December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Linux under SecureDrive partition?
by jpp＠jpplap.markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I don't know how to make a dos device driver run under linux. I would be interested since due to lack of space, most of my dos partition is doublespaced. I supose you could port SecureDrive to linux, after all, you have (or theoreticaly can get) the source. j' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQBXAgUBLg3DedC3U5sdKpFdAQHHWAIKAsUp+azpPNe2QnPBVBfds9bUcnufauqs BjK07S1/S+i6naeLXj4Ge7JB2qKlmqYQs5DylPAHeUa5QxVOnoQtOYh5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Linux under SecureDrive partition?
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Re: Linux under SecureDrive partition? > 1. Where can I get the latest/greatest copy of SecureDrive? > (I'm a U.S. resident). > > 2. Can I install Linux underneath a SecureDrive partition -- > say, DOS on C:, Linux under SecureDrive under D: and the > Linux swap also under SecureDrive. So that the C: DOS > partition is in the clear, and all the good stuff running > under Linux is hidden on D:. There's something called CFS written by mab(a)research.att.com which is an encrypting file system for many flavours of Unix (essentially does NFS over the loopback) including Linux. It isn't the fastest thing in the world, but it does work. I've heard mutterings about a port of SFS to Linux, but I don't have any concrete information about this. You can get the latest SecureDrive from ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXXX/SECDRV/secdrv13e.zip to find the value of XXXXXXXX cd /pub/crypto/software and read the README file. Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBVAgUBLg3fnmrJdmD9QWqxAQEyywIAn/Q15RpxdXMS0OACYQTCyYkbgIGNhACc eWpL1FyZM84r1aUeQDVimlOAz9qHIr6Yy4cT0408ZtcKJituXgHrGQ== =Z6UI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca - RIPEM MD5: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP key fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 low security key fingerprint: EC E7 C3 A9 2C 30 25 C6 F9 E1 25 F3 F5 AF 92 E3 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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GILMORE IN THE SUNDAY PAPER
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, John Gilmore has a hot op-ed piece in the business section of the San Francisco Examiner entitled, "Strong Cryptography a Must." Lots of good stuff. My favorite was, "...we want the public to see a serious debate about why the Constitution should be burned in order to save the country." Gee, I'm glad John is on *our* side. S a n d y

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Re: anon service at vox.hacktic.nl
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There are basicly two remailers at vox.hacktic.nl : - -> a cypherpunx-style remailer with three adresses -) nobody -) remail -) remailer - -> a anon mail back ID remailer -) anon Sometimes you may find it conveniant to have te ability to receive mail, but to remain anonymous for the sender. anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl gives you that ability. Here is some info: {step 1} send some mail to ping(a)vox.hacktic.nl to receive a pong and an account ie. an0(a)vox.hacktic.nl {step 2} send your first message to anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl, the commands for remailingare similair to the cypherpunx-remailers, the only differance will be the sender. If you send mail to remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl, the name that will appear in the FROM: line is nobody(a)vox.hacktic.nl. If you send mail to anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl the corresponding entry for the adress that is sending the mail will be in the FROM: line, ie an0(a)vox.hacktic.nl so someone can contact you by sending mail to an0(a)vox.hacktic.nl. This mail will not be anonymised, you -will- know the sender. If you - -as a sender- want to remain anonymous send the mail trough a remailer or aquire a anon account at vox.hacktic.nl and send the mail using the anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl remailer. {step 3} make -absolutily positively- sure the header pasting tokens [::] are the first thing you type, if you start with a blanc line, your remail request -will- fail. Hope this helps. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz. iQCVAgUBLg4Ki1nfdBSNVpE9AQG+jgP+PUmaqszGp+aMelflYXOOin47Zu+dVIqX 25Ry356L3/dGD2rMKYZMTK3P1+ly4F4ildgh/Gf5zQiqTh4Ry4L0zG8z3/xYEzwJ vNun9e6zREXGhnaFx9W/7Da67AHfhe38hvcO15riG9Jl4sEQWAXCkqQmyj+05KFx oxxt2XbkQ+U= =Rg9Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regz, -- ____ Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl> \ /__ =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- \/ / "It's dangerous to be right when the government is wrong." \/ --Voltaire --finger usura(a)hacktic.nl for PGPKEY -kinky-

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H.E.A.T. UPDATE
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, "Acapulco H.E.A.T." was hip deep in crypto again this week. This time the Team was trying to bust *drug trafficers* (bad, bad drug lords). For some reason, my favorite character, "Cat" (Alison Armitage) got herself into a school for women drug operative recruited by the trafficers. We got to see lots of scenes of Cat and other nubiles jogging, doing jumping jacks, push ups and, best of all, shooting strange large caliber automatic weapons. The crypto part? Oh, yeah, right. Anyway, the trafficers (ex-KGB types) were transmitting date, time and location information to associates in Miami. Communications was via a series of numbers read in the clear over shortwave radio. For some reason, the H.E.A.T. guys new that the "key" was a ten-digit number that was the *same* every time! Since the KGB guy had once been busted by the CIA, H.E.A.T. finally guessed that the key was the CIA's phone number. No kidding. There was some other minor computer stuff, but the important values were preserved: Alison and other babes did callisthenics, there was lots of gun play and Fabio did *not* "act" in this episode. Tune in next--same H.E.A.T.-time, same H.E.A.T.-channel--for the further crypto adventures of "Acapulco H.E.A.T." S a n d y

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Warning about PGP
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING Quoting "Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schneier, Page 287-288." > Low Exponent Attack Agenst RSA > Another suggestion to "improve" RSA is to use low > values for e, the public key. This makes encryption > fast and easy to perform. Unfortunately, it is also > insecure. Hastad demonstrated a successful attack > against RSA with a low encryption key [417]. Another > attack by Michael Wiener will recover e, when e is > up to one quarter the size of n [878]. A low decryption > key d, is just as serious a problem. Moral: Choose > large values for e and d. > 417. J. Hastad, "On Using RSA with Low Exponent in a Public- > Key Network," Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '85 > Proceedings, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp403-408 > 878. M. J. Weiner, "Cryptanalysis of Short RSA Secret Exponents." > IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, v.36, n. 3, > May 1990, pp. 553-558. The public domain PGP programs curriently produce short public key exponents, (17 is a common value). It would seem that the Governments of the world have had easy access to PGP traffic. Tom Rollins <trollins(a)debbie.telos.com> WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCzAgUBLg3CpGWJTLDtTMmNAQHhfQTwkalahr6xBNpeO8Yg2Ln1TkTbJ/VDccSS 4hZmqos1WEhmNuHEYTbKBZoS5wA9PHJkd26byy8JCAxoM5siiL6tNUaA4hRa+0IV RJtIYnS5yIvGfocrBcmN+e2fJGZXyyc+h1cUzNMq/aml4CEmnaHl7PKhL69pk4jI TfKUnah0ihgCb72Dkzqtsw6iTsJpg1rEd+TDpDPpTp3KIB0xbtk= =e5eN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: H.E.A.T. UPDATE
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, shoot, what's the use of watching this show if Fabio (+5) isn't in it? Why, it's because when he *is* on, it will make you ponder the need for & importance of privacy. I get it, now. Blanc Le Bon Femme

