December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: RMorality and Ethics (was Pseudonym's and Reputation)
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Curtis D. Frye Attempted translation: Morality is both individual and situational, and must not be externally imposed as the imposition would violate individual sovereignty. Thanks, Curtis. For some reason, I kept reading the first sentence as: "Morality is the ablility to differentiate between right and wrong, without detonation." Which, I guess, would be another good translation. Blanc

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REMAIL: pseudo-account remailer @andrew gains anonymous feature
by Matthew J Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I added an anonymous feature to my remailer. If you have an address of the form mg5n+eaxxx(a)andrew.cmu.edu, anonymous mail can be sent to that address by changing it to the format: mg5n+anxxx(a)andrew.cmu.edu An encrypted reply address is created for the sender of the anonymous message. You can get an anonymous address by sending mail to mg5n+getid(a)andrew.cmu.edu P.S. For what it's worth, the address mg5n+anz3ajg8o1yxicqzt6v6qgpg3tkhddpqw3jl(a)andrew.cmu.edu will forward anonymously to cypherpunks(a)toad.com. If your mail software supports mail aliases, a mail alias to that address might be an easy way to post anon to the list (and get replies ;-) As before, anyone who wants the source is welcome to it, however there is nil documentation, and some of my recent hacks to it have increased the code sloppiness factor by several orders of magnitude. It does now support 3DES encryption, much thanks to Phil Karn and Jim Gillogly's PD code.

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Re: NSA Security Manual
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. Toal said : What I found interesting was that it was published in Phrack about a week ago, and nothing happened, but when Grady reposted it, suddenly phone-calls come aflying. Either this means that the NSA read Grady's posts more diligently than everyone else's, or Grady went out of his way to tell them that he'd posted it, which wouldn't surprise me... G <- This is partly up to Grady to verify, but I suspect the answer lies in the different frequency and lag time between examination of the net and examination of Phrack. Grady's probably just got noticed first.

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NSA manual.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Grady says: Actually I speculate that someone who saw my reposting helpfully phoned the NSA about the security breach. But SDO10 didn't give me that information... Grady <- Sorry for the bandwidth, this sounds more reasonable than any active scanning. -uni- (Dark)

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NSA Manual and Media
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well Sports Fans, I just mailed the NSA manual to every media source with an email adress listed in Adam's _Big_Dummies_Guide_ - It took 6 aliases to get them all. Scuuuze me! I'm headed back to the Buckhorn Bar and all those drunk undergraduate fillies. This will do for a nights work >;) -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Re: Today cryptography, tomorrow ??
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Many of the Cynosure users hid their identities by using an > > Internet address in Finland that provided an anonymous forwarding > > service for the pirated programs, according to the indictment. > Does this mean we will soon be seeing Julf in chains on the evening news > with his coat over his head? > After all, the United States long ago awarded itself kidnapping > priveleges against anyone it claims has violated US law, with no concern > for the laws of the country in which the person resides. Just ask Manuel > Noriega. or timothy leary. josh

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Soda remailer tampering?
by Isaac.Norby＠f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

