December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Mailing List
by kevin＠beach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please put me on your mailing list. Thanks Sincerely, Kevin T. Smith, President TeleSource A Division of SonRise Corp. (408) 247-4782 voice (408) 247-1070 fax ksmith(a)beach.com *************************************NeXTMail Preferred***********************************

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ID card from hell
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yeah, I know it's not about crypto but it sure is about privacy ... 1984 COMES ONE DECADE LATE July 12, 1994 On CBS News tonight, the lead story announced a government plan to require all of us to carry a national identity card. This card will contain your picture, a fingerprint, your social security number, and other "electronically encoded" information. You will be required to present this card to obtain employment or "receive government services." CA Governor Pete Wilson and Sen. Alan Simpson were featured explaining how this was a really great idea, necessary to "stop illegal immigration." Prediction If Americans accept this, as I expect they will, we will see the following: Cops doing card-scan roadblocks, ostensibly to find drunks and immigrants. A requirement to present your card and have a computer record kept after every financial transaction over, say, $100. A requirement to present your card to get medical care. Adoption of these cards as drivers' licenses. Just a magnetic / electronic data entry to indicate if you are authorized to drive. Same thing for professional licenses. Card-scan to buy guns or ammunition - if you are allowed to buy them at all. Card-scan to buy potentially subversive tools, chemicals, books. Card-scan on entry to or exit from the U.S. Instant database check to see if you are authorized to enter or leave the U.S. Card-scan on entry to or exit from "special" areas: an extra little security check before you enter places the government is taking an extra interest in. Mandatory presentation of card to get access to an internet- attached computer account. Card-scan at your kids' school. Linked databases of parents and kids, to correlate child support payments, vaccination histories, academic performance, truancy, antisocial attitudes, you name it. I could go on, but why bother? As an exercise for the reader: The federal government currently is encouraging states to revoke drivers licenses and professional licenses of "bad" people who use drugs, drive drunk, don't pay child support, etc. What will happen to you in the future if you displease the state? Brad bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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A Plea for Meaningful Message Titles
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't often make requests for netiquette changes here on this list, but I will now. I have no power to enforce anything, so these are only suggestions. 1. Could we people make an effort to pick reasonably meaningful thread titles? A lot of "Re: your mail" and "(None)" titles are cluttering up the list. Not to mention the overly broad titles like "PGP" and "Question." In sorting through my list archives recently I found several hundred messages that contained variations on the simple phrase "PGP," most discussing points only loosely related to PGP. 2. People should feel free to edit the subject line to better reflect the topic of their post. This may "destroy the continuity of the thread," a concern raised by some, but that's a small price to pay for having new threads more accurately labelled. 3. Forwards are really getting out of hand. It seems that the "Four Letter Acronyms" of CPSR, EPIC, ACLU, and EFF (an honorary FLA) routinely copy us on everything they put out, even though their stuff is widely distributed in other forums available to us all, and none of them seems to be reading Cypherpunks and actually participating in followup discussions. (If Banisar, Godwin, Kapor, McLandish, et. al. are actually reading this, I invite them to prove me wrong.) 4. While I'm at it, could newcomers to the world of crypto please take the time to read up on some of the basic crypto isues? The lateness of my FAQ is not the issue, as the needed knowledge is contained in any of the basic FAQs that are already out there, such as the oft-republished sci.crypt FAQ and the RSA FAQ. And basic articles and books are readily available. This list is not a place to ask 500-600 people "What's so bad about Clipper?" or "Can't the NSA break any cipher with enough effort?" Thank you for your time. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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SPA & FBI after Pornographic traitors
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy asked.... Associated Press reports today: Officials at one the nation's three nuclear weapons laboratories discovered their computers were used to store pornography, the Los Angeles Times reported Tuesday. Computers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory contained more than 1,000 pornographic images, said Chuck Cole, deputy associate director of computing at the lab. [...] The computers were shut down after an investigation uncovered software piracy on the Internet, a network of thousands of computer networks originally designed to connect computers at universities and government research labs. It is now used by millions of people. "We are currently tracking over 1,600 pirate sites on the Internet in a joint investigation with the FBI," said Peter Beruk of the Software Publishers Association, which represents major software manufacturers. "It is a very serious and costly problem." [...] ----------------------------------------------------------------- Some people might consider the second paragraph a nonsequitur to the first. However, if one doesn't think too clearly about things, one might get the general message that we need Daddy to help protect us from the pornographers and pirates lurking out there on that internet thing. Brad bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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"True Names," chat with Vinge, and Cypherpunks
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some random comments that may interest some of you. Someone asked me for some novels he could read that might cover some cypherpunkish topics. These are some titles I gave him: * Brunner, The Shockwave Rider * Vinge, True Names * Card, Ender's Game * Gibson, Neuromancer (He's currently reading Orwell's "1984," which is of Required Reading to remain on our list! I read '1984" when I was in the 7th grade, in 1966, probably before many of you were born.) Vernor Vinge's "True Names" comes up in another context: I spent all of Sunday talking to Vernor and several other bright folks in the aftermath of a great party in the hills of Marin County, right next to Skywalker Ranch. My mad scientist/entrepreneur friends Bob Fleming and Cherie Kushner, in whose startup company I've invested some money, had a party to celebrate something or other. As it turned out, noted author--and winner of the Hugo Award fpr Best Novel last summer for "A Fire Upon the Deep"--Vernor Vinger was giving a talk on cyberspace and whatnot at Interval Research on Friday, so they invited him to stay at their place. (Interval is doing futuristic work in a lot of areas, and is funded by billionaire Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft.) I don't plan to recap the party; that's just a party. But the discussions on Sunday (some of stayed over, due to the long distances back to our homes, or as with Vernor, in lieu of a night in a hotel) touched on point of interest to our list. Also there were Eric Hughes, who you all know, and Alan Huang, who built one of the world's first optical computers for Bell Labs. (Alan's project, which included work on optical switchers, terabit per second Sagnac fibers, optical cellular automata, and even crypto, was cancelled by AT&T because they decided to concentrate on other things....Alan chose to leave AT&T and is now planning a move to the Bay Area to set up something here.) In my years of being able to worm my way into high-power discussions, at universities, at Intel, and at too many conferences to remember, I can't recall being in such a conversation as this, with everyone of the highest possible caliber. (I'm just calling it as I see it.) Wormholes, reversible computation, the 7,000-Cray NSA computer, the problems with nanotech, the problems with AI, the Tines and the Powers, the Extropians group (Vernor was curious), the Singularity, and the implications of the OJ Simpson case were a few of the topics. (Yes, several of us had "wasted" our time watching this case. Me, I think it's drama of truly Shakespearean proportions, and should not be "dissed" just becuase it's getting more attention than the Rhwandans and Haitians are getting...not to mention the boring Bosnians.) I'd met Vinge a few times before, notably at the 1989 Hackers Conference, but this time I got to spend enough time to really get some information exchanged. We all left Bob and Cherie's place at 7 p.m., as they took Vernor down to the SF airport, and as the rest of us scattered. With all the telecommunications we have, nothing beats an intensive face-to-face session. Which is why I still live within driving distance of the Silicon Valley and the Bay Area in general. Sorry if this message seems too personal, but I felt the urge to "share." And at least it's not a forward. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: NATIONAL SECURITY PORN RISK
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Excerpt -- One computer expert, who requested anonymity, said there might be more to the incident than meets the eye. The expert suggested that the hard-core pornography may be a cover for an ultra-sophisticated espionage program, in which a "sniffer" program combs through other Livermore computers, encodes the passwords and accounts it finds, and then hides them within the pornographic images, perhaps to be downloaded by foreign agents. -- End excerpt -- Maybe this is all just an excuse to examine the evidence (1,000 GIFs). Blanc

