December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: identity, privacy, & anonymity in cyberspace
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A few more comments for tmp (hit delete if you don't want to know): " isn't what we *really* want a more basic definition of what is allowed and what is not? besides, under the cypherpunk vision, operators would never censor a user for postings-- but is it the case that all cypherpunks can say they have never tried to censor anyone by notes to sysadmins,........?" . Isn't it true that what we really want is a way to defend ourselves or find relief from a disruptive or discomfitting effect? If the capacity to do this (defending) is built into a system, and everyone involved is aware of how it can be applied, then it should be expected that it *will* be used; no one who has a means for relief can be expected to restrain themselves from employing it when they feel there is sufficient cause. At some point it becomes a matter of self-preservation. "the cypherpunk vision seems to split the world into two groups: those people i trust (my friends) and everyone else (whom i completely distrust withintense paranoia). this is a very xenophobic and chauvinistic philosophy at heart." . However, there is no mandate to subscribe to any particular attitude on the net, especially among a group of strangers who are not constrained to remain in contact. " it seems to me to be the case that either `i know who you are' or i don't. what does it mean for me to `know who you are'?" . And why, one might ask oneself, should I care? "the important goal is `defining what privacy really means' and cypherpunks seem to take the position, `it means that nobody knows anything about me'. our society simply cannot function under this constraint." . But society is barely functioning anyway, under all of the present constraints. It would function better if more of these were removed, and everyone's "true self" were allowed to manifest itself; this would also present greater opportunities to deal with underlying problems which otherwise cannot be resolved and only lead to unfriendliness & suspicion. "if i wish to `interconnect', identity is necessary to minimize risk to the people i `interconnect' with." . This is true, but it is also true that anyone who agrees to interconnect must realize that they are taking a risk, and that they cannot default on the responsibility they have assumed by participating. Blanc

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? EFF Hoax/PRZ Defense (Mech)
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 11 Apr 1994 12:23:03 -0400 From: tim werner <werner(a)mc.ab.com> >On Mon, 11 Apr 1994, tim werner wrote: >I guess what I was thinking about was a thread in comp.org.eff.talk about >some bogus eff press release that happened some time ago. My concern is >that I was taken in by this. >Does anyone know if there was an appeal for contributions to a legal >defense fund in that bogus press release? I didn't follow the thread that >closely, especially after it seemed like it turned into a flame war. I can unequivocably assure you nothing in the *Porn Press Release Hoax* that I read mentioned anything about the Phil Zimmerman Defense Fund. If McCandlish manages to glean import from the subject of this message to the degree he reads it, I invite his comment as well. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Reviews of APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY
by schneier＠chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