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More of one man's opinion
by Michael Wilson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello again Cypherpunks... A fast follow up to the previous note I dropped at the list... I was asked by a group of businessmen to explain, following up my previous message, why the government was restricting exports on crypto gear/software/knowledge when everything else in the inventory was being shoved out the door, as well as why the media wasn't getting into the picture. My answers: If the domestic market dries up for a product [alternative cryptographic solutions besides Clipper], then traditionally a provider will look to export his products to available markets overseas. With the requirement of a munitions license to deal in these products, few software or hardware houses are going to attempt to get approval and deal with the problems of selling the product overseas. It fits into the strategy of market denial--create apathy at home so people can't support the advances there, and prevent them from making money overseas. Consider it 'follow the money'' in reverse--watch what happens when there is no money to be made in an area. Classic 'die-back.' As for media coverage on the issue, look at what we are talking about. Can you explain it in 4th grade language? Can you put the issues on a 3x5 card? Where is the 'sizzle,' as they say in the news biz? A new product release of PGP? So what. Barlow or other EFF members write an article or speak? So what. Phil makes a comment? So what. Where is the blood, the arrests, the kicking in of doors, the things that make for news? Nada. To sustain interest, you have to have 'developments,' witness the Simpson fiasco. Why does that so dominate the attention of the media and the public? Because the lid gets peeled back and people get to hear more dirt every day. Just try to peel back the lid at NSA, I dare you. What is the solution? There isn't one. There was all sorts of noise when it first became an issue. That noise was in fact detrimental to the cause. Now a news organization will say "we covered that already, so what's new... nothing? drop it." The only thing that can be done is by the continuing effort to discover 'developments' and make those known. Find the holes. Tell people. Keep the situation buzzing. Right now, there is a lot of 'preaching to the choir' going on; lots of high-fives and back-slapping, and when it all is said and done, the government still gets its way. Push on the issue and expand it; demonstrate how strong crypto can be used for secure operating systems and viral protection (don't look for viral signatures, MAC executables and look for changes). Is Clipper the choice of the National Information Infrastructure? If it is, kiss any effort at ANY other form of crypto good-bye. Develop alternates that are more appealing to the market for NII. Push stories of how international industrial espionage is attacking American business, and how strong crypto is needed for commercial enterprise (site the French attacks on companies such as IBM, where the DST [French intel] was the perpetrator, and they could break Clipper). Cypherpunks write code, but they also need to wage political war against the enemy. Michael Wilson Managing Director, The Nemesis Group [A special note to the government 'stoolie'; tell the boys back at McLean and Meade that their purchases through the Maryland Procurement Office are in public databases, and are quite revealing! Tag, you're it!]

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Re: Warning about PGP - relax
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Re: Warning about PGP - relax > WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING > > insecure. Hastad demonstrated a successful attack > > against RSA with a low encryption key [417]. Another > > attack by Michael Wiener will recover e, when e is > > up to one quarter the size of n [878]. Take a look at the errata (I'm quoting from version 1.5.9). } Page 287: Last line: Wiener's attack is misstated. If d is } less than one-quarter the length of the modulus, then the attack } can use e and n to find d quickly. Still, I do prefer e=65537 to e=17 (the value that PGP typically uses). But the situation isn't as bad as it looks from reading Schneier. Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBVAgUBLg5YfWrJdmD9QWqxAQHwGAH/b0NcQQCSO7xcsF0VufzsSG5mk0tZu1Eq jt3Cr5gfhZsuuf2zoNEIOLVEz+Hsbgv9mBhccCNSOIgP3aowgcWoyQ== =tavZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca - RIPEM MD5: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP key fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 low security key fingerprint: EC E7 C3 A9 2C 30 25 C6 F9 E1 25 F3 F5 AF 92 E3 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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Is the NSA really competent?
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are the biggest breakthroughs in cryptography during the period when the NSA has been the purported leader in the field, and has enjoyed by far the largest budget: public key: Diffie, Hellman, Merkle, R.,S., A., etc. key escrow: Micali (and the current NSA/NIST scheme has all the earmarks of being thrown on top of Skipjack at the last moment, after Micali had published, and perhaps even after Denning had discussed it). DES: IBM Skipjack: probably just a modified DES IDEA: Swiss Also zero-knowledge proofs, blind signatures, oblivious transfer, BBS, and other recent advances were all discovered outside the NSA. For all their vaunted competence, for all the mathematicians they have been alleged to employ, despite having a cryptography budget orders of magnitude larger than any other Western crypto group, it looks like the NSA contribued to _none_ of the major advances in cryptography that occured during its zenith.

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Re: Is the NSA really competent?
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- An anonymous author writes: > For all their vaunted competence, for all the mathematicians > they have been alleged to employ, despite having a cryptography > budget orders of magnitude larger than any other Western > crypto group, it looks like the NSA contribued to _none_ of > the major advances in cryptography that occured during its zenith. The above assumes that if the NSA does something interesting they'll tell the world about it. I'm not sure that's a plausible assumption. They seem to view their mission as creating and maintaining a balance-of-power of intelligence in favor of the United States; specifically, gathering intelligence, preserving their ability to gather intelligence, and preventing others from gathering intelligence. Revealing the existence or substance of crypto breakthroughs isn't necessarily compatible with that mission, at least as it's been historically understood. (I think remailers are good, but their use makes it necessary to write to the list to reply; I'd have preferred to reply in E-mail.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.5 iQCVAgUBLg56633YhjZY3fMNAQEUrwP+OKCOWXHtiMh6dLoe8owILD5N26AIKtpY dEdp74XlJ1pCagyIUsEeMNjvBPpH3xHpCZKygHWfPI74GRrDoxpDOdfIiHM6kDmI fDwQf395aDrNrYcZJFOBVEM6FwpW3iMNZ8TRJPsLqKMbYSxq/pu/ST45jlxRg2eO 7eZjdJmqz8Q= =BgnT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Is the NSA competent?
by Michael Wilson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An anonymous author writes: > For all their vaunted competence, for all the mathematicians > they have been alleged to employ, despite having a cryptography > budget orders of magnitude larger than any other Western > crypto group, it looks like the NSA contribued to _none_ of > the major advances in cryptography that occured during its zenith. I think that this message betrays a serious misconception that a number of people likely share, and that has to do with the levels of security offered by commercial versus military methods. NSA has never portrayed themselves as having any role in the creation of commercial systems until recently (the last few years) when in-fighting developed between their organization and NBS now NIST (NSA wanted DES to remain the standard, NBS wanted to change). NSA-CSC will evaluate commercial security products to give them an Orange Book rating (a rating which was meaningless when it was created, thanks to viral/worm technology), but keep to themselves as an arm of the military. The cryptosystems that the anonymous author notes are all commercial level systems; NSA concentrates on cryptosystems that have greater requirements than the free market. It is widely rumoured that they had public key systems for secure key management before Diffie-Hellman. Their role in engineering the S-boxes for FDES is documented. The assistance they gave to commercial organizations to provide system integration style 'one shot' systems for military use created a number of companies, such as the Honeywell Secure Computing Technology Center, as well as a number of DARPA funded groups such as Cray and Thinking Machines. As the saying in the intelligence community goes, their successes are never known, but they will always be judged by their failures. Don't assume that you have probed the depths of the NSA's abilities by their unwillingness to play on the commercial playing field; underestimating an opponent will lead you into gross miscalculations. Michael Wilson Managing Director, The Nemesis Group [Today's Fun Math Problem: Given an exhaustive search method, how long would it take to discover the key of a standard DES financial transaction using four Connection Machines? There are more than that in the basement at Fort Meade, or at least they purchased that many during the time period they used the Maryland Procurement Office to buy them.]

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Re: Is the NSA really competent?
by Patrick Juola 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are the biggest breakthroughs in cryptography during the period when the NSA has been the purported leader in the field, and has enjoyed by far the largest budget: [ list of major breakthroughs deleted. ] For all their vaunted competence, for all the mathematicians they have been alleged to employ, despite having a cryptography budget orders of magnitude larger than any other Western crypto group, it looks like the NSA contribued to _none_ of the major advances in cryptography that occured during its zenith. My understanding is that we don't *know* what NSA actually has found. For example, *someone* knew about differential cryptanalysis long before Adi Shamir rediscovered it, as the DES S-boxes are optimized against it. Similarly, they may have discovered public-key encryption fifty years ago and simply not bothered to patent/publish it.... - Patrick p.s. Any other cypherpunks heading to ACL this week? If so, look me up (Patrick Juola, U. of Colorado) and we can go grab a brew or something and discuss the state of the world.... pmj

