December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

WiReD has a gopher (and its name was...)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.wired From: kadie(a)cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie) Subject: Wired Magazine's gopher Message-ID: <CHBE7B.Jt(a)cs.uiuc.edu> Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 17:06:46 GMT Wired Magazine has a gopher. It includes many articles. Try gopher gopher.wired.edu I've also added it to the CAF whatsnew server. Try gopher gopher.eff.org 5070 - Carl ANNOTATED REFERENCES (All these documents are available on-line. Access information follows.) ================= admin/access ================= Information on how to access one computer medium via another: access anonymous ftp via email, access gopher via email, access gopher via telnet, read netnews via gopher, read netnews via telnet, write netnews via email, ftp via gopher. ================= admin/whatsnewd ================= * Code for and description of "whatsnewd" (v. 0.42) (Connect your Gopher to "gopher.eff.org", port "5070" to play with it.) It is a gopher-protocol server. What it does: When a user gives a date (e.g. "1 day ago") or enters a dated bookmark (generated by a previous query), he or she gets a gopher menu of the gopher items that are new or changed since that date. ================= ================= If you have gopher, you can browse the CAF archive with the command gopher gopher.eff.org These document(s) are also available by anonymous ftp (the preferred method) and by email. To get the file(s) via ftp, do an anonymous ftp to ftp.eff.org (192.77.172.4), and get file(s): pub/academic/admin/access pub/academic/admin/whatsnewd To get the file(s) by email, send email to archive-server(a)eff.org. Include the line(s) (be sure to include the space before the file name): send acad-freedom/admin access send acad-freedom/admin whatsnewd -- Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me. = kadie(a)cs.uiuc.edu =

2 1

Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several folks have recently mentioned the need to carefully look at the statistics/distributions of bit values in the low-order bits (least-significant bits, LSBs) of real-world images intended for steganographic use. I concur. This problem interests me. Material from Li and Vitanyi's "An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications," 1993, bears directly on the issues of "picture distance" and how much one can change an image before it's recognizably "different" or before filter programs can detect the presence (or absence) of characteristic structure in images. In this little article I'll be making some general points and reasoning informally about image statistics, picture distances, and the like. There's no doubt a more rigorous way to reason about these statistical properties, using sigmas and summations and Central Limit Theorems and the like, but I'm not that much of a real mathematician to be bothered with that. C'est la vie. Several points: 1. Probably not a pressing concern, yet. I expect few sites have LSB-analyzers, just as few folks are using LSB stegonagraphy. 2. Romana Machado's "Stego" program for the Mac is interesting, and may be useful, but it makes almost no effort to hide the _existence_ of the message bits, e.g., anyone with a copy of Stego can apply it to an image and recover the plaintext or ciphertext. (I mean in contrast to some of the schemes which require a copy of the original image, a kind of one-time pad approach, in which one XORs or subtracts the original image to see the "differences" in the LSBs--a cryptanalyst without the "reference" image is unable to extract any bits for further analysis.) (I suggest we keep these two models in mind. Proposal for jargon: "Type 1 Stego": No reference model needed: message bits are just the specified bits, e.g., LSB, or larger low-order bits. "Type 2 Stego": a reference model--an image or DAT or whatever--is needed to XOR with message to recover the plaintext or ciphertext (if more encryption was used originally).) 3. With fairly noisy 8-bit images, such as might be gotten by frame-grabbing a video image under poor lighting or focus conditions, my experiences at Intel (I ran an image processing lab, for electron microscope analyis of microprocessors) tells me that the lowest _several_ bits of each pixel are "noisy." Very noisy. The bottom bit is "almost purely noise" (also a dangerous term!). But I agree that more recent images need to be looked at and the statistics analyzed. Still, I suspect the bottom bit, the LSB, will be found to have Gaussian noise characteristics. Note also that images are often run through filters, as in PhotoShop, which can give Gaussian characteristics where before there were none. 4. Can "image analyzers" in the hands of border security/law enforcement be used to proseute holders of images that have such white noise characteristics in the LSBs? I doubt it. I interject this point here because an important long-term issue for stego is whether the "Crypto Authority" (resonance with Gibson's "Turing Authority") can make such images ipso facto illegal. I suspect this is hopeless, both because many images have these characteristics and because many people will massage their images to be this way, regardless of original camera-CCD characteristics. 5. All of these arguments apply to the LSBs in DATs. Ambient room noise, noise in microphones, thermal noise in the electronics, etc., all contributes to there being almost no "signal" in the LSB of a 16-bit CD or DAT sample of music. (There are anecdotal reports of people being able to hear effects here, and different noise-shaping filters may have audible effects at least some of the time. So, I do agree that these statistics ought to be looked at, eventually. Some of my audio magazines have articles on this, which I'll try to look at soon.) 6. Here's a strategy which may work OK even if the statistical patterns of the LSBs are not "completely random" (a dangerous term, of course). - take a plaintext or ciphertext and compress it with a good compressor (L-Z may not be enough to wring out all the structure and raise the entropy to the full 8 bits per character, for ASCII). A good encryption of the text should of course produce high entropy. - XOR the compressed (high entropy) text with the LSBs of the image. - the resulting LSBs should have _similar statistics_ as compared with the original image. "Noise" has been added, but no knew structure has been added. Consider a couple of examples to see this: Original image (in bits) : 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 Random 1s and Os: 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 Resultant Image (XOR): 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 (Another example: If one toggles all the bits in a binary image, the "Hamming distance" between the images is maximal, and yet the "picture distance" is very small, i.e., the images look nearly the same. The picture distance being small means the structure is the same, even though the Hamming distance is, by definition, the greatest it can be. This provides a powerful clue that there is a "lot of room" to manipulate images so as to pack bits into this "Hamming space" while still keeping the resulting pictures in a "tiny picture space volume.") Well, this is of coure not a proof, but gives a feel for why XORing with a high entropy image will not _add_ structure. However, it can certainly _remove_ structure! Which takes us back to the original issue of the statistics (structure) of the LSBs of images. If in fact there were "clumps" of 1s and 0s, "ridges" and "valleys" caused by camera/CCD characteristics, then XORing the LSB image with a "random" image will demolish this structure. This is nothing more than the role of the one-time pad....to remove structure but allow its immediate reconstruction on the other end. At least in this case one does not have to worry about the ciphertext _adding_ unwanted structure, only that it may _remove_ structure already present in the image (and perhaps "typical" of images not carrying stego bits). 7. A better approach may be to take two very similar images, perhaps successive frame grabs with the same camera/digitizer, and use the statistics of the LSBs directly as part of the "one-time pad" above (Type 2 Stego). This could be used to give the LSBs the same "structure" (ridges and valleys of pixel values, for example) as a "real image" but without leaking message bits. (More work needed here.) (I apologize for any vagueness here. Partly it is that I haven't worked this out completely. Partly it is the lack of a blackboard to draw pictures on--verbal descriptions get confusing after a while. And partly it is that this message is already too long and I want to wrap it up.) 8. None of this subtlety really matters too much, I suspect. An image or DAT contains _so much room_ for stego bits that the problem of finding a tiny fraction of message bits in megabytes or hundreds of megabytes (DATs) of noisy source material seems well beyond current crunch capabilties. Perhaps images being sent to some sensitive location could be given a quick analysis to see if the LSBs are "too regular," but even this I doubt. And at least the XOR method described above won't introduce new structure....at worst the images or DATs would appear to be "too random." Perhaps we need to paraphrase Eric's line: "Use a random image, go to jail." --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