................................................................. One-Stop Cypher Shop Once and for all, there's a book that collects the history and truth about data encryption and presents it in a no-bullshit, easy- to-understand English. It's the book that the National Security Agency wanted never to be published. Author Bruce Schneier's premise is a simple one: Good encryption should be available to all. Just as people have the right to hide their letters in whatever kind of vault they wish, he reasons, so too should they have the right to protect their digital information with the most impenetrable cryptography. The federal government certainly isn't going to provide citizens with strong encryption tools (the Clipper chip fracas proves that), so Schneier felt a duty to provide a single sourcebook of useful algorithms for people who wish to keep their private business private. The first hundred pages Applied Cryptography contain the best introduction to cryptography I've ever seen. Part two teaches the techniques and tricks necessary to tell a good crypto-system from a bad one. Part three is the down-and-dirty description of each algorithm. And part covers political issues. Roughly a hundred pages of the book is devoted to source code for the most important crypto systems. Anybody seriously interested in cryptography, though, should get the two-disk set for $30 and save all that typing. Because we have a First Amendment in this country, Schneier's book can be printed and exported, despite how the National Security Agency might feel. But, incredibly, since the First Amendment doesn't cover books on floppy disks, it's a federal crime for Schneier to mail the source code on his floppies outside the US. Go figure. --Simson L. Garfinkel, Wired v 2 n 4 (Apr 94). ................................................................. Applied Cryptography Here at OpenVision's security branch (formerly Greer-Zolot Assoc.), we recently got a copy of Bruce Schneier's new book, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms and Source Code in C. We immediately ordered two more copies, because our security jocks (me included) didn't want to share it. It is encyclopedic, quite readable, and well-informed, and it more or less picks up where Dorothy Denning's classic Cryptography and Data Security (Addison- Wesley, '82) takes off a dozen years ago. I've often wished lately that such a reference as Schneier's existed. Schneier covers those topics in data security that touch most closely on the encryption algorithms themselves. Thus, the book doesn't discuss authorization, audit, firewalls, or the recent formal logics for proving protocols correct. As far as I can tell, it does cover everything about authentication and key-distribution- -everything. Of the recent flurry of books and articles on data security that I've seen, including some by my old colleagues from Project Athena, and including a couple of others that are still in press, this one has the clearest and most accurate treatment of kerberos. The book is structured like a reference, but written like an undergraduate text. Thus, you can enter anywhere and make sense of what you find, even if you don't already know the material well. It does not include exercises or end-of-chapter summaries, but does include a bibliography of 908 references. This makes it a good place to go, before you dive into the literature on a topic like zero-knowledge proofs and protocols. Schneier also includes licensing and sourcing addresses for encryption algorithms. The index, unfortunately, is a bit weak (though it is available from the author on the net: schneier(a)chinet.com) This book would be a bargain at twice the price. --Donald T. Davis, ;login: v 19 n 2 (Mar/Apr 94). ................................................................. Applied Cryptography Winner: 1993 Software Development Productivity Award Cryptography may not be of interest to everyone, but this book is the definitive text on the subject. From one-way hash functions to a slew of public-key encryption algorithms, Schneier combines clear descriptions with pseudocode and fully working examples in C. --Software Development v 2 n 5 (May 94). ................................................................. Levels of Secrecy The opening sentence in the preface of Applied Cryptography says it all--I have to quote it: "There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files. This book is about the latter." This is a book you can use for more than one purpose. You can read it as an introduction to the mathematics of cryptography, as a resource of course code for encryption algorithms or as a guide to how traffic on the information superhighway might remain secure even as the highway (supposedly) becomes more accessible. Cryptography isn't restricted to studying the means by which a digital document is securely encoded for purposes of transmission. It can cover activities as wellþactivities once carried out via the transfer of paperwork, but now carried out by transactions across a network. Take digital signatures, for example. Bank A sends a transaction to Bank B. The transaction is encoded, of course. But how can the clerk at bank B be sure that the transaction was authorized by the proper officer at bank A prior to being encoded and transmitted? This is one of the topics of perhaps my favorite section of the book: cryptographic protocols. It begins with the fundamentals (e.g., authentication and public key cryptography), builds through intermediate protocols (e.g., digital signatures and subliminal channels), and moves to more advanced protocols (e.g., blind signatures). The best material, however, appears in the concluding topic: esoteric protocols. Here, you'll find step-by-step procedures for such operations as secure elections and digital cash. Some of the protocols read like descriptions of Rube Goldberg machines. I followed in fascination the step-by-step process of Alice (a hypothetical character) could use to accomplish the audit- trail-free transfer of digital cash. Alice could send a campaign contribution to her favorite senator, and no one could trace where the money had come from. It gets worse: Alice shows up pages later using digital cash to commit a perfect kidnapping. It also gets better. In a later chapter, we're given a brief glimpse of--no kidding--"quantum cryptography." All it takes it some polarized light and a fiber-optic link; the message is encoded in the polarization angle of the light. What you get is an untappable link--since tapping would require measuring a quantum variable, which affects the outcome of any subsequent measurements. Sender and receiver can compare partial messages and verify the presence or absence of an eavesdropper. Finally, if you want code, you've got it. Not only are code fragments smattered throughout, the rear of the book contains listing after well-documented listing (all in C) of cipher routines, secure hash functions, and so forth. If you want to avoid typist's cramp, you can send $30 to the author and get the disk set that includes all the source code from the book, plus updates and new algorithms. Once more, don't let the presence of so much source code frighten you from the book. The descriptions of the exchange protocolsþintricate though they may beþmake good reading for anyone interested in cryptography. --Rick Grehan Byte v 19 n 6 (Jun 94). ................................................................. Applied Cryptography was also reviewed in the May 1994 issue of Dr. Dobbs Journal. It is a three-page review, so I won't reprint it all. However, here are some choice excerpts: "It is the definitive work on cryptography for computer programmers.... Although Applied Cryptography describes itself as a reference book, it also serves as a wall-to-wall tutorial on cryptography.... Applied Cryptography represents a monumental body of knowledge, particularly to the programmer. I do not know of another work that encapsulates as much information about cryptography and then supplies the computer code to implement the algorithms that it describes. Even a programmer who is only mildly interested in cryptography will find this book fascinating.... No matter how you use the book, though, Applied Cryptography is an interesting and comprehensive explanation of an enigmatic subject, and well worth the time you will spend with it." >From the Mar/Apr 1994 issue of The Cryptogram (the journal of the American Cryptogram Association): "A comprehensive review of the latest developments in practical cryptographic techniques.... It is an encyclopedic work with more than 900 references...." And from the National Computer Security Association News, Nov/Dec 93: "[A] complete guide to using cryptography to maintain data security...." And finally, from Computer Literacy Bookshops' New Book Bulletin, Spring 1994: "Unquestionably the most modern, popular and up-to-date cryptographic reference.... Highly recommended." My publisher expects to sell out of the second printing sometime in June. Bruce

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thorazine dose
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

um... It may be time for us to check our thorazine dosage...