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RE: "True Names," chat with Vinge, and Cypherpunks
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May Sorry if this message seems too personal, but I felt the urge to "share." ............................................ Oh, that's okay - I wasn't doing anything, anyway. Blanc

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Encrypted, Chained Reply Blocks
by nobody＠ds1.wu-wien.ac.at 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I noticed a message posted here, anonymously, with an "encrypted reply block" (ERB) attached to the end of it. Instructions were given that to reply to the message, the block was to be pasted at the very beginning of the reply, which was then to be sent to a certain remailer. The block started with the usual "::", followed by and "Encrypted: PGP" line typically used with chained remailers. While I don't know the specifics of that particular ERB, would it be possible to chain a REPLY through several remailers, such that the body of the reply was sent along in the clear through each link of the chain, but the final destination address was only visible to the operator of the final link in the chain? This would require that after the "Encrypted: PGP" block, any appended plaintext would also be sent along by each remailer and not discarded. Which remailers allow that? Hypothetically, it would seem that one could take an "empty message", using the "CHAIN" utility to chain the "message" through remailers A,B,C,D, encrypting it at each step, placing the resulting block in the message body with instructions that the resultant block must precede any replies, which must then be sent to remailer "A". Alternatively, instead of an empty message, a single, unique, identifying line could be used as the message. This would allow a person to generate multiple ERBs and know which one had been used for any given reply. One weakness I can see in such a scheme is that traffic analysis would be a bit easier, since the plaintext of the reply would be visible at each step. Also, there would be a potential for "hand tracing" the reply to its destination, assuming each remailer operator cooperated, by sending a personal message to operator "A", with the ERB attached, asking him/her to decrypt the next link destination, then forward the message to the operator of the next link with a similar request, and so on, requesting that the last operator in the link report the ultimate recipient's email address to the requestor. This would potentially be easier than tracing a message the other direction, since by the time the message arrived, information necessary to trace it backwards might have been already deleted at one or more of the chained remailer sites. Any thoughts or suggestions? Are there any further obvious weaknesses in this scheme that I may have missed?

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Pseudonymous ID cards?
by analyst＠Onramp.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the bright side, at least the Clinton administration is trying to stir up interest in privacy issues amongst the general public. Between the administration's support of Clipper, National ID cards, National Health cards and Digital Telephony (have they supported this yet?), there should start to be a lot of public interest in these issues. Personally, rather than _just_ naysay everything that is being proposed (which I will do, strongly), I would like more concrete recommendations and proposals to make on the positive side that use technologies like digital signatures and reputations to *protect* privacy while still allowing many of the familiar sorts of social/economic interactions that we take for granted. Perhaps we can pull an Aikido maneuver on this sudden gov power grab (ok,ok, pretty far-fetched). But, short of tracking down the Scientific American article from a couple of years ago and re-reading it (and I'm sure it's out of date), I'm not really sure what we can do with pseudonymous reputations and whatnot given the current state-of-the-art. So, I'd like suggestions, comments about alternative ways of establishing digital IDs, insurance cards, credit cards, etc. that protect privacy instead of divulge it, while still providing some of the societal controls that we have come to expect (e.g. that drunk drivers will be deprived of a license to drive). Do we have alternative suggestions to make in this dark hour so that we can actually win back some of our privacy? Can these sorts of technologies be implemented in a way that is understandable by the average citizen-unit? -- Benjamin McLemore analyst@onramp,net PS I wonder what exactly Justice and/or the spooks have on Clinton that's so effective? Or are he and Gore actually as stupid as they act?

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Re:"True Names," chat with Vinge, and Cypherpunks
by analyst＠Onramp.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Any newer Vinge estimates of arrival time for the Singularity? I saw an article a while back by Vinge and I think he was estimating 2013-2030 timeframe. I've been thinking of starting a Singularity Watch type Web-page/email list, as I am often struck by technological newsbits that seem enough out-of-the-ordinary and potentially status quo shattering that they seem to indicate some sort of potential for breakthrough. Some recent examples: *human genome project *quantum mechanical teleportation *high energy ion bombardment of nuclei in Germany yields something besides quarks, gluons in protons (potential challenge to QCD, is this our photoelectric effect finally?) *quantum computing *etc Despite the romantic appeal of the idea, though, I think it is a bit farther off than Vinge imagines--maybe 2050. -- Benjamin McLemore analyst(a)onramp.net