|To: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Seems your remailer (or you personally) is playing games with messages posted via the Post-To: function. Note indicated additions: Isaac Norby - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!217!Isaac.Norby INTERNET: Isaac.Norby(a)f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG >>enriched uranium ak-47 >>chile columbia -------- For more information about this anonymous posting service, please send mail to hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu with Subject: remailer-info. Eric Hollander takes no responsibility for the contents of this post. Please, don't throw Isaac Norby - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!217!Isaac.Norby INTERNET: Isaac.Norby(a)f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG >>ira shipment of cocaine >>explosives detonate -------- For more information about this anonymous posting service, please send mail to hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu with Subject: remailer-info. Eric Hollander takes no responsibility for the contents of this post. Please, don't throw I don't have a sense of humor about this and want an explanation, now. Cc: to cypherpunks(a)toad.com IN -- Isaac Norby - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!217!Isaac.Norby INTERNET: Isaac.Norby(a)f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Shot 'Round the World
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, my personal secretary compiled every single media email adress in the _Big_Dummies_Guide_ into 6 alias'. Then I emailed it to every one of them. If the FBI comes to the front door, this piece of shit XT clone I use for a UNIX terminal goes out the back door and off the sun deck into the alley. I suppose the fucking phone will ring off the hook in Ft. Meade for a while. By God! It's a good day for the Revolution!!! *** Here's the follow up *** To whom it may concern, You have been emailed an authentic National Security Agency Employee's Manual. I as an Electronic Frontier Foundation member, acting purely on my own initiative, and solely accountable for my actions, have emailed this information, as well as John Gilmore's FOIA attack on the current Clipper Chip proposal for key escrowed encryption, to every media source with an email adress listed in EFF's _Big_Dummies_Guide_to_the_Internet_ on the entire planet. You may authenicate the NSA manual via confirmation by the phone numbers listed in it. Consider this the shot heard round the world in the Electronic Revolution. Sincerely, Jeff Leroy Davis, AKA Eagle EFF Member # 2176 Attached is my PGP public key by which you may verify that I am indeed who I say I am. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAi1yIUsAAAEEANIDU/e6qt77IAX+zDqCLMpj6tjYZBOd7HhAmNlIOapgd926 J029AapszLkDqASgVU/Zzs0QpgQ1GAOerlJj1wDPdSMZ03mEqo94ztPI8uNliJTe /CRKqMrkVpe/zOj13QS3HOk2sH//EM73OrlfftxJucLUf2Y30V/ScHuGXWgVAAUR tCtKZWZmIExlcm95IERhdmlzIDxlYWdsZUBkZWVwdGh0LmFybW9yeS5jb20+iQCV AgUQLY8mOTZAgYw09MRxAQFABgP+NJ0TWTUXL/NSvErHP/9zYe+DU8r7ox4k9upd wQ0DKpBEJIg0UNN1DoztLHLr3V3HehvLACGCP/InJPUXTuEFrKyg08t5AFpYpY2b 1+TF1lne0Q0snASd+D2HrIzJQYw0U5siDUe70l6V/dFNCF/9OclNmeMU66j77nW4 zZ16BjaJAJUCBRAtjyXWmEsctw8gOSUBAc9nBACyTl0EhoakGWLJNHOrL1HO+Rf7 RSR0mmdnAn97hzNkC+/O6pAalL3Lp+7fTooYgE35qjItavvdPCcUz2Q6iATXAH6e JnIY2/Jn/oS6TZgksSDcczcwok1C+H6oXp17IqxVCmlV+6wO5jRv2qNJ1Re0QnYy rdFOHVb5YFmtNUwt34kAlQIFEC2OBTgOhDSHLufvWQEBRdoD+gKDZ/xfrDiL3iUU KCWB4g0jjJT8/0JT+9W+I/P5hH2A8XIlFdXVjBUlCSjEjBiXEEzkYCg7xUiCgARP NqGbEu9uIEOIoU5hlhWs7hvVfDTFqpcyBvJ12HXvZMtPswwyR9mWQ8sSd18Bz+dZ vzX4fV8jB+ZayS55j2ZD1jMymMYt =cyXF -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Nsa Manual distribution
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-> From: Al Billings <mimir(a)illuminati.io.com> Subject: Re: NSA Security Manual To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com On Fri, 8 Apr 1994, Black Unicorn wrote: > You realize, of course, that by posting the manual verbatim you have allowed > them to discover where the leak was. They have the ability to change the > wording slightly on every document, so that when you quote the document they > can discover who gave it to you. That is why newspapers no longer report > quotes from documents that they have, or never show pictures of secret > documents. Then again, for something as simple as a manual, they may not > bother to change each one. But the capability exists. Could someone e-mail the manual to me. I accidentally deleted the posting of it. -- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- | Al Billings aka Grendel Grettisson | Internet: mimir(a)illuminati.io.com | | Nerd-Alberich - Lord of the Nerd-Alfar | Sysop of The Sacred Grove | | Admin for Troth, the Asatru E-mail List| (206)322-5450 | =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- <- Watch your attributation, this was not my quote. I personally would counsel people to be quite cautious about distributing the document in question actively. There is a case to be made if you know the material is restricted and you send it out anyhow. I don't think this applies to Grady, who seems to have forwarded the material as a "is this real" project. Now that he has indicated the material is of some interest to NSA, anyone sending the document back and forth should really be cautious. For the less paranoid: Most of the information in the document, as I indicated before, is not damning by itself. It is the distribution that is offensive to the powers that be. The question is how obnoxious and picky the enforcement side wants to be and what the background of the leak is. If this is material put out by someone who might otherwise be in trouble it might get nasty out there. I don't think I'd want it on my ftp site, let me put it that way. The FOIA exemption for administrative materials is what worries me most. -uni- (Dark)

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Jeff Davis/Eagle pokes his thumb in big bro's eye
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HA HA HA HA HA HA HA! Ya done good! Brad bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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MIT Talk on randomness/key management
by Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I have no more information than is contained in the announcement --AW] > Friday, April 15, 1994 > Refreshments at 1:45pm, Talk at 2:00pm in NE43-518 > >``Regaining Pseudorandomness by Cooperation with Applications to Key > Management'' > by Amir Herzberg, IBM Watson > > ABSTRACT > >Consider a multiparty system where parties may be occasionally >``infected'' by malicious agents, called {\sf viruses.} The viruses >are controlled by an adversary. Once a party is infected the entire >contents of its memory is revealed and possibly modified. After some >time the virus is expelled and the party wishes to regain its >security. Since the leaving virus knows the entire contents of the >infected party's memory, a source of ``fresh'' randomness, >unpredictable by the adversary, seems essential for full recovery >(e.g., for selecting new keys). However, such an ``on-line'' source >of randomness may not be always readily available, or beneficial to use. > >We describe a scheme in which the parties, being given access to >randomness only at the onset of the computation, jointly generate a >sequence of numbers that are pseudorandom from the point of view of >the adversary (a different generated number for the use of each party >at each round). Thus, these pseudorandom numbers can be used just as >``fresh'' randomness in the design of protocols (e.g., for regaining >security). These properties of our scheme hold as long as in each >round there is at least {\em one} non-infected party. > >We describe an important application of our scheme to >practical key-management systems, such as Kerberos and \NetSP. > >Joint with Ran Canetti, Weizmann Institute > >Host: Nancy Lynch