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Classic Math gone wrong...Re: (n!+1)^(1/2)
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >For any number n, if the square root of (n!)+1 is an integer, it is also > >prime. (This is interesting, but rather useless in practice) > >For any number a, 1<a<=n, n! mod a == 0; therefore, n!+1 mod a == 1. n!+1 >is prime. Prime numbers don't have integral square roots. You're getting things missed up with the classic proof that there is no largest prime number. This doesn't hold in general. Try a=5. 5!=5*4*3*2*1=120. 120+1=121. 121=11*11. The classic proof goes: Is there a largest prime number? If there is then collect all primes, p1...pn and multiply them together p=p1*p2*...*pn. p+1 is not divisible by p1...pn. Therefore p+1 is a prime. Therefore there is no largest prime number. > > >Scott Collins | "That's not fair!" -- Sarah > | "You say that so often. I wonder what your basis > 408.862.0540 | for comparison is." -- Goblin King >................|.................................................... >BUSINESS. fax:974.6094 R254(IL5-2N) collins(a)newton.apple.com >Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2D Cupertino, CA 95014 >..................................................................... >PERSONAL. 408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Books on cryptography
by forsythe＠fiji.oc.nps.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a quick question...and painless at that. I have available to me an almost complete set of books on Cryptography from the Aegean Park Press. The question is, are these books worth reading (there are a whole bunch of them) ? If only particular ones are noteworthy, which ones are they? I guess I should have said a couple of questions... Carl -- These are my views and not those of the United States Government, The Department of Defense, The Department of the Navy or the Naval Postgraduate School. -- ******************************************************************** ** Carl R. Forsythe ** Naval Postgraduate School ** ** forsythe(a)oc.nps.navy.mil ** Oceanography Department ** ** ** Monterey, California ** ********************************************************************

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Re: MacPGP and AOL
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: mpj(a)netcom.com (Michael Paul Johnson) >Date: Mon, 11 Apr 1994 08:07:48 -0700 (PDT) >> On Mon, 11 Apr 1994, tim werner wrote: >> > Late last year, in response to a "bulletin" from eff, I sent money to some >> > lawyer (in Colorado, I think) for the Phil Zimmerman defense fund. Was >> > I defrauded? How embarrassing. > >Not to worry, if the check was made to Philip Dubois and marked as going >to Philip Zimmermann's legal defense fund, it will be used as >advertised. I have personally met both of these people, and trust them >to do what they promised. Phil Zimmermann is still a free man (last I >checked), but being the target of a grand jury investigation has already >cost Phil more than sleep and peace of mind. He has had his lawyer >interceding on his behalf as much as possible to prevent an actual >indictment, and this does cost money. Thanks! I remember now, it was Philip Dubois. I feel much better. :-) tw

