December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: clipper pin-compatible chip
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: m5(a)vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) >I don't think the idea proposed is to reverse-engineer the Clipper. >Rather, the idea is that once you know the pin-out you can make an >electrically-compatible (and, in important ways, software-compatible) >replacement. While the clipper chip and its CCEP brethern have chip specifications that imply that key is supplied as long as a read flag is in a certain state. The key for the clipper chip is 10 bytes of actual key plus 3 bytes of cryptographic check word (CCW), for a total of 13 bytes. Operating in a system expecting a clipper chip potentially restricts the keyspace. Non-centrally selected keys use the clipper chip to 'fish' for the CCW, where it is re-fed. The host system (to the clipper chip) is going to try and feed 10 bytes plush 3 bytes of a constant. Utilizing IDEA, the key is supposed to be 16 Bytes. The point being that dropping an IDEA chip in is not 'plug and play'.

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unsubscribe
by Godzilla's Home Boy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE

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Quantum cryptography
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

J >Does anyone know how quantum cryptography works? J > J > - Joi Almost certainly. DCF "We'll free you sons of bitches whether you want to be freed or not." --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: Crypto and 4th A.
by Lee Tien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Roy: I'm a lawyer, and I've not run across any law review articles that discuss cryptography in relation to privacy or Fourth Amendment rights. The classic treatise on Fourth Amendment search and seizure is by LaFave. I haven't looked at it recently, but it might discuss crypto. One "brute-force" approach to the legal literature is to go to the law library and scan the Index to Legal Periodicals, which is organized by subject as well as author. I don't think you'll find anything under crypto, but you'll find LOTS of stuff about the Fourth Amendment. It'll take time, but by scanning the titles of the articles you'll be able to tell if there's anything about crypto. Some law libraries also have an index of recent articles on CD- ROM, which is easier to search but is typically less comprehensive. Also check under the name Tribe, L. Tribe is the nation's leading constitutional scholar IMHO and at the first Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy he gave a talk on "technology and the Constitution." I don't recall his talking about crypto at all, but he did use as an example the cases involving privacy and wiretapping, i.e., Olmstead v. U.S., Katz v. U.S. Katz is the case which set forth the notion of "reasonable expectation of privacy." (REP) Tribe was a Supreme Court clerk who worked on this opinion, I believe. Tribe's one-volume treatise, "American Constitutional Law," briefly discusses constitutional dimensions of privacy law in one section. It is good, but only current up to 1988, as I recall. Having said that, it becomes obvious that you may want to focus on the law of REP and how it intersects with technological change. For instance, advocates of Digital Telephony, Clipper et al often make the argument that "we're only trying to maintain the status quo -- we just want to keep the existing practical balance that comes from most communications being plaintext." Yet in the same discussion -- almost in the same breath -- the same advocates of "maintaining the status quo" will remind you that you have NO REP in such things as your hair fibers, DNA obtained from saliva under a postage stamp, etc., and therefore "we don't need a search warrant." Clearly, forensic technologies have improved greatly over the years, but the law has not consistently followed a "status quo" approach. Law enforcement is better described as having a "ratchet" approach; they want to keep all the gains from improvements in forensic and surveillance technology, but not the losses. (I am indebted to Mike Godwin of EFF for this point, which he made publicly in a panel with an Assistant U.S. Attorney back in January.) BTW, keep in mind that there's an (arguably) crucial difference between the privacy implications of something like hair fiber or DNA forensic analysis and encryption/decryption relative to communications. Analyzing my hair fibers reveals no information about anyone else. With most communications there is a threat to the privacy of more than one person. I'm curious -- what's the thesis or general thrust of your article? I could say more, but that's probably enough for now. We can take this discussion to e-mail rather than the list if Cypherpunks find it too tangential. Lee Tien tien(a)well.sf.ca.us

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No Subject
by nobody＠eli-remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear List, Actually what I am looking for is a country like Switzerland or Lichenstein where a numbered(or anonymous) accounts are possible and where confirmation of deposits(wire transfer) can be done to the Internet(note that direct internet connectivity is NOT required) only Email.... Anyone know of Institutions like this(i.e. email addresses for correspondance are needed) Thank you in advance Anon

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4th ammendment and cryptography
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I didn't say much on the 4th ammendment, but did mention it in csn.org:/mpj/cryptusa.* My main argument was that the ITAR violates the 1st ammendment. By the way, the above mentioned ftp site has an "export controlled" area for crypto software and information. Don't let lack of a distribution point stop you from writing crypto software. Send me some mail if you are interested in distributing a quality, strong crypto program in the USA. Mike Johson mpj(a)csn.org