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Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nathan Loofbourrow writes, regarding the on-line game: > > You could impose an annoyance factor on the distribution of initial > resources (a week's wait, perhaps), or on unlikely transfers (you > can't give away the resource except in exchange for some other form of > goods... an Objectivist's paradise, perhaps?) Some kinds of play-by-mail games have had a similar situation, but they have generally not faced the problem in this form because they charge money to enter. This puts a cap on how many entries a person is willing to make. With a large number of participants, controlling two or three players instead of one does not increase the average person's chance of winning enough to make it worthwhile. This does suggest an alternative form of "is-a-person" credentialling, though. Rather than trying to verify identity at a distance, one could simply have a "he paid me $10" credential. You would give these out (probably just one per customer rather than multiple ones) as blinded signatures for anybody who sent you the cash. These could be substitute is-probably-a-person credentials on the theory that most people wouldn't be able to waste a lot of money purchasing a great many of these. OTOH, it's not clear that anyone would be willing to pay this much for a credential unless it had some real, tangible benefit (otherwise it serves as an "I'm a sucker" credential), and if the benefits are great enough perhaps it would be worthwhile to buy multiples. Hal

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Data Lock 271.82 dollar contest
by Michael Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __ / \ New Cryptographic Freeware Available: Data Lock /____\ \ / * Uses the Diamond Encryption Algorithm (slight variation on MPJ2) \ / * Includes complete source code \/ * No patent infringement problems * Includes source code library for Diamond & Diamond Lite * Can be strong enough to protect very valuable data (see below) * Can be weakened enough to be exportable in executable form only * Ciphertext doesn't advertise its algorithm or key (stealth) Documentation only (exportable): ftp:csn.org//mpj/public/dlockdoc.zip or dlockdoc.tar.gz ftp:ftp.netcom.com//pub/mpj/public/dlockdoc.zip or dlockdoc.tar.gz Full package (including all source code & executable file): ftp:csn.org//mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/mpj/dlock.zip or dlock.tar.gz ?????? and anti-export warning given in ftp:csn.org//mpj/README.MPJ ftp:ftp.netcom.com//pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/mpj/dlock.zip or dlock.tar.gz ?????? and anti-export plea given in ftp:ftp.netcom.com//pub/mpj/README.MPJ Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-938-9654 DLOCK.ZIP Data Lock itself may be useful, but its greater value lies in the fact that it is written more to be used as a function library for people who want to incorporate encryption into other applications. The only change from MPJ2 to the Diamond Encryption Algorithm is that the key expansion mechanism now distinguishes between keys of different lengths. For example, the keys "aaaaaaaa" and "aaaaaaaaaaaa" would have been equivalent in MPJ2, but are not in Diamond. Diamond Lite is just the logical contraction of Diamond from a 16 byte (128 bit) block to an 8 byte (64 bit) block. Even though "Lite" is in the name, it yields better security for small numbers of rounds because of the faster avalanche effect (1 bit to 64 in just 2 rounds instead of 1 bit to 128 in 5 rounds). MPJ2 and Diamond are derived from the MPJ encryption algorithm, invented in 1989, but use an improved key scheduling algorithm that eliminates the slight bias in the way the substitution arrays were filled. The following is a comparison of some of the symmetrical key ciphers available to the general public today. Included is a (somewhat subjective) strength comparison to give a general idea of how Diamond and Diamond Lite compare: ALGORITHM BLOCK KEY ROYALTY ECB RELATIVE APPROXIMATE WORK FACTOR NAME SIZE SIZE FREE? MODE SPEED TO BREAK log base 2 of BITS BITS OK? number of operations DES 64 56 YES YES MEDIUM 43 3DES 64 112-168 YES YES SLOW 64-168 DIAMOND 128 variable YES YES MEDIUM 128-key size DIAMOND LITE 64 variable YES YES VERY FAST 64-key size BLOWFISH 64 variable YES YES VERY FAST 64-key size? SHA-CFB 160 variable YES NO VERY FAST 80-160 MD5-CFB 128 variable YES NO VERY FAST 64-128 REDOC II 80 160 NO YES FAST 80-key size REDOC III 64 variable NO YES VERY FAST 64-key size KHUFU 64 512 NO YES ? 64-512 IDEA 64 128 NO YES FAST 64-128 MMB 128 128 ? YES FAST 128? The "work factor to break" column is somewhat subjective, and is based on the best attacks that I have knowledge of (hardly an exhaustive list), combined with a GUESS at what attacks might succeed. They also assume that the key length is at least as long as the numbers indicated when the key length is variable. You should decide for yourself what you will believe. Don't put all your eggs in one basket. Besides those things listed above, some distinguishing characteristics of Diamond and Diamond Lite include: * They can easily and securely take a pass phrase directly as a key. * They can be extremely fast when implemented in hardware. * They allow you to perform some security vs. speed and size tradeoffs. * Key setup is designed to make brute force attacks very costly. OK, this is where I put my money where my keyboard is. If you are the first one to correctly decipher my challenge text (CHALLENG.ENC in DLOCK.ZIP), enciphered with DLOCK.EXE, before midnight UTC, 29 April 1997, and follow the redemption instructions contained within the challenge text, then I will send you US$271.82 of my hard-earned money. You must (1) reveal to me how you did this, and (2) not break any laws in the process to collect the prize. I know that this isn't enough to justify much serious cryptanalysis, but it should demonstrate that such a challenge is beyond the reach of the average hacker. ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-938-9654 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org ftp:csn.org//mpj/README.MPJ for crypto stuff | | |||/ /_\ | aka mpj(a)netcom.com mpjohnson(a)ieee.org mikej(a)exabyte.com | | |||\ ( | m.p.johnso(a)nyx.cs.du.edu CIS 71331,2332 PGP key by finger | | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLaDz1j9nBjyFM+vFAQHJ8QP/UgnrRX0u5AAnEoOIuNPi1Y8yRPrY7U3R BWTb04eyi1hqSuWnVQaAkINp84R5d/PhyS7wa5xEEoq+UmhISEoGHoSVc6e2QWr+ xsSR5vjvUQpc5zkPIdkFOpVb94aCUCDHh5Zv4bU6WsVoKI+zAXSrRDL7o4zhwfxp +H6ov+NPI1M= =9Ul1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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bumpersticker source
by nates＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lots of people have been asking about where to get the sticker paper, so I'll just tell everyone. I think it may be easier to just let everyone make their own instead of bothering with making them myself. Here's the info: The stuff is called "stickyback" Saga Division of DADE, Inc. Interchange Office Park 400 Highway 169 South Minneapolis, MN 55426-1199 Pricing: Size: Qty 1-3 4-11 12+ --------------------------------------- 8.5" x 11.0" 10 7.35 6.60 5.95 8.5" x 11.0" 50 31.50 28.50 25.60 11" x 17" 50 63.00 57.00 51.20 It's available in either white (opaque) or clear. -nate -- +--------- | Nate Sammons <nates(a)netcom.com> PGP Key and fingerprint via finger. | Clipper == Big Brother Inside. Question Authority. Encrypt everything. +---------