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Re: (n!+1)^(1/2)
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>For any number n, if the square root of (n!)+1 is an integer, it is also >prime. (This is interesting, but rather useless in practice) For any number a, 1<a<=n, n! mod a == 0; therefore, n!+1 mod a == 1. n!+1 is prime. Prime numbers don't have integral square roots. Scott Collins | "That's not fair!" -- Sarah | "You say that so often. I wonder what your basis 408.862.0540 | for comparison is." -- Goblin King ................|.................................................... BUSINESS. fax:974.6094 R254(IL5-2N) collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2D Cupertino, CA 95014 ..................................................................... PERSONAL. 408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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new PGP tool - your opinion on ITAR regs?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone just sent me this, encrypted, via anon remailer yet asking for it to be distributed. Go figure. Anyway, the author thinks it may be ITAR controlled, but from the looks of it it's not crypto at all but simply an incidental utility that contains no crypto code. I'll leave it up to y'all to figure that out though. Here's the doc, and I'll pass on the binary to any US or Canada folks that want it to examine it. Don't just ask for it because you want it, wait till it shows up for ftp somewhere, eh. I have to manually send it to you, and am severely limited time-wise. Thx. _______ begin _________ This is a hack to the pgp source files random.h and random.c to support a hardware random number generator. Please distribute these file as widely as possible in the U.S. But be aware of the following problem. The U.S. governmemt is trying to say that the export of files relating to cryptography is illegal. In spite of the first ammentment to the U.S. constitution and the inalienable rights of all peoples. They might say that ranodm.h and random.c are subject to export controls in spite of the fact that they have non-croptographic applications. So be aware that if you export these file from the U.S. the govnmnt may try to prosecute, persecute or otherwise screw you! I am sure that you are aware of this problem. As a result I can not recommend that you export this file out of the U.S. The hacked files are under the GNU public licence same as the original unhacked files. This allows a program using random.h random.c to use a hardware random number generator. Thus one need not type in all those stupid keyboard timing strokes. The source files from 2.3a have been hacked. The hack has been "ifdef"ed so that the hacked files compile the same as the unhacked files unless certain "DEFINE"s have been defined. I have tested this hack under MSDOS and OS/2. I do not know about other machines compilers. RANDDRIVER This hack supports the following combinations: A hardware RNG supported by a OS drive. It is assumed that the driver can be opened as a character oriented device. Each byte read is a random byte. (Tested under OS/2) RANDHARDPORT This hack attempts to directly read random bytes directly from a bus hardware RNG. It is assumed that for each inb instruction that you do on the port you get one random byte. If necessary a spin wait can be done that enough time has passed to insure random indpandance. (RANDHARDWAIT) This has been tested under the MS-DOS program loader. RANDHARDPORT and TESTCFG same as above except that OS/2's IO driver TESTCFG$ is used to get random bytes from the port. (Tested under OS/2) HARDRANDOM is defined if you have a hardware RNG. RANDDRIVER is defined to be the filespec of the random number generator if you have a software driver. RANDHARDPORT is defined to be the port number of the random number generator if random.c is to directly access the random number generator. RANDHARDWAIT is the number of timer0 clicks that must be waited for to assure that the next random byte will be independant from the last. TESTCFG is defined is you want to use OS/2's TESTCFG driver to read a bus RNG with the port address spedified by RANDHARDPORT. UUENCODE ZIP file follows which contains the source! table !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>? @ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_ begin 666 0.zip [...] _________ end ___________ -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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No Subject
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reprinted from the Mercury News, 4/10/94 GROUP AIMS TO INTRODUCE BUSINESS TO THE INTERNET By DAVID BANK Mercury News Staff Writer FOR entrepreneurs who are seeking to create an electronic marketplace for Silicon Valley businesses to buy, sell and pursue profits, the creators of CommerceNet have a distinctly un-capitalist marketing plan for their key technology. They're giving it away. When CommerceNet, the first large-scale trial of electronic commerce over the Internet, goes on-line Tuesday, computer users finally will have a secure way to make payments, send confidential documents and verify the identity of the person or company at the other end of the e-mail message. That security system is the key to unlocking the commercial potential of the Internet, the network of computer networks that connects more than 20 million users, said Jay Tenenbaum, chairman of Enterprise Integration Technologies in Palo Alto, which is leading the CommerceNet effort. CommerceNet is working to overcome the other obstacles that have prevented the Internet from becoming an accessible, full-service network for business and the general public. These include the lack of an easy-to-use interface, high prices for the high-speed telephone lines needed, and widely varying standards and systems that make true collaboration difficult. As solutions to those problems are found, Tenenbaum predicts, CommerceNet will revolutionize the way business is done. CommerceNet's promotional literature blithely lists as one long-term impact the disintegration of vertical companies. ''This is monopoly busting,'' Tenenbaum said. ''We think there will be an immediate, demonstrable edge in competitiveness for the companies that are participating.'' In Tenenbaum's vision, large manufacturers will be able to quickly put their orders out to bid, driving down costs. Small businesses that develop a needed new service will be able to compete with industry powerhouses, because the cost of distributing their products electronically will be, essentially, zero. Participating companies, initially, include Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Hewlett-Packard Co., Digital Equipment Corp. and National Semiconductor Corp. One new business already has been created on CommerceNet: the Internet Shopping Network, a computer buying club based in Menlo Park that will be launched at the same time CommerceNet is introduced at Santa Clara's Techmart. ''We couldn't do it without CommerceNet,'' said Randy Adams, president of the Internet Shopping Network, who estimated the cost for each sales transaction over CommerceNet at 20 cents, compared to $5 for an 800-number telephone order. ''Our costs are the lowest anywhere because of the way we leverage the Internet.'' Many companies already use private electronic networks to communicate with their suppliers or collaborate with strategic partners. But such networks are expensive, exclusive and require prior arrangements to ensure smooth interconnections. For example, Ford Motor Co. requires its suppliers to use a particular computer-aided design program for the transfer of specifications and blueprints. If the supplier also wants to sell to General Motors Corp., it may need a different system. CommerceNet's goal is to bring the capabilities of the private networks into a public network, so that any business or individual can participate in the competitive marketplace spontaneously, without prior arrangements. Unlike commercial on-line services such as America Online or Prodigy, CommerceNet is an open marketplace. Anybody with a computer ''server'' can create an electronic storefront, or ''home page,'' which will be included in CommerceNet's directory. At first the home page will be little more than an electronic brochure of a company's products or services. Then, catalogs will be added. With the ability to send and receive electronic payments, orders can be placed and filled. Soon, bids will be requested and received electronically. Services will develop to search for and compare prices in various catalogs. The need for other services, such as banking, brokerages and specialized directories will create opportunities for new businesses. But to create these opportunities, CommerceNet decided it had to seed the marketplace. Some of the work already had been done by others. For example, CommerceNet will rely on free software known as Mosaic, which gives Internet users a relatively simple ''point-and-click'' way to navigate among thousands of information providers. With its ''hypertext'' functions, Mosaic allows browsers to click on key words to receive more information. To make Mosaic secure, CommerceNet struck a deal with RSA Data Security Inc. in Redwood City for the use of RSA's ''public key'' encryption technology. In simple terms, the technology enables a sender to encode a message in a way that allows only the intended recipient to decode it. At the same time, the recipient of a message is able to verify the identity of the sender. In addition to payment, the security system enables companies to enter into legal contracts with ''digital signatures,'' to control who sees proprietary trade documents, and to use electronic letters of credit for financing purchases. ''Everybody's worried about whether the Internet can be made as secure as the phone system,'' said Allen Schiffman, the principal architect of CommerceNet. ''Well, with this, we can do much better than the telephone system.'' CommerceNet is able to give away the security system in part because it has already been paid by the government, in the form of a three-year, $6 million matching grant from the Technology Reinvestment Program, which supports projects that aid in the transition from a defense-based to a civilian economy. CommerceNet will share its lessons and technologies with other communities that are planning similar efforts, including Boston, Austin, Texas, and Champaign-Urbana, Ill. The CommerceNet team also includes BARRNet, a regional Internet provider, and Stanford's Center for Information Technology. The project is sponsored by the non-profit Smart Valley Inc., which is pushing high-speed communications networks as the way to revitalize the local economy. The state of California put in $500,000, and companies that want to participate in the governance of CommerceNet are expected to contribute $25,000 eachin cash or services. But companies that want to enter the CommerceNet marketplace need not pay anything beyond the cost of their own hardware. CommerceNet will provide starter software and technical assistance for free to those who want to engage in electronic commerce. IF YOU'RE INTERESTED For information about CommerceNet, call (415) 617-8790, or send e-mail to info(a)commerce.net