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Re: Is the NSA really competent?
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I think that this message betrays a serious misconception that a number of > people likely share, and that has to do with the levels of security offered by > commercial versus military methods. I think that this reply betrays a serious lack of reading competence. The breakthroughs cited were the most important breakthroughs in the science of cryptography, period. There are no branches of mathematics called "military" and "commercial". The techniques have both military and commercial application. There is no evidence that the NSA knows about _any_ fundamental technique that has not been published in the literature. Nor is there any evidence (save the hearsay about S-boxes, which were actually developed at IBM) that they have made any major contribution to the science of cryptography, despite the massive resources they throw into it. But they do want to preserve their jobs, so they would like you to think they do. Their ability to drop hints here and there without having to demonstrate they actually know anything, to make people believe that Skipjack is an "advanced" algorithm without having to actually publish it, in general their ability to use their top secret status for the purpose of selective revelation, is perfectly suited to this kind of PR. Thus they can claim to "contribute to American competitiveness" by releasing Skipjack, an algorithm for which there is _not even any evidence that it is stronger than DES_, much less state of the art algorithms like IDEA. This has the actual efffect of shooting the American computer security industry in the balls, while making Congress believe they are helping it. Note that I am _not_ accusing the NSA of political incompetence. Any organization that can get a Congressional intelligence committee to vote its way 13-0, that can keep pushing a warmed-over DES crippled with a last-minute Rube Goldberg version of key escrow, in the face of 70% public opposition (and nearly unanimous and quite vocal opposition in the hi-tech industries) is no political slouch. Any organization that can increase their budget after their mission has gone away, knows the ropes in D.C. They are simply much better lobbyists than cryptographers. > integration style 'one shot' systems for military use created a number of > companies, such as the Honeywell Secure Computing Technology Center, as well as > a number of DARPA funded groups such as Cray and Thinking Machines. Of course with their budget, they can buy lots of slick hardware. That doesn't mean they know how to use it well. Let's face it, our awe of NSA stems entirely from their budget and their ability to stamps their incompetence top secret.

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Re: Is the NSA really competent?
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:59 AM 06/27/94 -0700, catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com wrote: >I think that this reply betrays a serious lack of reading competence. The >breakthroughs cited were the most important breakthroughs in the >science of cryptography, period. There are no branches of mathematics >called "military" and "commercial". The techniques have both There is no *inherent* branch split, just as there is no inherent split in knowledge of, say, what is in my pocket right now. If I choose to tell you, we both know. If not... and I have a lot more time devoted to 'researching' this question than you. See my point? You can't measure thier competence on crypto based on what they let you see. And if it is true that they really don't know shit about it, then so much the better for paranoid nutcases like me and you that assumed they were a much more formidable foe, right? :) >Thus they can claim to "contribute to American competitiveness" by >releasing Skipjack, an algorithm for which there is _not even >any evidence that it is stronger than DES_, much less state of Just curious, what is your reference for asserting it is similar to DES? >Let's face it, our awe of NSA stems entirely from their budget >and their ability to stamps their incompetence top secret. Yep. The NSA is a beaurocracy like any other. Probably has more than a fair share of imcompetence and waste. On the other hand, with a room full of connection machines, odds are they were brute forcing DES long before most other folks on the block. Add in a huge R&D budget and a few hundred mathematicians and odds are you are gonna find something neat now and then... -j

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RE: NSA and competence
by Michael Wilson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An anonymous author comments on my comments... >> I think that this message betrays a serious misconception that a number of >> people likely share, and that has to do with the levels of security offered by >> commercial versus military methods. >I think that this reply betrays a serious lack of reading competence. The >breakthroughs cited were the most important breakthroughs in the >science of cryptography, period. There are no branches of mathematics >called "military" and "commercial". The techniques have both >military and commercial application. There is no evidence that the NSA >knows about _any_ fundamental technique that has not been published >in the literature. Nor is there any evidence (save the hearsay about >S-boxes, which were actually developed at IBM) that they have made >any major contribution to the science of cryptography, despite the >massive resources they throw into it. But they do want to preserve their >jobs, so they would like you to think they do. Their ability to drop >hints here and there without having to demonstrate they actually know >anything, to make people believe that Skipjack is an "advanced" algorithm >without having to actually publish it, in general their ability >to use their top secret status for the purpose of selective >revelation, is perfectly suited to this kind of PR. I always love it when they try to get a personal attack in first; be that as it may, I prefer to think my reading competence is quite adequate, thank you. As for there not being any branches of mathematics that differentiate between application, you make a serious error when you fall into the standard academic 'if they didn't publish it, they didn't do it' mentality. Unlike corporations such as AT&T with the old Bell System Technical Journal or IBM with their internal publication of their own filed patents (and technical papers designed to act as prior art to prevent *others* from filing patents), NSA and the others who make advances do not publish, but build systems that stay in the defense sector and remain classified. If you want an interesting clue as to what sort of things they will leak into the commercial domain every so often, research the creation of relational databases and the involvement of CIA; it is quite educational. As for their making advances, they have done it on a number of occassions, and I think you would benefit by reading a good primer on the history of the topic and organizations. Kahn or Bamford would do nicely. As for rumours... I am uncertain of which rock you have been hiding under, but until recently, they weren't even officially recognized, and capabilities that we know about are known more from leaks or defectors. NSA is a military organization and is run as one; the snake pit that the anonymous author works in may operate on rumour, but these people do not. >Thus they can claim to "contribute to American competitiveness" by >releasing Skipjack, an algorithm for which there is _not even >any evidence that it is stronger than DES_, much less state of >the art algorithms like IDEA. This has the actual efffect >of shooting the American computer security industry in the balls, >while making Congress believe they are helping it. Actually, the argument they are truly using is one of 'the child down the street can listen to your portable and cell phone conversations, and this will stop that.' What Skipjack and Clipper provide is a higher floor for the average person; it also, incidentally, kills the viability of the marketplace for alternate solutions. No money, no advances. Life gets simpler for them. I have pointed this out in my two earlier posts, which you in fact are commenting on. >Note that I am _not_ accusing the NSA of political incompetence. >Any organization that can get a Congressional intelligence committee >to vote its way 13-0, that can keep pushing a warmed-over DES >crippled with a last-minute Rube Goldberg version of key escrow, >in the face of 70% public opposition (and nearly unanimous and quite >vocal opposition in the hi-tech industries) is no political slouch. >Any organization that can increase their budget after their mission >has gone away, knows the ropes in D.C. They are simply much better >lobbyists than cryptographers. NSA didn't get anyone to do anything; the situation is status quo--crypto wasn't liberalized for export, which is what Cypherpunks want, and would have constituted a change. NSA has a very real function, which I would like to remind you of--they are responsible for the introduction of technology security into the Defense Department. Based on track record, from 'spy birds' capable of picking up a conversation on the ground, to creating the first evaluation rigor of computer security (even though Orange was out of date when instituted), they have been doing it. As for political ability, of course they are no slouch; they view it much as I do, a form or warfare, which they are very good at. Has their mission gone away? Not in the least; they are still the watchdog of the airwaves. People who think that NSA and CIA have no remaining mission are people who have no understanding of what they do. >> integration style 'one shot' systems for military use created a number of >> companies, such as the Honeywell Secure Computing Technology Center, as well as >> a number of DARPA funded groups such as Cray and Thinking Machines. >Of course with their budget, they can buy lots of slick hardware. >That doesn't mean they know how to use it well. >Let's face it, our awe of NSA stems entirely from their budget >and their ability to stamps their incompetence top secret. I don't think you know *how* they use the gear they have, so I recommend you don't make comments that you are not informed to make. My awe of NSA comes from viewing them as a powerful opponent with incredible resources, but as one who is limited by their own tradecraft; a healthy respect, but we hold our own. You do raise an interesting point, and that is the ability of groups such as NSA to abuse their Classification priviledge. They do. Everyone in the intelligence community does. Far too much material is considered classified. The hazards of professional intelligence organizations stem from classification; they aren't open to outside review, analyses can end up driven by political agendas rather than available facts (see Casey and his positions vis a vis terrorism and State sponsorship by the Sovs and Libyans, neither of which is accurate), and sometimes gross errors are covered by the same cloak of secrecy. Do not, however, assume that they do not know and perform their job to the best of their abilities, or you will be in the position of the mark talking to a cardsharp: 'I'm not any good at cards, but I sure do like to play for money.' Michael Wilson Managing Director, The Nemesis Group [The Maryland Procurement Office, which was the shell used to purchase budgeted items of a 'black' nature by the intelligence community, actually published (by accident) their complete records during the hottest part of the Cold War. You can find them if you look in the right place, and see what it was that NSA, CIA, etc. were spending their money on. Capability is augmented by resource, including such hardware, and so this gives vital clues as to the lines they were developing themselves along.]