6 6

Unsubscribe
by Paul Gilberti 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please unsubscribe me. I really thought that this list was for serious discussion of crypto technology/news. Instead, I'm just tired of weeding through my mail of immature postings of posters who are afraid to post under their own names (DL), and all the traffic regarding the censorship of the same.

1 0

democracy and L. Detweiler
by baumbach＠atmel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

L. Detweiler is a champion of democracy. He has argued strongly for it here on this forum. I am not a supporter of democracy. A crowd of people has no greater rights than one person. L. Detweiler disagrees with this. I shall confront this disagreement with an example that strikes to its core. I propose a vote. This vote will have no time limit. If at any point you wish to change your vote you are free do so. This vote is non-binding on those who do not support democracy. This vote will be conducted publicly on this list. ======================================================================= VOTE: Proposition desist L. Detweiler will cease posting to the cypherpunks mailing list. He will no longer concern himself with the activities of those on the cypherpunks mailing list here or on any other forum. [I support]/[I Do not support] ======================================================================= L. Detweiler will be the only judge of the results of this vote. If he believes a majority of unique individuals carry this proposal one way or another, then by his honor and support for democracy he is bound by it. If he recants his support for democracy, then he is not bound by it. ------------------ I shall cast my vote here: I support Proposition desist. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

1 0

Re: The Cure
by hawkwind＠dink.foretune.co.jp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It craves fame. It resents what it perceives to be the fame of the >better-known members of this list to be. It is jealous of that fame, >and wants some for itself. It is sick and ugly, small and unintelligent, >resentful of its underdeveloped brain and the fact that everyone he looks >up to instantly recognizes his stupidity. And now it has found a way to get >those very people to acknowledge it, discuss it, feel threatened by it. >It is used to rejection, so the endless repeats of it mean nothing. And >then even less in the face of the warm glow at the center of the >Cypherpunks collective attention. > >This is the first and the last word I'll ever write about about it. >If we all did that, it would go away. > >Coerr > REALLY excellently stated! Great analysis of the nature of the problem. Thank you, do you mind if I quote this to others? Alas, though, I can not from long and bitter experience agree with you about the solution. In the real world physical verbal/facial expressions of disapproval and disdain might rapidly rid the group of the problem person, but in cyberspace, such traditional cultural prods are non-existent. The aberrant user KNOWS he faces no meaningful penalties or censure and thus has no inducement not to continue his chaotic ways. I do feel that in addition to the observations you made above, that such people often take sheer perverse delight in the mere poisoning of the creativity of the group being creatively atrophic themselves.

1 0

Who is this Detweiler guy anyway?
by an48848＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a fairly recent addition to this list, I'm unfamilliar with the history of cypherpunks. Can anyone enlighten me? Thanks. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