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cypherpunks email list help?
by Gerald.R.Martinez＠att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know the phone number of the cypherpunks list owner? I have tried for weeks to remove my duplicate email address entries from the list - probably placed there as a result of the email list scroggings of late... so far I have not gotten any response from: majordomo(a)toad.com (reply indicates request forwarded to cypherpunks-approval(a)toad.com) hughes(a)toad.com hughes(a)ah.com Any advice would be appreciated... thank you. -- gerald.r.martinez(a)att.com / grmartinez(a)attmail.att.com / att!drmail!grm @ AT&T GBCS Bell Labs, Denver (303) 538-1338 @ WWW: http://info.dr.att.com/hypertext/people/grm.html & life is a cabernet ...o&o )))

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Re: NATIONAL SECURITY PORN RISK
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> "Computer at Nuclear Lab Used for Access to Porn" >[ snip ] >-- Excerpt -- >One computer expert, who requested anonymity, said there might be more >to the incident than meets the eye. The expert suggested that the hard-core >pornography may be a cover for an ultra-sophisticated espionage program, >in which a "sniffer" program combs through other Livermore computers, >encodes the passwords and accounts it finds, and then hides them within >the pornographic images, perhaps to be downloaded by foreign agents. >-- End excerpt -- > > It's a Steganography reference. This sets off my warning bells -- >why would they explicitly mention the Stego technique, unless possibly it >was used in the porn ring there? Granted, Stego makes good journalism >fodder ("Hide your encrypted nuclear bomb plans in porn GIFs from the >Internet!"), but it's definitely not as sexy [sic] as "Taxpayer-funded >computers used in secret porn ring!" Anybody know exactly what was going >on at LLL? We can't get papers easily up here. :( > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >Michael Brandt Handler <grendel(a)netaxs.com> >Philadelphia, PA <mh7p+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> >Currently at CMU, Pittsburgh, PA PGP v2.6 public key on request >Boycott Canter & Siegel <<NSA>> 1984: We're Behind Schedule I think that the Steganography is just an excuse to close down the place. It _could_ happen, therefore we should defend against it. Of course, every spy knows that blending in is the most important trick. It would be better to hide the information in something bland. On the other hand, a gif-station is one of the few types of ftp sites that attract enough attention to drown out the one transfer from the spies.

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Re: Pseudonymous ID cards?
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

analyst(a)Onramp.NET (Benjamin McLemore) wrote: > digital IDs, insurance cards, credit cards, etc. that protect privacy I've seen articles about that here and/or sci.crypt and places like that. If you think in terms of cryptographic authentication of smaller pieces of information instead of a card that can reveal all about someone, it isn't too difficult. If a traffic cop wants proof that you have a valid driver's license, all they really need access to is the key to verify the authenticity of something that certifies that you have a valid driver's license. Your card can provide that certificate without revealing any other information about you than the fact that you are licensed to drive. The good thing about this kind of setup is that information can be partitioned so that only people with a reason to be authorized to get that information would have access to it. The bad thing about this is that it still makes it easy for the government to require that we all carry around a card that tells everything about us and makes access to all that only a matter of legal authorization. I don't want a society where my cryptographically secured private information is required to be shown at every police seatbelt/alcohol/immigrant/drug/pedophilia/sedition checkpoint. -- sidney <sidney(a)apple.com>

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New version of Digital Telephony Bill?
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the latest Wired issue (2.08) there is a small blurb about a new version of the Digital Telephony Bill that the FBI has presented. According to the blurb, a couple of Senators has expressed a willingness to sponsor this new version. Anybody have any more info on this? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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MAKE.MONEY.FAST
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It looks like Micali struck it rich with Clipper and his key-escrow patents. Want to get rich? Read up on digicash, then design a digicash system with "escrowed identity", meaning you are untraceable until the government uses an escrowed key to identify you. The bank acting on its own cannot identify you, nor can the stores. Patent your system. When the government and the banks try to introduce such a system, threaten to sue them. They will pay you off just like they did Micali. --- Mike

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Re: FWD: Netbank
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When I read the first few paragraphs, I thought it was interesting, but as I got to the details, I was quickly disappointed. Serial number based cash with *no* authentication? I could have hacked this protocol up with perl in less than 24 hours. The mailing list already has a sort of "e-cash" built in keyed by e-mail address and password instead of serial number. No encryption ready yet? They should have waited. If this system were to go into large scale use, I'd be tempted to try and forge their ecash and eavesdrop on other people's mail. This system is an accident waiting to happen and if it got subverted, it would just provide evidence to bureaucrats that we need laws protecting us in cyberspace and the government should start its own ecash on the net. Somebody point these guys to the IMP list. -Ray

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Re: "True Names," chat with Vinge, and Cypherpunks
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) >Date: Tue, 12 Jul 1994 19:21:04 -0700 (PDT) > >Some random comments that may interest some of you. > > I read '1984" when I was in the 7th grade, in >1966, probably before many of you were born.) I read it in 1965, I think. When I was in the 9th grade. >Sorry if this message seems too personal, but I felt the urge to >"share." > >And at least it's not a forward. Yes, but you did have a double signature. :) tw