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Re: NSA and competence
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Do not, however, assume that they do not know and perform their job to the best >of their abilities, or you will be in the position of the mark talking to a >cardsharp: 'I'm not any good at cards, but I sure do like to play for money.' OTOH, one need not assume that everyone at NSA is a rocket scientist and that they are miles ahead of us in this game. The long undistinguished history of federal agencies shows them to be full of incompetence, waste and usually gross fraud as well. Considering the huge budget and lack of accountability, NSA seems an unusual place to look for an exception. A truly competent and efficient government agency that can hold its own against competition from the private sector is a rarity indeed. Granted, NSA had a head start of a few decades, yet it would be surprising if their lead at this point is more than negligible. Yes, I have read Bamford (though - sorry - not Kahn): remember that Bamford's book is already 12 years old and was probably out-of-date WRT the technology when it was published. <not the same anonymous author>

2 1

Sternlight
by Bill O'Hanlon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone else noticed that David Sternlight has been quiet for the past two weeks or so? I hope he's not like you-know-who in that mentioning his name summons the fiend. ObCrypto: Maybe he has decided that PGP 2.6 is okay, and now has had the wind removed from his sails... Doubt it. -Bill

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NSA Agents Threaten to Kill Bidzos of RSA?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunk Criminals, I'm surprised that I got home today and didn't find any mention of this distrurbing and important news article anyplace I looked. So I wrote up this article and posted in several newsgroups. It is not a spoof on my part, and I assume Bidzos was speaking the truth as he knew it. Maybe the NSA agents were half-joking, but it doesn't look like that. I avoided speculating and commenting in the article I posted, expecting to do so in the discussion that I hope will follow. I urge you to make your most cogent responses in public, in the newsgroups listed. (If posting under your name bothers you, use one of the Remailer-to-Usenet gateways mentioned on this list so often...if you have no info on this, send me a note and bounce you back some instructions.) I think things are really heating up. In the aftermath of Waco, Randy Weaver, drug raids, and the government losing the Clipper war, it looks like they're playing hardball. --Tim May Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.politics.org.nsa,comp.org.eff.talk Path: netcom.com!tcmay From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: NSA Agents Threaten to Kill Bidzos of RSA? Message-ID: <tcmayCs2vI2.6EC(a)netcom.com> Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700 guest) X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL1] Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 22:51:37 GMT Lines: 51 I know it sounds strange, but I have the article in front of me. I'll excerpt it without further comment: "The Keys to the Kingdom," David Bank, San Jose Mercury News, June 27, 1994, page D-1. Blurb: "The government wants to be able to see private computer communications. A Silicon Valley entrepreneur is leading the fight to keep secret messags secret." [stuff elided, to avoid copyright violations and because I don't feel like typing in the whole article.] "Take a meeting in April, for example, when three NSA agents dropped in on Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security, Inc. For two hours, Bidzos said, the agents were civil and pleasant as he drew diagrams, told jokes and tried to convince them that the agency's attempts to promote an alternative encryption scheme would fail. "He must have said something wrong. One of the agents threatened to run him over in the parking lot, Bidzos said. "'He looked at me and very coldly said he would do me,' Bidzos said. 'He clearly threatened me.' "To Bidzos the incident--which could not be confirmed independently--was another indication that tensions are increasing as his eight-year struggle with the government moves into its final stages." [discussion of privacy, NSA, Clipper, civil rights, etc., elided] The article closes with this quote from Jim: "'If we are ever in danger of undermining the NSA, they will either buy us or shoot us.' "'We'll know when we screw up. We'll either be rich--or dead.'" Something to contemplate. I'll make comments in followups. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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CRYPTO '94 prelim. pgm (long)
by baum＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hope I'm not wasting net bandwidth here, - its long, but relevant. -AJB ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CRYPTO '94 August 21-25, 1994 Crypto '94 is the fourteenth in a series of workshops on cryptology held at Santa Barbara, California and is sponsored by the International Association for Cryptologic Research, in cooperation with the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Security and Privacy and the Computer Science Department of the University of California, Santa Barbara. Formal proceedings will be provided at the conference. Preliminary Program Monday August 22 ================ 8:30-8:45 Welcome Session 1: Block Ciphers: Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis (8:45 - 10:10) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8:45 - 9:05 The First Experimental Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard Mitsuru Matsui (Mitsubishi, Japan) 9:10 - 9:20 Linear Cryptanalysis of the Fast Data Encipherment Algorithm Kazuo Ohta (NTT, Japan) and Kazumaro Aoki (Waseda Univ., Japan) 9:20 - 9:40 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis Susan K. Langford and Martin E. Hellman (Stanford, USA) 9:45 - 10:05 Linear Cryptanalysis Using Multiple Approximations Burton S. Kaliski Jr. and M. J. B. Robshaw (RSA Laboratories, USA) Coffee Break 10:10 - 10:35 Session 2: Schemes Based on New Problems (10:40 - 11:25) -------------------------------------------------------- 10:40 - 11:00 Hashing with SL_2 Jean-Pierre Tillich and Gilles Zemor (ENS, France) 11:05 - 11:15 Design of Elliptic Curves with Controllable Lower Boundary of Extension Degree for Reduction Attacks Jinhui Chao (Chuo University, Japan), Kazuo Tanada (Tokyo Inst. of Tech., Japan) and Shigeo Tsujii (Chuo University, Japan) 11:15 - 11:25 Cryptographic Protocols based on Discrete Logarithms in Real-quadratic Orders Ingrid Biehl, Johannes Buchmann and Christoph Thiel (Univer. Saarlandes, Germany) Session 3: Practical Implementations I -------------------------------------- 11:25 - 11:55 Cryptography in the Commercial World --- Hardware Aspects (Invited presentation) David Maher (AT&T) lunch Session 4: Signatures I (1:30 - 2:30) ------------------------------------- 1:30 - 1:50 Designated Confirmer Signatures and Public-Key Encryption are Equivalent Tatsuaki Okamoto (NTT, Japan) 1:55 - 2:05 Directed Acyclic Graphs, One-way Functions and Digital Signatures Daniel Bleichenbacher and Ueli M. Maurer (ETH, Switserland) 2:05 - 2:25 An Identity-Based Signature Scheme With Bounded Life-span Olivier Delos and Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Univ. Louvain, Belgium) Session 5: Implementation and Hardware Aspects (2:30 - 3:15) ------------------------------------------------------------ 2:30 - 2:50 More Flexible Exponentiation with Precomputation Chae Hoon Lim and Pil Joong Lee (Pohang University, Korea) 2:55 - 3:05 A Parallel Permutation Multiplier for a PGM Crypto-chip Tamas Horvath (Univ. Essen, Germany), Spyros S. Magliveras (University of Nebraska, USA) and Tran van Trung (Univ. Essen, Germany) 3:05 - 3:15 Cryptographic Randomness from Air Turbulence in Disk Drives Don Davis (Openvision Technologies, USA), Ross Ihaka (Univ. Auckland, New Zealand) and Philip Fenstermacher (USA) Coffee Break 3:15 - 3:35 Session 6: Authentication and Secret Sharing (3:40 - 5:05) ---------------------------------------------------------- 3:40 - 4:00 Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol Christian Gehrmann (Lund University, Sweden) 4:05 - 4:15 LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication Hugo Krawczyk (IBM, USA) 4:15 - 4:35 New Bound on Authentication Code with Arbitration Kaoru Kurosawa (Tokyo Inst. of Tech., Japan) 4:40 - 5:00 Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes Carlo Blundo, Alfredo De Santis, Giovanni Di Crescenzo, Antonio Giorgio Gaggia and Ugo Vaccaro (Univ. Salerno, Italy) Poster Session Tuesday August 23 ================= Session 7: Zero-Knowledge (8:30 - 10:10) ---------------------------------------- 8:30 - 8:50 Designing identification schemes with keys of short size Jacques Stern (ENS, France) 8:55 - 9:15 Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols Ronald Cramer (CWI, The Netherlands), Ivan Damgard (Aarhus University, Denmark) and Berry Schoenmakers (CWI, The Netherlands) 9:20 - 9:40 Language Dependent Secure Bit Commitment Toshiya Itoh, Yuji Ohta (Tokyo Inst. of Tech., Japan) and Hiroki Shizuya (Tohoku Univ., Japan) 9:45 - 10:05 On the length of cryptographic hash-values used in identification schemes Marc Girault (SEPT, France) and Jacques Stern (ENS, France) Coffee Break 10:10 - 10:35 Session 8: Securing an Electronic World: are we ready? (10:40 - 12:00) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 10:40 - 11:10 Securing the Information Highway (Invited presentation) Whitfield Diffie (Sun Microsystems) 11:10 - 11:30 Opening statements 11:30 - 12:00 Panel Debate (could continue till 12:45) Panel members: Ross Anderson, Bob Blakley, Matt Blaze, George Davida, Yvo Desmedt (moderator), Whitfield Diffie, Joan Feigenbaum, Bob Greenlee, Martin Hellman, David Maher and Miles Smid free afternoon 7:00 - 11:00 pm Rump session Wednesday August 24 =================== Session 9: Signatures II (8:30 - 9:20) -------------------------------------- 8:30 - 8:50 Incremental Cryptography: the Case of Hashing and Signing Mihir Bellare (IBM, USA), Oded Goldreich (Weizmann Inst., Israel) and Shafi Goldwasser (Weizmann Inst., Israel and MIT, USA) 8:55 - 9:15 An Efficient Existentially Unforgeable Signature Scheme and its Applications Cynthia Dwork (IBM, USA) and Moni Naor (Weizmann Inst., Israel) Session 10: Combinatorics and its Applications (9:20 - 10:10) ------------------------------------------------------------- 9:20 - 9:40 Bounds for resilient functions and orthogonal arrays Jurgen Bierbrauer (Math. Inst., Heidelberg, Germany), K. Gopalakrishnan and D. R. Stinson (University of Nebraska, USA) 9:45 - 10:05 Tracing Traitors Benny Chor (Technion, Israel), Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv Univ., Israel) and Moni Naor (Weizmann