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MIT Student Indicted on Piracy Charges
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://the-tech.mit.edu/V114/N19/piracy.19n.html Student Indicted on Piracy Charges By Josh Hartmann Contributing Editor A federal grand jury charged an MIT student yesterday on a felony charge for allegedly allowing the piracy of over $1 million in business and entertainment software using Athena workstations. David M. LaMacchia '95 was indicted on one count of conspiring to commit wire fraud, according to a statement from the U.S. Attorney's office in Boston. LaMacchia allegedly allowed the duplication of hundreds of copyrighted software packages between Nov. 21, 1993, and Jan. 5, 1994, using workstations on the Athena Computing Environment. "We became aware sometime in December that a computer was being used to distribute software," said Kenneth D. Campbell, director of the news office. "That information was turned over to Campus Police and the FBI. MIT personnel cooperated with the FBI in the investigation." The incident was discovered when an Athena-user in the Student Center cluster noticed that an unattended workstation next to him was behaving abnormally, making frequent disk accesses, according to James D. Bruce ScD '60, vice president for Information Systems. The user apparently reported the abnormal behavior to members of the Student Information Processing Board, who then proceeded to investigate the matter, according to a source familiar with the investigation. The SIPB members saw the status of the workstation and reported the incident to the Information Systems staff, the source said. SIPB itself was not part of the investigation, according to Jessie Stickgold-Sarah '96, the SIPB chairman. Attorneys for LaMacchia issued a swift denial of the charges late yesterday, saying LaMacchia was merely the provider of a service which others used to place and remove files. The statement called the indictment a test case to "decide whether current criminal law would penalize a [systems operator] who neither controls what is placed on the system nor profits one cent from any copyrighted software that others upload to and download from the system that he and others create and operate." Many of the people who accessed the pirated files over the Internet concealed their location by using an anonymous service in Finland, Bruce said. The Associated Press reported yesterday that LaMacchia advertised the server strictly by word-of-mouth to avoid detection. The AP quoted the indictment as saying that as many as 180 users accessed the server in one 16-hour period. Disciplinary process underway Within MIT, "there was a disciplinary action filed against [LaMacchia] sometime in January," Bruce said. These proceedings have been halted, he added. Another anonymous source said that the Office of the Dean for Undergraduate Education and Student Affairs had received a complaint in January, but had not decided whether the disciplinary action would be forwarded to the Committee on Discipline, handled by the Dean's Office, or dismissed outright. Dean for Undergraduate Education and Student Affairs Arthur C. Smith said last night that Institute disciplinary procedures are usually suspended when a student is charged with such a crime. However, Smith would not comment on the status of any disciplinary case underway. If LaMacchia were convicted, he would still be subject to the normal disciplinary measures within the Institute, Smith said. Losses over $1 million Losses from the illegal software duplication are expected to surpass $1 million, according to the statement from the U.S. Attorney's office. "The pirating of business and entertainment software through clandestine computer bulletin boards is tremendously costly to software companies, and by extension to their employees and to the economy," said U.S. Attorney Donald K. Stern. "We need to respond to the culture that no one is hurt by these thefts and that there is nothing wrong with pirating software." A list obtained by The Tech revealed that MS-DOS games dominated the server. Among the business software, however, were Aldus Pagemaker 5.0 for Windows, Microsoft Word for Windows 6.0, a beta (pre-release) copy of a forthcoming operating system by Microsoft code-named Chicago, WordPerfect 6.0 for both DOS and Windows, a beta copy of Microsoft 5.0, and Aldus PhotoStyler 2.0. If found guilty LaMacchia could conceivably be the subject of a civil suit by the software vendors, Bruce said. "It would be entirely possible for a vendor to make a case that it suffered monetary damages," he said. "I would think there is some reason [LaMacchia] could be sued." Bruce said he thought the Institute's liability would be limited because of Athena rules prohibiting duplication of copyrighted software. LaMacchia did not return telephone calls last night. Copyright 1994 by The Tech. All rights reserved. This story was published on Friday, April 8, 1994. Volume 114, Number 19 The story began on page 1 and jumped to page 13. This article may be freely distributed electronically, provided it is distributed in its entirety and includes this notice, but may not be reprinted without the express written permission of The Tech. Write to archive(a)the-tech.mit.edu for additional details.

