December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(FWD) WHAT MOTIVATES FORWARDERS?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually, no, it's not really a forward of anything at all. It's just that this forwarding business is *really* getting out of hand. For Christ's sake guys, if *you* can read stuff on other groups, credit us with the intelligence of being able to find it too. If this keeps up we'll have the who 20Mb/day of usenet funnelling through cypherpunks. How about in future just saying "Hey, anyone who doesn't know about talk.politics.crypto, go have a look at it on usenet. By the way there's an interesting thread going on just now about blah blah blah."? G

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Devil's Advocate (again)
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I notice the argument against "why do you need crypto... are you doing something ILLEGAL" is that the argument that "why don't you want a camera in your house... are you doing something ILLEGAL". This is good, but where in the Constitution does it say that people can have crypto not regulated by the Government? Would this be under the First Amendment of free speech? Again, I am playing Devil's Advocate here. ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 8 lines: :: Response-Key: ideaclipper ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%IS^P;+]AB?X9TW6\8WR:"P&2%))6DK&_"'9H7Z#TP^%/-Q).;<[88Q ME30D:-V2"G!=KV&$CCA?;+(6+E.#?2%P`0:V-J'.#NA:J^2@,\;GUI)DG5,O %CR6`-HX` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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Re: Physical storage of key is the weakest link
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)netcom.com tells us: >Much more likely: > >* Diskettes left lying around. Secret keys on home computers. > >* Incompletely erased files. (Norton Utilities can recover erased >files; mil-grade multiple-pass erasure may be needed.) > > >A simple search warrant executed on your premises will usually crack >open all your crypto secrets. (Fixes to this are left as an exercise.) > >Where to store one's secret key is an issue that makes academic the >issue of whether one's key can be compelled. A diskette stored at >one's home, in one's briefcase, etc., can be gotten. A pendant or >dongle or whatever that stores the key can also be gotten. The >passphrase (8-12 characters, typically) is secure, but not the key. > >--Tim May If your passphrase is good (128+ bits of entropy), then your private key is as secure as the messages that you send. Although it need be broaken only once, I see no real danger of IDEA being compromised in the near future. Given a good passphrase, I would suggest that you want multiple coppies of your key to prevent loss or accidental destruction. My passphrase is > 30 characters. Fortunately Mac PGP remembers the key during any given session so typing is kept down a bit. -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Re: (Fwd) What motivates Cryp
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

J >It may seem that I am being particularly naive in being J >surprised by this but I am from the UK where libertarian views J >of this kind are not so widely held. Though they *were* largely invented there... I think it's just that most of us get out when we see state control here getting oppresive past our personal limits. (Which it just did, hello Criminal Justice Bill, goodbye Graham) G

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someone clue me in about USACM..
by sommerfeld＠orchard.medford.ma.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone explain to me the difference, if any, between the "USACM" and the panel of luminaries who put out the "Codes, Keys, and Conflicts" paper? The paper was downright bland in tone, while the one-page USACM position in the press release is clearly hostile towards the EES. Who is the USACM? How big is it, who can join, and who has? - Bill

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Re: ANI 800 number
by werner＠mc.ab.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: khijol!erc(a)apple.com (Ed Carp [Sysadmin]) >Date: Fri, 1 Jul 1994 08:55:30 -0400 (EDT) > >> shamrock(a)netcom.com (Lucky Green) wrote: >> >> No, but you can use AT&T's test number - 1073214049889664 > >Too bad it doesn't work from Canada :( Doesn't seem to work for me in Cleveland, either. Maybe you have to have AT&T long distance for it to work. tw