Inst., Israel) Coffee Break 10:10 - 10:35 Session 11: Number Theory (10:40 - 11:30) ----------------------------------------- 10:40 - 11:00 Towards the Equivalence of Breaking the Diffie-Hellman Protocol and Computing Discrete Logarithms Ueli M. Maurer (ETH, Switserland) 11:05 - 11:25 Fast Generation of Provable Primes Using Search in Arithmetic Progressions Preda Mihailescu (UBS, Switzerland) Session 12: Practical Implementations II 11:30 - 12:00 Cryptography in the Commercial World --- Software Aspects (Invited presentation) Joseph Pato (Hewlett-Packard Co.) lunch Session 13: Cryptanalysis and Protocol Failures (1:30 - 2:45) ------------------------------------------------------------- 1:30 - 1:50 Attack on the Cryptographic Scheme NIKS-TAS Don Coppersmith (IBM, USA) 1:55 - 2:15 On the Risk of Opening Distributed Keys Mike Burmester (Univ. London, UK) 2:20 - 2:40 Cryptanalysis of Cryptosystems based on Remote Chaos Replication Th. Beth, D. E. Lazic and A. Mathias (Univ. Karlsruhe, Germany) Coffee Break 2:45 - 3:05 Session 14: Pseudo-Random Generation (3:10 - 3:35) -------------------------------------------------- 3:10 - 3:30 A Fourier Transform Approach to the Linear Complexity of Nonlinearly Filtered Sequences James L. Massey and Shirlei Serconek (ETH, Switserland) 3:30 - 4:15 Special event 4:15 - General Assembly of the IACR (IACR President: Peter Landrock) Thursday August 25 ================== Session 15: Block Ciphers: Design and Cryptanalysis (8:30 - 10:10) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8:30 - 8:50 The Security of Cipher Block Chaining Mihir Bellare (IBM, USA), Joe Kilian (NEC, USA) and Phillip Rogaway (Univ. California, Davis, USA) 8:55 - 9:15 A Chosen Plaintext Attack of the 16-round Khufu Cryptosystem Henri Gilbert and Pascal Chauvaud (CNET, France) 9:20 - 9:40 Ciphertext Only Attack for One-way function of the MAP using One Ciphertext Yukiyasu Tsunoo, Eiji Okamoto and Tomohiko Uyematsu (J. Adv. Inst. Sci. Techn., Japan) 9:45 - 10:05 Pitfalls in Designing Substitution Boxes Jennifer Seberry, Xian-Mo Zhang and Yuliang Zheng (Univ. Wollongong, Australia) Coffee Break 10:10 - 10:30 Session 16: Secure Computations and Protocols (10:35 - 11:50) ------------------------------------------------------------- 10:35 - 10:55 A Randomness-Rounds Tradeoff in Private Computation Eyal Kushilevitz (Technion, Israel) and Adi Rosen (Tel Aviv Univ., Israel) 11:00 - 11:20 Secure Voting Using Partially Compatible Homomorphisms Kazue Sako (NEC, Japan) and Joe Kilian (NEC, USA) 11:25 - 11:45 Maintaining Security in the Presence of Transient Faults Ran Canetti (Weizmann Inst., Israel) and Amir Herzberg (IBM, USA) adjournment and final lunch The following people served on the Program Committee. Tom Berson, Anagram Laboratories, USA Don Coppersmith, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, USA Donald Davies, United Kingdom Yvo Desmedt, Chair, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, USA Shimon Even, Technion, Israel Amos Fiat, Tel Aviv University, Israel Russell Impagliazzo, University of California San Diego, USA Ingemar Ingemarsson, University of Linkoping, Sweden Mitsuru Matsui, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Japan Alfred Menezes, Auburn University, USA Andrew Odlyzko, AT&T Bell Laboratories, USA Jennifer Seberry, University of Wollongong, Australia Ben Smeets, Lund University, Sweden Moti Yung, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, USA General Information Facilities will also be provided for attendees to demonstrate hardware, software and other items of cryptological interest. If you wish to demonstrate such items, you are urged to contact the General Chair so that your needs will be attended to. The social program will include hosted cocktail parties and dinners on Sunday, Monday and the Beach Barbecue on Wednesday. These events are included with the cost of registration. No evening meals will be provided at the dining hall. About the conference facilities: The workshop will be held on the campus of the University of California, Santa Barbara. The campus is located adjacent to the Santa Barbara airport and the Pacific Ocean. Accommodations are available in the university dormitories at relatively low cost for conference participants. Children under the age of 13 are not allowed to stay in the dormitories, so those bringing small children will need to make separate arrangements in one of several nearby hotels. More information on hotels is enclosed. Parking on campus is available at no cost to participants. Travel information: The campus is located approximately 2 miles from the Santa Barbara airport, which is served by several airlines, including American, America West, Delta, United and US Air. Free shuttle bus service will be provided between the Santa Barbara airport and the campus on Sunday and Thursday afternoons. All major rental car agencies are also represented in Santa Barbara, and AMTRAK has rail connections to San Francisco from the north and Los Angeles from the south. Santa Barbara is approximately 100 miles north of the Los Angeles airport, and 350 miles south of San Francisco. Registration: Participation is invited by interested parties, but attendance at the workshop is limited, and pre-registration is strongly advised. To register, fill out the attached registration form and return to the address on the form along with payment in full before July 8, 1994. Campus accommodations will be available on a first come, first serve basis for attendees who register by July 8, 1994. Late registrations, subject to a late registration fee, may be accepted if space is available, but there are no guarantees. The conference fees include participation in the program and all social functions, as well as membership to the IACR and a subscription to the Journal of Cryptology. The room and board charges include dormitory lodging Sunday night through Wednesday night and breakfast and lunch Monday through Thursday. Technical sessions will run from Monday morning to Thursday at noon. A very limited number of stipends are available to those unable to obtain funding. Students whose papers are accepted and who will present the paper themselves are invited to apply if such assistance is needed. Requests for stipends should be sent to the General Chair before June 3, 1994. ================================================================== Hotels For those who choose not to stay in the dormitories, the following is a partial list of hotels in the area. Those who choose to stay off campus are responsible for making their own reservations, and early reservations are advised since August is a popular season in Santa Barbara. Note that Goleta is closer to UCSB than Santa Barbara, but a car will probably be required to travel between any hotel and the campus. All prices are subject to change; prices should be confirmed by calling the individual hotels directly. However, mention CRYPTO '94 when you are making your reservation and in several of the hotels you will be eligible for the university rate which can be significantly less than the normal rates. We are not able to block rooms in these hotels, so please make reservations as early as possible. The quality of the hotels range from rather expensive beach-front resorts to basic inexpensive accommodations. For further information, try contacting the Santa Barbara Convention and Visitors Center, (805) 966-9222. South Coast Inn: 5620 Calle Real, Goleta, CA 93117. Single is $89; Double is $94. Call to see if they have University rates. Contact person is Ms. Murrill Forrester (805) 967-3200, Fax (805) 683-4466. Cathedral Oaks Lodge: 4770 Calle Real, Santa Barbara, CA 93110. Single rates start at $75; double rates start at $85. No University rates available. Prices include breakfast. Contact Doug Smoot or Tom Patton at (805) 964-3511. Fax (805) 964-0075 Motel 6: 5897 Calle Real , Goleta, CA 93117. Single rate is $36.99 + tax.. Double rate is 42.99 + tax. (Rates are subject to change.) (805) 964-3596. The Sandman Inn: 3714 State Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93105. Single rate: $71 Double rate: $81. (805) 687-2468. Fax (805) 687-6581. Miramar Hotel (Beachfront): 3 miles south of Santa Barbara on U.S. 101 at San Ysidro turnoff. No specific single or double rate. Rooms begin at $75. Call Laura at (805) 969-2203. Fax (805) 969-3163. Pepper Tree Inn: 3850 State Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93105. Single rate: $112 Double rate: $120. (805) 687-5511. Fax (805) 682-2410 Encina Lodge: 2220 Bath Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93105. Single rate: $112 Double rate: $118. (805) 682-7277. Fax (805) 563-9319. Pacifica Suites (formerly Quality Suites): 5500 Hollister Avenue, Santa Barbara, CA 93111 (close to campus). Normal rates begin at $120 for a suite. Includes full-cooked breakfast. Contact Michael Ensign at (805) 683-6722. Fax (805) 683-4121. Upham Hotel: (bed-and-breakfast) 1404 De La Vina Road, Santa Barbara, CA 93101. Beginning rate: $105 per night. (You must mention you are attending the Crypto conference.) Contact: Shirley Fagardo or reservations at (805) 962-0058. Fax (805) 963-2825. The El Encanto Hotel: 1900 Lasuen Road, Santa Barbara, CA 93105. Beginning rate: $90. Contact: Elizabeth Spencer, (805) 687-5000. Fax (805) 687-3903. ================================================================== CRYPTO '94 Registration Form Registration deadline: July 8, 1994 Last Name:________________________________________________________ First Name:__________________________________ Sex: (M)___ (F)___ Affiliation:______________________________________________________ Mailing Address:__________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ Phone: _________________________ Fax: __________________________ Electronic Mail: _________________________________________________ Payment of the conference fee entitles you to membership in the International Association for Cryptologic Research for 1995 at no extra charge, including a subscription to the Journal of Cryptology, published by Springer-Verlag, at no extra charge. Do you wish to be an IACR member? YES_____ NO ______ Conference fee: Regular ($300) US $ ________ Attended Eurocrypt '94, Perugia ($250) ________ Full Time Student ($150) ________ deduct $50 if you do not wish the proceedings ________ (There will be NO pre-proceedings; the proceedings will be provided at the conference) Total Conference fee: ________ Room and Board (4 nights): Smoking ______ Non-Smoking _____ (Prices include breakfast and lunch on Monday through Thursday) Single room ($250 per person) ________ Double room ($200 per person) ________ Roommate's name: ___________________ Saturday Night ________ ($50 per person single / $40 per person double) $50 late fee for registration after July 8; ________ (registration not guaranteed after July 8) Total Guest Fees (from back of form) ________ Total funds enclosed (U.S. Dollars) US$ ________ Payment must be by check payable in U.S. funds, by money order in U.S. funds or by U.S. bank draft, PAYABLE TO: CRYPTO '94. Payment should be mailed to the General Chair: Additional Contact Information: Jimmy Upton, Crypto '94 Email: crypto94(a)uptronics.com 1590 Oakland Road Phone: (408)451-8900 Suite B203 Fax: (408)451-8901 San Jose, CA 95131 ================================================================== CRYPTO '94 Guest Form Registration deadline: July 8, 1994 Please fill out this form for anyone who is coming with a conference attendee but not registering for the conference and wishes to either stay on campus or attend the social functions Sunday, Monday and Wednesday. Guests are not entitled to attend the talks and must be attending with someone registering for the conference. Last Name:________________________________________________________ First Name:__________________________________ Sex: (M)___ (F)____ Affiliation:______________________________________________________ Mailing Address:__________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ Phone: _________________________ Fax: __________________________ Electronic Mail: _________________________________________________ Social Program Attendance ($50) _________ (Sunday, Monday and Wednesday Night Dinners - No admittance to talks) Room and Board (4 nights): Smoking ______ Non-Smoking _____ (Prices include breakfast and lunch on Monday through Thursday) Single room ($250 per person) ________ Double room ($200 per person) ________ Roommate's name: ___________________ Saturday Night ________ ($50 per person single / $40 per person double) Total Guest Fees US$ ________ (Show here and on the other side of this form) ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, MS/305-3B * * 1 Infinite Loop * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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Where to get the latest PGP FAQ
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 27 June 1994 by Mike Johnson) WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION? There is more than one latest version. Pick one or more of the following that best suits your computer, patent restrictions, and export restrictions. Some countries (like France) may also restrict import or even use of strong cryptography like PGP. |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Platform(s) | Countries | Allowed Use | Latest Version | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, | USA & Canada | Commercial | Viacrypt PGP 2.4 | | or WinCIM/CSNav | | Personal | | | | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, Mac, | USA & Canada | Personal | MIT PGP 2.6 | | OS/2, others | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, Mac, | Most of the | Personal | PGP 2.6ui | | OS/2, others | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Mac Applescript | Most of the | Personal | MacPGP 2.3aV1.2 | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Mac Applescript | USA | Research | MacPGP 2.3aV1.2 | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Amiga | Most of the | Personal | Amiga PGP 2.3a3 | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Amiga | USA | Personal | Amiga PGP 2.6 0b0.6 | | | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Atari | Most of the | Personal | Atari PGP 2.3a | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Atari | USA | Research | Atari PGP 2.3a | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Any of the | Countries | Commercial | Any of the above | | above | where IDEA | Personal | | | | is not | Research | | | | patented and | | | | | cryptography | | | | | is not | | | | | restricted. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| Note: there are other versions available, but these are either old, or outside of the mainstream PGP project. Look for new versions from one of three sources: Viacrypt (Commercial), MIT (North American freeware), or mathew(a)mantis.co.uk (the unofficially non-designated holder of the unofficial international version that parallels what Philip Zimmermann and the rest of the PGP development team is doing in the USA. WHAT IS ALL THIS NONSENSE ABOUT EXPORT CONTROLS? For a detailed rant, get ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/cryptusa.zip The practical meaning, until the law is corrected to make sense, is that you are requested to get PGP from sites outside of the USA and Canada if you are outside of the USA and Canada. If you are in France, I understand that you aren't even supposed import it. Other countries may be worse. WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? Versions are available for DOS, Unix, or WinCIM/CSNav Commercial software. Call 800-536-2664 to order. If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest version number for their version of PGP is 2.4. Prices shown include release of version 2.7 if you buy your copy after May 27, 1994 (otherwise the upgrade will be about US$10). Viacrypt's licensing and price information is as follows: ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 1 user $ 99.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 5 users $ 299.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 1 user $ 149.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 5 users $ 449.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 1 user $ 119.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 5 user $ 359.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt If you wish to place an order please call 800-536-2664 during the hours of 8:30am to 5:00pm MST, Monday - Friday. They accept VISA, MasterCard, AMEX and Discover credit cards. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact: Paul E. Uhlhorn Director of Marketing, ViaCrypt Products Mail: 2104 W. Peoria Ave Phoenix AZ 85029 Phone: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 Internet: viacrypt(a)acm.org Compuserve: 70304.41 WHERE CAN I GET MIT PGP? MIT PGP is Copyrighted freeware. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu, log in as getpgp, answer the questions, then ftp to net-dist.mit.edu and change to the hidden directory named in the telnet session to get your own copy. MIT-PGP is for U. S. and Canadian use only, but MIT is only distributing it within the USA (due to some archaic export control laws). 1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/mitlicen.txt and agree to it. 2. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt and agree to it. 3. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp. 4. Answer the questions and write down the directory name listed. 5. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get the distribution files (pgp26.zip, pgp26doc.zip, pgp26src.tar.gz, MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx, and MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx). If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 3, above. File names (shortened file names are for DOS BBS distribution): pgp26doc.zip - documentation only pgp26.zip - includes DOS executable & documentation pgp26src.zip - source code pgp26src.tar or pgp26src.tar.gz - source code release for Unix and others macpgp26.hqx or MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx - Macintosh executable & documentation macpgp26.src or MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx - Macintosh source code mcpgp268.hqx or MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx - Macintosh executable for 68000 pgp26os2.zip - OS/2 executable (may not be on the MIT archive) RSA and IDEA algorithms licenced for personal and noncommercial use. Uses RSAREF, which may not be modified without RSADSI permission. Contains "time bomb" to start generating messages incompatible with PGP 2.3 and 2.4 on 1 September 1994 as an incentive for people to not use PGP 2.3a in the USA, which RSADSI claims infringes on their patents. Mac versions are not yet Applescriptable. This version is not intended for export from the USA and Canada due to the USA's International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Canada's corresponding regulations. You can also get MIT PGP 2.6 from: ftp.csn.net/mpj ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26os2.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/mac MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/amiga/ pgp26-amiga0b0.6-000.lha pgp26-amiga0b0.6-020.lha pgp26-amiga0b0.6-src.lha amiga.txt See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj//I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj//I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. TO GET THESE FILES BY EMAIL, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message for instructions. You will have to work quickly to get README.MPJ then the files before the ??????? part of the path name changes again (several times a day). ftp.eff.org Follow the instructions found in README.Dist that you get from one of: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/README.Dist gopher.eff.org, 1/Net_info/Tools/Crypto gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Net_info/Tools/Crypto http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ Colorado Catacombs BBS Mike Johnson, sysop Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff. Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written by Mike Johnson, including DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR, DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, etc. v.FAST/v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 28,800 bps 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, as fast as your modem will go. Use ANSI terminal emulation, of if you can't, try VT-100. Free access to PGP. If busy or no answer, try again later. Log in with your own name, or if someone else already used that, try a variation on your name or pseudonym. You can request access to crypto software on line, and if you qualify legally under the ITAR, you can download on the first call. Download file names: pgp26.zip (DOS version with documentation) pgp26src.tar (Unix version and source code) pgp26doc.zip (Documentation only -- exportable) macpgp26.hqx (MacPGP executables, binhexed .sea) macpgp26.src (MacPGP source, binhexed .sea) mcpgp268.hqx (MacPGP executables, binhexed .sea for 68000 processor). (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado number - 2 lines. (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number intended for use by people in the Denver, Colorado area. Verified: This morning. Other BBS and ftp sites do have these files, as well. I noticed that PGP26.ZIP is being distributed on FIDONET. WHERE CAN I GET PGP FOR USE OUTSIDE OF THE USA? The latest for outside the USA is the "Unofficial International" PGP 2.6 for most platforms, MacPGP 2.3aV1.2 for the Mac (although 2.6ui is under development and should appear very soon), and 2.3a3 for the Amiga. The latest amiga version is fully compatible with MIT's PGP 