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THE ANTI-CLIPper
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An excerpt from the THE SPOTLIGHT newspaper April 11, 1994 from its TECHNOLOGY & LIBERTY column. "TV THAT WATCHES YOU" "In a little-noticed agreement reported in Washington Technology Week Bell Atlantic, General Instruments Corporation, & the National Institute of Science & Technology(NIST) have agree to build Clipper chips into future General Instruments cable-TV boxes." "It's a landmark agreement, & the mainstream media has been virtually silent on the subject. But what does the agreement mean?" "For starters, it means your high-tech cable box of the future will have all the "privacy protection" of your Clinton Clipper telephone. It is designed to snitch on you." "For example, you'll soon be able to order merchandise through your high-tech cable TV. And the Clipper chip implanted in your cable box wil flag every purchase as yours. Maybe you contribute to church causes? Use your cable box for tithes & it could be "profiled". Do you watch pay- per-view movies? Big Brother could soon be critiquing your viewing habits." "Starting to get the picture? The Clipper chip is designed to auto- matically identify every cable TV transaction you make. It can report your favorite programs & films. It can mark your buying habits." "And since Clipper's actual capabilities are still top-secret, it could theoretically be even more sinister. It could even contain logic to encrypt signals from monitoring equipment built into your cable box, such as a miniature video camera or infrared sensor (like the cameras & sensors already built into experimental cable boxes used by the Arbitron & Nielson rating services to monitor who is in the room with the TV on)." "General Instruments Corporation (GI) has a near-monopoly on the production of home cable-TV receivers. As a result, the "quiet" Clipper agreement virtually assures that Clipper chips will be insin- uated into the cable boxes of almost 90% of American's cable sub- scribers, all of whom have GI's cable equipment." This looks like really bad news to me! Maybe the free market could help? How about "CLIPPER FREE" labels on small companies cable_TV receivers. If the company could get away with it, it might really help their sales. Maybe foreign companies could come in with Clipper-frees? They could scream trade- war if the feds tried to stop them. American companies could then claim unfair restrictions were keeping them from being competitive. An even better possibility presents itself! How about the poss- ibility of a pirate cottage industry in disabling Clipper chips. Would the TV work with a broken Clipper. How about jumping around the Clipper chip? If that doesn't work, then an anti-clipper chip that goes in parallel or in series with the Clipper or replaces it? I don't know much about electronics. There has been for years a small in- dustry in producing "pirate" cable boxes. Imagine the possibilities with the anti-chip business. Electronic hackers working their way though college by installing off-shore produced anti-Clipper chips. Also individuals making a living from this or a good moonlighting job. If the feds outlaw this - THEN EVEN BETTER! An off the books, non-taxed business employing skilled technical people & habituating the population to engaging in federally unlawful activities! I predict that in coming years, the productive general population is going to become boldly contemptful of the big state. In this atmosphere, anti-Clipper activity will be well received & popularly endorsed. We will see a booming underground electronic privacy industry. What would the new chip's name be? THE ANTI-CLIPper? THE FREEDOM CHIP? THE WACO? THE WEAVER FAMILY? THE ANARCHIST CHIP? THE EQUALIZER CHIP? THE CYPHERPUNK CHIP? THE PRIVACY CHIP? THE YOU'LL-MIND-YOUR-OWN-DAM'D-BUSINESS CHIP? THE NEUROMANCER CHIP? THE ANTI-STATE CHIP? THE REVOLT CHIP? THE CLIP CLIPPER CHIP? THE NO-FEDS CHIP? THE CLIPPER CLIPPER CHIP? Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWWAAAYYYY BBAAACCCKKK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