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Politics and crypto
by Michael Wilson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks: There seems to be a debate floating through here on how an individual's political beliefs may influence their usage of cryptography. When I was first formulating my personal beliefs regarding politics, it seemed that Western democratic nations had created an artificial dichotomy for themselves. The political Left had the belief that while you, an individual, should have the right to do what you want with your body (free choice, free speech, substance use, etc.), they wanted to control what you did with your money (social programs, playing field leveling, etc.). The political Right had the belief that you should have the right to do what you want with your money (free markets, minimal taxation, etc.), but not with your body (right to life, war on drugs, etc.). The 'lunatic fringe' opinion, that there was no dichotomy, and that you should be able to do what you want with your money/body because they are the same thing, was the Libertarian position. Personally, I feel that a perfect world should be Libertarian. In reality, I believe that political systems evolve, and that the supporting infrastructure of the region in question will dictate the most efficient form of government for it (I'm sorry, but regions in South and Central America do not have the supporting economy to actually afford the luxury of democracy). Politics are a tool for control, but as a system, they are subject to the same evolutionary pressures as organic systems. Just as lower life forms in simple ecological niches evolve into higher life forms in more complex niches, political systems evolve as well. There is a good reason why revolutionaries in very poor nations tend to espouse socialist or communist rhetoric--those are political systems that can raise the quality of life considerably and immediately, a necessity for partisan support. Only once there is a strong enough foundation in place can a Nation (not Empire) support the freedoms and inefficiencies of a democracy; when the time is right, it will happen on its own (witness the collapse of the Soviet Union--the well educated population in central, controlling regions decided they wanted a better lifestyle). Sadly, this is why many American attempts to foster democratic tendencies in satellite nations or in countries in turmoil have failed. It would be like trying to build a self-sustaining aircraft manufacturing plant in primitive Africa. In such a case, it is easy to understand how anomalous this is--there is no infrastructure to support the plant, and there is no point in having the planes that it would produce. Thus the lack of a political doctrine here--it would be inappropriate. Who can tell the proper order of things? Who can say that it wasn't a natural occurrence that the USSR brought the region from a backward agrarian economy into the industrial age and could go no farther? Who can say if the 'top of the food chain' is really a representative democracy? Not I. Note that this does not reflect the need, at all levels, for basic human rights (Maslow's hierarchy). Cypherpunks need to view political beliefs as orthogonal to what they doing. For propaganda purposes (read 'psychological warfare'), arguments do need to be structured along lines that the target audience can understand. When talking to the Western Left, push examples that stress the emotional human rights; arguments for the Right should be reasoned on an economic basis. Libertarians will understand either. Anarchists will appreciate the 'sand in the gearworks' appeal of strong crypto. As a side note, the Clinton Administration seems to be veering off into dangerous territory for citizens of America. They seem to want centralized control of both aspects, a person's body *and* money; programs such as healthcare, Clipper, national ID cards, national information infrastructures, and so forth are all direct yet subtle attacks on such basic freedoms. It creates both the motive *and* mechanism for tyrrany. Michael Wilson Managing Director, The Nemesis Group An old hand at political engineering...

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Re: (FWD) WHAT MOTIVATES FORWARDERS?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, I for one like to see forwarded stuff. I have no desire to chase down likely references. Maybe I'm lazy for letting others filter stuff for me, or maybe you're lazy for not hitting "D". Quien sabe? It's you :-) Really, it's a question of degree and obscurity. A forward a day isn't too bad, a dozen a day is, especially if they're 600 lines of EFF press release which we see *everywhere*. However if the item was found in some out of the way place (like say a BITNET mailing list for librarians) then forwarding would be reasonable. But stuff from comp.org.eff.talk, sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto and alt.security.pgp which are groups that most people interested in crypto will read, is a bit redundant. If you're not reading them, you *should* be. G

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Dr. Dobbs Dev. Update 1/5 July 94 & Schneier
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Once again DDDU has an encryption News Brief re the Standards & clipper, and Bruce Schneier has an article on Eurocrypt '94 with some highlights from the same. As he is on the list (yes?) perhaps he might upload it here... -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

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What was the House Rules Committee vote?
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The House Rules Committee was supposed to vote on the General Export Administration Act HR 3937 yesterday. Anybody know the result of the vote? Did they mark the bill "open"? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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RE: Devil's Advocate
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not so kind as others on this list. I think people should live consistent with their philosophy and what they advocate. Many times arguments are useless and only experience serves to convince. I wouldn't try to convert another from their faith just because it would do me good. As long as it's possible to find alternate methods of doing the same thing (in this case achieving privacy), I wouldn't try too hard to save Liberals from themselves. I think they deserve to use Clipper. Blanc