2.6. Copyrighted freeware. Version 2.6ui released by mathew(a)mantis.co.uk. Amiga version 2.3a3 released by Peter Simons <simons(a)peti.gun.de> These versions do NOT use RSAREF. No RSA patent problems outside the USA, but this version is not legal for commercial or extensive personal use in the USA. IDEA licensed for presonal use only in countries where the IDEA patent holds. The freeware version of PGP is intended for noncommercial, experimental, and scholarly use. It is available on thousands of BBSes, commercial information services, and Internet anonymous-ftp archive sites on the planet called Earth. This list cannot be comprehensive, but it should give you plenty of pointers to places to find PGP. Although the latest freeware version of PGP was released from outside the USA (England), it is not supposed to be exported from the USA under a strange law called the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of this, please get PGP from a site outside the USA if you are outside of the USA and Canada. Even though the RSAREF license associated with PGP 2.6 from MIT no longer prohibits use outside the USA, it still carries the not-for-profit restriction that the original RSA code in PGP 2.6ui doesn't have. On the other hand, patents on the IDEA cipher may limit PGP use in your country to nonprofit applications, anyway. Indeed, I understand that there are some countries where private electronic mail is not legal, anyway. These listings are subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Source code (gzipped tar format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz Source code (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uis.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uis.zip * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26uis.zip Executable for DOS (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uix.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uix.zip MacIntosh: * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/mac /MacPGP2.6ui_beta.sit.hqx * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/PGP/MacPGP2.6ui_V1.2sources.cpt.hqx Other sites to look for the above mentioned files at: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de /pub/virus/crypt/pgp <---- a good collection! ftp.ee.und.ac.za /pub/crypto/pgp soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt/PGP ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) /src/security/pgp23A.zip (MS-DOS executables & docs) /src/security/pgp23srcA.zip (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS, Amiga sources, docs, info on building PGP into mailers, editors, etc.) /src/security/pgp23A.tar.Z (Same as PGP22SRC.ZIP, in Unix tar format) /src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx (Macintosh version) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) ftp.csn.net /mpj/public/pgp/ contains PGP shells, faq documentation, language kits. ftp.netcom.com /pub/dcosenza -- Non-mainstream variants on PGP with huge keys sizes. /pub/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. /pub/qwerty -- How to MacPGP Guide, largest steganography ftp site as well. PGP FAQ, crypto FAQ, US Crypto Policy FAQ, Steganograpy software list. MacUtilites for use with MacPGP. Stealth1.1 + other steganography programs. Send mail to qwerty(a)netcom.com with the subject "Bomb me!" to get the PGP FAQ and MacPGP guide if you don't have ftp access. nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca (192.48.234.1) /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23A.zip /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23srcA.zip ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) StealthPGP: The Amiga version can be FTP'ed from the Aminet in /pub/aminet/util/crypt/ as StealthPGP1_0.lha. Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command: archie -s pgp26 (DOS & Unix Versions) archie -s pgp2.6 (MAC Versions) ftpmail: For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. For the ftp sites on netcom, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message. World Wide Web URLs: (Thanks to mathew(a)mantis.co.uk) _________________________________________________________________ MACPGP 2.3 Program * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.3.cpt.hqx * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx.gz Source code Requires Think C. * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx -- version 2.2 only * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3src.sea.h qx.pgp Documentation PGP is rather counter-intuitive to a Mac user. Luckily, there's a guide to using MacPGP in ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qwerty/Here.is.How.to.MacPGP. _________________________________________________________________ OS/2 PGP You can, of course, run the DOS version of PGP under OS/2. * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/2.6ui/pgp26ui-os2.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26os2.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? _________________________________________________________________ AMIGA PGP * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha Source * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha _________________________________________________________________ ARCHIMEDES PGP * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/archimedes/ArcPGP23a _________________________________________________________________ DOCUMENTATION ONLY * _US:_ ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/pgp26doc.zip * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip _________________________________________________________________ LANGUAGE MODULES These are suitable for most PGP versions. I am not aware of any export/import restrictions on these files. German * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/PGP_german_docs.lha Italian * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz Japanese * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz Lithuanian * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp23ltk.zip Russian * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26ru.zip (MIT version) * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26uir.zip (ui version) * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26ru.zip Spanish * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz Swedish * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_swedish.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_swedish.txt _________________________________________________________________ OTHER SITES Some cryptographic software is available from ftp://van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca/pub/crypto/software/. Read the README file and proceed from there. BBS sites: Colorado Catacombs BBS (See also the entry above for PGP 2.6) (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado (2 lines) (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado (free call from Denver CO, but 1 line) For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions, then select [Q]uestionaire 3 from the [M]ain menu. Verified: This morning. Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado) DOS, OS2, and Mac versions. (303) 443-2457 Verified: 5-2-94 For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO" with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files). Exec-Net (New York) Host BBS for the ILink net. (914) 667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> If you find a version of the PGP package on a BBS or FTP site and it does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. ARCHIE WHO? There are many more sites. You can use archie and/or other "net-surfing" tools to find a more up-to-date listing, if desired. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.4 mQCNAi0aFSUAAAEEAOCOKpaLepvJCFgIR4m+UvZe0IN8g7Guwc+6GH4u6UGTPxQO iAhk/MJ7E8LE4c55A1G8to2W4y3aKAHvi9QCYKnsLV8Ag0BYWo3bGGTPEfkS7NAI N+Zy6vSjuF1D6MUnbvrQJ5p4efz7a28iYRKoAdan2bfnvIYWUD9nBjyFM+vFAAUR tDdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajQgW2V4cCAz MSBEZWMgOTRdiQCVAgUQLTqfXj9nBjyFM+vFAQGU7wP/ZuuHfdAnCIblNCtbLLG8 39CSg6JIVa3KWfe0WIz6dXFU3cvl2Wt094kJgZ+Nmq01INWlib2lTOznbkA9sV1W q0aJSBHFWQH29qGmIdEqThs7A5ES2w8eRjJD80lxHodRIkBcC5KI6x4Mxo8cib5V BrwsvtG0+81HD6Mrpvc+a0GJAJUCBRAtJc2rZXmEuMepZt0BAe4hA/9YANYPY4Z3 1pXv2mT6ReC09cZS5U3+xxC5brQdLsQGKuH6QVs/b5oc6NV84sh8A9tZyHG2067o 3XIEyN7PPQzRm2UUnHHqw9lBCNhMiFQsAJi4W+m8zXrVrpJWK0Wv61eV2/XIQl0V d4lxu0r+MNRP6ID6FBzA4C9rO+RYEZmwOIkAlQIFEC0aGRzb/VZRBVJGuQEBfaUD /3c2h//kg843OIcYHG4gMDqdeeZLzGlp3RVvh0Rs3/T0YylJZGjPL2L/BF/vfLlB 9E2Urh9mDG/7hiB5FncrUnkmN63IkSj+K9YyfPyYxBVx06Srj8ZzYynh0N+zledd 6cnwxRXhaD3Wc4EfSNR7BH9M2rjkGzyb5to9cgBb0ng+ =BLg5 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi4PT2QAAAEEAPPCZnrshEJ9PSnV+mXEwjM4kzJF0kyg2MnLMzo83vWI40ei jogncqdkXT0c2TQWg+Bsu9ckFoXdId0utumYv0aqd8yI/oU/DwJ1zJrqRL2PFbxe ZLofHoKFjvq1TiNiJq9ps3jW6iYS4IU1SzyKhjmyE+K0+WyrPPX0zg8FAL9FAAUR tCdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajiJAJUCBRAu D1m7P2cGPIUz68UBASsjA/wO5L/dQtWWSEbZGwvZPZbFjoDpzvMBvGxjGo2nKOOu WeZZVg/mPEAjHUlnKMLTgRn1tFr9W2dbnm3gqYNS+uqSewvgThMa5ID6kVQrLSy4 lXqyhnkjmaN8l7cWCmF+5h0D6x6ffHn+31BuCIikvkvs55hsaScK1bB2UZYSd4V1 LIkAlQIFEC4PWXn19M4PBQC/RQEBQUwEAIeLuFbp+1oT7i+n7F4l5qWmhn3i7Xd2 4kY/2jjABtXh7oVXVno8e9aK5sik3TQdmFeem6bBNyUPyoQbmA6NDUpEZ6njNkvh H+2mRIOkOOLlxudqagmVJXbQnmHzrN2iwkfUjJXOmN85qUsAdcCj9OfrTfc67jWF SigS1hCBQGO1tCtNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bS5wLmpvaG5zb25AaWVl ZS5vcmc+tCBNaWNoYWVsIEpvaG5zb24gPG1wakBuZXRjb20uY29tPrQoTWlrZSBK b2huc29uIDw3MTMzMS4yMzMyQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPrQrTWljaGFlbCBQLiBK b2huc29uIDxtcGpvaG5zb0BueXguY3MuZHUuZWR1PrQtRG8gbm90IHVzZSBmb3Ig ZW5jcnlwdGlvbiBhZnRlciAyNyBKdW5lIDE5OTYu =1B8+ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLg9jvD9nBjyFM+vFAQFK4gQAuBM4AYkrMk5wI4M40AUqAxrY/8rybYKO U9lzypAQsNQNYMAot2Y+iCZQo1G3axEdyvxLb7Dwp5HDx4j/paQ866mHWX4nHOlA 7PXJv1jV9c+acnr8Z/cc7H3LiZ7UX1FaXmqoWGX1oRDdhCkLgLKtc6DPlsCNYaBR Z18e6nKFd3s= =j240 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Brits propose internet voting
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The brits have the "american" disease, only they've done us one better. I just got through listening to the BBC World Service. It seems that some official commission or other over there proposed the Information Infrastructure thang with a couple of twists: polling and elections. They said that they could save mucho dinero by having people vote from home. Looks like someone over there did their crypto homework... Even cited Mr. Bill's (Clinton, not Gates) email address as a Good Thing. What's next, er(a)bpalace.gov, gov? <hyuk> Seriously, they couldn't be talking about this election thing unless they knew it was possible (no star wars flames, please). I wonder who put the bug in their ear? If anyone finds a copy of this report online (fat chance, I bet) let me know. Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