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Re: Shot 'Round the World
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr Davis: >You may authenicate the NSA manual via confirmation by the phone numbers >listed in it. Consider this the shot heard round the world in the >Electronic Revolution. Well, this certainly helped the "cause." If I were a media person recieving this mail, I'd get a good laugh, then hit delete. I don't see anything nifty, wonderful, or unusual in the manual. I've held a Secret clearance doing work as a Defense contractor, and the requirements aren't abnormal. They're stricter, but given that the clearance level is higher and it's in the intelligence community, it's not unusual. I would seriously doubt the manual is of much interest to the media. If you want to help, mail the media about privacy, and what Clipper is going to do to it. This kind of mail just makes the online community look like fanatical crackpots. Bob (I'm an EFF member as well. What does that have to do with your message?) -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu finger for RIPEM public key When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. <- I tend to side with Mr. Snyder here. I would add that Mr. Davis has probably attracted a good deal of attention to himself for little gain. Distributing the manual anonymously would have made more sense, and in the event that the manual becomes an issue of contention or a torch for a witchhunt, Mr. Davis would be an interesting martyr in the quest to test the security of remailers and anonymous distribution. I fail to see how this is an important step for the cause. The manual was already in active distribution, the media will probably be the first to jump on the "electronic risks" bandwagon by noting how easy it would have been for an individual to spread a much more damning document. This brings up a curious point. If the cause is thawarting intelligence agencies, the next Clipper will be much less open, perhaps even black. My take on the point of cyberpunks was to make the technology available, organize the positive societal impacts, and prevent the government regulation of information and technology. How can the reckless distribution of (admittedly moderate) intelligence information serve these goals? As much of an anti-estlablishment movement as cypherpunks might associate themselves with, since when has treason been on the agenda? (Obviously I don't label Mr. Davis a traitor, but I'm not in authority in this matter.) Even Mr. May, who I most respectfully place on the heavy side of anti- estlablishment, has often noted that the goal is to allow society to evolve into the technology that is available. Freedom of information, and nil transaction cost in anonymous settings is key in empowering the individual and securing individual rights. Obviously the goal will conflict with modern intelligence agencies that seek to attempt domestic monitoring, but I think everyone here needs to address the role of such agencies in the grand scheme of things. Is the cypherpunk position a lawless one, or one promoting the evolution of law? I will be the first to assert that the manual was basically non-damning, I did in fact assert so some days ago. But consider, what if it had indeed been a revelation in the security methods and practices of the intelligence agency? That would be a significant compromise, and cost mass sums of money in modified security efforts by the agency. Not to mention the fact that it stands to endanger lives. Consider the recent attack on the CIA. I doubt that even this would have prevented the wild distribution of the manual however, prompting me to wonder about the place of responsibility and restraint in the realm of freedom of information. Who would be the bidders on BlackNet for such information? No one who wanted to know simply for academic purposes I'll wager. Issues like this seem to add to the Pro-Clipper arguements. The current pathalogical obsession with anti-crime measures can only be fueled with incidents like this and the MIT piracy case. If anon.penet.fi was not really used in this case, we see how the media will capitolize on these events to feed the headlines, and in this case that means anti-crime positions. Most media people will pass up the manual, just as someone suggested they might. What concerns me is the radical right reporter who asks, "Just who is this guy and why does he have this manual?" -uni- (Dark)