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Re: (n!+1)^(1/2) Oops! I'm wrong.
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>For any number a, 1<a<=n, n! mod a == 0; therefore, n!+1 mod a == 1. n!+1 >is prime. Prime numbers don't have integral square roots. >For example : > >(4!+1)^(1/2)=5 >(5!+1)^(1/2)=11 >(7!+1)^(1/2)=71 I am completely wrong. I replied too hastily. Please accept my apologies. In fact, n!+1 is relatively prime to any a, 1<a<=n, however plainly it is much larger than n itself and when n>3, (n!+1)>(n^2) and may have factors (including an integral square root) larger than n. Oops :-) Scott Collins | "That's not fair!" -- Sarah | "You say that so often. I wonder what your basis 408.862.0540 | for comparison is." -- Goblin King ................|.................................................... BUSINESS. fax:974.6094 R254(IL5-2N) collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2D Cupertino, CA 95014 ..................................................................... PERSONAL. 408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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RE: Code review is requested
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> 3) There may be other RNG's in existence which are accessed in a >> different way, or have different IO drivers. If you have knowledge of >> such RNG's please post the info to the cypherpunks mailing list. > >In Cryptosystems Journal, published by Tony S Patti, Volume 2 Number 2 >is a description, circuit board layouts, parts list, etc. for Ranger >hardware RNG. It produced 6,750 bits per second into the parallel port of a >standard PC. The author says that you can build a Ranger for less than $40 >worth of parts. > >Cryptosystyems Journal >P.O. Box 188 >Newtown PA 18940-0188 > >I have not seen any reviews of this device, but it has been arround for a >while, and may have been covered before I got interested in the field. > Could not the operating systems' IO driver be used for the interface to the parallel port be used as the interface to the RNG? The hack has support for a device which can be accessed thru an IO driver that returns one random byte for each byte read. (RANDDRIVER). Would this be adequate for such a device, or would special code be required? Is the IO driver for the parallel port that comes with MS-DOS OK for this purpose? Has anyone out there built such a device? Yours in anonymity XXX

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New anon mailer idea?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** This message is not from the person in the headers above. *** Reply to this message as normal, but be sure to include the *** following three lines in the mail when you do: *** Remailer-Reply-To: fdwgfjghfsdvkglhfslkjghfdkjhgkjfhgkfhg *** ljdfhkjhgfkjhfgkvjhfklvgkfjhvbgjkfhgjkhfgfkjhgjkfhgjf *** jkfdhkjfhgk;hfdgklhfdlgfldjkglkjfhg;hfgkjhfhgfghfkdhg *** Your reply mail will be anonymised. :From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> :> How about generating a secure hash and using that as an index :> into a table? If there's an address already there, use that - :> otherwise, generate one. :> :> Generate the hash from the incoming address, of course. That way, :> you don't need to keep track of anon-id-to-real-id mappings, yet :> guarantee that each user has one and only one anon address. Of :> course, folks coming in from different hosts will have different :> anon ID's. :> :> Or have I missed some blindingly obvious technical point thaqt :> would make this impossible? :I don't see how this would prevent me from having to keep track of :anon-id-to-real-id mappings. It could work for sending mail, but I'd :still have to have some way of keeping track of the real ids for the :replies. Excuse me butting in to a discussion I haven't really been following (I don't have a lot of interest in remailers); I'm wondering if everyone is missing some terribly obvious point here. Without knowing too much about how the current anon/remail stuff works, tell me what you think of this way of doing things (apologies if it's what someone already does or has been discussed recently). I want to mail fred@somesite anonymously. I know fred@somesite's public key. I encrypt my message for fred, then send it to a remailer address with instructions to pass it on to fred. For a little eavesdropping security, I include an anonymous pgp key of mine in the mail to fred so that he can reply to me without the remailer operators reading his mail. You can choose your favourite syntax for how I ask the remailer to send this mail to fred - I don't care what it is. The remailer then encrypts *my reply mail address* with the remailers own key, and inserts this as a header in the mail which only it can read. It attaches a little message to this header saying 'when you reply to this message, be sure to include this opaque header I'm giving you here...' The recipient gets the mail, decodes it, reads it, and replies. (Maybe encrypted with an anonymous public key I included in the mail, maybe in cleartext - doesn't matter for the scheme) When he replies, he included the small encrypted block that the remailer gave him at the top of his message, as he was asked to do by the remailer. The reply goes to the anonymous remailer. The anonymous remailer decrypts the header block that it searches the mail for, and extracts my email address from it again. The remailer then passes the mail back to me - this time including an encrypted block with the fred@somesite's address in it. (Or some other address if fred replied from another account; or perhaps I mailed a mail to news gateway - well, my encrypted address will still work even if a dozen people reply to the news article by mailing via the remailer, and now I *don't* know who the encrypted sender is) In this way, once a conversation has been established, replies can keep going backwards and forwards without much fancy protocol at all - all you ever do is remember not to delete the encrypted block that the remailer keeps inserting at the top of your mail. And with this scheme, the remailer does not need to remember the addresses of either the initial poster or the recipient, and hence can't divulge them if the machine is hacked. So it gives you a combination of the penet-style mailer with return address, and the cypherpunk-style mailer of throw-away anonymity -- as long as you trust the remailer operator not to cheat and log stuff anyway. Of course, you then extend the scheme by the same mechanisms that the cpunk remailers already use - chaining from one remailer to the next... if done properly, the return addresses should chain too, transparently, and the whole scheme will remain easy to use. Clearly this scheme is succeptible to mass logging of comms links followed by a bust to grab the remailer's secret key, but that's about par for the current remailers anyway. This scheme is no worse, and possibly quite a bit better. So, have I just stated the obvious or is this a new idea to anyone? Regards G PS Note this scheme doesn't need Matthew's hack for "+" in usernames, which not everyone wanting to run a remailer in say a private account on netcom etc would be able to install... PPS I thought for fun I'd put a header of the kind I'm talking about on this mail. Anyone replying should note it really *will* go to me, and you *won't* be anonymized ;-)