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INFOBAHN PANEL SEES WORLD THROUGH [..] BLINDERS
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A recent fax from The Center for Strategic and International Studies' International Communications Studies and Political-Military Programs: topic: encryption wars on the global information highway: beyond the clipper chip battle. This introductory discussion will take place on July 14th, 1994, at CSIS, 4th floor conference room, 1800 K St., N.W., DC from 9:30am-12noon. Dr. Michael Nelson, Special Assistant, White House Office of Science and Technology, and Mr. Kent Walter, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, will lead off the morning, followed by diverse industry and expert views. Since this by invitation only, please RSVP to Craig Johnson by Monday, July 11 at either Fax: (202) 775-0898, or e-mail: csis-ics(a)clark.net. [Included with the fax was the following ILA report reproduced here with permission from the author. Is anyone on this list invited to the above mentioned meeting? - jm] -------------------------- What's Left Unsaid And Undone INFOBAHN PANEL SEES WORLD THROUGH NARROW COPYRIGHT BLINDERS Lehman Panel Leaves Later How To Deal With Other Issues The best way to understand the recently released government report on protecting intellectual property is to look at the credentials of its primary author: Bruce Lehman, patent commissioner. Don't be misled by his title. Lehman is a copyright lawyer and legislative aide by training. His report reflects these points of view: If there is an emerging problem, as the economy enters the digital age, when information can be quickly, easily, and secretly copied, then the solution is to tinker with the law. A patch here, and a new subsection there, and Humpty Dumpty will be put back together again. "We tried to fine tune the dials of public policy," says Lehman, who emphasizes that the report benefited from hundreds of sets of eyes, not his alone. The draft report was issued by a working group underneath the Clinton Administration's National Information Infrastructure Task Force. And while its recommendations on changes to copyright law received wide attention earlier this week, the report is only one arrow in a quiver to deal with the theft of intellectual property. Faith in the rule of law is a good thing, in other words, but it won't be enough. Just ask anyone who has watched his or her copyrighted work flung through the Internet in a seamless chain of infringement. Or a software company that discovers 300 copies of a program at a corporation and only one sale. The working group's recommendations by themselves won't break the chain any more than stiffer laws and penalties have cured the drug crisis. But there are other arrows to shoot. Next week, for example, a different wing of the NII task force will hold a public hearing on the "security, integrity, and reliability" of information that travels through digital networks. Yet another wing, headed by Arati Prabhakar, director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is at work on applications and technology. GOTTA START SOMEPLACE Nearly everyone (except those who don't believe in intellectual property) seems to think the law is a good place to start. "Lehman has done an excellent job bringing focus to this issue," says Henry Perritt, Jr., a professor at Villanova Law School, who nonetheless has concerns about some of the specific proposals. Among the major recommendations, which are all subject to change (Possible objections mentioned by critics are in parenthesis): It would be illegal to tamper with devices or methods used to protect copyrighted material. (What happens when the work is no longer subject to copyright? If it is held in a technological envelope that is unlawful to break, the work cannot enter the public domain, as other works do upon copyright expiration.) Transmissions that may be considered both a performance and a distribution, such as when a recipient listens to a recording as it is being downloaded, would be considered a distribution, if that was the transmission's primary purpose. (Would this give more protection to the creator than the consumer than now exists in the law?) Recipients of digital transmissions of copyrighted works would not have the freedom to redistribute the material. Normally, under the so-called "first sale doctrine," if Ted sells a book to Alice, she can then turn around and sell or rent that book to Fred. This recommendation would prohibit Alice from reselling that book, if it is in digital form. The theory is that in a digital environment Alice can keep the book and distribute it, thereby destroying Ted's market. (The first sale doctrine was meant to limit the copyright monopoly so that the holder of the copyright gives up control once he or she has obtained economic benefit. The proposal may unhinge that balance. If the prior proposal is a "look but don't touch" rule, this would be a "touch but don't sell" rule, says Perritt.) Recording artists and record companies would receive royalties on sound recordings that are transmitted digitally. It is an anomaly of existing law that sound recordings don't have a so-called "public performance" right, as do plays, dances, and movies. Without this change, consumers could simply download top-quality recordings from specialized digital services, bypassing the retail purchase. (The broadcasting industry will put its full lobbying force behind blocking this measure, arguing that airplay is a form of free publicity.) A conference will be held on how to preserve the "fair use" concept of copyright law under which consumers are allow to use small portions of copyrighted work without fear of infringement. As more information becomes available on line, the ability to browse through material in libraries and schools for free will be curtailed. It will be possible to meter every usage of a work, even those that heretofore were protected by fair use doctrine. (Some copyright holders feel that fair use developed only because the transactional costs of charging for small uses outweighed any remunerative benefit. If advanced metering systems reduce transactional costs, then why not charge for all uses?) BALANCING ACT Lehman calls these changes "very modest" and built upon practices proven in other areas. For example, it is already unlawful to tamper with the encryption devices that scramble cable signals. And computer software has an exemption from the first-sale doctrine. Otherwise, to use the prior analogy, Alice could rent out the software to Fred and his 15 best buddies, who would then produce perfect copies for their own use. At the same time, the working group tried to balance the interests of creators, by suggesting modifications in first-sale and distribution language, and consumers, by holding the fair use conference. After all, copyright law is meant to protect the works of creators for the overall benefit of society. Prior to becoming patent commissioner, Lehman was at Swidler & Berlin. He cut his teeth on the Hill as the chief legal advisor during the drafting of the 1976 Copyright Act and 1980 Computer Software Amendments. That experience, he says, shaped his belief in being responsive to all sides of a debate. "If I was the general counsel of McGraw Hill, I might be less inclined to hold a conference on fair use," Lehman said. Still, he recognizes that the law can only do so much. "The most you can expect out of the copyright system is to prevent hemorrhaging," Lehman said. "It cannot prevent leakage," such as casual pirating of software for home use. That function falls to the marketplace to develop technologies that can envelop copyrighted material so it can only be opened by rightful recipients and to educators, according to Lehman. While the working group did not delve seriously into technological solutions, it will sponsor a second conference on education. The conference will explore course work that can be used in schools and libraries. Just imagine: Intellectual Property Education 101. It's hard to envision the course being as popular as driver's ed. Agencies Participating In Intellectual Property Rights Working Group Advanced Research Projects Agency Commerce Department Council of Economic Advisors Energy Department General Services Administration Justice Department National Institute of Science and Technology National Library of Medicine National Science Foundation National Security Agency National Telecommunications and Information Administration Office of Consumer Affairs Office of Management and Budget Office of Science and Technology Policy Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Patent and Trademark Office State Department Treasury Department --- *********************************************************** Information Law Alert ||||||||| || |||| * a voorhees report * || || || || * * || || || || * 718-369-0906 * || || ||||||||| * voice * || || || || * 718-369-3250 * || || || || * fax * ||||||||| |||||||| || || markvoor(a)phantom.com* *********************************************************** 411 First St., Brooklyn, NY 11215-2507 July 8, 1994 ****************************************************** * PLEASE KEEP THIS BOX ATTACHED TO NEWSLETTER * ****************************************************** Information Law Alert (ISSN-1068-8129) is published 20 times a year by Voorhees Reports, 411 First Street, Brooklyn, NY 11215-2507. Subscription rates: E-mail subscriptions are available for $195 a year. $550 a year for print newsletter. For information, call 718-369-0906 or 800-369-4840, or fax 718-369-3250. E-mail address: markvoor(a)phantom.com. On line: Information Law Alert is available electronically to subscribers of NewsNet (800-952-0122); Dialog (800-334-2564); and Dow Jones News Retrieval (800-522-3567). E-mail subscriptions are also available through Counsel Connect (800-952-0122) under the Resources section. Back issues and bundles of stories are available at Marketplace.Com. Gopher to Marketplace.Com or use the URL http://marketplace.com. Copyright 1993 Mark Voorhees. Unauthorized duplication prohibited by law. ********************************************************* Anybody know where I can get a copy of the Lehman Panel report? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Singularity... what is it?
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: > On the Singularity, I've already said a fair amount. What _is_ Singularity? It's not a term I'm familiar with. --Jeff