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Crypto-Doc Gopher
by ejohnson＠pmip.dist.maricopa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Crypto-Doc Gopher is open: gopher://pmip.maricopa.edu:770/ It may in the future become a WWW server; who knows. New documents, updates, and comments appreciated: ejohnson(a)pmip.maricopa.edu --Eric --- "Knowledge of C++ isn't a requirement of full (voting) membership of the committee." -- Bjarne Stroustrup Eric Johnson ejohnson(a)names.maricopa.edu Maricopa Community Colleges, Tempe AZ 602-731-8919

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No Subject
by god 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

God knows I have sent messages to the -request address, but again I must ask, and this time maybe it will happen... unsubscribe blankenm(a)seq.oit.osshe.edu ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - It's an analog world, son... - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just thought some people would want to know -- Detweiler has turned up under a new nym from the PENET server. Some posts to his "cypherwonks" list have recently appeared with the From line of From: an62770(a)anon.penet.fi (CRaP) <anon12070(a)anon.penet.fi> (S.Boxx) Undoubtedly this will turn up elsewhere as well. Yours, A LOYAL TENTACLE OF MEDUSA

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Multikey crypto
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I am relatively new to the field of encryption forgive me if this is a FAQ. Has anyone ever done anything with an encryption scheme that allows multiple unlocking keys? What I'm thinking about is a way to encrypt some data and then create multiple keys that will decrypt the data. I want to be able to encrypt a document and then give multiple people access to the document and be able to lock out a key and/or generate new keys without having to redistribute keys to everybody that already has one. I realize that this makes it easier to attack the encrypted information since there are multiple keys to unlock the data but I don't consider this a big problem. If someone wants to throw heavy duty horsepower at the problem they will crack it eventually anyway. Mike -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Mike Markley || The opinions here do not represent the mmarkley(a)microsoft.com || opinions of my employer. Attempts to || associate the two are pointless. "I want to look at life, In the available light" - Neil Peart -

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Re: The Packwood Memorial Diary Server
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim choate writes: > The courts could then assume that the purpose of the > server is to collect and store documents in such a way that > there is a priori intention to prohibit legal agents from > accessing said data under court ordered supeona. This > qualifies as a conspiracy in every legal jurisdiction > that I know of. It also opens the sysadmin open to > prosecution as well. > > Won't float in any pond I know of... > Are there really no countries in the world that would permit such a server? How depressing. If true, I guess the next question becomes: How can you offer a service to the Internet, but make it impossible for a Bad Guy to physically locate you? Perhaps the server shouldn't stay in any one location for very long. Bring it up and post an Internet address. Operate for a few days, then shut it down and move to some new location, with a new Internet address. Sounds possible, but damned inconvenient. A wireless connection would help. The server host could be in a van or RV or something. <sigh> Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: Multikey crypto
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I am relatively new to the field of encryption forgive me if this is a FAQ. Has anyone ever done anything with an encryption scheme that allows multiple unlocking keys? What I'm thinking about is a way to encrypt some data and then create multiple keys that will decrypt the data. I want to be able to encrypt a document and then give multiple people access to the document and be able to lock out a key and/or generate new keys without having to redistribute keys to everybody that already has one. I realize that this makes it easier to attack the encrypted information since there are multiple keys to unlock the data but I don't consider this a big problem. If someone wants to throw heavy duty horsepower at the problem they will crack it eventually anyway. There are a number of ways to do that. The best overview can be found in @incollection{Simmons92, author = {Gustavus J. Simmons}, title = {An Introduction to Shared Secret and/or Shared Control Schemes and Their Application}, booktitle = {Contemporary Cryptology: The Science of Information Integrity}, year = 1992, pages = {441--497}, editor = {Gustavus J. Simmons}, publisher = {{IEEE} Press} } The best-known scheme is described in @article{sharesecret, author = {Adi Shamir}, journal = {Communications of the ACM}, number = {11}, pages = {612--613}, title = {How to Share a Secret}, volume = {22}, year = {1979} } but also see @article{sealing, author = {David K. Gifford}, journal = {Communications of the ACM}, number = {4}, pages = {274--286}, title = {Cryptographic Sealing for Information Secrecy and Authentication}, volume = {25}, year = {1982} }