3 2

Re: Knights who say NII (was Crypto(A), govt & NII)
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Steve Witham writes: > > > Giving the government savvy advice, telling them they should do whatever > > will promote, say, competition or open forums...what effects will these > > have? They may provide justifications, expertise and targeting info > > for interventions, for instance. New ways to get involved... Mike Godwin replies: > The government is already tempted to get involved, all the time. We can't > make the government go away by resolving that it would be nice if they > weren't around. Best to work from where we are, not where we'd like to be. Sure, I agree. It's just, will the process-that-be have a tendency to be encouraged to intervention in general, by positive-sounding things in what you say. > > I can't think of one positive thing (as opposed to the negative thing, > > disengagement) government can contribute to the goals of EFF. On being true police, see below. > Government is not the only potential source of harm--private industry can > be plenty harmful. Private business can be nasty, slow and unhelpful, but short of physical sabotage and threats, they can't do nearly the kind of harm and prevention of alternatives that government does. > > ...the most centralized organization in the world as the > > decentralist's tool or ally doesn't seem workable to me. The > > means clashes against the ends. > > I don't see how. One actually can use a weapon to keep the peace, for > example. Yes, you're right. I wasn't thinking about that because I assumed there's a minimum of physical crime in the communications industry. But now that I think about it, there's one thing State governments could limit: local governments' interference (franchises) in communications. But other than real basic policing like that, the means clash with the ends. Government is okay at nabbing true bad guys, not at trying to steer people in good directions. > > Telling a bull that he should make whatever > > positive contributions he can to the china shop...is worse than just > > not mentioning that there are none. > > I think you're reasoning from your conclusions here, not toward them. Well, sure, I'm talking from my view of how things are. Mostly I'm just saying that the *need* for positive government involvement is dubious while the *danger* is obvious in the current state of things, and if you aren't always saying that, then your well-informed comments and laudible goal statements can be misconstrued more easily, because in certain circles, radical deregulation is not assumed. That's my not-so-humble-but-trying (IMNSHBTO?) point in a nutshell. Your participation without this particular sternness, may, as one side-effect, encourage and assist where we all won't be happy it did--and maybe it'll fail to push through the single most helpful idea. I know, it's not your particular hobbyhorse. It's just what I'm afraid will happen. > What's more, government ain't the only bull in this shop. Although the FCC is smaller than AT&T, there's nothing in private industry with the momentum, power and difficulty of correcting that our layers of government have. Business without the power of government behind it (which status-quo businesses do have right now) faces much more immediate corrective pressure than government. Even combinations of big nasty companies are less of a problem. Throw me in that briar patch, puh-*leeze*, it's better than this one. -fnerd(a)smds.com quote me -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtoxiQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

What recipient-end mail filters are available?
by Anthony Garcia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm aware of two mail-filtering systems that operate at the recipient's end, procmail and Elm filter. Are there others? -Anthony Garcia agarcia(a)neosoft.com

3 2

Entropy, Randomness, etc.
by jerry＠terminus.dell.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With all this talk about entropy, randomness, and gaussian distributions, I'm hoping we can clear up some of the confusion that I am having. My understanding of a random number is a number is generated from two or more unrelated events. In order for this number to be most useful cryptographically, it needs a even distribution. This distribution is such that any one number in the range of possible values is equally probable as any other number. Does this make this distribution a gaussian distribution? Maybe I just don't understand the theory behind the random numbers well enough, but with all of these terms floating around it is hard to keep track. The reason I want to get some of these things clarified, is because I am becoming more interested in some of the analysis people have been talking about being possible. Also how are these statistical measurements done? Is it as simple as a histogram? (useful for simple alphabet transliterations). Are we talking frequency analysis with FFTs and more advanced things? How do we measure the entropy of a random number, or a series of random numbers? Have people on the list done this, or is this still in the range of people that do math and number theory for a living? Give a particular set of data used to generate a random key, such as, a unix box's /dev/mem, how can one measure the number of bits of entropy? These topics are probably covered in some of the basic books in the field, but all of the reference's I've been able to locate don't go into specifics of how to measure the quality of random numbers. Unless some measurements are made, you can't really be sure that those /dev/mem MD5 hashes don't come up the same 10%, 30%, or more of the time. It seems that a lot of assumptions are being made about what is good and what isn't. I plan to build a hardware random number generator and I have a couple of different circuits to do it, but I've heard some comments about some types of noise not being "good" cryptographically. -- Jeremy Porter ------------- Systems Engineering -------- Dell Computer Corp. ------ jerry(a)terminus.us.dell.com ---- --- 70 4F BD AE 6D E9 D2 66 48 18 8B E7 64 7F 59 8F --- Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology.

4 3

soundfile stego
by jel＠sutro.SFSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Also, I am told that humans have a tough time identifying >> the phase of the frequency components of the sounds they >> identify. So one could hide date in the phase relationships >> among the frequency components of, say, recorded speech. > >This sounds interesting. How about detection, how will some >random phase relationships stand out against normal phase of >various frequencies? I suspect that the unusual phase relationships would stick out, to anyone looking at the speech with,say, an oscilliscope. Eg, a squarewave would look pretty mangled if you shifted its component frequencies by some random amount, even though a human being might not be able to detect the difference between a squarewave, and a component-frequency shifted squarewave. On the other hand, how often does speech over some electronic medeum actually get analyzed this deeply?

1 0

A change of pace
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk From: strnlght(a)netcom.com (David Sternlight) Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Times Message-ID: <strnlghtCHBurB.7on(a)netcom.com> Reply-To: david(a)sternlight.com (David Sternlight) Organization: DSI/USCRPAC References: <199311301632.LAA28210(a)eff.org> Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 23:04:21 GMT In article <199311301632.LAA28210(a)eff.org>, Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> wrote: >From the New York Times Op-Ed Page, Wednesday, November 24, 1993 > >A Superhighway Through the Wasteland? > By Mitchell Kapor and Jerry Berman [Proposal for new laws to regulate the information highway omitted] Like most elitists and autocrats, eff's leaders believe in government intervention for the things they like (this topic) but not for the things they don't (Clipper). They believe in the private sector unrestricted for things they like (cryptography) but not for the things they don't (the information highway). David -- David Sternlight When the mouse laughs at the cat, there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb