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Re: your mail
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Chris Knight <cknight(a)crl.com> So much for an Ivy-League education... Please send mailing list requests to owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Actually I think that should be majordomo(a)toad.com, and if it isn't, then cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com owner-* addresses are intended for mail bounces and stuff like that. G

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Re: A confused quotation ?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: Is this not strange ? :Date: Sun, 10 Apr 1994 20:26:23 -0400 :From: E-D-U-P-A-G-E <info(a)ivory.educom.edu> : ... : :OPEN SECRET : Instead of using mathematical codes to scramble and unscramble :messages, Georgia Tech physicists are devising a way of sending a message :with electronic noise generated by a flickering laser. By connecting :identical lasers over fiber optics, the same random pattern of noise is :generated at both the sending and receiving end, and the receiving simply :subtracts the noise to uncover the message. (Atlanta Journal-Constitution :4/7/94 E2) It is as you say a confused quotation. My guess is it's that synchronised chaos crap again, badly reported. G

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RE: Shot 'Round the World
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Greg Broiles "We don't insist on all-or-nothing accuracy in other forms of warfare, why expect it here?" Because you want to succeed? "Psychological warfare is about manipulation and FUD (fear, uncertainty, doubt)." All's fair in love and war. What makes it psychological is the faculty & type of effect aimed for, and FUD isn't the only thing possible, or desireable. "... we don't need to demonstrate good behavior to convince it/them that we deserve or can be trusted......" ". . . to bolster their flagging confidence, they need a good kick in the teeth." "There is no rational argument that can force the non-trusting to trust." ". . . the point may be to create a state of irrationality, not a particular rational conclusion." . What you would be aiming for here, apparently, is neither their psychology nor their intellect. But actually if you are not intending to communicate at all, then all of things which I mentioned are irrelevant. I would leave you to your own devices. "Perhaps this discourse about "images" isn't useful, and it's time to talk about capabilities." . What image do you get of the engagement of your capabilities under normal circumstances vs under a totalitarian regime? What sort of picture is created in your mind by the statements about human nature, "endowed ...with inalienable rights", among which are included "Life, liberty, Pursuit of Happiness", and what do you suppose George thought about that? Some questions I would ask in regard to this warfare business: What sort of a win would you be aiming for, which served the purposes of rational discussion poorly? For how long would you be expecting to live in the company of those whom you drove to irrationality? And how would you go about the business of returning everything back to a viable, liveable state, supposing you achieved victory? Blanc

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Tessera
by XXCLARK＠indst.indstate.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check the April 4, 1994 issue of Electronic Design magazine, New Products section, p. 148. Product is the Tessera card, by National Semiconductor. A "token".