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USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 16:35:37 +0000 From: "US ACM, DC Office" <usacm_dc(a)acm.org> To: "usacm_dc(a)acm.org" <distribution.list(a)acm.org> Subject: USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal U S A C M Association for Computing Machinery, U.S. Public Policy Committee * PRESS RELEASE * Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Barbara Simons (408) 463-5661, simons(a)acm.org (e-mail) Jim Horning (415) 853-2216, horning(a)src.dec.com (e-mail) Rob Kling (714) 856-5955, kling(a)ics.uci.edu (e-mail) COMPUTER POLICY COMMITTEE CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CLIPPER COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY "TOO IMPORTANT" FOR SECRET DECISION-MAKING WASHINGTON, DC The public policy arm of the oldest and largest international computing society today urged the White House to withdraw the controversial "Clipper Chip" encryption proposal. Noting that the "security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures," the Association for Computing Machinery's U.S. Public Policy Committee (USACM) added its voice to the growing debate over encryption and privacy policy. In a position statement released at a press conference on Capitol Hill, the USACM said that "communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms." The Clipper technology was developed by the National Security Agency, which classified the cryptographic algorithm that underlies the encryption device. The USACM believes that Clipper "will put U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market and will adversely affect technological development within the United States." The technology has been championed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the NSA, which claim that "non-escrowed" encryption technology threatens law enforcement and national security. "As a body concerned with the development of government technology policy, USACM is troubled by the process that gave rise to the Clipper initiative," said Dr. Barbara Simons, a computer scientist with IBM who chairs the USACM. "It is vitally important that privacy protections for our communications networks be developed openly and with full public participation." The USACM position statement was issued after completion of a comprehensive study of cryptography policy sponsored by the ACM (see companion release). The study, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," was prepared by a panel of experts representing various constituencies involved in the debate over encryption. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. USACM was created by ACM to provide a means for presenting and discussing technological issues to and with U.S. policymakers and the general public. For further information on USACM, please call (202) 298- 0842. ============================================================= USACM Position on the Escrowed Encryption Standard The ACM study "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy" sets forth the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over widespread use of encryption. The importance of encryption, and the need for appropriate policies, will increase as networked communication grows. Security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures. The Clipper Chip, or "Escrowed Encryption Standard" (EES) Initiative, raises fundamental policy issues that must be fully addressed and publicly debated. After reviewing the ACM study, which provides a balanced discussion of the issues, the U.S. Public Policy Committee of ACM (USACM) makes the following recommendations. 1. The USACM supports the development of public policies and technical standards for communications security in open forums in which all stakeholders -- government, industry, and the public -- participate. Because we are moving rapidly to open networks, a prerequisite for the success of those networks must be standards for which there is widespread consensus, including international acceptance. The USACM believes that communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms. We support the principles underlying the Computer Security Act of 1987, in which Congress expressed its preference for the development of open and unclassified security standards. 2. The USACM recommends that any encryption standard adopted by the U.S. government not place U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market or adversely affect technological development within the United States. Few other nations are likely to adopt a standard that includes a classified algorithm and keys escrowed with the U.S. government. 3. The USACM supports changes in the process of developing Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) employed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This process is currently predicated on the use of such standards solely to support Federal procurement. Increasingly, the standards set through the FIPS process directly affect non-federal organizations and the public at large. In the case of the EES, the vast majority of comments solicited by NIST opposed the standard, but were openly ignored. The USACM recommends that the standards process be placed under the Administrative Procedures Act so that citizens may have the same opportunity to challenge government actions in the area of information processing standards as they do in other important aspects of Federal agency policy making. 4. The USACM urges the Administration at this point to withdraw the Clipper Chip proposal and to begin an open and public review of encryption policy. The escrowed encryption initiative raises vital issues of privacy, law enforcement, competitiveness and scientific innovation that must be openly discussed. 5. The USACM reaffirms its support for privacy protection and urges the administration to encourage the development of technologies and institutional practices that will provide real privacy for future users of the National Information Infrastructure.