1 0

re: Big Brother/Bank Acco
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

M >Given the material in the WiReD 1.6 article, how likely is it that a M >true anonymous digital cash system would be allowed? I know, I know; M >there's "no way to prevent it"; however, I think that concept is M >based on the premise that the Government proceeds rationally. The East German government did not "proceed rationally" and yet is no longer with us. M >If somebody with an axe to grind gets hold of the "kidnapped baby" M >scenario described in _Applied_Cryptography_, plenty of public M >outrage and indignation could be generated. To what end. We have had the Kiddie Porn Over the Nets story of the Day every day for the last six months in the US and the UK. Have the nets been shut down? With the clearance rate for *murders* in NYC falling down towards 30%, I doubt if we have much to worry about for our minor "crimes." M >Go on, reassure me that "all is well". All is as well as can be extected and much better than we used to fear. DCF "I never expected to live to see the Death of Communism" -- Friedrich Hayek a few months before his death (and a few months after the SU's death. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

Crypto Anarchy, the Gover
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

T >You mean, how likely is that the government will allow a system that T >makes taxation almost impossible, that enables black markets, that T >facilitates the transfer of illegal information, and that basically T >nukes the present arrangement? T > T >I don't think they'll "allow" it. But this doesn't mean it won't T >happen. For all of you who didn't hear my talk at ECFP '93 in London on the 20th (quite a few since there were fewer than 75 there) here is my conclusion which addresses this subject. **** "And what can we call this new form of social organization growing on the nets and in the modern fluid business environment? When two or more people can meet together and communicate freely and privately without interference by outsiders, they can trade -- they can form a market. If this trade on the nets is made free from even the possibility of external regulation, what we have is a free market and a free society." **** Remember kids God fights on the side with the heaviest artillery. Unless the government can come up with a way of blocking the above communication, it is SOOL. T >Imagine this: to get on the Data Superhighway, which will likely be T >the only major lines if the government succeeds in making it the T >mandatory standard, every data packet must have a "license plate." T >Don't laugh! The idea of a license plate on data packets is coming. It T >would provide the kind of traceability that control freaks like T >Detweiler claim to want So what if the car has a license plate if you can't tell what is in the car. No matter what happens telecoms will be cheap. Cheap means you can establish accounts and run a virtual network without disclosing the contents of the network messages or even that the network exists. You can hide your virtual network inside a much larger pseudo network which contains nothing interesting. DCF "The Trader swims in the sea of communications" -- Left out of Mao on Guerrilla Warfare because of editing error. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
by kqb＠whscad1.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several people are attempting to create an algorithm to mask the presence of a steganized encrypted message in the least significant bits of an image. Don't forget that no matter how fancy your algorithm or how closely you mask your steganography with a model of what the statistics of an ordinary image look like, you have to assume that your opponent also knows your steganization algorithm, including your masking technique. (Otherwise you are just relying on security through obscurity.) This leaves you with three problems: (1) your opponent may have a much better model of an ordinary image than you do, and still be able to discern the existence of masked steganography, (2) since your opponent knows your steganization algorithm, he/she can look for any "signature" that your steganography masking model leaves, and (3) your opponent can "desteganize" all your images and check their statistics for deviations from the statistics for "desteganized" ordinary images. Resolving problems (1) and (2) requires a lot of work constructing good models. Resolving problem (3) requires, I think, a modeling function for steganography that is invertible only with a secret key. (Otherwise, your opponent could desteganize your image and find a uniform random distribution, which indicates an encrypted message.) Since this type of function is, to my knowledge, not well-developed, don't expect it to be secure. Thus, if breaking it could compromise your secret key for desteganization, then don't use the same public/private key pair for both encryption and steganography. Kevin Q. Brown INTERNET kqb(a)whscad1.att.com or kevin_q_brown(a)att.com

1 0

Re: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Good questions. >My understanding of a random number is a number is generated from >two or more unrelated events. No. This may be one general category of ways to manufacture random numbers, but specifically a random number is just an arbitrary number typically drawn from a sequence of independent arbitrary numbers. The quality of 'randomness' is a measure of the independence of the elements in the stream. Therefor, there is no such thing as a random number except as an element of a sequence or other context from which to establish independence. >In order for this number to be most useful cryptographically, it needs >a even distribution. No. In order for this number to be cryptographically useful, it must cost more to guess the number (perhaps knowing the numbers that came before) than the reward for guessing it correctly. It happens that non-flat distribution of a sequence is a lever for cheaper guessing, thus flat distribution is natural characteristic of high-quality random sequences. >Does this make this distribution a gaussian distribution? No. Gaussian (a.k.a. 'normal') distribution is the bell curve (and clearly indicates a relation between samples). Math texts describing this distribution often use the phrase 'distribution of some random variable x', by which they in fact mean 'distribution of samples from a varying source'. >Also how are these statistical measurements done? See Knuth, "The Art of Computer Programming", Volume 2: Seminumerical Algorithms, Chapter 3: Random Numbers. >Is it as simple as a histogram? Yes. >Are we talking frequency analysis with FFTs and >more advanced things? Yes. >How do we measure the entropy of a random number, or a series of >random numbers? Ah. Now we're talking. Entropy is closely related but not equal to 'randomness'. Entropy is a measure of information often expressed as the fraction of information-size to data-size. Randomness is a measure of unpredictability. A sufficiently random sequence will be of very high entropy from the perspective of the 'guesser', though not necessarily from the that of the generator (e.g. a PRNG). The best way to measure entropy (if that is what you want to measure), is to build a sufficiently powerful Markov model, or the equivalent, to predict the sequence, and treat it like a compressor. The number of bits output is the entropy of the sequence with respect to that model. If you can't build a model as smart as your presumed attackers (as smart as them, not as smart as any model they might build), then you will have to use more tests to assure yourself of indepence of elements in the sequence (see Knuth, et al). In practice however, most of these methods represent very low bars over which any RNG _must_ jump, and which often poor ones can. Most RNGs are broken by understanding how they work, and exploiting weaknesses in their construction and context (e.g. poor 'seed' selection). >Have people on the list done this, or is this still in the range of >people that do math and number theory for a living? Yes, and Yes. >These topics are probably covered in some of the basic books in the field, >but all of the reference's I've been able to locate don't go into >specifics of how to measure the quality of random numbers. See Knuth. >Unless some measurements are made, you can't really be sure that those >/dev/mem MD5 hashes don't come up the same 10%, 30%, or more of the time. >It seems that a lot of assumptions are being made about what is good and >what isn't. You should be exactly as paranoid as it is cost effective to be. Hope this helps. Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