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Re: Crypto-Doc Gopher
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:29 PM 1/26/94 -0700, Eric Johnson wrote: >The Crypto-Doc Gopher is open: > > gopher://pmip.maricopa.edu:770/ > >It may in the future become a WWW server; who knows. You are aware that you really don't have to have a http server to serve HTML documents. I do it only with ftp (see my signature file for URL.) It is not as elegant as an http server with it's lower overhead protocol, but it works! ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

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clipper cracking
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May says; >Yeah, I guess Duncan is right. I did write some comments about the >procedures that would be needed to reverse-engineer the Clipper >chip (having started Intel's electron-beam analysis lab in 1981), >but I don't think I ever advocated it as a Cyperpunks project, >that's for sure! >(If I'm misremembering, someone will correct me.) >Might I suggest first spending several thousand dollars to buy--if >you can--some Clipperphones, then tear them apart to see how the >chips are mounted (rumor: surface mount, hard to get at) and what >kind of encapsulization is used. I'll be happy to provide a few >hours or more of free consulting on what kind of plasma asher >you'll need to get to the chip surface, some approaches to >voltage-contrast analysis, and other "peeling" steps to consider. >--Tim May I remember that post, in fact I have it right here <digital rummaging sounds> Here's a fairly long posting I made to sci.crypt and comp.lsi about reverse engineering the Clipper chip. Especially on the technical issues about tamper-resistant modules and electron-beam probing. (followup to comp.lsi added, as they may have something to say on this) allyn (allyn(a)netcom.com) wrote: I ran an electron microscope/chip testing lab for Intel, circa 1981-84. (We built a kind of "time machine" for imaging the internal states of complex chips--the 286 in those days--and displaying them on an image processing system which "subtracted out" the states of bad chips from known good chips and thus allowed us to analyze the nucleation and propagation of logic faults through the chip. Very useful for finding subtle speed and voltage problems, as well as gross faults, of course.) Analyzing the Clipper chip, or any "tamper-resistant module," will not be trivial, but neither will it be impossible. Some issues, questions, problems: 1. Getting through the package to the chip surface itself is problematic. Proprietray molding compounds may be used to make this tough. (For example, carborundum and sapphire particles are often mixed in, so that mechanical grinding and lapping also destroys the chip. And plasma ashing won't work.) 2. Sometimes the package itself has "traps" which wipe the chip (the data) if breached (fiber optic lines mixed in the epoxy, for example). This seems unlikely for a relatively low-cost solution like the Clipper. Papers presented at the "Crypto Conference" have dealt with this. (The main uses: nuclear weapons "Permissive Action Links" and credit card "smart cards," which use less intensive measures, obviously.) 3. Once at the chip surface, via grinding, chemical etch, plasma ashing, etc., the chip can be analyzed. Carefully photographing the chip as layers are etched away (or even carefully lapped away) can reveal much about the internal operation, though not the data stored in internal ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash EPROM, etc. If the Clipper/Capstone algorithm is embedded in the microcode and not apparent from the visible circuitry, then it must be read by other means. 5. Voltage contrast electron microscopy allows internal chip voltages to be read with good reliability. Cf. any of the the many papers on this. Commercial e-beam probers are available. (How voltage contrast works is itself an interesting issue, and there are many good references on this.) 6. However, operating the chip is necessary to read the internal states and voltage levels, and opening the chip under "hostile conditions" (read: limited numbers of samples, no knowledge of the molding compound, no help from the manufacturer) often destroys the functionality. It can be done, but count on lots of trial and error. 7. Metal layers may be used to shield lower signal-carrying layers from scrutiny by electron beam probes. Intel, for example, builds the new Pentium on a 3-layer metal process in which the top layer almost completely covers the lower layers. (Extremely sophisticated measurements using lasers (Kerr effect) and magnetic field sensing may be possible. Count on a very expensive set-up to do this.) 8. Other "tricks" may route parts of the key circuitry through buried layers, polysilicon lines, several layers of metal, etc. 9. VLSI Technology, Inc., the company with the "tamper-resistant technology" used by Mykotronx (VTI will fab the chips), may also be storing bits in very small EEPROM cells, which are very hard to e-beam probe (especially without disrupting them!). Note also that Intel bought a partial stake in VLSI. (I'm not imputing anything and don't know if Intel is somehow involved in the Clipper/Capstone effort. In fact, I left Intel in 1986.) 10. The easiest way to get the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone details is probably the old-fashioned way: offer money for it. With anonymous remailers and digital cash, this may be much easier. Just some thoughts on this extremely interesting issue of reverse-engineering the Clipper. - -Tim May No, you clearly did not advocate this as a Cypherpunk project, but feel free to elaborate.... Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUgn+tCcBnAsu2t1AQEVLgP8DVxH2AJgk/6M8+Xj2i6L+GIJCRahkg5A pjKIFQcE++nQwqmnOnAAl/zr7jR8hezLl/e5CNaD4Chjo21MDuoj8+ZQZPOAF85s lxhBxmy6prME36EA4cOpgwOvZrKpMeEskRUmXoLJfd9DVcJKhMImHbsDrNNaplij cm4BJIC0ch8= =FHiQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Anonymous Anonymous ftp
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > [stuff deleted] > > How is anonymous 2-way communication possible? Several > ways: > > - prepaid mailers, good for sending a packet to a > destination. With the final address nested insided a > series of encrypted packets, no mix along the way can > identify Bob without extensive collusion with other > mixes. > > [stuff deleted] > > - pools, a la the pools used by Miron Cuperman and by my own > BlackNet experiment. Not a fast 2-way communication > system, but it works. > > - a Penet-style 2-way system, with additional security. > Multiple... > I understand how you can do 2-way anonymous communication via message pools and Penet-style systems, but I don't "get" prepaid mailers. Could you post an example showing how two people can converse anonymously via prepaid mailers. Thanks, Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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No Subject
by Audun.Joesang＠alcatel.no 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Aviel Rubin asked: >I am compiling a list of places that are actually using digital >cash. If anyone knows of current implementations, or of any >plans that will probably be implemented, can you please send >me the info.? Thanks a lot. Denmark has got a live system going on for a few years. It's called DANMONT (with a slash through the "O") meaning litterally "Danish coin". They gave a talk at Smart Card '93 at Wembley, London, last year and will give another talk at Smart Card '94 on Wednesday 16th February this year. You can contact Jens Lindboe-Larsen or Annette Falberg of DANMONT,or you can call the Wembley Exhibition organisers on (tel)+44-733-394304 (fax)+44-733-390042.