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Re: NATIONAL SECURITY PORN RISK
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Does anyone on the Cypherpunks Channel have any inside information about > the "computer porn ring" that was busted at Lawrence Livermore Labs? Is > there a crypto tie-in? >From the meager facts in the front page article in the San Jose Mercury News, this whole thing could be as simple as an employee archiving two gigabytes of alt.binaries.pictures.erotica on an unused disk volume and setting up a passworded account for people who knew about it to ftp them. Nobody can put that kind of stuff on an anonymous ftp site because the traffic volume grows too high, and I would expect that such stuff is against LLL policy, so anyone who wanted to provide an archive site would have to only tell a few people who would tell a few people who ... and eventually a reporter for the LA Times thought that he had discovered a scoop. The real news here is that the major daily newspaper in Silicon Valley could print a front page story which goes from talking about an LLL employee who was archiving erotic pictures to talking about software piracy on BBS's and the internet to referring to the people who ftp'd the pictures as "pirates" and lumping the pictures and the software together as "illegal" material and then raising some vague issues of national security by quoting an "anonymous computer expert" as saying that people could have used the pictures to transmit secret information (with nothing to indicate that there was any reason to think that anyone did). If the article had been printed in the National Enquirer it would be funny. In the mainstream press I find it frightening. Especially coming at the same time as reports of Clinton's support of a national data/id card and our governor's volunteering of my privacy to beta test it. Is it time to move out of here? Does anyone have any suggestions of countries where things are better, not likely to get much worse as the U.S. decides to spread its brand of "democracy" even more universally, and which have not closed their doors to refugees from America? -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)apple.com> [In a pretty down mood at the moment]