1 0

Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sounds like the simple solution is for people everywhere to replace >the low order bits of all of their pictures with good random noise. You're kidding, right? Image processing software, and music processing equipment, are designed to get the maximum performance out of the storage medium. I find it pretty unlikely that any developer of image processing tools is going to deliberately drop one bit of precision off each n-bit unit; sheesh, image files are big enough without software deliberately wasting bits. As for introducing noise into the low-order bit of music CDs, definitely not; the trend is towards equipment that can extract the last dribble of information from well-recorded sources, and towards recording equipment that can meaningfully record every bit of every word. Why do you think there are 64x-oversampling players and the like? Eric's right; you'll have to build your own tools to make things noisy, as the trend elsewhere is to make things unnoisy. On the other hand, have you looked at the new mini-disc technology? That stuff already introduces audio compression, and the bits on a minidisc should be pretty high in entropy; of course, twiddling bits in a compressed audio recording may have dramatic effects on sound... Jason

2 1

dithering, repudiable steganography
by jel＠sutro.SFSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

REPUDIABLE STEGANOGRAPHY I have a book (unfortunately not with me now) describing the format of data on music CDs. It seems that there is a kind of objectionable, heard noise in digital recordings called granulation noise. This is peculiar to digital; analog recording doesn't have this problem. Granulation noise manifests itself at low amplitudes, when the signal being represented is just at the resolution of the digital sampling. For example, if the signal is a sinusoid with a peak-to-peak amplitude represented by just a little greater than one bit difference in each sample. The problem is, the sampled sinusoid sounds just like a square wave when it is played back. Input, the signal: +--------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 | | xxx xxx | xx xx xx xx | x x x x 1 | x x x x | x x x x | x x x x | x x x x 0 +x-----------------x-----------------x-----------------x-------------- | x x x | x x x | x x x -1 | x x x x | x x x x | xx xx xx xx | xxx xxx -2 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Output, the digitized, sampled signal: +--------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 | | | | xxxxxxxxxxx 1 | xxxxxxxxxxx | | | 0 +xxxx-----------xxxx-----------------xxxx-----------xxxx-------------- | | | -1 | xxxx xxxx xxxx | | | -2 | xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx +--------------------------------------------------------------------- This introduces (would introduce) lots of strong harmonics, making a very quiet flute, say, sound very unflutelike. The people who make commercial CDs get around this problem with a technique called dithering. They add to each sample a number from {-2, -1, 0, 1 2}, picked randomly. I.e., they randomly scramble the low few bits of each sample. The interesting thing about this is that, while it obviously degrades the signal, the result sounds better to human ears! It solves the problem of granulation noise. (The noisy flute sounds better than the clear but mangled squarewave thing the flute sounds like through the granulation noise). Of course there is something like 93 db dynamic range on a CD, so the dither hardly makes a dent in the usual sound quality -- it's only there to solve the granulation noise problem, which is only a problem at very low signal strengths. The only requirement for the dither bits is that they be such that they sound random, like noise. But any random source of bits with this property would work just as well for dithering. In particular, let's suppose you have an encrypted file, represented as a sequence of symbols, each of which has exactly 5 values it can assume. Musically, this would sound exactly like noise :-) . So *this* file could be used to dither an audiofile, instead of the "real" random values currently used. I guess what I really mean to say is that this insures that the low bit in a dithered file is *really* random; hence could be replaced with a bit from your encrypted file. Moreover, such a dithered audio file has some nice steganographic properties. 1) Repudiability. Under the assumption that the encrypted file cannot be cracked without the possession of the key to the file (which the owner of the steganographically-injected audio file has but claims ignorance of), the dither *really does* look like genuine, random dither. She can claim that the file is in fact a recording of the minutes of the last cypherpunks meeting, or a 3 hour concert that she taped off the radio, and no TLA can prove otherwise. Usually, a steganographically hidden datum (a microdot, invisible ink, etc.) doesn't have this property. 2) Zero storage requirements. This follows from 1), really. If you hide data in the unused parts of the last blocks on disk in a disk file, or in a hidden partition, the secrecy of the data (the "steganographic integrity"?) depends on the enemy not knowing or suspecting the existence of the data. PROBLEMS: You wouldn't be able to hide anything in your private copy of Michael Jackson's Thriller; the enemy could simply compare your copy with the standard copy, making the differences (the hidden file) stand out. Unless you were Warner Brothers, in which case you could just steganographically-inject ALL copys of Thriller with the secret file. This would make storage of the hidden file trivial. You could get a copy from the nearest Wherehouse. [I don't know if W.B in fact publishes Thriller; it's just an example] I wonder if CD pulishers know that they could make some money on the side by hiding data for people in their thousands of CDs? Anyway, while I don't know the format for DAT, I suspect there is some point where the sound signal is dithered to mask the granulation noise, and at this point Alice with information to hide could inject her file. Do digital pictures employ dithering to prevent aliasing? I think so. --John. jel(a)sutro.sfsu.edu