2 1

Regional Lists
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A month or so back, there was a brief discussion talking about the production of a cypherpunks net.book. Out of that discussion I talked about the fact that I (would) have a workstation available to provide a platform for various mailing lists if they were needed. On of the suggestions that was made by Eric was that it might be a 'good thing'{tm} to creat some regional cypherpunk lists to facilitate the planning of physical meetings, to make announcements about speakers, or whatever. In any case, I have the computer up and running, and am now in a position to create whatever cypherpunk mailing lists might be wanted or needed. So, does anyone have anything they'd want a mailing list for? ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)vorlon.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or Blue Earth County -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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Re: Lotto odds
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) >Date: Mon, 27 Jun 94 23:43:46 PDT > >One other tip for lotto players: Never mark your ticket with any >recognizable pattern. The random "quick pick" is probably best. >Reason: A pattern is equally likely to be picked at random as a "quick >pick" but much -more- likely to also be picked by some other schmuck. >So if your pattern pick wins, you're more likely to have to split the >prize. Another hot tip: use at least 1 number greater than 31, so you don't have to share with people who use family members' birthdays. Or, like I told my sister: "The best number is 1-2-3-4-5-6", to which she replied, "But that'll NEVER hit!". tw

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radio program - Los Angeles area only
by Robert Lau 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

today's topic on Which Way LA (KCRW 89.9FM, Los Angeles) was on phone, computer, etc. privacy, and how the government is doing everything it can to take it away from us. at least that's what the spots have said. presumably about clipper, FBI wiretap laws, etc. first broadcast was at 13:00 but i missed it, being rebroadcast at 19:00. i don't have a tape deck in my office, but i guess i could digitize it. sorry for all of you outside LA, which is probably 99.3598% of you... :) Robert Lau - Systems Programmer, Unix Systems 213-740-2866 -- University Computing Services Internet: rslau(a)usc.edu -- University of Southern California Bitnet: rslau@uscvm -- 1020 W Jefferson, LA, CA USA, 90089-0251 UUCP: ...!uunet!usc!rslau

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