com> writes: > > I have the program in front of me and it looks ominous. > > Here's a soft copy. At least you can say it appears to present a consistent > point of view. You may be right, but I think you will find that the commercial speakers will raise a different set of "global challenges" to those identified by governments. > That should be good for the keynote speakers, Mr. Freeh and > Mr. Gore. (The soft copy shows Mr. Glickman as the other keynote; a hardcopy > in front of me here shows Mr. Gore --I don't know which is more recent.) One of my colleagues is among the speakers. We don't plan to advocate GAK or key escrow ...

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RE: It's MEME time!!!
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------Original Message--------------- I thought I'd jump onto the meme-creation bandwagon before it gets too full.. Cryptography - it's not just for governments anymore! --- Clipper and the Wiretap Bill: salvos in the War On Privacy! --- The price of security is continuous surveillance. --- Denning's Dilemma: Privacy or Oppression. There's no middle ground. --- Surrender Dorothy! ----------End of Original Message---------- How 'bout: Dorothy Denning: Clipper [clip her] TLA's are AFU Dammit, it's *my* net, too! Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Media Bias
by j.hastings6＠genie.geis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James A. Donald (jamesd(a)netcom.com) writes: >I note that Chomsky fans, like Chomksy himself, have no >shame in lying bare faced in public. I have seen Chomsky speak at F.A.I.R. (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting - a New Left anti-media-bias watchdog inspired by the right-wing Accuracy In Media group), and have heard him on KPFK. I saw the movie about him and have read some of his writing, including articles in Anarchy magazine. The movie, as I remember it from a year or two ago, claims that the East Timor people suffered the same magnitude of oppression at the hands of the U.S.-supported Indonesians, as did the Cambodians under the Khmer (were they Soviet or Chinese puppets? Or independent?). In a dramatic scene in the Chomsky film, the press reports about the Cambodian killing fields, convenient for the U.S. anti-Communist fascist imperialist running-dog empire, *ahem*, rolled across the floor of a warehouse, with lights flicking on as the spool of printouts passed under them, covering a great length of the floor. The reports of East Timor atrocities were relatively non-existent. How do you explain that, Man?! Fight the Power! Right Awn! I don't say that Chomsky isn't biased himself, or that Timor equals Cambodia, I'm just telling you what I remember. >Your claim, and Chomsky's claim, is a flagrant lie >... the Ambassador and the editors of the New York times ... >could not have clocked up as many as Amin did in real life, >let alone in Amin's "wildest fantasies". I wonder where the other guy came up with Chomsky's Uganda comparison. >Nothing the New York times said or did remotely compares with Chomsky's >enthusiastic support of Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia. >Chomsky compared Pol Pot's genocide to the denazification by the French >Resistance after world war II. When I saw him live and on stage, Chomsky said he thought the genocide stories about Cambodia were as bogus as the other 99% lies told by the lapdog "adversarial" press (like Yellow Rain "chemical warfare" actually caused by bee droppings). Or the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Or Terrorists, Pedophiles, Money-Launderers, and Dope Dealers that will surely get us all if Digital Telephony and Clipper aren't adopted. Can we really blame him for doubting the unreliable media? He stopped defending Khmer Rouge (sp?) when he became convinced that the killing fields were real. In other words, he would never support genocide. That's the Party Line anyway, comrade. >But Chomsky defines peoples free choice to say one thing rather >than another thing, to listen to one source rather than another >source, to be "extreme coercion and control". What is the source of this accusation? Chomsky is an extreme free-speech anarchist, from what I've read about and by him. He even defended the right of Holocaust-revisionist Robert Faurisson to speak about his historical beliefs against the French state's claim that it has the right to determine what is "historical fact." Chomsky himself does not deny the Holocaust. >...when Chomsky argues that speech is coercion, and choice is submission, >I know that he and his pals in the government are planning to enhance our >civil liberties by protecting us from that speech, and to enhance our >lives by rescuing us from that submission. Fine. Death to P.C. government-imposed "sensitivity." But, what does Chomsky have to do with this? According to the S.F. Weekly in 1989, Noam Chomsky was once described in a college newspaper as both "a Nazi sympathiser" and "a Soviet apologist." That's a neat trick, maybe possible during the Hitler-Stalin pact. However, the Soviets wouldn't let him enter the worker's paradise because he called it "The Dungeon State" in one of his many books. And his support for free speech, even for those with controversial non-P.C. positions, makes his Nazi qualifications, and your "speech is coercion" accusation, suspect. Looks like an un-F.A.I.R. smear job to me. Kent - j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com Ham packet AX.25: WA6ZFY @ WB6YMH.#SOCA.CA.USA.NA (or "NoAm")

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