2 1

soundfile stego
by jel＠sutro.SFSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You know, you don't have to think of somehow modifying a file pointwise in the time domain. How about this, to stego a sound file: Do an FFT of the *entire* file. Assuming the file is two hours = 7200 seconds, the frequency res of the transformed file will be about 140 microhertz. Pick a band that humans don't usually pay much conscious attention to when they hear music; say 18 KHz through 19.5 KHz. Replace the low bit in each of these frequency space samples (there are 1500 / 0.000140 ~= 1E7 such samples) with the stego data. Inverse transform the modified, frequency space representation of the file back into the time domain, and voila! I suspect you would not be able to tell the difference from the original with your naked ears. But this is not repudiable; I suspect the spectrum of the file would look artificial. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Also, I am told that humans have a tough time identifying the phase of the frequency components of the sounds they identify. So one could hide date in the phase relationships among the frequency components of, say, recorded speech.

2 1

Fedworld BBS Info
by jkyser＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Somewhat off topic, but for those of you interested in government information, there is a BBS called FEDWORLD which has gateways into 100+ federal BBS systems. It can be reached via telnet to fedworld.gov. Following is a list of the federal systems that can be reached through the gateway: 2:ALF (USDA) :National Agricultural Library BBS 3:ALIX (Lib of Congress) :Automated Library Information eXchange 4:BOM-BBN(Dept of Interior):Bureau of Mines-Bulletin Board Network 5:ISM-SIS (IRS) :ISM Support Info System 6:CIC-BBS (GSA) :Consumer Information Center 7:CLU-IN (EPA) :Superfund Data and Information 8:CPO-BBS (Census) :Lists open jobs at the Census Dept 9:CRS-BBS (Dept of Justice):Amer. With Disabilities Act Info 10:Computer Security (NIST) :Computer Sys Lab Computer Security BBS 11:DCBBS (DC Govt) :DC Government Information 12:DMIE (NIST/CSL) :NIST/CSL Data Management Information 13:EBB (Dept of Commerce) :Economic data and information 14:ELISA System (DoD) :DoD Export License Tracking System 15:GSA/IRM BBS (GSA) :Information Resources Management Issues 16:EPUB (Dept of Energy) :Energy information and data 17:FDA's BBS (FDA) :FDA info and policies 18:FDA/DMMS (FDA) :PMA, IDE, 510k & guidance documents 19:FERC-CIPS BBS(Dof Energy):Fed Energy Regulatory Commission 20:FEBBS (Fed Highway Admin):FHWA information and data 21:FRBBS (NIST) :FRBBS - Info on Fire Research 22:FEDERAL BBS (GPO) :GPO and Govt Data (Fee Based) 23:OSS-BBS (GSA) :GSA On-line Schedules System 24:Eximbank BBS :Export/Import Bank data and info. 25:JAG-NET (U.S. Navy) :Navy Judge Advocate General 26:Labor News(Dept of Labor):Dept of Labor information and files 27:Megawatt 1(DofEnergy) :Information on energy and DoE 28:NADAP (US Navy) :Navy Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention 29:NAVTASC (US Navy) :NAVCOMTELSTA Washington DC 30:EHSC-DDS :Army Engineering & Housing 31:NDB-BBS(Dept of Agricul) :Human Nutrition Information Service 32:NSSDC\NASA\Goddard :The NASA NODIS Locator System. 33:1040 BBS (IRS) :Electronic Tax Filing Information 34:SBB-BB (Treasury) :Surety Bond Branch, Circular 570 35:OIS (Bureau of Prisons) :US Bureau of Prison employees 36:SBIR-BBS (NASA) :NASA Small Business Innovation Research 37:WTIE-BBS (EPA) :Wastewater Treatment Info Exchange 38:QED-BBS (USGS) :Quick Epicenter Determ and EQ data 39:SALEMDUG-BBS (FEMA) :State and local FEMA user groups 40:SBA On Line (SBA) :SBA Information and data (9600 bps) 41:SBA On Line (SBA) :SBA Information & Data (2400 bps) 42:SBAI-BBS (SBA) :Small Bus. Admin internal BBS 43:Sample Weather Data (NWS):Sample data from Fee Based System 44:OPM Mainstreet :OPM - Job Info, Personnel Guidance 45:TELENEWS(Dept of Energy) :Data and info on Fossil fuels 46:USA-GPCS BBS (US Army) :Army Info System Software 47:USCS-BBS (Customs) :Customs and Exchange Rate Data & Info 48:USGS-BBS (USGS) :Geological Survey BBS/CD-ROM Info 49:NLPBB (Navy) :CNO's Navy Leadership Policy BB 50:FMS-BBS (U.S. Treas) :Inventory management data & programs 51:OASH-BBS (HHS) :Health & AIDS Information & Reports 52:FEDIX :Links Fed Data to Higher Education 53:DASC-ZE(Def Log Agency) :PC Info and files 54:GPSIC (Coast Guard) :GPS, Loran & Omega Info/status 55:NGCR-BBS (US Navy) :Next Generation Computer Resources Stan 56:PPIC-BBS (EPA) :Pollu. Preven, Clean Product, Ozone 57:Gulfline (EPA&NOAA) :Gulf Coast Pollution Information 58:FAA Safety Exchange (FAA):Small Plane Safety Reports & info 59:NTIS QuikSERVICE (NTIS) :Order NTIS Documents Online 