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ACM Releases Crypto Study (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 16:34:47 +0000 From: "US ACM, DC Office" <usacm_dc(a)acm.org> To: "usacm_dc(a)acm.org" <distribution.list(a)acm.org> Subject: ACM Releases Crypto Study Association for Computing Machinery PRESS RELEASE __________________________________________________ Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Joseph DeBlasi, ACM Executive Director (212) 869-7440 Dr. Stephen Kent, Panel Chair (617) 873-3988 Dr. Susan Landau, Panel Staff (413) 545-0263 COMPUTING SOCIETY RELEASES REPORT ON ENCRYPTION POLICY "CLIPPER CHIP" CONTROVERSY EXPLORED BY EXPERT PANEL WASHINGTON, DC A panel of experts convened by the nation's foremost computing society today released a comprehensive report on U.S. cryptography policy. The report, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," is the culmination of a ten-month review conducted by the panel of representatives of the computer industry and academia, government officials, and attorneys. The 50-page document explores the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over the Clipper Chip and the export control of information security technology. "With the development of the information superhighway, cryptography has become a hotly debated policy issue," according to Joseph DeBlasi, Executive Director of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), which convened the expert panel. "The ACM believes that this report is a significant contribution to the ongoing debate on the Clipper Chip and encryption policy. It cuts through the rhetoric and lays out the facts." Dr. Stephen Kent, Chief Scientist for Security Technology with the firm of Bolt Beranek and Newman, said that he was pleased with the final report. "It provides a very balanced discussion of many of the issues that surround the debate on crypto policy, and we hope that it will serve as a foundation for further public debate on this topic." The ACM report addresses the competing interests of the various stakeholders in the encryption debate -- law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, industry and users of communications services. It reviews the recent history of U.S. cryptography policy and identifies key questions that policymakers must resolve as they grapple with this controversial issue. The ACM cryptography panel was chaired by Dr. Stephen Kent. Dr. Susan Landau, Research Associate Professor in Computer Science at the University of Massachusetts, co-ordinated the work of the panel and did most of the writing. Other panel members were Dr. Clinton Brooks, Advisor to the Director, National Security Agency; Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Dr. Dorothy Denning, Computer Science Chair, Georgetown University; Dr. Whitfield Diffie, Distinguished Engineer, Sun Microsystems; Dr. Anthony Lauck, Corporate Consulting Engineer, Digital Equipment Corporation; Douglas Miller, Government Affairs Manager, Software Publishers Association; Dr. Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist, SRI International; and David Sobel, Legal Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center. Funding for the cryptography study was provided in part by the National Science Foundation. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. For general information, contact ACM, 1515 Broadway, New York, NY 10036. (212) 869-7440 (tel), (212) 869-0481 (fax). Information on accessing the report electronically will be posted soon in this newsgroup.