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Where to get the latest Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) FAQ
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 13 June 1994 by Mike Johnson) WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION? There is more than one latest version. Pick one or more of the following that best suits your computer, patent restrictions, and export restrictions. Some countries (like France) may also restrict import or even use of strong cryptography like PGP. |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Platform(s) | Countries | Allowed Use | Latest Version | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, | USA & Canada | Commercial | Viacrypt PGP 2.7 | | or WinCIM/CSNav | | Personal | | | | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, Mac, | USA & Canada | Personal | MIT PGP 2.6 | | OS/2, others | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, Mac, | Most of the | Personal | PGP 2.6ui | | OS/2, others | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Mac Applescript | Most of the | Personal | MacPGP 2.6ui v 1.2 | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Mac Applescript | USA | Research | MacPGP 2.6ui v 1.2 | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Amiga | Most of the | Personal | Amiga PGP 2.6 b0.6 | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Amiga | USA | Personal | Amiga PGP 2.6 0b0.6 | | | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Atari | Most of the | Personal | Atari PGP 2.3a | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Atari | USA | Research | Atari PGP 2.3a | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Any of the | Countries | Commercial | Any of the above | | above | where IDEA | Personal | | | | is not | Research | | | | patented and | | | | | cryptography | | | | | is not | | | | | restricted. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| Note: there are other versions available, but these are either old, or outside of the mainstream PGP project. Look for new versions from one of three sources: Viacrypt (Commercial), MIT (North American freeware), or mathew(a)mantis.co.uk (the unofficially non-designated holder of the unofficial international version that parallels what Philip Zimmermann and the rest of the PGP development team is doing in the USA. WHAT IS ALL THIS NONSENSE ABOUT EXPORT CONTROLS? For a detailed rant, get ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/cryptusa.zip The practical meaning, until the law is corrected to make sense, is that you are requested to get PGP from sites outside of the USA and Canada if you are outside of the USA and Canada. If you are in France, I understand that you aren't even supposed import it. Other countries may be worse. WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? Versions are available for DOS, Unix, or WinCIM/CSNav Commercial software. Call 800-536-2664 to order. If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest version number for their version of PGP is 2.7. Upgrade from Viacrypt PGP 2.4 to 2.7 is free if you bought version 2.4 after May 27, 1994, otherwise the upgrade is US$10. Viacrypt's licensing and price information is as follows: ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 1 user $ 99.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 5 users $ 299.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 1 user $ 149.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 5 users $ 449.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 1 user $ 119.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 5 user $ 359.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt If you wish to place an order please call 800-536-2664 during the hours of 8:30am to 5:00pm MST, Monday - Friday. They accept VISA, MasterCard, AMEX and Discover credit cards. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact: Paul E. Uhlhorn Director of Marketing, ViaCrypt Products Mail: 2104 W. Peoria Ave Phoenix AZ 85029 Phone: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 Internet: viacrypt(a)acm.org Compuserve: 70304.41 WHERE CAN I GET MIT PGP? MIT PGP is Copyrighted freeware. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu, log in as getpgp, answer the questions, then ftp to net-dist.mit.edu and change to the hidden directory named in the telnet session to get your own copy. MIT-PGP is for U. S. and Canadian use only, but MIT is only distributing it within the USA (due to some archaic export control laws). 1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/mitlicen.txt and agree to it. 2. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt and agree to it. 3. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp. 4. Answer the questions and write down the directory name listed. 5. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get the distribution files (pgp26.zip, pgp26doc.zip, pgp26src.tar.gz, MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx, and MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx). If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 3, above. File names (shortened file names are for DOS BBS distribution): pgp26doc.zip - documentation only pgp26.zip - includes DOS executable & documentation pgp26src.zip - source code pgp26src.tar or pgp26src.tar.gz - source code release for Unix and others macpgp26.hqx or MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx - Macintosh executable & documentation macpgp26.src or MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx - Macintosh source code mcpgp268.hqx or MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx - Macintosh executable for 68000 pgp26os2.zip - OS/2 executable (may not be on the MIT archive) RSA and IDEA algorithms licenced for personal and noncommercial use. Uses RSAREF, which may not be modified without RSADSI permission. Contains "time bomb" to start generating messages incompatible with PGP 2.3 and 2.4 on 1 September 1994 as an incentive for people to not use PGP 2.3a in the USA, which RSADSI claims infringes on their patents. Mac versions are not yet Applescriptable. This version is not intended for export from the USA and Canada due to the USA's International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Canada's corresponding regulations. You can also get MIT PGP 2.6 from: ftp.csn.net/mpj ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26os2.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar.gz ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/mac MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/amiga/ pgp26-amiga0b0.6-000.lha pgp26-amiga0b0.6-020.lha pgp26-amiga0b0.6-src.lha amiga.txt See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar.… ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. TO GET THESE FILES BY EMAIL, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message for instructions. You will have to work quickly to get README.MPJ then the files before the ??????? part of the path name changes again (several times a day). ftp.eff.org Follow the instructions found in README.Dist that you get from one of: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/README.Dist gopher.eff.org, 1/Net_info/Tools/Crypto gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Net_info/Tools/Crypto http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ COMPUSERVE The NCSA Forum sysops have a library that is available only to people who send them a message asserting that they are within the U. S. A. This library contains PGP. I have also seen PGP 2.6 in some other places on Compuserve. Try searching for PGP26.ZIP in the IBMFF forum for up-to-date information on PGP in selected other areas. The last time I tried a search like this, PGP 2.6 was found in the PC World Online forum (GO PWOFORUM) new uploads area, along with several PGP shells and accessories. I've also heard that EUROFORUM caries PGP 2.6ui, but have not confirmed this. Compuserve file names are even more limited than DOS, so the file names to look for are PGP26.ZIP, PGP26S.ZIP (source code), and PGP26D.ZIP (documentation only). Colorado Catacombs BBS Mike Johnson, sysop Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff. Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written by Mike Johnson, including DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR, DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, etc. v.FAST/v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 28,800 bps 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, as fast as your modem will go. Use ANSI terminal emulation, of if you can't, try VT-100. Free access to PGP. If busy or no answer, try again later. Log in with your own name, or if someone else already used that, try a variation on your name or pseudonym. You can request access to crypto software on line, and if you qualify legally under the ITAR, you can download on the first call. Download file names: pgp26.zip (DOS version with documentation) pgp26src.tar (Unix version and source code) pgp26doc.zip (Documentation only -- exportable) macpgp26.hqx (MacPGP executables, binhexed .sea) macpgp26.src (MacPGP source, binhexed .sea) mcpgp268.hqx (MacPGP executables, binhexed .sea for 68000 processor). (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado number - 2 lines. (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number intended for use by people in the Denver, Colorado area. Verified: This morning. Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado) Jim Still (aka Johannes Keppler), sysop. DOS, OS2, and Mac versions. (303) 443-2457 For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO" with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files). Other BBS and ftp sites do have these files, as well. I noticed that PGP26.ZIP is being distributed on FIDONET. WHERE CAN I GET PGP FOR USE OUTSIDE OF THE USA? The latest for outside the USA is the "Unofficial International" PGP 2.6 for most platforms, MacPGP 2.3aV1.2 for the Mac (although 2.6ui is under development and should appear very soon), and 2.3a3 for the Amiga. The latest amiga version is fully compatible with MIT's PGP 2.6. Copyrighted freeware. Version 2.6ui released by mathew(a)mantis.co.uk. Amiga version 2.3a3 released by Peter Simons <simons(a)peti.gun.de> These versions do NOT use RSAREF. No RSA patent problems outside the USA, but this version is not legal for commercial or extensive personal use in the USA. IDEA licensed for presonal use only in countries where the IDEA patent holds. The freeware version of PGP is intended for noncommercial, experimental, and scholarly use. It is available on thousands of BBSes, commercial information services, and Internet anonymous-ftp archive sites on the planet called Earth. This list cannot be comprehensive, but it should give you plenty of pointers to places to find PGP. Although the latest freeware version of PGP was released from outside the USA (England), it is not supposed to be exported from the USA under a strange law called the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of this, please get PGP from a site outside the USA if you are outside of the USA and Canada. Even though the RSAREF license associated with PGP 2.6 from MIT no longer prohibits use outside the USA, it still carries the not-for-profit restriction that the original RSA code in PGP 2.6ui doesn't have. On the other hand, patents on the IDEA cipher may limit PGP use in your country to nonprofit applications, anyway. Indeed, I understand that there are some countries where private electronic mail is not legal, anyway. These listings are subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Source code (gzipped tar format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz Source code (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uis.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uis.zip * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26uis.zip Executable for DOS (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uix.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uix.zip MacIntosh: * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/mac /MacPGP2.6ui_beta.sit.hqx * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/PGP/MacPGP2.6ui_V1.2sources.cpt.hqx Other sites to look for the above mentioned files at: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de /pub/virus/crypt/pgp This site has most, if not all, of the current PGP files. ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXX/PGP (U. S. and Canadian users only) See /pub/crypto/software/README for the characters for XXXXXXXX This site has all public releases of the freeware PGP from 1.0 through 2.6 and 2.6ui. black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) /src/security/pgp26uix.zip (MS-DOS executables & docs) /src/security/pgp26uis.zip (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS, Amiga sources, docs, info on building PGP into mailers, editors, etc.) There are several other versions of PGP here, including the MIT release. ftp.csn.net /mpj/public/pgp/ contains PGP shells, faq documentation, language kits. ftp.netcom.com /pub/dcosenza -- Some crypto stuff, sometimes includes PGP. /pub/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. /pub/qwerty -- How to MacPGP Guide, largest steganography ftp site as well. PGP FAQ, crypto FAQ, US Crypto Policy FAQ, Steganograpy software list. MacUtilites for use with MacPGP. Stealth1.1 + other steganography programs. Send mail to qwerty(a)netcom.com with the subject "Bomb me!" to get the PGP FAQ and MacPGP guide if you don't have ftp access. ftp.ee.und.ac.za /pub/crypto/pgp soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt/PGP ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) StealthPGP: The Amiga version can be FTP'ed from the Aminet in /pub/aminet/util/crypt/ as StealthPGP1_0.lha. Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command: archie -s pgp26 (DOS & Unix Versions) archie -s pgp2.6 (MAC Versions) ftpmail: For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. For the ftp sites on netcom, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message. World Wide Web URLs: (Thanks to mathew(a)mantis.co.uk) _________________________________________________________________ MACPGP 2.3 Program * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.3.cpt.hqx * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx.gz Source code Requires Think C. * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx -- version 2.2 only * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3src.sea.h qx.pgp Documentation PGP is rather counter-intuitive to a Mac user. Luckily, there's a guide to using MacPGP in ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qwerty/Here.is.How.to.MacPGP. _________________________________________________________________ OS/2 PGP You can, of course, run the DOS version of PGP under OS/2. * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/2.6ui/pgp26ui-os2.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26os2.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? _________________________________________________________________ AMIGA PGP 2.3 * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha Source * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha _________________________________________________________________ ARCHIMEDES PGP * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/archimedes/ArcPGP23a _________________________________________________________________ DOCUMENTATION ONLY * _US:_ ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/pgp26doc.zip * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip _________________________________________________________________ LANGUAGE MODULES These are suitable for most PGP versions. I am not aware of any export/import restrictions on these files. German * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/PGP_german_docs.lha Italian * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz Japanese * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz Lithuanian * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp23ltk.zip Russian * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26ru.zip (MIT version) * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26uir.zip (ui version) * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26ru.zip Spanish * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz Swedish * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_swedish.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_swedish.txt _________________________________________________________________ OTHER SITES Some cryptographic software is available from ftp://van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca/pub/crypto/software/. Read the README file and proceed from there. BBS sites: Colorado Catacombs BBS (See also the entry above for PGP 2.6) (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado (2 lines) (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado (free call from Denver CO, but 1 line) For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions, then select [Q]uestionaire 3 from the [M]ain menu. Verified: This morning. Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado) Jim Still (aka Johannes Keppler), sysop. DOS, OS2, and Mac versions. (303) 443-2457 Verified: 5-2-94 For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO" with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files). Exec-Net (New York) Host BBS for the ILink net. (914) 667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> If you find a version of the PGP package on a BBS or FTP site and it does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. ARCHIE WHO? There are many more sites. You can use archie and/or other "net-surfing" tools to find a more up-to-date listing, if desired. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi4PT2QAAAEEAPPCZnrshEJ9PSnV+mXEwjM4kzJF0kyg2MnLMzo83vWI40ei jogncqdkXT0c2TQWg+Bsu9ckFoXdId0utumYv0aqd8yI/oU/DwJ1zJrqRL2PFbxe ZLofHoKFjvq1TiNiJq9ps3jW6iYS4IU1SzyKhjmyE+K0+WyrPPX0zg8FAL9FAAUR tCdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajiJAJUCBRAu G3chZXmEuMepZt0BAZtAA/0Rw5mintlUDgHycNbeoyIiMHoLu8jWaCSaiGSt+dDU 1A/bUCo+gorv5TYxOClRf3XHjD6zSooWyUz3ehotrzPYLunhVOE2YBxPU+OvKFOc 37mcZrnXGBlF5NblnSYxp0186tGaTm7WMWx7NDlHT4GvhzHJQSOoo48ykDkKm/mk LIkAlQIFEC4PWbs/ZwY8hTPrxQEBKyMD/A7kv91C1ZZIRtkbC9k9lsWOgOnO8wG8 bGMajaco465Z5llWD+Y8QCMdSWcowtOBGfW0Wv1bZ1uebeCpg1L66pJ7C+BOExrk gPqRVCstLLiVerKGeSOZo3yXtxYKYX7mHQPrHp98ef7fUG4IiKS+S+znmGxpJwrV sHZRlhJ3hXUsiQCVAgUQLg9ZefX0zg8FAL9FAQFBTAQAh4u4Vun7WhPuL6fsXiXm paaGfeLtd3biRj/aOMAG1eHuhVdWejx71ormyKTdNB2YV56bpsE3JQ/KhBuYDo0N SkRnqeM2S+Ef7aZEg6Q44uXG52pqCZUldtCeYfOs3aLCR9SMlc6Y3zmpSwB1wKP0 5+tN9zruNYVKKBLWEIFAY7W0K01pY2hhZWwgUGF1bCBKb2huc29uIDxtLnAuam9o bnNvbkBpZWVlLm9yZz60IE1pY2hhZWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQG5ldGNvbS5jb20+ tChNaWtlIEpvaG5zb24gPDcxMzMxLjIzMzJAY29tcHVzZXJ2ZS5jb20+tCtNaWNo YWVsIFAuIEpvaG5zb24gPG1wam9obnNvQG55eC5jcy5kdS5lZHU+tC1EbyBub3Qg dXNlIGZvciBlbmNyeXB0aW9uIGFmdGVyIDI3IEp1bmUgMTk5Ni4= =rR4q - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLiQM2fX0zg8FAL9FAQEW9AQAxs3nPZ8LDGMtvzHCbIZ43fWWdeRUyzBE /2MJJk/UBsKFGxUxtjXd5BCKhb1kCUaYvoixvn2WTMpDrVOw1bmok0p8olOcREb8 MFlM1hgrWY3pvn6xVLwKOaBjpuDLMfnm9jxyeA6LGozpDZGbUGTByHP+v/usb+tG trf3UTg8kbg= =eth8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Workshop on privacy in computer supported cooperative work
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At least one person who understands crypto should go -- the other participants may not know what our technology makes possible. Forwarded-by: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> Forwarded-by: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> Date: Fri, 24 Jun 1994 19:02:39 PDT From: Lucy Suchman <suchman(a)parc.xerox.com> >>> Workshop Announcement <<< CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CREATION AND CONTROL OF PERSONAL/COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS SPACES to be held in conjunction with the ACM 1994 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW'94) Chapel Hill, North Carolina Saturday, October 22, 1994 sponsored by IFIP WG9.1 (Computers and Work) (pending approval) organized by Andrew Clement Faculty of Information Studies University of Toronto Lucy Suchman Systems and Practices Lab Xerox PARC Ina Wagner Centre for CSCW Technical University of Vienna Themes and Goals: The development of CSCW applications generally implies new ways of recording and transmitting detailed information about individual users' behaviour. Frequently,this is associated with new forms of interpersonal access. This is the case for those working in settings as diverse as team based manufacturing environments and the "media spaces" of corporate research labs. Even routine use of email poses still unresolved questions about who has access to messages and under what conditions. Such new communications capabilities pose the possibility of unwelcome intrusion and exposure. More generally, they can undermine the ability of individuals and groups to negotiate control of information about themselves. Personal privacy may be threatened and the potential for CSCW technologies to support collaboration impaired. This workshop builds upon the experiences with the privacy workshop and panel sessions held at CSCW'92 (see reports in SIGCHI Bulletin, October 1993, and especially, SIGOIS Bulletin, August 1993). Whereas the former workshop focused on identifying privacy issues, this one will emphasise remedial responses. In particular, it will explore theoretical and practical considerations in developing various forms of communications spaces under the control of the individuals and groups concerned. The specific goals of this one day workshop are: - to further develop a network of researchers and practitioners who have an ongoing interest in the privacy and related implications of CSCW technologies - to explore the theoretical and practical aspects of defining manageable personal and group information spaces within CSCW applications - to consider possibilities for diverse forms of participation (and non- participation) in the use of communications media and technologically mediated workspaces - to elaborate a general framework to guide CSCW developers and implementors in creating applications that are sensitive to personal/collectiveinformation control concerns. Planned Activities: In the morning session, participants will explore in detail several realistic scenarios involving privacy/accessibility issues. These will reflect a range of common/plausible situations by drawing upon prior research and participants' written submissions. Discussions of each scenario will focus on identifying the sources of concern, their basis in technologies and/or social relations, and the ways in which potential privacy violations may be avoided or diminished. Design options will be highlighted. The afternoon session will identify and elaborate the general principles that underlie the scenarios analysed earlier. These will cover recommendations and appropriate rationales that can guide the design of technologies and inform working practices. The main product will be a set of key ideas to incorporate in a report suitable for publication in SIGCHI/SIGOIS Bulletins. Organizer Backgrounds: Andrew Clement's research has been on the social and organizational implications of workplace computerization. A central theme of this work has been the ways in which users exercise control and are controlled through computing technology. He has written several papers on the subject of electronic workplace surveillance and, as a participant in the Ontario Telepresence project, is currently researching the privacy aspects of media spaces. He organized the privacy workshop at CSCW'92. He is vice chair of IFIP WG9.1 (Computers and Work). Lucy Suchman's research concerns the social relations of computer systems design and use, including studies of cooperative working practices in technology-intensive workplaces. Through her involvement in the CSCW and Participatory Design communities, she has worked to develop more use-oriented practices of systems design. She was Program Chair for the Second Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work, and is engaged in ongoing dialogues with the PARC/EuroPARC media space and ubiquitous computing projects. Ina Wagner is the Director of the Centre for CSCW at the Technical University of Vienna. Her recent research has focused on the political and cultural aspects of software development practices and on time management issues in medical teams. She was the principal organizer of the recent IFIP WG9.1 NetWORKing Conference ("Connecting Workers In and Between Organizations") and serves as the Working Group's chair. Participant Selection: Prospective participants are asked to submit a short position statement (2-5 pages) describing their background, nature of interest in the workshop themes (e.g. privacy, CSCW application development, what they consider to be the primary issues and promising remedial approaches). As part of this, prospective participants are also encouraged to submit a brief scenario description (2-3 pages), suitable for discussion in the workshop. These should describe a situation, preferably based on experience, which explores a privacy concern in connection with the use of CSCW technologies. The richer and more detailed the better. Identities of individuals and organizations should be suitably disguised. Position statements and scenarios will be distributed to participants in advance of the session. Participants, to a maximum of 20, will be selected to promote a stimulating mix of researchers, developers, implementors and users of CSCW technologies. Four copies of the position paper/scenario should be sent by August 15, 1994 to the contact person, Andrew Clement. Please also email an ASCII version. Invitations will be sent by August 29, 1994. Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number, email address and fax number in your submission. The workshop will start at 8:30AM Saturday morning and last until 5PM. The workshop fee is $50, which includes continental breakfast, lunch and refreshment breaks. The fee is payable at the conference. Contact: Andrew Clement Faculty of Information Studies University of Toronto 140 St George Street Toronto, Ontario Canada M5S 1A1 clement(a)fis.utoronto.ca (416) 978-3111 (Office) (416) 971-1399 (Fax)