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LA Times - "Gestapo State"
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a good article from the L.A. Times. It is a bit off topic, so I'll post it anon and avoid the fLamers. AMERICANS ARE PUTTING UP WITH A SPIRALING GESTAPO STATE By Paul Craig Roberts Special to the Los Angeles Times What will become of "law and order conservatism" now that we know that our law-enforcement agencies -- from the Justice Department to local police forces -- can be as criminal as the miscreants that they are supposed to pursue? Unspeakable acts of cold-blooded murder and fabricated evidence now routinely characterize everyday acts of law enforcement in the United States. In Malibu, Calif., a 30-person raiding party of sheriff's deputies, federal drug agents and the California National Guard broke into the home of Donald Scott and shot him dead. Scott, it turns out, was a reclusive man, heir to a European fortune, whose $5 million, 200-acre ranch was targeted by federal agents under drug-forfeiture laws. No drugs or marijuana plants were found, but an alert Ventura County prosecutor, Michael Bradbury, did find that the raiding party had an appraisal of Scott's ranch, along with notes on the sale price of nearby property. Gideon Kanner, a Los Angeles law professor who has examined the case, concluded that the feds thought Scott might have a wife who indulged in drugs and decided to see if they could bag a $5 million piece of property for the Treasury. In pre-democratic times, this was known as "tax farming". Government officials simply seized whatever they could and raked off a commission. Today, the commission is in the form of the bureaucracy's budget. Ever since President Reagan's budget director, David Stockman, invented "budget savings" from tougher Internal Revenue Service and drug enforcement, the pressure has been on these marauders to farm more revenues. The results are mounting abuses of citizens and occasional deaths. What will be done about it? Nothing. Scott, awakened from sleep by the sound of his door crashing in, made the mistake of walking out of his bedroom with a gun in his hand. The military force got off with a self-defense plea. Shades of Waco, Texas, where the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms folks killed 86 men, women and children, while the attorney general took all the credit to show how tough she is. Noted defense attorney Gerry Spence told the Montana Trial Lawyers Association in July that he had never been involved in a case with the federal government in which the government had not lied and manufactured evidence to gain a conviction. "These are not the good guys", he said. "These are people who do what they believe is necessary to do to bring about a conviction." The law gets hung with the victim. What, you might protest, about the Los Angeles and Detroit convictions of police officers who beat black motorists? Aren't these signs that checks and balances work and that we are free from the arbitrary application of power that medieval serfs had to endure? Alas, these police offers were not done in because they abused their power, but because they were charged with racism and violating the civil rights of a member of a "preferred minority". As incredible as it may seem, in the United States only blacks have any protection from abusive state power. They have a special, racial civil-rights shield. The rest of us must make do with happenstance. Formally, a person could protect himself by getting rich. But today that just makes you more of a target. Witness the fates of billionaires Michael Milken and Leona Helmsley -- and of Donald Scott. Politically ambitious prosecutors need drama, and they don't get that from the local drug pusher. Federal drug agents are not going to waste their time and risk their lives rounding up Jamaican drug gangs (who shoot back) -- especially when inner-city juries may not convict either out of fear or feelings of racial solidarity -- when they can pick soft targets like Scott. Nothing makes it clearer that the United States is no longer a "nation of laws" than federal wetlands regulations. These "laws" have been created entirely by bureaucrats and courts. All over America, people are finding their uses of their property circumvented and themselves in jail because of these regulatory police and their "laws". Recently, the Clinton administartion said: "Congress should amend the Clean Water Act to make it consistent with the agencies' rule- making." And Sens. Max Baucus, D-Mont., and John H. Chaff, R-R.I., have introduced a bill to codify all the wetlands regulations that are being enforced without any legal basis. Note that the two senators did not introduce a bill to stop unelected bureaucrats from illegally creating laws and running all over our constitutional protections. Not even a wrist slap. To hell with the U.S. Constitution, say the senators. Let's pass a law that future courts will use to give carte blanche to the regulatory police. Let's ennoble the bureaucrats. Divine rule cannot be blocked by special-interest lobbying. Roberts, former assistant Trasury secretary, is chairman of the Institute for Political Economy.