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Beware of keystroke capture tools!
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to remind folks of another _practical_ security weakness in using PGP or any other crypto program: keystroke capture utilities. These are small utilities (inits in Mac terms, perhaps TSRs in DOS terms, and who knows what in Windoze terms) that record all keyboard input. Very useful for recovering from crashes and such. These started in the Unix community, where I've forgotten the name ("history"?). In the Mac community, "Last Resort" has been doing this for a couple of years, and now several other packages offer similar capabilities (QuicKeys has "GhostWriter," or somesuch). Many's the time I've forgotten I had thse things enabled, only to find in my System Folder a folder marked "Saved Work" or the like, containing files of all the histories from each rebooting. The security risks are obvious: * passphrases (and perhaps even the original key generation process, in toto) are captured over and over again. * the stored history files may be tucked away in odd places on one's disk, on various backup tapes made, and so on. (Easily recoverable with search warrants.) * anyone with access to one's machine (a snoopy coworker, an employer, a spouse, even an NSA black bag job) can insert this harmless-looking utility and then pick up the results later. There are commands to bypass such keystroke capture--specifically intended to head off these breaches--but most people will forget sometimes, and may not even know the program is installed. (And there are at least 3 of these for the Mac, so confusion is increased.) This is a well-known security concern, but I thought it important to mention. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: What motivates Crypto-folk?
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sandfort(a)crl.com: > > Thanks for your thoughtful comments. However the message was > > not by me but by Sherry May <scmay(a)rschp2.anu.edu.au>. > > Sherry May, Tim's EVIL TWIN? (Or is it the other way 'round?) Sherry Mayo, not May -- <scmayo@....> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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USACM
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sommerfeld(a)orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld): > Who is the USACM? How big is it, who can join, and who has? I thought it was pretty clear that the USACM is the US Public Policy committee of the Association for Computing Machinery. This would suggest a branch of the ACM, which as you know is rather large. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Pedophiles everywhere!!!
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com>: > > The drumbeat against all those anonymous pedophiles continues.... > > _Wall Street Journal_, 6/30/94 > > PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY by Walter S. Mossberg > > "Keeping Your Kids Away From Creeps As They Play Online" > > They aren't the only ones talking about it. I've seen three articles > about this in the past week. Even the Clipper article in the Economist, who should know better, that appeared a few weeks ago talked about pedophiles abounding in a Clipper-less world... I think the pedophilic possibilities of the Internet capture the imaginations of the media -- their deepest desires, perhaps. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: WHAT MOTIVATES FORWARDERS?
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

perobich(a)ingr.com: > IMHO a more serious and prevalent problem is the onslaught of spam > whenever EFF, CPSR, EPIC, NSA, or EIEIO issue press releases even > tangentially related to crypto. Not only do I usually get a copy in my > main inbox (since my filter doesn't catch it because it's not via I had cribbed about this a while ago, after I received 6 copies of an EFF release. I suggested that we agree on individuals responsible to forward posts from different sources. IAC the major ones - EFF, EPIC, CPSR... seem to have cypherpunks(a)toad.com on _their_ lists, and many of us subscribe to them independently. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Re: What motivates crypto-folk?
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:28 PM 07/01/94 +0200, Mats Bergstrom wrote: >anarchy. And I don't think any ultra left-wingers are lurking on >cypherpunks. That epithet should be saved for people believing in Depends on what you call ultra-left. You have a very serious socialist here... I don't advertise it much becuase too many libertarian types spam me trying to tell me why I'm wrong. Maybe I am the only one that gets tired of those arguments... [tame but promising aproach to social welfare deleted] >But such a pinko-green approach to privacy does not, and should >not in my humble opinion, have to extend to public funding of >education, libraries, minorities, arts, infobahns or other soft >issues. And it gives no one a right to pry into my software >collection or drug cabinet. Well, you were doing well for a while...:) And this pinko agrees 110% with the last statement. My own personal opinion is that waiting for governments to collapse due to crypto and tech is gonna have you waiting a long, long time. I prefer doing something with the tools at hand to dreaming. And the government isn't all bad, as is; just mostly bad. Heck, let me be so optimistic as to say maybe even fixable, at least to what I want to see. >Mats Bergstrom Jamie "Is a Mayist Like a Janist?" Lawrence -- "Blah Blah Blah" ___________________________________________________________________ Jamie Lawrence <jamiel(a)sybase.com>