60:LC News Service (LOC) :Library of Congress News Service 61:STIS (NSF) :Science & Technology Information System 62:MI-BBS (DoE) :DoE Minority Impact Bulletin Board 63:TECH SPECS (NRC) :Technical Specifications Improvement Pr 64:Census-BEA (Census) :Census BEA Electronic Forum 65:IHS-BBS (HHS) :Indian Health Service BBS 66:NOAA-ESDD (NOAA) :NOAA Environmental Services Data Direct 67:Offshore-BBS (Interior) :Off Shore Oil & Gas Data 68:TQM-BBS (T. Glenn) :Total Quality Management 69:NIDR Online (NIH) :Nat. Institute of Dental Research 70:NIHGL (NIH) :Nat. Inst. of Health Grant Line BBS 71:PayPerNet #1 (OPM) :Fed. Pay & Performance Management BBS 72:PayPerNet #2 (OPM) :Fed. Pay & Performance Management 73:CASUCOM (GSA) :Interagency Shared Services/Resources 74:ATTIC (EPA) :Alternative Treatment Tech Info Center 75:NCJRS-BBS (DofJustice) :National Criminal Justice Reference Sy 76:DRIPSS (EPA) :Drinking Water Info Processing Support 77:PIM BBS (EPA) :Pesticide Information Network 78:SWICH BBS (EPA&SWANA) :Solid Waste Management 79:NPS-BBS (EPA) :Nonpoint Source Program BBS 80:OEA BBS (DofInterior) :Interior's Off of Environment. Affairs 81:Metro-Net (US Army) :Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 82:CABB (Dof State) :Passport Info/ Travel Alerts 83:BUPERS Access (US Navy) :Navy Personnel Information 84:FCC-State Link (FCC) :FCC daily digest & carrier stats/report 85:HUD-N&E BB (HUD) :HUD News & Events BB. Press Releases 87:FREND #1 (Natl Archives) :Fed. Register Electronic News Delivery 88:FREND #2 (Natl Archives) :Fed. Register Electronic News Delivery 89:NHS-BBS (HHS) :National Head Start BBS 90:WSCA-BBS (Dof Labor) :Board of Wage & Service Contract Appeal 91:TEBBS (OGE) :Office of Government Ethics BBS 92:HSETC MD (U.S. Navy) :Naval Health Sci Edu & Training Command 93:PPCUG/RDAMIS (DoD) :Pentagon Users Group BBS 95:CBEE (Coast Guard) :Coast Guard On-Line Magazine & News 96:ATD BBS (FAA) :Air Transport Div. BBS 97:ATOS-BBS (FAA) :Air Traffic Operations Service BBS 98:AEE BBS (FAA) :FAA Office of Environment & Energy 99:OCA BBS (PRC) :Postal Rate Commission/Consumer Advocat 100:GEMI (GSA) :GSA Electronic Management Information 101:Airports BBS #1 (FAA) :Airport operators and designers 102:EnviroNET (NASA) :Space Environment Information Service 103:FAA HQ BBS (FAA) :FAA Headquarters BBS 104:IRS-SOI (IRS) :Public Taxpayer Statistical Information 105:ARA-BBS (FAA) :Aviation Rulemaking Advisory BBS 106:IIAC BBS (US Army) :Integration & Analysis Center BBS 108:ACF-BBS (HHS) :Admin. for Children and Families 109:NTIA-BBS (Dof Commerce) :Radio Freq. Management Issues 110:ED Board (Dept of Ed) :Dept of Ed Grant & Contract Info 111:BHPr-BBS (HHS) :Medical & Health Services Information 112:Marine Data BBS (NOAA) :Marine Databases & Files 113:Call-ERS BBS (USDA) :Agriculture Economic Research Info 114:Call ERS (USDA) :Economic Research Line Service Line 2 115:ABLE INFORM (Dof Ed) :Disability & Rehab Data & Info 116:PTO-BBS (PTO) :Patent and Trademark Office BBS 117:PerManNet (Dof State) :US Agency for International Development 118:Quick Facts! (NIAAA/HHS) :Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism Information 123:IBNS/OMPAT BBS (DoD) :Military Performance Assessement 124:EDOS (DC Crt Appeals) :US Court of Appeals, District of Columb 125:RSA-BBS (RSA) :Rehabilitation Services Administration 126:FRESBB (GSA) :Federal Real Estate Sales Bulletin Boar 128:NCUA BBS (NCUA) :National Credit Union Administration 129:NBCI-BBS (USDA) :Natl Biological Control Institute 130:OECI-BBS (DOC&DoD) :Defense Conversion Information -- Jeff Kyser PGP 2.3 public key available via finger jkyser(a)netcom.com " "

1 0

Signing Keys for Nyms and Digibank Users
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > If I remember right, none of these people puts a PGP Key ID or fingerprint > in their posting signatures, so I don't have that clue available - > that would increase my confidence a lot. But I still couldn't be sure. Suppose one were an anon(a)penet.fi subscriber, and that one were strict in digitally signing all messages, and that one's public key were available from the PGP public key servers, and that one conducted affairs in this way for a lengthy period. Would the confluence of the Email identification in the digitally signed message with the identity on the PGP public key along with the presumption of good identity management on the Finnish remailer be of sufficient weight to convince you to sign one's PGP public key? Would existing signatures on a PGP public key influence your decision? DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQBFAgUBLPxHnvFZTpBW/B35AQF68AF+LqDXWrjntXqW0bqgdIETD+aOddCAvJIA J02n5sreNbTv/1beDYpL1vQiA/3vHZOl =MH5W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