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Multiple Posting
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry about the multiple appearance of "Digital Barter Economy". I did not send it twice; Delphi does that sometimes. It seems to think the message bounced the first time, so it sends it again.

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Re: Remailer Noise Traffic
by Philippe Nave 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hollander writes : > > Hey, no problem, I'll have my remailer barf up a bunch of noise messages if > you'll run a slocal to filter them out. > I don't know what 'slocal' is, but I've got a kill file; if these messages contain some identifying pattern, I should be able to filter them out. Throw me a few of them and I'll tinker with my setup; also, give me some warning about what they'll look like so I can pick them out of the 'normal' mix of inspired brilliance and warped lunacy that passes for Cypherpunks message traffic...... :) [Zing! Off on a tangent.....] Stop me if you've heard this... This looks like a neat opportunity to play with digital money. Note that I said _play_. Apologies to all, but my eyes glaze over when I read too deeply into postings about authenticated foo bar prime number anonymously deniable recursively repudiable ching fong quux blat zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz...... However, if you wanted to send me (n) digital coins, electric cents, donkey farts, or whatever for every (k) noise messages I send/receive, I can see where it would be fun to try to spend them. Everybody else could try to steal them from me, I could try to spend them over and over and try to counterfeit them (perhaps asking for skilled help), and we could fiddle around with Monopoly money to our hearts' content. I'd buy things, somebody would produce goods for sale, we'd screw up the whole 'economy' repeatedly, and you digital-cash types could write enormously complex and elegant papers about the whole thing. - -- ........................................................................ Philippe D. Nave, Jr. | The person who does not use message encryption pdn(a)dwroll.dw.att.com | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO... Denver, Colorado USA | PGP public key: by arrangement. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUgq+AvlW1K2YdE1AQFoIwQAiCL067b+4zHbPQJYTJiDz0vrwu9dCwr9 9f83J4rAMFWENB/+8MRDskKgG0oY9l1qz/trdwqvkWr5SpYuGGnecULl/8jpAp6f NfNOA3bCopVpnTH4EpHG569kAjcpQk9vWi8zmEj7Y7s/hW4sVZmqmTVvMWbh6EEp yRRlkVmrjVM= =cJX9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Talk at MIT Feb 2 (mini-abstract)
by Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This was posted to an MIT internal newsgroup; people in the local area are welcome to attend. I do not have any further information. --AW] MIT TOC SEMINAR Wednesday, February 2, 1994 Refreshments at 4:00pm, Talk at 4:15pm in NE43-518 Title: Tracing Traitors by Amos Fiat, Tel Aviv University Abstract: We give cryptographic schemes that help identify the source of a leak. Such schemes are relevant in the context of pay television, and easily combine and complement the broadcast encryption schemes of Fiat and Naor. Joint work with Benny chor and Moni Naor Host: Baruch Awerbuch