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Illegal Acts & Crypto
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The dumbest question of all: "But if you aren't doing anything illegal, why do you need crypto? (or have to worry about stop-and-frisk, or need legal due process protections.) Only lawbreakers have to worry if their privacy is violated." Great thought. Now tell me what will be illegal in 40 years in all the jurisdictions in which I will live. In addition, tell me what (legal) behaviors or characteristics of mine will nonetheless cause me to lose social approbation//jobs//friends//etc in all of the societies in which I will live. Statistics say I've got 40 years left. Forty years ago, smoking was a virtue and sodomy a vice. Twenty-five years ago, money laundering was as legal as church on a Sunday and every bank in America offered defacto secret bank accounts. Given the speed with which things are changing, in twenty-five more years, participating on a crypto mailing list like this could be punished by the death penalty under the Krypto Kingpins Kontrol Act of 2005. Or if things go another way, advocates of government key escrow systems could be subject to outlawry and instant public "vector control measures" if they accidentally wander onto the land of the wrong proprietary community. You never know. In the last 200 years of human history, people have been killed at one time or another in one place or another simply because they had any human characteristic you could name or indulged in any human behavior. You name the characteristic or behavior and I bet I can name the time when people somewhere were died because of it. Giving up your privacy is too great a risk. What do you gain. Besides, if we are all equal then the rulers are equal to us and we don't have to give up our autonomy to them. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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RE: Politics and crypto
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Michael Wilson The political Left had the belief that while you, an individual, should have the right to do what you want with your body. . ., they wanted to control what you did with your money. . . The political Right had the belief that you should have the right to do what you want with your money . . , but not with your body. . . . .................................................. True! ....programs such as healthcare, Clipper, national ID cards, national information infrastructures, and so forth are all direct yet subtle attacks on such basic freedoms. It creates both the motive *and* mechanism for tyrrany. .................................................. Thus the Administration would undermine the motives & mechanisms for privacy. Everyone wants the advantages for themselves and not for their enemies; it would be useful to be able to distinguish enemies from friends, but this is not an easy task when everyone's philosophies & politics are so mixed up & inconsistent & counterproductive. At some point, it becomes unavoidable to conclude that in reality, it's "every man for himself"; i.e. - anything which helps individual, independent competence is a valuable & valid pursuit. Blanc

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Password Difficulties
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey folks, passwords are hard to choose! It boils down to this: I can't remember as many bits as the TLAs can crack by brute force. Starting with a bunch of coin tosses I tried ways of coding them: hex, ASCII, and words off word lists. Horrors! The hex is too long, the ASCII is too long and too obscure, words words chosen by those bits too many and too obscure. Sorry, there is no way regular people are going to remember pass words or phrases with more than about 50-bits worth of information in them--and even doing that well is going to be rare. We need to slowdown password testing? Obvious things come to mind. 1) Try to pair up short passwords with slow hardware, like a smartcard that can only consider a few passwords a second. 2) Try to hide behind an expensive operation. (Does encrypting my private key 1,000,000-times equal encrypting it once with a key 20-bits longer?) What do we do? (What are you folks doing right now?) -kb, the Kent who occasionally considers practicalities -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 31:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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Clipper "voluntary" like taxes are?
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the front page of the 6/29/94 WSJ there is mention of the fact that the IRS chief refers to the US tax system as "voluntary". I had heard this "voluntary" before. So at about 3:20 today I called the IRS at 1-800-tax-1040 to ask if this was correct. After about 40 minutes on hold (fortunately I have a computer to keep me busy) I got someone. They said that, yes, the US does have a "voluntary compliance" tax system. They said that I could find the tax codes saying this in the local library. I tried to pin down why they used the word "voluntary". After asking a couple questions I said, "but if we don't comply there are penalties, right?", they said yes, then I said, "so why is it voluntary?" and they hung up on me. Since this same government says that Clipper is "voluntary" I am worried that they mean some new Orwellian definition of "voluntary" and not the old fashioned "voluntary" many of us might have assumed. Voluntary used to mean things like "without legal obligation" and such (see below). Get a copy of PGP while you can, -- Vince Word voluntary (VAHL'uhn-ter'ee) adj. Definition --adj. 1. a. Arising from one's own free will. b. Acting on one's own initiative. 2. Acting or serving in a specified capacity willingly and without constraint or guarantee of reward. 3. Normally controlled by or subject to individual volition. 4. Capable of exercising will; volitional. 5. Proceeding from impulse; spontaneous. 6. Law. a. Acting or performed without external persuasion or compulsion. b. Without legal obligation, payment, or valuable consideration: a voluntary conveyance. c. Not accidental; intentional: voluntary manslaughter. --n., pl. - ies. 1. Mus. Solo organ music, occasionally improvised, that is played usually before and sometimes during or after a church service. 2. A volunteer. voluntarily (-taruh-lee) --adv. voluntariness --n. Etymology ME < Lat. voluntarius < voluntas, choice < velle, to wish. Domain Literature, Rhetoric, Philosophy, Law, Music Synonyms voluntary, intentional, deliberate, willful, willing, spontaneous. These adjectives mean unforced. Voluntary is applied in several related senses to what is done by choice, to physical movement subject to regulation by the will, and less often to action that is not only of one's choice but premeditated. The last-named sense is more basic to intentional and deliberate; in addition, deliberate stresses the idea of action taken with full awareness of the consequences. Willful can mean merely in accordance with one's will but often implies headstrong persistence in a self- determined course of action. Willing suggests acceding to a course proposed by another, without reluctance or even eagerly. Spontaneous refers to behavior that seems wholly unpremeditated, a natural response and a true reflection of one's feelings.