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Re: Shot 'Round the World
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:21 AM 4/9/94 -0700, Jeff Davis wrote: >*** Here's the follow up *** > >To whom it may concern, > >You have been emailed an authentic National Security Agency Employee's >Manual. I as an Electronic Frontier Foundation member, acting purely >on my own initiative, and solely accountable for my actions, have emailed >this information, as well as John Gilmore's FOIA attack on the current >Clipper Chip proposal for key escrowed encryption, to every media source >with an email adress listed in EFF's _Big_Dummies_Guide_to_the_Internet_ >on the entire planet. > >You may authenicate the NSA manual via confirmation by the phone numbers >listed in it. Consider this the shot heard round the world in the >Electronic Revolution. Well, this certainly helped the "cause." If I were a media person recieving this mail, I'd get a good laugh, then hit delete. I don't see anything nifty, wonderful, or unusual in the manual. I've held a Secret clearance doing work as a Defense contractor, and the requirements aren't abnormal. They're stricter, but given that the clearance level is higher and it's in the intelligence community, it's not unusual. I would seriously doubt the manual is of much interest to the media. If you want to help, mail the media about privacy, and what Clipper is going to do to it. This kind of mail just makes the online community look like fanatical crackpots. Bob (I'm an EFF member as well. What does that have to do with your message?) -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu finger for RIPEM public key When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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CPSR petition to oppose Clipper
by Senator Bedfellow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know how many signatures this eventually got? Thanks Ben. ____ Renegade academician. They're a dangerous breed when they go feral. -James P. Blaylock in "Lord Kelvin's Machine"

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'mostly for crypto and stuff'
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know c'punks strays, on occasion but hows this: From: nick.konidaris(a)accbbs.com (Nick Konidaris) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Hydrogen Fuel Cells Date: 3 Apr 94 23:14:00 GMT Distribution: world Organization: Advanced Computer Concepts BBS, New Rochelle, NY 914-654-1981 I know this conference is mostly for cryptography & stuff but I want to know if there is anyone out there who knows about the Hydrogen Fuel Cell. I think that I understand how the Cell works yet, I find that something does not make sense. My basic question is: 1. Is a salt/ion bridge required? 2. If so what crosses the salt bridge? [ie. H2 and O2 protons, electrons, what?] 3. What is the best way to make a working fuel cell? Thanx -Nicholas Konidaris II

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keywords
by Erich von Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

yes, my remailer does insert keywords, and you can expect that i will continue refinining the keyword insertion system so that it will be harder to automatically filter out. some people have said that keywords should be an option, not a default. i rejected this idea, because keywords are useless unless they are widely used. there is safety in large numbers. from the cypherpunk perspective, ideally, all or most net communications would consist of encrypted text, with the only plaintext being keywords, i think. if the keywords really do bother you, you can use some other remailer. also, if you have good keywords lists, please send them to me. i might have missed something. e

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Key Servers
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone send me a list of the keyservers or which ever one is the largest. Thanks, Reuben Halper -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAi16KosAAAEEAMUwRni4a9+GbuAhHDLcBWK60hCJUYxhr2hYokpELAhx0ejp 2fq61Tu9Hjn051CN8Xy5nu6sv2ODfG/t59l4DJSb5pirQaII3zaX0rMX0ydwGDoW YakL4ow1lNY+d/k14KpIuUW404+fNuNhIGSkdVLQIfbOgh0preK7/P44AKvdABEB AAG0JlJldWJlbiBIYWxwZXIgPGZoYWxwZXJAcGlsb3Qubmppbi5uZXQ+iQCVAgUQ LXorceK7/P44AKvdAQEUxwQAoffTibRlwE5tNQVGvrulh1OQgXNhTRec9vUaUwPy U64FIZ+KnmdfYgiJYXtcItA90EB9MDexazKeqJzMOPShVNOfyiwy2yUlnQs425f8 DxBvM//zuvj6s4/mXDTPUZtG9PP0HVaEGTJY15JdfRqtj/w+HHnsHlgCnj0NnIhX TW8= =D9UX -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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ILF: Encryption Plan Gets Gov't Nod
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front Reproduced without permission from Communications Week Encryption Plan Gets Gov't Nod By Sharon Fisher WASHINGTON Encryption users and industry observers have said they are unhappy with the Clinton administration's endorsement of a comprehensive interagency review of cryptographic technology. The review was initiated last April and overseen by the Na- tional Security Council. It was scheduled to have been complet- ed by mid-October of last year. As part of the Feb. 4 release of the report, the administration said it has approved the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) as a voluntary Federal In- formation Processing Standard. The EES, known as both the Clipper proposal and Skipjack, was announced last April. The administration also said that the National Institute of Stan- dards and Technology and the Automated Services Division of the Treasury Department would be charged with storing the escrowed keys. The procedures for gaining access to the keys were also announced. The ESS proposal has been heavily citicized because of the escrow proposal, which gives law enforcement agencies access to the encryption keys via a warrantmuch like a wiretap. Industry observers have said an algoithm with such keys is inherently insecure. They voiced concern at the government's plans to keep the algorithm classified (Comm Week, Jan. 3). Critics said the ESS is a first step toward outlawing other forms of cryptog raphy, but the administration reiterated at the announcement that it had no such intention. Industry groups such as the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, both based here, immediately launched grassroots protests against the announcements. Both groups have citicized the proposal since it was first announced. -