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Re: number theory
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Karn [density of Carmichael numbers?] I have a vague recollection of the number of Carmichael numbers less than N being N^(2/7). Thus, the number of 1000-bit Carmichael numbers is (2^1001)^(2/7) - (2^1000)^(2/7) = 2^286 - 2^(2000/7) = 2^285*(2-2^(5/7)) =~ 2.2 x 10^86 I make no claims that this information is correct. -Ray -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- rjc(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | politics is the implementation of faith. --

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Wandering Seniors
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw something scary on our "public access" cable channel, just a one-screen announcement, and please forgive my memory: WANDERING SENIORS PROGRAM Help find Alzheimers patients who have gotten lost. New program gives people identification for life. [I didn't catch the program's phone number.] Seems like it just keeps oozing down those slippery slopes, don't it? -fnerd quote me - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - `We want information.' `You won't get it!' `By hook or by crook, we will.' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Prime Numbers
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes: > It was first claimed that if (2^n-2)/n was an integer, then n was > prime. That's false. I thought he said "if p prime, then p|(2^p-2)" which is why I stated the converse isn't true. > then: > > This is fermat's little theorem. What you have written basically > >says 2^N - 2 = 0 (mod N) or 2^(N-1) = 1 (mod N). Note, the converse > >doesn't apply. If (2^N-2)/N is an integer, N isn't neccessarily > >prime. For example, take N=561=(3*11*37) > > 561 is the first Carmichael number. If you replace 2 by any other > number relatively prime to 561, then the congruence still holds. (The > second Carmichael number is 1729, if I remember right.) It was Which is why I chose it. Carmichael numbers are pseudoprime in any valid base so when coming up with a counterexample to the converse of fermat's little theorem, just memorize a few Carmichael numbers. The key property of them is if n is a Carmichael number and n=p*q*r, then (p-1), (q-1), and (r-1) divide (n-1). I wonder if Carmichael numbers always have some small factors. If true, PGP's sieve test probably eliminates the very very rare case that you actually choose one. -Ray -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- rjc(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | politics is the implementation of faith. --

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Re: New anon mailer idea?
by gtoal＠gtoal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Following up my own post, because I'm rather pleased with it and have had some more ideas... :-) : I want to mail fred@somesite anonymously. I know fred@somesite's : public key. I encrypt my message for fred, then send it to a : remailer address with instructions to pass it on to fred. For a little : eavesdropping security, I include an anonymous pgp key of mine : in the mail to fred so that he can reply to me without the remailer : operators reading his mail. You can choose your favourite syntax : for how I ask the remailer to send this mail to fred - I don't care : what it is. : The remailer then encrypts *my reply mail address* with the remailers own : key, and inserts this as a header in the mail which only it can read. : It attaches a little message to this header saying 'when you reply to : this message, be sure to include this opaque header I'm giving : you here...' : The recipient gets the mail, decodes it, reads it, and replies. : (Maybe encrypted with an anonymous public key I included in the : mail, maybe in cleartext - doesn't matter for the scheme) When : he replies, he included the small encrypted block that the remailer : gave him at the top of his message, as he was asked to do by the : remailer. : The reply goes to the anonymous remailer. The anonymous remailer : decrypts the header block that it searches the mail for, and : extracts my email address from it again. The remailer then passes : the mail back to me - this time including an encrypted block with : the fred@somesite's address in it. (Or some other address if : fred replied from another account; or perhaps I mailed a mail : to news gateway - well, my encrypted address will still work : even if a dozen people reply to the news article by mailing : via the remailer, and now I *don't* know who the encrypted : sender is) : In this way, once a conversation has been established, replies : can keep going backwards and forwards without much fancy protocol : at all - all you ever do is remember not to delete the encrypted : block that the remailer keeps inserting at the top of your mail. I've thought of another thing that cypherpunks like that this scheme can do: return postage. Where the remailer encrypts the reply address and puts it in the body of the destination mail, so that the adressee can reply, I'd been assuming a public key system like pgp, just because that's what we're used to. But in fact the encryption is entirely private to the remailer and might as well be secret key like DES. So instead of having a single master key, let's use a key that's generated for each message. So, the remailer encrypts the return block with a secret DES key, and includes something like the MD5 hash of the DES key in cleartext so that it can find the correct DES key when the reply comes back. (Hmmm. doesn't have to be the md5 hash - could even be the filename that stores the key - yeah, that works better...) Anyway, we now have a way of doing postage. Let's say that the outgoing message was to a mail2news gateway, and the sender asked for a limit of 10 replies. Then as each reply comes in, the reply count stored in the file that holds the DES key is decremented to 0, and when it hits 0 the file is deleted. Unless the remailer operator made illicit backups, that return address can *never* be used again - it may be out there on the net in an encrypted version, but *no-one* can now decrypt it. More likely you'd use this feature to guarantee single-shot replies. Similarly, the same thing can be applied to timed-expiry keys - the file storing the DES key can be removed after a certain time has elapsed. If you post a message on some timely event, you arrange that only answers posted in the next 48 hours will be delivered - anything that arrives too late is bounced by the remailer. I can see *lots* of uses for this feature :-) One nice use of this is to foil traffic analysis - if you send off something to someone with a reply address and force an immediate reply, they don't have time to get stuff in place to watch all the feed sites and follow a message through the net if they later want to trace who you are by sending you lots of mail (a technique I realised would work against Julf's mailer) - as soon as one of the remailer-chain's keys has expired (and been deleted), that part of the routing is permanently broken. Couple this implementation of postage-limitation with the Magic-money stuff for payment and I think we have quite a nice extension of the cypherpunk mailing ethos. I wonder if it could be hacked in to the existing remailers? Anyone interested? G