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RE: MAIL: chained remailing strategy
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: > Here are the times at which my remailer has received messages > over the past week. (This is the only form of log which I keep, > except for messages titled "DEATH TO BLACKNET".) In return for > this information, please provide a histogram showing usage as a > function of time of day. Thanks - Hal Finney You're on, Hal. Thanks for the work you put into that, and I'll see if I can whip up a program to produce a histogram ... well, at least in tabular form. Thanks for the challenge... In fact, if you want, I can send you the source code (in "C"), privately. This mention of "DEATH TO BLACKNET" sounds intriguing. Is this some sort of abusive/harassing message you're trying to track down? With encrypted chaining available to hide the actual subject until the last link, it would seem that the sender is either naive, or else WANTS the Subject: line itself to send some sort of "statement". (What is "BLACKNET", BTW?) This brings up a related question, however. How often, if at all, are you asked to help trace down the source of a message handled by your remailer? Under what circumstances would you cooperate with such a request? I've noticed that you have a 510 bit public key for your remailer. Did you choose the shorter length to speed things up, or what? I tend to use a remailer with a longer key as my FIRST link in the chain. Maybe it's overkill, but why not? And, finally, as a chained remailer user, I've read the periodic "status reports" by fingering "ghio(a)andrew.cmu.edu" and your remailer must certainly rank as one of the promptest and most reliable. In fact, I think I'll include you *SOMEWHERE* on the chain for this reply... <g>

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RE: Illegal Acts & Crypto
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some collected thoughts & misc. impressions: Images of the psychology of crypto-users: . scurrying around like rats, hiding in the dark from regular interactions (regular = unconcerned) . fear of being onesself in the light, lacking courage . having a view of life which is not trusting, but suspicious and cynical . not identifying with the group, therefore keeping things from them, something akin to hoarding & not sharing (closed to the other members of the society, rather than open) . not necessarily "officially" illegal, but generally not really "one of us", as in hypocritical - "with us, but not *of* us" i.e., an individual, having separated themselves from the group from the use of an individuating tool/mechanism. Encrypted Info (Positive): . being particular & specific, exclusive ("for your eyes only") . channelling the sent info to arrive at the intended destination only . limited to those involved, rather than diffused throughout to others for whom it is meaningless or without value; relevancy . the info being the product of one's Own (mind, purpose), therefore also being the prerogative of one's own judgement to determine its dissemination Encrypted Info (Negative): . fear that it *will* involve others, having a negative, destructive potential to harm innocents . fear of not being able to control the developments from these and from its larger counterpart, organized "crime" . trying to beat them to the punch instead of having to deal with the after-effects . inadequacy of preparations for dealing with the element of surprise in cases of destructive, harmful influences: Consequential Circumstance: . insufficient self-reliance, having to wait for the cavalry to come over the hill to save oneself. . having to maintain a relationship with the saviours (the managers & real owners of the general welfare) which maintains the individual in a dependent, subordinate, infantile state Blanc

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