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House Rules Committee marks encryption bill as "open" (fwd)
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I phoned the House Rules comm. this morning. They informed me that the committee voted 5-4 earlier this week to allow amendments to the General Export Administration Act on the House Floor. This should allow a contingent to restore the strength to the act on the House floor, should Rep. Maria Cantwell and her cosponsors be able to muster the required votes. It was obviously a close vote. If you wrote in, know that your letter probably helped to tip the scales. -Shabbir

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Re: Singularity... what is it?
by doug＠OpenMind.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Jeff Gostin says: > What _is_ Singularity? It's not a term I'm familiar with. Perry Metzger replies: >The notion that the rate of progress is increasing, and the increase >in the rate is also increasing, so at some point in the next century >more change will occur per hour than occurred in all of human history >to, say, now. "The Singularity" is the point at which the world >becomes not merely odd but incomprehensable TO US. Presumably those >alive at the time will not really notice. This is not the only possible definition -- I wrote a paper in '84 defining it as a singular event or change beyond which "all bets are off". No future events after that point can really be reasonably predicted on this side of it. For example, the sudden development of a "god-like" AI. Or the discovery of some medical treatment which increases human intelligence two-fold... which is cheap and is widely distributed to everyone. Not all of the possible singularities are good... I would call global thermonuclear war a singularity, or the rise of a virus like AIDS, that spreads like the common cold. Sorry, this is getting pretty far away from subjects relevant to cypherpunks. The Extropian's list has been having a discussion recently about the "singularity" of runaway AI development acceleration. That list is probably the appropriate place to look for more info... Doug ___________________________________________________________________ Doug Cutrell General Partner doug(a)OpenMind.com Open Mind ===================================================================

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House Rules Committee marks encryption bill as "open" (fwd)
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

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