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Cyber PsyOps (Re: Shot)
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Blanc Weber <blancw(a)microsoft.com> Date: Mon, 11 Apr 94 20:17:28 PDT >included "Life, liberty, Pursuit of Happiness", and what do you suppose >George thought about that? > >Some questions I would ask in regard to this warfare business: >What sort of a win would you be aiming for, which served the purposes >of rational discussion poorly? For how long would you be expecting to live in the company of those whom you drove to irrationality? And how >would you go about the business of returning everything back to a Psychological Warfare is the only way to compete with the NSA on this issue. This is how they are manipulating the Clinton Administration, and the population with propagandic undue infuluence. Power is only aquired by the fact that the population gives the NSA power via credibility. They are the NSA, ergo, they must know what they are talking about. The Clinton Administration has been similarly duped. Second question. Of the consensual normalities of society, Fredrich Perls said, "You can choose to participate in the collective psychosis, or dare to be yourself, and possibly be crucified." I'm in the business of raising the population's awareness, as is EFF. Perls also said, "Awareness of itself, is curative." Provisions for the survival of tribal anarchy- a pure democracy- were written into the Constitution by Thomas Jefferson, if one is to give weight to progressive theory. An aware, informed, and actively participating population is my aim, not "driven to irrationality" as Blanc state above. The internet, in its present state is a belevolent anarchy, with guidlines of courtesy extended to the new participants by the older experienced participants.Some of us are experienced and quite comfortable functioning in an anarchic environment. As the hordes come, we are already preparing the way for them. Kapor talked about the public outcry that would be percipitated by shutting down the internet. We've talked about strength in numbers. We can trust the innate herd instinct of humankind to self regulate and organize itself with in this new paradigm of confluence. Psychological Warfare is duofold. It harrases the enemy, and hopefully wins the hearts and minds of the population. I suggest Blanc not throw the baby out with the bath water. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Help: Can I get a current Cypherpunks gateway site list here?
by johns＠macadam.mpce.mq.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been sent a somewhat dated file, listing Cypherpunks remailer sites, and mail-to-news gateways; can I get sent a current list, please? (It is the gateway list that I'm particularly after.) In case this is an automated a/c: I did not get the list please send list Thanks, ################## internet: johns(a)macadam.mpce.mq.edu.au ###################

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Re: Cyber PsyOps
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn sez.. >What you seem to be looking for is change NOW. >THIS SECOND. If this is your time table, I hope you like bloodshed. Change is happening now. This is not something an individual can instigate, it just happens in predictible cycles. I'm just spitting in the ocean with my $0.02. I am committed to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of the United States of America. Maybe Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a fuck up. Reversing that decision is a plank of the Libertarian platform. The Constitution has provided amending provisions, and we can always rectify the errors of shortsightedness. Article XXI Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. I opperate under the ASSUMTION that anything I release publicly, (email post cards included), is available to the intelligence community. Here's a little personal Hx for you and cypherpunks. I find it rather Pynchonesque. Between a high school friend of mine, Peter Anthony Zellner, and I, we have 3 Social Security #'s. Two of them are consecutive and are mine. The US Navy spent a years worth of investigation, (NIS), to find out why Pete's SS# didn't work. He was given an "N" designation for Navy until they got it straightened out. My mother has testified under oath in a court of law she signed my elistment papers when I was 17. When I was 18, my draft classification was 1-H. On 18 February 1983, an Air Force Lt Col stopped by my place in Denver on his way to a conference at Keystone that became SDI. I refused a mission and was cashiered on the spot. End of story. I can offer circumstantial evidence and personal corraboration that the above is true. FOIA is useless. I always draw a blank- (which is indicative of an active file). In the Fall of 1984, at the bequest of Robert Bragg, Petty Officer 1st Class, NIS ran a check on me. The reason is because FTS clearances are "Q" clearances, and I gave Bragg the proper cue. Bragg informed me that NIS considered me questionble. There are a lot of very bright people doing some important work on this list that is far beyond my technical expertise. I don't have to write it, however, just learn how to use it. I offer mainly social philosophy and social activism.In consideration of this, I have no intentions of disscussing the above any further. One may believe it, or disbelieve it. I don't care. If one tends toward disbelief, I'm sure the above will be used in an attempt to discredit me. If my personality and activism is disruptive to cypherpunks, I can always shut up and just read the damn thing. I have no intention of becoming involved in a Detweilerian flame war. Especially with Black Unicorn. I'm trained to determine potential harm of a classified leak. I can tell by Unicorn's response that he is informed to an extent, yet has a limited paradigm of intelligence access by which he/she makes his/her judgements. Carry on cypherpunks. If rebuttal to my statements cloggs the group, I will do all I can to minimize it. I can always sit here and read the damn thing. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Cyber PsyOps
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Having read Black Unicorn, Thank you. Would you please critique my _Paradigms_of_Revolution? I am prone to action on instinct. I'm still thinking about your questions relative to function. For one thing, I suggest that everyone have a refferance with the Constitution with in arms reach of their terminals. Its despicalbly under read by law enforcement types, and may give us an edge up somewhere down the road. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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