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ILF: What 4th Amendment? Here Comes the Clipper Encryption Plan
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front Reproduced without permission from Communications Week WHAT 4TH AMENDMENT? HERE COMES THE CLIPPER ENCRYPTION PLAN YOU'RE A CRIMINAL. That person sitting next to you is a criminal, too. All of the people you work with are criminals. How do I know this? I get it straight from the federal government. In fact, the federal government is so certain you're a criminal that the executive branch has just announced a new way to pry into your affairs, steal your correspondence, read your electronic mail, and listen in on your most private conversations. Not only that, but the Clinton administration wants you to pay for the privilege of having the government keep tabs on you. The administration claims that it's doing all of this as a way to fight crime, and since you're the one its targeting, apparently the Clinton administration has decided you're a criminal. By now, of course, you probably know what I'm writing about, but in case you've been in a cave for a couple of weeks, here's a summary. Earlier this month, the administration announced that the government was going ahead with its plans to start using the infamous Clipper chip -- that's the one that encrypts information, but includes a government-sponsored backdoor -- for the Justice and Defense departments. You're going to pay about $2,000 for each of the initial 50,000 or so Clipper-encrypted phones and similar terminal devices the government buys. Once the government starts using Clipper equipment, the plan is for these agencies to require anyone dealing with them to use it also. Meanwhile, you must provide a way for the government to listen in to your telephone system. You get to pay for the new or modified equipment. Finally, sources tell us, the adminis- tration plans to outlaw any form of encryption other than that approved by the government. You get to pay for any changes these new systems require, too. No doubt you're thinking that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is supposed to prevent your papers and effects, among other things, from un- reasonable search and seizure. Is it reasonable to be required to hand over materials in a form the government wishes so that it can search you conveniently? It's not unlike being required to carry on your phone conversations in English for the convenience of government listeners who may not understand, say, pig latin. I suppose we shouldn't be surprised. In his debate on the ratifiation of the Constitution, Patrick Henry predicted that the gov- ernment'may, unless the general government be restrained by a Bill of Rights ". . . go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ran sack and measure everything you eat, drink and wear. They ought to be restrained." Of course, Henry didn't know computers would exist, but he knew of their analogue at the time-a person's papers and effects and that's why he fought successfully for an amendment to restrain the government. Now it appears that the government would slip its restraints. Apparently, in this new world of technology and digital communications, prying into one's affairs has become difficult. It's inconvenient to search an office, after all. It requires work. Instead, the government wants to read your electronic papers and effects, and it wants you to pay for it. The Bill of Rights? I guess that's become inconvenient, too. ------------- Wayne Rash Jr. is a Washington-based networking systems integrator. He can be reached on MCI Mail as WRASH on CompuServe at 72205,221 and on the Internet at rash(a)access.digex.com. The opinions expressed are his own.

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ILF: E-Mail Destination - Black Hole, White House
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front Reproduced without permission from Communications Week Editor's View E-MAIL DESTINATION: BLACK HOLE, WHITE HOUSE Is the Clinton adminisration really an ally of the communications and networking community, or are the politicians only jerking our strings? The answer to this imortant question seems to vary day to day. A few weeks ago I received four elecronic-mail communiques from the White House Office of Media Affairs. This caught my attention for several reasons. First, the administration is not in the habit of communicat- ing with the trade press so I was impressed with this outreach. (Cool move, guys.) Next, the messages were targeted at key journalists using the preferred medium du jour: electronic mail. (Very cool!) Finally, all four messages were dispatched the same day. I was most interested in a message detailing the administration's efforts to communicate over electronic networks. The Clinton administration's Electronc Public Access Project has achieved some important milestones during its first year. According to the project's press release: lt has received over 100,000 E-mail messages to the president and the vice president since it started on June 1, 1993; It established Internet addresses and accepts E-mail from the public; It has electronically processed over 220,000 requests for information since September 1, 1993; 1,600 public documents were published electronically last year; It established forums on America Online, CompuServe, GEnie and MCI Mail. The project plans this year to publish the national budget and other public documents on CD-ROM. It also plans to refine existing electronic com munications techniques via the Internet. I applaud the administration for these innovations. But I also have some reservations. For one, it's looks great on the surface that the administration has set up so many channels for communication. Yet this is the key question: Is anyone really listening? E-mail questions do not get electronic replies from administration officials. Questioners (if they are lucky) get back a letter -- via the U.S. Postal Service. This sounds more like a black hoel than a viable communications process. The president did respond at least once via E-mail -- to a group of fifth-graders in Oxford, Ohio, last spring. At best the opinions of communications and networking experts seem to be ignored; at worst they have been rejected by the president. An example is the president's recent adoption of the socalled "Clipper Chip." This encoding/decoding scheme was devloped by the National Security Agency to assist government agencies to evesdrop on digital communications. Virtually every major computer and communications company, opinion maker, and civil rights group opposes the use of this technology. apparently, however, the president doesn't care what we think. This action has jilted our enthusiasm for the administration's avowed embrace of communications technology. It's beginning to look more like a charade to keep techies playing with their toys instead of a mature partnership in molding our technological future. Send reactions to 542-9851(a)mcimail.com on MCI Mail or the Internet, or by fax, 516-562-5055

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