1 0

NSA Insecure Remailers?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A >probably only the NSA and some defense agency we haven't A >yet heard of are actually performing this analysis right now. But A >given the declining price of storage media, even saving everything on A >magnetic media and paying $1000/gig, it only costs about US$8.7 million A >to keep a year's worth of traffic headers around (media cost). A > A >So what? So what indeed. Why oh why do we waste so much time seeking systems that are mathematically unbreakable. You don't need mathematically unbreakable systems to have a free market on the nets. It costs a minimum of $50K to start a federal criminal prosecution (that is if the perp is inside the US). This means that the feds can only afford a few tens of thousands a year. When you add incarceration costs it quickly becomes very difficult. This being the case, they are dependent on your obedience for law enforcement success. Like any predator, the government must gain more energy from the kill than it expends on the hunt. Otherwise it weakens and dies. Did you know that fewer than 1000 people are convicted of federal tax evasion every year. Your obedience is in turn dependent on your view of whether or not obedience is right and on your fear of punishment. Quite apart from computer networks both the ideology of obedience and the fear of punishment have been declining. Net society further weakens both of these factors. The consensual hallucination that is rule by others seems more threadbare every year. The DDR border guards had the machine guns to fire on the crowds at the Berlin Wall on 10 Nov 1989. It was not mechanical failure or a magic shield that prevented them from firing. It was simply because a change had occurred in the minds of the citizenry (and in their own minds). Sure the feds can nuke your house. Would that gain them anything? It would cost more than it was worth. What they can't do is sit down next to every person on earth (or on the nets) and intimidate them. In the past it didn't matter because almost everyone was a peasant bound to the soil. As you keep piling technology and market opportunities (choices) on individuals, their power increases. Governance of others is hard enough when those governed are weak. It rapidly becomes impossible as they gain strength. Today and in the future, those who "move like Gods through cyberspace" will be much harder to control particularly since such controls will depend not on guns but on them convincing us that we are not free. DCF "They would not leave him alone." -- The first line of what relevant work of fiction? --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

"CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL" t-shirts
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The "CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL" t-shirt project is now being handled by: Christian Void <cvoid(a)albemuth.tatertot.com> I've passed on all queries and "I want one!" messages to him, so no need to resend them. -- Stanton McCandlish mech(a)eff.org 1:109/1103 EFF Online Activist & SysOp O P E N P L A T F O R M C R Y P T O P O L I C Y O N L I N E R I G H T S N E T W O R K I N G V I R T U A L C U L T U R E I N F O : M E M B E R S H I P @ E F F . O R G

1 0

Re: Factor Breakthru!
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Factoring is only one method. Case in point: solving the game of Go has been proven to take exponential time *and* exponential space. An encryption algorithm based on it could potentially be very hard, although there are subtleties about trap doors and the cost of key generation and use... Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com P.S.: I'm installing procmail over here...get version v2.91 (I fixed a segv in v2.61 [on SunOS] yesterday and should have just picked up the newer version first.)

1 0

Re: Knights who say NII (
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

M >Government is not the only potential source of harm--private industry M >can be plenty harmful. Prove it. Sans guns there's not much private institutions can do. That's the problem with letting leftists hang around here. (Just kidding folks.) They're not worried about governments with nukes and centuries of a tradition of slaughtering millions of people but they are worried about private entities who've hardly killed anyone. Most NGO (non governmental organization) problems are actually misclassifications. Analysts confusing NGO+Government conspiracies with NGOs alone. I can live next to a Chevy dealer for 80 years without him sending armed men next door to my house to get me to buy a car. Bell Atlantic is a bad thing only because it used to have a government granted local loop monopoly. Since that monopoly is as dead as a doornail no matter what Bell Atlantic or the government thinks about the matter, BA (and indeed the government itself) are just market actors. As soon as we (and they) recognize their new status, we'll be better off. May you live in interesting times. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

N >The amount of electronic material the superhighway can carry is N >dizzying compared to the relatively narrow range of broadcast TV and N >the limited number of cable channels. Properly constructed and N >regulated, it could be open to all who wish to speak, publish and N >communicate. How is it possible to prevent it with or without government action. Since the information superhighway will be carrying "phone calls" and since there will be absolutely no difference between "phone calls" and everything else on the system, "phone calls" can carry everything. If we don't like corporate offerings "phone calls" can be used to disseminate whatever we like. Phone and cable services were limited because they were government monopolies. The only way to assure that future networks don't suffer from these problems, is to eliminate government regulation/monopoly. The market smashed IBMs closed platform computer system without government help. There is no risk that Bell Atlantic could impose a closed network system unless the government helps it. To the contrary, I doubt if they would be able to do it even *with* government help. And another thing. I'm sick and tired of moaning about cost. Services are virtually free today and prices can go nowhere but down. There are homeless people on the streets of NY with Internet accounts. The hardware cost of a computer is essentially zero. What exactly is the fair market value of a Commodore Vic 20 and a Commodore 300 baud modem. I know I can get an XT+1200 baud modem + shareware comms program for circa $100 at any computer show in NJ. Once your local loop monopoly is broken, local phone service will be dirt cheap. Network Email connections via local BBS are cheap. AT&T Mail charges a big $3/month for an Email account (with 800 number). Most network services are reachable via Email gateways. The real prices of almost all open market goods have fallen dramatically since WWII. This has particularly been the case in telecoms and electronics. This decline will continue. We need market discipline not government discipline to open up network access. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0