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remailer multiple paths?
by Mark W. Eichin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there any value to the idea of breaking up a message and sending the parts of it by different "remailer paths" to the ultimate recipient? Shouldn't this reduce the risk of remailer compromise as much or more than simply nesting remailers? You'd need a good way of breaking up the message; if you were encrypting already, it'd probably do well enough to put byte x into message (x mod n) where you're sending n messages. (You could even slice it at the bit level, but that's a little harder to do in a trivial script...) Or would you? is breaking up the message at all good enough, or is it necessary that "nothing of value" can be produced from the pieces? Haven't thought this through, but perhaps others here have. (The concept could even be used with an anonymous pool, sort of a "collect the whole set!" type of reading mechanism...) It could be argued that the various binary.pictures groups are already run this way :-) _Mark_ <eichin(a)paycheck.cygnus.com> ... just me at home ...

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GUI for a remailer!
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out: http://monet.vis.colostate.edu/testing/mailer.html It's a test of a remailer based in a WWW HyperText Server, coded by yours truly. You need a WWW client that supports "forms" to see it, so try NCSA's Mosaic 2.1 for X. (available from ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu in /Mosaic -- they have binaries for most machines.) Tell me if you would like to set one up for yourself, and I would be glad to help. Please realize that this is just a test. Don't use it for remailing, just for seeing if you like it. Thanks, and have fun, -nate -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons <nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu> <nate(a)yuma.ANCS.ColoState.Edu> | | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | | Data Visualization/Interrogation, Modeling, Animation, Rendering | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re:quote of the day
by an56238＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hughes writes: >Because of economics and political stability. > >You can build computers and monitoring devices in secret, deploy them >in secret, and listen to _everything_. To listen to everything with >bludgeons and pharmaceuticals would not only cost more in labor and >equipment, but also engender a radicalizing backlash to an actual >police state. So, it looks like cryptography boils down to making a lot of noise on the _everything_ channel, to prevent the state from listening to it, but that the case of an individual under suspicion is hopeless. How terrible! That almost scares you into being honest and paying your taxes and everything again. All of you cypherpunks who were hoping to hide your little secrets with pgp, just forget about it: what cryptography is all about is to make statistics look bland. >Of course, if one is paranoid, these considerations of the whole do >not hold, since for only one person the cost balance is reversed. But I *am* paranoid, and proudly so, since the age of two. And you would be too if you were into the business of getting cryptography down into the real world instead of toying with theoretical ideas in front of a computer screen. - -zap -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCUAgUBLUdx0Ck+9PttYUp1AQHm+AP0CFtl01rygFYz16WYFsd5r7+gpe9iajUr xeVmB/YTccc/GJO8jbzeA+cpTtedQ8t5iiFlMdtX6NcskeN3fwi52RAL/7sgNhIL LMV13dhl7IJ5pEHb2zdhbCIMClXSVVihHfs2eJRRWHSVwSYV+0Xpy8ISNW/OM7A3 WsqlsMip/A== =ZHFB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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remailer?
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nice as remailers are, I wonder if it might be better to simply create a "message drop". Various anon ID's would be created, with suitable passwords. If Sam wishes to mail to Joe, he sends to the account. It sits for up to a week before auto-deletion; prior to that time Joe can check his account for messages, retrieve as appropriate, leave other messages, and leave. The primary 'phone number would be in one location, with the remailer at a different physical location connected via non-toll call forwarding. Hence, no LD toll records of the calls to the device. Individuals would place calls, so their records might "give them away"; but there would be no return calls from the device. Finally, if someone wanted to use methods other than PGP this would seem to support such methods. Any thoughts, or am I hopelessly clueless? Regards, Dave

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Re: clipper pin-compatibl
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

T >Yeah, a lot of folks suggested the same thing (I didn't, so I'm T >neutral on the credit issue). It was debated in scy.crypt, as well as T >here on Cypherpunks. Modesty, modesty. It seems to me than *some* T. C. May discussed the reverse engineering of the Clipper Chip in April 1993 as part of the Clipper/Capstone announcement firestorm. DCF An elephant never forgets. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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